Lecture CivPro_AMEV 1 Rule 5

RULE 5 UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS

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they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No. 7691) 1 cause of action PN- p1m and 2 cause of action- amt of 5php. they can be joined- do not apply summary procedures (crim cs no. 4 par 2) p. 654 paras review: complex crimes. summons if with grounds- dismiss if none- 10 days fr receipt ---ateneo- diagram ALEX COMBATE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. GERONIMO R. SAN JOSE, JR., crime of theft of fighting rooster. was convicted in MTC w/o trial and w/o assistance of counsel during arraignment thought he can decide it basing it only fr the complaint. held: violation of due process. summary procedure- n/a only not exceeding 6 mos. theft is 2 yrs and 4 mos, 2 mos and 1 day. HEIRS OF RICARDO OLIVAS, represented by POMPEYO F. OLIVAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. FLORENTINO A. FLOR assuming summary pro is applicable= there is still a need for trial as provided by the rules on sum pro. the accused plead not guilty, trial shld proceed immediately - dapat cross examine the affidavit- direct cross examine. - defect: Consti right to confront his accusers. In the guise of a position paper, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. While this is, indeed, a prohibited pleading (Sec. 15[a], Rule on Summary Procedure) it should be noted that the Motion was filed after an Answer had already been submitted within the reglementary period. In essence, therefore, it is not the pleading prohibited by the Rule on Summary Procedure. What the Rule proscribes is a Motion to Dismiss, which would stop the running of the period to file an Answer and cause undue delay. Be that as it may, dismissal of the case by the MTC, as affirmed by Respondent RTC, for failure to state a cause of action, is not in order. The description of the land in the Complaint, quoted hereunder, may, indeed, have been wanting: "Bounded on the North, by Francisco Ramos; on the East by Ramon Aquino & Cipriano Aquino; on the South by Felisa Aquino; on the West by Casimiro, Francisco & Benito Ramos." Nonetheless, private respondent's Answer (paragraph 3, supra) left no room for doubt that the parties were acquainted with the identity of the disputed property. It would be sheer technicality, destructive of the ends of substantial justice, were the case to be dismissed on the
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Section 1. Uniform procedure. The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts, except (a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Sec. 2. Meaning of terms. The term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. rules on Summary Proceeding: Family court in criminal cs- minor commited slight physical injuries or malicious mischief, violation of the traffic rules. - they will not follow the rules on summary procedure: only MTC

BP 129 v SumPro in Crim Cases. which will apply? minor- jaywalking- Special Law prevails over the gen law- Family Courts. BP 129 Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence

Lecture CivPro_AMEV 2 Rule 5

ground of lack of particularity of the disputed property. In fact, if the Rule on Summary Procedure had been followed, such additional data as were needed to define the issues of the case could have been threshed out in the preliminary conference. 1 LORENZO P. LESACA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO RAVELO lesaca filed a complaint for ejectment against ravelo in MTC. prelim con was set and both were present but it was rescheduled and defendant did not appear during the rescheduled prelim con and was declared in default by the MTC. affirmed by RTC and reversed by CA. cant be declared in default bec defendant filed an answer. motion to declare defendant on default is a prohibited pleading Hence, the present petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals erred: 1. when it ruled that the only instance (when) Section 5 of the Summary Rule can be applied is when the defendant fails to answer. 2. when it ruled that should a party fail to attend/comply with the preliminary conference mandated under Section 6 of the Summary Rule, the court below is powerless and has no discretion but to still proceed under Section 6 of same rule to issue an order clarifying and defining the issues of the case and to proceed under Section 7 of same Rule for submission of affidavits of parties. 3. when it ruled that "as in default" declaration is prohibited by the Rule on Summary Procedure. As found by the Court of Appeals, when the private respondent (then defendant) and his counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial conference and no compromise agreement was reached by the parties despite the opportunity given them by the court, the situation was similar to that provided in Section 6 of the Summary Rule above quoted. The Court should have issued a "preliminary conference order" defining" the issues in the case as provided in Section 6 RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT; CANNOT BE ORDERED WHEN DEFENDANT FILED AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT. In this case, since Ravelo did file an answer to the complaint, the trial court may not declare him as in default (despite his absence and that of his counsel at the pre-trial conference on May 3, 1990) because a motion to declare the defendant in default is a prohibited pleading under Section 15 (h) of the Rule on Summary Procedure. It is the policy of the law to have every litigated case tried on the merits. It is for this reason that judgments by defaults are generally looked upon with disfavor. As this Court observed in the "case of Coombs vs. Santos, (24 Phil. 446): a default judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified on the ground that it is the one final expedient to induce the defendant to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so without unnecessary delay. A judgment by default may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside." VICTORIA D. BAYUBAY, represented by her attorney-infact, MARIBEL MAMARIL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, bayubay filed a cs for ejectment due to expiry of lease contract against Big Mak burger. MTC issued summons and that the cs will be heared under rules of sumpro. prelimcon was conducted but the judge immediately ruled that the lease contract expired. the MTC violated Secs. 6 and 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure by rendering judgment without ordering the parties to submit their respective position papers and affidavits of their respective witnesses, as a consequence of which, defendant's right to due process was violated." 2 yes. cs was remanded to MTC for further proceedings. order to submit position papers and affidavits are reqd after prelimcon We think that the failure of the MTC to give the petitioner the opportunity to submit its position paper and/or affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of due process. True, between August 22, 1989 and December 18, 1989, when the MTC rendered its decision was a period of more than three month s. But under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the ten-day period for submitting affidavits and position papers did not commence to run until receipt by a party of the order of the court embodying the results of the pre-trial conference. Here, as already stated, the MTC never issued such an order and so the ten day period never started to run. It is not true, as the MTC said, that the only questions raised were questions of law. The petitioner's answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements allegedly made by it on the premises, as well as claim for damages for alleged bad faith of private respondent in bringing the case questions which obviously required at least the affidavits of witnesses. The Court of Appeals did not err therefore in calling for the remand of the case to the Municipal Trial Court. While the municipal judge may be commended for his zeal in speeding up the resolution of the case, he nevertheless cannot be sustained for his non-observance of the Rule on Summary Procedure.