Synthese (2013) 190:18991916 DOI 10.

1007/s11229-012-0208-6

Deviant interdisciplinarity as philosophical practice: prolegomena to deep intellectual history

Steve Fuller

Received: 9 February 2012 / Accepted: 10 October 2012 / Published online: 23 October 2012 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Abstract Philosophy may relate to interdisciplinarity in two distinct ways On the one hand, philosophy may play an auxiliary role in the process of interdisciplinarity, typically through conceptual analysis, in the understanding that the disciplines themselves are the main epistemic players. This version of the relationship I characterise as normal because it captures the more common pattern of the relationship, which in turn reects an acceptance of the division of organized inquiry into disciplines. On the other hand, philosophy may be itself the site for the production of interdisciplinary knowledge, understood as a kind of second-order understanding of reality that transcends the sort of knowledge that the disciplines provide, left to their own devices. This is my own position, which I dub deviant and to which most of this article is devoted. I begin by relating the two types of interdisciplinarity to the organization of inquiry, especially their respective attitudes to the history of science. Underlying the two types are contrasting notions of what constitutes the efcient pursuit of knowledge. This difference is further explored in terms of the organization of the university. The normal/deviant distinction was already marked in the institutions medieval origins in terms of the difference between Doctors and Masters, respectively, an artefact of which remains in the postgraduate/undergraduate degree distinction. In the context of the history of the university, the prospects for deviant interdisciplinarity were greatest from the early sixteenth to the early nineteenth centurythe period called early modern in the philosophy curriculum. Towards the end of that period, due to Kant and the generation of idealists who followed him, philosophy was briey the privileged site for deviant interdisciplinarity. After Hegels death, the mantle of deviant interdisciplinarity increasingly passed to some version of biology. I explore the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaft versions of that post-philosophical vision, which continue

S. Fuller (B ) Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK e-mail: s.w.fuller@warwick.ac.uk

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to co-exist within todays biological science. I then briey examine the chequered reputation of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, someone who exemplied the promise and perils of deviant interdisciplinarity over the past 200 years. I conclude with an Epilogue that considers contemporary efforts to engage philosophy in interdisciplinary work, invoking William James as an exemplar. Keywords Biology Deviant interdisciplinarity Energy Idealism Integration Kant Naturphilosophie Normal interdisciplinarity Positivism Reduction University Lamarck William James

1 Normal and deviant interdisciplinarity as alternative strategies for the organization of inquiry My old teacher Nicholas Rescher used to describe his research as interdisciplinary, which puzzled those who saw him as a solitary producer of books of systematic philosophy. He quickly explained that his own mind was the site of the interdisciplinary work, which left the audience amused by the apparent irony of the remark. In fact, Rescher was playing it straight, but this moment of unintended humour reveals two rather incommensurable views about the animus behind interdisciplinary work, each of which is tied a conception of philosophys role in the organization of knowledge. Normal interdisciplinary work occurs in research teams or, if does it occur in a single mind, ones mental space is arranged as a factory with a clear division of labour amongst the disciplines, each of which contributes a discrete task to an overarching epistemic enterprise. But Rescher was talking about interdisciplinary work as a blending process whose distinctly interdisciplinary character is more clearly present in the style of work than the nished product. Reschers view represents what I call the deviant interdisciplinarian perspective, an understanding of interdisciplinarity that has been both persistent and persistently abnormal in Western intellectual history. It is also the form of interdisciplinarity that I champion (Fuller 2010b). The difference between normal and deviant interdisciplinarity turns on contrasting attitudes to the history of the rise of disciplines in organized inquiry. Both the normal and the deviant versions accept that the need for interdisciplinarity arises from the gradual specialisation of inquiry, which is typically portrayed as a division of labour from some primordial disciplinecall it theology or philosophythat asks the most general and fundamental questions about the nature of reality. But this common image is then interpreted in two radically different ways, which are fairly called normal and deviant in two distinctive senses. Normal interdisciplinarity is not only the more widely subscribed view in our time (i.e. empirically normal) but it also portrays interdisciplinary inquiry as a natural outgrowth of disciplinised inquiry (i.e. normatively normal). Correspondingly, deviant interdisciplinarity is not only the less subscribed view but also sees interdisciplinary inquiry as, in key respects, reversing epistemically undesirable tendencies inherent in disciplinised inquiry. The normal interdisciplinarian gives cognitive specialisation a positive, even a naturalistic spin, say, by associating it with arboreal exfoliation, as in Kuhn (1970), in which the specialisation attending a paradigm shift is explicitly associated with the tree of

