Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Coercion and Persuasion in COIN Approaches - Research Appendix
Coercion and Persuasion in COIN Approaches - Research Appendix
discussed at the end of this document, 47 conflicts include the universe of relevant cases for this study. These are:
Case # Case Name 1 ' + 4 * 7 & % 10 11 1' 1+ 14 1* 117 1& 1% '0 '1 '' '+ '4
1
Year Started 1%7& 1%*4 1%%' 1%-1 1%71 1%%1 1%4& 1%%1 1%%4 1%%% 1%-4 1%%1%*+ 1%7* 1%74 1%-0 1%-' 1%&0 1%&% 1%41%71%*& 1%-1 1%*'
f!hanistan "anti#Soviet$ l!erian (nde)endence l!eria ",( $ n!olan (nde)endence Ban!ladesh Yu!oslavia Burma./yanmar Burundi Chechnya ( Chechnya (( Colom1ia "2 3C$ 4aire "anti#/o1utu$ Cu1a 5ast Timor 5ritrea ,uatemala ,uinea#Bissau (nde)endence (ndia "Na6alites$ (ndia "7ashmir$ (ndochina (ndonesia " ceh$ (ndonesia "8aru (slam$ (ra9 "7urdistan$ 7enya "/au /au$
;am)inella
<aos /alaya /o=am1i9ue "35N />$ /o=am1i9ue (nde)endence Nami1ia Ne)al Nicara!ua "Contras$ Nicara!ua "Somo=a$ Ni!eria "Ni!er 8elta$ ;a)ua Ne? ,uinea ;eru ;hili))ines "@uA 3e1ellion$ ;hili))ines "/N<2$ ;hili))ines "/(<2$ Sene!al Somalia "anti#Barre$ Sri <anAa "<TT5$ Sudan "S;< $ Ti1et TurAey B!anda "<3 $ Cietnam 4im1a1?e
1%-0 1%4& 1%71%-' 1%7+ 1%%7 1%&1 1%7& 1%%1 1%&& 1%&0 1%*0 1%71 1%77 1%&0 1%&0 1%71%&+ 1%*1%&4 1%&7 1%-0 1%7'
Belo?, each of these cases is coded for si6 counterinsur!ency )ractices. These are the Boolean conditions for DC .
"2eifer '00', 10'#10+$,@elmand in 2all 1%&1 "(1id. 1--$, @erat in )ril 1%&+, @elmand in 1%&+ "4aeef '00%, '+#'4$. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 3e!ular use of intimidation, torture, and murder of ordinary f!hans "2eifer '010, 104$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Soviet Bnion did ne!otiate ?ith s)ecific commanders "such as /assoud$ to declare cease#fires in s)ecific areas. Fhile conducted in !ood faith initially, hostilities resumed over time and these ne!otiations did not ever lead to counterinsur!ent victory. Soviets and 83 en!a!ed in a reconciliation initiative after Ganuary 1%&7 that sou!ht ne!otiations ?ith the mujahideen durin! the Soviet ?ithdra?al. These ne!otiations led to the Bilateral !reement 1et?een f!hanistan and ;aAistan, ?hich the BS and Soviet Bnion si!ned as interested )arties ",rau '00', +04#+0*$. E . ,evelopment Assistance present"0 The Soviets )rovided si!nificant economic assistance to the 83 in su))ort of the military effort to su))ress the mujahideen. These efforts at forced moderni=ation ?ere consistent ?ith the socialist ideolo!y of the Soviet Bnion and military. Soviet develo)ment )ersonnel conducted mass )roEects aimed at im)rovin! infrastructure "7alinovsAy, '010$. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence found.
it ?as nonetheless effective. This method effectively com1atted the 2<NHs indiscriminate terrorism ?ith terrorism 1y the 2rench army and ?as consistent ?ith !uerre revolutionairre. C . *esettlement present"0 The 2rench rmy did em)loy civilian resettlement to se)arate the )eo)le from insur!ents durin! the l!erian ?ar. This )ro!ram ?as actively administered 1y S S and monitored 1y the (ns)ection ,MnMrale des 3e!rou)ements de la ;o)ulation "(,3;$. 3esettlement 1e!an under a )ro!ram of recasement, in ?hich isolated rural villa!es ?ere consolidated into more defenda1le )ositions. SuttonHs descri)tion su!!ests this 1ecame ?ides)read in the conflictHs second )hase. lar!er )ro!ram of re!rou)ement ?as first mentioned in late 1%*7 ?hich sou!ht to )ur)osely deny the )eo)le interaction ?ith insur!ents. By late 1%*%, re!rou)ement had 1een articulated as a four#ste) model of resettlement that su))orted the maneuver o)erations of ;lan Challe. 3e!rou)ement ?as em)loyed into ;hase 2our ?hen the lar!est num1er of civilians resettled )eaAed in late 1%-0. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Fhile the )ossi1ility of reconciliation and ne!otiation ?as 1roached 1y the civilian !overnment in 2rance, this ?as out of the 9uestion for the 2rench rmy and the colons. Ne!otiations are o)ened 1y 8e ,aulle in 1%*& ?hen he discusses a )ai6 de 1raves, he o)ens the )ossi1ility of self#determination in late 1%*%, and the colons and rmy resist 1itterly, com)romisin! the )olicy and leadin! to Barricades FeeA in Ganuary 1%-0 "@orne 1%77$. E . Economic ,evelopment present"0 8evelo)ment assistance ?as common throu!hout the )eriod. Soustelle develo)ed the S S to reconnect ?ith the )o)ulation after his a))ointment in 1%**, also aimed to im)rove lives of l!erians 1y dou1lin! school#1uildin! 1ud!et, initiatin! land a! reform, and startin! )u1lic ?orAs )roEects "@orne 1%77, 10&$ The 2rench rmy su))lanted the state as a )rovider of services to the )o)ulation. ,alula himself o)ens schools and health clinics throu!hout his command, staffs them ?ith soldiers from his o?n com)any ?ho act at teachers and doctors for the )eo)le. ",alula 1%-+$ The Constantine ;lan is im)lemented startin! in 1%*%, aims to im)rove lives of l!erians 1y startin! industrial enter)rises, !ivin! land to l!erian farmers, increasin! school attendance, 1uild more housin! to ease the stru!!les of re!rou)ment. "@orne 1%77, +40#+41$ 2 . 4ocal Elite *elationships present"0 2rench colonial administration ?as overstretched in l!eria at the start of the re1ellion ?ith Iareas half as 1i! as 2rance ?ere left in char!e of one 2rench administrator and a handful of !enarmes "@orne 1%77, 107#10&$ ,alula descri1es o1servin! 7a1yles )ayin! the 2rench ta6 collector out of custom, as he ?as the only endurin! )resence of the 2rench state in l!erian villa!es. ",alula 1%-+$ @o?ever, military )resence does create more coo)erative relationshi)s. ,alula also descri1es creatin! self#!overnment 1y holdin! elections for mayors and councilmen ?ithin villa!es. S S ?as also intended to create more relationshi)s ?ith local )o)ulace and connect 2rench state to l!erians. @o?ever, 2<N attacAs ?ere intended to erode trust 1et?een 2rench and loyalist l!erians : S S officers ?ere al?ays a tar!et of 2<N "@orne 1%77, 10%$ Com1ined ?ith escalation of colons. rmy alliance, l!erians
4 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella
lose faith in the 2rench over time. Fhile the )rotests callin! for the end of the 2ourth 3e)u1lic in 1%*& include loyalist l!erians, the riots at Barricades FeeA includes no l!ierans "@orne 1%77$.
