EU 101 Session 5: UK application, EEC and Empty Chair Crisis General de Gaulles plan was to put France firmly

back on the global stage by pursuing demonstratively independent policies. This was his paramount interest as he sought to give new impetus to European integration. While he supported a Europe with France and Germany as its pillars, he re ected any significant relin!uishment of sovereignty to a supranational authority. Franco"#merican relations General de Gaulle wanted to review the relationship between the $nited %tates and Europe. The global geopolitical situation had undergone considerable changes between &'() and &'*+. ,n the &'*+s, the threat of world war was receding and the $nited %tates no longer held the monopoly on nuclear protection of the West. ,n fact, de Gaulle wondered whether the $nited %tates really would use nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe. -e felt the need to reconsider the relationship between the .ld /ontinent and #merica, especially since he no longer felt the #merican nuclear umbrella to be reliable. #ccordingly, France pursued a national nuclear policy and developed its own nuclear arsenal. The $nited %tates reviewed its strategy at the same time, moving from the graduated response approach to a strategy of massive reprisals. #ny conflict between the superpowers would now be played out in Europe, not in the territory of the parties to the conflict. France was determined not to be governed purely by the decisions of the 0resident of the $nited %tates in issues relating to the defence of the national territory. France and 1#T. .n &2 %eptember &')3, the French 0resident, General /harles de Gaulle, sent a memorandum to 0resident 4wight 4. Eisenhower of the $nited %tates and 0rime 5inister -arold 5acmillan of the $nited 6ingdom. ,n it, he called for the terms of reference of the #tlantic #lliance to be broadened to global scale in order, among other things, to cover certain geographical areas where France retained particular interests. -e also proposed the creation of a tripartite 4irectorate of the 1orth #tlantic Treaty .rganisation, putting France, Great 7ritain and the $nited %tates on an e!ual footing for the purposes of discussing nuclear strategy. ,n the case of refusal by its partners, France, which wished to retain absolute control of its armed forces, reserved the right to withdraw from 1#T.. ,ndeed, de Gaulle drew no distinction between 1#T. and Europe. -e sought to take advantage of Frances strengthened position in 1#T. in order to consolidate its influence among the %i8 on the basis of a Franco" German a8is. .n the other hand, he also hoped to develop European political and strategic cooperation in order to pressurise the $nited %tates into accepting the French plans for the reform of the #tlantic #lliance. The $nited %tates and Great 7ritain did not follow up the French proposals. /onse!uently, on && 5arch &')', France decided to remove its 5editerranean naval fleet from 1#T. command. ,n 9une, it refused to stock foreign nuclear weapons on national soil, forcing the $nited %tates to transfer :++ military aeroplanes out of France. ,n the spring of &'*+, the $nited %tates and Great 7ritain repeatedly stated to the French Government their refusal to conclude an agreement on nuclear cooperation, particularly on the development of nuclear warheads. France finally concluded that the ;special relationship between 7ritain and #merica was at work and decided to re"focus its efforts on coordinating policy in Europe. .n

:& 9une &'*<, France also withdrew its #tlantic and /hannel fleets from 1#T. command. The rift deepened on &+ 5arch &'**, when General de Gaulle officially announced that France intended to withdraw from the #lliance and demanded that all 1#T. bases be removed from French territory. %-#0E was relocated from 0aris to 7russels. -owever, France retained membership of the #tlantic 0act and of 1#T.. 4e Gaulle and Europe /harles de Gaulle was very committed to a particular vision of Europe. -e re ected the idea of an integrated Europe, yet supported a Europe composed of %tates detached from the direct domination of the $%#. ,n implementing his European ideal, de Gaulle counted mainly on the support of the Federal =epublic of Germany >F=G?, and maintained a very close relationship with the German /hancellor, 6onrad #denauer. -is approach was re ected, however, by the other European partners, whose priority was to protect the ac!uis communautaire, the entire body of legislation adopted by the /ommunity. 4e Gaulle@s re ection of any structure based on integration and supranational authority did not gain unanimous support. The tensions between de Gaulle and his partners were aired publicly on &) 5ay &'*: at what was known as the ;AolapBk press conference, when he re ected the concept of a Europe of integrated powers and languages. -is policies met with some opposition in France, too. ,n &'*:, si8 ministers of the 5ouvement rCpublicain populaire >0opular =epublican 5ovement, 5=0?, opponents of the presidential stance on Europe, hastily stepped down from their governmental posts. The Fouchet 0lans -aving suffered, in &')' and &'*+, the re ection by the #mericans and 7ritish of his plans for the reform of 1#T., General de Gaulle partly focused his international activities on achieving a politically integrated Europe. ,n 9uly &'*+, he discussed his views on European political union with /hancellor #denauer of Germany. 