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life image used by Darwinists to capture biological speciation as a whole. However, this can be misleading, since Darwins own use implied that the fruits produced by the branches are eventually consumed (i.e. rendered extinct). Not surprisingly, then, it has been more common to envisage specialisation in terms of the functional differentiation of the developing individual organism, which may better t with what Kuhn had in mind (Fuller 2007a, chap. 2). In any case, normal interdisciplinary inquiry is easily likened to the gathering of ripe fruit from the various branches so as to produce an intellectually satisfying dish. The value of the dish is entirely dependent on the quality of fruits from which it is prepared. This suggests that interdisciplinary inquiry is subordinate toif not parasitic ondiscipline-based inquiry. In contrast, the deviant interdisciplinarian treats the division of labour identied by his normal counterpart as a dispersion of effort, such that an overall sense of the ends of inquiry is lostspecifically how the various disciplines contribute to the full realization of the human being. The recovery of this loss is then the deviant interdisciplinarians task (Fuller and Collier 2004, chap. 2). The task is biblically rooted in the Tower of Babel, a second Fall consisting in humanitys self-arrogation of its divine entitlement for its own particular purposes (symbolised by the proliferation of tongues) without sufciently attending to the deitys overarching design. Such was the theological pretext for the modern idea that science should aim to fathom this unifying intelligence, what Newton, following Renaissance scholars, originally called prisca sapientia (pristine wisdom) but which after Einstein has been popularised as the search for a Grand Unied Theory of Everything (Harrison 2007). We shall return to this difference in attitude towards specialisation below, as it bears directly on the image of the philosopher in interdisciplinary inquiry. One of the most striking differences between normal and deviant interdisciplinarityalready present in my Rescher storyis the locus and character of interdisciplinary work. Normal interdisciplinarity is designed for teamwork, as each disciplinary expertise is presumed to make a well-dened contribution to the nal project, whereas deviant interdisciplinarity assumes that the differences in disciplinary expertise themselves pose an obstacle to the completion of the project. Of course, at one level, the normal interdisciplinarian could hardly disagreenamely, about the prima facie difculties in translating and then integrating forms of knowledge that are tied so intimately to distinct technical jargons and skills. But for her these difculties are surmountable because they correspond to well-dened domains, such that each expert knows (at least in principle) when to defer to a more adequately informed colleague (Kitcher 1993, chap. 8; Lamont 2009). In contrast, the deviant interdisciplinarian takes this culture of deference to reect something more sinister, what I have called epistemic rent-seeking (Fuller 2002, chap. 1). Here the distinctive skills associated with disciplinary expertise are portrayed as conspiracies against the public interest: They give the misleading impression that the most reliable, if not only, means of arriving at valid conclusions in a given domain is by trusting someone who has undergone a specic course of training, regardless of its empirical track record on relevant past cases or the availability of less costly means likely to reach the same ends (cf. Tullock 1966). Despite the best efforts by modern philosophers of science to warn against committing the genetic fallacy by distinguishing the context of discovery from that of justication, the deviant interdisciplinarian

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would diagnose her normal counterparts deep trust in expertise as reproducing the very problem for which that distinction was meant to solve, since in the rst instance expertise refers to how knowledge has been acquired rather than how it is being used. However, the normal interdisciplinarian is unlikely to be fazed, citing Kuhn (1970), whereby normal science is most clearly marked by the default inclination to solve todays problems by seeing them as versions of past problems, courtesy of their textbook representation. Normal sciences sense of path dependency, as economists would call it, characterises each disciplines sense of methodological rigour, a capacity to abstract the essential elements of a problem and resolve them in a principled fashion. From this standpoint, the deviant interdisciplinarian may seem eclectic and arbitrary, very much as upstart entrepreneurs look to managers in established rms, where the former wish to creatively destroy and the latter to monopolize markets (Schumpeter 1950). Keeping with the business analogy, normal and deviant interdisciplinarians differ in their understanding of efciency. On the one hand, normal interdisciplinarians appeal to efciency in terms of the path-dependent nature of disciplinary specialisationthe fact that specialisation only increases over time and through sub-divisions in already existing specialities. This is a sense of efciency dictated by the environmentthat is, the most economic means of dealing with real complexity discovered in the world. On the other hand, deviant interdisciplinarians appeal to environmental pressures that encourage the creative combination of previously distinct expertises into an all-purpose technique. This is a sense of efciency dictated by the inquirerthat is, the most economic means of dealing with the need to retain a unied sense of purpose in the face of centrifugal forces in the environment. Both glosses on efciency can lay claim to the title of more evolved, the one in a divergent Darwinian and the other in a convergent Lamarckian sense (cf. Arthur 2009; Fuller 2008b).

2 Normal and deviant interdisciplinarity as alternative regimes for organizing the university If normal interdisciplinarity aims to exfoliate the complexity of reality and its deviant counterpart aims to recover some lost unity of knowledge, then how is the historic relationship between philosophy and science cast in the two cases? In normal interdisciplinarity the philosopher recedes from the rst-order eld of epistemic play in order to referee jurisdictional disputes between disciplines, which typically turn on the need for conceptual clarication and logical analysis of evidence. She acts as an honest broker between their competing epistemic claims but without imposing an epistemic regime of her own. This is close to the self-avowed underlabourer role rst self-ascribed by John Locke (vis--vis the master builder Newton) and advocated by many of todays analytic philosophers of science (Fuller 2000, chap. 6; Fuller 2006a, chap. 3). In contrast, deviant interdisciplinarity would have the philosopher use her own understanding of the goal of disciplined inquiryroughly, an epistemic superuniversalism that aims to have all people know all thingsas implying standards against which to judge the adequacy of any given disciplinary conguration. This is the sense in which philosophy has laid claim to being the foundational discipline of the university (or queen of the sciences, when directly challenging theology) since

