Chris Tayloris the Senior Vice-President for Global Strategy at Mission Essential Personnel, LLC.

He is also a board member at the Peace Operations Institute in Washington, DC

African peacekeeping and the private sector

Chris Taylor

That mass atrocities are being committed in Africa escapes no one. Unlike many global issues, this is not one that is under-reported or ignored. It lls television screens and newspapers around the world every day. Sadly, one of the areas that frequently features in this context is the African continent. Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) all continue to be plagued by seemingly intractable and predictable conditions of chaos and human suffering. The state of violence in East Africa is particularly alarming, despite its centre front position on the world stage with the attendant wringing of hands and outrage on the part of the global audience. Darfur continues to unravel both because the Sudanese government continues its attacks on non-Arab civilians and its support of Janjaweed militia and because rebel groups like the Justice and Equality Movement and Sudan Liberation Army continue to ght each other. Caught in the middle are the millions of innocent citizens who cannot escape the violent politics of the region. More than 300000 people

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have been killed and nearly three million displaced in Darfur. The hybrid AU/UN force of roughly 10000 is still at only half its mandated strength with no real hope of reaching full capacity. The DRC, where more than ve million have lost their lives in the last ten years, continues to be aided by an inadequate UN force of 17000, mainly comprising troops from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. Although another 3000 troops have been authorised and nearly US$7,5 billion has already been spent on peacekeeping in the DRC, the efforts of the international community have thus far been exorbitantly expensive but woefully ineffective. Indeed, a 1999 UN report found that nearly 100000 peacekeepers would be necessary for success, but only 6000 were initially authorised. The UN recently authorised a 5000-person force for Chad and is now considering whether any troops should be authorised for Somalia in view of Ethiopias withdrawal of the troops who were supporting the fragile interim Somali government. These and other missions share a common challenge, namely a lack of capacity to full the mandate. One reason for this state of affairs is the paradoxical situation in which the stronger the mandate, the greater the possibility that it will result in a political quagmire, and therefore the less inclined stronger member nations will be to contribute troops. This paradox has led to Westernless peacekeeping forces in Africa. To be fair, not all Western nations have been absent, but the permanent members of the UN Security Council seem to be more interested in passing resolutions that lead to painfully slow implementation than in contributing their own well-trained troops. This places the greatest burden of meeting the demanding mandates on those member nations that have the least experienced, least trained and least well-equipped troops a combination that almost guarantees a prolonged, inefcient presence at great cost but with no assurance of success. Enough resolutions have been passed, enough white papers have been written and enough checks have been deposited. The time has come to explore other avenues to improve capacity. African nations should lead peace operations on their own continent. In a recent article in the Journal of International Peace Operations,1 Lieutenant Colonel Birame Diop, a Senegalese air force pilot and technical adviser, noted that the AUs creation of a peace and security council as well as a panel of elders is evidence of Africans commitment to nding local solutions. However, the AU suffers from a lack of capacity in training, equipment and support, three things that are critical to any peacekeeping operation. When these are in place, they allow the force to take advantage of critical points of intervention and change the momentum in favour of a more secure environment. Without these key pillars of success, even the best missions will nd this difcult to achieve. Thus, if member nations

