The Market for Online Poker

Ingo Fiedler Ann-Christin Wilcke

Abstract The recent events of the Black Friday the biggest online poker networks in the USA were shut down demonstrated the necessity to make decisions about the regulation of online poker. But although online poker is a gold mine of data, until now nobody knows where the players and their money come from. It seems that the knowledge about the online poker market has not been able to keep up with the speed of its evolution in the past years. This paper is the first to shed light on this matter. We use data of 4,591,298 poker identities from the Online Poker Database of the University of Hamburg (OPD-UHH) collected over a six months period from 09/2009 to 03/2010. We find that the worldwide 6 million players paid 3.61 billion US$ rake to the operators in 2010. USA is still by far the biggest market with 1,429,943 active players and 973.3 million US$ net revenues in 2010. With regard to the number of internet users in a country, Hungary is the biggest relative market: One out of 50 Hungarians with internet access plays online poker for real money. The two main drivers of the relative market size in a country are GDP per capita and culture. Using the data from the OPD-UHH, future research will be able to break down the market also on a regional level within countries and to examine inter and intra country differences in the playing habits of online poker players. Keywords: online, poker, market, gambling, data, habits. Introduction Online gambling and online poker in particular is a relatively new phenomenon nearly nonexistent in 2003. During the past years it has grown extraordinarily so that it is now an important factor in the whole gambling market. However, even today it is often neglected by the old industry, the legislators and the researchers as an unwelcome black market just as if denying would cease its existence. But the economic reality is different. Online gambling has tremendous cost advantages due to electronic instead of brick and mortar operation and, even more important, its operators do not have to pay (high) taxes and license fees. In the case of poker, large player pools and the corresponding network effects have also helped the game to grow to a size not to be matched in the offline world. From an academic perspective, most research in the field of poker has focused on playing strategy (e.g. Chen & Ankenman, 2006) and especially the question whether poker is a game of skill or a game of chance (see e.g. Dreef et al. 2003, Cabot & Hannum 2005, Dedonno & Detterman 2008, or Turner 2008 and for an empirical point of view see Fiedler & Rock 2009). The answer to this question is especially important from a legal perspective as most jurisdictions legalize games of skill while they regulate games of chance. However, the skill/chance debate has not yet come to an end, and also skill does not seem to be the best criterion for the distinction between harmful and non-harmful games (Rock & Fiedler 2008). The recent events of the Black Friday the biggest online poker networks in the USA were shut down demonstrated the necessity to make decisions about the regulation of online poker. Should it be prohibited? If so, what are the best instruments to enforce a prohibition? Or should online poker be legalized like Italy and France have chosen lately? If so, what is the optimal tax and how could player protection be implemented? Before answering these questions it may be worthwhile to gather more information about the national markets as information about them is practically nonUNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1

Ingo Fiedler Research Associate Institute of Law & Economics University of Hamburg Ann-Christin Wilcke Research Associate Institute of Law & Economics University of Hamb

existent. We use data from the Online Poker Database of the University of Hamburg (OPDUHH), a database including information on the origin and playing habits of 4,591,298 poker identities over a six months period. Before describing the data in the OPD-UHH we analyze the worldwide online poker The recent events of the Black market and the market shares of the various poker operators. We then present the results about the size of the whole market and for Friday the biggest online the ten biggest markets in dollar terms. Afterwards we analyze poker networks in the USA were the prevalence of online poker in absolute terms in relation to the shut down demonstrated the internet users. We also identify the main drivers of the relative market size of a country. Both sections provide new and important necessity to make decisions about insights into the online gambling market especially for legislators. the regulation of online poker. We continue by highlighting the limitations of this study before we summarize the results and give an outlook on further research in the last section. Market Size and Market Shares by Operators With the exception of an analysis of poker marke ts in the European Union (Fiedler & Wilcke 2012) academic research on the prevalence and size of online poker markets thestill observation of the industry by PokerScout which tacks the players atby thePokerScout different operators at is missing. However, due to the observation of active the industry which tacks themoment active the players at the different operators at any given moment the market shares any given market shares of the operators are known. Table 1 shows the market shares for the of the operators are in known. Table shows the market shares theare nine biggest nine biggest poker sites 2008, 2009 and1 2010 (until August). The marketfor shares computed in poker sites in 2008, 2009 and 2010 (until August). The market shares are computed in relation relation to the monthly average players of the total market: 53,121 in 2008, 68,483 in 2009 and 71,441 in to the monthly average players of the total market: 53,121 in 2008, 68,483 in 2009 and 2010. Note that a player is not counted in this statistic unless he is playing at the moment of the scan by 71,441 in 2010. Note that a player is not counted in this statistic unless he is playing at PokerScout. The average number accounts for all differences in active players per daytime, week days the moment of the scan by PokerScout. The average number accounts for all differences and months. in active players per daytime, week days and months.
Table 1

Market shares in the online poker industry in 2008, 2009, and 2010
2008 Market share 30.53% 14.65% 9.82% 8.72% 2.35% 4.85% 1.84% 2.81% 2.18% 6.86% 15.39% 2009 Market share 36.05% 19.45% 8.40% 7.22% 3.40% 3.36% 2.71% 2.80% 2.45% 3.96% 10.20% 2010a Market share 40.96% 21.73% 5.77% 6.12% 3.03% 1.80% 2.66% 2.88% 1.97% 3.55% 9.53% Data recorded for OPD-UHH Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No

Site/Network Pokerstars Full Tilt Poker iPoker Network Party Poker Cereus Networkb Everest Poker Microgamingc IPN (Boss Media)d Cake Poker Network Ongame (bwin)e Other
a b

: 2010 includes only data from January to August. : Cereus merged with Ultimate Bet in 12/2008. c : Microgaming merged with Ladbrokes in 03/2009. d : IPN (Boss Media) merged with Cryptologic 04/2009. e : Ongame (bwin) merged with Betfair in 08/2010.

The online poker industry is dominated highly dominated by theproviders: two biggest providers: The online poker industry is highly by the two biggest Pokerstars and Full Tilt Pokerstars and Full Tilt Poker, and their importance has increased over the past years. Poker, and their importance has increased over the past years. In 2008 they had a combined market share In 2008 they had a combined market share of 45.18% while in 2010 they already of 45.18% while in 2010 they already accounted for nearly two thirds (62.69%) of the whole playing accounted for nearly two thirds (62.69%) of the whole playing volume in the market. volume in the market. the Correspondingly, the smaller operators lost significance and dwindled not only in Correspondingly, smaller operators lost significance and dwindled not only in relative

8 Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1 on smaller UNLV networks at any given moment, the number decreased to 26,655 in 2010.