;ress. 3o1erts, @u!h. '00+. The Battlefield Algeria, 1988- 00 . <ondon: Cerso. 7ervyn, Geanine and 2rancois ,N=e. '004. IThe or!ani=ation of the forces of re)ression,K e6tract from a re)ort )resented 1y !ustice Commission for Algeria, at +'nd Session of the ;ermanent ;eo)leOs Tri1unal on @uman 3i!hts Ciolations "1%%'#'004$. ;aris, 2rance. 7hati1, Sofiane. '00*. IS)oiler /ana!ement 8urin! l!eriaOs Civil Far.K "tanford !ournal of #nternational $elations -"1$: htt):..???.stanford.edu.!rou).sEir.-.1.0-PAhati1.html. <ast accessed 2e1ruary 1+, '014. 7alyvas, Stathis. '000. IFanton and SenselessQ The <o!ic of /assacres in l!eria.K $ationalit% and "ociet% 11"+$: '4+#'&*.
enou!h education.healthcare to I)roduce any marAed chan!e in the 9uality of life.K fricans are really chea) la1or for coffee )lantations. "Bender 1%7', ++&$ (n 5ast, none of the services )romised 1y the !ovHt ?ere )rovided, at least 1y 1%70. "Bender 1%7', ++%$ , . Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 No evidence of ne!otiations. @o?ever, ;ortu!uese sou!ht to turn ca)tured insur!ents and recruit them into their military forces. This is offered as an alternative to )unishment, not as a form of for!iveness follo?in! voluntary surrender, so ( do not code this as amnesty. E . ,evelopment Assistance present"0 ;ortu!uese seeA to moderni=e n!ola throu!h resettlements and )rovide health and educational services. rmy em)loyed as teachers in many cases, su))orted 1uildin! schools, health clinics. ccordin! to Cann "1%%7, RR$, ;ortu!al ado)ts F@> standards for doctor.)o)ulation and meets them. @o?ever, accordin! to Bender "1%7'J 1%7&, 1-7$, economic develo)ment )ro!rams fail 1.c of social disru)tions to ordinary life. fricans livin! in settlements faced declinin! standards of livin!, not im)rovn!. So, efforts at develo)ment ?ere incom)lete at 1est. 2 . 4ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0 lthou!h ;ortu!uese incor)orate fricans into military forces, there is no evidence that they ally or su))ort local indi!enous leadershi) amon! tri1es contested 1y insur!ents. @eavy#handed tactics involvin! mass use of air)o?er as ?ell as resettlements a))ear to )revent any move to?ard elite coo)tion.
C . *esettlement a(sent"0 no clear )olicy of resettlement. , . Amnesty3+egotiations0 a(sent"0 no evidence durin! the conflict, althou!h military and ?ami <ea!ue of Ban!ladesh are in ne!otiations 1efore the ?ar starts. >f course, these 1reaA do?n. E . ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance.
7 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella
2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 ?hile there ?ere ;aAistani loyalists in Ban!ladesh, the ;aAistani rmy failed to cultivate these relationshi)s amid the massacres of Ban!ali civilians and conventional com1at ?ith the (ndian rmy and ir 2orce.
- . E1emplary 2orce present"0 Burmese forces have re!ularly )ressed the )o)ulation into service as )orters. Beatin!s and intimidation of civilians are common, as ?ell as ra)es and se6ual crimes a!ainst ethnic minorities. C . *esettlement present"0 Burmese military begins to forcibly resettle ethnic minorities in 1996 in its campaign against the Karenni National Progressive Party, continues for several years with thousands resettled. D Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): Burmese military is constantly negotiating with different rebel groups, leading to many cease-fires. Yet, many of these fail (like the cease-fire prior to the 1996 offensive) and as a result, fighting recommences. E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of development assistance or civic action to win over ethnic minorities. F Elite Local Relationships (present): The Burmese military has co-opted some rebel groups to fight others, like the 20,000 strong United Wa State Army. References Cline, Lawrence, E. 2009. Insurgency in amber: ethnic opposition groups in Myanmar. Small Wars and Insurgencies. 20(3-4), 574-591.
*eferences Bvin, ;eter. 1%%%. I5thnicity and ;o?er in Burundi and 3?anda: 8ifferent ;aths to Ciolence.K Com*arative +olitics +1"+$: '*+#'71.
A . /assacres present"0 3ussian military attacAs ,ro=ny in >ct 1%%% and nearly levels the entire city ?ith air and artillery 1om1ardments, taAes full control in 2e1ruary '000. 3ussian military re!ains control over most of Chechnya 1y mid#'000, 1ut causin! immense destruction ?ith indiscriminate violence "3enaud '010$. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 ;ro#3ussian Chechen !overnment esta1lished after 3ussian invasion ruled mainly throu!h violent coercion, re!ularly 1rutali=ed the )o)ulation "3enaud '010$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 Fhile refu!ees ?ere created durin! the ?ar, no evidence of a focused resettlement )olicy. , . Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 Several amnesties occur durin! 3ussian attem)ts to esta1lish !overnance. 7,000 taAe amnesty 1y '00*. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 3econstruction occurred durin! the initial second invasion in '000, 1ut slo?ed after this. reas in southern Chechnya that ?ere destroyed in the fi!htin! ?ere necessarily re1uilt. So, this is incom)lete reconstruction "3enaud '010, 7ramer '00*$. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 3ussia identifies ne? )ro#3ussian allies ?ho successfully 1uild local su))ort, )articularly the 7adyrov family. 8es)ite the assassination of the father, the son tooA over as the re!ionOs )ro#3ussian leader and !uided the end of the counterinsur!ency "3enaud '010$. *eferences 7ramer, /arA. '00*. I,uerrilla Farfare, Counterinsur!ency, and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The /ilitary 8imension of the 3ussian#Chechen Conflict,K ,uro*e-Asia "tudies *7"'$, '0%#'%0. 3enaud, Sean. '010. I Cie? from Chechnya: n ssessment of 3ussian Counterinsur!ency 8urin! the t?o Chechen Fars and 2uture (m)lications.K /assey Bniversity, un)u1lished /asterOs Thesis.
A . /assacres present"0 /ilitary does not )ur)osely use mass fire)o?er to ?i)e out villa!ers or )o)ulation centers. @o?ever, air)o?er is used alon!side military o)erations, and there are incidents ?here air)o?er is used on individual homes. ;aramilitaries that ?orA closely ?ith the !overnment do commit lar!e#scale massacres in the 1%%0s, includin! the /a)ri)ian /assacre in 1%%7 involvin! +0 civilian deaths, the lto Naya massacre in '001 involvin! at least 40 civilians deaths, and others. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 56em)lary force is common throu!hout the ?ar. BS military advisors instruct Colom1ian military to develo) )aramilitary or!ani=ations in late 1%*0s to intimidate sus)ected insur!ents, includin! mem1ers of le!al )olitical )arties, unions, other civil society or!ani=ations "StoAes '00*$. /ilitary or )aramilitary forces re!ularly intimidate, torture, and murder civilians sus)ected of insur!ent su))ort. !ain, !ro?th of massacres due to )aramilitaries. 1' deaths at <a 3ochela massacre 1y / S in 1%&% "7irA '00+, 1'7$. /ulti)le deaths at <a Cristalinamassacre, includin! Eud!es investi!atin! )aras 1y / S in 1%&7 "7irA '00+, 1'1J @3F 1%%-, '+$. ;ara net?orAs conduct tar!eted Aillin!s and massacres throu!hout Chucuri re!ion in 1%%', Idetainin! and Aillin! sus)ects and threatenin! those they accused of har1orin! sym)athies for !uerrillas.K "@3F 1%%-, +4, +*$ Tar!eted Aillin!s in 1%%' of civil society or!ani=ers in Barranca1ermeEa "@3F 1%%-, +*$. (n Barranca1ermeEa, BC )aras force out the 2 3C throu!h the use of e6em)lary force, indiscriminate violence a!ainst civilians. Fave of violence on city residents 1y )aras starts in 1%%&, continues throu!h '00'. /ay 1-, 1%%&, *0#man )ara unit raid city, Aill 11, ca)ture '*, they ?ere later Ailled. /assacres liAe this occur throu!hout the year. "@3F 1%%-, 114$ fter late 1%%%, )aras shift Ifrom terrifyin! raids to silent, individual crimesK "@3F 1%%-, 11*$. ;aras ?ithdra? in '004, Aillin!s dro) dramatically "@3F 1%%-, 117$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 ?hile counterinsur!ency forces re!ularly create refu!ees, they do not force them to resettlement in a )articular !eo!ra)hic are controlled and maintained 1y the state. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 /ulti)le ne!otiations taAe )lace throu!hout the conflict ?ith either the Colom1ian state or )aramilitaries and different insur!ent !rou)s. 2 3C and the !overnment o)ened ne!otiations in 1%&4, ho?ever violence from 1oth sides continued throu!hout these talAs and they eventually 1roAe do?n. This )eriod also sa? the formation of the first )aramilitaries tied to nacrotrafficAers in res)onse to insur!ent Aidna))in!s. Ne!otiations are o)ened a!ain 1et?een the 2 3C and the ;astrana administration in 1%%%, leadin! to the !rantin! of the demilitari=ed =one as a )re#condition for talAs. @o?ever, it a))ears the 2 3C used these ne!otiations merely to 1uy time and !ro?th its stren!th in the =ona, and they ?ere never conducted in !ood faith. Fhile ;resident ;astrana attended the o)enin! of the )eace talAs, /arin sent a su1ordinate. These talAs 1reaA do?n ?hen ;astrana reali=es he is maAin! no head?ay in '00' "7irA '00+$
