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Politics
By Aristotle Commentary: Quite a few comments ha e !een posted a!out "olitics# Download: A te$t-only ersion is a aila!le for download# Politics By Aristotle %ritten &'( B#C#) *ranslated !y Ben+amin ,owett
*a!le of Contents

Book Three Part I He who would in-uire into the essence and attri!utes of arious kinds of .o ernments must first of all determine /%hat is a state0/ At present this is a disputed -uestion# Some say that the state has done a certain act1 others2 no2 not the state2 !ut the oli.archy or the tyrant# And the le.islator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state1 a constitution or .o ernment !ein. an arran.ement of the inha!itants of a state# But a state is composite2 like any other whole made up of many parts1 these are the citi3ens2 who compose it# 4t is e ident2 therefore2 that we must !e.in !y askin.2 %hois the citi3en2 and what is the meanin. of the term0 5or here a.ain there may !e a difference of opinion# He who is a citi3en in a democracy will often not !e a citi3en in an oli.archy# 6ea in. out of consideration those who ha e !een made citi3ens2 or who ha e o!tained the name of citi3en any other accidental manner2 we may say2 first2 that a citi3en is not a citi3en !ecause he li es in a certain place2 for resident aliens and sla es share in the place1 nor is he a citi3en who has no le.al ri.ht e$cept that of suin. and !ein. sued1 for this ri.ht may !e en+oyed under the pro isions of a treaty# 7ay2 resident aliens in many places do not possess e en such ri.hts completely2 for they are o!li.ed to ha e a patron2 so that they do !ut imperfectly participate in citi3enship2 and we call them citi3ens only in a -ualified sense2 as we mi.ht apply the term to children who are too youn. to !e on the re.ister2 or to old men who ha e !een relie ed from state

duties# Of these we do not say -uite simply that they are citi3ens2 !ut add in the one case that they are not of a.e2 and in the other2 that they are past the a.e2 or somethin. of that sort1 the precise e$pression is immaterial2 for our meanin. is clear# Similar difficulties to those which 4 ha e mentioned may !e raised and answered a!out depri ed citi3ens and a!out e$iles# But the citi3en whom we are seekin. to define is a citi3en in the strictest sense2 a.ainst whom no such e$ception can !e taken2 and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of +ustice2 and in offices# 7ow of offices some are discontinuous2 and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice2 or can only hold them after a fi$ed inter al1 others ha e no limit of time- for e$ample2 the office of a dicast or ecclesiast# 4t may2 indeed2 !e ar.ued that these are not ma.istrates at all2 and that their functions .i e them no share in the .o ernment# But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who ha e the power do not .o ern# 6et us not dwell further upon this2 which is a purely er!al -uestion1 what we want is a common term includin. !oth dicast and ecclesiast# 6et us2 for the sake of distinction2 call it /indefinite office2/ and we will assume that those who share in such office are citi3ens# *his is the most comprehensi e definition of a citi3en2 and !est suits all those who are .enerally so called# But we must not for.et that thin.s of which the underlyin. principles differ in kind2 one of them !ein. first2 another second2 another third2 ha e2 when re.arded in this relation2 nothin.2 or hardly anythin.2 worth mentionin. in common# 7ow we see that .o ernments differ in kind2 and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior1 those which are faulty or per erted are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect# 8%hat we mean !y per ersion will !e hereafter e$plained#9 *he citi3en then of necessity differs under each form of .o ernment1 and our definition is !est adapted to the citi3en of a democracy1 !ut not necessarily to other states# 5or in some states the people are not acknowled.ed2 nor ha e they any re.ular assem!ly2 !ut only e$traordinary ones1 and suits are distri!uted !y sections amon. the ma.istrates# At 6acedaemon2 for instance2 the )phors determine suits a!out contracts2 which they distri!ute amon. themsel es2 while the elders are +ud.es of homicide2 and other causes are decided !y other ma.istrates# A similar principle pre ails at Cartha.e1 there certain ma.istrates decide all causes# %e may2 indeed2 modify our definition of the citi3en so as to include these states# 4n them it is the holder of a definite2 not of an indefinite office2 who le.islates and +ud.es2 and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reser ed the ri.ht of deli!eratin. or +ud.in. a!out some thin.s or a!out all thin.s# *he conception of the citi3en now !e.ins to clear up# He who has the power to take part in the deli!erati e or +udicial administration of any state is said !y us to !e a citi3ens of that state1 and2 speakin. .enerally2 a state is a !ody of citi3ens sufficin. for the purposes of life# Part II

But in practice a citi3en is defined to !e one of whom !oth the parents are citi3ens1 others insist on .oin. further !ack1 say to two or three or more ancestors# *his is a short and practical definition !ut there are some who raise the further -uestion: How this third or fourth ancestor came to !e a citi3en0 ;or.ias of 6eontini2 partly !ecause he was in a difficulty2 partly in irony2 said- /Mortars are what is made !y the mortar-makers2 and the citi3ens of 6arissa are those who are made !y the ma.istrates1 for it is their trade to make 6arissaeans#/ <et the -uestion is really simple2 for2 if accordin. to the definition +ust .i en they shared in the .o ernment2 they were citi3ens# *his is a !etter definition than the other# 5or the words2 /!orn of a father or mother who is a citi3en2/ cannot possi!ly apply to the first inha!itants or founders of a state# *here is a .reater difficulty in the case of those who ha e !een made citi3ens after a re olution2 as !y Cleisthenes at Athens after the e$pulsion of the tyrants2 for he enrolled in tri!es many metics2 !oth stran.ers and sla es# *he dou!t in these cases is2 not who is2 !ut whether he who is ou.ht to !e a citi3en1 and there will still !e a furtherin. the state2 whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state1 for what ou.ht not to !e is what is false# 7ow2 there are some who hold office2 and yet ou.ht not to hold office2 whom we descri!e as rulin.2 !ut rulin. un+ustly# And the citi3en was defined !y the fact of his holdin. some kind of rule or office- he who holds a +udicial or le.islati e office fulfills our definition of a citi3en# 4t is e ident2 therefore2 that the citi3ens a!out whom the dou!t has arisen must !e called citi3ens# Part III %hether they ou.ht to !e so or not is a -uestion which is !ound up with the pre ious in-uiry# 5or a parallel -uestion is raised respectin. the state2 whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state1 for e$ample2 in the transition from an oli.archy or a tyranny to a democracy# 4n such cases persons refuse to fulfill their contracts or any other o!li.ations2 on the .round that the tyrant2 and not the state2 contracted them1 they ar.ue that some constitutions are esta!lished !y force2 and not for the sake of the common .ood# But this would apply e-ually to democracies2 for they too may !e founded on iolence2 and then the acts of the democracy will !e neither more nor less acts of the state in -uestion than those of an oli.archy or of a tyranny# *his -uestion runs up into another: on what principle shall we e er say that the state is the same2 or different0 4t would !e a ery superficial iew which considered only the place and the inha!itants 8for the soil and the population may !e separated2 and some of the inha!itants may li e in one place and some in another9# *his2 howe er2 is not a ery serious difficulty1 we need only remark that the word /state/ is am!i.uous# 4t is further asked: %hen are men2 li in. in the same place2 to !e re.arded as a sin.le city- what is the limit0 Certainly not the wall of the city2 for you mi.ht surround all "eloponnesus with a wall# 6ike this2 we may say2 is Ba!ylon2 and

e ery city that has the compass of a nation rather than a city1 Ba!ylon2 they say2 had !een taken for three days !efore some part of the inha!itants !ecame aware of the fact# *his difficulty may2 howe er2 with ad anta.e !e deferred to another occasion1 the statesman has to consider the si3e of the state2 and whether it should consist of more than one nation or not# A.ain2 shall we say that while the race of inha!itants2 as well as their place of a!ode2 remain the same2 the city is also the same2 althou.h the citi3ens are always dyin. and !ein. !orn2 as we call ri ers and fountains the same2 althou.h the water is always flowin. away and comin. a.ain Or shall we say that the .enerations of men2 like the ri ers2 are the same2 !ut that the state chan.es0 5or2 since the state is a partnership2 and is a partnership of citi3ens in a constitution2 when the form of .o ernment chan.es2 and !ecomes different2 then it may !e supposed that the state is no lon.er the same2 +ust as a tra.ic differs from a comic chorus2 althou.h the mem!ers of !oth may !e identical# And in this manner we speak of e ery union or composition of elements as different when the form of their composition alters1 for e$ample2 a scale containin. the same sounds is said to !e different2 accordin.ly as the Dorian or the "hry.ian mode is employed# And if this is true it is e ident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution2 and it may !e called or not called !y the same name2 whether the inha!itants are the same or entirely different# 4t is -uite another -uestion2 whether a state ou.ht or ou.ht not to fulfill en.a.ements when the form of .o ernment chan.es# Part IV *here is a point nearly allied to the precedin.: %hether the irtue of a .ood man and a .ood citi3en is the same or not# But2 !efore enterin. on this discussion2 we must certainly first o!tain some .eneral notion of the irtue of the citi3en# 6ike the sailor2 the citi3en is a mem!er of a community# 7ow2 sailors ha e different functions2 for one of them is a rower2 another a pilot2 and a third a look-out man2 a fourth is descri!ed !y some similar term1 and while the precise definition of each indi idual/s irtue applies e$clusi ely to him2 there is2 at the same time2 a common definition applica!le to them all# 5or they ha e all of them a common o!+ect2 which is safety in na i.ation# Similarly2 one citi3en differs from another2 !ut the sal ation of the community is the common !usiness of them all# *his community is the constitution1 the irtue of the citi3en must therefore !e relati e to the constitution of which he is a mem!er# 4f2 then2 there are many forms of .o ernment2 it is e ident that there is not one sin.le irtue of the .ood citi3en which is perfect irtue# But we say that the .ood man is he who has one sin.le irtue which is perfect irtue# Hence it is e ident that the .ood citi3en need not of necessity possess the irtue which makes a .ood man# *he same -uestion may also !e approached !y another road2 from a consideration of the !est constitution# 4f the state cannot !e entirely composed of .ood men2 and

yet each citi3en is e$pected to do his own !usiness well2 and must therefore ha e irtue2 still in a smuch as all the citi3ens cannot !e alike2 the irtue of the citi3en and of the .ood man cannot coincide# All must ha e the irtue of the .ood citi3enthus2 and thus only2 can the state !e perfect1 !ut they will not ha e the irtue of a .ood man2 unless we assume that in the .ood state all the citi3ens must !e .ood# A.ain2 the state2 as composed of unlikes2 may !e compared to the li in. !ein.: as the first elements into which a li in. !ein. is resol ed are soul and !ody2 as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite2 the family of hus!and and wife2 property of master and sla e2 so of all these2 as well as other dissimilar elements2 the state is composed1 and2 therefore2 the irtue of all the citi3ens cannot possi!ly !e the same2 any more than the e$cellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands !y his side# 4 ha e said enou.h to show why the two kinds of irtue cannot !e a!solutely and always the same# But will there then !e no case in which the irtue of the .ood citi3en and the irtue of the .ood man coincide0 *o this we answer that the .ood ruler is a .ood and wise man2 and that he who would !e a statesman must !e a wise man# And some persons say that e en the education of the ruler should !e of a special kind1 for are not the children of kin.s instructed in ridin. and military e$ercises0 As )uripides says: =7o su!tle arts for me2 !ut what the state re-uires# = As thou.h there were a special education needed !y a ruler# 4f then the irtue of a .ood ruler is the same as that of a .ood man2 and we assume further that the su!+ect is a citi3en as well as the ruler2 the irtue of the .ood citi3en and the irtue of the .ood man cannot !e a!solutely the same2 althou.h in some cases they may1 for the irtue of a ruler differs from that of a citi3en# 4t was the sense of this difference which made ,ason say that /he felt hun.ry when he was not a tyrant2/ meanin. that he could not endure to li e in a pri ate station# But2 on the other hand2 it may !e ar.ued that men are praised for knowin. !oth how to rule and how to o!ey2 and he is said to !e a citi3en of appro ed irtue who is a!le to do !oth# 7ow if we suppose the irtue of a .ood man to !e that which rules2 and the irtue of the citi3en to include rulin. and o!eyin.2 it cannot !e said that they are e-ually worthy of praise# Since2 then2 it is sometimes thou.ht that the ruler and the ruled must learn different thin.s and not the same2 !ut that the citi3en must know and share in them !oth2 the inference is o! ious# *here is2 indeed2 the rule of a master2 which is concerned with menial offices- the master need not know how to perform these2 !ut may employ others in the e$ecution of them: the other would !e de.radin.1 and !y the other 4 mean the power actually to do menialduties2 which ary much in character and are e$ecuted !y arious classes of sla es2 such2 for e$ample2 as handicraftsmen2 who2 as their name si.nifies2 li e !y the la!or of their hands: under these the mechanic is included# Hence in ancient times2 and amon. some nations2 the workin. classes had no share in the .o ernment- a pri ile.e which they only ac-uired under the e$treme democracy# Certainly the .ood man and the statesman

and the .ood citi3en ou.ht not to learn the crafts of inferiors e$cept for their own occasional use1 if they ha!itually practice them2 there will cease to !e a distinction !etween master and sla e# *his is not the rule of which we are speakin.1 !ut there is a rule of another kind2 which is e$ercised o er freemen and e-uals !y !irth -a constitutional rule2 which the ruler must learn !y o!eyin.2 as he would learn the duties of a .eneral of ca alry !y !ein. under the orders of a .eneral of ca alry2 or the duties of a .eneral of infantry !y !ein. under the orders of a .eneral of infantry2 and !y ha in. had the command of a re.iment and of a company# 4t has !een well said that /he who has ne er learned to o!ey cannot !e a .ood commander#/ *he two are not the same2 !ut the .ood citi3en ou.ht to !e capa!le of !oth1 he should know how to .o ern like a freeman2 and how to o!ey like a freeman- these are the irtues of a citi3en# And2 althou.h the temperance and +ustice of a ruler are distinct from those of a su!+ect2 the irtue of a .ood man will include !oth1 for the irtue of the .ood man who is free and also a su!+ect2 e#.#2 his +ustice2 will not !e one !ut will comprise distinct kinds2 the one -ualifyin. him to rule2 the other to o!ey2 and differin. as the temperance and coura.e of men and women differ# 5or a man would !e thou.ht a coward if he had no more coura.e than a coura.eous woman2 and a woman would !e thou.ht lo-uacious if she imposed no more restraint on her con ersation than the .ood man1 and indeed their part in the mana.ement of the household is different2 for the duty of the one is to ac-uire2 and of the other to preser e# "ractical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler: it would seem that all other irtues must e-ually !elon. to ruler and su!+ect# *he irtue of the su!+ect is certainly not wisdom2 !ut only true opinion1 he may !e compared to the maker of the flute2 while his master is like the flute-player or user ofthe flute# 5rom these considerations may !e .athered the answer to the -uestion2 whether the irtue of the .ood man is the same as that of the .ood citi3en2 or different2 and how far the same2 and how far different# Part V *here still remains one more -uestion a!out the citi3en: 4s he only a true citi3en who has a share of office2 or is the mechanic to !e included0 4f they who hold no office are to !e deemed citi3ens2 not e ery citi3en can ha e this irtue of rulin. and o!eyin.1 for this man is a citi3en And if none of the lower class are citi3ens2 in which part of the state are they to !e placed0 5or they are not resident aliens2 and they are not forei.ners# May we not reply2 that as far as this o!+ection .oes there is no more a!surdity in e$cludin. them than in e$cludin. sla es and freedmen from any of the a!o e-mentioned classes0 4t must !e admitted that we cannot consider all those to !e citi3ens who are necessary to the e$istence of the state1 for e$ample2 children are not citi3en e-ually with .rown-up men2 who are citi3ens a!solutely2 !ut children2 not !ein. .rown up2 are only citi3ens on a certain assumption# 7ay2 in ancient times2 and amon. some nations the artisan class were sla es or forei.ners2

and therefore the ma+ority of them are so now# *he !est form of state will not admit them to citi3enship1 !ut if they are admitted2 then our definition of the irtue of a citi3en will not apply to e ery citi3en nor to e ery free man as such2 !ut only to those who are freed from necessary ser ices# *he necessary people are either sla es who minister to the wants of indi iduals2 or mechanics and la!orers who are the ser ants of the community# *hese reflections carried a little further will e$plain their position1 and indeed what has !een said already is of itself2 when understood2 e$planation enou.h# Since there are many forms of .o ernment there must !e many arieties of citi3en and especially of citi3ens who are su!+ects1 so that under some .o ernments the mechanic and the la!orer will !e citi3ens2 !ut not in others2 as2 for e$ample2 in aristocracy or the so-called .o ernment of the !est 8if there !e such an one92 in which honors are .i en accordin. to irtue and merit1 for no man can practice irtue who is li in. the life of a mechanic or la!orer# 4n oli.archies the -ualification for office is hi.h2 and therefore no la!orer can e er !e a citi3en1 !ut a mechanic may2 for an actual ma+ority of them are rich# At *he!es there was a law that no man could hold office who had not retired from !usiness for ten years# But in many states the law .oes to the len.th of admittin. aliens1 for in some democracies a man is a citi3en thou.h his mother only !e a citi3en1 and a similar principle is applied to ille.itimate children1 the law is rela$ed when there is a dearth of population# But when the num!er of citi3ens increases2 first the children of a male or a female sla e are e$cluded1 then those whose mothers only are citi3ens1 and at last the ri.ht of citi3enship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are !oth citi3ens# Hence2 as is e ident2 there are different kinds of citi3ens1 and he is a citi3en in the hi.hest sense who shares in the honors of the state# Compare Homer/s words2 /like some dishonored stran.er/1 he who is e$cluded from the honors of the state is no !etter than an alien# But when his e$clusion is concealed2 then the o!+ect is that the pri ile.ed class may decei e their fellow inha!itants# As to the -uestion whether the irtue of the .ood man is the same as that of the .ood citi3en2 the considerations already adduced pro e that in some states the .ood man and the .ood citi3en are the same2 and in others different# %hen they are the same it is not e ery citi3en who is a .ood man2 !ut only the statesman and those who ha e or may ha e2 alone or in con+unction with others2 the conduct of pu!lic affairs# Part VI Ha in. determined these -uestions2 we ha e ne$t to consider whether there is only one form of .o ernment or many2 and if many2 what they are2 and how many2 and what are the differences !etween them#