relative size but also in absolute size. While in 2008 on the average 29,121 players were actively playing

size but also in absolute size. While in 2008 on the average 29,121 players were actively playing on smaller networks at any given moment, the number decreased to 26,655 in 2010. This development shows the power of positive network effects in the online poker market. The bigger the player pool, the more players are attracted to it just by its mere size. As a player, you will more likely find (weak) opponents on a large network for your favorite game type, betting structure and limit. This is even more true for players who play multiple tables at the same time (multitabling) and therefore generate significantly more traffic than players who only play at one table. Another important factor reason for the large and increasing market share of PokerStars is the price of the product in form of the rake structure, which is cheapest for the players at Pokerstars. But this only applies to the gross costs without considering rakeback or promotions which are used to set incentives for players to play more often and stick to one site. Rakeback andThis bonuses effectively reduce the costs for the players and are, hence, also an important development shows the power of positive network effects in the online poker market. The bigger factor which drives market shares. Other factors include the quality of the software, the player pool, the more players are attracted to it just by its mere size. As a player, you will more likely security, reputation, ease of deposits and withdrawals, and also interactions between find online (weak) opponents on a large network for your favorite game type, betting structure and limit. This is the site and offline casinos (e.g. satellites into live events like the Word Series of even more true for players who play multiple tables at the same time (multitabling) and therefore Poker). Knowing the market shares ofplayers the different operators, next step important is to look at the generate significantly more traffic than who only play at one the table. Another factor revenue which is generated in the market. The gambling consultant company H2GC reason for the large and increasing market share of PokerStars is the price of the product in form of the estimated the size of the online poker market in 2009 to be 2.4 billion US$ (H2GC rake structure, which is cheapest for the players at Pokerstars. But this only applies to the gross costs 2009). Another way to determine the revenues is to look at the revenues stated in without considering rakeback promotions which and are used to set incentives for players more financial reports of stock or listed companies extrapolate it in relation to to itsplay market often and stick to one site. Rakeback andreported bonuses effectively reduce the costs for the players and are, share. For example, PartyGaming to have earned together with its subsidiary PartyPoker, 196.7 million US$ net revenues in 2009 (Partygaming 2010). Extrapolated hence, also an important factor which drives market shares. Other factors include the quality of the with the 7.22% average market share of PartyPoker in 2009, the total market for online software, security, reputation, ease of deposits and withdrawals, and also interactions between the online poker was 2.7 billion US$, close to the estimate of H2GC. site and offline casinos (e.g. satellites into live events like the Word Series of Poker). But these figures are only estimates. They also do not answer where the money comes from and which the biggest national markets with the most players are. What Knowing the market shares of the different operators, the next step is to look at the revenue which is was the size of the US-market before the Black Friday? Was it still the largest market generated in the market. The gambling consultant company H2GC estimated the size of the online poker although the legislator tried to enforce a prohibition of online gambling with the market in 2009 to be 2.4 billion US$ (H2GC 2009). Another way tosince determine the revenues is to look at Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) 2006? These are questions the revenues financial reports ofOPD-UHH stock listed companies and extrapolate it in relation to its we address stated with in the data from the which we describe next. The Online Poker Database of the University of Hamburg (OPD-UHH) 196.7 million US$ net revenues in 2009 (Partygaming 2010).1 Extrapolated with the 7.22% average Online poker is a goldmine of data as all operators show in their lobby a lot of market share of PartyPoker in 2009, the total market for online poker was 2.7 billion US$, close to the information about the people playing at their tables. It is easy to observe the origin 2 estimate of H2GC. of a player (city or country ), the game type, betting structure and limit of the table they play at, and, of course, the date and time. Financed by the city of Hamburg, the But these figures are only estimates. They also do not answer where the money comes from and which Institute of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg collected these data in the biggest national markets with the mostmarket players are. What was the size of the before the collaboration with the independent spectator PokerScout in US-market the OPD-UHH. A software electronically gathered the data of the for the poker networks: Black Friday? Was it still the largest market although theplayers legislator tried tofollowing enforce a prohibition of online Pokerstars, Full Poker, Everest Poker, IPN (Boss Media) and Cake Poker. This the Tilt Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) since 2006? These are gambling3 with software scanned each cash game table of the mentioned poker sites and wrote the questions we address with the data from the OPD-UHH which we describe next. displayed information into a SQL database. The data collection was conducted for each poker site during a period of six months. It took about ten minutes to scan all tables of an operator and collect the information about the players sitting at the tables. This implies about 6 data points per hour or 25,920 in the course of six months and allows not only to determine the session lengths of the players but also to analyze differences in time. The main period of the data collection

1

market share. For example, PartyGaming reported to have earned together with its subsidiary PartyPoker,

The gross revenue was 250.9 million US$. 54.2 million US$ were paid in bonuses to the players (so called rakeback), meaning that the players got an average effective discount on the price of 21.6%. 2 Note that the extrapolation assumes that the revenues per player of PartyPoker are representative for the industry. 3 As the UIGEA applies to the definition of remote gambling in the Wire Act it does not necessarily include poker.

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The data collection was conducted for each poker site during a period of six months. It took about ten minutes to scan all tables of an operator and collect the information about the players sitting at the tables. This implies about 6 data points per hour or 25,920 in the course of six months and allows not only to determine the session lengths of the players but also to analyze differences in time. The main period of the data collection took place during September 2009 and March 2010. Table 2 depicts the exact starting

took place during September 2009 and March 2010. Table 2 depicts the exact starting and and ending points for each site. site. Note that the period of data collection had to be extended due to technical ending points for each Note that the period of data collection had to be extended due problems such as downs of the server, software updates andsoftware disconnections. to technical problems such as downs of the server, updates and disconnections.
Table 2 Starting and ending points of the data collection for each site Poker site PokerStars Full Tilt Poker Everest Poker IPN (Boss Media) Cake Poker Start 09/10/2009 09/06/2009 08/13/2009 07/27/2009 11/01/2009 End 03/11/2010 03/11/2010 03/11/2010 02/02/2010 07/02/2010

The Online Poker Database of the University of Hamburg (OPD-UHH) In the poker 6 months of the data collection we obtained data for a4,591,298 pokerabout identities Online is a goldmine of data as all operators show in their lobby lot of information the including country of origin and their playing habits. Regarding the market shares of In the 6 their months of the data collection we obtained data for 4,591,298 poker identities including their 4 people playing at their tables. It is easy to observe the origin of a player (city or country ), the game type, the observed poker sites these are 64.72% of all poker players worldwide (88.27% of the country of origin and their playing habits. Regarding the market shares of the observed poker sites these betting structure and limit of the table they play at, and, of course, the date and time. Financed by the city US-players and 57.4% of the players from all other countries) who were playing during of Hamburg, thethe Institute Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg these data inwe the period of data of collection. If this number is extrapolated tocollected the total market, collaboration with independent market spectator PokerScout Note in the OPD-UHH. A software get a number ofthe 7,094,095 different player identities. that one real person can have 4 multiple player identities if he opens accounts with more than one operator and many electronically gathered the data Everest of the players for IPN the following poker networks: Pokerstars, Full Tilt The poker sites Full Tilt Poker, Poker and (Boss Media) quote the country of origin while Poker Stars and Cake have Poker tried specifyout the city of origin of the poker player. site and therefore have multiple accounts.5 players more than one Poker, Everest Poker, IPN (Boss Media) and Cake Poker. This software scanned each cash game table of 5 Play money tables have not been taken into consideration. However, to be counted multiple times in the OPD-UHH he collection has to have played with these 6 6 For a more detailed regarding the technical approach of the a data see Sakai/Haruyoshi 2005. the mentioned pokerdescription sites and wrote the displayed information into SQL database. accounts actively during the data collection period. This may be true for three groups of players: 1) High volume players (professional and addicted gamblers), 2) Players on the 5 The data collection was conducted for each poker site during a period of six months. It took about ten high limits as they may need more than one site to find opponents and 3) People trying minutes to scan all tables of an operator and collect the information about the players sitting at the tables. out different sites to see which one suits them best. The high volume players have a huge This implies about data points hour or 25,920 the course of six months andget allows not only to incentive to play6at just oneper network as the in bonuses/rebates they can increase with determine the session lengths of the on players but also to analyze differences in time. The main period their playing volume. Players high limits are quite rare (which is the reason whyof they may have to switch to find enough competition). reveals that example the data collection took sites place during September 2009 and March The 2010.data Table 2 depicts the for exact starting only 0.36% of the No Limit Holdem on high stakes table 11 in and ending points for each site. Note that theplayers period ofare data collection had to (see be extended due tothe technical appendix). We therefore reason that most people with multiple player identities in our problems such as downs of the server, software updates and disconnections. sample come from the third group. We estimate that for 100 player identities about 85 real players exist. This results in 6,029,980 people with a 6-months prevalence rate of Table 2 participating in online poker cash games for real money.
Results: Market Sizes, Prevalence, and Drivers of Online Poker The data in the OPD-UHH allows us to specify how many players in each country in Poker site play online poker for real money Start End the world and how much rake they paid to the operators PokerStars 09/10/2009 03/11/2010 while playing. Using these data we determined the market sizes of the different countries Full Tilt Poker 09/06/2009 in dollar terms and also the absolute and relative prevalence of online03/11/2010 poker in a country.
Everest Poker IPN (Boss Media) Market Sizes Cake Poker Starting and ending points of the data collection for each site