4e Gaulles ob ective was to reform the European /ommunities, with the aim of establishing a Europe of %tates. To that end, his proposals included regular meetings between 5inisters and -eads of %tate or Government of the %i8 with senior officials, to discuss particular issues of policy, economics, culture and defence. -e also proposed attaching to those meetings an advisory assembly composed of members of the national parliaments. Essentially, what de Gaulle proposed to #denauer was none other than a sort of Franco"German confederation with common citiDenship. -e counted on the influence of the Franco"German partnership to gain the support of the other European partners for the building of an autonomous Europe. This led to the first /ommunity negotiations, despite the /hancellor@s guarded response and the differing views among the %i8 on the sub ect of 7ritish participation. #t a summit held in 0aris on &+ and && February &'*&, the %i8 agreed to develop political cooperation. 4e Gaulle accordingly proposed to his five partners the establishment of a =esearch /ommittee composed of representatives of the si8 Governments and responsible for studying the potential forms of diplomatic and political cooperation among the 5ember %tates of the European Economic /ommunity >EE/?. The =esearch /ommittee met for the first time on &* 5arch &'*&. Eight days later, it appointed /hristian Fouchet, French diplomat and former Gaullist parliamentarian, as /hairman, and decided to establish two subcommittees. The /ultural /ooperation /ommittee was headed by 0ierre 0escatore of Eu8embourg, while

/arl Friedrich .phBls of Germany presided over the 0olitical /ooperation /ommittee. .n &3 9uly &'*&, at 7ad Godesberg, near 7onn, the %i8 reiterated their intention to create a politically united Europe. .n &' .ctober &'*&, /hristian Fouchet submitted to the =esearch /ommittee a first draft treaty >Fouchet 0lan ,?, establishing an indissoluble union of %tates based on intergovernmental cooperation and respect for the identity of 5ember %tates and their peoples. ,t proposed cooperation, alongside the /ommunity treaties, in the areas of foreign policy and defence, science, culture and human rights protection. ,n institutional terms, the draft treaty provided for the establishment of a /ouncil composed of -eads of %tate or Government, which would meet three times a year and adopt decisions on the basis of unanimity. # /ouncil of Foreign 5inisters would cover the interim period. $nder the draft treaty, the #ssembly of the /ommunities was granted an advisory role, and it was envisaged that a European 0olitical /ommission would be established to assist the /ouncil. ,n other words, the plan drew a further distinction between the terms of reference of the /ommunity and those of the future 0olitical $nion. Fearing French domination of their foreign policy, Frances partners opposed the draft treaty as submitted. They also re ected any strengthening of the institutions intergovernmental character, regarding it as a threat to the independence and supranational nature of the /ommunity bodies. 5oreover, the 1etherlands showed reluctance to complicate further the common market enlargement negotiations under way with the $nited 6ingdom or eopardise the ongoing discussions between Europe and #merica on the future of 1#T.. ,n the light of this opposition, de Gaulle hardened his stance, abandoning the compromises that the European negotiators had reached. .n &3 9anuary &'*:, /hristian Fouchet accordingly submitted a new version of the plan >Fouchet 0lan ,,?, which this time proposed to grant the $nion the economic powers that had previously been the prerogative of the /ommunities, which became subordinate to the intergovernmental cooperation body. This second version, moreover, made no reference to 1#T.. #t the point when the common market was proceeding to the second stage of implementation, Frances partners, notably the 7enelu8 countries, once again lambasted and re ected the plan. They accordingly drew up counter"proposals for a more federalist approach, which were re ected in turn by the French Government. #t the beginning of #pril, the %ecretary"General of the ,talian Foreign 5inistry, Emilio /attani, replaced Fouchet, who had been appointed -igh /ommissioner in #lgeria, as 0resident of the =esearch /ommittee. /attani proposed new amendments, but was not able to reconcile Frances interests with those of the other European partners. 7elgium and the 1etherlands wanted to see the $nited 6ingdom complete its accession to the EE/ before moving forward with the implementation of 0olitical $nion. /onse!uently, the Foreign 5inisters, meeting in Eu8embourg on &2 #pril &'*:, decided to bring the /ommittees work to an end permanently. .n &) 5ay, General de Gaulle sealed the breakdown in the attempts at political integration. #t a sensational press conference, he condemned European federalist policies and openly criticised the game played by 7ritain and #merica. The failure of the Fouchet 0lans sparked off a series of crises, characterised by disagreement on the very nature of the European unification process, the powers of the /ommunity institutions, European independence and relations with the $%#. The -eads of %tate or Government did not meet again for seven years. This failure would, however, lead to a strengthening of Franco"German relations.