A constitution is the arran.ement of ma.istracies in a state2 especially of the hi.hest of all# *he .o ernment is e erywhere so erei.n in the state2 and the constitution is in fact the .o ernment# 5or e$ample2 in democracies the people are supreme2 !ut in oli.archies2 the few1 and2 therefore2 we say that these two forms of .o ernment also are different: and so in other cases# 5irst2 let us consider what is the purpose of a state2 and how many forms of .o ernment there are !y which human society is re.ulated# %e ha e already said2 in the first part of this treatise2 when discussin. household mana.ement and the rule of a master2 that man is !y nature a political animal# And therefore2 men2 e en when they do not re-uire one another/s help2 desire to li e to.ether1 not !ut that they are also !rou.ht to.ether !y their common interests in proportion as they se erally attain to any measure of well-!ein.# *his is certainly the chief end2 !oth of indi iduals and of states# And also for the sake of mere life 8in which there is possi!ly some no!le element so lon. as the e ils of e$istence do not .reatly o er!alance the .ood9 mankind meet to.ether and maintainthe political community# And we all see that men clin. to life e en at the cost of endurin. .reat misfortune2 seemin. to find in life a natural sweetness and happiness# *here is no difficulty in distin.uishin. the arious kinds of authority1 they ha e !een often defined already in discussions outside the school# *he rule of a master2 althou.h the sla e !y nature and the master !y nature ha e in reality the same interests2 is ne ertheless e$ercised primarily with a iew to the interest of the master2 !ut accidentally considers the sla e2 since2 if the sla e perish2 the rule of the master perishes with him# On the other hand2 the .o ernment of a wife and children and of a household2 which we ha e called household mana.ement2 is e$ercised in the first instance for the .ood of the .o erned or for the common .ood of !oth parties2 !ut essentially for the .ood of the .o erned2 as we see to !e the case in medicine2 .ymnastic2 and the arts in .eneral2 which are onlyaccidentally concerned with the .ood of the artists themsel es# 5or there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practice .ymnastics2 and the helmsman is always one of the crew# *he trainer or the helmsman considers the .ood of those committed to his care# But2 when he is one of the persons taken care of2 he accidentally participates in the ad anta.e2 for the helmsman is also a sailor2 and the trainer !ecomes one of those in trainin.# And so in politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of e-uality and likeness2 the citi3ens think that they ou.ht to hold office !y turns# 5ormerly2 as is natural2 e ery one would take his turn of ser ice1 and then a.ain2 some!ody else would look after his interest2 +ust as he2 while in office2 had looked after theirs# But nowadays2 for the sake of the ad anta.e which is to !e .ained from the pu!lic re enues and from office2 men want to !e always in office# One mi.ht ima.ine that the rulers2 !ein. sickly2 were only kept in health while they continued in office1 in that case we may !e sure that they would !e huntin. after places# *he conclusion is e ident: that .o ernments which ha e a re.ard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of +ustice2 and are therefore true forms1 !ut those which re.ard only the interest of the rulers

are all defecti e and per erted forms2 for they are despotic2 whereas a state is a community of freemen# Part VII Ha in. determined these points2 we ha e ne$t to consider how many forms of .o ernment there are2 and what they are1 and in the first place what are the true forms2 for when they are determined the per ersions of them will at once !e apparent# *he words constitution and .o ernment ha e the same meanin.2 and the .o ernment2 which is the supreme authority in states2 must !e in the hands of one2 or of a few2 or of the many# *he true forms of .o ernment2 therefore2 are those in which the one2 or the few2 or the many2 .o ern with a iew to the common interest1 !ut .o ernments which rule with a iew to the pri ate interest2 whether of the one or of the few2 or of the many2 are per ersions# 5or the mem!ers of a state2 if they are truly citi3ens2 ou.ht to participate in its ad anta.es# Of forms of .o ernment in which one rules2 we call that which re.ards the common interests2 kin.ship or royalty1 that in which more than one2 !ut not many2 rule2 aristocracy1 and it is so called2 either !ecause the rulers are the !est men2 or !ecause they ha e at heart the !est interests of the state and of the citi3ens# But when the citi3ens at lar.e administer the state for the common interest2 the .o ernment is called !y the .eneric name- a constitution# And there is a reason for this use of lan.ua.e# One man or a few may e$cel in irtue1 !ut as the num!er increases it !ecomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in e ery kind of irtue2 thou.h they may in military irtue2 for this is found in the masses# Hence in a constitutional .o ernment the fi.htin.-men ha e the supreme power2 and those who possess arms are the citi3ens# Of the a!o e-mentioned forms2 the per ersions are as follows: of royalty2 tyranny1 of aristocracy2 oli.archy1 of constitutional .o ernment2 democracy# 5or tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in iew the interest of the monarch only1 oli.archy has in iew the interest of the wealthy1 democracy2 of the needy: none of them the common .ood of all# Part VIII But there are difficulties a!out these forms of .o ernment2 and it will therefore !e necessary to state a little more at len.th the nature of each of them# 5or he who would make a philosophical study of the arious sciences2 and does not re.ard practice only2 ou.ht not to o erlook or omit anythin.2 !ut to set forth the truth in e ery particular# *yranny2 as 4 was sayin.2 is monarchy e$ercisin. the rule of a master o er the political society1 oli.archy is when men of property ha e the .o ernment in their hands1 democracy2 the opposite2 when the indi.ent2 and not the men of property2 are the rulers# And here arises the first of our difficulties2 and it relates to the distinction drawn# 5or democracy is said to !e the .o ernment of the many# But what if the many are men of property and ha e the power in their hands0

4n like manner oli.archy is said to !e the .o ernment of the few1 !ut what if the poor are fewer than the rich2 and ha e the power in their hands !ecause they are stron.er0 4n these cases the distinction which we ha e drawn !etween these different forms of .o ernment would no lon.er hold .ood# Suppose2 once more2 that we add wealth to the few and po erty to the many2 and name the .o ernments accordin.ly- an oli.archy is said to !e that in which the few and the wealthy2 and a democracy that in which the many and the poor are the rulers- there will still !e a difficulty# 5or2 if the only forms of .o ernment are the ones already mentioned2 how shall we descri!e those other .o ernments also +ust mentioned !y us2 in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer2 and !oth .o ern in their respecti e states0 *he ar.ument seems to show that2 whether in oli.archies or in democracies2 the num!er of the .o ernin. !ody2 whether the .reater num!er2 as in a democracy2 or the smaller num!er2 as in an oli.archy2 is an accident due to the fact that the rich e erywhere are few2 and the poor numerous# But if so2 there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference !etween them# 5or the real difference !etween democracy and oli.archy is po erty and wealth# %here er men rule !y reason of their wealth2 whether they !e few or many2 that is an oli.archy2 and where the poor rule2 that is a democracy# But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many1 for few are well-to-do2 whereas freedom is en+oyed !y an2 and wealth and freedom are the .rounds on which the oli.archical and democratical parties respecti ely claim power in the state# Part IX 6et us !e.in !y considerin. the common definitions of oli.archy and democracy2 and what is +ustice oli.archical and democratical# 5or all men clin. to +ustice of some kind2 !ut their conceptions are imperfect and they do not e$press the whole idea# 5or e$ample2 +ustice is thou.ht !y them to !e2 and is2 e-uality2 not# howe er2 for howe er2 for !ut only for e-uals# And ine-uality is thou.ht to !e2 and is2 +ustice1 neither is this for all2 !ut only for une-uals# %hen the persons are omitted2 then men +ud.e erroneously# *he reason is that they are passin. +ud.ment on themsel es2 and most people are !ad +ud.es in their own case# And whereas +ustice implies a relation to persons as well as to thin.s2 and a +ust distri!ution2 as 4 ha e already said in the )thics2 implies the same ratio !etween the persons and !etween the thin.s2 they a.ree a!out the e-uality of the thin.s2 !ut dispute a!out the e-uality of the persons2 chiefly for the reason which 4 ha e +ust .i en- !ecause they are !ad +ud.es in their own affairs1 and secondly2 !ecause !oth the parties to the ar.ument are speakin. of a limited and partial +ustice2 !ut ima.ine themsel es to !e speakin. of a!solute +ustice# 5or the one party2 if they are une-ual in one respect2 for e$ample wealth2 consider themsel es to !e une-ual in all1 and the other party2 if they are e-ual in one respect2 for e$ample free !irth2 consider themsel es to !e e-ual in all# But they lea e out the capital point# 5or if men met

and associated out of re.ard to wealth only2 their share in the state would !e proportioned to their property2 and the oli.archical doctrine would then seem to carry the day# 4t would not !e +ust that he who paid one mina should ha e the same share of a hundred minae2 whether of the principal or of the profits2 as he who paid the remainin. ninety-nine# But a state e$ists for the sake of a .ood life2 and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the o!+ect2 sla es and !rute animals mi.htform a state2 !ut they cannot2 for they ha e no share in happiness or in a life of free choice# 7or does a state e$ist for the sake of alliance and security from in+ustice2 nor yet for the sake of e$chan.e and mutual intercourse1 for then the *yrrhenians and the Cartha.inians2 and all who ha e commercial treaties with one another2 would !e the citi3ens of one state# *rue2 they ha e a.reements a!out imports2 and en.a.ements that they will do no wron. to one another2 and written articles of alliance# But there are no ma.istrates common to the contractin. parties who will enforce their en.a.ements1 different states ha e each their own ma.istracies# 7or does one state take care that the citi3ens of the other are such as they ou.ht to !e2 nor see that those who come under the terms of the treaty do no wron. or wickedness at an2 !ut only that they do no in+ustice to one another# %hereas2 those who care for .ood .o ernment take into consideration irtue and ice in states# %hence it may !e further inferred that irtue must !e the care of a state which is truly so called2 and not merely en+oys the name: for without this end the community !ecomes a mere alliance which differs only in place from alliances of which the mem!ers li e apart1 and law is only a con ention2 /a surety to one another of +ustice2/ as the sophist 6ycophron says2 and has no real power to make the citi3ens *his is o! ious1 for suppose distinct places2 such as Corinth and Me.ara2 to !e !rou.ht to.ether so that their walls touched2 still they would not !e one city2 not e en if the citi3ens had the ri.ht to intermarry2 which is one of the ri.hts peculiarly characteristic of states# A.ain2 if men dwelt at a distance from one another2 !ut not so far off as to ha e no intercourse2 and there were laws amon. them that they should not wron. each other in their e$chan.es2 neither would this !e a state# 6et us suppose that one man is a carpenter2 another a hus!andman2 another a shoemaker2 and so on2 and that their num!er is ten thousand: ne ertheless2 if they ha e nothin. in common !ut e$chan.e2 alliance2 and the like2 that would not constitute a state# %hy is this0 Surely not !ecause they are at a distance from one another: for e en supposin. that such a community were to meet in one place2 !ut that each man had a house of his own2 which was in a manner his state2 and that they made alliance with one another2 !ut only a.ainst e il-doers1 still an accurate thinker would not deem this to !e a state2 if their intercourse with one another was of the same character after as !efore their union# 4t is clear then that a state is not a mere society2 ha in. a common place2 esta!lished for the pre ention of mutual crime and for the sake of e$chan.e# *hese are conditions without which a state cannot e$ist1 !ut all of them to.ether do not constitute a state2 which is a community of families and a..re.ations of families in well-!ein.2 for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficin. life# Such a community can only !e esta!lished amon.

those who li e in the same place and intermarry# Hence arise in cities family connections2 !rotherhoods2 common sacrifices2 amusements which draw men to.ether# But these are created !y friendship2 for the will to li e to.ether is friendship# *he end of the state is the .ood life2 and these are the means towards it# And the state is the union of families and illa.es in a perfect and self-sufficin. life2 !y which we mean a happy and honora!le life# Our conclusion2 then2 is that political society e$ists for the sake of no!le actions2 and not of mere companionship# Hence they who contri!ute most to such a society ha e a .reater share in it than those who ha e the same or a .reater freedom or no!ility of !irth !ut are inferior to them in political irtue1 or than those who e$ceed them in wealth !ut are surpassed !y them in irtue# 5rom what has !een said it will !e clearly seen that all the partisans of different forms of .o ernment speak of a part of +ustice only# Part X *here is also a dou!t as to what is to !e the supreme power in the state: 4s it the multitude0 Or the wealthy0 Or the .ood0 Or the one !est man0 Or a tyrant0 Any of these alternati es seems to in ol e disa.reea!le conse-uences# 4f the poor2 for e$ample2 !ecause they are more in num!er2 di ide amon. themsel es the property of the rich- is not this un+ust0 7o2 !y hea en 8will !e the reply92 for the supreme authority +ustly willed it# But if this is not in+ustice2 pray what is0 A.ain2 when in the first di ision all has !een taken2 and the ma+ority di ide anew the property of the minority2 is it not e ident2 if this .oes on2 that they will ruin the state0 <et surely2 irtue is not the ruin of those who possess her2 nor is +ustice destructi e of a state1 and therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot !e +ust# 4f it were2 all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity !e +ust1 for he only coerces other men !y superior power2 +ust as the multitude coerce the rich# But is it +ust then that the few and the wealthy should !e the rulers0 And what if they2 in like manner2 ro! and plunder the people- is this +ust0 if so2 the other case will likewise !e +ust# But there can !e no dou!t that all these thin.s are wron. and un+ust# *hen ou.ht the .ood to rule and ha e supreme power0 But in that case e ery!ody else2 !ein. e$cluded from power2 will !e dishonored# 5or the offices of a state are posts of honor1 and if one set of men always holds them2 the rest must !e depri ed of them# *hen will it !e well that the one !est man should rule0 7ay2 that is still more oli.archical2 for the num!er of those who are dishonored is there!y increased# Some one may say that it is !ad in any case for a man2 su!+ect as he is to all the accidents of human passion2 to ha e the supreme power2 rather than the law# But what if the law itself !e democratical or oli.archical2 how will that help us out of our difficulties0 7ot at all1 the same conse-uences will follow# Part XI