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Wilhelm von Humboldt re-launched the university as an institution dedicated to the resolution of what Kant memorably called the contest of the faculties, more about which below (Fuller 2007b, pp. 208213; Fuller 2009a, chap. 1).1 Given that the university is the only institution explicitly dedicated to the indefinite pursuit of knowledge, it should come as no surprise that the normal-deviant divide in interdisciplinary horizons was already present in its original medieval formation. The division was marked in two degrees of equal status that matriculants could receive: Master and Doctor. The former is the prototype for the deviant interdisciplinarian, the latter for the normal one. My old teacher Rescher followed the way of the Masters in seeing himself as the self-sufcient site of interdisciplinary integration, whereas todays networks of distributed expertise follow the way of the Doctors, for whom interdisciplinarity always implies knowledge beyond the competence of any given individual. It is worth observingthough it cannot be followed up herethat the policy of treating the ways of the Master and the Doctor as sequential in a course of study from undergraduate to postgraduate training in todays universities sends profoundly mixed messages about the ends of higher education, since ideally each of the two ways calls into question, if not outright obviate, the need for the other. Put starkly: If one could know for oneself all that is worth knowing, then there would be no need to defer to others; but if there really is too much of value for any one person to know, then the very idea of training self-sufcient individuals is futile. Thus, the Masters would be rid of the Doctors, and vice versa, respectively. In terms of the mendicant orders that staffed the original universities, Franciscans were prominent amongst the Masters, Dominicans amongst the Doctors (Fuller 2011, chap. 2). Included in the ranks of the former were John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, in the latter Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Franciscans inspired heretics, while the Dominicans trained their inquisitors in the period leading up to the Reformation (Sullivan 2011). In the medieval universities, a Masters degree empowered one to read, write, speak, see, hear, calculate and measurethe so-called liberal arts. These skills equipped one with the self-mastery needed to deal with others as equals. This is the basis of humanistic education, which by the nineteenth century had morphed into a standard of citizenship. Students were expected to integrate the liberal arts with their personal experience into a synthetic whole that expressed their unique public persona (Fuller 2009b). In todays terms, we would say that the Masters located the value of discipline-based knowledge not in its inherent pursuit but in the transferable skills it provided for living ones life. In contrast, the Doctors were trained to administer over specic aspects of realitythe body (medicine), the soul (theology) or the land (law)that were understood
1 From this standpoint, both German idealism and logical positivismthough not normally seen as philo-

sophical bedfellowsturn out to be exemplars of deviant interdisciplinarity, indeed, each having provided the paradigmatic gloss for the nineteenth and twentieth century, respectively, on what it means for all people to know all things However, the sort of unity of knowledge originally promoted by Auguste Comte under the guise of positivism and his English contemporary William Whewell as consilience would lie between the normal and deviant poles of interdisciplinarity, as both granted a strong integrationist role to a philosophically inspired discipline (sociology for Comte, natural theology for Whewell) but without presuming that everyone should or can have access to such a unied understanding of reality (Fuller 2007a, chap. 2; 2010a, chap. 3).

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in markedly geographic terms, remnants of which linger in the idea of domains of knowledge separated by disciplinary boundaries. Doctoral training required a demonstration of ones competence in the management and productive use of what academics still refer to as eld. The academic degree effectively granted a license to work on that metaphorical plot of land with an expected yield on investment for ones professional colleagues, the elds shareholders. Anyone who wished to apply or simply pass through that eld of knowledge had to acquire their own license or pay a toll (i.e. at least make formal reference) to a relevant expert. In that respect, the Doctors interpreted the idea of interdisciplinary exchange economistically, such that one specialist traded the fruits of his original labours with those of another so that both specialists were mutually enriched in the process, with the overall effect of facilitating the societal governance. Abstracting a bit from this characterisation of the distinction between the Masters and Doctors, we can see the pedagogical basis for, respectively, the coherence and correspondence theories of truth, the former focused on the self as the source of epistemic unity and the latter on an external reality conceptualised as a mappable terrain. For its rst ve centuries, the university was mostly dominated by the Doctors, whose conservative bias began to receive uniformly unfavourable publicity during the Protestant Reformation. As we shall see below, what might be called the long early modern periodsay, the three centuries from the Protestant Reformation (early sixteenth century) to the Age of Romanticism (early nineteenth century)was a time when the precedence of the Doctors over the Masters were increasingly challenged, though the Doctors would eventually regain the upper hand in the nineteenth century, as universities came to be organized along disciplinary lines (Merz 1965). In retrospect, the gures of Ren Descartes and Francis Bacon stand out for their innovative ways of re-asserting the Masters prerogative against the scholastic Doctors. I shall now take each in turn. Descartes declaration cogito ergo sum, was understood, at least by younger contemporaries such as Nicolas Malebranche, as re-asserting humanitys epistemic overlap with Gods point of view in line with the biblical claim of our having been created in imago dei. What philosophers after Kant still call a priori knowledge has carried forward this interpretationnamely, that regardless of the actual history of science, every human is endowed with the wherewithal to reason for themselves from rst principles about any point in space and time, which implies the capacity to conclude that knowledge could have developed more efciently. (Logical positivism eventually got the most rhetorical mileage from this possibility.) To be sure, as godlike but not full-edged deities, we may reason falsely, but that does not take away from our godlike ambition and perhaps even its ultimate success, as long as we are not complacent about our epistemic foundations. This image of Descartes was expressly promoted by the French Enlightenment gures Condorcet and Turgot, who were attracted to the idea that the intellectual revolutionary need not recover the meaning of ancient Scriptures because the capacity for receiving and responding to Gods word is always already constitutive of humanitys birthright (Cohen 1985, chap. 9). The Enlightenment followed up Francis Bacons particular brand of anti-scholasticism by trying to make good on his avowed desire to re-plant the tree of knowledge by requiring that disciplines reect the logical outgrowth of specic mental facultiesas