The crisis in the EE/ The crisis simmering in the European Economic /ommunity between France and its partners reached boiling point in &'*). The reasons behind the crisis were twofoldF the difficulties in financing the common agricultural policy >/#0?G and rapid European integration supported by France@s partners. The financial problems in the EE/, and the /#0 crisis, shook the /ommunity to its very foundations. Financing the /#0 The agricultural financial regulations in force from &'*: were due to e8pire on & 9uly &'*). .n &) 4ecember &'*(, the /ouncil of 5inisters asked the /ommission to draw up a draft document on the financing of the common agricultural policy >/#0?. .n <& 5arch &'*), the /ommission proposed the establishment of an autonomous /ommunity budget. The financial regulations had to be adopted before & 9uly &'*). The 0resident of the /ommission, Walter -allstein, and the /ommissioner for #griculture, %icco 5ansholt, suggested reviewing the financial structures of the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? and providing the /#0 with its own financial resources. $nder their plan, the /ommunity would no longer be financed by national contributions, but by own resources paid directly into the /ommunity budget. They were to be provided partly by agricultural levies and partly by customs revenue from duties on manufactured goods, of which a significant proportion would be payable to the /ommunity. ,n the short term, the resources would be considerably greater than those actually needed. The proposals also contained elements conducive to broadening the powers and responsibilities of the European 0arliamentary #ssembly and the /ommission. The /ommission endorsed the proposal by a ma ority vote. -owever, the French /ommissioners and one ,talian /ommissioner voted against. %ubse!uently, -allstein submitted the proposal to the European 0arliament without holding initial consultations with the Governments of the 5ember %tates. This was the /ommissions way of trying to link the financial regulations to institutional reviewF it hoped to gain ground from Frances commitment to promoting the /#0. -owever, General de Gaulle made it clear that he was firmly opposed to it. There seemed no way out of the deadlock. ,n fact, Franco"German cooperation had been in decline since /hancellor #denauer had left the political scene. The debate on the /ommunitys own resources dragged on interminably and was only resolved with the compromise worked out during the agricultural marathon of &'H:: 4ecember &'*', when the /ouncil adopted the following two"tier systemF I #gricultural levies would be payable to the /ommunity in their entiretyG I /ustoms revenue would be payable to the /ommunity according to a sliding scale, in order to avoid e8cessive disruption of national budgets. The issue of ma ority voting The entry into force of the 5erger Treaty, signed on 3 #pril &'*), which fused the E8ecutives of the European /ommunities, was postponed because of the deep political rift between France and its partners.

The third stage of the transitional period, which began on & 9anuary &'**, provided that in future a larger number of decisions would be adopted on the basis of a !ualified ma ority, rather than unanimity. .nly the most important issues, such as the accession of new 5ember %tates, or controversial decisions, such as the harmonisation of legislation and economic policy, remained sub ect to unanimity. This was also true of any initiative that went beyond the provisions of the treaties. General de Gaulle was willing to use all means at his disposal in order to avoid the application of the ma ority rule. From &'*+, in parallel to the Fouchet negotiations, he asked #lain 0eyrefitte, %ecretary of %tate for ,nformation, to study the potential for France to undermine or, at least, bypass the supranational nature of the /ommunity decision"making process. 4e Gaulle did not participate in the negotiations on the Treaty of =ome, which he accepted in &')3 purely for economic reasons and on the condition that the application of the ma ority vote was postponed. The ;empty chair policy The proposal for the financing of the common agricultural policy >/#0?, developed in &'*) by Walter -allstein, 0resident of the /ommission, marked the beginning of what was known as the ;empty chair crisis. The /ommission@s proposal was geared towards developing its own financial resources, independently of the 5ember %tates, and attributed additional budgetary powers to the European 0arliament. 