1' 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella
E . ,evelopment Assistance present"0 8evelo)ment assistance ?as common durin! the counterinsur!ency efforts s)earheaded 1y ;lan <a=o. ssistance and aid ?as )rovided to )easants to tie them to the Colom1ian !overnment and )rovide incentives for their loyalty. This assistance ?as administered in tandem ?ith military o)erations. These initiatives ?ere derided 1y /arin as a 1ri1e to tricA )easants into for!ettin! the armyHs )ast a1uses "7irA '00+$. 8evelo)ment assistance is intended as a Aey )art of Bri1eHs 8emocratic Security )lan, and ( have found evidence su!!estin! that such assistance is )rovided to civilians in areas of counterinsur!ency o)erations "FalAer '00%, '&#'%$. The National Consolidation ;lan ?as one as)ect of the 8emocratic Security )olicy that sou!ht to )rovide social services to areas recently retaAen from insur!ent control and inte!rated into the Colom1ian state. Fith su))ort for BS military civil affairs officers, 9uicA#im)act )roEects and lon!er#term service delivery )roEects ?ere im)lemented. "S)encer et al., '010, &7#&&, %0$. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 3elationshi)s 1et?een )rovincial elites and counterinsur!ency forces have 1een common throu!hout the conflict, 1ut have intensified in the last +0 years to )roduce ne? counterinsur!ent or!ani=ations. 5lites "includin! nacrotrafficAers$ formed their o?n )aramilitaries ?ith assistance from the rmy in the 1%&0s. These ties and relationshi)s continued throu!hout the follo?in! years amon! li1eral )arty elites led to stron!er )aramilitaries that )rovided security for lando?ners "some of ?hom ?ere )ara leaders$. s 3ichani "'00*$ notes, the ne6us 1et?een re!ional elites, the military, and the )aras contri1utes to the fra!mented soverei!nty of the Colom1ian state. *eferences 7irA, 3o1in, '00+. -ore Terri(le than .eath) .rugs, /iolence, and America0s War in Colom(ia. Ne? YorA: ;u1lic ffairs. @uman 3i!hts Fatch. 1%%-. Colom(ia0s 1iller 'et2or3s) The -ilitar%-+aramilitar% +artnershi* and the 4nited "tates. Fashin!ton, 8.C: @uman 3i!hts Fatch. 3ichani, Na=ih. '00*. I/ultinational Cor)orations, 3entier Ca)italism, and the Far System in Colom1ia.K &atin American +olitics and "ociet%. 47"+$: 11+#144. ####. '007. ICaudillos and the crisis of the Colom1ian state: fra!mented soverei!nty, the ?ar system and the )rivatisation of counterinsur!ency in Colom1ia.K Third World 5uarterl%. '7"'$: S)encer, 8avid. 5., et. al. '010. Colom(ia0s $oad to $ecover%) "ecurit% and 6overnance 198 010. Fashin!ton, 8.C.: National 8efense Bniversity. FalAer, Games . '00%. A Com*arison of the .emocratic "ecurit% +olic% in Colom(ia and
1+ 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella
*rovincial $econstruction Teams in #ra7. /asterOs Thesis. /onterrey: Naval ;ost!raduate School.
Thom, Filliam. 1%%%. ICon!o#4aireHs 1%%-#%7 Civil Far in the Conte6t of 5volvin! ;atterns of /ilitary Conflict in frica in the 5ra of (nde)endence.K The !ournal of Conflict "tudies R(R"'$. htt):..Eournals.hil.un1.ca.inde6.)h).GCS.article.vie? rticle.4+*&.*01*, last accessed 2e1ruary 10, '014. /cNulty, /el. 1%%%. IThe Colla)se of 4aire: (m)losion, 3evolution or 56ternal Sa1ota!eQK The !ournal of -odern African "tudies +7"1$: *+#&'.
A . /assacres present"0 Search#and#destroy o)erations Aill thousands of civilians from 1%77# 1%&1. /ore than 100 Ailled in Santa Cru= massacre at funeral in 1%%1. ;aramilitaries commit massacres leadin! u) to vote for inde)endence in 1%%% and after. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 (ntimidation, Aidna))in!, e6tra#Eudicial murder ?as common in the 1%%0s amon! )ro#!ovOt militias and )aramilitaries a!ainst anti#(ndonesian activists, )ro# 235T<(N su))orters. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 Fides)read resettlement of civilians 1y (ndonesian military from 1%&+ # 1%&%. /aEor civilian dis)lacement ?as common in )eriod )rior to 1%&+ as ?ell. <ar!e# scale dis)lacements after 1%%% referendum on inde)endence. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Cease#fire and ne!otiations 1et?een 235T<(N and TN( in 1%&+, 1ut talAs fail and (ndonesian military attacAs. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 The military did enact a civil affairs )ro!ram that im)roved sanitation, health, created infrastructure, enhanced local !ovOt control. 2 ! Elite *elationships present"0 <ocal (ndonesian military leaders taAe )olitical control in areas of o)eration, 1ut do esta1lish local allies and su))ort elites liAe Tomas ,oncalves, conservative !rou)s liAe 7>T , )odeti and the B8T. *eferences 7ilcullen, 8avid. '000. The +olitical Conse7uences of -ilitar% :*erations in #ndonesia, 19;<1999. 8issertation. Syndey: Bniversity of Ne? South Fales. ####. '00-. I,lo1alisation and the 8evleo)ment of (ndonesian Counterinsur!ency Tactics.K "mall Wars and #nsurgencies. 17"1$. 44#-4. ####. '010. Counterinsurgenc%. <ondon: >6ford Bniversity ;ress.
C Resettlement (present): Civilians were cleared from a six-mile area running alongside the Keren-Asmara road in 1970 to reduce attacks, cleared from other areas as well (Tareke 2002). D Negotiations/Amnesty (present): Ethiopian military government held talks with the EPLF in 1977 in Berlin, but then broke them off as they instead launched a new military offensive. Negotiations between mid-level officers guided by Jimmy Carter also begin in 1989 (Pateman 1990). E Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development assistance. F Elite Local Relationships (absent): no evidence of local relationships. References De Waal. Alexander. 1991. Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine In Ethiopia. New York: Human Rights Watch. Pateman, Roy. 1990. The Eritrean War. Armed Forces and Society 17(1): 81-98. Tareke, Gebru. 2002. From Lash to Red Star: the pitfalls of counter-insurgency in Ethiopia, 1980-82. Journal of Modern Africa Studies 40(3), 465-498.
D - Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Amnesty offered in 1982 for those returning from Mexico, or other insurgents, who had to sign an appeal for amnesty (Streeter 2006). E - Development Assistance (present): Much assistance available via USAID and the Alliance for Progress, but the Guatemalan gov't never adopts a firm policy of development to implement programs. Oligarchy always shirked from supporting socioeconomic reform. Military does implement its own civil affairs program known as the National Plan for Security and Development, offering both guns and beans. Elite Relationships (absent): Military doesn't build new alliances among local elites, 'model villages' enable complete surveillance and monitoring of the population. No move to use local elites for control. More direct form of intervention in civil society (Streeter 2006). References Streeter, Stephen M. 2006. Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal Counter-Insurgency: Guatemala and the contradictions of the Alliance for Progress. Third World Quarterly 27(1): 5768.
lthou!h fricans are incor)orated into ;ortu!uese military forces, no evidence e6ists that the ;ortu!uese form allies amon! local elites. This is consistent ?ith direct rule throu!hout the colonial )eriod. *eferences 8hada, /, 1%%&. IThe <i1eration Far in ,uinea#Bissau 3econsidered,K !ournal of -ilitar% =istor%. Cha1al, ;articA. 1%&0. INational <i1eration in ;ortu!uese ,uinea, 1%*-#1%74.K African Affairs &0"+1&$, 7*#%%. Cann (((, Gohn ;. 1%%7. Counterinsurgenc% in Africa) The +ortuguese Wa% of War, 1981-19>;. Fest)ort, CT: ;rae!er.
