Transmission Genetics of Isozyme Loci in Raphanus sativus (Brassicaceae): Stress-Dependent Non-Mendelian Segregation Author(s): N. Ellstrand and B.

Devlin Reviewed work(s): Source: American Journal of Botany, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 40-46 Published by: Botanical Society of America Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2444771 . Accessed: 15/11/2011 19:22
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Botanical Society of America is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Journal of Botany.

http://www.jstor.org

THE BI-LA KAYFADOCTRINE AND ITS FOUNDATIONS IN ISLAMIC THEOLOGY

BY

BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

s is well known, the anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur'an and the Sunna were generally treated by Muslim scholars in three different ways. Some scholars adopted the literal meanings of these expressions saying, e.g., that God has hands, face, legs and that He sits on His Throne and descends every night to the lowest heaven, and that He is angry or is happy'. On the basis of Qur'an verses that God is unlike anything2, some others, mainly rationalist thinkers, interpreted these anthropomorphisms in a figurative way. Thus, God's hand stands for His power and His sitting on the Throne means His rule over the world3. A third group embraced a middle way according to which one has to accept the sacred text as it is without trying to interpret its modality (kayfiyya), This last attitude toward anthropomorphism (tasbhh) occurs in Islamic theological works through the formula bi-ld kayfa, i.e., without asking how, or without comment4. An important contribution to the understanding of bi-Id kayfa was made by R.M. Frank (<<Elements)>, pp. 155-160) who proved that in Arabic the question koyfa applies to corporeal features, therefore any reference to anthropomorphic expression with the addition of the denial of

I See e.g., Qur'an 38.75, 28.88, 20.5, 4.93. The Sunna literature is replete with anthropomorphic traditions. For example: <<Godcreated Adam in His image>, <(The Almighty put His leg in the Fire,>, )(The believer's heart is between two of God's fingers,>. Al-Bagdadi, Usuil, p. 74f. Al-Sahrastani, Nihayat, p. 103f. Id., K. al-milal, p. 77, 11. 15-18. Al-Razi, Asa-sal-taqdis, passim. W.M. Watt, <<Createdin His Image,), pp. 38-49. For extensive collections of such traditions see al-Lalaka'i, Sarh, III, pp. 412-430. Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wUl, pp. 204-224, 270-276. Ibn Uuzayma, K. al-tawhzd, pp. 6-230. 2 See e.g., Qur'an 42.11, 112.4. 3 Abrahamov, al-Qdsim, p. 27. Id., Anthropomorphism, introduction. 4 (Affirmation de l'existence des attributs en refusant de s'interroger sur leur mode (kayf)>>, L. Gardet and M.M. Anawati, Introductiona la Theiologie Musulmane, Paris 1948, p. 66, n. 5.

? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1995

Arab9ca,

tome XLII

366

BINYAMIN

ABRAHAMOV

kayfameans to accept this expression as it is without attributing corporeal qualities to God. In Laoust's view the bi-ld kayfadoctrine is traced back to the Hanbalites. The Hanbalite scholar al-Barbahari (d. 941) defines exactly the Hanbalite approach saying that God should be described as He describes Himself and as the Prophet describes Him, without comment on ((how>)and ((why>).According to al-Barbahar1, the origin of this doctrine is the teaching of Malik ibn Anas (d. 795) and other fuqahd5. Malik is reported to have made the following statement, which, according to some sources, is a tradition going back to Muhammad or to one of the sahdba. (<God's sitting on the Throne is known (ma'luim), but its modality is unknown (al-kayf (istiwdl)6 maghul). The belief in the istiwa' is obligatory (al-fmdn bihi wdgib), and the inquiry about it is an innovation?>(al-su Idl Canhu bid'a)7. The idea of the affirmation of anthropomorphisms without commenting on them appears in a creed ('aqfda) ascribed to Ibn Hanbal. The term bi-ld kayfa, however, does not appear in it. Ibn Hanbal deals with God's face which appears in some Qur'anic verses8. (<God, may He be extolled and exalted, has a face unlike shapes which are formed (suwar musawwara) and substances which are limited (a!ydn muhattata), but a face which He has described in His verse: 'Everything will perish except His face' (Qur'an 28.88). Whoever changes the meaning of the verse, deviates from it (alhada 'anhu). It is a face in reality (haqfqa) and not in a figurative way (magaz). God's face is eternal and will not disappear, it is His attribute (sifa) which will not perish. Whoever claims that His face means His essence (nafsuhu)is a heretic and whoever changes its meaning is an unbeliever. Face in the Qur'an is not interpreted to mean a body, or a shape or a limit. Whoever says so is an innovator9.?) The constiH. Laoust, La Professionde Foi D'Ibn Batta, Damascus 1958, p. 102, n. 3, p. 87, n. 1. By fuqahd' al-Barbahari seems to refer to the imams of the jurisprudent schools, namely, Ibn Hanbal, al-Safi'i and Abu- Hanifa. 6 This statement refers to Qur5dn 20.5: <(The All-compassionate sate Himself upon the Throne,, (tr. Arberry). Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, p. 132f. Malik's statement has several versions. See e.g., al-Bada-di, Usul, p. 113 in which God's sitting is intelligible (al-istiwa' maCquil). 8 See e.g. Qur5an 2.115: ?To God belong the East and the West; whithersoever you turn, there is the Face of God,, (tr. Arberry). For a discussion of this issue in a work of a Zaydite imam prone to Mu'tazilism see my Anthropomorphism,intro(luction. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 'Aqida (according to the version of Abu Bakr al-Hallal), ed. 'Abd al-'Azlz Izz al-Din al-Sirawdn, Damascus 1988, p. 103.