5oreover, the progression, on & 9anuary &'**, to the third stage of the transitional period preceding the establishment of the common market was to involve the application of the ma ority vote in the /ouncil of 5inisters. France could not agree to this development, which it regarded as an unacceptable renunciation of sovereignty. ,n addition, General de Gaulle, who had not participated in the negotiations on the Treaty of =ome, criticised Walter -allstein for having prepared his budgetary proposal without prior consultation with the Governments of the 5ember %tates and for having behaved almost as though he were 0resident of a European government. -e also accused -allstein of behaving like a -ead of %tate. France was, in fact, afraid that a coalition of 5ember %tates might, on the basis of a ma ority decision, challenge the common agricultural policy, which France had persuaded its partners to accept only with great difficulty. France held the 0residency of the /ouncil until <+ 9une &'*), and its stance only e8acerbated the latent conflicts between the ideas of the -allstein /ommission and those of the /ouncil of 5inisters. 7y refusing any solution based on compromise, 5aurice /ouve de 5urville, French Foreign 5inister in the second 0ompidou Government, brought down the negotiations on the financial regulations for the agricultural policy. .n <+ 9une &'*), /ouve de 5urville recalled to 0aris the French 0ermanent =epresentative in 7russels and announced France@s intention not to take its seat in the /ouncil of 5inisters until it had its way. This was the beginning of the e8tremely serious ;empty chair crisis. ,t was the first time since the entry into force of the Treaty of =ome in &')3 that the operation of the EE/ had been crippled by a 5ember %tate. The Eu8embourg /ompromise For si8 months, France stayed away from 7russels and boycotted the /ommunity. #ware, however, of the risks of prolonged isolation and its impact on the national economy, it eventually agreed to resume negotiations. #t the meetings held in Eu8embourg on &2 and &3 and on :3 and :' 9anuary &'**, 0ierre Werner, 0rime 5inister of Eu8embourg and

0resident of the /ouncil, proposed a compromise solution. This compromise stipulated that a country which believed that its vital national interests might be adversely affected could not be overruled by a ma ority, and that negotiations had to continue until a universally acceptable compromise was reached. The document, which fundamentally altered the spirit of the EE/ Treaty by creating a new mechanism by which %tates could e8ert pressure on the /ouncil, did not, however, make any reference to the nature of the essential national interest and the arbitration procedure in the event of dispute. %ince then, the ;Eu8embourg /ompromise has fre!uently been invoked by 5ember %tates in order to block ma ority decisions. /ontrary to the literal interpretation of the te8t, they have used the compromise in practice to make unanimity the normal decision"making procedure. The national delegations have, therefore, let the Eu8embourg /ompromise degenerate into a right of veto for sometimes minor issues. $nder this arrangement, the /ouncil agrees to continue discussions until such point as all ministers are satisfied with the proposed solution. While the Eu8embourg /ompromise allowed the %i8 to break the deadlock, it created a situation which sometimes gave rise to a certain resistance to change, for fear that the negotiations might be blocked, and imposed a de facto limitation on the /ommission@s right of initiative. This political loophole, which became increasingly unmanageable as the number of 5ember %tates increased, was partially corrected by the application of the %ingle European #ct, which, from & 9uly &'32, considerably broadened the range of decisions that could be adopted by !ualified ma ority. ,nstitutional challenges #lthough the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? got off to a good start, the Europe of the %i8 was soon shaken by serious internal crises. The causes lay both in General de Gaulles determination to modify the /ommunitys ob ectives by keeping any development towards supranational authority to a minimumG and in the financial and institutional problems inherent in a multinational organisation built on compromise. ,t proved necessary to change the focus of the institutions in order to break the deadlock. The European 0arliamentary #ssembly .nce Europe had been built from the top down, the idea of democratising the European institutions began to gain ground. The European 0arliamentary #ssembly, consisting of members of the national parliaments, made clear its desire to be elected by universal suffrage and demanded the right to appoint the new %ingle /ommission. .n <+ 5arch &'*:, the European 0arliamentary #ssembly passed a resolution changing its own name to European 0arliament. 7efore that, in 5ay &'*+, its 5embers had adopted a convention on the election of the #ssembly by universal suffrage. ,n 9une &'*<, 0arliament adopted a resolution calling for a strengthening of its powers through the direct election of its 5embers. The stance adopted by the French Government was a priori hostile to this development of the European institutions and categorically opposed to an #ssembly directly elected by its citiDens. ,t took the view that the #ssembly did not possess legislative power, which, moreover, it refused to grant it. The other European governments, with the e8ception of ,taly and the 1etherlands, had similar reservations with regard to universal suffrage. 5erging the e8ecutives