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opposed to knowledge being simply allowed to ourish as esoteric, path-dependent traditions of scholarship. Such traditions only served to create sectarian differences that, in the case of England, eventuated in civil war in the generation after Bacons. As the Masters would have it, Bacon recast the quest for knowledge in terms of rening the entire mind so as to realize its full potential, not the narrow matter of learning which specic expert is entitled to deference if one lacks the relevant expertise. To Bacons Enlightenment followers, this shift in the ground of epistemic legitimation provided a scientic basis for supposing that any individual, by virtue of having been born with a fully functioning mind, could learn all that was worth knowing. The naysayerslargely the clerics who controlled the universitiesoperated with confused or obscure conceptions of how the human mind worked, based on a superstitious attitude toward how certain ideas have come to dominate the human condition (i.e. what has been mistaken for what ought to be). The concrete symbol of this revisionist sentiment was LEncyclopdie, a multi-volume work that was designed to be read not in service of specialised research but in the leisure of bourgeois salons, which would generate conversations closer to what symbolic interactionists call perspective-taking than the mutually benecial exchanges of information favoured by the Doctors (cf. Darnton 1984, chap. 5). For Descartes, Bacon and their Enlightenment followers, the scientic method functioned as a self-imposed discipline of lifelong learning, a generalisation and extension of the arts of memory that checked the superstitious associations we are prone to make between the contingent and necessary features of knowledge, as epitomised in our deference to clerical experts for reasons having more to do with the relatively exclusive means by which they have acquired their knowledge (i.e. the contingency of their professional training) than any proof that they possess the requisite competence to address a given problem.2 In this superstitious frame of mind, to give it a theological spin, we too quickly read signs of the eternal in the temporal. Thus, the clergy, Gods self-appointed representatives, end up being trusted as if they were the deity himself. Galileos reckless precursor, Giordano Bruno had been martyred in 1600 for insisting that everyone could realize their divine potential by comprehending their current beliefs as deductions from natures rst principles, presumably as laid down by a creative deity indifferent to time, for whom the order of knowing coincides with the order of being. Put bluntly, we might re-enact in our own minds how God unfolded Creation, and the coherence of that thought processwe would now say the successful execution of that simulationwould secure its validity (Yates 1966). What eventually became the scientic methodand later the Enlightenment aude sapere and still later, and more prosaically, Think for yourself!effectively routinized Brunos

2 By the twentieth century, epistemologists had come to recast the distinction between the contingent (aka

psychological) and necessary (aka logical) dimensions of inquiry in terms of the contexts of discovery and justication, the latter functioning as the secular residue of the divine standpoint sought by Bruno, but without the administrative apparatus envisaged by Bacon (cf. Laudan 1981, chap. 11). While in the UK it is common to cite William Whewell as the key nineteenth century gure in this sublimation of sciences divine aspirations, pivotal in Germany was Hermann Lotze, the physician-philosopher often credited with having canonised both the fact-value and the truth-validity distinctions that served to revolutionise methodology in the early twentieth century (Schndelbach 1984, p. 107; Heidelberger 2004, chap. 8).

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dangerous charisma.3 In this respect, Bruno was the rst democratic intellect who openly disputed authoritative opinion from a standpoint that he took to be available to everyone capable of mastering the arts of memory. His heroic status simply reects the fact that there was hardly anyone quite like him in his day.4 As the Scientic Revolution wore on, it became more widely accepted that a properly organized mind might know, if not everything, at least the limits of ones knowledge, both empirically and conceptually. In this context, Kants transcendental method may be understood as an attempt to dene philosophy as the second-order discipline dedicated to the pursuit of deviant interdisciplinaritythat is, the discipline tasked with providing unity and purpose to the other disciplines, which left to their own devices would pursue their own parochial knowledge interests to the exclusion of the others, and thereby fail to realize their synergistic potential. Kant made this point most concretely in The Contest of Faculties (1798). This polemical essay fully modernised the Masters standpoint as a call for university reform, one that inspired Wilhelm von Humboldt, in his capacity as Prussian Minister of Education, to re-dedicate the university as the environment for students to learn to think for themselves. In the meanwhile, the image of the autonomous thinker had received a Romantic makeoverless the heretical Bruno and more the polymathic Johann Wolfgang von Goethethat is, someone who integrated several elds within himself to great effect, leaving an indelible trace on politics, science and art, but without turning himself into a martyr in the process. Indeed, the Humboldtian university was designed to generate just such individuals on a regular basis, each a unique integrator (a genius) of all that is worth knowing. 3 Re-inventing deviant interdisciplinarity without philosophy: from naturphilosophie to biological science Without denying the extent to which Humboldts vision was realized in nineteenth century Germany, philosophy itself fell into pronounced decline after Hegels death in 1830, as the discipline was seen as having slid into theologys old dogmatic role of pre-emptively restricting the development of empirical knowledge in the name of anticipating it (Collins 1998, chap. 12). Nevertheless, arguably the two most innovative sciences of the nineteenth century were attempts to operationalize the post-Kantian idealist take on the natural world, Naturphilosophie. These sciences, psychophysics and thermodynamics, were concerned with the conversion of material differences of degree to those of kind (i.e. quantity into quality in Hegel-speak), or as Cassirer (1923) memorably put it, the conversion of substance into function. In this context, idealisms Holy Grail, the unity of subject and object was made experimentally
3 While Bacon envisaged that a state-funded House of Solomon would regularly perform experiments in the name of the scientic method, that would have been only the specialist wing of a mental regime that would ultimately set the standard of right thinking in everyday life, as JS Mills canons of inductive proof have been sometimes treated (Lynch 2002). 4 Galileo at once learned from but kept his distance from Bruno, whom he had beaten for the chair in mathematics at the University of Padua. The closest Protestant equivalent to Brunos style of epistemic self-assertion was Michael Servetus, whom John Calvin had burned in Geneva about fty years earlier.