Most of these -uestions may !e reser ed for another occasion# *he principle that the multitude ou.ht to !e supreme rather than the few !est is one that is maintained2 and2 thou.h not free from difficulty2 yet seems to contain an element of truth# 5or the many2 of whom each indi idual is !ut an ordinary person2 when they meet to.ether may ery likely !e !etter than the few .ood2 if re.arded not indi idually !ut collecti ely2 +ust as a feast to which many contri!ute is !etter than a dinner pro ided out of a sin.le purse# 5or each indi idual amon. the many has a share of irtueand prudence2 and when they meet to.ether2 they !ecome in a manner one man2 who has many feet2 and hands2 and senses1 that is a fi.ure of their mind and disposition# Hence the many are !etter +ud.es than a sin.le man of music and poetry1 for some understand one part2 and some another2 and amon. them they understand the whole# *here is a similar com!ination of -ualities in .ood men2 who differ from any indi idual of the many2 as the !eautiful are said to differ from those who are not !eautiful2 and works of art from realities2 !ecause in them the scattered elements are com!ined2 althou.h2 if taken separately2 the eye of one person or some other feature in another person would !e fairer than in the picture# %hether this principle can apply to e ery democracy2 and to all !odies of men2 is not clear# Or rather2 !y hea en2 in some cases it is impossi!le of application1 for the ar.ument would e-ually hold a!out !rutes1 and wherein2 it will !e asked2 do some men differ from !rutes0 But there may !e !odies of men a!out whom our statement is ne ertheless true# And if so2 the difficulty which has !een already raised2 and also another which is akin to it - i3#2 what power should !e assi.ned to the mass of freemen and citi3ens2 who are not rich and ha e no personal merit- are !oth sol ed# *here is still a dan.er in aflowin. them to share the .reat offices of state2 for their folly will lead them into error2 and their dishonesty into crime# But there is a dan.er also in not lettin. them share2 for a state in which many poor men are e$cluded from office will necessarily !e full of enemies# *he only way of escape is to assi.n to them some deli!erati e and +udicial functions# 5or this reason Solon and certain other le.islators .i e them the power of electin. to offices2 and of callin. the ma.istrates to account2 !ut they do not allow them to hold office sin.ly# %hen they meet to.ether their perceptions are -uite .ood enou.h2 and com!ined with the !etter class they are useful to the state 8+ust as impure food when mi$ed with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small -uantity of the pure would !e92 !ut each indi idual2 left to himself2 forms an imperfect +ud.ment# On the other hand2 the popular form of .o ernment in ol es certain difficulties# 4n the first place2 it mi.ht !e o!+ected that he who can +ud.e of the healin. of a sick man would !e one who could himself heal his disease2 and make him whole- that is2 in other words2 the physician1 and so in all professions and arts# As2 then2 the physician ou.ht to !e called to account !y physicians2 so ou.ht men in .eneral to !e called to account !y their peers# But physicians are of three kinds: there is the ordinary practitioner2 and there is the physician of the hi.her class2 and thirdly the intelli.ent man who has studied the art: in all arts there is such a class1 and we attri!ute the power of +ud.in. to them -uite as much as to professors of the art# Secondly2 does not the same principle apply to elections0

5or a ri.ht election can only !e made !y those who ha e knowled.e1 those who know .eometry2 for e$ample2 will choose a .eometrician ri.htly2 and those who know how to steer2 a pilot1 and2 e en if there !e some occupations and arts in which pri ate persons share in the a!ility to choose2 they certainly cannot choose !etter than those who know# So that2 accordin. to this ar.ument2 neither the election of ma.istrates2 nor the callin. of them to account2 should !e entrusted to the many# <et possi!ly these o!+ections are to a .reat e$tent met !y our old answer2 that if the people are not utterly de.raded2 althou.h indi idually they may !e worse +ud.es than those who ha e special knowled.e- as a !ody they are as .ood or !etter# Moreo er2 there are some arts whose products are not +ud.ed of solely2 or !est2 !y the artists themsel es2 namely those arts whose products are reco.ni3ed e en !y those who do not possess the art1 for e$ample2 the knowled.e of the house is not limited to the !uilder only1 the user2 or2 in other words2 the master2 of the house will !e e en a !etter +ud.e than the !uilder2 +ust as the pilot will +ud.e !etter of a rudder than the carpenter2 and the .uest will +ud.e !etter of a feast than the cook# *his difficulty seems now to !e sufficiently answered2 !ut there is another akin to it# *hat inferior persons should ha e authority in .reater matters than the .ood would appear to !e a stran.e thin.2 yet the election and callin. to account of the ma.istrates is the .reatest of all# And these2 as 4 was sayin.2 are functions which in some states are assi.ned to the people2 for the assem!ly is supreme in all such matters# <et persons of any a.e2 and ha in. !ut a small property -ualification2 sit in the assem!ly and deli!erate and +ud.e2 althou.h for the .reat officers of state2 such as treasurers and .enerals2 a hi.h -ualification is re-uired# *his difficulty may !e sol ed in the same manner as the precedin.2 and the present practice of democracies may !e really defensi!le# 5or the power does not reside in the dicast2 or senator2 or ecclesiast2 !ut in the court2 and the senate2 and the assem!ly2 of which indi idual senators2 or ecclesiasts2 or dicasts2 are only parts or mem!ers# And for this reason the many may claim to ha e a hi.her authority than the few1 for the people2 and the senate2 and the courts consist of many persons2 and their property collecti ely is .reater than the property of one or of a few indi iduals holdin. .reat offices# But enou.h of this# *he discussion of the first -uestion shows nothin. so clearly as that laws2 when .ood2 should !e supreme1 and that the ma.istrate or ma.istrates should re.ulate those matters only on which the laws are una!le to speak with precision owin. to the difficulty of any .eneral principle em!racin. all particulars# But what are .ood laws has not yet !een clearly e$plained1 the old difficulty remains# *he .oodness or !adness2 +ustice or in+ustice2 of laws aries of necessity with the constitutions of states# *his2 howe er2 is clear2 that the laws must !e adapted to the constitutions# But if so2 true forms of .o ernment will of necessity ha e +ust laws2 and per erted forms of .o ernment will ha e un+ust laws# Part XII

4n all sciences and arts the end is a .ood2 and the .reatest .ood and in the hi.hest de.ree a .ood in the most authoritati e of all- this is the political science of which the .ood is +ustice2 in other words2 the common interest# All men think +ustice to !e a sort of e-uality1 and to a certain e$tent they a.ree in the philosophical distinctions which ha e !een laid down !y us a!out )thics# 5or they admit that +ustice is a thin. and has a relation to persons2 and that e-uals ou.ht to ha e e-uality# But there still remains a -uestion: e-uality or ine-uality of what0 Here is a difficulty which calls for political speculation# 5or ery likely some persons will say that offices of state ou.ht to !e une-ually distri!uted accordin. to superior e$cellence2 in whate er respect2 of the citi3en2 althou.h there is no other difference !etween him and the rest of the community1 for that those who differ in any one respect ha e different ri.hts and claims# But2 surely2 if this is true2 the comple$ion or hei.ht of a man2 or any other ad anta.e2 will !e a reason for his o!tainin. a .reater share of political ri.hts# *he error here lies upon the surface2 and may !e illustrated from the other arts and sciences# %hen a num!er of flute players are e-ual in their art2 there is no reason why those of them who are !etter !orn should ha e !etter flutes .i en to them1 for they will not play any !etter on the flute2 and the superior instrument should !e reser ed for him who is the superior artist# 4f what 4 am sayin. is still o!scure2 it will !e made clearer as we proceed# 5or if there were a superior fluteplayer who was far inferior in !irth and !eauty2 althou.h either of these may !e a .reater .ood than the art of flute-playin.2 and may e$cel flute-playin. in a .reater ratio than he e$cels the others in his art2 still he ou.ht to ha e the !est flutes .i en to him2 unless the ad anta.es of wealth and !irth contri!ute to e$cellence in fluteplayin.2 which they do not# Moreo er2 upon this principle any .ood may !e compared with any other# 5or if a .i en hei.ht may !e measured wealth and a.ainst freedom2 hei.ht in .eneral may !e so measured# *hus if A e$cels in hei.ht more than B in irtue2 e en if irtue in .eneral e$cels hei.ht still more2 all .oods will !e commensura!le1 for if a certain amount is !etter than some other2 it is clear that some other will !e e-ual# But since no such comparison can !e made2 it is e ident that there is .ood reason why in politics men do not .round their claim to office on e ery sort of ine-uality any more than in the arts# 5or if some !e slow2 and others swift2 that is no reason why the one should ha e little and the others much1 it is in .ymnastics contests that such e$cellence is rewarded# %hereas the ri al claims of candidates for office can only !e !ased on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state# And therefore the no!le2 or free-!orn2 or rich2 may with .ood reason claim office1 for holders of offices must !e freemen and ta$payers: a state can !e no more composed entirely of poor men than entirely of sla es# But if wealth and freedom are necessary elements2 +ustice and alor aree-ually so1 for without the former -ualities a state cannot e$ist at all2 without the latter not well# Part XIII 4f the e$istence of the state is alone to !e considered2 then it would seem that all2 or some at least2 of these claims are +ust1 !ut2 if we take into account a .ood life2 then2

as 4 ha e already said2 education and irtue ha e superior claims# As2 howe er2 those who are e-ual in one thin. ou.ht not to ha e an e-ual share in all2 nor those who are une-ual in one thin. to ha e an une-ual share in all2 it is certain that all forms of .o ernment which rest on either of these principles are per ersions# All men ha e a claim in a certain sense2 as 4 ha e already admitted2 !ut all ha e not an a!solute claim# *he rich claim !ecause they ha e a .reater share in the land2 and land is the common element of the state1 also they are .enerally more trustworthy in contracts# *he free claim under the same tide as the no!le1 for they are nearly akin# 5or the no!le are citi3ens in a truer sense than the i.no!le2 and .ood !irth is always alued in a man/s own home and country# Another reason is2 that those who are sprun. from !etter ancestors are likely to !e !etter men2 for no!ility is e$cellence of race# >irtue2 too2 may !e truly said to ha e a claim2 for +ustice has !een acknowled.ed !y us to !e a social irtue2 and it implies all others# A.ain2 the many may ur.e their claim a.ainst the few1 for2 when taken collecti ely2 and compared with the few2 they are stron.er and richer and !etter# But2 what if the .ood2 the rich2 the no!le2 and the other classes who make up a state2 are all li in. to.ether in the same city2 %ill there2 or will there not2 !e any dou!t who shall rule0 7o dou!t at all in determinin. who ou.ht to rule in each of the a!o e-mentioned forms of .o ernment# 5or states are characteri3ed !y differences in their .o ernin. !odies-one of them has a .o ernment of the rich2 another of the irtuous2 and so on# But a difficulty arises when all these elements co-e$ist# How are we to decide0 Suppose the irtuous to !e ery few in num!er: may we consider their num!ers in relation to their duties2 and ask whether they are enou.h to administer the state2 or so many as will make up a state0 O!+ections may !e ur.ed a.ainst all the aspirants to political power# 5or those who found their claims on wealth or family mi.ht !e thou.ht to ha e no !asis of +ustice1 on this principle2 if any one person were richer than all the rest2 it is clear that he ou.ht to !e ruler of them# 4n like manner he who is ery distin.uished !y his !irth ou.ht to ha e the superiority o er all those who claim on the .round that they are free!orn# 4n an aristocracy2 or .o ernment of the !est2 a like difficulty occurs a!out irtue1 for if one citi3en !e !etter than the other mem!ers of the .o ernment2 howe er .ood they may !e2 he too2 upon the same principle of +ustice2 should rule o er them# And if the people are to !e supreme !ecause they are stron.er than the few2 then if one man2 or more than one2 !ut not a ma+ority2 is stron.er than the many2 they ou.ht to rule2 and not the many# All these considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule and to hold all other men in su!+ection to them are strictly ri.ht# *o those who claim to !e masters of the .o ernment on the .round of their irtue or their wealth2 the many mi.ht fairly answer that they themsel es are often !etter and richer than the few- 4 do not say indi idually2 !ut collecti ely# And another in.enious o!+ection which is sometimes put forward may !e met in a similar manner# Some persons dou!t whether the le.islator who desires to make the +ustest laws ou.ht to le.islatewith a iew to the .ood of the hi.her classes or of the many2 when the case which we ha e mentioned occurs# 7ow what is +ust or ri.ht is to !e interpreted in the sense of /what is e-ual/1 and that which is ri.ht in the sense of

!ein. e-ual is to !e considered with reference to the ad anta.e of the state2 and the common .ood of the citi3ens# And a citi3en is one who shares in .o ernin. and !ein. .o erned# He differs under different forms of .o ernment2 !ut in the !est state he is one who is a!le and willin. to !e .o erned and to .o ern with a iew to the life of irtue# 4f2 howe er2 there !e some one person2 or more than one2 althou.h not enou.h to make up the full complement of a state2 whose irtue is so pre-eminent that the irtues or the political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs2 he or they can !e no lon.er re.arded as part of a state1 for +ustice will not !e done to the superior2 if he is reckoned only as the e-ual of those who are so far inferior to him in irtue and in political capacity# Such an one may truly !e deemed a ;od amon. men# Hence we see that le.islation is necessarily concerned only with those who are e-ual in !irth and in capacity1 and that for men of pre-eminent irtue there is no law- they are themsel es a law# Any would !e ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them: they would pro!a!ly retort what2 in the fa!le of Antisthenes2 the lions said to the hares2 when in the council of the !easts the latter !e.an haran.uin. and claimin. e-uality for all# And for this reason democratic states ha e instituted ostracism1 e-uality is a!o e all thin.s their aim2 and therefore they ostraci3ed and !anished from the city for a time those who seemed to predominate too much throu.h their wealth2 or the num!er of their friends2 or throu.h any other political influence# Mytholo.y tells us that the Ar.onauts left Heracles !ehind for a similar reason1 the ship Ar.o would not take him !ecause she feared that he would ha e !een too much for the rest of the crew# %herefore those who denounce tyranny and !lame the counsel which "eriander .a e to *hrasy!ulus cannot !e held alto.ether +ust in their censure# *he story is that "eriander2 when the herald was sent to ask counsel of him2 said nothin.2 !ut only cut off the tallest ears of corn till he had !rou.htthe field to a le el# *he herald did not know the meanin. of the action2 !ut came and reported what he had seen to *hrasy!ulus2 who understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the state1 and this is a policy not only e$pedient for tyrants or in practice confined to them2 !ut e-ually necessary in oli.archies and democracies# Ostracism is a measure of the same kind2 which acts !y disa!lin. and !anishin. the most prominent citi3ens# ;reat powers do the same to whole cities and nations2 as the Athenians did to the Samians2 Chians2 and 6es!ians1 no sooner had they o!tained a firm .rasp of the empire2 than they hum!led their allies contrary to treaty1 and the "ersian kin. has repeatedly crushed the Medes2 Ba!ylonians2 and other nations2 when their spirit has !een stirred !y the recollection of their former .reatness# *he pro!lem is a uni ersal one2 and e-ually concerns all forms of .o ernment2 true as well as false1 for2 althou.h per erted forms with a iew to their own interests may adopt this policy2 those which seek the common interest do so likewise# *he same thin. may !e o!ser ed in the arts and sciences1 for the painter will not allow the fi.ure to ha e a foot which2 howe er !eautiful2 is not in proportion2 nor will the ship!uilder allow the stem or any other part of the essel to !e unduly lar.e2

any more than the chorus-master will allow any one who sin.s louder or !etter than all the rest to sin. in the choir# Monarchs2 too2 may practice compulsion and still li e in harmony with their cities2 if their own .o ernment is for the interest of the state# Hence where there is an acknowled.ed superiority the ar.ument in fa or of ostracism is !ased upon a kind of political +ustice# 4t would certainly !e !etter that the le.islator should from the first so order his state as to ha e no need of such a remedy# But if the need arises2 the ne$t !est thin. is that he should endea or to correct the e il !y this or some similar measure# *he principle2 howe er2 has not !een fairly applied in states1 for2 instead of lookin. to the .ood of their own constitution2 they ha e used ostracism for factious purposes# 4t is true that under per erted forms of .o ernment2 and from their special point of iew2 such a measure is +ust and e$pedient2 !ut it is also clear that it is not a!solutely +ust# 4n the perfect state there would !e .reat dou!ts a!out the use of it2 not when applied to e$cess in stren.th2 wealth2 popularity2 or the like2 !ut when used a.ainst some one who is pre-eminent in irtue- what is to !e done with him0 Mankind will not say that such an one is to !e e$pelled and e$iled1 on the other hand2 he ou.ht not to !e a su!+ect- that would !e as if mankind should claim to rule o er ?eus2 di idin. his offices amon. them# *he only alternati e is that all should +oyfully o!ey such a ruler2 accordin. to what seems to !e the order of nature2 and that men like him should !e kin.s in their state for life# Part XIV *he precedin. discussion2 !y a natural transition2 leads to the consideration of royalty2 which we admit to !e one of the true forms of .o ernment# 6et us see whether in order to !e well .o erned a state or country should !e under the rule of a kin. or under some other form of .o ernment1 and whether monarchy2 althou.h .ood for some2 may not !e !ad for others# But first we must determine whether there is one species of royalty or many# 4t is easy to see that there are many2 and that the manner of .o ernment is not the same in all of them# Of royalties accordin. to law2 8@9 the 6acedaemonian is thou.ht to answer !est to the true pattern1 !ut there the royal power is not a!solute2 e$cept when the kin.s .o on an e$pedition2 and then they take the command# Matters of reli.ion are likewise committed to them# *he kin.ly office is in truth a kind of .eneralship2 irresponsi!le and perpetual# *he kin. has not the power of life and death2 e$cept in a specified case2 as for instance2 in ancient times2 he had it when upon a campai.n2 !y ri.ht of force# *his custom is descri!ed in Homer# 5or A.amemnon is patient when he is attacked in the assem!ly2 !ut when the army .oes out to !attle he has the power e en of life and death# Does he not say- /%hen 4 find a man skulkin. apart from the !attle2 nothin. shall sa e him from the do.s and ultures2 for in my hands is death/0 *his2 then2 is one form of royalty-a .eneralship for life: and of such royalties some are hereditary and others electi e#