France proposed that the position of the /ouncil of 5inisters be strengthened. The partner %tates, however, rather envisaged the creation of an independent body with e8tended powers, based on a merger of the -igh #uthority of the European /oal and %teel /ommunity >E/%/?, the /ommission of the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? and the /ommission of the European #tomic Energy /ommunity >E#E/ or Euratom?. France opposed the merger of the e8ecutives for some time. -owever, under pressure from the other 5ember %tates, it finally accepted the principle. #fter accepting the principle of merging the /ommunity e8ecutives at the /ouncil of 5inisters on :< %eptember &'*<, France attempted to limit the supranational power of the new single /ommission. Following three years of difficult negotiations, the Treaty establishing a %ingle /ouncil and a %ingle /ommission of the European /ommunities was signed in 7russels on 3 #pril &'*). ,t entered into force on & 9uly &'*2. -enceforth, the /ommission of the European /ommunities was the single body of the three European /ommunities >European /oal and %teel /ommunity >E/%/?, European Economic /ommunity >EE/? and European #tomic Energy /ommunity >E#E/ or Euratom??. .n France@s proposal, the /ommittee of 0ermanent =epresentatives >/.=E0E=?, composed of ambassadors from the 5ember %tates, played a permanent role in support of the /ommission, which still retained the right to propose legislation, and the powers of implementation and representation. The first 0resident of the %ingle /ommission was Walter -allstein of Germany, who had presided over the EE/ /ommission since &')3 and had formerly served as a 5inister under /hancellor #denauer. -is strong personality rapidly left its mark on the /ommission. For the followers of federalist thinking, the /ommission represented the embryo of a future federal European government. -owever, General de Gaulle was resolutely opposed to this approach and ensured that -allstein@s mandate was e8tended for only si8 months following the merger. =efusing to accept this compromise, -allstein resigned. The /ouncil of 5inisters was the principal decision"making body of the European Economic /ommunity >EE/?. ,t regularly held meetings of the national 5inisters !ualified to discuss the items on the agenda. Each EE/ country took it in turns to hold the 0residency for si8 months. The /ouncil@s decisions were drafted by the /ommittee of 0ermanent =epresentatives >/.=E0E=?, with assistance from a number of committees of e8perts and senior officials from the national ministries. The $nited 6ingdom and its applications for accession to the /ommon 5arket 4uring the &'*+s, there were changes in the $nited 6ingdoms policy towards Europe. The wait"and"see approach of the &'(+s and &')+s, which, at most, allowed European cooperation at intergovernmental level, was gradually replaced by a will to participate more actively in the European unification process. # fear of being sidelined in international affairs and the resounding success of the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? were the main factors behind the change in direction of the 7ritish Governments in the early &'*+s. 0ublic opinion and the ma or political parties, with their commitment to national sovereignty, appeared to be divided. The /onservative 0arty was more pro"Europe than the Eabour 0arty. The latter, together with the trade unions, was in

fact keen to protect the welfare state and %tate control of the economy against what it popularly perceived to be a capitalist Europe too wedded to the idea of free trade. The $nited 6ingdoms interest in Europe met with a mi8ed reaction elsewhere. The strongest opposition came from France, which although it had welcomed the idea of the $6s accession in the forties and fifties, changed its stance to re ection when General de Gaulle came to power. This was a symptom of the two countries@ ostling for position as leaders of Europe. ,n this light, France took a sceptical view of the $nited 6ingdoms relationship with the $nited %tates. The $6 Government also found itself called to task for old wartime grudges. The end of a great power -aving refused to participate in the European Economic /ommunity >EE/?, the $nited 6ingdom became aware of the isolation it had brought on itself, especially since the special relationship between the $nited 6ingdom and the $nited %tates cooled after the &')* %ueD crisis. The empire on which Great 7ritain@s status as a world power had rested until the %econd World War collapsed, and the political and strategic ties with the /ommonwealth were rela8ed. The links between the 7ritish and former colonial economies declined steadily throughout the &'*+s. %ubse!uently, the $nited 6ingdom turned increasingly to Europe and the