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Relating Decision Making Styles to Predicting Selfefficacy and a Generalized Expectation of Success and Failure
Thomas E. Nygren and Rebecca J. White Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 2005 49: 432 DOI: 10.1177/154193120504900346 The online version of this article can be found at: http://pro.sagepub.com/content/49/3/432

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PROCEEDINGS of the HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY 49th ANNUAL MEETING2005

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RELATING DECISION MAKING STYLES TO PREDICTING SELFEFFICACY AND A GENERALIZED EXPECTATION OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE
Thomas E. Nygren and Rebecca J. White The Ohio State University Columbus, OH The theoretical and applied distinction between a propensity toward a more intuitive decision style versus a more analytical style has gained prominence in recent years. A self-report measure, the Decision Making Styles Inventory, is presented and is shown to differentiate among those who endorse an analytical, an intuitive, or an avoidant, regret-based decision style. Results from one study, a horse race betting task, indicated that those who endorsed a decision style, particularly those endorsing a flexible analytical and intuitive style, performed better on the task than those who did not. A second study clearly showed that decision style was related to self reports of self-efficacy, optimism, and self-regard. These results suggest that having either an analytical, intuitive or combined decision style is beneficial to the decision maker.

Individual differences in decision making styles have become increasingly important components of theories of decision making. In particular, the distinction between a propensity toward a more intuitive decision style versus a more analytical style has gained prominence (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1993). In recent years a number of books have been written to address the specific role that intuition might play in peoples decision making strategies. Two of the current authors (Myers, 2002; Hogarth, 2001) make it clear that an investigation of intuitive and analytical decision styles is critical to understanding human decision making behavior. Nygren and White have shown in a number of recent papers (c.f., Nygren & White, 2001, 2002; White & Nygren, 2002) that a reliable and valid self-report measure of decision making styles could be constructed that differentiates between propensities to be a more analytical decision maker, a more intuitive decision maker, or a more regret-induced procrastinator or decision avoider. In addition, they found that a persons propensity toward one decision making style (e.g., analytical) did not necessarily preclude use of the other (intuitive), and that some individuals actually endorse both styles. That is, the two styles are not, as had been informally assumed, opposite extremes on one unidimensional continuum, where endorsement of one precludes endorsement of the other. This suggests that we ought to find some individuals who might, in the vein of Payne, Bettman, and Johnsons (1993) idea of the adaptive decision maker, endorse both an analytical and an intuitive decision style and use either style as a task might warrant. Clearly, some tasks exist where a more deliberate analytical style is most likely to enhance performance, and other tasks suggest that quick, intuitive responses are more beneficial. Thus, the literature suggests that being a kind of flexible decision maker who could use either style as necessary ought to enhance performance and improve quality of decisions.

We also suggest that a predisposition toward avoiding decisions or use of a regret-based style can undermine positive aspects of using either an analytical or intuitive style. The Decision Making Styles Inventory Our measure, the Decision Making Styles Inventory, assesses all three styles. It currently consists of a set of 45 scale items, 15 items on each of three scales (6-point Likert-type response format.). Based on two separate factor analyses of about n=800 each, three scales consistently emerged from the analyses that clearly separated items associated with endorsing use of an Analytical decision making style (ANA), an Intuitive decision making style (INT), and an Avoidance, Regret-based Emotional decision making style (AVOID). Examples of items from each scale are: Analytical: My best decisions are those for which I have weighed all of the relevant information. Intuitive: When making decisions, my first instinct usually turns out to be the best. Avoidance: When I find out that Ive made a bad decision, I feel a lot of regret. In both of the factor analysis and current samples, the analytical and intuitive scales were nearly orthogonal (r = .094, n = 830; r = .071, n = 801, and r = -.047, n = 1154, all ps > .05). Correlations among the other pairs of factors are typically small, but are significant (ANA vs AVOID, r = .280, p <.001; INT vs AVOID, r = -.180, p < .001). All three scales have been found to be internally reliable with coefficient "s equal to .883, .862, and .861 for ANA, INT, and AVOID in a recent data set, respectively. Test-retest reliabilities in a recent sample of n = 208 students who took the inventory four to eight weeks apart were .702, .704, and .745, respectively.