BI-LA

KA YFA

367

tuents of the bi-ld kayfa doctrine can be derived from this passage. First, it is the denial of tasbah,both in its <<crude)) form, i.e., God is not a body, and in its <(soft)) form, God has not a shape of a body. Second, the word ((face))represents a reality and therefore it should not be interpreted in a figurative way (ta wi7) or changed in any other way. Thirdly, the word ((face))is an attribute, which means that it is equal to other attributes of God like (<God is hearing)> or (<God is Omniscient>>. And fourthly, the change of the meaning of a Qur'anic expression amounts to unbelief. To sum up, on the one hand, this method manifests God's incorporeality (against tasbah) and the authority of the Qur'an (against ta'wal which, according to the adherents of this theory means also ta'tal-i.e., divesting God of His attributes), and on the other, it attests to man's inability to know God's essence'0. The proponents of the bi-ld kayfadoctrine had to defend it against both the musabbihun and the mu'awwilun. Whereas they used a stock argument against anthropomorphism, already developed by the Mu'tazilites, to the effect that if God were like the created beings He would also be regarded as created and hence could not be eternal and God1", they had to set forth arguments to show why the Qur'an and the Sunna must not be interpreted figuratively in order to eschew tasbah. An examination of the works of several Muslim scholars, beginning with Ibn Qutayba (d. 889) and ending with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), reveals a variety of arguments in favour of bi-lId kayfa. These arguments, which are based on scriptural as well as linguistic, rational and philosophical considerations, are proof beyond doubt of the efforts made by Muslim scholars to render this doctrine sound and hence acceptable. The seeds of the justification of bi-ld kayfa were sown in the ninth century, and the <<tree>> has grown

'0 Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism, introduction. "1 This argument can be formulated in another way: Since any body is composed of parts, whereas God is one, and since any body is produced in time, whereas God is eternal, it is inconceivable to liken God to a body. Al-Baqillani, K. al-tamhid, pp. 191-193. Al-As"ari, K. al-lumac f l-radd cald ahl al-zayg wal-bidac, ed. and tr. R.J. McCarthy, in the Theologyof al-Asjcarl,Beirut 1953, p. 8, 1. 1, p. 9, 1. 18-p.10, 1. 8, p. 17, 1. 14. Al-Sahrastani, Nihayat, p. 105, 11. 8-10. AlMaturidi, K. al-tawhfd, p. 38, 11. 3-7. Al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (?), K. al-cadl waltawhJd wa-nafy al-gabr wal-tasbih, in Rasa-il al-cadl wal-tawhzid, ed. Muhammad clmara, Cairo 1971, I, p. 103.

368

BINYAMIN

ABRAHAMOV

during the ages. In the following an attempt will be made to bring forth and analyze these arguments. First we shall see how the Qur'an and the Sunna and their interpretations serve the proponents of bi-ld kayfa. Qur'an 21.23 is set forth to show that one should not engage himself in asking questions about God, because ((He is not to be questioned about His acts, whereas people are questioned (about their acts)>>12.Another justification of bi-ld kayfa is based on Qur'an 14.27 which reads: <<God does what He wills>). Abui Bakr Ahmad ibn-Husayn alBayhaqi (d. 1066) cites this verse as a corroboration for the thesis of the impossibility of knowing God's modality. (<Goddoes what He wills)>means, e.g., that He descends to the earth as He wills, and the conclusion implied is that His will cannot be known by man. According to al-Bayhaql, one should know the literal meaning of the anthropomorphic expressions of the Qur)an, but one (zadhir) cannot reveal their inner meaning (batin). These expressions are the ambiguous (mutasdbih)part of the Qur'an as against the self evident part (muhkam) of it which one can know its real meaning'3. Likewise, al-Guwayni uses the same verse to show that in the Qurdan there are secrets which people cannot know. These secrets have no connection to the carrying out of the religious precepts'4. Orthodox Muslim scholars also deny interpretations of anthropomorphic expressions in order to draw the conclusion that interpretation cannot be applied to these expressions and that they should remain as they are. Using the Kalam device of division

Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, p. 194. Al-Bayhaqi, al-Asma' wal-sitdt, Ddr Ihya' al-Turdt al-Arab1, Beirut n.d., pp. al-salaf wa-ashdb al453-457. Id., al-I'tiqdd wal-hiddya ild sabfl al-rasad ald ma4dhab hadft, ed. al-Sayyid al-6umayli, Beirut 1988, p. 94. Qur'dn 3.7 is the basis of the distinction between self-evident verses and ambiguous ones. It reads as follows: ,,It is He who brought down the Book; in it there are self-evident verses (muhkamdt) that are the basis of the Book (umm al-kitdb) and others that are ambiguous (mutasabihdt). Those who deviate from the right way follow the ambiguous verses for the purpose of [bringing about] dissension and of interpreting them (the ambiguous ones). Only God knows the interpretation of these verses (wa-md yaclamu ta wliahu illd allah). And the most erudite persons (al-rasihu-nfil-cilm) say we believe in them (the ambiguous verses), each one (every ambiguous or self-evident verse) is from God, and only the clever people pay attention to [it]>. For further ch. 2. details concerning this verse, see Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism, 1 Al-Guwayni, al-Sdmilfzusiil al-din, ed. cAll Sami al-Nassar, Alexandria 1969, p. 550f.
12 13

BI-LA

KAYFA

369

(qisma)'5, al-A'sarli denies the possibility of interpreting God's hands (Qur'an 38.75, 51,47) either as His organs, or His favours or His ability, and hence affirms God's hand without interpreting its meaning'6. To this he adds a hermeneutic rule directed toward the proponents of the figurative interpretation (magaz and elsewhere ta)wd): the literal meaning of a verse should not be replaced by a figurative meaning unless there is a proof which necessitates such a change'7. It is to be noted that those who adhere to the bi-Ia kayfa doctrine have as their principal opponents the adherents of the figurative interpretation and not the anthropomorphists, who were a minority among Muslim scholars. A hermeneutic rule against magaz, is, then, a rule in favour of bi-ld kayfa. A similar procedure is taken by al-Maturid1. All the possible interpretations of anthropomorphisms are cancelled on account of Qur'an 42.11, for if God is unlike anything, no attribute of this world can apply to Him. Moreover, in the case of many interpretations, no one can state definitely which is the true one'8. This point was further elaborated by Ibn Taymiyya. The proponents of ta)wil, says Ibn Taymiyya, base their use of ta'wil on the argument that reason cannot accept such notions as the people's seeing of God in the world to come, the uncreatedness of the Qur'an, the Resurrection and God's sitting on the Throne. However, reason is not a consistent device for solving such problems. This is proved through their using of reason; some of them claim that reason makes a certain notion possible or necessary, whereas others, concerning the same notion, say that reason makes it absurd19. Let us now show how Ibn Taymiyya interprets Qur'an verses in a rational manner to deny the figurative interpretation. The reference is to al-Gazali's interpretation of God's sitting on the Throne. According to Ibn Taymiyya, al-Gazall is one of those who deny God's raising Himself above the Throne. Al-Gazall states that this raising should be interpreted to mean God's ability over and
15 For this term, see J. van Ess, ,The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology>, in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. G.E. von Grunebaum, Wiesbaden 1970, pp. 40-42. 16 Al-As"arl, al-Ibana, p. 37. 17 Ibid., p. 39. 18 Al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhfd, pp. 67-85. Cf. Ibn al-Gawzl, Naqd al-Cilm walulama-'aw talbzs iblWs, Idarat al-Tib5ca al-Muniriyya, Cairo n.d., p. 85. 19 Ibn Taymiyya, cAqjdahamawiyya, p. 440. Cf. Abrahamov, <Jbn Taymiyya on the Agreement of Reason with Tradition,,, MW, 82,3-4 (1992), p. 259f.

