THE ESSENCE OF STRATEGY

REAR ADMIRAL J. C. WYLIE, U.S. NAVY Military Strategy

(Strategy is) a plan ! a"ti n #esigne#$ t a"%ie&e s 'e en#( a p)rp se t get%er *it% a syste' ! 'eas)res ! r its a"" 'plis%'ent. Definitions of strategy abound. Laymen find it the loosest sort of word, subject to wide interpretation. Even the professional opinion expressed above has shortcomings, since it implies that strategy is essentially an operational matter. In fact, strategy occupies two distinctive but interrelated planes, one abstract, the other concrete. The former is peopled with strategic philosophers and theoreticians, the latter with practical planners. NATIONAL, GRAND, DIFFERENTIATED AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

The term strategy originally meant the art of generalship,! but it encompasses much more today. "trategy no longer is the exclusive preserve of the military, nor does it deal merely with armed combat. #en in mufti, as well as those in uniform, now pursue strategic matters at the national level. $ational strategy fuses all the powers of a nation% during peace as well as war, to attain national interests and objectives. &ithin that context, there is an over'all political strategy, which addresses both international and internal issues% an economic strategy, both foreign and domestic% a national military strategy% and so on. Each component influences national security immediately or tangentially. ()

This text is devoted primarily to national security! strategies which have a direct bearing. In compilation, they constitute grand strategy the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to exert desired degrees and types of control over the opposition through threats, forces, indirect pressures, diplomacy, sub' terfuge, and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying national security interests and objectives. +ig)re , "trategic *pproaches

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#ilitary strategy! and grand strategy! are interrelated, but are by no means synonymous. #ilitary strategy is predicated on physical violence or the threat of violence it see.s victory through force of arms. /rand strategy, if successful, alleviates any need for violence. E,ually important, it loo.s beyond victory toward a lasting peace. #ilitary strategy is mainly the province of generals. /rand strategy is mainly the (0

purview of statesman. /rand strategy controls military strategy, which is only on of its elements. /rand strategy, which embraces such niceties as bluff, negotiation, economic s.ul'duggery, and psychological warfare, debun.s the belief7widely held since -lausewit89s day7that strategy simply is the :use of engagements to attain the object of war!. 3n the contrary, it cleaves closely to Liddell hart9s conclusion that the true aim is not so much to see. battle as to see. a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this.! $ot exactly a new idea, one might add. "un T8u recogni8ed that to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of s.ill.! STRATEGIC OPTIONS &ithin the matrix of interests, objectives, theories, concepts, and schools of thought, countless strategic combinations are conceivable. * few sample strategic options, paired to emphasi8e contrasts, are listed below ; 3ffensive &ar r Defensive &ar 4reemptive &ar r "econd "tri.e #assive 1etaliation r <lexible 1esponse <orces in =eing r 1apid #obili8ation 1egional &ar r /lobal &ar =lit8.rieg r *ttrition *rmed "trife r "ubversion 4assive 1esistance r *ctive 1esponse Isolationism r -ollective "ecurity -ounterforce r -ountervalue -ontrolled Escalation r Insensate *ttac. "pheres of Influence r 6niversal -onfrontation The 6nited "tates, being a leading contender for world'power, juggles global and regional strategies simultaneously. &e have a (>

strategy for Europe, another for the #iddle East, a third for East *sia and the &estern 4acific, and a fourth for worldwide nuclear war, each custom'blended to match specific conditions. 3ther countries adapt to meet their peculiar needs and situations. "ecluded "weden gambled on neutrality during both &orld &ars, and succeeded because no one re,uired her territory. Embattled =elgium, a passage state, was not so luc.y. Israel ban.ed on a first'stri.e strategy in ?@)0 and ?@0>, featuring rapid mobili8ation and ,uic. termination of hostilities. That amalgam wor.ed well for a nation that could afford neither large standing armed forces nor lengthy wars of attrition, but it would not seem so attractive if the *rabs were more alert and better organi8ed. Every strategy must be tailored to meet speciali8ed needs. The <rench failed to ta.e that into account in ?@AB, when they tried to re' fight the last war. "trategies cannot be transferred intact from one period to another without very precise appreciation for changes that transpire in the interim. $either can strategies be transplanted from place to place unless the situation in one locale is pertinent in the other. #ost of the things the 6nited "tates has done right in 5ietnam, for instance, would not wor. in Europe. In sum, strategy is the art and science of options. &hat reactions are right for one leader or nation may be wholly inappropriate for others. It is just as hard to imagine 4epperpots li.e +arry Truman or Teddy 1oosevelt adopting devious, subtle, or passive strategies as it is to see "talin as straightforward. *mericans, being impetuous, abhor the strategy of protracted war which seems to suit stoic orientals. "ir 1obert Thompson, a disinterested observer, put that matter in proper perspective with a few well'chosen remar.s related to 5ietnam;
&ea.nesses in the *merican character were to play their part. 3f these, the greatest was and still is impatienceCC.. #ore than any other factor, coupled with the frustration which automatically follows, it has led to a desire for ,uic. results which, in a war concerned with people and immune to the application of power, are just not obtainable.

STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS (D

1egardless of their philosophical convictions, all strategists are fettered by a cornucopia of constraints7political, military, economic, cultural, geographic, and technological. "ome are intangible, li.e national will and world opinion. The precepts of humanity and chivalry play a role, along with ethics and legal limitations. -ustomary law prescribed well'defined, firmly established rules of war, but those sometimes are counterbalanced or countermanded by other influences. The so'called 4rinciple of #ilitary $ecessity, for example, invo.es the right to apply whatever pressure is necessary to bend or brea. the enemy9s will with the least possible expenditure of time, lives, and money. #ost grand strategists also must contend with national myths and tradition. In the 6nited "tates, these are intensely inhibitive, as the following samples suggest ; $ever stri.e the first blow. <ight fairly,! in accord with the rules.! -hampion the underdog. *void secret alliances or agreements. "ubmit all major strategic decisions for popular approval. "upport minimum forces in peacetime% mobili8e for war. *ll of the above have been violated at one time or another, but each instance was almost invariably accompanied by national fits of conscience. The spectrum of war conditions strategies by creating a spectrum of problems. There is general nuclear war, limited war E with or without nuclear weapons ' and a smorgasbord of low'intensity hostilities, including insurgencies and cold war. The causes, conduct peculiarities, and termination problems associated with each category are in many ways uni,ue. $ational leaders of world powers, primarily the 6nited "tates and the "oviet 6nion, must understand the lot and proceed accordingly, since strategies that wor. well in one environment do not necessarily wor. well in the others. (@

THE ROLE OF ASSUMPTIONS This brings us to a ,uic. survey of assumptions which, for better or worse, underlie nearly every strategic decision, and which in themselves can sow the seeds of success or failure. "ome wishful thin.ers! are tempted to assume away problems when the going gets difficult. 4essimistic strategists cause costs to s.yroc.et unnecessarily by assuming the worst. Those polari8ed approaches produce dramatically different strategies. The following fifteen conflicting assumptions illustrate the diversity of opinion that underlies contemporary strategic debates in the 6nited "tates ; ?. <orce is FnotG outmoded as a foreign'policy tool. H. The 6nited "tates does FnotG need to be $umber 3ne.! (. Domestic needs should FnotG ta.e priority over defense. A. Detente does FnotG reflect benign "oviet intentions. ). The "ino'"oviet split is FnotG permanent. 0. 6.". nuclear superiority is FnotG essential. >. -ontrolled nuclear war is FnotG feasible. D. *lliances are FnotG preferable to unilateral defense. @. The 6nited "tates should FnotG be the world9s policeman.! ?B. *sia should FnotG dominate 6.". regional strategy. ??. 6.". support should FnotG be limited to democratic regimes. ?H. Time is FnotG on our side in any ideological struggle. ?(. =udgetary concerns should FnotG dictate strategy. ?A. 1eserve component forces are FnotG imperative. ?). "urface fleets are FnotG obsolete. #any other assumptions, some sound, some suspect, could embellish that list. Each influences strategy in its own special way. *ll should be subject to constant "urveillance, so that conjecture will correspond as closely as possible with fact when the real world and real threats replace planning assumptions. THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE AB

-lausewit8 summari8ed the essence of strategy nicely when he wrote ;

* prince or general, who .nows how to organi8e his war exactly according to his object and means, who does neither too much nor too little, furnishes thereby the greatest proof of his geniusCC =ut let us admit that there is no ,uestion at all here of scientific formulas and problems. The relations of material things are all very simple. The comprehension of the moral forces which come into play is more difficultCCF*t the highest levelsGstrategy borders on politics and statesmanship, or rather it becomes both itself, and, as we have observed before, these have more influence on how much or how little is to be done than on how it is executed Fwhich is tacticsG. Thus, then, in strategy everything is very simple, but not on that account very easy.

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