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The DMI scales have been correlated with a number of individual differences measures; Table 1 presents some of these. The construct validity of the Analytical decision making style scale is supported in that those who endorse an analytical decision style are, as expected, less likely to be risk-seeking (r = -.214, n = 1130) or impulsive (r = -.394, n = 182), and are more likely to be rational thinkers (r = .333 with Epsteins Rational Thinking scale, n = 1154), are low in cognitive disorganization (r = -.165, n = 332), and have a higher need for cognition (r = .281, n = 793). The Intuitive scale correlates very highly with the Epsteins REI Experiential Scale (r =.640, n=1154), risk taking tendency (r = .245, n=1130), impulsivity (r = .320, n = 182), Rosenbergs self-esteem scale (r = .250, n=509), and belief in luck (r = .274, n = 1117). Those endorsing an avoidant regret-based decision making style are less likely to be REI experiential thinkers (r=-.261, n = 1154), less likely to be risk-takers (r = -.303, n = 1130), are high in self-doubt (r = .463, n = 451), and more likely to be low in self-esteem (r = -.387, n = 509). Win-Place-Show (WPS) Gambling Task Although people clearly can be expected to make idiosyncratic decisions from time to time, we were interested in determining whether a majority of individuals would endorse at least one of these decision styles and whether endorsement and use of a particular style would enhance performance in a gambling task. Participants. In a study of simulated horse race gambling, 313 participants evaluated and placed bets on 30 different hypothetical horse races. All participants started with 500 dollars and were, unknown to them, programmed to win on exactly eight of the 30 races (i.e., on the same trials for all participants) and lose on the other twenty-two. Each individual saw the particular horse races in a unique random order, however, and each could bet either to win, place, or show, with amounts of 0 (no bet), 30, 60 or 90 dollars. Although the gains and losses, betting behavior, and the actual races differed from trial to trial across individuals, all subjects ultimately experienced the same races and the same number and sequences of one, two, three, or even four losses in a row. On average, then, all subjects should have performed about the same. Results. Results showed surprising differences in performance. Figure 1 shows the results of three separate analyses for subjects who were grouped as either (a) high (upper 1/3, n=112) or low (lower 1/3, n=111) endorsers of an analytical decision style, (b) high (n=96) or low (n=102) endorsers of an intuitive decision style, and (c) high (n=90) or low (n=117) endorsers of both an analytical and intuitive decision style. Regardless of particular decision style, those who did endorse a style did significantly better than those who did not, even though there was no statistical basis

for them to do so. Further, as the bottom graph in Figure 1 shows, those who endorsed both styles did even better. We suggest from these results that endorsement of either or both decision styles may be associated with greater confidence and self-efficacy and less influence of poor heuristics or biases and avoidance or regretbased decision making. Correlational Studies In several large scale correlational studies we wanted to specifically examine this idea that we could find people who endorsed either or both an analytical and intuitive style, and that these individuals would, in fact, show greater self-efficacy and confidence in their decision making abilities as long as they did not endorse an avoidance or regret-based style as well. Specifically, we examined how well the three DMI scales could predict four measures of self-esteem / self-efficacy and the Big Five personality factors of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect as measured by the IPIP (Goldberg, L. R., 1999). The Generalized Self-efficacy Scale is designed to reflect a generalized expectation of success rather than failure in new situations; the Unconditional SelfRegard Scale measures global self-esteem; and the Instrumentality Scale measures the ability to take action on ones behalf and to feel a sense of control in ones life. We predicted that those individuals who highly endorsed either an analytic or intuitive decision style would score higher on all of the self-efficacy measures, but that those individuals who endorsed an avoidant regret-based style would score lower on all measures. Secondly, we predicted that there would be an interactive effect; namely, that those individuals who endorsed both an intuitive and analytical decision style would score even higher on the self-efficacy measures and in the positive domain of the Big Five measures of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability. Those who endorsed an analytical and avoidant or an intuitive and avoidant combined style would score lower in self-efficacy. Finally, we hypothesized that in a statistical sense all three DMI scales and at least the INT x ANA interaction would each be statistically significant components of a formal stepwise multiple linear regression model that could reliably and validly predicting self-esteem, self-efficacy, instrumentality, and some components of the Big Five. Participants. Six hundred and six introductory psychology students participated in the self-efficacy study and 395 in the IPIP Big Five study. Results. Table 2 provides the results of the four stepwise regression analyses for the self-efficacy scales and for the five personality factor scales. Each row contains the multiple correlation of the three DMI scales