Misra, Amalendu. 2002. Subaltern and the civil war: An assessment of left-wing insurgency in South Asia. Civil Wars, 5(4): 56-76. Andhra Pradesh/Naxalite. GlobalSecurity.org, accessed December 12, 2012. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/naxalite.htm
Bhatt, ShaAti. '00+. IState Terrorism vs. Gihad in 7ashmir.K !ournal of Contem*orar% Asia ++"'$: '1*#''4. Telford, @amish. '001. ICounter#(nsur!ency in (ndia: >1servations from ;unEa1 and 7ashmir.H The !ournal of Conflict "tudies RR("1$: htt):..Eournals.hil.un1.ca.inde6.)h).Ecs.article.vie?.4'%+.4&&&, last accessed 2e1ruary 14, '014. ,an!uly, 3aEat. '001. I(ndia, ;aAistan and the 7ashmir (nsur!ency: Causes, 8ynamics and ;ros)ects for 3esolution.K Asian "tudies $evie2 '*"+$: +0%#++4. Gafa, Yateendra Sin!h. '00*. I8efeatin! Terrorism: Study of >)erational Strate!y and Tactics of ;olice 2orces in Gammu S 7ashmir "(ndia$.K +olice +ractice and $esearch -"1$: 141#1-4. <ama, /ahendra ;. '000. I(nternal dis)lacement in (ndia: causes, )rotection and dilemmas.K 9orced -igration $evie2 &: '4#'-.
alliances ?ith Cao 8ai and @oa @ao sects, they form militias to defend a!ainst Ciet /inh. But no local elites in North Cietna. ">OBallance 1%-4, &+#&4$ *eferences >OBallance, 5d?ard. 1%-4. The #ndochina War, 19;<-19<;. <ondon: 2a1er and 2a1cr, 1%-4
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in a-Cdef A . /assacres a(sent"0 No evidence of massacres by Indonesian military. B - Exemplary Force (present): Indonesian military pressed civilians into militia service and participation in cordon-and-sweep operaitons known as pagar betis while under threat. C Resettlement (present): Indonesian military does evacuate and resettle villagers who live in Zone C, whose villages were then destroyed. D - Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): No evidence of amnesty or negotiations, DI insurgency ends with decapitation. E - Development Assistance (absent): No evidence found. F - Elite Relationships (absent): Few elite relationships, Kilcullen (2000) argues that local military commanders were the real powerbrokers and exercised de facto control over civil administration and civil society. References Kilcullen, David. 2000. The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, 19451999. Dissertation. Syndey: University of New South Wales. ----. 2006. Globalisation and the Devleopment of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics. Small Wars and Insurgencies. 17(1). 44-64. ----. 2010. Counterinsurgency. London: Oxford University Press.
7urdistan Ano?n as mujamma?at, or collectivities that (ra9is referred to as modern villa!es. "@3F 1%%'$ , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 (ra9i re!ime and 7urds si!n a cease#fire in 1%70 that !rants 7urdish autonomy in four years. @o?ever, a!reement doesnHt really hold as 1order dis)utes and conflicts are endemic. E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance )rovided 1y (ra9 to 7urdish )o)ulations. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence that (ra9i re!ime 1uilds local 7urdish allies. *eferences >H<eary, Carole . '00'. IThe 7urds of (ra9: 3ecent @istory, 2uture ;ros)ects.K -iddle ,ast $evie2 of #nternational Affairs -"4$: 17#'%. ,unter, /ichael /. 1%%+. I de facto 7urdish state in Northern (ra9.K Third World 5uarterl% 14"'$: '%*#+1%. >HBallance, 5d!er. '00'. I(ra9.K (n Ara(s at War) -ilitar% ,ffectiveness, 19;8-1991.@ ed. 1y 7enneth >. ;ollacA. <incoln: Bniversity of Ne1rasAa ;ress. @uman 3i!hts Fatch. 1%%+. 6enocide in #ra7) The Anfal Cam*aign against the 1urds. Ne? YorA: @uman 3i!hts Fatch.
- ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 Bennett "'007a$ ar!ues that 1rutality ?as re!ularly used indiscriminately a!ainst the civilian )o)ulation. These included 1eatin!s, torture, and murder. @e ar!ues that these )ractices ?ere mostly committed 1y the 7enya ;olice 3eserve "civilian settlers$, 7in!Hs frican 3ifles, @ome ,uard. 2ormer modeled on rmy 1attalions, latter used in Eoint o)s ?ith the rmy. "(1id., 1**$ British strate!y used )unitive force, fear and intimidation. <ess hearts and minds. "(1id., 1*7$ 5ven thou!h common la? still rei!ned, the result ?as Lsham le!alismH. "(1id., 1*&$ I/inimum force didn not )revail as often as is claimedJ intimidation of the )o)ulation, summary e6ecutions, torture and unrestrained violence ?ere )revalent for at least ei!ht months.K "(1id., 1*&$ This ?ould 1e from 10.*' to -.*+. "(1id.,, 1*+$ The /au /au <ari massacre of @ome ,uard families at <ari and su1se9uent mass intimidation occurs in +.*+. nderson confirms sham le!alism and sho?s ho? sham le!alism ?orAed throu!h the court system, ?ith mass arrests of 7iAuyu and confessions under duress resulted in mass e6ecutions. (ntimidation ?as even used a!ainst sus)ected insur!ent la?yers ?ho ?ere frican or sian. "(1id., 1*-#1*7$ (ntimidation continued throu!h >)erational nvil, startin! ;hase + on )ril '4 1%*4. I nvil e)itomi=ed an attitude of mind that )ervaded the security forcesK " nderson '00*., '0*$, led to screenin! of 7iAuyu in Nairo1i "(1id., '01$. Screenin! commonly involved 1eatin!s and torture "Bennett '0071, -4&$. @ome ,uard also re!ularly looted and )illa!ed 7iAuyu "'10# '11$. nvil 1ecomes the turnin! )oint of the British cam)ai!n and disru)ts /au /au 1ands "'1+#'14$. C . *esettlement present"0 The British re!ularly used resettlement throu!hout the conflict. Cilli!i=ation 1et?een 10.*' and 4.*+ led to as much as 100,000 7iAuyu dis)laced from the 3ift Calley and Central ;rovinces. <ancaster 3ifles LevacuatedH 7iAuyu throu!hout this )hase "Bennett -*', '0071J Bennett 1*+, '007a$ ;olicy reversed in mid#1%*+ ?ith overcro?din! and reali=ation of use of murder, torture, and 1eatin!s. "Bennett '007a, 1*+$ @o?ever, )o)ulation is )ut throu!h mass screenin! in >) nvil in 4.*4, and this results in detention and relocation of 70,000 7iAuyu. The cam)s ?ere atrocious, and all Nairo1i churches made outs)oAen criticism of !ovHt )olicy " nderson '07#'0&$. 3esettlements of loyalist 7iAuyu around 5uro)ean farms also tooA )lace throu!h 1%**#1%*- "Branch '007, +0-$, )resuma1ly for their security and for economic o))ortunities. They sou!ht self#mastery, and critici=ed /au /au for their lacA of it and use of violence a!ainst them. "Branch '007, +07$ , ! Amnesty3+egotiation a(sent"0 T?o offers of ne!otiation are made to /au /au, first ha))enin! in 4.*4 after ca)ture of ,eneral China. This ?as not honored and re1els ?ho aimed to surrender ?ere instead am1ushed, and those ?ho ?ent to trail ?ere han!ed. " nderson '00*, '7-#'77$. The settlers al?ays reEected ne!otiations as ?ell "(1id., '7&$, maAin! British commitments difficult to u)hold and caused )references to diver!e. Belief of /au /au as Lsu1# humanH 1locAed British from ever taAin! re1el )references seriously or seein! them as le!itimate, and instead they ?ere Eust seen as cra=ed and 1loodthirsty, a reEection of modernity "(1id. '&0# '&1$.