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tractable in terms of control over the physical conditions (the object pole) needed to alter sensory experience (the subject pole). Activities that in the eighteenth century would have been seen as tracking the life force were thus increasingly subject to mathematical formulation as exchanges in energy, even as the latter term stood equivocallyand, after Einstein, unsuccessfullyfor both a phenomenological and a physical aspect of nature (Rabinbach 1990). The spirit of deviant interdisciplinarity travels most clearly after Hegel through this energeticist tradition, which over the past two centuries has aimed for a re-enchanted sense of science, which is to say, an epistemic state that is accountable to empirical reality yet in terms meaningful to the development of the human condition (Harrington 1999, chap. 1). Two of the most notable works in this vein from the mid-twentieth century were Koehler (1938) and Bertalanffy (1950). The prospect of epistemic unity through translation principles was advanced from the 1850s to the 1950sat rst quite literally between forms of energy but increasingly between discourses subsumed under a common semantics (or metalanguage). Whereas the neutral monist Hermann von Helmholtz focused on the human body itself as the ultimate transducer of caloric to psychic energy, the logical positivist Otto Neurath aspired to a kind of pan-disciplinary Esperanto through which the knowledge content of any specialised discourse could be communicated to any ordinary person (cf. Mendelsohn 1974; Holton 1993).5 In both cases epistemic unity was presented as potentially resolving metaphysically inspired political differences, in effect updating Bacons juridical understanding of science alluded to earlierindeed, now often extended to the cause of international diplomacy, a function in which philosophers since Leibniz had dreamed of science serving (Schroeder-Gudehus 1989; Berkowitz 2005). However, these philosophical efforts to unify the sciences by nding a point neutral to their operation succeeded more at keeping increasingly disparate forms of inquiry under the umbrella term science for purposes of public legitimation than in steering the conduct of inquiry. For the latter purpose, we may turn to two more interventionist ways of pursuing deviant interdisciplinarity, each turning on a distinct image of the natural philosopher. She may be seen as either alchemist (i.e. someone who could make the most with the least through skilful recombination of elements) or architect (i.e. someone who could design the conceptual blueprint for others to ll in empirically). In the balance hangs whether the quest for unied knowledge is interpreted as aiming for reduction or integration. Let us consider briey the rather different ways in which unity is conceptualised in the two cases. Reduction refers to the relations among the objects of knowledge, whose ideal state involves minimising their possible interactions to achieve maximum effects. Thus, one is simultaneously trying to understand both the fundamental principles of matterwhat the medieval alchemists called minima naturaand the prospects of their outworking. In contrast, integration is a process unique to the individuals whose idealist-style education equips them with a conceptual cartography of permissible and
5 A key but neglected transitional gure between these two translation-based paths to unity is the last great defender of the universal energy principle, the chemist Wilhelm Ostwald, whose nal (1921) edition of Annalen der Naturphilosophie included Wittgensteins Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

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preferred interdisciplinary trafc. What they make of this may lead to further social conict but it will be among people who can be presumed to be knowledgeable of all that might be realized. At this point, politics takes over from science as the clash of world-views. The specic differences in the disciplinary structure of the national university systems of Europe forged over the nineteenth century were largely institutionalised negotiated settlements of this sort (Merz 1965). Behind these two versions of deviant interdisciplinarity are alternative images of the deviants claims to godlike genius. Whereas integrationists aim to imitate God in the strict sense of retaining an ontological distance from the deity as they contest the best way to interpret the divine plan (i.e. their mental maps aspire to be a copy of the conceptual structure of the divine plan), reductionists would lay claim to occupy the divine standpoint for themselves, on the basis of which they would reconstruct (a possibly improved) nature from scratch, a second creation, to recall the phrase used equally for the twentieth century revolutions in nuclear physics and biotechnology (Crease and Mann 1986; Wilmut et al. 2000). In terms of general approaches towards inquiry, reductionists are recognisable as practitioners of the Naturwissenschaften. integrationists of the Geisteswissenschaften. We normally distinguish the two types of sciences in terms of their extreme casessay, atomic physics and historical criticism. However, in what follows I focus on biology as the borderland discipline, or liminal eld: Would biology be the ultimate synthetic molecular science, as revealed by the Naturwissenschaften or the foundational science for life underpinning the Geisteswissenschaften? As the astute practitioner/historian of molecular biology Morange (1998) has observed, this dual aspect of biologys identity remains in the relatively independent research trajectories of, on the one hand, the mechanical sense of life fostered by biotechnology and, on the other, the more holistic sense retained by modern evolutionary theory. On the one hand, the reductionist proposes to assist scientists to arrive at the foundational principles of nature that are responsible for everything, both as they are and as they could be. As suggested above, this project was associated with alchemy, which always existed in the interstices of what we would now call chemistry and political economy (e.g. the conversion of lead to gold), which in turn explained the threat it posed to both secular and sacred authorities. But after Schrdingers (1955) famous 1943 Dublin lectures, What Is Life?, the alchemical ambition was decisively transferred to the interface of chemistry and biology, motivating physical scientists to fathom the structural-functional character of genes, the eld that the Rockefeller Foundation itself had christened a decade earlier as molecular biology, which eventuated a decade after Dublin in the discovery of DNAs double helix structure (Morange 1998, chaps. 78). From this came three interdisciplinary styles of reductionism: (1) synthetic biology, closest in spirit to Schrdinger, which tests various molecular combinations for their genetic consequences, a project academically championed by Walter Gilbert and popularised by Craig Venter; (2) strategic chemical interventions to regulate gene expression, following the lead of Franois Jacob and Jacques Monod and now a mainstay of the pharmaceutical industry; (3) most ambitiously, the promoted by Drexler (1986) under the name of nanotechnology, which would realize

