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Labor Relations Cases
CASES NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITER Reformist Union of RB Liner Inc. vs. NLRC - 266 scra 713
The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement binding upon the private respondents, for compulsory arbitration has been defined both as the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. [24] Clearly then, the legality of the strike could no longer be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter, much less by the NLRC, as this had already been resolved. Definition of compulsory arbitration Art. 227. Compromise agreements. Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non- compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or coercion. The water district is a government agency
Davao City Water Distric vs. CSC 201 scra 593 Zamoras vs Su 184 scra 248
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners are declared "governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charter" which fall under the jurisdiction of the public respondents CSC and COA. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between landlord and tenant . The element of personal cultivation of the land, or with the aid of his farm household, essential in establishing a landlord-tenant or a lessor-lessee relationship, is absent in the relationship between Su and Zamoras, for Zamoras did not cultivate any part of Su's plantation either by himself or with the help of his household. On the other hand, the following circumstances are indicative of an employer-employee relationship between them: 1. Zamoras was selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut plantation. 2. His duties were specified by Su. 3. Su controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He determined to whom Zamoras should sell the copra produced from the plantation. 4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of the copra sales every two months as compensation for managing the plantation.
Tenancy
It is of no moment that Vailoces, in his amended complaint, seeks other reliefs which would seemingly fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, because a closer look at these underpayment of salary and nonpayment of living allowance shows that they are actually part of the perquisites of his elective position, hence, intimately linked with his relations with the corporation. The question of remuneration, involving as it does, a person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a
Notes
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam . . . .
Considering the character of its purposes and its functions, the statutory designation of the BSP as "a public corporation" and the substantial participation of the Government in the selection of members of the National Executive Board of the BSP, the BSP, as presently constituted under its charter, is a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX. (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution. In view of the foregoing, we hold that both the Labor Arbiter and public respondent NLRC had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed.
The Court, therefore, rules that under the contract invoked by him, Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but a commission agent, an independent contractor whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an ordinary civil action. The Labor Arbiter erred in taking cognizance of, and adjudicating, said claim, being without jurisdiction to do so, as did the respondent NLRC in affirming the Arbiter's decision. This conclusion renders it unnecessary and premature to consider Basiao's claim for commissions on its merits. The case, the subject of which is an intra-union dispute, fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and respondent Labor Arbiter and NLRC have no jurisdiction over said cases. Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or intra-union conflicts.
No EER NO jurisdiction
Internal Union Dispute" includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code (Book V, Rule I, Section l(a), Omnibus Rules Implementing The Labor Code).
The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the complaint and the relations of the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in fact could have arisen independently of an employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging is that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint which the Municipal Trial Court said was intended "to harass the poor employees" and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor "for lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the respondents herein have committed the crime imputed against them." This is a matter which the labor arbiter has
The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola bottles.
Notes
The labor commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed by petitioner. Her cause did not arise from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi delict or tort. Further, there is no reasonable causal connection between her suit for damages and her claim under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code, which allows an award of damages incident to an employeremployee relation. No jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form or worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with which attached religious significance. However, in this case, petitioner was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation. With this clear mandate, the SDA cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of the doctrine of separation of church and state to avoid its responsibilities as an employer under the Labor Code. Finally, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. It is already too late in the day for private respondents to question the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter since the SDA had fully participated in the trials and hearings of the case from start to finish.
Notes
Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes. A possible exception is provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code, which provides thatThe Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance Machinery or Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF A REINSTATEMENT ORDER Pioneer Texturizing Corp vs NLRC -280 scra 479
Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and executory. It can not relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Article 223 contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor. 32 In ruling that an order or award for reinstatement does not require a writ of execution the Court is simply adhering and giving meaning to this rule. Henceforth, we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is selfexecutory. After receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the employee's reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the employee of his choice. The notification is based on practical considerations for without notice, the employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for work or not.
Notes
Both the labor arbiter and the NLRC found for private respondent primarily because of the fact that petitioners were guilty of misrepresentation by their failure to disclose to the ALPI employees the real nature of the negotiations and transaction between Wyeth and ALPI. The Court is bound by this finding of fact there being no showing that neither the arbiter nor the NLRC gravely abused their discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of the same (Ilas v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 682 [1991]). Indeed, Santos resigned because of the uncertainty as to the future of ALPI. Like the other employees, he was made to believe that the deal between the two companies was merely a merger but it really was a projected buy-out. While "dire necessity" as a reason for signing a quitclaim is not acceptable reason to set aside the quitclaim in the absence of a showing that the employee had been forced to execute it, such reason gains importance if the consideration for the quitclaim is unconscionably low and the employee has been tricked into accepting it (Veloso v. DOLE, 200 SCRA 201 [1991]).
Respondents' non-disclosure of the true facts of the transaction between the two companies was a "material misrepresentation", which, had it not been timely discovered, would have resulted in the "serious economic dislocation" of many of ALPI's employees (p. 24, Rollo). She added: "Moreover, even the mere impending `merger' with no definite security as to the status of one's employment will certainly cause anxiety and worry especially during these times where the rate of unemployment is soaring and the means of survival is becoming extremely difficult everyday.