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cannot or will not provide the necessary support, how can peacekeeping missions be successful? The question that therefore needs to be answered is: How can we enable African nations to provide and lead their own peacekeeping operations to success? Part of the solution lies in the capabilities of the private sector and their ability to support peacekeeping forces. These peace support companies have a wealth of experience in Africa and in peacekeeping and can be used to assist the AU, UN, EU and NATO troops in fullling their mandates. But too often when private companies are mentioned in the context of African peacekeeping the conversation turns to stories of Mad Mike Hoare in the 1960s, Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and the coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea that resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of Simon Mann and an ongoing investigation by the British government into the alleged role of former prime minister Margaret Thatchers son, Mark Thatcher. The overwhelming majority of private companies are transparent, guided by codes of conduct and abide by international human rights laws. It is in their best interests to do so. As with any industry, there are bad apples, but they are in the minority. In some cases industry groups like the International Peace Operations Association 2 and the British Association of Private Security Companies3 have refused membership to companies that would in their opinion damage the reputation of their industry. (In this regard it is worth noting, however, that a logical argument can be made for having as inclusive as possible a trade association that operates under an open code of conduct which could serve to bring less reputable companies into the open, raise the global standard and ensure better accountability by all.) While it is imperative to consider the social, political and nancial benets and costs of using both armed and unarmed private actors and companies, it is irresponsible not to discuss this enormous potential capacity openly and honestly and weigh it against the needs of peacekeeping missions, especially when innocent lives are at stake. The time has surely come to explore the capability the private sector could bring to peace support operations. Private companies already provide a myriad of services to the UN and other international organisations. The UN hires private rms for logistic, linguistic and interpretation and protection services. These private companies to some extent use local resources and hire locals, stimulating local growth to the benet of stability in the community. But there are other services the private sector can provide that could have an immediate and positive impact on even the toughest peacekeeping missions. Aviation assets are critical to success in Africa but member nations generally nd it extremely difcult to contribute to this. For example, although helicopters would make the AU/UN hybrid force in Darfur more responsive, more logistically capable, and far more efcient, no-one

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was able to provide desperately needed aircraft even after UN Secretary General Ban KiMoon extended a plea to all member states. The solution would be for the UN to contract air support in the form of safe aircraft, qualied pilots and complete maintenance packages to meet its needs from the private sector. A further glaring gap in equipment is armoured vehicles. In any contingency operation protective vehicles are necessary to transport peacekeepers safely so they can perform their duties. Member nations may be willing to provide troops for missions but may be unable to supply the vehicles necessary to provide such support services, including maintenance. Private companies have the capacity to supply comprehensive vehicle packages, complete with driver and maintenance training programmes, that can build sustainable African capacity in peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, aerial surveillance platforms which could be provided by private companies would help force commanders view their entire area of responsibility and allow them to allocate resources efciently and to prevent violence rather than respond to it. Where atrocities do take place, aerial surveillance could capture the crimes and provide a record of evidence of human rights violations at subsequent trials. Broadcasting the surveillance globally could also present member nations and their citizens with a view of the harsh reality and compel them to take action. A record of crimes committed could also be used at reconciliation courts. There are already successful African peacekeeping support programmes that make use of private sector resources. Successful partner programmes contracted to the private sector to enhance African peacekeeping include the African Crises Response Initiative, which developed into the African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance Programme responsible for the training of thousands of peacekeepers, the US State Departments Africa Peacekeeping Program which offers training, logistics and construction programmes for building sustainable African capacity, and initiatives such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative of the US and G8 partners, which has trained some 40000 peacekeepers worldwide. Such programmes and partnerships should be renewed andencouraged. While no single programme can resolve a specic conict situation, the speed with which the private sector can respond to ll gaps and contribute to African solutions is noteworthy. Finally, the use of private security services, if properly planned, integrated and overseen, can add signicant value to peacekeeping missions that have insufcient personnel. Imagine the improved impact the current AU/UN force in Darfur could have if internally displaced persons camps were protected by trained, UN/AU-certied private security professionals supported by helicopters, vehicles and aerial surveillance to provide the mission commander with improved exibility and complete control of his

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area of responsibility. There would be considerably fewer deaths, stemming from a more efcient and successful mission. Peacekeeping operations in Africa are likely to continue for the foreseeable future, and they will be long on demands and short on resources. If the ultimate goal is human security, all options to ensure the safety of innocent civilians should be considered. The time has come to take a dispassionate and pragmatic look at the full spectrum of capabilities the private sector can bring in support of African peacekeeping operations. Proper use of this capacity can only enhance the success of these missions, by enabling African forces to play their part. No peacekeeping mission should fail because of a lack of vehicles, air support, training or language difculties, when the private sector has the ability to provide these services. We should look for ways in which every bit of the capacity the private sector has to offer could be used in a partnership with African forces, not preclude its use. When the international community can honestly say that it has exhausted all options for supporting global peacekeeping missions, perhaps never again may become a reality at last.

Notes
1 LTC B Diop, A review of African peacekeeping, Journal of International Peace Operations 4(4) (2009), 30, http://www.peaceops.com (accessed 17 January 2009). 2 See http://www.ipoaworld.org. 3 See http://www.bapsc.org.uk.