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the alchemical dream of creating new beings from the fundamental re-organization of matter.6 On the other hand, the integrationist projects the prospects for knowledge by imaginatively transcending the empirical limitations of the special disciplines. From this perspective, the emergence of qualitative or subjective difference may be seen as marking an increase in matters self-consciousness, again operationalised as increased powers of discrimination, culminating in the reective philosopher-scientist as (in his/her person) the ultimate register of differences. Thus, Gustav Fechner (1801 1887), the most intellectually adventurous student of Schelling, the greatest of the original Naturphilosophen, spent his career trying to wed a mathematical psychophysics with a metaphysical panpsychism, as if Leibniz had undergone a Romantic makeover (Heidelberger 2004). Fechner had a vitalist view of the world according to which Newtons inertial bodies and Goethes self-legislating individuals appear as polar states of matter-in-motion: The former constitute potential yet to be realized at the level of both knowing and being (i.e. dumb matter), the latter potential fully realized at both levels (i.e. enlightened genius). Put bluntly, what Newton knew was radically distinct from his being, whereas what Goethe knew was integral to his being. This view attracted practitioners of the Geisteswissenschaften as the culmination of the entire scientic enterprise. Its end product would be not only a science of life but also a science for life (Veit-Brause 2001). In their own distinctive ways, Ernst Mach, Charles Sanders Peirce and William James tried to follow Fechners lead. The same spirit also drove their contemporary, Friedrich Nietzsche, who was a student in Leipzig when Fechner held the chair in philosophy (Heidelberger 2004, chap. 7). But looming in the background of all these integrationist efforts was the spectre of the original evolutionist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, whose reception has been all too typical of that of deviant interdisciplinarians. 4 The fate of the deviant interdisciplinarian: the case of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck Deviant interdisciplinarians can be hard to identify and trace in intellectual history because in the fullness of time much of their radical challenge comes to be accommodated and/or distorted by mainstream disciplinary knowledge. From the standpoint of normal science historiography, the deviant interdisciplinarian can be made to look like someone who simply landed on the wrong side of such a wide range of debates that his or her seriousness and sanity may come into question. Such has been the fate of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (17441829), the rst curator of the invertebrates section of the French Natural History Museum, who is normally credited with the rst explicit theory of the evolution of life forms. The theory was proposed in the rst decade of the nineteenth century as the cornerstone of a new discipline that he called zoological
6 This reductionist project has always had a spiritual side, harking back to what the historian of science

Crombie (1994) called makers knowledge, the idea that motivated the hypothesis-testing style of scientic reasoning: namely, that as creatures in the image and likeness of God, we are capable of divining the grammar of life so as someday to become capable of reverse engineering the process, at which time we might be able to improve, complete or even divert the course of creationdepending on the brand of heretical theology to which one subscribed.

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philosophy or biology. The latter term stuck, though Lamarcks original scope was much broader than that of todays biological science. For Lamarck, biology aspired to what we would now call a grand unied theory of everything, where everything is presumed to have been endowed by the deity with a primitive life force that develops on its own accord (Packard 1901, chap. 19). In the century prior to the Enlightenment, say, in gures such as Hobbes and Spinoza, the preferred term of art for this life force was conatus, which suggested that something of Gods will worked its way through otherwise unruly matter, issuing in some divinely sanctioned cosmic order (Fuller 2008a). Deist tendencies in the Enlightenment detached God from any direct involvement in the process, resulting in a generic concept of besoin (need), the term favoured by the French physiocratic school of political economy in the generation before Lamarcks to describe what two traders had to satisfy mutually in order to constitute a just exchange (Menudo 2010). Lamarck added a further conceptual distinction: besoin versus dsir, or need versus want. The physiocrats, for whom the goal of political economy was a sustainable ecology, treated the two words interchangeably, whereas Lamarck clearly meant dsir as a specication of besoin in terms of the particular sensory apparatus through which an organism nds that certain objects and environments enable it to ourish and develop (Bowler 2005). While I may have no choice over the sorts of needs that are necessary for my survival (besoin), exactly how I satisfy those needs is an open question answers to which are provided by an account of my wants (dsir). Lamarcks deviant interdisciplinarian status is complicated by uncertainty over exactly how he would have had the disciplines integrated in aid of a master science of biology. Clearly, for Lamarck, what begins as the expression of divine will ends up as organic functionality, and in that respect theology eventually yields to biology, corresponding to the increased specication and complexication of the life force over the course of natural history. But this process, while recognisably evolutionary, did not suggest any overarching image to its path. Nowadays it is common to represent Lamarcks intentions in terms of a convergent (as opposed to Darwins own quite clearly divergent) sense of the overall shape of natural history. That image is helped along by Lamarcks view that the continued existence of relatively simple organisms marks them not as atavisms but as the latest spontaneously generated life forms, all destined to ascend what Gillispie (1958) dubbed the escalator of being, whereby life re-incorporates or re-organizes itself as it learns to exert greater control over its environment. At the same time, Lamarck regarded freestanding chemical substances of the sort that his compatriot Antoine Lavoisier had begun to call elements in a manner much closer to that of the last great phlogiston theorist, Joseph Priestley namely, as the fossilised residues of the spent life force. In short, Lamarck inhabited an intellectual universe that was almost inside out from our own. Nevertheless, to his more ambitious later admirers, typically heretical Christians like Teilhard de Chardin (1955), Lamarcks theory implied nothing less than the history of Gods self-realization in the world through a suitably escalated (or enhanced, as we would now say) version of Homo sapiens. Lamarcks project did not prevail, perhaps unsurprisingly, for a host of reasons ranging from charges of empirical disconrmation and conceptual confusion to outright theological anathema. In his own day, Lamarcks conception of life went against