8A9 *here is another sort of monarchy not uncommon amon. the !ar!arians2 which nearly resem!les tyranny# But this is !oth le.al and hereditary# 5or !ar!arians2 !ein. more ser ile in character than Hellenes2 and Asiadics than )uropeans2 do not re!el a.ainst a despotic .o ernment# Such royalties ha e the nature of tyrannies !ecause the people are !y nature sla es1 !ut there is no dan.er of their !ein. o erthrown2 for they are hereditary and le.al# %herefore also their .uards are such as a kin. and not such as a tyrant would employ2 that is to say2 they are composed of citi3ens2 whereas the .uards of tyrants are mercenaries# 5or kin.s rule accordin. to law o er oluntary su!+ects2 !ut tyrants o er in oluntary1 and the one are .uarded !y their fellow-citi3ens the others are .uarded a.ainst them# *hese are two forms of monarchy2 and there was a third 8&9 which e$isted in ancient Hellas2 called an Aesymnetia or dictatorship# *his may !e defined .enerally as an electi e tyranny2 which2 like the !ar!arian monarchy2 is le.al2 !ut differs from it in not !ein. hereditary# Sometimes the office was held for life2 sometimes for a term of years2 or until certain duties had !een performed# 5or e$ample2 the Mytilenaeans elected "ittacus leader a.ainst the e$iles2 who were headed !y Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet# And Alcaeus himself shows in one of his !an-uet odes that they chose "ittacus tyrant2 for he reproaches his fellow-citi3ens for /ha in. made the low-!orn "ittacus tyrant of the spiritless and ill-fated city2 with one oice shoutin. his praises#/ *hese forms of .o ernment ha e always had the character of tyrannies2 !ecause they possess despotic power1 !ut inasmuch as they are electi e and ac-uiesced in !y their su!+ects2 they are kin.ly# 8B9 *here is a fourth species of kin.ly rule- that of the heroic times- which was hereditary and le.al2 and was e$ercised o er willin. su!+ects# 5or the first chiefs were !enefactors of the people in arts or arms1 they either .athered them into a community2 or procured land for them1 and thus they !ecame kin.s of oluntary su!+ects2 and their power was inherited !y their descendants# *hey took the command in war and presided o er the sacrifices2 e$cept those which re-uired a priest# *hey also decided causes either with or without an oath1 and when they swore2 the form of the oath was the stretchin. out of their sceptre# 4n ancient times their power e$tended continuously to all thin.s whatsoe er2 in city and country2 as well as in forei.n parts1 !ut at a later date they relin-uished se eral of these pri ile.es2 and others the people took from them2 until in some states nothin. was left to them !ut the sacrifices1 and where they retained more of the reality they had only the ri.ht of leadership in war !eyond the !order# *hese2 then2 are the four kinds of royalty# 5irst the monarchy of the heroic a.es1 this was e$ercised o er oluntary su!+ects2 !ut limited to certain functions1 the kin. was a .eneral and a +ud.e2 and had the control of reli.ion *he second is that of the !ar!arians2 which is a hereditary despotic .o ernment in accordance with law# A

third is the power of the so-called Aesynmete or Dictator1 this is an electi e tyranny# *he fourth is the 6acedaemonian2 which is in fact a .eneralship2 hereditary and perpetual# *hese four forms differ from one another in the manner which 4 ha e descri!ed# 8'9 *here is a fifth form of kin.ly rule in which one has the disposal of all2 +ust as each nation or each state has the disposal of pu!lic matters1 this form corresponds to the control of a household# 5or as household mana.ement is the kin.ly rule of a house2 so kin.ly rule is the household mana.ement of a city2 or of a nation2 or of many nations# Part XV Of these forms we need only consider two2 the 6acedaemonian and the a!solute royalty1 for most of the others he in a re.ion !etween them2 ha in. less power than the last2 and more than the first# *hus the in-uiry is reduced to two points: first2 is it ad anta.eous to the state that there should !e a perpetual .eneral2 and if so2 should the office !e confined to one family2 or open to the citi3ens in turn0 Secondly2 is it well that a sin.le man should ha e the supreme power in all thin.s0 *he first -uestion falls under the head of laws rather than of constitutions1 for perpetual.eneralship mi.ht e-ually e$ist under any form of .o ernment2 so that this matter may !e dismissed for the present# *he other kind of royalty is a sort of constitution1 this we ha e now to consider2 and !riefly to run o er the difficulties in ol ed in it# %e will !e.in !y in-uirin. whether it is more ad anta.eous to !e ruled !y the !est man or !y the !est laws# *he ad ocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only in .eneral terms2 and cannot pro ide for circumstances1 and that for any science to a!ide !y written rules is a!surd# 4n ).ypt the physician is allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day2 !ut if sooner2 he takes the risk# Hence it is clear that a .o ernment actin. accordin. to written laws is plainly not the !est# <et surely the ruler cannot dispense with the .eneral principle which e$ists in law1 and this is a !etter ruler which is free from passion than that in which it is innate# %hereas the law is passionless2 passion must e er sway the heart of man# <es2 it may !e replied2 !ut then on the other hand an indi idual will !e !etter a!le to deli!erate in particular cases# *he !est man2 then2 must le.islate2 and laws must !e passed2 !ut these laws will ha e no authority when they miss the mark2 thou.h in all other cases retainin. their authority# But when the law cannot determine a point at all2 or not well2 should the one !est man or should all decide0 Accordin. to our present practice assem!lies meet2 sit in +ud.ment2 deli!erate2 and decide2 and their +ud.ments an relate to indi idual cases# 7ow any mem!er of the assem!ly2 taken separately2 is certainly inferior to the wise man# But the state is made up of many indi iduals# And as a feast to which all the .uests contri!ute is !etter than a !an-uet furnished !y a sin.le

man2 so a multitude is a !etter +ud.e of many thin.s than any indi idual# A.ain2 the many are more incorrupti!le than the few1 they are like the .reater -uantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little# *he indi idual is lia!le to !e o ercome !y an.er or !y some other passion2 and then his +ud.ment is necessarily per erted1 !ut it is hardly to !e supposed that a .reat num!er of persons would all .et into a passion and .o wron. at the same moment# 6et us assume that they are the freemen2 and that they ne er act in iolation of the law2 !ut fill up the .aps which the law is o!li.ed to lea e# Or2 if such irtue is scarcely attaina!le !y the multitude2 we need only suppose that the ma+ority are .ood men and .ood citi3ens2 and ask which will !e the more incorrupti!le2 the one .ood ruler2 or the many who are all .ood0 %ill not the many0 But2 you will say2 there may !e parties amon. them2 whereas the one man is not di ided a.ainst himself# *o which we may answer that their character is as .ood as his# 4f we call the rule of many men2 who are all of them .ood2 aristocracy2 and the rule of one man royalty2 then aristocracy will !e !etter for states than royalty2 whether the .o ernment is supported !y force or not2 pro ided only that a num!er of men e-ual in irtue can !e found# *he first .o ernments were kin.ships2 pro!a!ly for this reason2 !ecause of old2 when cities were small2 men of eminent irtue were few# 5urther2 they were made kin.s !ecause they were !enefactors2 and !enefits can only !e !estowed !y .ood men# But when many persons e-ual in merit arose2 no lon.er endurin. the preeminence of one2 they desired to ha e a commonwealth2 and set up a constitution# *he rulin. class soon deteriorated and enriched themsel es out of the pu!lic treasury1 riches !ecame the path to honor2 and so oli.archies naturally .rew up# *hese passed into tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies1 for lo e of .ain in the rulin. classes was always tendin. to diminish their num!er2 and so to stren.then the masses2 who in the end set upon their masters and esta!lished democracies# Since cities ha e increased in si3e2 no other form of .o ernment appears to !e any lon.er e en easy to esta!lish# ) en supposin. the principle to !e maintained that kin.ly power is the !est thin. for states2 how a!out the family of the kin.0 Are his children to succeed him0 4f they are no !etter than any!ody else2 that will !e mischie ous# But2 says the lo er of royalty2 the kin.2 thou.h he mi.ht2 will not hand on his power to his children# *hat2 howe er2 is hardly to !e e$pected2 and is too much to ask of human nature# *here is also a difficulty a!out the force which he is to employ1 should a kin. ha e .uards a!out him !y whose aid he may !e a!le to coerce the refractory0 4f not2 how will he administer his kin.dom0 ) en if he !e the lawful so erei.n who does nothin. ar!itrarily or contrary to law2 still he must ha e some force wherewith to maintain the law# 4n the case of a limited monarchy there is not much difficulty in answerin. this -uestion1 the kin. must ha e such force as will !e more than a match for one or more indi iduals2 !ut not so .reat as that of

the people# *he ancients o!ser e this principle when they ha e .uards to any one whom they appointed dictator or tyrant# *hus2 when Dionysius asked the Syracusans to allow him .uards2 some!ody ad ised that they should .i e him only such a num!er# Part XVI At this place in the discussion there impends the in-uiry respectin. the kin. who acts solely accordin. to his own will he has now to !e considered# *he so-called limited monarchy2 or kin.ship accordin. to law2 as 4 ha e already remarked2 is not a distinct form of .o ernment2 for under all .o ernments2 as2 for e$ample2 in a democracy or aristocracy2 there may !e a .eneral holdin. office for life2 and one person is often made supreme o er the administration of a state# A ma.istracy of this kind e$ists at )pidamnus2 and also at Opus2 !ut in the latter city has a more limited power# 7ow2 a!solute monarchy2 or the ar!itrary rule of a so erei.n o er an the citi3ens2 in a city which consists of e-uals2 is thou.ht !y some to !e -uite contrary to nature1 it is ar.ued that those who are !y nature e-uals must ha e the same natural ri.ht and worth2 and that for une-uals to ha e an e-ual share2 or for e-uals to ha e an une en share2 in the offices of state2 is as !ad as for different !odily constitutions to ha e the same food and clothin.# %herefore it is thou.ht to !e +ust that amon. e-uals e ery one !e ruled as well as rule2 and therefore that an should ha e their turn# %e thus arri e at law1 for an order of succession implies law# And the rule of the law2 it is ar.ued2 is prefera!le to that of any indi idual# On the same principle2 e en if it !e !etter for certain indi iduals to .o ern2 they should !e made only .uardians and ministers of the law# 5or ma.istrates there must !ethis is admitted1 !ut then men say that to .i e authority to any one man when all are e-ual is un+ust# 7ay2 there may indeed !e cases which the law seems una!le to determine2 !ut in such cases can a man0 7ay2 it will !e replied2 the law trains officers for this e$press purpose2 and appoints them to determine matters which are left undecided !y it2 to the !est of their +ud.ment# 5urther2 it permits them to make any amendment of the e$istin. laws which e$perience su..ests# *herefore he who !ids the law rule may !e deemed to !id ;od and Reason alone rule2 !ut he who !ids man rule adds an element of the !east1 for desire is a wild !east2 and passion per erts the minds of rulers2 e en when they are the !est of men# *he law is reason unaffected !y desire# %e are told that a patient should call in a physician1 he will not .et !etter if he is doctored out of a !ook# But the parallel of the arts is clearly not in point1 for the physician does nothin. contrary to rule from moti es of friendship1 he only cures a patient and takes a fee1 whereas ma.istrates do many thin.s from spite and partiality# And2 indeed2 if a man suspected the physician of !ein. in lea.ue with his enemies to destroy him for a !ri!e2 he would rather ha e recourse to the !ook# But certainly physicians2 when they are sick2 call in other physicians2 and trainin.-masters2 when they are in trainin.2 other trainin.-masters2 as if they could not +ud.e +ud.e truly a!out their own case and mi.ht !e influenced !y their feelin.s# Hence it is e ident that in seekin. for +ustice men seek for the mean or neutral2 for the law is the mean# A.ain2 customary laws ha e more wei.ht2

and relate to moreimportant matters2 than written laws2 and a man may !e a safer ruler than the written law2 !ut not safer than the customary law# A.ain2 it is !y no means easy for one man to superintend many thin.s1 he will ha e to appoint a num!er of su!ordinates2 and what difference does it make whether these su!ordinates always e$isted or were appointed !y him !ecause he needed theme 4f2 as 4 said !efore2 the .ood man has a ri.ht to rule !ecause he is !etter2 still two .ood men are !etter than one: this is the old sayin.2 two .oin. to.ether2 and the prayer of A.amemnon2 =%ould that 4 had ten such councillorsC = And at this day there are ma.istrates2 for e$ample +ud.es2 who ha e authority to decide some matters which the law is una!le to determine2 since no one dou!ts that the law would command and decide in the !est manner whate er it could# But some thin.s can2 and other thin.s cannot2 !e comprehended under the law2 and this is the ori.in of the ne$ted -uestion whether the !est law or the !est man should rule# 5or matters of detail a!out which men deli!erate cannot !e included in le.islation# 7or does any one deny that the decision of such matters must !e left to man2 !ut it is ar.ued that there should !e many +ud.es2 and not one only# 5or e ery ruler who has !een trained !y the law +ud.es well1 and it would surely seem stran.e that a person should see !etter with two eyes2 or hear !etter with two ears2 or act !etter with two hands or feet2 than many with many1 indeed2 it is already the practice of kin.s to make to themsel es many eyes and ears and hands and feet# 5or they make collea.ues of those who are the friends of themsel es and their .o ernments# *hey must !e friends of the monarch and of his .o ernment1 if not his friends2 they will not do what he wants1 !ut friendship implies likeness and e-uality1 and2 therefore2 if he thinks that his friends ou.ht to rule2 he must think that those who are e-ual to himself and like himself ou.ht to rule e-ually with himself# *hese are the principal contro ersies relatin. to monarchy# Part XVII But may not all this !e true in some cases and not in others0 for there is !y nature !oth a +ustice and an ad anta.e appropriate to the rule of a master2 another to kin.ly rule2 another to constitutional rule1 !ut there is none naturally appropriate to tyranny2 or to any other per erted form of .o ernment1 for these come into !ein. contrary to nature# 7ow2 to +ud.e at least from what has !een said2 it is manifest that2 where men are alike and e-ual2 it is neither e$pedient nor +ust that one man should !e lord of all2 whether there are laws2 or whether there are no laws2 !ut he himself is in the place of law# 7either should a .ood man !e lord o er .ood men2 nor a !ad man o er !ad1 nor2 e en if he e$cels in irtue2 should he ha e a ri.ht to rule2 unless in a particular case2 at which 4 ha e already hinted2 and to which 4 will once more recur# But first of all2 4 must determine what natures are suited for .o ernment !y a kin.2 and what for an aristocracy2 and what for a constitutional

.o ernment# A people who are !y nature capa!le of producin. a race superior in the irtue needed for political rule are fitted for kin.ly .o ernment1 and a people su!mittin. to !e ruled as freemen !y men whose irtue renders them capa!le of political command are adapted for an aristocracy1 while the people who are suited for constitutional freedom are those amon. whom there naturally e$ists a warlike multitude a!le to rule and to o!ey in turn !y a law which .i es office to the well-todo accordin. to their desert# But when a whole family or some indi idual2 happens to !e so pre-eminentin irtue as to surpass all others2 then it is +ust that they should !e the royal family and supreme o er all2 or that this one citi3en should !e kin. of the whole nation# 5or2 as 4 said !efore2 to .i e them authority is not only a.reea!le to that .round of ri.ht which the founders of all states2 whether aristocratical2 or oli.archical2 or a.ain democratical2 are accustomed to put forward 8for these all reco.ni3e the claim of e$cellence2 althou.h not the same e$cellence92 !ut accords with the principle already laid down# 5or surely it would not !e ri.ht to kill2 or ostraci3e2 or e$ile such a person2 or re-uire that he should take his turn in !ein. .o erned# *he whole is naturally superior to the part2 and he who has this preeminence is in the relation of a whole to a part# But if so2 the only alternati e is that he should ha e the supreme power2 and that mankind should o!ey him2 not in turn2 !ut always# *hese are the conclusions at which we arri e respectin. royalty and its arious forms2 and this is the answer to the -uestion2 whether it is or is not ad anta.eous to states2 and to which2 and how# Part XVIII %e maintain that the true forms of .o ernment are three2 and that the !est must !e that which is administered !y the !est2 and in which there is one man2 or a whole family2 or many persons2 e$cellin. all the others to.ether in irtue2 and !oth rulers and su!+ects are fitted2 the one to rule2 the others to !e ruled2 in such a manner as to attain the most eli.i!le life# %e showed at the commencement of our in-uiry that the irtue of the .ood man is necessarily the same as the irtue of the citi3en of the perfect state# Clearly then in the same manner2 and !y the same means throu.h which a man !ecomes truly .ood2 he will frame a state that is to !e ruled !y an aristocracy or !y a kin.2 and the same education and the same ha!its will !e found to make a .ood man and a man fit to !e a statesman or a kin.# Ha in. arri ed at these conclusions2 we must proceed to speak of the perfect state2 and descri!e how it comes into !ein. and is esta!lished#
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Politics
By Aristotle Commentary: Quite a few comments ha e !een posted a!out "olitics# Download: A te$t-only ersion is a aila!le for download# Politics By Aristotle %ritten &'( B#C#) *ranslated !y Ben+amin ,owett
*a!le of Contents

