Background of the event

An aerial view of the Texas City port before the 1947 Texas City Disaster. On the morning of April 16, 1947 just before 8 am, dock workers prepared to load the remainder of a consignment of ammonium nitrate fertilizer into the Hold 4 of the French Liberty ship Grandcamp. About 2,300 tons were already onboard, 880 tons of which were in the lower part of Hold 4. The remainder of the ship's cargo consisted of large balls of sisal twine, peanuts, drilling equipment, tobacco, cotton, and a few cases of small ammunition. No special safety precautions were in focus at the time.

SS Grandcamp moored at dockside.

Shortly after the workers entered the ship's holds, several of the men noticed smoke near the surface of the hold. After they removed a few fertilizer bags, a small fire became visible ten to fifteen feet below, near the hull. Workers tried to put out the fire with several jugs of water and a fire extinguisher, but the flames continued to spread. The captain of the ship soon appeared and stated that he did not want to put out the fire with water because it would ruin the cargo. Instead, he elected to suppress the flames by having the hatches battened and covered with tarpaulins, the ventilators closed, and the steam system turned on. As the fire grew, the increased heat forced the stevedores and some crew members to leave the ship. The Grandcamp's whistle sounded an alarm that was quickly echoed by the siren of the Texas City Terminal Railway Company. At around 8:30, growing pressure from the compressed steam fed into Hold 4 blew off the hatch covers, and a thick column of orange smoke billowed into the morning sky. Several hundred onlookers began gathering a few hundred feet away at the head of the ship. Twenty-six men and the four trucks of the Volunteer Fire Department, followed by the Republic Oil Refining Company firefighting team, arrived on the scene and set up their hoses. At 9:00, flames erupted from the open hatch and twelve minutes later, the Grandcamp disintegrated in a prodigious explosion heard as far as 241 km away. Blast over pressure and heat disintegrated the bodies of the firefighters and ship's crew still on board. The blast caused a fifteen-foot tidal wave that crashed onto the dock and flooded the surrounding area. Windows were shattered in Houston, 40 miles to the north, and people in Louisiana felt the shock 250 miles away. Most of the buildings closest to the blast were flattened, and there were many more that had doors and roofs blown off. The Monsanto plant, only three hundred feet away, was destroyed by the blast. Hundreds of employees, pedestrians and bystanders were killed. The horror was not over yet. As help poured into Texas City, no one gave much thought to another Liberty ship tied up in the adjoining slip. The High Flyer was loaded with sulfur as well as a thousand tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Much later in the afternoon, two men looking for casualties boarded the High Flyer and noticed flames coming from one of the holds. Although they reported this to someone at the waterfront, several more hours passed before anyone understood the significance of this situation. At 11:00 pm tugs manned by volunteers arrive from Galveston to pull the burning ship away from the docks. Unfortunately, the crew could not manage to lift the High Flyer's anchor, and it continued to drift dangerously close to the Grandcamp's flames. After an hour of trying to bring the anchor up, High Flyer crew members abandoned the ship. By 1:00 am on April 17th, flames were shooting out of the hold. Ten minutes later, the High Flyer exploded in a blast which witnesses thought was even more powerful than that of the Grandcamp. Although casualties were light because rescue personnel had evacuated the dock area, the blast compounded already severe property damage. While sources disagree on the exact number of deaths, it is estimated that 500-600 people died in the explosion. More than 5,000 people were injured. An exact count of the dead would have been difficult to get because of the condition of many of the bodies. There were also a number of foreign seamen and non-census laborers present who may have gone unaccounted for. The story of the Texas City explosions is considered as America's worst industrial disaster in terms of casualties.

Refineries and oil storage tanks at a Monsanto chemical plant burn after SS Grandcamp being loaded with fertilizer exploded in Texas City, Texas, on April 16, 1947, killing hundreds and injuring thousands. SUMMARY On April 16, 1947, a small fire broke out among bags of ammonium nitrate fertilizer in the hold of the ship Grandcamp as it lay docked at Texas City, Texas. Despite immediate attempts to extinguish the fire, it rapidly intensified until the Grandcamp exploded in a blast that caused massive loss of life and property. In the ensuing chaos, no one gave much thought to the ship in the next slip, the High Flyer. It exploded sixteen hours later. Source: The Texas City Disaster, 1947 by Hugh W. Stephens or On April 16, 1947, the French cargo ship SS Grandcamp, anchored in Texas City, was being loaded with a cargo of ammonium nitrate fertilizer when a fire broke out on board. At 9:12 a.m., the ship exploded and took much of the town with it, according to the archives of Moore Memorial Public Library in Texas City. A second blast rattled the area 16 hours later. About 1,000 homes and businesses were either heavily damaged or destroyed in the explosion, which caused a 15-foot-high tidal wave, killed 28 firemen and destroyed all the town's firefighting equipment. Contemporary accounts say the blast shattered windows 40 miles away in Houston and was felt 250 miles away in Louisiana. Source: Chemical blast brings echoes from ship explosion disaster 66 years earlier (usnews.nbcnews.com)