The OPD-UHH covers how often and how long a poker player played and if he played multiple tables at the same time. We linked this information to data about the average rake per player, hour, and table for the different poker variants and In the US$ 6 months ofpaid the data collection we obtained data for 4,591,298 poker identities including their stakes. This allowed us to determine how much US$ rake a player paid to the operator country of origin and their playing habits. Regarding the market shares of the observed poker sites these over the course of 6 months. As we also obtained the origin of the players, we could aggregate the rake paid for all observed players of each country. We then extrapolated

4 5

08/13/2009 07/27/2009 11/01/2009

03/11/2010 02/02/2010 07/02/2010

The poker sites Full Tilt Poker, Everest Poker and IPN (Boss Media) quote the country of origin while Poker Stars and Cake Poker specify the city of origin of the player. Play money tables have not been taken into consideration. 6 For a more detailed description regarding the technical approach of the data collection see Sakai/Haruyoshi 2005.

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this data to the whole market of each country by considering the market share of the observed operators in each country (88.4% in the USA, 57.4% in all other countries, resulting in 64.72% of the whole market). Multiplied by 2 we got the market size for online poker cash games for each country in 2010. Given that the operators earn about 70% of their revenues with cash games and 30% with tournaments we further extrapolated the market size to include the tournament revenues. The resulting gross market size is the rake paid by all online poker players in a given country. This is not identical with the players net losses: 1) Players get about 25-30% of Despite the prohibition of online their rake back in form of rakeback deals or bonuses and 2) players can win and lose money from other players, a cash flow we did not gambling and the introduction observe. To obtain the net losses, it is only necessary to account for of the Unlawful Internet the former point, which can be easily done be deducting 30% of the Gambling Enforcement Act gross market size. The latter point does not matter much for whole countries, because cash flows between the players converge to zero if (UIGEA) in 2006 the US was The OPD-UHH covers how often andplayer how long a poker player (without played andrake, if he played tables the observed pool are large pokermultiple is a zero sum at the same time. We linked this information to data about the average US$ rake paid per player, hour, game). still by far the biggest market 10 Table 3 shows the ten biggest poker the world in dollar This allowed us to markets determinein how much US$ rake a and table for2010. the different poker variants and stakes. with 973.3 million US$ in terms of their gross market size and their share of the total market. player paid to the operator over the course of 6 months. As we also obtained the origin of the players, we Despite the prohibition of online gambling and the introduction of could aggregate the rake paid for all observed players of each country. We then extrapolated this data to the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) in 2006 the US was still by the whole market of each country by considering the market share of the observed operators in each far the biggest market with 973.3 million US$ in 2010. After the Black Friday, when the country (88.4% in the USA, 57.4% in all other Absolute countries, resulting in 64.72% of theBet whole market). US sites of Pokerstars, Full Tilt Poker Poker and Ultimate were shut down, 11 the US market has dropped dramatically. The games remaining operators Cake Poker Given that Multiplied by 2 wesize got the market size for online poker cash for each country inlike 2010. 12 10% before or Bodog Poker which still accept US-players had a market share of less that the operators earn about 70% of their revenues with cash games and 30% with tournaments we further the Black Friday. It will be interesting to see if these operators now rise and which level extrapolated the market size to include the tournament revenues.13 The resulting gross market size is the the US market will settle on. rake paid by all online poker players in a given country. This is not identical with the players net losses: The second largest market is Germany with a market size of 392 million US$. Other 14 and 2) players can 1) Players get about 25-30% of their rake back in and formGreat of rakeback deals or bonusesthe big markets are France, Russia, Canada Britain. Although French market win and loselook money from other players, a cash flow was we did not observe. To obtain the net losses, it is only may now different after online poker legalized, license, taxed, and insulated online poker was legalized, license, taxed, and insulated from the other markets in 2010. In total, the from the other markets in 2010. In total, the players paid 3.6 billion US$ rake to necessary to account for the former point, which can be easily done be deducting 30% of the grossthe market players paid 3.6 billion US$ rake to the operators in 2010 or 599 US$ per player. operators in point 2010 or 599 US$ per player. size. The latter does not matter much for whole countries, because cash flows between the players
converge Table 3 to zero if the observed player pool are large (without rake, poker is a zero sum game). Table 3 shows the ten biggest poker markets in the world in dollar terms of their gross market size and Number of active online poker players, market share and market size per country their share of the total market. Despite the prohibition of online gambling and the introduction of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) in 2006 the US was still by far the biggest Gross Market size 2010
Rank Country in mil. US$ per year Share market with 973.3 million US$ in 2010. After theSize Black Friday, when the US sites of Pokerstars, Full Tilt 1 USA 973.30 Poker Absolute Poker and Ultimate Bet were shut down, the US market size has dropped dramatically.

26.95% 10.85% 2 Germany 391.94 The remaining operatorsRussia like Cake Poker or Bodog Poker235.12 which still accept US-players had a market 6.51% 3 6.08% 4 Canada 219.63 share of less that 10% before the Black Friday. It will be interesting to see if these operators now rise and 5.19% 5 France 187.35 which level the US market will settle on. 4.42% 6 Great Britain 159.72 4.23% 7 Netherlands 152.80 The of 392 million US$. Other big markets are 3.24% 8 second largest market Spain is Germany with a market size 117.07 2.75% 9Russia, Canada Sweden 99.25 market may now look different after France, and Great Britain. Although the French 2.24% 10 Finland 80.93 100% Total 3,611.59

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market grew a little in this time, but we neglected this and conservatively decided that it did not so we can give a number for the year Besides thewhole market size2010. the prevalence of online poker is a key figure for describing the market for 12 According to PokerScout, the revenue of a poker site approximately consists of 70% cash games and 30% poker online poker in a country. Prevalence can be measured in absolute terms (how many people play poker in tournaments. 13 assumes that the share of(how revenues of the operators is 70% in every a This country) and in relative terms many people play poker in relation to,country. for example, the population). 14 The exact amount differs from operator to operator and also depends on the playing volume of the player. The higher the playing volume, the higher the rakeback. We derived the number of poker players in a country as follows: First, we used the country data 15 for

Prevalence of from Online Poker Our data were 09/09 to 03/10, but we assumed that these data are representative for 2010. Probably the

For a more detailed description of this procedure, see main report of the research project: Fiedler/Wilcke, 2011.

extrapolated the number by the market share of the observed sites during the data collection period. In a
last step we calculated the number of active players by assuming that per 100 player identities 85 real persons exist (see reasoning above). The market shares are derived from the players in a country in relation to the total number of players.