370

BINYAMIN

ABRAHAMOV

overwhelming the Throne or God's being better than the Throne. Notwithstanding God's being above everything in the meaning of rule and power, He is near every existent, and He is nearer to man than the jugular vein20. God's nearness to man is understood by alGazdll as His knowledge of him. Ibn TIaymiyya does not agree with al-Gazdli for several reasons: a. Nearness is not expressed in the language only through knowledge or ability; b. It is well known through Qur'an verses (67.13-14, 20.7, 9.78, 43.80, 58.7) that God knows the overt and the hidden things, so that there is no reason to particularize the jugular vein in order to prove God's knowledge of man; c. The structure of the verse (see note 20) proves that God first affirms knowledge, and then nearness. Thus, nearness should not be interpreted as knowledge; d. The following two verses (50.17-18) which read: <<When the two angels (al-mutalaqqiydni) meet together, sitting one on the right, and one on the left, not a word he utters, but by him is an observer ready)> prove that those who are near to man are the angels, who write man's deeds every day, and not God's essence21. Consequently, the interpretation of God's nearness to man as God's knowledge of him is out of place here22. The method Ibn Taymiyya adopts is very interesting, for he proves here and in the following pages23 that some scholars have recourse to figurative interpretation without justification, since this interpretation is wrong from either the rational or linguistic point of view. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya denies the using of ta)wil. This denial proves the necessity of understanding the Qur'an verses according to their context, which, in other words, means to describe God as he describes Himself. It seems that the polemics of Ibn Taymiyya against ta)wil aims at paving the way for the bi-ld kayfa system. The rational use of a tradition in order to interpret another tradition also serves as a device for abrogating ta)wfl. Concerning God's attributes, says Ibn Qutayba, we reach the point which God's messenger reached. This means that one should not say about God's attributes more than what the Prophet said24. The reason
20 Qur'an 50.16: ,We indeed created man; and We know what his soul whispers within him, and We are nearer to him than the jugular vein>>, (tr. Arberry) 21 Cf. al-Tabarl, XI, 26, p. 100. 22 Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 368-371. 23 Ibn Taymiyya, op. cit., pp. 372-397. 24 Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wil, p. 208.

BI-LA

KAYFA

371

implicit in this assertion is the notion that the sacred texts are perfect and hence supply the believer with what he should know, and any addition to them is superfluous and leads to absurdities. Ibn Qutayba refers to a tradition which states that the believer's heart is between two of God's fingers. On the basis of God's otherness, he rejects the anthropomorphic perception of this tradition. But he also does not accept its figurative interpretation which regards God's finger as His favour. His repudiation of this interpretation is based on another tradition which speaks of the Prophet's prayer. The Prophet said: (<O He who turns about men's hearts (muqallib al-qulzib)25,fasten (labbit) my heart to Your religion!> Then one of his wives said: <(Do you fear for yourself?>>Muhammad answered: <The believer's heart is between two of God's fingers)). Now, says Ibn Qutayba, if, according to their view, the heart is between two of God's favours, and Muhammad is guarded by these two favours, why did he pray to God to fasten his heart to the religion, and why did he argue against his wife by quoting a tradition which affirms her question? If his heart had been protected by two of God's favours, he should not have feared. Therefore God's finger is not His favour26. After rejecting both the literal and the figurative interpretation of the text, there is nothing left but to accept it as it is. This kind of argument appears in Ibn Huzayma (d. 925). He rejects the interpretation of God's hands in the Qur'dnic phrase ((God's hands are outspread> as God's favours, because such an interpretation would mean that God has only two favours, which is absurd27. Both the preceding and the present examples have as their point of departure the adherence to the text, which if it is abandoned, will bring about irrational conclusions. For the purpose of defending the bi-ld kayfa doctrine, the Safi'ite scholar al-Ldlakad: (d. 1027) quotes a tradition on the authority of 'Umar ibn al-Hattab. It reads: <(Think on (tafakkard) God's creation and do not think on God!>>28This prohibition to deal with God's
25 This phrase seems to be derived from Qur'dn 6.110: .We shall turn about their hearts (wa-nuqallibu af'idatahum) and their eyes, even as they believed not in it the first time; and We shall leave them in their insolence wandering blindly> (tr. Arberry). 26 Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wdl, pp. 208-210. 27 Ibn Huzayma, K. al-Tawhfd, p. 85. 28 Al-Lalakadi, Sarh, III, p. 524. Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi, ItbJt sifat al-uluww, ed. Ahmad ibn CAtiyya ibn 'All al-Gamidi, al-Madina 1407 H., p. 155.