'* 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella
E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 8evelo)ment assistance a))eared to 1e used selectively, and not all 7iAuyu received the same 1enefits from ne? schools, infrastructure, and other ne? services. !ain, )atrona!e ?as used to 1uild net?orAs of clients, and British assistance ?as funneled throu!h their loyalists. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 British ties to 7enyan loyalists ?ere dee), local chiefs had 1een incor)orated into self#rule throu!hout the colonial )eriod, they favored their clients. (n fact, these relationshi)s to local elites are ?hat drove the re1ellion, as many fricans ?ere e6cluded and 1ecame tenants ?ho lost their land and suffered under lo? ?a!es. /au /au led the cause of the dis)ossessed " nderson '00+, **$ These loyalists ?ere recruited into the @ome ,uard as ?ell, they ?ere the tar!ets of /au /au. @o?ever, British res)ond 1y )rotectin! and )rovidin! 7iAuyu loyalists ?ith resources to 1uild their o?n )atrona!e throu!h ne? local institutions: I lthou!h not usur)ed entirely, chiefs and headmen ?ere demoted and re)laced in the u))er echelons of )atron#client net?orAs 1y frican le!islators and administrators a))ointed as 7enya 1e!an to )re)are for decoloni=ation.K "Branch '007, +14$ Thus, there is the erosion of the old net?orA throu!h /au /au attacAs and the construction of a ne? one in the emer!in! edifice of the 7enyan state. *eferences nderson, 8avid. '00*. =istories of the =anged) The .irt% War in 1en%a and the ,nd of ,m*ire. Bennett, @u?. '007"a$. IThe /au /au 5mer!ency as ;art of the British rmyOs ;ost#Far Counterinsur!ency 56)erience.K .efense A "ecurit% Anal%sis. '+"'$: 14+#1-+. Bennett, @u?. '007"1$. IThe >therSide of the C>(N: /inimum and 56em)lary 2orce in British rmy Counterinsur!ency in 7enya.K 1&"4$: -+&#--4. Branch, 8aniel. '007. IThe 5nemy Fithin: <oyalists and the Far !ainst /au /au in 7enya.K !ournal of African =istor%. 4&: '%1#+1*. Cha))ell, Ste)hen. '011. I ir)o?er in the /au /au conflict: the !overnmentOs chief ?ea)on.K "mall Wars and #nsurgencies. ''"+$: 4%*#*'*. Thornton, 3od. '00%. I/inimum 2orceO: a re)ly to @u? Bennett,K "mall Wars and #nsurgencies. '0"1$: '1*#''-.
- ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 C( #funded and trained Lsecret armyH of @mon! troo)s ?orAed ?ith C( to neutrali=e ;athet <ao elements via assassination, torture to !ain intelli!ence and information. C ! *esettlement present"0 (n 1%-0, @mon! commander relocated '00 villa!es dee)er into the mountains south of the ;lain of Gars to Aee) )o)ulation from comin! under control of the ;athet <ao. This )o)ulation is then used to recruit irre!ulars for the Lsecret ?arH. "Stuart#2o6 1%%7, 117$. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Tri)artite ne!otiations occur after 1%-0 cou) amon! neutralists, ri!htists, and leftists "includin! !reat )o?ers$ that leads to the ,eneva !reement of 1%-' and the formation of a Second Coalition ,overnment. @o?ever, this !overnment does 1reaA do?n in 1%-4 and the ?ar resumed. "Stuart#2o6 1%%7$ E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 BS (8 ?as heavily involved in )rovidin! assistance to the <aotian !overnment, so much so that a BS (8 advisor ?as assi!ned to each ministry "Stuart# 2o6 1%%7, 1+0$ 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 <aotian !overnment and C( 1uild stron! ties to leaders of @mon! ethnic !rou) "Stuart#2o6 1%%7$. *eferences Stuart#2o6, /artin. 1%%7. A =istor% of &aos. Cam1rid!e: Cam1rid!e Bniversity ;ress.
initially settin! out s)ecific !uideliens on the use of force.K "Bennett '00%, 4+1$. 2orms of re)ression used descri1es sus)ects as Oshot ?hilst attem)tin! to esca)eO, liAe at the Batan! 7ali massacre in 8ecem1er 1%4&. lso mass arrests in cordon#and#s?ee) o)s. "Bennett '00%, 4+-$. Nonetheless,these actions alienated the )o)ulation from counterinsur!ents "@acA '007$. C . *esettlement present"0 1&,*00 resettled 1y /arch 1%*0. 8one in an adhoc 1asis. /aEor resettlement )ro!rams 1e!in after that "Bennett '00%, 4+&#%$. ,enerally occurred follo?in! insur!nt attacAs )re#1%*0, follo?ed 1y 1urnin! of homes, )ro)erty destruction "Bennett '00%, 4+%$. Bri!!s ;lan of )ril 1%*0 resettles over *00,000 s9uatters, re!rou)s -00,000 la1orers. Starts in Gune, done 1y 1%*1. 3esettlements involve food controls, denyin! resources to )o)ulation. By the end of the 5mer!ency, almost one#tenth of entire )o)ulation ?ere resettled in Ne? Cilla!es "7omer 1%7', *-#-1$. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 re?ard for defection )ro!ram e6ists after 1%4&, offers )ayment to /N< #/C; mem1ers for defection, inforamtion a1out others. Nets over ',000 defections durin! entire emer!ency. Ne!otiations do occur in 1%** as ?ell. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 2rom late 1%*' on?ard, Ne? Cilla!es "resettlements$ receive more 1asic schools, to?n halls, medical facilities, and 1etter infrastructure "@acA '00%$. Ne? Cilla!es ?ere I/alayaOs !reatest socioeconomic develo)ment )roEect durin! 1%4%-0.K "7omer 1%7', -'$ 2 ! Elite *elationships present"0 Tem)ler tries to ?in over Chinese after comin! to )o?er, im)rovin! infratstructure in Ne? Cilla!es, )ermits enhanced administrative )o?ers 1y elected villa!e councils in /ay 1%*', citi=enshi) conferred on Chinese. "Smith '001, --$. Tem)ler also she)herds throu!h a ne? ;u1lic Service Commission in Nov 1%*+, ?hich )ermits non#/alays "Chinese$ to Eoin administrative service, and encoura!es Chinese recruitment "Smith '001, -7# -&$. lliance 1et?een Bnited /alays National >r!ani=aiton "BN/>$ and /alayan Chinese ssociation "/C , )reviously formed in 1%4% ?ith su))ort from ,urney and /ac8onald "Smith '001, -*J 7omer 1%7', -*$, ?hile the alliance itself ?as formed in 1%*' "Smith '001, 71$ ?ins elections in 1%**. 8emonstrates elite relationshi)s formed amon!st leaders of Chinese minority @acA "'00%$. 5lections 1ecame an incentives for these !rou)s, liAe /C , to challen!e /C; for )o)ular su))ort. "Smith '001, 71$. *eferences Bennett, @u?. '00%. I Cery Salutary 5ffect: The Counter#Terror Strate!y in the 5arly /alayan 5mer!ency, Gune 1%4& to 8ecem1er 1%4%.K !ournal of "trategic "tudies. +'"%$: 41*#444.
'& 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella
@acA, 7arl. '00%. IThe /alayan 5mer!ency as counter#insur!ency )aradi!m.K !ournal of "trategic "tudies. +'"+$: +&+#414. 7omer, 3o1ert F. 1%7'. The -ala%an ,mergenc% in $etros*ect. Fashin!ton, 8.C.: 3 N8 Cor)oration. Smith, Simon. '001. I,eneral tem)ler and counter#insur!ency in /alaya: hearts and minds, intelli!ence, and )ro)a!anda.K .efence and #ntelligence Anal%sis. 1-"+$: -0#7&. Na!l, Gohn . '00'. &earning to ,at "ou* 2ith a 1nife) Counterinsurgenc% &essons for -ala%a and /ietnam. Chica!o: Bniversity of Chica!o ;ress.
Lunstrom, Elizabeth. 2009. Terror, Territory, and Deterritorialization: Landscapes of Terror and the Unmaking of State Power in the Mozambican Civil War. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99(5): 884-892. Machava, Benedito Luis. 2011. State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of Punishment in Post-Independence Mozambique (1975-1983). Journal of Southern African Studies 37(1): 593-609. @uman 3i!hts Fatch. 1%%0. =uman $ights Watch World $e*ort 1990. Ne? YorA: NY. htt):..???.hr?.or!.re)orts.1%%0.F3%0.inde6.htm#To)>f;a!e, last accessed 2e1. '1, '014.