An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. In the opinion of August 14, 1981 of the Solicitor General he correctly opined that employees of cooperatives who are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves co-owners of the cooperative.
Conflict of interest However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country.
One bargaining unit The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interests. This is so because "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights." (Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu
In the case at bar, petitioner alleges that the employer MALDECO was composed of two bargaining units, the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the Logging Division, in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan Norte, about 80 kilometers distant from each other and in fact, had then two separate CBA's, one for the Sawmill Division and another for the Logging Division, both the petition and decision referred only to one bargaining unit;
Notes
that from 1979 to 1985, the Ministry of Labor and Employment recognized the existence of two (2) separate bargaining units at MALDECO, one for its Logging Division and another for its Sawmill Division. Significantly, out of two hundred and one (201) employees of MALDECO, one hundred seventy five (175) consented and supported the petition for certification election, thereby confirming their desire for one bargaining representative (Rollo, p. 104).:nad Moreover, while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered.
Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the member a right to vote during the annual meeting becomes too trivial and insubstantial vis-a-vis the primordial and more important constitutional right of an employee to join a union of his choice. Besides, the 390 employees of CENECO, some of whom have never been members of the cooperative, represent a very small percentage of the cooperative's total membership of 44,000. It is inconceivable how the withdrawal of a negligible number of members could adversely affect the business concerns and operations of CENECO. Under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory employees, the Secretary of Labor must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to security guards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor organization, whether rank and file or supervisory, in recognition of their constitutional right to self-organization. We are aware however of possible consequences in the implementation of the law in allowing security personnel to join labor unions within the company they serve. The law is apt to produce divided loyalties in the faithful performance of their duties. Economic reasons would present the employees concerned with the temptation to subordinate their duties to the allegiance they owe the union of which they are members, aware as they are that it is usually union action that obtains for them increased pecuniary benefits.
They should however create separate unions for security guards alone. Because if not, in the event of a strike declared by their union, security personnel may neglect or outrightly abandon their duties, such as protection of property of their employer and the persons of its officials and employees, the control of access to the employer's premises, and the maintenance of order in the event of emergencies and untoward incidents.
CASES on CBA Union of Nestle Workers CDO Factory (UNWCF) vs Nestle Phil
Respondent Nestles Drug Abuse Policy states that (i)llegal drugs and use of regulated drugs beyond the medically prescribed limits are prohibited in the workplace. Illegal drug use puts at risk the integrity of Nestle operations and the safety of our products. It is detrimental to the health, safety and work-performance of employees and is harmful to the welfare of families and the surrounding community.[6] This pronouncement is a guiding principle adopted by Nestle to safeguard its employees welfare and ensure their efficiency and well being. To our minds, this is a company personnel policy. Considering that the Drug Abuse Policy is a company
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies x x
Notes
x. (Emphasis supplied)
In Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,13 we found that petitioner therein, Sweden Ice Cream Plant, refused to submit any counter proposal to the CBA proposed by its employees certified bargaining agent. We ruled that the former had thereby lost its right to bargain the terms and conditions of the CBA. Thus, we did not hesitate to impose on the erring company the CBA proposed by its employees union - lock, stock and barrel. Our findings in Kiok Loy are similar to the facts in the present case, to wit: petitioner Companys approach and attitude stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union much less justify its objection thereto.
In the case at bar, the CBA negotiation between petitioner and respondent union failed notwithstanding the intervention of the NCMB. Respondent union went on strike for eleven days and blocked the ingress to and egress from petitioners two work plants. The labor dispute had to be referred to the Secretary of Labor and Employment because neither of the parties was willing to compromise their respective positions regarding the four remaining items which stood unresolved. While we do not fault any one party for the failure of the negotiations, it is apparent that there was no more goodwill between the parties and that the CBA was clearly not signed through their mutual efforts alone. Hence, the payment of the signing bonus is no longer justified and to order such payment would be unfair and unreasonable for petitioner. Furthermore, we have consistently ruled that a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation.[14] True, it may nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations as when the giving of such bonus has been the companys long and regular practice.[15] To be considered a regular practice, however, the giving of the bonus should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.[16] The test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not covered by the law requiring payment thereof.[17] Respondent does not contest the fact that petitioner initially offered a signing bonus only during the previous CBA negotiation. Previous to that, there is no evidence on record that petitioner ever offered the same or that the parties included a signing bonus among the items to be resolved in the CBA negotiation. Hence, the giving of such bonus cannot be deemed as an established practice considering that the same was given only once, that is,
A signing bonus is justified by and is the consideration paid for the goodwill that existed in the negotiations that culminated in the signing of a CBA.
Notes
Anent the issue of whether or not the term of an existing CB, particularly as to its economic provisions, can be extended beyond the period stipulated therein, and even beyond the three-year period prescribed by law, in the absence of a new agreement, Article 253 of the Labor Code explicitly provides: Art. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
NEFATCO vs NLRC