372

BINYAMIN

ABRAHAMOV

essence is further elaborated by another Safi'ite scholar Abiu alQasim al-Taymi (d. 1140) who quotes Ibn Mandah (d. 1004) as saying the following: ((God's messenger ordered not to deal with and discuss God through rational arguments and to avoid what would bring about doubts)>29. According to Abiu al-Qasim alTaymi, discussing God's names and attributes and not keeping silent about what the Prophet's Companions (sahdba) and their followers (tdbi'uin)kept silent amounts to an innovation (bid'a)30. The end of this statement alludes to the principle of igma' (general consensus), which is one of the bases of Islamic jurisprudence. Here it is the consensus of the first two generations of Muslim scholars. The Ascarite theologian al-Guwayni (d. 1085) plainly states that the Prophet's Companions and their followers neither interpreted anthropomorphic expressions nor did they deal with figurative interpretation. One has to follow the igma' of those scholars31. After presenting arguments based on the Qur'an, the Sunna and the igma'c,we shall now turn to the linguistic or logical argument. The essential part of this argument is the use of the term <<common name)). A common name is a name which applies to some objects. It can be either a name of different objects which have no common traits, or which partake of one or more attributes32. A common name may have a different meaning in each object to which it applies. Ibn Huzayma brings examples from the Qur'an to ('azaz) applies in illustrate this phenomenon. The word ((mighty>> the Qur'an both to God and to men; the master of Yuisuf in Egypt as well as Yiusuf himself are named mighty33. Likewise other words (e.g., powerful- cazim,gabbdr, knowing-'al/m) which apply to God apply also to men and to created entities. The same rule should be followed when dealing with words such as face and hand which apply both to God and to men but apply to God. Just as ((mighty>?
Al-Taymi, al-Huga, vol. I, p. 98. Ibid., p. 104. 31 Al-Guwayni, al- Aqfdaal-niza-miyya,ed. Muhammad Zahid al-Kawtari, Cairo hamawiyya, p. 464. 1948, p. 23f. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, CAqfda 32 For the various kinds of common name, see Maimonides, Introductionto Logic in the Hebrew Versionof Moses ibn Tibbon, (Milot Ha-higayon), ed. L. Roth, Jerusalem 1965, ch. 13. On one kind of common name, an amphibolous name, see H.A. Wolfson, <(The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides>>, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 1, Cambridge Mass. 1979, pp. 455-477.
29

30

33

Qur'an 12.30, 78.

BI-LA

KA YFA

373

in different meanings, so <face>> and ((hand))apply both to God and to men in different meanings. One does not know the real meaning of mighty when applying to God, and therefore one cannot know the real meaning of face when applying to God. It follows that there is no ground for the thesis of the interpretation of the anthropomorphic expressions in a figurative way, for if each word in the Qur'an which has double application (both to God and to created things) brings about tasbfh, then whoever believes in the Qur'an is a likener (musabbih), which is absurd34. Ibn Huzayma's implied conclusion that without common names one can know nothing about God, and hence the use of common names is a necessity, is stated plainly by al-Maturidi (d. 944). According to al-Maturidl, abstaining from using common names leads to divesting God of His attributes (ta 'tfl), which means ignorance of God, whereas affirming the literal meaning of a word applying to God means taibih. Therefore it is necessary to employ a middle way; to adhere to the common name while denying the application of the usual meaning to God. Thus, God is a knower unlike other knowers. In like manner, both the reward and the punishment of the world to come are perceived by the people through the Qur'an's speaking of the pleasures and injuries of this world35. The notion that using common names does not necessitate likening God to created entities is further developed by Ibn Taymiyya. He says that if God were like man because both God and man are designated as being knowing, living and compassionate, then every existent would be like every other existent, because all existents share the attribute of existence. Thus, that a thing takes part in one attribute with another thing does not entail total likeness of the two things. If this statement is right with regard to two created things,

Ibn Huzayma, K. al-Tawh'd, pp. 24-36, 84-85. Al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid, p. 42, 11. 14-22. Cf. al-Gazall, al-Maqsad al-asnafisarh asma' alldh al-husna, ed. Muhammad Mustafa Abiu al-'Ala, Cairo n.d., p. 41. It is worth noting that with regard to the notion that the Scripture does not set forth the real meaning of the world to come al-Maturidi's stand resembles the philosopher's. Cf. R. Walzer, Al-Fdrdbi on the Perfect State: Abui Nasr al-FdrdbUs Mabddi'Ara'Ahl al-Madina al-Fddila, a rev. text with intr., trans., and commentary, Oxford 1985, pp. 474-480. But whereas the philosopher thinks that the descriptions of the world to come are no more than symbols of the truth, the theologican does not know what are the meanings of these descriptions.
34 35