Book Three Part I He who would in-uire into the essence and attri!utes of arious kinds of .o ernments must first of all determine /%hat is a state0/ At present this is a disputed -uestion# Some say that the state has done a certain act1 others2 no2 not the state2 !ut the oli.archy or the tyrant# And the le.islator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state1 a constitution or .o ernment !ein. an arran.ement of the inha!itants of a state# But a state is composite2 like any other whole made up of many parts1 these are the citi3ens2 who compose it# 4t is e ident2 therefore2 that we must !e.in !y askin.2 %hois the citi3en2 and what is the meanin. of the term0 5or here a.ain there may !e a difference of opinion# He who is a citi3en in a democracy will often not !e a citi3en in an oli.archy# 6ea in. out of consideration those who ha e !een made citi3ens2 or who ha e o!tained the name of citi3en any other accidental manner2 we may say2 first2 that a citi3en is not a citi3en !ecause he li es in a certain place2 for resident aliens and sla es share in the place1 nor is he a citi3en who has no le.al ri.ht e$cept that of suin. and !ein. sued1 for this ri.ht may !e en+oyed under the pro isions of a treaty# 7ay2 resident aliens in many places do not possess e en such ri.hts completely2 for they are o!li.ed to ha e a patron2 so that they do !ut imperfectly participate in citi3enship2 and we call them citi3ens only in a -ualified sense2 as we mi.ht apply the term to children who are too youn. to !e on the re.ister2 or to old men who ha e !een relie ed from state duties# Of these we do not say -uite simply that they are citi3ens2 !ut add in the one case that they are not of a.e2 and in the other2 that they are past the a.e2 or somethin. of that sort1 the precise e$pression is immaterial2 for our meanin. is clear# Similar difficulties to those which 4 ha e mentioned may !e raised and

answered a!out depri ed citi3ens and a!out e$iles# But the citi3en whom we are seekin. to define is a citi3en in the strictest sense2 a.ainst whom no such e$ception can !e taken2 and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of +ustice2 and in offices# 7ow of offices some are discontinuous2 and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice2 or can only hold them after a fi$ed inter al1 others ha e no limit of time- for e$ample2 the office of a dicast or ecclesiast# 4t may2 indeed2 !e ar.ued that these are not ma.istrates at all2 and that their functions .i e them no share in the .o ernment# But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who ha e the power do not.o ern# 6et us not dwell further upon this2 which is a purely er!al -uestion1 what we want is a common term includin. !oth dicast and ecclesiast# 6et us2 for the sake of distinction2 call it /indefinite office2/ and we will assume that those who share in such office are citi3ens# *his is the most comprehensi e definition of a citi3en2 and !est suits all those who are .enerally so called# But we must not for.et that thin.s of which the underlyin. principles differ in kind2 one of them !ein. first2 another second2 another third2 ha e2 when re.arded in this relation2 nothin.2 or hardly anythin.2 worth mentionin. in common# 7ow we see that .o ernments differ in kind2 and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior1 those which are faulty or per erted are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect# 8%hat we mean !y per ersion will !e hereafter e$plained#9 *he citi3en then of necessity differs under each form of .o ernment1 and our definition is !est adapted to the citi3en of a democracy1 !ut not necessarily to other states# 5or in some states the people are not acknowled.ed2 nor ha e they any re.ular assem!ly2 !ut only e$traordinary ones1 and suits are distri!uted !y sections amon. the ma.istrates# At 6acedaemon2 for instance2 the )phors determine suits a!out contracts2 which they distri!ute amon. themsel es2 while the elders are +ud.es of homicide2 and other causes are decided !y other ma.istrates# A similar principle pre ails at Cartha.e1 there certain ma.istrates decide all causes# %e may2 indeed2 modify our definition of the citi3en so as to include these states# 4n them it is the holder of a definite2 not of an indefinite office2 who le.islates and +ud.es2 and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reser ed the ri.ht of deli!eratin. or +ud.in. a!out some thin.s or a!out all thin.s# *he conception of the citi3en now !e.ins to clear up# He who has the power to take part in the deli!erati e or +udicial administration of any state is said !y us to !e a citi3ens of that state1 and2 speakin. .enerally2 a state is a !ody of citi3ens sufficin. for the purposes of life# Part II But in practice a citi3en is defined to !e one of whom !oth the parents are citi3ens1 others insist on .oin. further !ack1 say to two or three or more ancestors# *his is a short and practical definition !ut there are some who raise the further -uestion: How this third or fourth ancestor came to !e a citi3en0 ;or.ias of 6eontini2 partly

!ecause he was in a difficulty2 partly in irony2 said- /Mortars are what is made !y the mortar-makers2 and the citi3ens of 6arissa are those who are made !y the ma.istrates1 for it is their trade to make 6arissaeans#/ <et the -uestion is really simple2 for2 if accordin. to the definition +ust .i en they shared in the .o ernment2 they were citi3ens# *his is a !etter definition than the other# 5or the words2 /!orn of a father or mother who is a citi3en2/ cannot possi!ly apply to the first inha!itants or founders of a state# *here is a .reater difficulty in the case of those who ha e !een made citi3ens after a re olution2 as !y Cleisthenes at Athens after the e$pulsion of the tyrants2 for he enrolled in tri!es many metics2 !oth stran.ers and sla es# *he dou!t in these cases is2 not who is2 !ut whether he who is ou.ht to !e a citi3en1 and there will still !e a furtherin. the state2 whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state1 for what ou.ht not to !e is what is false# 7ow2 there are some who hold office2 and yet ou.ht not to hold office2 whom we descri!e as rulin.2 !ut rulin. un+ustly# And the citi3en was defined !y the fact of his holdin. some kind of rule or office- he who holds a +udicial or le.islati e office fulfills our definition of a citi3en# 4t is e ident2 therefore2 that the citi3ens a!out whom thedou!t has arisen must !e called citi3ens# Part III %hether they ou.ht to !e so or not is a -uestion which is !ound up with the pre ious in-uiry# 5or a parallel -uestion is raised respectin. the state2 whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state1 for e$ample2 in the transition from an oli.archy or a tyranny to a democracy# 4n such cases persons refuse to fulfill their contracts or any other o!li.ations2 on the .round that the tyrant2 and not the state2 contracted them1 they ar.ue that some constitutions are esta!lished !y force2 and not for the sake of the common .ood# But this would apply e-ually to democracies2 for they too may !e founded on iolence2 and then the acts of the democracy will !e neither more nor less acts of the state in -uestion than those of an oli.archy or of a tyranny# *his -uestion runs up into another: on what principle shall we e er say that the state is the same2 or different0 4t would !e a ery superficial iew which considered only the place and the inha!itants 8for the soil and the population may !e separated2 and some of the inha!itants may li e in one place and some in another9# *his2 howe er2 is not a ery serious difficulty1 we need only remark that the word /state/ is am!i.uous# 4t is further asked: %hen are men2 li in. in the same place2 to !e re.arded as a sin.le city- what is the limit0 Certainly not the wall of the city2 for you mi.ht surround all "eloponnesus with a wall# 6ike this2 we may say2 is Ba!ylon2 and e ery city that has the compass of a nation rather than a city1 Ba!ylon2 they say2 had !een taken for three days !efore some part of the inha!itants !ecame aware of the fact# *his difficulty may2 howe er2 with ad anta.e !e deferred to another occasion1 the statesman has to consider the si3e of the state2 and whether it should consist of more than one nation or not#

A.ain2 shall we say that while the race of inha!itants2 as well as their place of a!ode2 remain the same2 the city is also the same2 althou.h the citi3ens are always dyin. and !ein. !orn2 as we call ri ers and fountains the same2 althou.h the water is always flowin. away and comin. a.ain Or shall we say that the .enerations of men2 like the ri ers2 are the same2 !ut that the state chan.es0 5or2 since the state is a partnership2 and is a partnership of citi3ens in a constitution2 when the form of .o ernment chan.es2 and !ecomes different2 then it may !e supposed that the state is no lon.er the same2 +ust as a tra.ic differs from a comic chorus2 althou.h the mem!ers of !oth may !e identical# And in this manner we speak of e ery union or composition of elements as different when the form of their composition alters1 for e$ample2 a scale containin. the same sounds is said to !e different2 accordin.ly as the Dorian or the "hry.ian mode is employed# And if this is true it is e ident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution2 and it may !e called or not called !y the same name2 whether the inha!itants are the same or entirely different# 4t is -uite another -uestion2 whether a state ou.ht or ou.ht not to fulfill en.a.ements when the form of .o ernment chan.es# Part IV *here is a point nearly allied to the precedin.: %hether the irtue of a .ood man and a .ood citi3en is the same or not# But2 !efore enterin. on this discussion2 we must certainly first o!tain some .eneral notion of the irtue of the citi3en# 6ike the sailor2 the citi3en is a mem!er of a community# 7ow2 sailors ha e different functions2 for one of them is a rower2 another a pilot2 and a third a look-out man2 a fourth is descri!ed !y some similar term1 and while the precise definition of each indi idual/s irtue applies e$clusi ely to him2 there is2 at the same time2 a common definition applica!le to them all# 5or they ha e all of them a common o!+ect2 which is safety in na i.ation# Similarly2 one citi3en differs from another2 !ut the sal ation of the community is the common !usiness of them all# *his community is the constitution1 the irtue of the citi3en must therefore !e relati e to the constitution of which he is a mem!er# 4f2 then2 there are many forms of .o ernment2 it is e ident that there is not one sin.le irtue of the .ood citi3en which is perfect irtue# But we say that the .ood man is he who has one sin.le irtue which is perfect irtue# Hence it is e ident that the .ood citi3en need not of necessity possess the irtue which makes a .ood man# *he same -uestion may also !e approached !y another road2 from a consideration of the !est constitution# 4f the state cannot !e entirely composed of .ood men2 and yet each citi3en is e$pected to do his own !usiness well2 and must therefore ha e irtue2 still inasmuch as all the citi3ens cannot !e alike2 the irtue of the citi3en and of the .ood man cannot coincide# All must ha e the irtue of the .ood citi3en- thus2 and thus only2 can the state !e perfect1 !ut they will not ha e the irtue of a .ood man2 unless we assume that in the .ood state all the citi3ens must !e .ood#

A.ain2 the state2 as composed of unlikes2 may !e compared to the li in. !ein.: as the first elements into which a li in. !ein. is resol ed are soul and !ody2 as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite2 the family of hus!and and wife2 property of master and sla e2 so of all these2 as well as other dissimilar elements2 the state is composed1 and2 therefore2 the irtue of all the citi3ens cannot possi!ly !e the same2 any more than the e$cellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands !y his side# 4 ha e said enou.h to show why the two kinds of irtue cannot !e a!solutely and always the same# But will there then !e no case in which the irtue of the .ood citi3en and the irtue of the .ood man coincide0 *o this we answer that the .ood ruler is a .ood and wise man2 and that he who would !e a statesman must !e a wise man# And some persons say that e en the education of the ruler should !e of a special kind1 for are not the children of kin.s instructed in ridin. and military e$ercises0 As )uripides says: =7o su!tle arts for me2 !ut what the state re-uires# = As thou.h there were a special education needed !y a ruler# 4f then the irtue of a .ood ruler is the same as that of a .ood man2 and we assume further that the su!+ect is a citi3en as well as the ruler2 the irtue of the .ood citi3en and the irtue of the .ood man cannot !e a!solutely the same2 althou.h in some cases they may1 for the irtue of a ruler differs from that of a citi3en# 4t was the sense of this difference which made ,ason say that /he felt hun.ry when he was not a tyrant2/ meanin. that he could not endure to li e in a pri ate station# But2 on the other hand2 it may !e ar.ued that men are praised for knowin. !oth how to rule and how to o!ey2 and he is said to !e a citi3en of appro ed irtue who is a!le to do !oth# 7ow if we suppose the irtue of a .ood man to !e that which rules2 and the irtue of the citi3en to include rulin. and o!eyin.2 it cannot !e said that they are e-ually worthy of praise# Since2 then2 it is sometimes thou.ht that the ruler and the ruled must learn different thin.s and not the same2 !ut that the citi3en must know and share in them !oth2 the inference is o! ious# *here is2 indeed2 the rule of a master2 which is concerned with menial offices- the master need not know how to perform these2 !ut may employ others in the e$ecution of them: the other would !e de.radin.1 and !y the other 4 mean the power actually to do menialduties2 which ary much in character and are e$ecuted !y arious classes of sla es2 such2 for e$ample2 as handicraftsmen2 who2 as their name si.nifies2 li e !y the la!or of their hands: under these the mechanic is included# Hence in ancient times2 and amon. some nations2 the workin. classes had no share in the .o ernment- a pri ile.e which they only ac-uired under the e$treme democracy# Certainly the .ood man and the statesman and the .ood citi3en ou.ht not to learn the crafts of inferiors e$cept for their own occasional use1 if they ha!itually practice them2 there will cease to !e a distinction !etween master and sla e# *his is not the rule of which we are speakin.1 !ut there is a rule of another kind2

which is e$ercised o er freemen and e-uals !y !irth -a constitutional rule2 which the ruler must learn !y o!eyin.2 as he would learn the duties of a .eneral of ca alry !y !ein. under the orders of a .eneral of ca alry2 or the duties of a .eneral of infantry !y !ein. under the orders of a .eneral of infantry2 and !y ha in. had the command of a re.iment and of a company# 4t has !een well said that /he who has ne er learned to o!ey cannot !e a .ood commander#/ *he two are not the same2 !ut the .ood citi3en ou.ht to !e capa!le of !oth1 he should know how to .o ern like a freeman2 and how to o!ey like a freeman- these are the irtues of a citi3en# And2 althou.h the temperance and +ustice of a ruler are distinct from those of a su!+ect2 the irtue of a .ood man will include !oth1 for the irtue of the .ood man who is free and also a su!+ect2 e#.#2 his +ustice2 will not !e one !ut will comprise distinct kinds2 the one -ualifyin. him to rule2 the other to o!ey2 and differin. as the temperance and coura.e of men and women differ# 5or a man would !e thou.ht a coward if he had no more coura.e than a coura.eous woman2 and a woman would !e thou.ht lo-uacious if she imposed no more restraint on her con ersation than the .ood man1 and indeed their part in the mana.ement of the household is different2 for the duty of the one is to ac-uire2 and of the other to preser e# "ractical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler: it would seem that all other irtues must e-ually !elon. to ruler and su!+ect# *he irtue of the su!+ect is certainly not wisdom2 !ut only true opinion1 he may !e compared to the maker of the flute2 while his master is like the flute-player or user ofthe flute# 5rom these considerations may !e .athered the answer to the -uestion2 whether the irtue of the .ood man is the same as that of the .ood citi3en2 or different2 and how far the same2 and how far different# Part V *here still remains one more -uestion a!out the citi3en: 4s he only a true citi3en who has a share of office2 or is the mechanic to !e included0 4f they who hold no office are to !e deemed citi3ens2 not e ery citi3en can ha e this irtue of rulin. and o!eyin.1 for this man is a citi3en And if none of the lower class are citi3ens2 in which part of the state are they to !e placed0 5or they are not resident aliens2 and they are not forei.ners# May we not reply2 that as far as this o!+ection .oes there is no more a!surdity in e$cludin. them than in e$cludin. sla es and freedmen from any of the a!o e-mentioned classes0 4t must !e admitted that we cannot consider all those to !e citi3ens who are necessary to the e$istence of the state1 for e$ample2 children are not citi3en e-ually with .rown-up men2 who are citi3ens a!solutely2 !ut children2 not !ein. .rown up2 are only citi3ens on a certain assumption# 7ay2 in ancient times2 and amon. some nations the artisan class were sla es or forei.ners2 and therefore the ma+ority of them are so now# *he !est form of state will not admit them to citi3enship1 !ut if they are admitted2 then our definition of the irtue of a citi3en will not apply to e ery citi3en nor to e ery free man as such2 !ut only to those who are freed from necessary ser ices# *he necessary people are either sla es who minister to the wants of indi iduals2 or mechanics and la!orers who are the

ser ants of the community# *hese reflections carried a little further will e$plain their position1 and indeed what has !een said already is of itself2 when understood2 e$planation enou.h# Since there are many forms of .o ernment there must !e many arieties of citi3en and especially of citi3ens who are su!+ects1 so that under some .o ernments the mechanic and the la!orer will !e citi3ens2 !ut not in others2 as2 for e$ample2 in aristocracy or the so-called .o ernment of the !est 8if there !e such an one92 in which honors are .i en accordin. to irtue and merit1 for no man can practice irtue who is li in. the life of a mechanic or la!orer# 4n oli.archies the -ualification for office is hi.h2 and therefore no la!orer can e er !e a citi3en1 !ut a mechanic may2 for an actual ma+ority of them are rich# At *he!es there was a law that no man could hold office who had not retired from !usiness for ten years# But in many states the law .oes to the len.th of admittin. aliens1 for in some democracies a man is a citi3en thou.h his mother only !e a citi3en1 and a similar principle is applied to ille.itimate children1 the law is rela$ed when there is a dearth of population# But when the num!er of citi3ens increases2 first the children of a male or a female sla e are e$cluded1 then those whose mothers only are citi3ens1 and at last the ri.ht of citi3enship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are !oth citi3ens# Hence2 as is e ident2 there are different kinds of citi3ens1 and he is a citi3en in the hi.hest sense who shares in the honors of the state# Compare Homer/s words2 /like some dishonored stran.er/1 he who is e$cluded from the honors of the state is no !etter than an alien# But when his e$clusion is concealed2 then the o!+ect is that the pri ile.ed class may decei e their fellow inha!itants# As to the -uestion whether the irtue of the .ood man is the same as that of the .ood citi3en2 the considerations already adduced pro e that in some states the .ood man and the .ood citi3en are the same2 and in others different# %hen they are the same it is not e ery citi3en who is a .ood man2 !ut only the statesman and those who ha e or may ha e2 alone or in con+unction with others2 the conduct of pu!lic affairs# Part VI Ha in. determined these -uestions2 we ha e ne$t to consider whether there is only one form of .o ernment or many2 and if many2 what they are2 and how many2 and what are the differences !etween them# A constitution is the arran.ement of ma.istracies in a state2 especially of the hi.hest of all# *he .o ernment is e erywhere so erei.n in the state2 and the constitution is in fact the .o ernment# 5or e$ample2 in democracies the people are supreme2 !ut in oli.archies2 the few1 and2 therefore2 we say that these two forms of .o ernment also are different: and so in other cases#