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the relatively static notions of health and illness associated with biologys closest disciplinary rival, medicine. He did not begin his inquiries with a specimen of an existing healthy organism but with some imagined (divine?) origin from which the organism was hypothesized to have evolved. (The word organism is ambiguous between individual and species because what might be ordinarily called a species was for Lamarck an extended phase in the generic life process.) Indeed, Lamarck famously asked his students to imagine what might have been the original complex of needs that came to be realized in the succession of forms taken by an organism in a given environment (Gillispie 1958). In that case, norms of health are to be found not in an organisms statistically normal behaviours but in the vector revealed by examining the long-term history of its behaviours in a common environment. Although no less than the great positivist Auguste Comte was impressed by these insights during his medical studies at Montplier, and arguably based the modus operandi of his own historical epistemology on them, Lamarcks reception had fallen foul of priests and positivists alike by the second half of the nineteenth century (Burkhardt 1970). After all, Lamarck was effectively claiming that organisms contain powers that come to the fore only on a need-to-respond basis that are then inherited by their offspring, making it then very difcultif not impossibledraw a sharp distinction between normal and abnormal behaviour, given that todays abnormality may anchor a new norm for future generations. Moreover, once Darwins theory of evolution by natural selection came on the scene in the mid-nineteenth century, Lamarcks overarching vision was distilled into a point of empirical disagreement with Darwin over the nature of hereditary transmission. Lamarck was presented as the champion of what is nowadays known as the inheritance of acquired traits, whereby changes to an organisms body can be passed to the organisms offspring. This thesis is normally seen as having been discredited experimentally by the work of August Weismann, who in 1889 showed that cutting off the tails of twenty generations of mice had no effect on the length of the tails of subsequent generations. On this basis, the famed Weismann barrier, i.e. the impassable wall separating the somatic and the germ cell line became a central dogma of Darwinian evolutionalbeit several decades before the genetic nature of the germ cell line was properly understood. This last point is significant because greater genetic knowledge has actually provided potential opportunities for re-asserting the by-now stereotyped Lamarckian doctrine of the inheritance of acquired traits. Nevertheless, the Weismann barrier is still routinely brandished in high school biology textbooks as the silver crucix designed to ward off any remaining Lamarckian vampires. Yet, Lamarck may be vindicated in the end. The Weismann barrier appears to apply only for the period of evolutionary history that began with the emergence of organisms with a hard cell membrane (i.e. eukaryotes) and has begun to end with the cracking of the genetic code (Dyson 2007). Between these two moments the dominant means of transmitting genetic information has been vertical, that is, through lines of descent. But both before and after that period in evolutionary history, more Lamarck-friendly horizontal gene transfer may be dominantfacilitated in the ancient case by porous cell membranes (something regularly evidenced in the spread of viruses), in the contemporary case by targeted biotechnological interventions. But in both cases, a change to the organism in its lifetime leaves a clear trace in the offspring, which may be itself

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enhanced or reversed in subsequent horizontal transfers of genetic information. Viewed in the broadest theoretical terms, the Darwinian definition of evolution as common descent with modication may come to be seen as limited as Newtonian mechanics is in physics today. In other words, Darwins and Newtons theories cover their respective target realities at the meso-level but not at the extremes. Interestingly, this hypothesisepitomised in the slogan Evolution itself had to evolvewas inspired by a microbiologist, Carl Woese, whose origins in biophysics and repeated run-ins with Darwinian taxonomists marks his own career as that of a deviant interdisciplinarian. Nevertheless Woese eventually succeeded in establishing the existence of a form of life more primitive than any previously acknowledged, now gathered in the kingdom of Archaea, whose character is reminiscent of Lamarcks take on spontaneous generation (Sapp 2008).7 While many lessons may be drawn from the treatment that both Lamarck and Lamarckism have suffered at the hands of history, let me conclude by highlighting issues that are of more general relevance to the pursuit of deviant interdisciplinarity. First, in the spirit of the deviant enterprise, Lamarck made a point of calling his epistemic practice zoological philosophy, implying that he was aiming for something much more metaphysically ambitious and normatively freighted than, say, Darwin, who presented himself as more natural historian than natural philosopher (keeping in mind that our use of the term scientist was not really available to either of them). One telling criticism of Lamarck, typically attributed to the early US developmental psychologist James Mark Baldwin and popularised more recently by the anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1979), bears on the deviant interdisciplinary project as suchnamely, a tendency to conate rst- and second-order perspectives on reality (Richards 1987, chap. 10). In particular, Lamarck presumed that if a shift in the distribution of traits in a population over several generations brought about adaptive improvement, then it was something that the individuals involved had been trying to achieve. Put that way, Lamarck appears to have fallen victim to the fallacy of division, as he seemed to presume that something present in the whole was also present in the parts. But if the role of historical order in epistemic progress is taken more seriously, Lamarck may have effectively attributed an emergent second-order awareness to members of a population once they learned the consequences of what might well have been originally fortuitous adjustments. Thus, the insiders come to incorporate the standpoint of the outsider so
7 Various other Neo-Lamarckian revivals were attempted in the twentieth centuryand continue to be mounted today. In the mid-twentieth century, some geneticistsnot least a principal craftsman of the Neo-Darwinian synthesis (and Teilhard de Chardin enthusiast), Theodosius Dobzhanskysaw irradiated genes as a potential evolutionary accelerator that could produce Lamarckian effects by Darwinian means. However, the pioneer of radiation genetics, Hermann Muller, warned against this wishful thinking in the impending Nuclear Age as more likely to result in maladaptive offspring (Ruse 1999, pp. 109110). More promising, but also originating from roughly the same period, is epigenetics, a term coined by the animal geneticist Conrad Waddington to capture the fact that at least some genes are not inherited in their nal form but are shaped in gestation and even early childhood (e.g. by diet or stress levels) in ways that can then be transmitted to offspring. Waddington saw the potential in the concept for explaining and remedying the tendency for class distinctions to biological ones over successive generations of, say, poor nutrition (Dickens 2000, chap. 6). To be sure, epigenetics in this strict sense is not classically Lamarckian in that the organisms intentionality is not involved. However, Neo-Freudian theorists quickly seized upon the idea in a spirit that may have been truer to Lamarcks (e.g. Erikson 1968).