European Economic /ommunity >EE/?. The $nited %tates encouraged the $nited 6ingdoms accession in order to counterbalance the influence of Gaullist France and prevent the /ommunity from drifting towards protectionism. The $nited 6ingdom@s first application for accession to the /ommon 5arket The $nited 6ingdom was not part of the European unification process in the &')+s. ,t first applied for accession to the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? in &'*&. ,t was somewhat envious of the rapid economic growth of the EE/ countries. The $nited 6ingdom wished to avoid being economically and politically e8cluded from the new Europe and sought rather to preserve its traditional role of intermediary between Europe and the $nited %tates. -arold 5acmillan, the 7ritish 0rime 5inister, prepared the 7ritish application after obtaining the backing of his Government and the /onservative 0arty. The -ouse of /ommons approved the $nited 6ingdoms application and the partners appeared to react favourably overall. The announcement of the first application The 7ritish 0rime 5inister, -arold 5acmillan, prepared his countrys application with great care. 0ossessing a solid ma ority in the /ommons, he could afford to ignore resistance to the /ommon 5arket within the /onservative 0arty and was able to appoint dedicated pro" Europeans to the key posts within his Government. #t international level, he promoted the advantages of the $nited 6ingdoms membership of the EE/ to the /ommonwealth countries. -e also toured the capital cities of the %i8 in order to sound out the 5ember %tates of the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? about the $nited 6ingdoms possible accession. Within the close"knit circles of the 7ritish Eabour 0arty, there was some opposition to 7ritains possible application for accession to the European /ommunities. The opponents

were afraid, in particular, of losing the benefits of the Welfare %tate in a liberal Europe. They were against any loss of sovereignty and fre!uently raised the spectre of capitalist Europe. -owever, the -ouse of /ommons vote of ( #ugust &'*& won resounding support. The -ouse of /ommons adopted the Governments proposal by <&< votes to (, while the Eabour .pposition and some )+ /onservatives abstained. .n ' #ugust &'*&, the $nited 6ingdom submitted its first application for accession to the /ommunities and entered into negotiations. The 7ritish press was buDDing with arguments for and against the /ommon 5arket. .verall, the reaction was !uite positive. The /ommunitys 5ember %tates appeared to be ready to welcome the $nited 6ingdom. 4ifficult negotiations #s Eord 0rivy %eal, Edward -eath, the future 7ritish 0rime 5inister, was responsible for European issues and was therefore put in charge of negotiating with the %i8 in 7russels. The negotiations were tough because Eondon, resting on its imperial laurels, demanded e8emption from a number of /ommunity regulations. For e8ample, it had difficulty accepting the /ommon /ustoms Tariff for fear that it would lose its privileged relationship with the /ommonwealth countries. /onsiderable progress was achieved over the summer of &'*:, particularly in terms of 7ritains gradual shift away from its colonial focus. The 7ritish now seemed ready to accept the ac!uis communautaire, the body of /ommunity legislation adopted to date. -arold 5acmillan even launched a public awareness campaign in order to win over 7ritish public opinion. 7ut at a conference of the /ommonwealth countries in %eptember &'*:, /anada and 1ew Jealand voiced their opposition to the $nited 6ingdom oining the European Economic /ommunity >EE/?. Germany, the 7enelu8 countries and ,taly were prepared to make substantial concessions. -owever, the negotiations on enlargement were ad ourned following General de Gaulles categorical veto on &( 9anuary &'*<. General de Gaulle@s first veto .n &( 9anuary &'*<, General de Gaulle held a press conference at which he declared his opposition to the $nited 6ingdoms application for membership. -e referred to incompatibilities between continental European and 7ritish economic interests. ,n addition, he demanded that the $nited 6ingdom accept all the conditions laid down by the %i8 and revoke its commitments to countries within its own free trade area. .n :3 9anuary, the French Government forced its five European partners, who were already shocked by the unilateral veto, to ad ourn the membership negotiations. General 4e Gaulle was afraid that the new member might threaten the common agricultural policy >/#0? and transform the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? into a huge free trade area. #bove all, he regarded the $nited 6ingdom as a Tro an horse concealing $% interestsF he believed that 7ritish membership would lead to the #mericanisation of Europe. -e declared his support for a deepening and an acceleration of common market integration rather than e8pansion, and shed doubts on the $6s commitment to Europe.