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with the respective dependent measure and the simple correlations between the dependent measure and each DMI scale or pairwise interactions of DMI scales. Finally, bullets () indicate which main effect or interaction term significantly entered into the stepwise regression equations. Several points are striking with respect to these analyses. First the DMI scales can, when independently combined, explain an impressive amount of variance in individuals self-reports of their ability to take action (instrumentality), their perceived self-esteem, their optimism, and their general self-efficacy. For example, in Table 2 with respect to Generalized Self-Efficacy, all three DMI scales serve as important predictors and the multiple R is impressively high across this very large sample (R=.680). Higher self-efficacy is associated with either an analytical or intuitive decision style. Moreover, as hypothesized, there is an even stronger relationship if the individual endorses both analytical and intuitive decision styles. In fact, for each of the Self-Efficacy, Self-Regard, and Instrumentality scales, the interaction between analytical and intuitive is a significant overall predictor in the stepwise regression equation. This positive interactive effect between analytical and intuitive decision styles suggests, as hypothesized, that those individuals who endorse both an analytical and an intuitive decision style are more likely to report higher self-efficacy and self-esteem and greater assurance of their ability to perform well and be in control of events. What is equally impressive from the additional IPIP analysis in Table 2 is that a positive decision style is clearly associated with positive personality characteristics including agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability. Again, in each case the interaction of analytical and intuitive styles makes a significant enhanced contribution; those who endorse both styles are more likely to score higher on the agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability scales. DISCUSSION The results of these studies suggest that in many decision tasks we may find that those who are more likely to endorse either a consistent analytical or intuitive decision style will report greater self-efficacy, confidence, and show better performance in decision making tasks. Further, the analyses in Table 2 suggest, interestingly, that neither style is necessarily more likely to enhance self-regard, confidence, or self-efficacy. There is evidence to suggest, however, that the best decision makers from a self-efficacy perspective, and maybe from a performance perspective as well, may very well be those who show additional flexibility in their decision style those who are willing to endorse both an analytical approach or an intuitive approach, and use each depending on the demands of the situation.

These results suggest that we may find that a valuable component from a human factors perspective for training individuals who must make decisions that lead to high performance and consistency over time would be to teach them to be flexible decision makers and comfortable with analytical and intuitive style. As a final caution, it is important to note that this correlational study is just that; there is no attempt here to suggest that a causal relationship exists between selfefficacy and decision style. Nevertheless, the DMI has shown, as a self-report individual differences instrument, that individual differences are important, reliable components of the decision making process and warrant further study. Our findings suggest that human performance may benefit if we can discover via the DMI or similar instruments when a more intuitive or when a more analytical decision making style may be best for the adaptive decision maker. REFERENCES
Epstein, S., Pacini, R. Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking style. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 390-405. Goldberg, L. R. (1999). A broad-bandwidth, public domain, personality inventory measuring the lower-level facets of several five-factor models. In I. Mervielde, I. Deary, F. De Fruyt, & F. Ostendorf (Eds.), Personality Psychology in Europe, Vol. 7 (pp. 7-28). Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University Press. Hammond, K. R., Hamm, R. M., Grassia, J., & Pearson, T. (1993). Direct comparison of the efficiency of intuitive and analytical cognition in expert judgment. In W. M. Goldstein & R. M. Hogarth (Eds.), Research on Judgment and Decision Making. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 144-180. Hogarth, R. M. (2001). Educating Intuition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Myers, D. G. (2002). Intuition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Nygren, T. E. & White, R. J. (2001). Decision making styles and choice behavior in gambling tasks. Paper presented at the 73rd Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL, May 2001. Nygren, T. E. & White, R. J. (2002). Assessing Individual Differences in Decision Making Styles: Analytical vs. Intuitive. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 953-957. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society: Santa Monica, CA. Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J> (1993). The adaptive decision maker: Effort and accuracy in choice. In W. M. Goldstein & R. M. Hogarth (Eds.), Research on Judgment and Decision Making. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 181-204.