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Prevalence of Online Poker Besides the market size the prevalence of online poker is a key figure for describing the market for online poker in a country. Prevalence can be measured in absolute terms (how many people play poker in a country) and in relative . . . there is a huge growth terms (how many people play poker in relation to, for example, the potential of the US market population). We derived the number of poker players in a country as follows: First, should online poker be we used the country data for the observed player identities and added legalized. the non identifiable identities proportionally. Then, we extrapolated the number by the market share of the observed sites during the data collection period. In a last step we calculated the number of active players by assuming that per 100 player identities 85 real persons exist (see reasoning above). The market shares are derived from the players in a country in relation to the total number of players. Table 4 lists the number license, of active poker players for the tenthe countriesmarkets with the most online poker online poker legalized, and insulated from in 2010. In total, Table 4 was lists the number oftaxed, active poker players for other the ten countries with the the most players and their share of all players in the world. Concerning the market size the USA is by far the players paid 3.6players billion US$ rake to the operators 2010 or in 599 US$ per player. online poker and their share of allin players the world. Concerning the market biggest market. people played online poker formillion real money during our data size the USA More is bythan far 1.4 themillion biggest market. More than 1.4 people played online Table 3 poker forperiod real money during ourNearly data collection fromis 09/09 to 03/10. Nearly collection from 09/09 to 03/10. every fourthperiod poker player an American (23.71%). On the every fourth poker player is an American (23.71%). On the second place is the German second place is the German market with 581 thousand players, or 9.64% of all players worldwide. On the market with 581 thousand players, or 9.64% of all players worldwide. On the next ranks Number of active online poker players, market size per country next ranks follow France (445,860 players, market 7.39%), share Russiaand (401,701 players, 6.66%) and Canada follow France (445,860 players, 7.39%), Russia (401,701 players, 6.66%) and Canada (401,701 players, 5.74%). Together, the ten countries with the highest number of poker players account (401,701 players, 5.74%). Together, the ten countries with the highest number of poker Gross Market size 2010 for 73.92% of all players worldwide. players account for 73.92% Rank Country of all players worldwide.
Size in mil. US$ per year Table 1 4 USA 973.30 2 Germany 391.94 3 Russia 10 countries with the highest number of active poker players 235.12 4 Canada 219.63 5 France 187.35 Rank Country Active players 6 Great Britain 159.72 71 Netherlands 152.80 USA 1,429,943 82 Spain 117.07 Germany 581,350 93 Sweden 99.25 France 445,860 10 Finland 80.93 4 Russia 401,701 Total 3,611.59 5 Canada 345,971 Share 26.95% 10.85% 6.51% 6.08% 5.19% 4.42% Share 4.23% 23.71% 3.24% 9.64% 2.75% 7.39% 2.24% 6.66% 100% 5.74%

4.47% 6 Great Britain 269,247 4.20% 7 Spain 253,043 Prevalence of Online Poker 3.98% 8 Netherlands 239,700 2.55% 9 Brazil 153,889 Besides the market size the prevalence of online poker is a key figure for describing the market for 2.15% 10 Australia 129,714 online poker in a country. Prevalence can be measured in absolute terms (how many people26.06% play poker in Other 1,571,389 100% TOTAL 5,490,908 a country) and in relative terms (how many people play poker in relation to, for example, the population).
15 We derived the number of poker in a country as follows: First, we used the country dataof for The absolute prevalence of players online poker disregards the information the size a The absolute prevalence of online poker disregards the information of the size of aof country. To know 16 Then, we the observed player identities and added the non identifiable identities proportionally. country. To know how large the proportion of online poker players is in a given country, how large the proportion of online poker players is in a given country, the number of players has to be the number ofnumber players to be related population of the But period. as not In a extrapolated the byhas the market share of to thethe observed sites during the country. data collection related to the population of the country. But as not everybody has access to the internet, it is more everybody has access to the internet, it is more meaningful to relate the number the last step we calculated the number of active players by assuming that per 100 player identities 85to real meaningful relate the number number of internet users in a country. Table of 5 depicts the number ofto internet users in to a the country. Table 5 depicts the proportion online poker persons exist (see reasoning above). The market shares are derived from the players in a country in proportion poker players in a country per internet 0.307% 326) ofworldwide all people players inof aonline country per internet users. 0.307% (1users. out of 326) (1 ofout allof people relation to the total number of players. with internet access have played online poker for real money during the 6 months worldwide with internet access have played online poker for real money during the 6 months of the of data collection. Accounting for the information of the internet users in a country changes the ranking of the
15 For the players on Pokerstars and Cake Poker we obtained the city of origin. We used the city data base World countries. Among theto countries with more to than 100,000 internet users the proportion of online poker Cities from MaxMind assign these players countries. 16 For 11.38% of all observed player identities we could not determine their country of origin. Adding them players is highest for Hungary with 1.983%. One out of 50 Hungarians with internet access plays online proportionally to the observed player identities of each country implies that they are equally distributed among all countries. may not For be true people from countries with stricter laws against onlinein gambling a higher poker for This real money. the as USA, it is striking that it is by far the biggest market absolutehave terms, but incentive to hide their identity.