1%-7#1%7+, ?ith ;(85 usin! torture on )risoners "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 10+$. 9lechas "native frican s)ecial forces includin! turned insur!ents$ Ano?n to Itreat ?ith a a sava!e ruthlessness the villa!ers amon! ?hom they o)erated...to )rove their ne? commitmentK "@enriAsen 1%&+, 107$. C . *esettlement present"0 3esettlement schemes ?ere modeled after British in /alaya "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1*4$. s Bender "1%7'$ )oints out in n!ola, ;ortu!uese use three ty)es of resettlements, includin! military#run aldeamentos, reordenamento rural for socioeconomic develo)ment, and colonatos de soldados But, reordenamentos are used less in /o=am1i9ue, and more colnatos used in areas ?ith !uerrilla activity. "Gundanian 1%74,*'0$ Aldeamentos first )ro)osed in 1%-*, im)lemented south of Tan=anian 1order in Ca1o 8el!ado, usin! scorched earth )olicy "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 100J Gundanian 1%74, *'+$. 1 million resettled 1y 1%70. >fficals admit that )o)ulation not so involved in resettlement construction, and Ithe amenities of the villa!es are minimal.K (nfrastructure and services to follo? after ra)id re!rou)in! "*'-$. "Gundanian 1%74, *40$ ,eneral rria!a does too much too 9uicAly, 1uilt all settlements fast, vie?ed ne!atively 1y the )eo)le . "Cann 1%%7, 1*7$ 3esettlements often done forcefully, had hardshi)s on the )eo)le and didnHt account for frian desire to remain in their o?n lands. "Cann 1%%7, 1-1J @enriAsen 1%&+, 1-1$ , ! +egotiations3Amnesty present"0 ;ortu!uese did su))ort efforts to !et 235<(/> )ersonnel to defect, as military )u1lished offers of amnesty 1efore, durin!, and after lar!e cam)ai!ns, offerin! money for ?ea)ons. "@enriAsen 1%&+, 10+$. Fhen rria!as comes to )o?er, he orders that ?ounded 235<(/> troo)s !et flo?n out for medical care first to encoura!e defection. "@enriAsen 1%&+, 104$ Ne!otiations eventually leadin! to inde)dence 1e!in on * Gune 1%74. Bnofficial cease# fires emer!e throu!hout the ;ortu!uese rmy. ;ortu!ual si!ns handover of )o?er to 235<(/> on 7 Se)tem1er 1%74 "/unslo? 1%&+, 1'7$. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 >nly s)oradic develo)ment )roEects in the a1sence of maEor reordenamento rural )roEects "*'0$. These )ro!rams IhavenHt 1een ?ell financed nor have they hel)ed a si!nificant num1er of fricans.K "*'1$ /aEor develo)ment initiatives centered around construction of the Ca1ora Bassa 8am "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1-*$. But, the dam ?asnOt intended so much for /o=am1ican develo)ment, 1ut to attract more settlers, foster mineral e6traction in Tete, and )rovide electricity to South frica "(ssacon and (ssacson 1&+, 104J /unslo? 1%&+, 114$. lso, ;ortu!uese settlers ?ant to use fricans as a la1or source, less em)hasis on actually )rovidin! develo)ment for them as o))osed to the 5uro)eans. frican cro) )urchases fell, indicatin! a declinin! standard of livin!, ?hile statistics sho? hi!her economic !ains for
5uro)eans "Gundanian *+-#*+7 1%74$ Bisho)s also com)lain not enou!h schools, 9ualified teachers "Gundanian 1%74, *+&$. Social )ro!rams: Cann )rovides data su!!estin! increases in admitted students and teachers in n!ola "*6$, ,uinea "'6$, and /o=am1i9ue "1.&6$. "Cann 1%%7, 147$ rmy )layed Aey role, 1uildin! schools, 1ecame teachers if necessary. "Cann 1%%7 ,14&$ >n health, ;ortu!uese ado)ted F@> standards for )ro)er health care re!ardin! num1ers of )rofessionals . )o)ulation, military 1ecame )rime im)lementer. "(1id., 14%$ /ilitary ?orAed to ensure doctors.nurses.hos)itals ?ere availa1le to meet standards. "(1id., 1*0$. But military had to fill in a massive !a) since not enou!h teachers ?ere availa1le. ll these su!!est a mi6ed a))roach to?ard develo)ment. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 ;ortu!al al?ays sou!ht to )it tri1es a!ainst each other, su!!ested 235<(/> ?as dominated 1y the /aAonde tri1e and an enemy of the /aAua tri1e., all in Ca1o 8el!ado "/unslo? 1%&+, 1'1$. (n Niassa, ;ortu!uese )it the ;ao and NyanEa, the latter ?as 235<(/> "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 10'$. (n aldeamentos, local chiefs are mo1ili=ed to raise a 10#1' man militia, su)ervised 1y the army 1ut )aid 1y administration "/unslo? 1%&+, 1''$. But over lon!#term, the ;ortu!uese fail to develo) a Imoderate /o=am1ican constituencyK "@endriAsen 1%&+, 47$, limited efforts to include fricans in the colonial state 1ut are never serious "@endriAsen 1%&+, 10&$. No )ro!rams to train local leaders and youth to lead local !overnment "@endriAsen 1%&+, 10%$. (N the last )hase, ;ortu!uese do su))ort the emer!ence of the 6ru*o 4nido de -oBam(i7ue, ?hich advocated for continued ties to metro)ole, 1ut this is too little and too late to affect ?ar. "@endriAsen 1%&+, 110$. *eferences (saacman, llen and Bar1ara (saacman, 1%&+. -oBam(i7ue) 9rom Colonialism to $evolution, 1900 C 198 . Boulder, C>: Fesvie? ;ress. @enriAsen, Thomas @. 1%&+. $evolution and Counterrevolution) -oBam(i7ue0s War of #nde*endence, 198;-19>;. Fest)ort, CT: ,reen?ood ;ress. Cann (((, Gohn ;. 1%%7. Counterinsurgenc% in Africa) The +ortuguese Wa% of War, 1981-19>;. Fest)ort, CT: ;rae!er. /unslo?, Barry. 1%&+. -oBam(i7ue) the $evolution and its :rigins. <ondon: <on!man. Gundanian, Brendan 2. 1%74. I3esettlement ;ro!rams: Counterinsur!ency in /o=am1i9ue.K Com*arative +olitics.
A . /assacres a(sent"0 Ciolence used a!ainst civilians, 1ut no evidence of mass Aillin!s or massacres. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 ;olice tortured ca)tured insur!ents, res)onsi1le for C>(N from 1%--#1%74 "3ichard '007, 10$. Then South frican 8efence 2orces 1ecome involved. /istreatment of )risoners and civilians continues 1y S 82 )ost#1%74 "(1id., 14$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 No evidence of resettlement. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 No evidence of amnesty.ne!otiations. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present" S 82 does em)loy civic action )ro!rams su))lyin! )u1lic !oods, indicatin! )rovision of develo)ment assistance, social services "(1id., 14$. 2 . 4ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0 No evidence of elite relationshi)s. *eferences Baines, ,ary. '007. IBreaAin! 3anA: Secrets, Silences and Stories of South fricaOs Border Far.K ,rahamsto?n: 3hodes Bniversity. 8ale, 3ichard. 1%%+. I/eldin! Far and ;olitics in Nami1ia: South fricaOs Counterinsur!ency Cam)ai!n, 1%--#1%&%.K Armed 9orces and "ociet%. '0"1$: 7#'4.
Ne)alese re!ime as )art of counterinsur!ency strate!y. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 state did try to co#o)t local )atrons.elites 1y )rotectin! their o?n economic interests "Goshi '01+$. But the Ne)alese re!ime !radually alienated most se!ments of the )o)ulation ?ith violence as /aoists rose in )o?er, eventually forcin! dissolution of the monarchy. No relationshi)s )resent or sustained. *eferences Norris, Gohn. '011. I@o? not to Fa!e a Counter#(nsur!ency: Ne)al, the /aoists, and @uman 3i!hts.K =uman $ights Bulletin, 11"'$: 1+#1*. Goshi, /adhav. '01+. I<ivelihood Co)in! /echanisms, <ocal (ntelli!ence, and the ;attern of Ciolence 8urin! the /aoist (nsur!ency in Ne)al.K Terrorism and +olitical /iolence '*"*$: &'0# &+%. Bhattacharya, Sro1ana. '01+. IStrate!ic (nteraction Bet?een 3e1els and the State: the /aoist Conflict in Ne)al.K "tudies in Conflict and Terrorism +-"7$: *7+#*&7. Study of
*eferences Close, 8avid. 1%&%. I3es)ondin! to <o? (ntensity Conflict: Counterinsur!ency in Nicara!ua.K ;resented to the RC Con!ress of the <atin merican Studies ssociation, San Guan, ;uerto 3ico. BlaAe, Samuel F. 1%%'. ITotalitarianism in Sandinista Nicara!ua.K "tudies in Conflict and Terrorism. 1*: '01#''+. Fest, F. ,ordon. 1%%'. IThe Sandinista 3ecord on @uman 3i!hts in Nicara!ua.K .roit et "ociete. '': +%+#40&.
