CONSTI LAW II NOTES ON EQUAL PROTECTION

SHAPIRO vs THOMPSON WON the waiting period requirement is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause? YES. The waiting-period requirement is unconstitutional because it "has a chilling effect on the right to travel." The majority also held that the provision was a violation of the Equal rotection !lause of the "ourteenth #mendment because the denial of relief to those resident in the State for less than a year is not based on any permissible purpose but is solely designed$ as "!onnecticut states quite fran%ly$" "to protect its fisc by discouraging entry of those who come needing relief." The statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year creates a classification which constitutes an invidious discrimination denying them equal protection of the laws.

ORMOCSUGAR vs CITY TREASURER WON the city ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and uniformity of taxation? YES. # perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them$ for it ta&es only centrifugal sugar produced and e&ported by the 'rmoc Sugar !ompany$ (nc. and none other. #t the time of the ta&ing ordinance)s enactment$ 'rmoc Sugar !ompany$ (nc.$ it is true$ was the only sugar central in the city of 'rmoc. Still$ the classification$ to be reasonable$ should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The ta&ing ordinance should not be singular and e&clusive as to e&clude any subsequently established sugar central$ of the same class as plaintiff$ for the coverage of the ta&. #s it is now$ even if later a similar company is set up$ it cannot be subject to the ta& because the ordinance e&pressly points only to 'rmoc !ity Sugar !ompany$ (nc. as the entity to be levied upon.

PEOPLE vs CAYAT WON Act16 ! "#ec $ % & violates equal protection clause? *'. #ct *o. +,-. satisfies these requirements. /+0 substantial distinctions- the degree of civili1ation and culture$ geographical area$ and$ more directly$ to natives of the hilippine (slands of a low grade of civili1ation$ usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities /20 germane purpose- to insure peace and order in and among the non!hristian tribes /-0 conditions not limited- (t is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions e&ist /30 apply equally - the #ct applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof . (t designed to promote peace and order in the non-!hristian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and$ eventually$ to hasten their equali1ation and unification with the rest of their !hristian brothers. (ts ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the "ilipino people with a view to a greater hilippines.

ICHONG vs HERNANDEZ WON 'A 11() violates the equal protection clause? *'. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citi1ens and country from such dominance and control4 that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State$ thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future4 that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the !onstitution because sufficient grounds e&ist for the distinction between alien and citi1en in the e&ercise of the occupation regulated.. The Treaty of #mity between the 5epublic of the hilippines and the 5epublic of !hina of #pril +6$ +.37 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. #ll that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the !hinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." 8ut the nationals of !hina are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries$ e&cept those of the 9nited States$ who are granted special rights by the !onstitution$ are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.

DUMLAO vs COMELEC WON sec* + of ,- ,lg* .$ contrary to equal protection clause? +st paragraph is not contrary to the equal protection clause. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose$ it cannot be considered invalid. #bsent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. :ell accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law$ there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the !onstitution$ not a doubtful and equivocal breach. 2nd paragraph is contrary to the equal protection clause. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence$ as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. (t condemns before one is fully heard. (n ultimate effect$ e&cept as to the degree of proof$ no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts$ as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.

DE GUZMAN vs COMELEC WON #ec++ of 'A (1(! is constitutional? *'. The classification under Section 33 of 5# 6+6. satisfies the aforestated requirements.The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the !onstitution. ;erily$ under Section -/n0 of 5# 6+6.$ election officers are the highest officials or authori1ed representatives of the !'<E=E! in a city or municipality. (t is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials$ large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. <oreover$ to require the !'<E=E! to reassign all employees /connected with the registration of voters0 who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the !'<E=E!.