5irst2 let us consider what is the purpose of a state2 and how many forms of .o ernment there are !y which human society is re.ulated# %e ha e already said2 in the first part of this treatise2 when discussin. household mana.ement and the rule of a master2 that man is !y nature a political animal# And therefore2 men2 e en when they do not re-uire one another/s help2 desire to li e to.ether1 not !ut that they are also !rou.ht to.ether !y their common interests in proportion as they se erally attain to any measure of well-!ein.# *his is certainly the chief end2 !oth of indi iduals and of states# And also for the sake of mere life 8in which there is possi!ly some no!le element so lon. as the e ils of e$istence do not .reatly o er!alance the .ood9 mankind meet to.ether and maintainthe political community# And we all see that men clin. to life e en at the cost of endurin. .reat misfortune2 seemin. to find in life a natural sweetness and happiness# *here is no difficulty in distin.uishin. the arious kinds of authority1 they ha e !een often defined already in discussions outside the school# *he rule of a master2 althou.h the sla e !y nature and the master !y nature ha e in reality the same interests2 is ne ertheless e$ercised primarily with a iew to the interest of the master2 !ut accidentally considers the sla e2 since2 if the sla e perish2 the rule of the master perishes with him# On the other hand2 the .o ernment of a wife and children and of a household2 which we ha e called household mana.ement2 is e$ercised in the first instance for the .ood of the .o erned or for the common .ood of !oth parties2 !ut essentially for the .ood of the .o erned2 as we see to !e the case in medicine2 .ymnastic2 and the arts in .eneral2 which are onlyaccidentally concerned with the .ood of the artists themsel es# 5or there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practice .ymnastics2 and the helmsman is always one of the crew# *he trainer or the helmsman considers the .ood of those committed to his care# But2 when he is one of the persons taken care of2 he accidentally participates in the ad anta.e2 for the helmsman is also a sailor2 and the trainer !ecomes one of those in trainin.# And so in politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of e-uality and likeness2 the citi3ens think that they ou.ht to hold office !y turns# 5ormerly2 as is natural2 e ery one would take his turn of ser ice1 and then a.ain2 some!ody else would look after his interest2 +ust as he2 while in office2 had looked after theirs# But nowadays2 for the sake of the ad anta.e which is to !e .ained from the pu!lic re enues and from office2 men want to !e always in office# One mi.ht ima.ine that the rulers2 !ein. sickly2 were only kept in health while they continued in office1 in that case we may !e sure that they would !e huntin. after places# *he conclusion is e ident: that .o ernments which ha e a re.ard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of +ustice2 and are therefore true forms1 !ut those which re.ard only the interest of the rulers are all defecti e and per erted forms2 for they are despotic2 whereas a state is a community of freemen# Part VII

Ha in. determined these points2 we ha e ne$t to consider how many forms of .o ernment there are2 and what they are1 and in the first place what are the true forms2 for when they are determined the per ersions of them will at once !e apparent# *he words constitution and .o ernment ha e the same meanin.2 and the .o ernment2 which is the supreme authority in states2 must !e in the hands of one2 or of a few2 or of the many# *he true forms of .o ernment2 therefore2 are those in which the one2 or the few2 or the many2 .o ern with a iew to the common interest1 !ut .o ernments which rule with a iew to the pri ate interest2 whether of the one or of the few2 or of the many2 are per ersions# 5or the mem!ers of a state2 if they are truly citi3ens2 ou.ht to participate in its ad anta.es# Of forms of .o ernment in which one rules2 we call that which re.ards the common interests2 kin.ship or royalty1 that in which more than one2 !ut not many2 rule2 aristocracy1 and it is so called2 either !ecause the rulers are the !est men2 or !ecause they ha e at heart the !est interests of the state and of the citi3ens# But when the citi3ens at lar.e administer the state for the common interest2 the .o ernment is called !y the .eneric name- a constitution# And there is a reason for this use of lan.ua.e# One man or a few may e$cel in irtue1 !ut as the num!er increases it !ecomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in e ery kind of irtue2 thou.h they may in military irtue2 for this is found in the masses# Hence in a constitutional .o ernment the fi.htin.-men ha e the supreme power2 and those who possess arms are the citi3ens# Of the a!o e-mentioned forms2 the per ersions are as follows: of royalty2 tyranny1 of aristocracy2 oli.archy1 of constitutional .o ernment2 democracy# 5or tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in iew the interest of the monarch only1 oli.archy has in iew the interest of the wealthy1 democracy2 of the needy: none of them the common .ood of all# Part VIII But there are difficulties a!out these forms of .o ernment2 and it will therefore !e necessary to state a little more at len.th the nature of each of them# 5or he who would make a philosophical study of the arious sciences2 and does not re.ard practice only2 ou.ht not to o erlook or omit anythin.2 !ut to set forth the truth in e ery particular# *yranny2 as 4 was sayin.2 is monarchy e$ercisin. the rule of a master o er the political society1 oli.archy is when men of property ha e the .o ernment in their hands1 democracy2 the opposite2 when the indi.ent2 and not the men of property2 are the rulers# And here arises the first of our difficulties2 and it relates to the distinction drawn# 5or democracy is said to !e the .o ernment of the many# But what if the many are men of property and ha e the power in their hands0 4n like manner oli.archy is said to !e the .o ernment of the few1 !ut what if the poor are fewer than the rich2 and ha e the power in their hands !ecause they are stron.er0 4n these cases the distinction which we ha e drawn !etween these different forms of .o ernment would no lon.er hold .ood#

Suppose2 once more2 that we add wealth to the few and po erty to the many2 and name the .o ernments accordin.ly- an oli.archy is said to !e that in which the few and the wealthy2 and a democracy that in which the many and the poor are the rulers- there will still !e a difficulty# 5or2 if the only forms of .o ernment are the ones already mentioned2 how shall we descri!e those other .o ernments also +ust mentioned !y us2 in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer2 and !oth .o ern in their respecti e states0 *he ar.ument seems to show that2 whether in oli.archies or in democracies2 the num!er of the .o ernin. !ody2 whether the .reater num!er2 as in a democracy2 or the smaller num!er2 as in an oli.archy2 is an accident due to the fact that the rich e erywhere are few2 and the poor numerous# But if so2 there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference !etween them# 5or the real difference !etween democracy and oli.archy is po erty and wealth# %here er men rule !y reason of their wealth2 whether they !e few or many2 that is an oli.archy2 and where the poor rule2 that is a democracy# But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many1 for few are well-to-do2 whereas freedom is en+oyed !y an2 and wealth and freedom are the .rounds on which the oli.archical and democratical parties respecti ely claim power in the state# Part IX 6et us !e.in !y considerin. the common definitions of oli.archy and democracy2 and what is +ustice oli.archical and democratical# 5or all men clin. to +ustice of some kind2 !ut their conceptions are imperfect and they do not e$press the whole idea# 5or e$ample2 +ustice is thou.ht !y them to !e2 and is2 e-uality2 not# howe er2 for howe er2 for !ut only for e-uals# And ine-uality is thou.ht to !e2 and is2 +ustice1 neither is this for all2 !ut only for une-uals# %hen the persons are omitted2 then men +ud.e erroneously# *he reason is that they are passin. +ud.ment on themsel es2 and most people are !ad +ud.es in their own case# And whereas +ustice implies a relation to persons as well as to thin.s2 and a +ust distri!ution2 as 4 ha e already said in the )thics2 implies the same ratio!etween the persons and !etween the thin.s2 they a.ree a!out the e-uality of the thin.s2 !ut dispute a!out the e-uality of the persons2 chiefly for the reason which 4 ha e +ust .i en- !ecause they are !ad +ud.es in their own affairs1 and secondly2 !ecause !oth the parties to the ar.ument are speakin. of a limited and partial +ustice2 !ut ima.ine themsel es to !e speakin. of a!solute +ustice# 5or the one party2 if they are une-ual in one respect2 for e$ample wealth2 consider themsel es to !e une-ual in all1 and the other party2 if they are e-ual in one respect2 for e$ample free !irth2 consider themsel es to !e e-ual in all# But they lea e out the capital point# 5or if men met and associated out of re.ard to wealth only2 their share in the state would !e proportioned to their property2 and the oli.archical doctrine would then seem to carry the day# 4t would not !e +ust that he who paid one mina should ha e the same share of a hundred minae2 whether of the principal or of the profits2 as he who paid the remainin. ninety-nine# But a state e$ists for the sake of a .ood life2 and not for

the sake of life only: if life only were the o!+ect2 sla es and !rute animals mi.htform a state2 !ut they cannot2 for they ha e no share in happiness or in a life of free choice# 7or does a state e$ist for the sake of alliance and security from in+ustice2 nor yet for the sake of e$chan.e and mutual intercourse1 for then the *yrrhenians and the Cartha.inians2 and all who ha e commercial treaties with one another2 would !e the citi3ens of one state# *rue2 they ha e a.reements a!out imports2 and en.a.ements that they will do no wron. to one another2 and written articles of alliance# But there are no ma.istrates common to the contractin. parties who will enforce their en.a.ements1 different states ha e each their own ma.istracies# 7or does one state take care that the citi3ens of the other are such as they ou.ht to !e2 nor see that those who come under the terms of the treaty do no wron. or wickedness at an2 !ut only that they do no in+ustice to one another# %hereas2 those who care for .ood .o ernment take into consideration irtue and ice in states# %hence it may !e further inferred that irtue must !e the care of a state which is truly so called2 and not merely en+oys the name: for without this end the community !ecomes a mere alliance which differs only in place from alliances of which the mem!ers li e apart1 and law is only a con ention2 /a surety to one another of +ustice2/ as the sophist 6ycophron says2 and has no real power to make the citi3ens *his is o! ious1 for suppose distinct places2 such as Corinth and Me.ara2 to !e !rou.ht to.ether so that their walls touched2 still they would not !e one city2 not e en if the citi3ens had the ri.ht to intermarry2 which is one of the ri.hts peculiarly characteristic of states# A.ain2 if men dwelt at a distance from one another2 !ut not so far off as to ha e no intercourse2 and there were laws amon. them that they should not wron. each other in their e$chan.es2 neither would this !e a state# 6et us suppose that one man is a carpenter2 another a hus!andman2 another a shoemaker2 and so on2 and that their num!er is ten thousand: ne ertheless2 if they ha e nothin. in common !ut e$chan.e2 alliance2 and the like2 that would not constitute a state# %hy is this0 Surely not !ecause they are at a distance from one another: for e en supposin. that such a community were to meet in one place2 !ut that each man had a house of his own2 which was in a manner his state2 and that they made alliance with one another2 !ut only a.ainst e il-doers1 still an accurate thinker would not deem this to !e a state2 if their intercourse with one another was of the same character after as !efore their union# 4t is clear then that a state is not a mere society2 ha in. a common place2 esta!lished for the pre ention of mutual crime and for the sake of e$chan.e# *hese are conditions without which a state cannot e$ist1 !ut all of them to.ether do not constitute a state2 which is a community of families and a..re.ations of families in well-!ein.2 for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficin. life# Such a community can only !e esta!lished amon. those who li e in the same place and intermarry# Hence arise in cities family connections2 !rotherhoods2 common sacrifices2 amusements which draw men to.ether# But these are created !y friendship2 for the will to li e to.ether is friendship# *he end of the state is the .ood life2 and these are the means towards it# And the state is the union of families and illa.es in a perfect and self-sufficin.

life2 !y which we mean a happy and honora!le life# Our conclusion2 then2 is that political society e$ists for the sake of no!le actions2 and not of mere companionship# Hence they who contri!ute most to such a society ha e a .reater share in it than those who ha e the same or a .reater freedom or no!ility of !irth !ut are inferior to them in political irtue1 or than those who e$ceed them in wealth !ut are surpassed !y them in irtue# 5rom what has !een said it will !e clearly seen that all the partisans of different forms of .o ernment speak of a part of +ustice only# Part X *here is also a dou!t as to what is to !e the supreme power in the state: 4s it the multitude0 Or the wealthy0 Or the .ood0 Or the one !est man0 Or a tyrant0 Any of these alternati es seems to in ol e disa.reea!le conse-uences# 4f the poor2 for e$ample2 !ecause they are more in num!er2 di ide amon. themsel es the property of the rich- is not this un+ust0 7o2 !y hea en 8will !e the reply92 for the supreme authority +ustly willed it# But if this is not in+ustice2 pray what is0 A.ain2 when in the first di ision all has !een taken2 and the ma+ority di ide anew the property of the minority2 is it not e ident2 if this .oes on2 that they will ruin the state0 <et surely2 irtue is not the ruin of those who possess her2 nor is +ustice destructi e of a state1 and therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot !e +ust# 4f it were2 all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity !e +ust1 for he only coerces other men !y superior power2 +ust as the multitude coerce the rich# But is it +ust then that the few and the wealthy should !e the rulers0 And what if they2 in like manner2 ro! and plunder the people- is this +ust0 if so2 the other case will likewise !e +ust# But there can !e no dou!t that all these thin.s are wron. and un+ust# *hen ou.ht the .ood to rule and ha e supreme power0 But in that case e ery!ody else2 !ein. e$cluded from power2 will !e dishonored# 5or the offices of a state are posts of honor1 and if one set of men always holds them2 the rest must !e depri ed of them# *hen will it !e well that the one !est man should rule0 7ay2 that is still more oli.archical2 for the num!er of those who are dishonored is there!y increased# Some one may say that it is !ad in any case for a man2 su!+ect as he is to all the accidents of human passion2 to ha e the supreme power2 rather than the law# But what if the law itself !e democratical or oli.archical2 how will that help us out of our difficulties0 7ot at all1 the same conse-uences will follow# Part XI Most of these -uestions may !e reser ed for another occasion# *he principle that the multitude ou.ht to !e supreme rather than the few !est is one that is maintained2 and2 thou.h not free from difficulty2 yet seems to contain an element of truth# 5or the many2 of whom each indi idual is !ut an ordinary person2 when they meet