4e Gaulle@s attitude also stemmed from reasons not connected solely with EE/ interests. ,n addition to the anti"7ritish resentment that he had continued to harbour ever since he was e8iled to Eondon during the war, he was afraid of 7ritish"#merican nuclear cooperation. When, in .ctober &'*:, #merican 0olaris rockets were supplied to the 7ritish, this was a grave blow to Franco"7ritish relations, while de Gaulle continued to develop close relations with Germany. The $nited 6ingdoms second application for accession to the /ommon 5arket The .ctober &'*( elections in the $nited 6ingdom were won by the Eabour 0arty. The Eabour 0arty leader, -arold Wilson, took over from the /onservative 0rime 5inister, -arold 5acmillan, who had come up against the opposition of French 0resident /harles de Gaulle in the bid to accede to the European /ommunities. The new 0rime 5inister, who had previously been opposed to the $nited 6ingdoms accession to the European /ommunities, gradually began to pursue a more Europe"oriented policy. This new direction in foreign policy was largely a result of the difficulties encountered by the 7ritish economy in the mid"&'*+s. =elations with the /ommonwealth continued to weaken and trade relations within the European Free Trade #ssociation >EFT#? were developing at a slower pace than e8pected. 0articipation in the European /ommunities therefore seemed the best solution to revive the 7ritish economy, all the more so because e8ports to the /ommunities 5ember %tates were constantly on the rise. The /ommunities also seemed to provide the necessary framework in which to overcome the balance of payments deficit and to devalue the pound sterling, a measure which had become essential. Finally, accession offered the $nited 6ingdom the prospect of playing an active role in the development of the /ommunities, which were e8periencing continued growth, and of reducing its dependence on the $nited %tates by choosing the path leading towards an emerging Europe. -owever, during -arold Wilsons first term of office, conditions were not yet favourable for an open policy change towards accession to the /ommunities. .pposition to accession within the Eabour 0arty itself was too great and the memory of the failure met by the first application for accession in &'*< was still too vivid in the minds of the general public. ,t was only following efforts made to persuade his party and after the elections held in 5arch &'** that -arold Wilson had a large enough ma ority to take the decision to make a second application for accession to the European /ommunities. #t the same time, the empty chair crisis served to highlight General de Gaulles opposition to the ma ority vote and to the /ommunities evolution towards a federal structure. This reassured the 7ritish leaders, because even if -arold Wilson was ready to accept the economic terms associated with accession to the /ommunities, the 0rime 5inister was not keen on accepting the slightest limitation of 7ritish sovereignty in terms of foreign and defence policy. .n &+ 1ovember &'**, the 0rime 5inister announced to the -ouse of /ommons that he had decided to visit the European capital cities to see whether conditions were favourable for a 7ritish application for accession. ,n early &'*2, -arold Wilson and his Foreign %ecretary, George 7rown, carried out a series of visits to the leaders of the %i8. The reactions in the capital cities were mostly positive, owing to the fact that Eondon had stated its willingness to accept the terms of the treaties and to fulfil the same obligations as its future partners. The most muted welcome came once again from France, in particular because of the economic difficulties e8perienced by the $nited 6ingdom and the countrys special relationship with the $nited %tates in foreign policy matters which, in the eyes of the French 0resident, threatened to hinder FrancoHGerman plans for political cooperation. -owever, the 7ritish 0rime 5inister was convinced that lessons had

been learnt from the failure of the first application and that this time he would be able to convince General de Gaulle that 7ritish accession was essential. .n : 5ay, after ascertaining the reactions of the members of the /ommonwealth and EFT#, -arold Wilson announced to the -ouse of /ommons that the government had decided to apply for accession to the European /ommunities. The 0rime 5inisters announcement was approved by a large ma ority. .n && 5ay, with the backing of the ma ority in the main parties and a general public that had come to support the idea of accession, the 7ritish Government submitted to 7russels its second application for accession to the European /ommunities. #s with its first application in &'*&, the $nited 6ingdoms application for accession was accompanied by those of ,reland, 4enmark and 1orway. The reaction of the %i8 to the $nited 6ingdoms second application for accession .n && 5ay &'*2, the 7ritish Government submitted its second application for accession to the European /ommunities. %ince French 0resident /harles de Gaulle vetoed 7ritains first application for accession in &'*<, his position on the $nited 6ingdoms membership of the European /ommunities had not fundamentally changed. 7ut as Eondon was certain of the backing of Frances partners in the /ommunity, it believed that this time it would be possible to convince the French 0resident, especially given that the 7ritish Government had considerably reduced its demands in comparison with the first application for accession in &'*&. Frances partners in the /ommunity had already indicated that they were in favour of a second 7ritish application for accession, but uncertainty remained over General de Gaulles position. -is initial reaction prolonged the doubts about his intentions. -e e8pressed his support for an association between the /ommunities and the $nited 6ingdom, but did not officially oppose an enlargement of the /ommunities, thus enabling the 5ember %tates to e8amine the 7ritish application. Frances partners reacted favourably to the $nited 6ingdoms involvement and declared their support for a Europe of Ten. Eondon, however, was not content with association status, particularly as the 7ritish Government was willing to accept the /ommunity ac!uis and the terms of the treaties, sub ect to a few financial ad ustments and a transitional period for some of its trade. 