Causes and effects of the event The event originated from complacency about hazardous materials; the close physical proximity of docks, petrochemical facilities, and residences; and an absence of preparation for a serious industrial emergency (Stephens, 1997). The refineries and tank farms were built immediately inland from the waterfront which meant that these facilities and the tremendous quantities of hazardous materials were congregated in close proximity to each other as well as to the docks and the southern extremity of the towns residential area. This dramatically increased the chance that a serious fire or explosion at or near the waterfront would initiate a chain reaction among facilities, with devastating effects on people and property. Refineries and chemical companies adhered to standard safety practices in their manufacturing processes. For instance, storage tanks were equipped with suppressant systems and surrounded by containment dikes. Nevertheless, distances between facilities were, more frequently than not, minimal. The fact that several hundred citizens gathered at the head of the North Slip and watched the Grandcamp burn is evidence that there is general ignorance about the explosive potential of the fertilizer. There was also an absence of any response plan for a major emergency by refineries, the Terminal Railway, and/or the municipal government which suggests an important fact: nobody, neither private sector companies nor municipal agencies, was seriously concerned about an industrial disaster. Officials responsible for the safe transit of hazardous materials through the port were not sufficiently aware of possible hazards, and they had not instituted measures that would have reduced vulnerability to fire and explosion. Safety and preparedness for industrial emergencies were hindered by the fragmented nature of waterfront operations. Companies only practiced safety within the confines of their property. What went wrong? Deteriorating conditions on both ships were allowed to persist. The captain of the Grandcamp ordered the hatches to be sealed and the steam fire suppression system to be activated. Steam vapors probably liquefied the ammonium nitrate to produce nitrous oxide, an extremely volatile substance. Steam also heated the internal compartments further escalating the core temperature of the vessels cargo. The heat of the Grandca mp's cargo quickly approached 850 degrees Fahrenheit, the temperature at which ammonium nitrate will explode. Fuel oil, which lay in tanks between holds 3 and 4, may have ruptured the bulkhead and leaked onto the bags of ammonium nitrate, literally adding more fuel to the fire. Properties of the cargo being loaded in both the Grandcamp and High Flyer were unknown or unobserved by ship/dock workers. First responders arrived too late.

Proposal for preventive measures Conclusions and Learnings Properties of hazmat chemicals must be communicated as well as the consequences of poor handling. (MSDS) A comprehensive plan must be in place in case of emergency and must be acknowledged by local businesses. Government agencies ought to take the lead in developing disaster preparedness policies.

Source: http://www.authorstream.com/Presentation/rmw10c-1237313-texas-city-disasterpresentation/ Always treat any scene with ammonium nitrate, or any other explosive compound, as just that, an explosive device. The best course of action is to evacuate the area and isolate the scene and call for help. Source: http://www.hazmatfc.com/hazmatResources/HazmatHistory/Documents/Hazmat%20History_Texas% 20City%20Disaster_Final.pdf

As a result of the Texas City Disaster, quality control officials implemented new standards for the transportation and dispersal of ammonium nitrate. In addition to cool temperatures, new regulations required specialized containers for storage and prohibited ammonium nitrate from being stored near other reactive materials. Travel over long distances was discouraged and overseas transfer of the substance was highly restricted. The Texas City Disaster also influenced attitudes toward disaster planning across the country. It was obvious that there was a need for a more pro-active approach to disaster planning. Many also noted that a centrally-coordinated emergency response effort might have been beneficial in the early hours of the disaster. As a result, refineries in the Texas City area formed the Industrial Mutual Aid System (IMAS), a cooperative endeavor in which they agreed to help each other out in the event of a disaster. Refineries in industrial zones across Texas followed suit. Along with support for reconstruction and fundraising came an investigation into what caused the disaster. The federal government in Washington D.C. appointed a team of chemists, engineers, and transportation officials to investigate the disaster, beginning with the way the ammonium nitrate was handled and extending through the progression of the disaster. After months of tests and evaluation, the team concluded that conditions aboard the ship were conducive to a reaction of the ammonium nitrate, although the cause of the original fire aboard the Grandcamp was never identified. Literally hundreds of lawsuits were filed on behalf of the disaster victims. In one of the most notable lawsuits, the Dalehite Case of 1950, several claimants compiled multiple lawsuits into one, filing jointly against the federal government.10 The case eventually made it to the Supreme Court, where the court ultimately ruled in favor of the U.S. government (Dalehite v. United States, 1953). At the time of the Disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not exist, nor was there another government system in place to provide monetary aid to disaster victims who had lost their homes, possessions or means of making a living. With this in mind, U.S. Representative Clark Thompson of Galveston introduced legislation to Congress that would provide compensation to Disaster victims to help them rebuild their town and their lives. The bill passed in 1955. It allowed about seventeen million dollars to be distributed to almost 1,400 claimants. The Texas Legislature

also agreed to rebate municipal and school taxes in Texas City for three years following the disaster, in an effort to stimulate an economic recovery in the area. Source: http://www.texascity-library.org/disaster/recovery.php