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the data collection. Accounting for the information of the internet users in a country changes the ranking of the countries. Among the countries with more than 100,000 th internet users the proportion of online poker players is highest for with 1.983%. rank only 36 considering the number of internet users in a country. 0.596% of Hungary all American internet th Hungarians with internet access plays online poker for real money. For One out of36 50 rank only considering the number of internet users in a country. 0.596% of all American internet users (1 out of 168) are online poker players. On the one hand that means that the restrictions of the theusers USA, it is that poker it is by far the biggest market in absolute terms, but rank (1 out of striking 168) are online players. On the one hand that means that the restrictions of the th UIGEA were effective to the some extent before the Black Friday. On of the other handof that means that rank only 36considering considering number ofeven internet users in users a country. 0.596% all American internet only 36th the number of internet in a country. 0.596% all American th UIGEA were effective to some extent before the Friday. On the hand that means that rank only 36 considering the number of even internet users inBlack a country. 0.596% ofother all American internet there huge growth potential ofare the US market should online poker be one legalized. usersis (1aout of 168) online poker players. On the one hand that means that the restrictions of means the internet users (1are out of 168) online poker players. On the hand that that the there a of huge growth potential ofplayers. the US market online poker be legalized. users (1 is out 168) are online poker On the should one hand that means that the restrictions of the restrictions of the UIGEA were effective toBlack some extent before themeans Black Friday. On UIGEA were effective to some extent even before the Friday. On even the other hand that that UIGEA were effective to some extent even before the Black Friday. potential On the other hand means that should Table 5a the other hand that means that there is ashould huge growth of thethat US market there is huge growth potential of the US market online poker be legalized. Table 5 there is a huge growth potential of the US market should online poker be legalized. online poker be legalized.
Table 5 10 countries with the highest proportion pokerplayers players per internet users (only countries 10 countries with the highest proportion of of online online poker per internet users (only countries withwith Table 5 10 countries with the highest proportion of online poker players per internet users (only countries with more than 100,000 internet users) in 2010 rank only 36thCountry considering the number of players internet users in Internet a country. 0.596% of all American internet Rank Country Active user Players/internet useruser Rank Active Internet user Players/internet more than 100,000 internet users) in 2010 players Hungary 122,482On the one hand 6,176,400 1.983% users (1 out of 168) are online poker players. that means that the restrictions of the 1 1 Hungary 122,482 6,176,400 1.983% Rank Active players Internet user Players/internet user Estonia 19,212 969,700 1.981% 2 2 were Country Estonia 19,212 969,700 1.981% UIGEA effective to some extent even before the Black Friday. other hand that means that Rank Country Active players Internet user On the Players/internet user 1 3 Hungary 122,482 6,176,400 1.983% Portugal 100,075 5,168,800 1.936% 3 Portugal 100,075 5,168,800 1.936% 1 is Hungary 122,482 6,176,400 1.983% there growth potential of the US market should online poker be legalized. 4 a huge 2 Denmark 90,532 4,750,500 1.906% Estonia 19,212 969,700 1.981% 4 Denmark 90,532 4,750,500 1.906% 2 5 Estonia 19,212 969,700 1.981% 3 Iceland 4,996 301,600 1.657% Portugal 100,075 5,168,800 1.936% 5 Iceland 4,996 301,600 1.657% 3 Portugal 100,075 5,168,800 1.936% 4 6 Netherlands 239,700 14,872,200 1.612% Denmark 90,532 4,750,500 1.906% Table 5 6 Netherlands 239,700 14,872,200 1.612% 4 7 Denmark 90,532 4,750,500 1.906% 5 Finland 71,543 4,480,900 1.597% Iceland 4,996 301,600 1.657% 7 Finland 71,543 4,480,900 1.597% 5 Iceland 4,996 301,600 1.657% 6 8 Netherlands 239,700 14,872,200 1.612% Cyprus 6,445 433,800 1.486% 108 countries with the highest proportion of online poker 14,872,200 players per internet users1.597% (only countries with 6 Netherlands 239,700 1.612% Cyprus 6,445 433,800 1.486% 9 7 Norway 64,535 4,431,100 1.456% Finland 71,543 4,480,900 7 Finland 71,543 4,480,900 1.597% 9 Norway 64,535 4,431,100 1.456% 8 10 Slovenia 18.899 1,298,500 1.455% Cyprus 6,445 433,800 1.486% more internet users) in6,445 2010 8 than 100,000 Cyprus 433,800 1.486% 10 9 Slovenia 18.899 1,298,500 1.455% Norway 64,535 4,431,100 1.456% 9 36 Norway 64,535 4,431,100 1.456% 10 USA 1,429,943 239,893,600 0.596% Slovenia 18.899 1,298,500 1.455% 10 Slovenia 18.899 1,298,500 1.455% user 36 Rank Country Active players Internet Players/internet USA 1,429,943 239,893,600 0.596% user 36 TOTAL 6,029,930 1,965,162,316 0.307% USA 1,429,943 239,893,600 0.596% 1 Hungary 122,482 6,176,400 1.983% 36 internet user: USA 239,893,600 0.596% Source Internet World Stats,1,429,943 for June 2010. TOTAL 6,029,930 1,965,162,316 0.307% 2 Estonia 19,212 969,700 1.981% TOTAL 6,029,930 1,965,162,316 0.307% Source3internet user: Internet World Stats, for June 2010. Portugal 100,075 5,168,800 1.936% Drivers ofTOTAL the prevalence of6,029,930 Online 1,965,162,316 0.307% Source internet user: Internet World Stats, for June 2010. Poker

more than 100,000 internet users) than 100,000 internet users)in in2010 2010 10 more countries with the highest proportion of online poker players per internet users (only countries with

Drivers of the prevalence of Online Poker 5 To understand Iceland 4,996 301,600 Drivers of prevalence Online Poker Drivers of the the prevalence Online Poker the drivers of ofof the market for online poker, it is most useful to analyze the 1.657% relative size Drivers of the prevalence of Online Poker 6 Netherlands 239,700 14,872,200 1.612% To understand the drivers of the market for online poker, it is most useful toon analyze of the markets because the absolute numbers mostly depend on the size of a country. We focused the size To thedrivers drivers of the market online poker, is most useful to analyze the relative 7 understand Finland 71,543 4,480,900 1.597% To understand the of the market forfor online poker, it is it most useful to analyze the relative size therelative relative size of the markets because the absolute numbers mostly depend on the size prevalence of online poker and identified that the two main drivers for this number are GDP per To understand the drivers of the market for online poker, it ison most useful to a analyze theWe relative size on the 8markets Cyprus 6,445 433,800 1.486% of because theabsolute absolute numbers mostly depend the size of country. focused ofthe the markets because the mostly depend on the size of a country. We focused on the that of a country. We focused on numbers the relative prevalence of online poker and identified 9 markets capita and culture. Athe simple regression model with the proportion of of poker playersWe perfocused internet users Norway 64,535 4,431,100 1.456% of the because absolute numbers mostly depend on the size a country. on the per relative prevalence ofonline online poker and identified that two main drivers for thisA number areper GDP per the two main Slovenia drivers for thisand number are GDP per capita and simple regression relative of poker identified that the the two main drivers forculture. this number are GDP 10 prevalence 18.899 1,298,500 1.455% country and its GDP per capita yielded a significant influence: If the GDP per capita rises by 1,000 US$, relative prevalence of online poker and identified that the two main drivers for this number are GDP per model with the proportion of poker players per internet users per country and its GDP capita A simple regression model with proportion of poker players per internet users per capita and and culture. culture. A simple regression model the the proportion of poker players per internet users with per 17 the proportion of online poker players increases by 0.009 percentage points (t=5.786, p<.001). capita and culture. A simple regression influence: model with the proportion of poker players per internet usersUS$, per per capita yielded a significant If the GDP per capita rises by 1,000 36 and USA 0.596% country and its GDP per yielded a1,429,943 significant influence: If 239,893,600 the per capita rises by 1,000 country GDP percapita capita yielded a significant influence: IfGDP the GDP per capita rises by US$, 1,000 US$, country and its GDP per capitapoker yielded players a significant influence: If the GDP per capita rises by 1,000 the proportion of online increases by 0.009 points 17 (t=5.786, by percentage US$, theproportion proportion of players increases 0.009 percentage points (t=5.786, p<.001). Table 6 the of online onlinepoker poker players increases by 0.009 percentage points (t=5.786, p<.001).17 p<.001). 6,029,930 1,965,162,316 0.307% the proportion ofTOTAL online poker players increases by 0.009 percentage points (t=5.786, p<.001).17
Table 6 Table 6 of a simple linear regression Table 6 Results regarding the influence of GDP per capita on the relative 17 Drivers of the of Online Poker See of appendix forprevalence the operationalization of the simple linear regression. Results a simple linear regression regarding the influence of GDP per capita on the relative poker prevalence of online 10 17 appendix understand for the the operationalization poker drivers of theof See the simple regression. To market for linear online poker, it is most useful to analyze the relative size prevalence of online 17 17
Source internet user: Internet World Stats, for June 2010.

4 internet user: Denmark Source Internet World Stats, for June 90,532 2010.