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as to accelerate their progress, as they render intentional what had been previously unintentional.8 Nowadays, after Bertalanffy (1950), this is called the systems-level perspective, arguably the secular residue of divine creativity. At least that is one way to gloss the idea raised by Bertalanffy and others who have gone down the deviant interdisciplinarity route in the recent past, namely, that humans, as the only animals without a natural habitat, are compelled to turn everywhere into its home. And the rst step involves learning to adopt the view from nowhere, whereby every seemingly isolated event is understood as a means to a larger end. 5 Epilogue: the fate of philosophy in a multi-disciplinary world I have presented a rather polarised fate for philosophy in a multi-disciplinary world: either an underlabourer for the various disciplines that have developed from its root (the normal way) or an overlord who treats such variation as itself a problem for which philosophy provides the disciplinary solution (the deviant way). The institutional history of knowledge production over the past two centuries has tended against the latter position, which I nonetheless champion. In that time, pretenders to the role of philosophical overlord have been attracted to a rather general sense of biology from which the discipline bearing that name has increasingly distanced itself, a fact most pointedly illustrated by the reputation of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck but perhaps also that of general systems theory. However, it may be argued that I have omitted the prospect that philosophy might inform the other disciplines operating on a levelled playing eld, as an equal. One might think of this, say, in terms of the addition of a missing ethical ingredient (Tuana 2012) or the provision of a facilitating service (ORourke and Crowley 2012), in both cases the point would be to enable disparate disciplines to become truly interdisciplinary, in the sense of collaborating on a common epistemic project that would be otherwise unachievable in their individual capacities. The rst point to make in response is that, at least in the Anglo-American world, the idea of philosophy as a discipline on par with other disciplines has been always justied more on institutional than intellectual grounds, the unsatisfactory consequences of which are routinely enacted in the so-called analytic-continental divide. Indeed, a maxim typically attributed to Quine rings true: People study philosophy out of interest in either the history of its doctrines or the logic of its argumentsthe former veering to hermeneutics, the latter mathematics. Yet, somehow the Department of Philosophy needs to accommodate both interests. In that context, which presumes the institutional standing of philosophy as a discipline, the interdisciplinary turn may be seen at the same time as a turning away from frustrating internecine disputes within the discipline. However, there is a more positive way out. It involves taking a page from the Bildungsroman of William James, now normally seen as the rst professional US philosopherwhich is to say, someone ensconced in an academic chair, and not a popular
8 To speak in purely logical terms, the Lamarckian trick may be characterised in terms of rendering the

extensional intensionalthat is, what begins as a property of the aggregate becomes a property of each of the constitutive individuals.

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lay preacher la Ralph Waldo Emerson or a rogue scientist la Charles Sanders Peirce. Like many nineteenth century secular middle class people seeking a career that provided for both spiritual fulfilment and material security, James originally studied medicine. But out of dissatisfaction with the curriculum, he travelled to Germany where he witnessed the interesting cross-disciplinary hybrids emerging in the wake of the institutional meltdown of idealist philosophymost importantly psychology. This left James with a metaphysical world-view, called neutral monism, which led him to see the various academic disciplines as alternative ways of organizing experience, which through routinisation solidied into habits of thought. However, these habits could easily generate neuroses that would render the trained disciplinarians socially dysfunctional outside of peer-oriented contexts. Into this context the philosopher would step to break or prevent such habits of thought.9 But interestingly, James did not think of philosophys role as merely an auxiliary research support service. Rather, his understanding of how specic disciplinary patterns of thoughts should be broken was informed by an overarching sense of the self-fullled person as a rugged individualist, a phrase popularised by Theodore Roosevelt, which in turn led him to see philosophy as an especially verbally aggressive form of therapy. In this respect, James never really rejected the deviant interdisciplinary way of the medieval Masters or the German idealists but tried to adapt it to the early twentieth century American context. Perhaps he failed but that should not stop us from trying to do something comparable.

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