to.ether may ery likely !e !etter than the few .ood2 if re.arded not indi idually !ut collecti ely2 +ust as a feast to which many contri!ute is !etter than a dinner pro ided out of a sin.le purse# 5or each indi idual amon. the many has a share of irtueand prudence2 and when they meet to.ether2 they !ecome in a manner one man2 who has many feet2 and hands2 and senses1 that is a fi.ure of their mind and disposition# Hence the many are !etter +ud.es than a sin.le man of music and poetry1 for some understand one part2 and some another2 and amon. them they understand the whole# *here is a similar com!ination of -ualities in .ood men2 who differ from any indi idual of the many2 as the !eautiful are said to differ from those who are not !eautiful2 and works of art from realities2 !ecause in them the scattered elements are com!ined2 althou.h2 if taken separately2 the eye of one person or some other feature in another person would !e fairer than in the picture# %hether this principle can apply to e ery democracy2 and to all !odies of men2 is not clear# Or rather2 !y hea en2 in some cases it is impossi!le of application1 for the ar.ument would e-ually hold a!out !rutes1 and wherein2 it will !e asked2 do some men differ from !rutes0 But there may !e !odies of men a!out whom our statement is ne ertheless true# And if so2 the difficulty which has !een already raised2 and also another which is akin to it - i3#2 what power should !e assi.ned to the mass of freemen and citi3ens2 who are not rich and ha e no personal merit- are !oth sol ed# *here is still a dan.er in aflowin. them to share the .reat offices of state2 for their folly will lead them into error2 and their dishonesty into crime# But there is a dan.er also in not lettin. them share2 for a state in which many poor men are e$cluded from office will necessarily !e full of enemies# *he only way of escape is to assi.n to them some deli!erati e and +udicial functions# 5or this reason Solon and certain other le.islators .i e them the power of electin. to offices2 and of callin. the ma.istrates to account2 !ut they do not allow them to hold office sin.ly# %hen they meet to.ether their perceptions are -uite .ood enou.h2 and com!ined with the !etter class they are useful to the state 8+ust as impure food when mi$ed with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small -uantity of the pure would !e92 !ut each indi idual2 left to himself2 forms an imperfect +ud.ment# On the other hand2 the popular form of .o ernment in ol es certain difficulties# 4n the first place2 it mi.ht !e o!+ected that he who can +ud.e of the healin. of a sick man would !e one who could himself heal his disease2 and make him whole- that is2 in other words2 the physician1 and so in all professions and arts# As2 then2 the physician ou.ht to !e called to account !y physicians2 so ou.ht men in .eneral to !e called to account !y their peers# But physicians are of three kinds: there is the ordinary practitioner2 and there is the physician of the hi.her class2 and thirdly the intelli.ent man who has studied the art: in all arts there is such a class1 and we attri!ute the power of +ud.in. to them -uite as much as to professors of the art# Secondly2 does not the same principle apply to elections0 5or a ri.ht election can only !e made !y those who ha e knowled.e1 those who know .eometry2 for e$ample2 will choose a .eometrician ri.htly2 and those who know how to steer2 a pilot1 and2 e en if there !e some occupations and arts in which pri ate persons share in the a!ility to choose2 they certainly cannot choose !etter than those who know# So that2 accordin. to this ar.ument2 neither the election of

ma.istrates2 nor the callin. of them to account2 should !e entrusted to the many# <et possi!ly these o!+ections are to a .reat e$tent met !y our old answer2 that if the people are not utterly de.raded2 althou.h indi idually they may !e worse +ud.es than those who ha e special knowled.e- as a !ody they are as .ood or !etter# Moreo er2 there are some arts whose products are not +ud.ed of solely2 or !est2 !y the artists themsel es2 namely those arts whose products are reco.ni3ed e en !y those who do not possess the art1 for e$ample2 the knowled.e of the house is not limited to the !uilder only1 the user2 or2 in other words2 the master2 of the house will !e e en a !etter +ud.e than the !uilder2 +ust as the pilot will +ud.e !etter of a rudder than the carpenter2 and the .uest will +ud.e !etter of a feast than the cook# *his difficulty seems now to !e sufficiently answered2 !ut there is another akin to it# *hat inferior persons should ha e authority in .reater matters than the .ood would appear to !e a stran.e thin.2 yet the election and callin. to account of the ma.istrates is the .reatest of all# And these2 as 4 was sayin.2 are functions which in some states are assi.ned to the people2 for the assem!ly is supreme in all such matters# <et persons of any a.e2 and ha in. !ut a small property -ualification2 sit in the assem!ly and deli!erate and +ud.e2 althou.h for the .reat officers of state2 such as treasurers and .enerals2 a hi.h -ualification is re-uired# *his difficulty may !e sol ed in the same manner as the precedin.2 and the present practice of democracies may !e really defensi!le# 5or the power does not reside in the dicast2 or senator2 or ecclesiast2 !ut in the court2 and the senate2 and the assem!ly2 of which indi idual senators2 or ecclesiasts2 or dicasts2 are only parts or mem!ers# And for this reason the many may claim to ha e a hi.her authority than the few1 for the people2 and the senate2 and the courts consist of many persons2 and their property collecti ely is .reater than the property of one or of a few indi iduals holdin. .reat offices# But enou.h of this# *he discussion of the first -uestion shows nothin. so clearly as that laws2 when .ood2 should !e supreme1 and that the ma.istrate or ma.istrates should re.ulate those matters only on which the laws are una!le to speak with precision owin. to the difficulty of any .eneral principle em!racin. all particulars# But what are .ood laws has not yet !een clearly e$plained1 the old difficulty remains# *he .oodness or !adness2 +ustice or in+ustice2 of laws aries of necessity with the constitutions of states# *his2 howe er2 is clear2 that the laws must !e adapted to the constitutions# But if so2 true forms of .o ernment will of necessity ha e +ust laws2 and per erted forms of .o ernment will ha e un+ust laws# Part XII 4n all sciences and arts the end is a .ood2 and the .reatest .ood and in the hi.hest de.ree a .ood in the most authoritati e of all- this is the political science of which the .ood is +ustice2 in other words2 the common interest# All men think +ustice to !e a sort of e-uality1 and to a certain e$tent they a.ree in the philosophical distinctions which ha e !een laid down !y us a!out )thics# 5or they admit that +ustice is a thin.

and has a relation to persons2 and that e-uals ou.ht to ha e e-uality# But there still remains a -uestion: e-uality or ine-uality of what0 Here is a difficulty which calls for political speculation# 5or ery likely some persons will say that offices of state ou.ht to !e une-ually distri!uted accordin. to superior e$cellence2 in whate er respect2 of the citi3en2 althou.h there is no other difference !etween him and the rest of the community1 for that those who differ in any one respect ha e different ri.hts and claims# But2 surely2 if this is true2 the comple$ion or hei.ht of a man2 or any other ad anta.e2 will !e a reason for his o!tainin. a .reater share of political ri.hts# *he error here lies upon the surface2 and may !e illustrated from the other arts and sciences# %hen a num!er of flute players are e-ual in their art2 there is no reason why those of them who are !etter !orn should ha e !etter flutes .i en to them1 for they will not play any !etter on the flute2 and the superior instrument should !e reser ed for him who is the superior artist# 4f what 4 am sayin. is still o!scure2 it will !e made clearer as we proceed# 5or if there were a superior fluteplayer who was far inferior in !irth and !eauty2 althou.h either of these may !e a .reater .ood than the art of flute-playin.2 and may e$cel flute-playin. in a .reater ratio than he e$cels the others in his art2 still he ou.ht to ha e the !est flutes .i en to him2 unless the ad anta.es of wealth and !irth contri!ute to e$cellence in fluteplayin.2 which they do not# Moreo er2 upon this principle any .ood may !e compared with any other# 5or if a .i en hei.ht may !e measured wealth and a.ainst freedom2 hei.ht in .eneral may !e so measured# *hus if A e$cels in hei.ht more than B in irtue2 e en if irtue in .eneral e$cels hei.ht still more2 all .oods will !e commensura!le1 for if a certain amount is !etter than some other2 it is clear that some other will !e e-ual# But since no such comparison can !e made2 it is e ident that there is .ood reason why in politics men do not .round their claim to office on e ery sort of ine-uality any more than in the arts# 5or if some !e slow2 and others swift2 that is no reason why the one should ha e little and the others much1 it is in .ymnastics contests that such e$cellence is rewarded# %hereas the ri al claims of candidates for office can only !e !ased on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state# And therefore the no!le2 or free-!orn2 or rich2 may with .ood reason claim office1 for holders of offices must !e freemen and ta$payers: a state can !e no more composed entirely of poor men than entirely of sla es# But if wealth and freedom are necessary elements2 +ustice and alor aree-ually so1 for without the former -ualities a state cannot e$ist at all2 without the latter not well# Part XIII 4f the e$istence of the state is alone to !e considered2 then it would seem that all2 or some at least2 of these claims are +ust1 !ut2 if we take into account a .ood life2 then2 as 4 ha e already said2 education and irtue ha e superior claims# As2 howe er2 those who are e-ual in one thin. ou.ht not to ha e an e-ual share in all2 nor those who are une-ual in one thin. to ha e an une-ual share in all2 it is certain that all forms of .o ernment which rest on either of these principles are per ersions# All men ha e a claim in a certain sense2 as 4 ha e already admitted2 !ut all ha e not an

a!solute claim# *he rich claim !ecause they ha e a .reater share in the land2 and land is the common element of the state1 also they are .enerally more trustworthy in contracts# *he free claim under the same tide as the no!le1 for they are nearly akin# 5or the no!le are citi3ens in a truer sense than the i.no!le2 and .ood !irth is always alued in a man/s own home and country# Another reason is2 that those who are sprun. from !etter ancestors are likely to !e !etter men2 for no!ility is e$cellence of race# >irtue2 too2 may !e truly said to ha e a claim2 for +ustice has !een acknowled.ed !y us to !e a social irtue2 and it implies all others# A.ain2 the many may ur.e their claim a.ainst the few1 for2 when taken collecti ely2 and compared with the few2 they are stron.er and richer and !etter# But2 what if the .ood2 the rich2 the no!le2 and the other classes who make up a state2 are all li in. to.ether in the same city2 %ill there2 or will there not2 !e any dou!t who shall rule0 7o dou!t at all in determinin. who ou.ht to rule in each of the a!o e-mentioned forms of .o ernment# 5or states are characteri3ed !y differences in their .o ernin. !odies-one of them has a .o ernment of the rich2 another of the irtuous2 and so on# But a difficulty arises when all these elements co-e$ist# How are we to decide0 Suppose the irtuous to !e ery few in num!er: may we consider their num!ers in relation to their duties2 and ask whether they are enou.h to administer the state2 or so many as will make up a state0 O!+ections may !e ur.ed a.ainst all the aspirants to political power# 5or those who found their claims on wealth or family mi.ht !e thou.ht to ha e no !asis of +ustice1 on this principle2 if any one person were richer than all the rest2 it is clear that he ou.ht to !e ruler of them# 4n like manner he who is ery distin.uished !y his !irth ou.ht to ha e the superiority o er all those who claim on the .round that they are free!orn# 4n an aristocracy2 or .o ernment of the !est2 a like difficulty occurs a!out irtue1 for if one citi3en !e !etter than the other mem!ers of the .o ernment2 howe er .ood they may !e2 he too2 upon the same principle of +ustice2 should rule o er them# And if the people are to !e supreme !ecause they are stron.er than the few2 then if one man2 or more than one2 !ut not a ma+ority2 is stron.er than the many2 they ou.ht to rule2 and not the many# All these considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule and to hold all other men in su!+ection to them are strictly ri.ht# *o those who claim to !e masters of the .o ernment on the .round of their irtue or their wealth2 the many mi.ht fairly answer that they themsel es are often !etter and richer than the few- 4 do not say indi idually2 !ut collecti ely# And another in.enious o!+ection which is sometimes put forward may !e met in a similar manner# Some persons dou!t whether the le.islator who desires to make the +ustest laws ou.ht to le.islatewith a iew to the .ood of the hi.her classes or of the many2 when the case which we ha e mentioned occurs# 7ow what is +ust or ri.ht is to !e interpreted in the sense of /what is e-ual/1 and that which is ri.ht in the sense of !ein. e-ual is to !e considered with reference to the ad anta.e of the state2 and the common .ood of the citi3ens# And a citi3en is one who shares in .o ernin. and !ein. .o erned# He differs under different forms of .o ernment2 !ut in the !est state he is one who is a!le and willin. to !e .o erned and to .o ern with a iew to the life of irtue#

4f2 howe er2 there !e some one person2 or more than one2 althou.h not enou.h to make up the full complement of a state2 whose irtue is so pre-eminent that the irtues or the political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs2 he or they can !e no lon.er re.arded as part of a state1 for +ustice will not !e done to the superior2 if he is reckoned only as the e-ual of those who are so far inferior to him in irtue and in political capacity# Such an one may truly !e deemed a ;od amon. men# Hence we see that le.islation is necessarily concerned only with those who are e-ual in !irth and in capacity1 and that for men of pre-eminent irtue there is no law- they are themsel es a law# Any would !e ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them: they would pro!a!ly retort what2 in the fa!le of Antisthenes2 the lions said to the hares2 when in the council of the !easts the latter !e.an haran.uin. and claimin. e-uality for all# And for this reason democratic states ha e instituted ostracism1 e-uality is a!o e all thin.s their aim2 and therefore they ostraci3ed and !anished from the city for a time those who seemed to predominate too much throu.h their wealth2 or the num!er of their friends2 or throu.h any other political influence# Mytholo.y tells us that the Ar.onauts left Heracles !ehind for a similar reason1 the ship Ar.o would not take him !ecause she feared that he would ha e !een too much for the rest of the crew# %herefore those who denounce tyranny and !lame the counsel which "eriander .a e to *hrasy!ulus cannot !e held alto.ether +ust in their censure# *he story is that "eriander2 when the herald was sent to ask counsel of him2 said nothin.2 !ut only cut off the tallest ears of corn till he had !rou.htthe field to a le el# *he herald did not know the meanin. of the action2 !ut came and reported what he had seen to *hrasy!ulus2 who understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the state1 and this is a policy not only e$pedient for tyrants or in practice confined to them2 !ut e-ually necessary in oli.archies and democracies# Ostracism is a measure of the same kind2 which acts !y disa!lin. and !anishin. the most prominent citi3ens# ;reat powers do the same to whole cities and nations2 as the Athenians did to the Samians2 Chians2 and 6es!ians1 no sooner had they o!tained a firm .rasp of the empire2 than they hum!led their allies contrary to treaty1 and the "ersian kin. has repeatedly crushed the Medes2 Ba!ylonians2 and other nations2 when their spirit has !een stirred !y the recollection of their former .reatness# *he pro!lem is a uni ersal one2 and e-ually concerns all forms of .o ernment2 true as well as false1 for2 althou.h per erted forms with a iew to their own interests may adopt this policy2 those which seek the common interest do so likewise# *he same thin. may !e o!ser ed in the arts and sciences1 for the painter will not allow the fi.ure to ha e a foot which2 howe er !eautiful2 is not in proportion2 nor will the ship!uilder allow the stem or any other part of the essel to !e unduly lar.e2 any more than the chorus-master will allow any one who sin.s louder or !etter than all the rest to sin. in the choir# Monarchs2 too2 may practice compulsion and still li e in harmony with their cities2 if their own .o ernment is for the interest of the state# Hence where there is an acknowled.ed superiority the ar.ument in fa or of ostracism is !ased upon a kind of political +ustice# 4t would certainly !e !etter that

the le.islator should from the first so order his state as to ha e no need of such a remedy# But if the need arises2 the ne$t !est thin. is that he should endea or to correct the e il !y this or some similar measure# *he principle2 howe er2 has not !een fairly applied in states1 for2 instead of lookin. to the .ood of their own constitution2 they ha e used ostracism for factious purposes# 4t is true that under per erted forms of .o ernment2 and from their special point of iew2 such a measure is +ust and e$pedient2 !ut it is also clear that it is not a!solutely +ust# 4n the perfect state there would !e .reat dou!ts a!out the use of it2 not when applied to e$cess in stren.th2 wealth2 popularity2 or the like2 !ut when used a.ainst some one who is pre-eminent in irtue- what is to !e done with him0 Mankind will not say that such an one is to !e e$pelled and e$iled1 on the other hand2 he ou.ht not to !e a su!+ect- that would !e as if mankind should claim to rule o er ?eus2 di idin. his offices amon. them# *he only alternati e is that all should +oyfully o!ey such a ruler2 accordin. to what seems to !e the order of nature2 and that men like him should !e kin.s in their state for life# Part XIV *he precedin. discussion2 !y a natural transition2 leads to the consideration of royalty2 which we admit to !e one of the true forms of .o ernment# 6et us see whether in order to !e well .o erned a state or country should !e under the rule of a kin. or under some other form of .o ernment1 and whether monarchy2 althou.h .ood for some2 may not !e !ad for others# But first we must determine whether there is one species of royalty or many# 4t is easy to see that there are many2 and that the manner of .o ernment is not the same in all of them# Of royalties accordin. to law2 8@9 the 6acedaemonian is thou.ht to answer !est to the true pattern1 !ut there the royal power is not a!solute2 e$cept when the kin.s .o on an e$pedition2 and then they take the command# Matters of reli.ion are likewise committed to them# *he kin.ly office is in truth a kind of .eneralship2 irresponsi!le and perpetual# *he kin. has not the power of life and death2 e$cept in a specified case2 as for instance2 in ancient times2 he had it when upon a campai.n2 !y ri.ht of force# *his custom is descri!ed in Homer# 5or A.amemnon is patient when he is attacked in the assem!ly2 !ut when the army .oes out to !attle he has the power e en of life and death# Does he not say- /%hen 4 find a man skulkin. apart from the !attle2 nothin. shall sa e him from the do.s and ultures2 for in my hands is death/0 *his2 then2 is one form of royalty-a .eneralship for life: and of such royalties some are hereditary and others electi e# 8A9 *here is another sort of monarchy not uncommon amon. the !ar!arians2 which nearly resem!les tyranny# But this is !oth le.al and hereditary# 5or !ar!arians2 !ein. more ser ile in character than Hellenes2 and Asiadics than )uropeans2 do not re!el a.ainst a despotic .o ernment# Such royalties ha e the nature of tyrannies