4,750,500

1.906%

of the markets because the absolute numbers mostly depend on the size of a country. We focused 10 on the Sample (n=161) 10 10 relative prevalence of online poker and identified that the two main drivers for this number are GDP per Sample (n=161) Regression capita and culture. A simple regression model with the proportion of poker players per internet users per Variable t-value Significance coefficient Regression Variable t-value Significance coefficient country and its GDP per capita yielded a significant influence: If the GDP per capita rises by 1,000 US$,

See for the theoperationalization operationalization simple linear regression. Seeappendix appendix for of of thethe simple linear regression.

poker players per internet users in a country. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a F-Value of of 14.114 (p<.001) confirmed that there are significant differences in the mean-values of each cultural group 14.114 (p<.001) there are differences in the mean-values of =12.753, each cultural group (see table 7). Weconfirmed controlledthat the effect for significant GDP per capita by using it as a covariate (F p<.001).

Constant .192 4.123 .000 the proportion of online poker players increases by 0.009 percentage points (t=5.786, p<.001).17 GDP per capita in Constant .192 4.123 .000 1000 .009 5.786 .000 GDP US$ per capita in Table 6 1000 US$ .009 5.786 .000 Goodness of fit R = .177; adjusted R = .171; F-value= 33.477 (p<.000) Goodness of fit R = .177; adjusted R = .171; F-value= 33.477 (p<.000) 17 18 See appendix for the operationalization of thethat simple regression. We were also able to find evidence thelinear culture has a significant influence on the proportion 18 We were also able to find evidence that the culture has a significant influence the 1 proportion 13 UNLV Research & Review Journal Volume 16 on Issue of poker players per internet users Gaming in a country. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a F-Value of 10

(see 7). We controlled the effect for GDPof per capita by using it as the a covariate =12.753, p<.001). GDPtable per capita and culture explain R=50.4% the variation between relative (F poker prevalence in

Constant GDP per capita in 1000 US$ Goodness of fit

.192 .009

4.123 5.786

.000 .000

R = .177; adjusted R = .171; F-value= 33.477 (p<.000)

18

were also able to to find that the culture has a has significant influenceinfluence on the proportion WeWe were also able findevidence evidence that the culture a significant on of poker players per users in aper country. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a F-Value of the proportion of internet poker players internet users in a country. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a F-Value of 14.114 (p<.001) confirmed that there are significant 14.114 (p<.001) confirmed that there are significant differences in the mean-values of each cultural group differences in the mean-values of each cultural group (see table 7). We controlled the (see table 7). We controlled the effect for GDP per capita by using it as a covariate (F =12.753, p<.001). effect for GDP per capita by using it as a covariate (F =12.753, p<.001). GDP per capita GDP per capita and culture explain R=50.4% of the variation between the relative poker prevalence in and culture explain R=50.4% of the variation between the relative poker prevalence in the countries. the countries. Table 7 Results of the ANOVA regarding the influence of culture on the relative prevalence of online poker Sample (n=161) Sum of Results of a simple linear regression GDP per capita on Squares regarding dfthe influence Meanof Square F the relative Sig. prevalence of online poker Between Groups 17.974 8 2.247 Constant 2.136 1 2.136 GDP per capita 1.483 1 1.483 Sample (n=161) Cultural group 11.512 Regression 7 1.645 Within Groups 17.673 coefficient 152 .116 Variable t-value TOTAL 35.647 161 Constant GDP Fit of per the capita modelin 1000 US$ .192 4.123 R = .504; adjusted R = .478 .009 5.786 19.324 18.375 12.753 14.114 .000 .000 .000 .000

Significance .000 .000

The results imply that online poker is only a factor in western and orthodox is only a factor in western and orthodox countries. With the The results of fit imply that online poker R = Goodness .177; adjusted Rfrom = .171; F-value= 33.477 (p<.000) countries. With the exception of the countries Latin America, markets in all 18 We operationalized culture according to the classification of Huntington 1996:the 1=Western, exception of the countries from Latin America, the markets in all other countries are negligible2=Orthodox, (see table other countries are (see table7=Hindu, 8). That can either mean see that these markets have 3=Islamic, 4=African, 5= negligible Latin American, 6=Sinic, 8=Buddhist, 0=Others; appendix. 8). That can either mean that these markets have an enormous potential or that people of these 18 growth an enormous growth potential or that people of these groups are not interested We were also able to find evidence that the culture has cultural a significant influence on the proportion 11 cultural groups are not interested in online poker at all. The directions of these results could be confirmed in online poker at all. The directions of these results could be confirmed in a Turkey-test poker players per internet users in a country. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a F-Value of of which compares the mean values (for detailed information see see table 12 in in a Turkey-test which compares the mean values (for detailed information table 12 inthe the appendix). appendix).
14.114 (p<.001) confirmed that there are significant differences in the mean-values of each cultural group (see table 7). We controlled the effect for GDP per capita by using it as a covariate (F =12.753, p<.001). Table 8 GDP per capita and culture explain R=50.4% of the variation between the relative poker prevalence in the countries. Descriptive statistics of the ANOVA regarding the influence of culture on the relative prevalence of online7 poker Table Sample (n=161) Results of the ANOVA regarding the influence of culture on the relative prevalence of online poker 95%-confidence interval Sample (n=161) Lower Upper Standard Standard of Culture N Mean Sum bound bound deviation error Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Western 47 .638 .452 .040 .558 .718 OrthodoxGroups 13 .450 17.974 .326 .348 .651 19.324 Between 8 .077 2.247 .000 Islamic 41 .076 .108 .043 -.009 .161 Constant 2.136 1 2.136 18.375 .000 African 23 .079 .059 .058 -.035 .193 GDP per capita 1.483 1 1.483 12.753 .000 Latin Cultural group 7 .062 1.645 .000 American 20 .185 11.512 .100 .063 .308 14.114 Sinic Groups 6 .019 17.673 .018 .113 -.204 .242 Within 152 .116 Hindu 5 .112 35.647 .196 .124 -.132 .356 TOTAL 161 Buddhist 6 .128 .157 .113 -.095 .351 Fit of the model TOTAL 161 .289 .369 R = .504; adjusted R = .478

An analysis of the influence of the law on the prevalence on online poker yielded no significant
18

We operationalized culture according to the classification of Huntington 1996: 1=Western, 2=Orthodox, 3=Islamic, 4=African, 5= the Latin American, 6=Sinic, 7=Hindu, 8=Buddhist, 0=Others; see appendix. results. But as law and enforcement of law are hard to quantify this result may not be taken for full

value. In our eyes Gaming it mainly Research says that law which prohibits poker was not enforced at the time of the 14 11 UNLV & Review Journalonline Volume 16 Issue 1 data collection.