374

BINYAMIN

ABRAHAMOV

the more so with regard to God in relation to the created entities36. The knowledge of the hidden things, says Ibn Taymiyya, is attained through the existent things. One cannot know what is power, knowledge or speech of another unless one knows these things through his own experience. If this process did not take place, there would be no possibility of learning, and a man would know only the objects of his senses. Like al-Maturdfi, he brings the example of the world to come which is described in the Scripture in terms known to every man in order to make people understand God's promise. In some aspects there is agreement and similarity between the existents of this world and the existents in the world to come. However, the difference between these two kinds of existents, which are created, is known only to God. In this context, Ibn Taymiyya uses the verse quoted above (Qur'an 3.7. n. 13 above); <only God knows its interpretation)> (wamdyaClamuta'wUlahu iladallih). The verse continues as follows: walfil-'ilmyaquluna dmanndbihi. The last sentence can be interrasiLhuin preted to mean either that those who are well rooted in knowledge know its interpretation (the wa being a conjunctive particle waw al-'atJ), or that those who are well rooted in knowledge say: ((We have believed in it)>(in its interpretation), which means that they do not know its interpretation. Now, according to Ibn Taymiyya, these two interpretations are right, although at first sight they seem contradictory, but refer to two different aspects; the first interpretation refers to the meaning of the words, which is known to those scholars, whereas the second refers to the modality (kayfiyya) of these words which only God knows (In this case the wa of walrasihun is waw al-ibtidd' in the meaning of (<whereas>)).Consequently, the forefathers (al-salaf), like Malik ibn Anas, explains Ibn Taymiyya, said: God's sitting upon the Throne is known, but its modality is unknown. According to him, the forefathers combined these two interpretations to create this famous formula37. Another tradition is set forth to corroborate the bi-ld kayfa doctrine. According to this tradition the Qur'an interpretation is divided into four aspects: a. interpretation which is known through the language, i.e., the knowledge of the literal meaning of the words; b. interpretation which no one can excuse because of his ignorance, i.e.,
36

37

Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Taymiyya,

Sarh, pp. 75-77, 84f. op. cit., pp. 104-108.

BI-LA

KAYFA

375

the knowledge of precepts; c. interpretation which is known to the scholars; d. interpretation which is known only to God38. As we have seen, the use of the common names is important regarding the people's knowledge of the world. But more important is the knowledge gained through the common names concerning God. The outcome of this knowledge is belief in God and the desire to worship Him (Sarh, p. 111). Thus, common names have an important function from the religious point of view. In his al-Nuagafr baydnal-mahaga wa-sarh Caqfdat ahl al-sunna, the Saficite scholar Abui al-Qasim al-Taym1 reasons the use of the middle way (the bi-ld kayfa) through understanding the relation between God's essence and attributes. He states that the discussion of God's attributes (sifat) branches off the discussion of His essence (ddt). Now, the affirmation of God's essence is only an affirmation of existence and not of modality, hence the affirmation of God's attributes is also only an affirmation of existence39. Abiu al-Qasim al-Taymi does not explain why the discussion of God's attributes branches off the discussion of His essence. This was done later on by Ibn Taymiyya. According to Ibn Taymiyya, in reality there is no essence which is free from its attributes40. An essence which is free from its attributes exists only in one's intellect. No one can affirm the existence of a man without qualifying him through life, power, moving, speaking, etc. Therefore, the forefathers called the deniers of God's attributes (nufdt al-sifdt) the abrogators (mu'atilla), because they abrogated God's essence, even if they did not know that their notion of abrogating God's attributes entailed the abrogation of God's essence. The connection between God's essence and His attributes demonstrates the idea that the attributes cannot be interpreted and hence known, that is, for if God's essence is unknown according to reason and the Qur'an (42.11: <<Thereis no one like

38 Ibid., p. 109. Cf. al-Tabari, I, 1, p. 26. Y. Goldfeld, <<TheDevelopment of Theory of Qur'anic Exegesis in Islamic Scholarship,,, Studia Islamica 67 (1988), p. 18f. It is not our concern to discuss the four aspects in this tradition, but attention should be paid to the overlapping of them. 39 Al-Taymi, al-Hugga, I, p. 175. 40 Ibn Taymiyya, Dar' tacdrudal-caql wal-naql, ed. Muhammad Rasad Salim, Riyad 1979, III, p. 20. Cf. H. Laoust, Essai sur les doctrinessociales et politiques de Takf-D-Din Ahmad B. Taimjya, Cairo 1939, p. 160.

376

BINYAMIN

ABRAHAMOV

Him)> and 112.4: ((No one is equal to Him))), His attributes should also remain unknown41. In al-Lalakal the impossibility of knowing God is derived from the impossibility of knowing the world. If we cannot know the created beings, all the more so we cannot know the Creator42. This argument is formulated in a slightly different manner in Ibn Taymiyya: ((The proof of the intellect's inability to know the true meaning of God's attribute (tahqzq syfatihi)is its inability to know the attribute of the smallest of God's created beings>43. On the other hand, the understanding of processes which take place in created beings helps man to understand the impossibility of knowing God's attributes. Ibn Taymiyya regards motion as a genus which has four species. These are: a. motion concerning modality (harakaffl-kayf). It means the change of an attribute in a thing: a thing which is red turns to be black. In like manner, one's knowledge after one's ignorance is deemed a motion; b. motion concerning quantity (harakaff 1-kam),e.g., a body which is small becomes big; c. motion concerning state (harakafifl-wad'), e.g., the rotation of a thing in one place. The millstone rotates in one place, but its state changes every moment; d. motion concerning place (4arakajfI-'ayn), e.g., the passing from one place to another44. The three last kinds refer to bodily features, whereas the first one can apply to changes in one's soul. There is a difference between the motion of the body and the motion of the soul. The soul is qualified by attributes which cannot qualify the body. The same rule applies to the angels, whose attributes and motions are different from those of the soul. Now, the possibility that God, the most perfect of all beings, has attributes which are different from the attributes of the created beings, is more likely than the possibility of the difference of attributes among the created beings themselves. The body's descent is different from the spirit's descent, and God's descent is more sublime than the descent of the former. Therefore, it is not impossible that God descends from the Throne while the Throne is not empty of Him45. Faithful to the bi-ld kayfa method, Ibn Taymiyya