!ecause the people are !y nature sla es1 !ut there is no dan.er of their !ein. o erthrown2 for they are hereditary and le.al# %herefore also their .uards are such as a kin. and not such as a tyrant would employ2 that is to say2 they are composed of citi3ens2 whereas the .uards of tyrants are mercenaries# 5or kin.s rule accordin. to law o er oluntary su!+ects2 !ut tyrants o er in oluntary1 and the one are .uarded !y their fellow-citi3ens the others are .uarded a.ainst them# *hese are two forms of monarchy2 and there was a third 8&9 which e$isted in ancient Hellas2 called an Aesymnetia or dictatorship# *his may !e defined .enerally as an electi e tyranny2 which2 like the !ar!arian monarchy2 is le.al2 !ut differs from it in not !ein. hereditary# Sometimes the office was held for life2 sometimes for a term of years2 or until certain duties had !een performed# 5or e$ample2 the Mytilenaeans elected "ittacus leader a.ainst the e$iles2 who were headed !y Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet# And Alcaeus himself shows in one of his !an-uet odes that they chose "ittacus tyrant2 for he reproaches his fellow-citi3ens for /ha in. made the low-!orn "ittacus tyrant of the spiritless and ill-fated city2 with one oice shoutin. his praises#/ *hese forms of .o ernment ha e always had the character of tyrannies2 !ecause they possess despotic power1 !ut inasmuch as they are electi e and ac-uiesced in !y their su!+ects2 they are kin.ly# 8B9 *here is a fourth species of kin.ly rule- that of the heroic times- which was hereditary and le.al2 and was e$ercised o er willin. su!+ects# 5or the first chiefs were !enefactors of the people in arts or arms1 they either .athered them into a community2 or procured land for them1 and thus they !ecame kin.s of oluntary su!+ects2 and their power was inherited !y their descendants# *hey took the command in war and presided o er the sacrifices2 e$cept those which re-uired a priest# *hey also decided causes either with or without an oath1 and when they swore2 the form of the oath was the stretchin. out of their sceptre# 4n ancient times their power e$tended continuously to all thin.s whatsoe er2 in city and country2 as well as in forei.n parts1 !ut at a later date they relin-uished se eral of these pri ile.es2 and others the people took from them2 until in some states nothin. was left to them !ut the sacrifices1 and where they retained more of the reality they had only the ri.ht of leadership in war !eyond the !order# *hese2 then2 are the four kinds of royalty# 5irst the monarchy of the heroic a.es1 this was e$ercised o er oluntary su!+ects2 !ut limited to certain functions1 the kin. was a .eneral and a +ud.e2 and had the control of reli.ion *he second is that of the !ar!arians2 which is a hereditary despotic .o ernment in accordance with law# A third is the power of the so-called Aesynmete or Dictator1 this is an electi e tyranny# *he fourth is the 6acedaemonian2 which is in fact a .eneralship2 hereditary and perpetual# *hese four forms differ from one another in the manner which 4 ha e descri!ed#

8'9 *here is a fifth form of kin.ly rule in which one has the disposal of all2 +ust as each nation or each state has the disposal of pu!lic matters1 this form corresponds to the control of a household# 5or as household mana.ement is the kin.ly rule of a house2 so kin.ly rule is the household mana.ement of a city2 or of a nation2 or of many nations# Part XV Of these forms we need only consider two2 the 6acedaemonian and the a!solute royalty1 for most of the others he in a re.ion !etween them2 ha in. less power than the last2 and more than the first# *hus the in-uiry is reduced to two points: first2 is it ad anta.eous to the state that there should !e a perpetual .eneral2 and if so2 should the office !e confined to one family2 or open to the citi3ens in turn0 Secondly2 is it well that a sin.le man should ha e the supreme power in all thin.s0 *he first -uestion falls under the head of laws rather than of constitutions1 for perpetual.eneralship mi.ht e-ually e$ist under any form of .o ernment2 so that this matter may !e dismissed for the present# *he other kind of royalty is a sort of constitution1 this we ha e now to consider2 and !riefly to run o er the difficulties in ol ed in it# %e will !e.in !y in-uirin. whether it is more ad anta.eous to !e ruled !y the !est man or !y the !est laws# *he ad ocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only in .eneral terms2 and cannot pro ide for circumstances1 and that for any science to a!ide !y written rules is a!surd# 4n ).ypt the physician is allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day2 !ut if sooner2 he takes the risk# Hence it is clear that a .o ernment actin. accordin. to written laws is plainly not the !est# <et surely the ruler cannot dispense with the .eneral principle which e$ists in law1 and this is a !etter ruler which is free from passion than that in which it is innate# %hereas the law is passionless2 passion must e er sway the heart of man# <es2 it may !e replied2 !ut then on the other hand an indi idual will !e !etter a!le to deli!erate in particular cases# *he !est man2 then2 must le.islate2 and laws must !e passed2 !ut these laws will ha e no authority when they miss the mark2 thou.h in all other cases retainin. their authority# But when the law cannot determine a point at all2 or not well2 should the one !est man or should all decide0 Accordin. to our present practice assem!lies meet2 sit in +ud.ment2 deli!erate2 and decide2 and their +ud.ments an relate to indi idual cases# 7ow any mem!er of the assem!ly2 taken separately2 is certainly inferior to the wise man# But the state is made up of many indi iduals# And as a feast to which all the .uests contri!ute is !etter than a !an-uet furnished !y a sin.le man2 so a multitude is a !etter +ud.e of many thin.s than any indi idual# A.ain2 the many are more incorrupti!le than the few1 they are like the .reater -uantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little# *he indi idual is lia!le to !e o ercome !y an.er or !y some other passion2 and then his +ud.ment is

necessarily per erted1 !ut it is hardly to !e supposed that a .reat num!er of persons would all .et into a passion and .o wron. at the same moment# 6et us assume that they are the freemen2 and that they ne er act in iolation of the law2 !ut fill up the .aps which the law is o!li.ed to lea e# Or2 if such irtue is scarcely attaina!le !y the multitude2 we need only suppose that the ma+ority are .ood men and .ood citi3ens2 and ask which will !e the more incorrupti!le2 the one .ood ruler2 or the many who are all .ood0 %ill not the many0 But2 you will say2 there may !e parties amon. them2 whereas the one man is not di ided a.ainst himself# *o which we may answer that their character is as .ood as his# 4f we call the rule of many men2 who are all of them .ood2 aristocracy2 and the rule of one man royalty2 then aristocracy will !e !etter for states than royalty2 whether the .o ernment is supported !y force or not2 pro ided only that a num!er of men e-ual in irtue can !e found# *he first .o ernments were kin.ships2 pro!a!ly for this reason2 !ecause of old2 when cities were small2 men of eminent irtue were few# 5urther2 they were made kin.s !ecause they were !enefactors2 and !enefits can only !e !estowed !y .ood men# But when many persons e-ual in merit arose2 no lon.er endurin. the preeminence of one2 they desired to ha e a commonwealth2 and set up a constitution# *he rulin. class soon deteriorated and enriched themsel es out of the pu!lic treasury1 riches !ecame the path to honor2 and so oli.archies naturally .rew up# *hese passed into tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies1 for lo e of .ain in the rulin. classes was always tendin. to diminish their num!er2 and so to stren.then the masses2 who in the end set upon their masters and esta!lished democracies# Since cities ha e increased in si3e2 no other form of .o ernment appears to !e any lon.er e en easy to esta!lish# ) en supposin. the principle to !e maintained that kin.ly power is the !est thin. for states2 how a!out the family of the kin.0 Are his child ren to succeed him0 4f they are no !etter than any!ody else2 that will !e mischie ous# But2 says the lo er of royalty2 the kin.2 thou.h he mi.ht2 will not hand on his power to his children# *hat2 howe er2 is hardly to !e e$pected2 and is too much to ask of human nature# *here is also a difficulty a!out the force which he is to employ1 should a kin. ha e .uards a!out him !y whose aid he may !e a!le to coerce the refractory0 4f not2 how will he administer his kin.dom0 ) en if he !e the lawful so erei.n who does nothin. ar!itrarily or contrary to law2 still he must ha e some force wherewith to maintain the law# 4n the case of a limited monarchy there is not much difficulty in answerin. this -uestion1 the kin. must ha e such force as will !e more than a match for one or more indi iduals2 !ut not so .reat as that of the people# *he ancients o!ser e this principle when they ha e .uards to any one whom they appointed dictator or tyrant# *hus2 when Dionysius asked the Syracusans to allow him .uards2 some!ody ad ised that they should .i e him only such a num!er#

Part XVI At this place in the discussion there impends the in-uiry respectin. the kin. who acts solely accordin. to his own will he has now to !e considered# *he so-called limited monarchy2 or kin.ship accordin. to law2 as 4 ha e already remarked2 is not a distinct form of .o ernment2 for under all .o ernments2 as2 for e$ample2 in a democracy or aristocracy2 there may !e a .eneral holdin. office for life2 and one person is often made supreme o er the administration of a state# A ma.istracy of this kind e$ists at )pidamnus2 and also at Opus2 !ut in the latter city has a more limited power# 7ow2 a!solute monarchy2 or the ar!itrary rule of a so erei.n o er an the citi3ens2 in a city which consists of e-uals2 is thou.ht !y some to !e -uite contrary to nature1 it is ar.ued that those who are !y nature e-uals must ha e the same natural ri.ht and worth2 and that for une-uals to ha e an e-ual share2 or for e-uals to ha e an une en share2 in the offices of state2 is as !ad as for different !odily constitutions to ha e the same food and clothin.# %herefore it is thou.ht to !e +ust that amon. e-uals e ery one !e ruled as well as rule2 and therefore that an should ha e their turn# %e thus arri e at law1 for an order of succession implies law# And the rule of the law2 it is ar.ued2 is prefera!le to that of any indi idual# On the same principle2 e en if it !e !etter for certain indi iduals to .o ern2 they should !e made only .uardians and ministers of the law# 5or ma.istrates there must !ethis is admitted1 !ut then men say that to .i e authority to any one man when all are e-ual is un+ust# 7ay2 there may indeed !e cases which the law seems una!le to determine2 !ut in such cases can a man0 7ay2 it will !e replied2 the law trains officers for this e$press purpose2 and appoints them to determine matters which are left undecided !y it2 to the !est of their +ud.ment# 5urther2 it permits them to make any amendment of the e$istin. laws which e$perience su..ests# *herefore he who !ids the law rule may !e deemed to !id ;od and Reason alone rule2 !ut he who !ids man rule adds an element of the !east1 for desire is a wild !east2 and passion per erts the minds of rulers2 e en when they are the !est of men# *he law is reason unaffected !y desire# %e are told that a patient should call in a physician1 he will not .et !etter if he is doctored out of a !ook# But the parallel of the arts is clearly not in point1 for the physician does nothin. contrary to rule from moti es of friendship1 he only cures a patient and takes a fee1 whereas ma.istrates do many thin.s from spite and partiality# And2 indeed2 if a man suspected the physician of !ein. in lea.ue with his enemies to destroy him for a !ri!e2 he would rather ha e recourse to the !ook# But certainly physicians2 when they are sick2 call in other physicians2 and trainin.-masters2 when they are in trainin.2 other trainin.-masters2 as if they could not +ud.e +ud.e truly a!out their own case and mi.ht !e influenced !y their feelin.s# Hence it is e ident that in seekin. for +ustice men seek for the mean or neutral2 for the law is the mean# A.ain2 customary laws ha e more wei.ht2 and relate to moreimportant matters2 than written laws2 and a man may !e a safer ruler than the written law2 !ut not safer than the customary law# A.ain2 it is !y no means easy for one man to superintend many thin.s1 he will ha e to appoint a num!er of su!ordinates2 and what difference does it make whether

these su!ordinates always e$isted or were appointed !y him !ecause he needed theme 4f2 as 4 said !efore2 the .ood man has a ri.ht to rule !ecause he is !etter2 still two .ood men are !etter than one: this is the old sayin.2 two .oin. to.ether2 and the prayer of A.amemnon2 =%ould that 4 had ten such councillorsC = And at this day there are ma.istrates2 for e$ample +ud.es2 who ha e authority to decide some matters which the law is una!le to determine2 since no one dou!ts that the law would command and decide in the !est manner whate er it could# But some thin.s can2 and other thin.s cannot2 !e comprehended under the law2 and this is the ori.in of the ne$ted -uestion whether the !est law or the !est man should rule# 5or matters of detail a!out which men deli!erate cannot !e included in le.islation# 7or does any one deny that the decision of such matters must !e left to man2 !ut it is ar.ued that there should !e many +ud.es2 and not one only# 5or e ery ruler who has !een trained !y the law +ud.es well1 and it would surely seem stran.e that a person should see !etter with two eyes2 or hear !etter with two ears2 or act !etter with two hands or feet2 than many with many1 indeed2 it is already the practice of kin.s to make to themsel es many eyes and ears and hands and feet# 5or they make collea.ues of those who are the friends of themsel es and their .o ernments# *hey must !e friends of the monarch and of his .o ernment1 if not his friends2 they will not do what he wants1 !ut friendship implies likeness and e-uality1 and2 therefore2 if he thinks that his friends ou.ht to rule2 he must think that those who are e-ual to himself and like himself ou.ht to rule e-ually with himself# *hese are the principal contro ersies relatin. to monarchy# Part XVII But may not all this !e true in some cases and not in others0 for there is !y nature !oth a +ustice and an ad anta.e appropriate to the rule of a master2 another to kin.ly rule2 another to constitutional rule1 !ut there is none naturally appropriate to tyranny2 or to any other per erted form of .o ernment1 for these come into !ein. contrary to nature# 7ow2 to +ud.e at least from what has !een said2 it is manifest that2 where men are alike and e-ual2 it is neither e$pedient nor +ust that one man should !e lord of all2 whether there are laws2 or whether there are no laws2 !ut he himself is in the place of law# 7either should a .ood man !e lord o er .ood men2 nor a !ad man o er !ad1 nor2 e en if he e$cels in irtue2 should he ha e a ri.ht to rule2 unless in a particular case2 at which 4 ha e already hinted2 and to which 4 will once more recur# But first of all2 4 must determine what natures are suited for .o ernment !y a kin.2 and what for an aristocracy2 and what for a constitutional .o ernment# A people who are !y nature capa!le of producin. a race superior in the irtue needed for political rule are fitted for kin.ly .o ernment1 and a people su!mittin. to !e ruled as freemen !y men whose irtue renders them capa!le of political

command are adapted for an aristocracy1 while the people who are suited for constitutional freedom are those amon. whom there naturally e$ists a warlike multitude a!le to rule and to o!ey in turn !y a law which .i es office to the well-todo accordin. to their desert# But when a whole family or some indi idual2 happens to !e so pre-eminentin irtue as to surpass all others2 then it is +ust that they should !e the royal family and supreme o er all2 or that this one citi3en should !e kin. of the whole nation# 5or2 as 4 said !efore2 to .i e them authority is not only a.reea!le to that .round of ri.ht which the founders of all states2 whether aristocratical2 or oli.archical2 or a.ain democratical2 are accustomed to put forward 8for these all reco.ni3e the claim of e$cellence2 althou.h not the same e$cellence92 !ut accords with the principle already laid down# 5or surely it would not !e ri.ht to kill2 or ostraci3e2 or e$ile such a person2 or re-uire that he should take his turn in !ein. .o erned# *he whole is naturally superior to the part2 and he who has this preeminence is in the relation of a whole to a part# But if so2 the only alternati e is that he should ha e the supreme power2 and that mankind should o!ey him2 not in turn2 !ut always# *hese are the conclusions at which we arri e respectin. royalty and its arious forms2 and this is the answer to the -uestion2 whether it is or is not ad anta.eous to states2 and to which2 and how# Part XVIII %e maintain that the true forms of .o ernment are three2 and that the !est must !e that which is administered !y the !est2 and in which there is one man2 or a whole family2 or many persons2 e$cellin. all the others to.ether in irtue2 and !oth rulers and su!+ects are fitted2 the one to rule2 the others to !e ruled2 in such a manner as to attain the most eli.i!le life# %e showed at the commencement of our in-uiry that the irtue of the .ood man is necessarily the same as the irtue of the citi3en of the perfect state# Clearly then in the same manner2 and !y the same means throu.h which a man !ecomes truly .ood2 he will frame a state that is to !e ruled !y an aristocracy or !y a kin.2 and the same education and the same ha!its will !e found to make a .ood man and a man fit to !e a statesman or a kin.# Ha in. arri ed at these conclusions2 we must proceed to speak of the perfect state2 and descri!e how it comes into !ein. and is esta!lished#