Limitations

An analysis of the influence of the law on the prevalence on online poker yielded no significant results. But as law and the enforcement of law are hard to quantify this result may not be taken for full value. In our eyes it mainly says that law which prohibits online poker was not enforced at the time of the data collection. Limitations Although the study yields many findings there are some limitations. First, we only collected data about cash games, poker tournaments have not been taken into consideration. As mentioned in footnote 12 the revenue of a poker site approximately consists of 70% cash games and 30% poker tournaments. The market size calculations of this study assume that this relation is identical for every operator, which might not be true as the tournaments require a larger player pool and the smaller poker networks probably earn a lesser percentage with them. The OPD-UHH also excludes pure tournament players and, hence, the numbers of poker players in the different countries we derived in The calculations of thistrue study assume that this relation is identical for every operator, which thismarket studysize underestimate the value. However, it is reasonable that there are just a very might not be true as the tournaments require a larger player pool andnot the smaller poker networks few players playing only tournaments and whom we do have any data on. probably the datawith on the origin is self reported by the players. It isplayers therefore earn Second, a lesser percentage them. The OPD-UHH also excludes pure tournament and, possible hence, the that not all players stated their correct country. But as withdrawing funds is only numbers of poker players in the different countries we derived in this study underestimate the true possible value. if the correct personal data are submitted, we reason that the cases of wrong information However, it is reasonable that there are just a very few players playing only tournaments and whom we do are rare. not have any data on. Third, as PokerStars and Cake Poker do not give information about the country of a player but only of their city. To assign the players to countries we used the city database Second, the data on the origin is self reported by the players. It is therefore possible that not all players World Cities by Maxmind. In doing so we faced two general challenges: 1) Many city stated their correct country. But as withdrawing funds is only possible if the correct personal data are names in the world exist multiple times. 2) The city data base only lists cities having a submitted, weof reason that the cases of wrong information are rare. population at least 50,000. To solve these issues we developed an algorithm to assign player identities to countries by taking the size of the cities into consideration. In the end, PokerStars and Cake Poker do not give information about the country of a player but only of weThird, wereas able to successfully assign 92% of the poker players stating a city of origin to their city. To assign the players toremained countries we city database World Cities by Maxmind.19 In their country of origin. 8% asused not the assignable. Finally, we faced the problem that one player can have more than one poker doing so we faced two general challenges: 1) Many city names in the world exist multiple times. identity 2) The by registering at multiple sites. It may also be possible that more than one person use the city data base only lists cities having a population of at least 50,000. To solve these issues we developed same player identity (for example family members). Considering different qualitative an algorithm to assign player identities to countries by taking the size of the cities into consideration. In arguments (see footnote 8), we estimate that for 100 poker identities 85 real persons the end, we were able to successfully assign 92% of the poker players stating a city of origin to their exist. We admit this number is not an exact empirical value but an estimation and country of origin. remained as interpretation. not assignable. therefore open 8% to subjective
multiple It may also market be possible that more rapidly than one person the same player identity (for example Thesites. online poker has grown in the use past years. But until now there family members). qualitative arguments footnote 8),knew we estimate that for 100 have only beenConsidering estimates different about the total market size(see and nobody how where the

Summary and Perspectives

Finally, we faced the problem that one player can have more than one poker identity by registering at

where the proportion of people gambling online on poker games in relation to the internet users estimation and therefore open to subjective interpretation. is highest. We were first to answer these questions by using data from the Online Poker Database of the University of Hamburg (OPD-UHH) which includes information about approximately 4.6 million online poker players and their countries of origin. Summary and Perspectives This study is able to shed light on the online poker market. It is the first time that The online poker market has grown rapidly in the past years. But until now there have only been the market can be broken down to countries which provides important insights for local estimates about the total market sizewant and nobody knew how where the players their gambling. money comeWe legislators who, for example, to evaluate their regulation ofand online from, whichan countries are the markets, of and where the proportion of the people gambling online first gave overview ofbiggest the structure the online poker and market shares ofon the different poker sitesto in the yearsusers 2008-2010. described the data in the OPDpoker games in relation the internet is highest.We We then were first to answer these questions by using UHH and the methodology of gathering it. We able to identify 4,591,298 poker data from the Online Poker Database of the University ofwere Hamburg (OPD-UHH) which includes identities and extrapolated this number to 6,029,980 different players who paid 3.6 information about approximately 4.6 million online poker players and their countries of origin. billion US$ rake to the operators in 2010 (on average 599 US$ per player). Hence, online poker has evolved to become a huge market. This is especially true for western and

19

players and their money come which countries are biggest markets, and poker identities 85 real persons exist. from, We admit this number is not an the exact empirical value but an

For further information about this database see: http://www.maxmind.com/app/worldcities.

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1

15 13

orthodox countries where most of the business takes place even when controlling for GDP per capita. We also assigned the observed poker identities to their country of origin and derived the market size of the most important poker countries: Even though the USA had been the biggest market with 1.4 million players paying 973 million US$ rake in 2010 (before Black Friday), there are 35 countries with a higher prevalence of online poker in relation to the number of internet users in that country. For example, Hungary has the highest proportion of online poker players in relation to the number of internet users (1.98%). The relatively low prevalence of players in the USA could be seen as evidence that the regulation of online poker and the UIGEA deterred at least some of the potential players even before Black Friday. On the other hand But the most important cause this comparison with the prevalence of online poker in other countries for a regulated market being means that there is a lot of potential in the American online poker market. However, these numbers are mostly generated from totally free a smaller market is a fenced (black) markets. However, a regulated market will probably not yield market, which excludes nonthe full potential of the market. One reason is taxes, which increase the residents from the player pool rake, make the product more expensive, and lead to reduced demand. Another reason might be player protection which helps addicted (e.g. Italy or France). gamblers to stay away from the game as addicts tend to play longer sessions, more often and more intensely than non-addicts (e.g. see Productivity Commission 2010) and, hence, are an important source of revenue (Williams & Wood 2004). But the most important cause for a regulated market being a smaller market is a fenced market, which excludes non-residents from the player pool (e.g. Italy or France). This sharply reduces the player pools and, hence, the positive network effects of large player pools where it is possible to find enough people to play with for every game type, every limit and at any daytime. The results presented in this paper did not include information on the market after the Black Friday when the most important poker operators in the USA were shut down. Further research has to determine the effects of this event and clarify if the players from the USA stopped playing, switched to other operators still accepting US players, or even avoid the country identification and log in to Pokerstars or Full Tilt Poker with a proxyIP and deposit with an international credit card. This study only scratches on the surface of the possibilities the detailed data in the ODP-UHH allow. It is possible not only to break down the market on a national level but also to regions within countries. Future studies will also be able to analyze the playing habits and to determine for example the session lengths and the playing frequency of a player and which limits and how many tables the player plays simultaneously. This information can then be used for further analyses regarding inter and intra country differences. By conducting time series analyses it is also be possible to identify how many players tend to play more often and more intensively over time and how many decrease the intensity of play and what kind of factors may give a hint at which group a player belongs to. This may not only be interesting for the industry but also from the viewpoint of excessive and compulsive gambling.

16

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1

play more often and more intensively over time and how many decrease the intensity of play and what kind of factors may give a hint at which group a player belongs to. This may not only be interesting for the industry but also from the viewpoint of excessive and compulsive gambling.