4'
42

43
44

45

Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 72-74. Al-Lalakd'i, Sarh usud, p. 530. p. 443. 'Aqjda hamawzjyya, Cf. Ibn Sind, K. al-Nagdt, ed. Magid Fahri, Beirut 1985, p. 143. Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 301-304, 400, 445-455.

BI-LA

KA YFA

377

does not trv to explain how God descends, but only to demonstrate that it is possibly different from the descent of other entities. Another attitude toward bi-ld kayfa is advanced by al-Gazdll (d. 1 1 1 1). Adhering to his way of differentiating between the common people (al-Cawamm)and the elite (al-hawdSS)46 al-Gazali states that al-cawamm cannot understand figurative interpretation, hence the bi-ld kayfa system is dedicated to them. However, the learned ones are able to use the figurative interpretation47. Al-Gazall, thus, does not explain the bi-ld kayfadoctrine but applies it to a kind of people. In doing this, he differs from the As'arite tradition in which bi-Ia kayfa and tawUl occur without such a differentiation48.
H. Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in al-Ghazzdll, Jerusalem 1975, pp. 353-355. Al-Gazdli, al-Iqtisddfl-iCtiqdd, Cairo 1971, p. 26f. 48 On the differences between al-Gazali's teachings and the A'sarites) see K. Nakamura, <Was Ghazali an AshCarite?,,, Memoirs of the ResearchDepartmentof the Toyo Bunko, Tokyo 51 (1993), pp. 1-24. A different reference to the common people in connection with the issue of God's corporeality is made by Ibn Rusd (d. 1198). In his Mandhig al-adillafr Caqdaid al-milla, Ibn Rusd states that one should follow the religious way (minhag'al-sar') in dealing with anthropomorphic expressions. According to this way, and contrary to the bi-ld kayfa doctrine, it is forbidden either to deny or to affirm these expressions, and whoever of the common people asks about them will be answered through Qur'an 42.11, and will be prohibited from asking. Ibn Rusd, Mandhig, p. 172. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, p. 258. Three reasons are brought forward in favour of this approach: a. The Mutakallimzin's proof that God is not a body is not demonstrative (burha-nzyya).Ibn Rusd, ibid., pp. 138-145. (According to the Mutakallimu-n each body is generated, since it is composed of atoms (gawdhir) and accidents (aCrd . Accidents are generated, therefore bodies, which are not free of accidents, must also be generated. Cf. H.A. Davidson, Proofsfor Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, New York and Oxford 1987, pp. 134-146.) If it were demonstrative, most of the common people could not attain it. Furthermore, the Mutakallimun hold that God is an essence to which attributes are added (sifa-t zadida 'ald al-dc-t). (Ibn Rusd refers to sifdt ma nawjyya. Cf. al-Guwayni, K. al-Irsdd ild qawatic al-adilla ft usil al-iCtiqdd, ed. Ascad Tamim, Beirut 1985, pp. 51f., 77ff.) This notion entails God's corporeality more than the denial of it. That is, since there is an attribute and a substance qualified by this attribute, and this is the state of a body. Ibn Rusd, Mandhig, p. 166f. As a result, the Scripture does not state plainly that God is not a body; b. The common people consider the existent as that which is perceived by the senses and imagination, and that which is not perceived by them is nonexistent. Thus, if they are told that there is an existent which is not a body, they will not be able to perceive this existent through imagination, and hence they will consider it as nonexistent. The more so, if they are told that this existent is neither outside the world nor inside it, neither above the world nor below it; c. The denial of God's corporeality brings about doubts as to some religious issues, e.g., the Resurrection and the people's seeing of God in the hereafter. Whoever denies God's corporeality denies His movement, which means that God will not come to judge the people contrary to Qur'an verses (e.g., 89.22). Likewise, in stating that God is not
46 47

378

BiNYAMIN

ABRAHAMOV

In this article we have seen how bi-ld kayfa has developed from a mere formula in the Hadit literature into a doctrine based on various kinds of arguments, some of which seem to be very convincing. As we have seen, these arguments had a dual function; on the one hand, they served as a weapon against anthropomorphism and against figurative interpretation, and on the other, they aimed at strengthening the thesis of the unknowability of God's essence and attributes. Al-Gazall is an exception, for he considered the bi-ld kayfa doctrine as a good device only for a certain type of people.