5oreover, the $nited 6ingdom had e8pertise in the nuclear field and capabilities in new technologies, and accession would enable it to open up new markets and develop its technological industries. /onfident of this potential contribution and of the Fives support, -arold Wilson reiterated his re!uest for full accession. # lengthy period of discussions was therefore launched between France and the Five on the opening of accession negotiations and the conditions in which they should take place. Finally, in 9uly, in accordance with #rticle :<2 of the Treaty of =ome, the %i8 decided to ask for the opinion of the /ommission of the European /ommunities on the applications for accession of the $nited 6ingdom, ,reland, 4enmark and 1orway. .n :' %eptember &'*2, the /ommission delivered its opinion. ,t noted that, even though accession of the applicant countries would bring ma or changes, it would not modify the fundamental ob ectives and individual features of the European /ommunities or the methods they used. 7ut it also emphasised that the applicant countries must accept the /ommunity ac!uis, the term given to all the decisions adopted before enlargement, and criticised some problems in the 7ritish economy which would need to be settled before accession, such as the re"establishment of the balance of

payments e!uilibrium and the definition of the role of the pound sterling. 7efore giving its final opinion on the applications for accession of the applicant countries, the /ommission suggested the immediate opening of accession negotiations. The /ommissions opinion therefore did not enable the !uestion to be resolvedG the Five and France each found arguments in favour of their respective positions. France continued to e8press strong opposition to the immediate opening of accession negotiations, arguing that a solution first needed to be found to the 7ritish problems raised by the /ommission. General de Gaulles second veto .n :' %eptember &'*2, the /ommission of the European /ommunities delivered an opinion on the applications for accession of the $nited 6ingdom, ,reland, 4enmark and 1orway in which it proposed the immediate opening of accession negotiations with the applicant countries. 4espite this opinion, Frances partners in the /ommunity, who were in favour of the first enlargement of the /ommunities, continued to meet with opposition from General de Gaulle. The French 0resident pointed to the economic difficulties e8perienced by the $nited 6ingdom and demanded that a solution to the ma or problems be found before its accession to the /ommunities. $nlike the Five, 0aris was convinced that the $nited 6ingdoms accession to the /ommon 5arket, even on the condition that it accepted the terms laid down in the treaties, would fundamentally change the nature of the /ommunity and cause it to move in the direction of a single free trade area. #side from the economic arguments put forward to block the $nited 6ingdoms accession, the French 0resident had other concerns. 4espite the commitments made by his government in economic matters, the 7ritish 0rime 5inister did not agree with the French views on foreign and defence policy. -arold Wilson continued to advocate the need for $nited %tates involvement in European defence and re ected the establishment of a European nuclear force. The French 0resident feared that in an enlarged /ommunity, France would not only be at risk of encountering greater difficulties in defending its economic interests, but that it would also be in danger of losing its leadership role to a more #tlanticist policy with the arrival of the new 5ember %tates. .n &3 1ovember, the 7ritish Government was forced to devalue the pound sterling. The French 0resident did not hesitate to voice his reaction. -e believed that this was proof that the 7ritish economy was not ready to meet the conditions of the /ommon 5arket. .n :2 1ovember &'*2, even before the accession negotiations with the applicant countries could begin, General de Gaulle held a press conference in which he declared his opposition, for the second time, to the $nited 6ingdoms accession to the European /ommunities. ,n his statement, the French 0resident particularly emphasised the incompatibility of the 7ritish economy with /ommunity rules and stressed that the $nited 6ingdoms accession to the European /ommunities firstly re!uired that the country undergo a ma or political and economic transformation. -e reiterated his proposal for an association between the European Economic /ommunity and the applicant countries to promote trade, but Eondon immediately re ected the idea of an association, which would e8clude it from the /ommunity decision" making process. -owever, Frances partners in the /ommunity were not willing to accept this unilateral decision. They therefore tried to find alternative solutions to break the deadlock and maintain the prospect of accession for the applicant countries. 7ut all the proposals came up against the opposition of General de GaulleG he became increasingly isolated from the other 5ember

%tates and even went as far as threatening to leave the /ommunity if 7ritain were to accede. The difference of opinion between France and its partners on the issue of 7ritish accession affected the /ommunities activities. ,t became essential to find a solution to the 7ritish !uestion in order to break the deadlock and pursue the development of the /ommunities. The Fives mistrust of Frances European policy was increased when, in February &'*', the French 0resident proposed to the 7ritish #mbassador to 0aris, /hristopher %oames, that the $nited 6ingdom accede to a single European free trade area which would replace the /ommunity structures. The 7ritish 0rime 5inister, -arold Wilson, not only re ected Frances proposal but revealed its substance to the Five, thus contributing to Frances isolation. .nly when /harles de Gaulles tenure as 0resident of the French =epublic came to an end three months later were negotiations able to be relaunched.