Measurement Appendix
Table 9

Measurement Appendix

Operationalization of s variables of the simple linear regression regarding relative market size and GDP per capita Variable GDP per Capita Description independent variable in thousand US-Dollar dependent variable proportion of poker players in a country per internet users in percentage

Proportion of poker players

Table 10 Operationalization of variables of ANOVA Variable Proportion of poker players Description dependent variable proportion of poker players in a country per internet users in percentage factor 1=Western, 2=Orthodox, 3=Islamic, 4=African, 5= Latin American, 6=Sinic, 7=Hindu, 8=Buddhist, 0=Others Covariate In thousand US-Dollar 15

Cultural group

GDP per capita Table 11 Players per Stake for No Limit Holdem Limit (Small Blind/Big Blind in $) 0,01/0,02-0,05/0,10 0,10/0,20- 0,5/1 0,75/1,50-5/10 8/16-500/1000

Stakes Micro Low Mid High

% of players 48.43% 41.24% 9.97% 0.36%

Table 12 Influence of Culture Results of Turkey-Test

Culture (I)

Culture (J) Orthodox Islamic African Latin American Sinic Hindu Buddhist Western Islamic African Latin American Sinic Hindu Buddhist Western Orthodox

Average difference (I-J)

Sample (n=161) Standard p-value error

95%-confidence interval Lower bound Upper bound -.165 .516 .484 .949 .436 .990 .287 .867 .318 1.261 .159 1.182 .178 1.121 -.516 .165 .195 .887 Review Journal Volume .160 .915 .014 .789 .077 1.150 -.077 1.067 -.063 1.011 -.949 -.484 -.887 -.195

Western

Orthodox

.176 .111 .760 .717* .076 .000 .713* .090 .000 .577* .094 .000 .789* .153 .000 .670* .166 .002 .649* .153 .001 -.176 .111 .759 .541* .113 .000 UNLV Gaming Research & .538* .123 .001 .401* .126 .037 .614* .175 .013 .495 .186 .144 .474 .175 .127 -.717* .076 .000 -.541* .113 .000

16 Issue 1

17

0,01/0,02-0,05/0,10 0,10/0,20- 0,5/1 0,75/1,50-5/10 8/16-500/1000

Micro Low Mid High

48.43% 41.24% 9.97% 0.36%

Table 12 Influence of Culture Results of Turkey-Test

Culture (I)

Culture (J) Orthodox Islamic African Latin American Sinic Hindu Buddhist Western Islamic African Latin American Sinic Hindu Buddhist Western Orthodox African Latin American Sinic Hindu Buddhist Western Orthodox Islamic Latin American Sinic Hindu Buddhist Western Orthodox Islamic African Sinic Hindu Buddhist Western Orthodox Islamic African Latin American Hindu Buddhist Western Orthodox Islamic African Latin American Sinic Buddhist Western Orthodox Islamic African Latin American Sinic Hindu

Average difference (I-J) .176 .717* .713* .577* .789* .670* .649* -.176 .541* .538* .401* .614* .495 .474 -.717* -.541* -.003 -.140 .073 -.046 -.067 -.713* -.538* .003 -.136 .076 -.043 -.064 -.577* -.401* .140 .136 .212 .094 .073 -.789* -.614* -.073 -.076 -.212 -.119 -.140 -.670* -.495 .046 .043 -.094 .119 -.021 -.649* -.474 .067 .064 -.073 .140 .021

Sample (n=161) Standard p-value error .111 .076 .090 .094 .153 .166 .153 .111 .113 .123 .126 .175 .186 .175 .076 .113 .092 .097 .155 .168 .155 .090 .123 .092 .108 .162 .175 .162 .094 .126 .097 .108 .165 .177 .165 .153 .175 .155 .162 .165 .214 .204 .166 .186 .168 .175 .177 .214 .214 .153 .175 .155 .162 .165 .204 .214 .760 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .001 .759 .000 .001 .037 .013 .144 .127 .000 .000 1.000 .833 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .001 1.000 .912 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .037 .833 .912 .902 .999 1.000 .000 .013 1.000 1.000 .902 .999 .997 .002 .144 1.000 1.000 .999 .999 1.000 .001 .127 1.000 1.000 1.000 .997 1.000

95%-confidence interval Lower bound Upper bound -.165 .484 .436 .287 .318 .159 .178 -.516 .195 .160 .014 .077 -.077 -.063 -.949 -.887 -.287 -.436 -.403 -.561 -.542 -.990 -.915 -.280 -.469 -.423 -.579 -.562 -.867 -.789 -.157 -.196 -.294 -.450 -.434 -1.261 -1.150 -.548 -.574 -.718 -.777 -.768 -1.182 -1.067 -.469 -.494 -.637 -.540 -.679 -1.121 -1.011 -.408 -.435 -.579 -.488 -.638 .516 .949 .990 .867 1.261 1.182 1.121 .165 .887 .915 .789 1.150 1.067 1.011 -.484 -.195 .280 .157 .548 .469 .408 -.436 -.160 .287 .196 .574 .494 .435 -.287 -.014 .436 .469 .718 .637 .579 -.318 -.077 .403 .423 .294 .540 .488 -.159 .077 .561 .579 .450 .777 .638 -.178 .063 .542 .562 .434 .768 .679

Western

Orthodox

Islamic

African

16

LatinAmerican

Sinic

Hindu

Buddhist

Table 12: Results of Turkey-Test. *: p < .05.

References
Cabot, A., & Hannum, R. (2008). Poker: Public Policy, Law, Mathematics and the Future of an American Tradition. T.M. Cooley Law Review, 22, 443-513. Chen, B., & Ankenman, J. (2006). The Mathematics of Poker. Pittsburgh : ConJelCo. DeDonno, M.A., & Detterman, D.K. (2008). Poker Is a Skill. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 12, 31-36. Dreef, M., & Borm, P., & van der Genugten, B. (2003). On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker. 18 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1 International Game Theory Review, 5, 83-103. Fiedler, I.,& Wilcke, A.-C. (2012). Online Poker in the European Union. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 16, 21-26. Fiedler, I., & Wilcke, A.-C. (2011). Der Markt fr Onlinepoker: Spielerherkunft und Spielerverhalten.

References Cabot, A., & Hannum, R. (2008). Poker: Public Policy, Law, Mathematics and the Future of an American Tradition. T.M. Cooley Law Review, 22, 443-513. Chen, B., & Ankenman, J. (2006). The Mathematics of Poker. Pittsburgh : ConJelCo. DeDonno, M.A., & Detterman, D.K. (2008). Poker Is a Skill. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 12, 31-36. Dreef, M., & Borm, P., & van der Genugten, B. (2003). On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker. International Game Theory Review, 5, 83-103. Fiedler, I.,& Wilcke, A.-C. (2012). Online Poker in the European Union. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 16, 21-26. Fiedler, I., & Wilcke, A.-C. (2011). Der Markt fr Onlinepoker: Spielerherkunft und Spielerverhalten. Norderstedt: BOD Verlag, Fiedler, I., & Rock, J.-P. (2009). Quantifying skill in games Theory and empirical evidence for poker. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 13, 50-57. Haruyoshi, S. (2005). Internet Poker: Data Collection and Analysis, Brown University. H2GC. (2009). eGambling data bulletin. 2008 Q3/Q4 report. H2 Gambling Capital. Internet World Stats. (June 2010). http://www.internetworldstats.com/list2.htm. Huntington, S. P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations. New York: Simon & Schuster. Partygaming, 2010: 2009 full year results presentation. Productivity Commission 2010, Gambling - Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, Australian Government. Rock, J.-P., & Fiedler, I. (2008). Die Empirie des Online-Pokers Bestimmung des Geschicklichkeitsanteils anhand der kritischen Wiederholungshufigkeit. Zeitschrift fr Wett- und Glcksspielrecht, 3, 412-422. Turner, N. E. (2008). Viewpoint: Poker Is an Acquired Skill. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 12. 229-30. Williams, R. J., & Wood, R. T. (2004). The proportion of gaming revenue derived from problem gamblers: Examining the issues in a Canadian context. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 4,3345.

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