Feathers, Bynum, 5. 1%&+. I,uerrilla Farfare in Nicara!ua,K ir Bniversity 8ocumentary 3esearch Study. /ont!omery, <: /a6?ell ir 2orce Base, BS ir 2orce. Seli!son, /itchell . and Cincent /c5lhinny. 1%%-. I<o?#(ntensity Farfare, @i!h#(ntensity 8eath: the 8emo!ra)hic (m)act of the Fars in 5l Salvador and Nicara!ua.K Canadian !ournal of &atin American and Cari((ean "tudies '1: '11#'41.
- ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 ;N, did use e6traEudicial murder and torture on sus)ected mem1ers of Bou!ainville re1ellion, as ?ell as se6ual assaults of ?ea)on in Lcare centersH "<asslett '01', 714$. C ! *esettlement present"0 ;N, forces drove civilians from conflict areas and held them in Lcare centersH, ?hich nominally ?ere created to )rovide them ?ith 1asic !ood 1ut functioned as concentration cam)s "<asslett '01', 714$. , ! Amnesty3+egotations0 present"0 )eace a!reement si!ned in '001 relyin! on local reconciliation traditions E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 ;N, !overnment ?ithheld food deliveries to Bou!ainville instead "<asslett '01'$, it did initiate the Bou!ainville 8evelo)ment ;acAa!e in 1%&%, )rovidin! 747,000 )er lando?ner to com)ensate for )ast creation of a co))er mine ?hich adversely affected the )o)ulation "Smith 1%%1$. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 althou!h some civilians are )ro#!overnment and form Bou!ainville 3esistance 2orce to counter re1els, no evidence of any leadershi) from s)ecific )re# e6istin! social !rou)s. *eferences <asslett, 7ristian. '01'. IState Crime 1y ;ro6y: ustralia and the Bou!ainville Conflict.K British !ournal of Criminolog%. *': 70*#7'+. Carl, ndy and Sr. <orriane ,arasu. '00'. Weaving Consensus) The +a*ua 'e2 6uinea C Bougainville *eace *rocess. <ondon: Conciliation 3esources. 7err, 7atherine S. '000. I;a)ua Ne? ,uinea in 1%%%: Ste))in! BacA from the BrinA.K Asian "urve%. 40"1$: -1#--.
+7 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella
A ! /assacres a(sent"0 massacre of )rotesters 1y Civilian @ome 8efense Cor)s unit does ha))en in 5scalante in 1%&*, 1ut they are tried for murder. Nonetheless, !overnment retains C@8Cs "van der 7roef 1%&-$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 ;hili))ine forces, es)ecially the /ilitary ;olice Command, a1sued villa!ers, intimidation and harassment, 1eatin!s ?ere common. /any )olitical o))onents ?ere summarily e6ecuted individually. ;aramilitary forces and !an!s allied ?ith re!ular military and )olice en!a!ed in re!ular e6traEudicial murder, e6tortion, and intimidation "van der 7roef 1%&-$ C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 No evidence of resettlement of civilians in ne? locations to ena1le se)aration from insur!ents. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Ne!otiations occur throu!hout the late 1%&0s and early 1%%0s, includin! the )ros)ect of su1stantial autonomy for /uslim areas. <eads to a!reement in 1%%- 1et?een /N<2 and !ovOt leadin! to creation of /uslim /indanao utonomous re!ion 1ut not /(<2 ?hich continues armed o))osition, althou!h !ovOt doesnOt 1other them if they do not launch attacAs. E !,evelopment Assistance present"0 rmy does initiate develo)ment )ro!rams, 1uildin! roads, im)rovin! /indinaoOs air)ort, 1uildin! mos9ues for /uslims, construction of schools, health facilities, su))ort for rural electric service. 2 ! Elite *elationships a(sent"0 after si!nin! )eace treaty, leader of /N<2, Nur /isuari, 1ecomes head of the Southern ;hili))ines Council for ;eace and 8evelo)ment, re!ional !overnor. @o?ever, ( consider this after the end of the conflict, so this is a1sent. *eferences Sales, ;eter /. '00%. IState terror in the ;hili))ines: the lston 3e)ort, human ri!hts and counter#insur!ency under the rroyo administration.K Contem*orar% +olitics 1*"+$: +'1#++-. Cline, <a?rence. '007. IThe (slamic insur!ency in the ;hili))ines.K "mall Wars and #nsurgencies 11"+$: 11*#1+&. Can der 7roef, G. /. 1%&-. ;rivate rmies and 56traEudicial Ciolence in the ;hili))ines. Asian Affairs) An American $evie2 1+"4$: 1#'1. Islam, Syed Serajul. 1998. The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines. Asian Survey 38(5): 441-456.
Bertrand, Gac9ues. '000. I;eace and Conflict in the Southern ;hili))ines: Fhy the 1%%- ;eace !reement is 2ra!ile.K +acific Affairs 7+"1$: +7#*4.
5vans, /artin. '00'. INi )ai6 ni !uerre: the )olitical economy of lo?#level conflict in Casamance.K @;, BacA!round ;a)er. <ondon: 7in!s Colle!e <ondon. htt):..ds)ace.ci!ili1rary.or!.Es)ui.1itstream.1'+4*-7&%.''-70.1.NiT'0)ai6T'0niT'0!uerre T'0theT'0)oliticalT'0economyT'0ofT'0lo?T'0levelT'0conflictT'0inT'0the T'0Casamance.)dfQ1, last accessed 2e1ruary '+, '014.
8in;) *A+, $ ongoing :8ar ends in 5=1=;" A-C,ef A . /assacres present"0 ,overnment forces shelled densely )o)ulated areas in Northern Sri <anAa durin! the last months of the conflict in '00%. Tar!ets included hos)itals. /unitions included cluster 1om1s, ?hite )hos)horous. Civilians had 1urn marAs from )hos)horous and na)alm. "Shahne?a= '010, -#7$. <ar!e civilian massacres have 1een common thorou!hout the ?ar, includin! *+ Tamil detaintees at FeliAade ;rison and -0 civilians in Gaffna in Guly 1%&+, 70 at a church in )ril 1%&4 in Gaffna, 100 Tamil civilians at (ra)eriyaAulam army cam) and 100 Tamil civilians at /annar, 1oth in 8ec 1%&4. ttacAs common e6ce)t for 1%&-#1%&%, 1ut lar!e massacres a!ain in 1%&% and 1%%0 of Tamils "(1id., 7#&$. 2e?er attacAs in mid#%0s, cou)le in late#%0s, mid#'00s, and then the final assault ?ith massive num1ers of civilians, in 10s thousands "(1id., &#%$. B - Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, torture, and summary execution have been common throughout the conflict. Intimidation occurred through arbitrary arrest, and disappearances of insurgents or civilians suspected of supporting the insurgency. From 19881994, at least 20,000 disappeared. (Shahnewaz 2010, 9) Extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, torture, forced recruitment and other human rights violations are persistent and widespread. (Ibid., 10) C Resettlement (present): Over 100,000 Tamils were displaced from the country post-1983, starting with a mass displacement at the outbreak of the conflict in 1983. Areas around Trincomalee have been depopulated of Tamils. Same happened to Manal aru Tamils in 1985, and in Vanni in 2009. COIN strategy appears to keep Tamil civilians out of some areas to prevent LTTE infiltration Sri Lankan military forces created internment camps called welfare centers in March 2008 for civilians fleeing conflicted areas, these were still used in late 2009 after the final offensive crushing the LTTE had ended despite mass overcrowding (Shahnewaz 2010, 7-8). D - Amnesty and Negotiations (present): Peace treaties and cease-fires were common thoroughout the conflict. The first led to the introduction of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 1987, but this collapsed in renewed violence in 1990, 1995, and 2002. However, In 2004, Colonel Karuna, commander of 6,000 troops, defected with his forces to the Sinhalese military. This greatly diminished LTTE forces and reduced recruitment in Sri Lankas Eastern Provinces, increasing its vulnerability. (Jalal 5-6, 2011). DeSilva says it was 3,000 troops that defected, and then 500-600 became govt troops (DeSilva 2010, 3). E - Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of the provision of development assistance to civilians. Instead, the origins of the conflict are due the denial of social services to Tamils. After the 2004-5 tsunami, aid was actually prevented from reaching civilians in LTTE areas. F - Elite Relationships (absent): None, this appears to be total war.