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PROCEEDINGS of the HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY 49th ANNUAL MEETING2005 White, R. J. & Nygren, T. E. (2002). Influence of Analytically and Intuitively Framed Instructions upon Multi-Attribute Decision Task Approach. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 497-500. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society: Santa Monica, CA.

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Table 1. Simple Correlations Among DMI Analytical, Intuitive, and Avoidance Scales and Decision Making Related Measures Scale DMI Analytical -.047 .280 .333 -.124 -.214 -.394 -.045 -.001 .148 -.084 .281 -.165 .002 DMI Intuitive DMI Avoid / Regret N

DMI Intuitive Style DMI Avoidance / Regret Style Rational Experiential Inv. Rational (S. Epstein, 1996) Rational Experiential Inv. Experiential (S. Epstein, 1996) Jackson Personality Inventory Risk Taking (D. Jackson) Personality Research Form Impulsivity (D. Jackson) Self Doubt (K. Oleson, 2002) Decisional Self Doubt (H. Mirels & P. Greblo, 1994) Rosenberg Self Esteem (S. Rosenberg, 1965) Belief in Luck (P. Darke & J. Freedman, 1997) Need for Cognition (J. Cacioppo & R. Petty, 1993) Cognitive Dysorganization (Mirels, unpublished) Gender

-.180 .111 .640 .245 .320 -.179 -.099 .250 .274 -.018 -.174 .047

-.241 -.261 -.303 .148 .463 .658 -.387 -.128 -.142 .161 .225

1154 1154 1154 1154 1130 182 451 180 509 1117 793 332 1154

Table 2. Stepwise Multiple Regression Results for DMI Scales as Predictors with Generalized Self-Efficacy Measures, Big 5 Personality Measures, Goal Orientation Measures, Betting Task (WPS) Measures, and Multi-task Performance (MAT) Measures Dependent Measure Multiple R .636 .544 .680 .518 .286 .280 .484 .595 .196 R2 N Ana Int Avoid An x Int .482 .327 .497 .363 An xAv Int x Av -.104 -.183 -.091 -.089

Generalized Self Efficacy Generalized Self Regard Instrumentality Optimism IPIP - Extraversion IPIP - Agreeableness IPIP - Conscientiousness IPIP - Emotional Stability IPIP - Intellect

.404 .296 .463 .268 .082 .078 .235 .354 .038

606 606 606 606 395 395 395 395 395

.368 .205 .323 .228 .262 .203 .460

.420 .342 .509 .372 -.153 .235 .170 .205 .148

-.397 -.434 -.443 -.357 .207

-.072 -.194 -.129 -.124

-.568

.280 .427 .159 .196

.166 .209 -.389

.215 -.379

.166

All correlations are significant at p < .01. Bullets () indicate predictors from stepwise regression equation.

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Figure 1. Running Point Totals for High and Low Analytical Decision Style Subjects, High and Low Intuitive Style Subjects, and High and Low on Both Scales
Running Total for Points: High vs. Low Analytical Decision Makers
550 500 450 400 350

High Analytical Low Analytical

Point T otal

300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Set 1: Gambles 1 - 15 4 Wins and 11 Losses

Set 2: Gambles 16 - 30 4 Wins and 11 Losses

Gamble Number

Running Total for Points: High vs. Low Intuition Decision Makers
550 500 450 400 350

High Intuitiveness Low Intuitiveness

Point T otal

300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Set 1: Gambles 1 - 15 4 Wins and 11 Losses Set 2: Gambles 16 - 30 4 Wins and 11 Losses

Gamble Number

Running Total for Points: High vs. Low on Both Analytical and Intuitive
550 500 450 400 350

High on Both Low on Both

P oint T otal

300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Set 1: Gambles 1 - 15 4 Wins and 11 Losses Set 2: Gambles 16 - 30 4 Wins and 11 Losses

Gamble Number
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