ABBREVIATIONS and InterpretaAbrahamov, Anthropomorphism= B. Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism tion of the Qur'an in the Theologyof al-Qdsim ibn Ibrihim, K. al-Mustarshid, Leiden (forthcoming). Abrahamov, al-Qdsim = B. Abrahamov, Al-IKdsimB. Ibrdhfmon the Proof of God's Existence, Kitab al-Dalt al-KabTr, Leiden 1990. Arberry = A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted,Oxford 1983. al-As"arl, al-Ibana = al-AsCari, al-Ibdna can usul al-dajyana,Idarat al-Tibd'a alMuniriyya, Cairo n.d. al-Bagdadi, Usiil = al-Bagdddi, K. Usuil al-dan, Istanbul 1928. al-Baqillani, K. al-Tamhfd = al-Baqillhni, K. al- Tamhfd, ed. R.J. McCarthy, Beirut 1957. Frank, <Elements>> = R. M. Frank, <,Elements in the Development of the Teaching of al-Ash'arl,, Le Muse'on 104 (1991), pp. 141-190. Ibn Huzayma, K. al-Tawhfd = Muhammad ibn Ishaq ibn Huzayma, K. alTawhid wa-itbdt sifdt al-rabb, ed. Muhammad Halil Harks, Beirut and Cairo 1988. Ibn Kutayba, Ta'wil = Ibn Kutayba, Tawfl muhtalif al-hadat, ed. Muhammad Zuhri al-Naggr, Cairo 1966. Ibn Rusd, ManJhig = Ibn Rusd, Mandhig al-adilla ft caqdaidal-milla, ed. Mahmuid Qasim, Cairo 1969.

a body, it is impossible to interpret the tradition concerning God's descent to the earth (hadit al-nuzfJ). To sum up, according to Ibn Rusd, from a religious point of view, it is better not to cancel plainly the literal meanings of the Book, for they are more persuasive, and hence more believable, than the non-demonstrative views of the adherents of the figurative interpretation. Ibid., pp. 171-174. Thus, Ibn Rusd justifies his stand on the grounds of its being a pedagogical device which aims at benefiting most of the people. The figurative interpretation is rejected because it cannot serve the common people. A similar stand was adopted by Ihwdn al-Safa' who permitted the common people (considered by them as the unlearned) to use anthropomorphic expressions in order to make them believe in God's existence and hence carry out his precepts. Rasa-il ihwdn al-safid, Beirut 1957 (rep. of Hayr al-Din al-Zirikli's edition, Cairo 1928, III, p. 515. I.R. Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, An Introductionto the Thought of the Brethrenof Purity (Ikhwdn al-SafJ'), London 1982, p. 40.

BI-LA

KAYFA

379

Ibn Taymiyya, CAqfda hamawzyya = Ibn Taymiyya, al-CAqfda al-hamawiyya al-kubra, in Magmu`at al-rasd'il al-kubra-,Beirut 1972, I, pp. 425-478. Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh = Ibn Taymiyya, Su'dlfh kadit al-nuziil wa-gawdbuhu aw sarh hadit al-nuziil, ed. Muhammad ibn CAbd al-Rahman al-Hamis, Riyad 1993. al-Lalakd'i, Sarh = Abfi al-Qasim Hibat Allah ibn al-Hasan ibn Mansuir alTabari al-Ldlakd'l, Sarh usuilictiqdd ahl al-sunna wal-g'amaca,ed. Ahmad SaCd Hamdan, Makka 1402 H. al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid = al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid, ed. Fathalla Kholeif, Beirut 1970. al-Razli, Asa-sal-taqdis = Fahr al-Din al-Razi, Asas al-taqdfs fi cilm al-kaldm, Cairo 1935. al-Sahrastani, K. al-Milal = al-Sahrastani, K. al-Milal wal-nihal, ed. W. Cureton, Leipzig 1923 (rep. of London 1846). al-Sahrastani, Nihdyat = al-Sahrastani, Niha-yat al-aqddmft cilm al-kaldm, ed. A. Guillaume, Oxford 1931. al-Tabarl = al-Tabari, Gdmical-bayanfttafszr al-Qurdn, Beirut 1986 (rep. of Bulaq 1323 H.). al-Taymi, al-Huga = Abu al-Qasim Ismacil ibn Muhammad ibn al-Fadl alTaymi al-Isbahani, al-N.ugaafitbayanal-mahaggawa-s`ar4caqidatahl al-sunna, ed. Muhammad ibn Rabic al-Madhall, Riyad. 1990. Watt, <Created in His Image,, = W.M. Watt, <Created in His Image,,, The Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society 18(1962), pp. 38-49.