44 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella
References DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei. 2010. Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan Military's CounterInsurgency Operations. Strategic Analysis Paper, Future Directions International. Jalal, Malik Ahmad. 2011. Think Like a Guerrlla: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka. Harvard Law School National Security Journal. June: 1-10. Shahnewaz, Abdullah. 2010. Military Solution of Political Crisis in Sri Lanka: Questions to be Asked. Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs Working Paper. Smith, Neil. '010. IBnderstandin! Sri <anAaOs 8efeat of the Tamil Ti!ers.K !oint 9orce 5uarterl%. *%"4$: 40#44.
6,153 hamlets evacuated or destroyed by the military(Jongerden 2001, 80). Systematic cleansing and evaculation occurred after 1991, leading to 2664 villages emptied by July 1995 (McDowall 2000, 440). Civilians were expected to be resettled in village-towns, which were constructed along urban planning models but did not accommodate the agricultural/pastoral lifestyle of the Kurds. These were mostly rejected. (Jongerden 2001, 80-84). D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Turkish military adopts purely military approaches toward dealing with the PKK and never considers real political reforms of alleviate causes of the rebellion. Army was seen as the only means of suppressing the rebellion, and negotiations were never considered, but government of AKP announces a new Kurdish initiative in 2009, which presumes civilian negotiations not dominated by military influence (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 251-252). Government brings home exiled Kurds, restores Kurdish names of villages and cities, has amnesty for low-middle ranked PKK fights, allows for Kurdish language in education, campaigns. (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 252). E - Development Assistance (present): Military controlled all large constructed projects and military enterprises by 1990 employing 40,000, but no overall plan for implementation. MGK declares itself as lead agent for development in SE through the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), to bring hydroelectric power to the region but no consideration was given about how to connect it to the Kurdish peasant capacity (Morgado 2006, 56; McDowall 2000, 434). In the course of resettlement of displaced Kurds into village-towns, hospitals and clinics were constructed alongside new homes for civilians. However, few civilians returned to live in such village-towns and utilize the available social services. F - Elite Local Relationships (present): Following the initial PKK offensives, the government passed the Village Law in 1985 to organize militias in each Kurdish village in SE Turkey. These militias were organized against tribal clans led by elders, these tended to identify with the rightwing parties and were in conflict with PKK already. Also, aghas (local landowners) collected salaries for village guards and controlled distribution, took a cut of the pay. (McDowall 2000, 422). Aghas also had close relationships with security forces, these were used to obtain construction contracts to build things like police complexes and schools. References Bacik, Gokhan, and Bezen Balamir Coskun. 2011. The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey's Failure to Develop a Political Solution. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 34(3): 248-265. McDowall, David. 2000. A Modern History of the Kurds. New York: I.B. Tauris. Morgado, Andrew. 2006. Turkish Culture and its Influence on the Counterinusrgency Campaign Against the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Thesis manuscript, US Army Command and General Staff College. Leavenworth, KS: Department of Defense.
Jongerden, Joost. 2001. Resettlement and Reconstruction of Identity: The case of the Kurds in Turkey. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. 1(1): 80-86. Jongerden, Joost, Jacob van Etten, and Hugo de Vos. Forst burning as a counterinsurgency strategy in Eastern Turkey. Paper presented at the Kurdish Studies Conference, organized by the Kurdish Instite of Paris and Salahaddin University, Arbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, September 6 to September 9, 2006. Can Bruinessen, /artin. 1%%-. ITurAeyOs 8eath S9uards.K -iddle ,ast $e*ort. )ril#Gune: '0# '+.
A . /assacres present" 8urin! resettlement )ushes, B!andan military forces fired artillery at villa!ers and villa!es that did not leave their homes "Branch '00*, 2innstrUm '00&$. /any deaths follo? from such attacAs and other massacres, includin! 40 civilian deaths at NamoAora in 1%&- ">tunnu 1%%&, -$. B - Exemplary Force (present): Acholi were regularly harrassed intimidated by Ugandan forces, leading to human rights violations, tortured, extrajudicial murder (Branch 2005, Finnstrm 2008). C Resettlement (present) Ugandan military forced the Acholi to leave their homes for protection camps in late 1980s (Utunnu 1998, 6). In 2002, forces civilians into IDP camps, eventually leading to 95 percent of Acholi population becoming IDPs (Branch 2005). D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): LRA and Ugandan government engage in negotiations from 2006 2008, which end with LRA agreeing to leave Uganda for safe areas in the DRC, however, these are then attacked by Ugandan, the DRC, and South Sudan (Finnstrm 2008). E - Development Assistance (present): Ugandan government under Museveni initiates Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan in northern Uganda to provide new livelihoods and opportunities for reconstruction. This is widely supported and coordinated with bilateral and multilateral donors (Finnstrm 2008). F Elite Local Relationships (present): Acholi are incorporated into the Ugandan government, including as members of parliament. The lack of a political program by the LRA has driven many Acholi civilians and leaders into finding supportive arrangements with the government.
References Otunnu, Ogenga. 1998. The Path to Genocide in Northern Uganda. Refuge 17(3): 4-13. Branch, Adam. 2005. Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern: Uganda, 1986-1998, African Studies Quarterly 8(2): 1-31. 2innstrUm, SverAer. '00&. &iving 2ith Bad "urroundings) War, =istor%, and ,ver%da% -oments in 'orthern 4ganda. 8urham, NC: 8uAe Bniversity ;ress.
to Thompson's own work (1965), the Hamlet program was expanded too quickly by Diem's brother, which made each hamlet difficult to defend, poorly located, and failed to adequately develop them over time and spread successfully. D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Alongside Strategic Hamlets was an anmesty program called 'Open Arms', or Chieu Hoi, but it had a small budget, and money wasn't actively spent, but organized under ARVN. 11,000 communist defecting in 1963. But, South Vietnamese leadership never expressed any interest, only draining enemy manpower, didn't see the political potential of the program. (Hunt 1991, 24) not interested in sharing power, including former enemies into political system. E - Development Assistance (present): US policy-makers conceived of development as a tool to use in COIN and drive forward the modernization of South Vietnam (Latham 2006). In 1966, Westmoreland adopts pacification, creates Office of Civil Operations (OCO) led by Dep. Amb. William Porter, unties all civilian agencies under one chain of command but still doesn't include military (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13). Komer pushes for a single manager, and CORDS is created in May 1967 with Westmoreland as commander with three deputies (Andrade et. al. 2006, 14). Integration of development and military operations occurs with AB 143, combined campaign plan for 1968 (Hunt 1991, 101). But, SVN didn't integrate with new Ministry of Revolutionary Development and CORDS advisers, and Ministry of RD never has any capacity to implement to address development priorities or implement US-provided aid programs (Hunt 1991, 103). Lack of ownership of development and state building initiatives by SVN. But, US creates more destruction than development: The alleviation of social and political dislocations which were the inevitable result of military operations in populated areas was impossible (Cable 1991, 130).
F - Elite Local Relationships (absent): From 1961 to 1962, Special Forces and CIA do close pop-centric COIN in Buon Enao, two hundred villages participating in (Krepenevitch 1986, 7071). Army takes over from CIA in April 1962, Gens. Rosson and Yarborough reform Special Forces program. New Army-led Special Forces execute Operation Switchback in 1962 for offensive operations against VC, no longer building local militias (Krepenevitch 1986,72)Elite relationships are also hard to form after Diem's coup in the political instability following it. Each time a new ruler came into power, adminstrative turnover was the result as they promoted their own loyaltists (Ibid., 37). Over time, no experience could develop among SVN pacification cadres. References Cable, Larry. 1991. Unholy Grail: The US and the wars in Vietnam, 1965-8. New York: Routledge.
*0 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella
Hunt, Richard A. 1991. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Kocher, Matthew Adam; Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, 2011. Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War, American Journal of Political Science. Latham, Michael E., 2006. Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the failure of nationbuilding in South Vietnam. Third World Quarterly. 27(1): 27-46. Krepenevitch, Andrew F. 1986. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Turse, NicA. '01+. 1ill An%thing That -oves) The $eal American War in /ietnam. Ne? YorA: /etro)olitan BooAs.
8e Boer, /arno. '011. I3hodesiaOs ))roach to Counterinsur!ency: -ilitar%-$evie2 Novem1er#8ecem1er '011, +*#4*.