The Mahayana Treatment of the Viparyasas

By Edward Conze
(London)
The theory of the uperverted views" (viparyasa) is fundanu'nlal to
Buddhism. Its purpose is to make the concept of ignorance, \\hi<h is the
root evil, amenable to meditation
.
It states that it is a mistake to seek
1. permanence in what is essentially impermanent, 2. case in "hat is
inseparable from sufering, 3. selfhood in what is not linked to dny s
elf,
and 4. delight in what is essentially repulsive, unlovely and disgusting.
The Hnayina viewl has been well summed up by Candrakirti \vhen he
says1:
uTpe frst perversion consists in seizing upon the fve skandhas
as perm
a
-
nent, when in fact they are impermanent and perish every instant.
"Inevitably the impermanent oppresses 3;
And what oppresss gives no ease.
Terefore whatever has no permanence
That also must be seen as ill".
For this reason whatever is impermanent is ill,-and all composite things
are impermanent. In consequence the second perversion consists in that
the fve skandhas, whic are essentially ill, are seized upon as at ease
( sukham). Furthermore:
"At the start a mixture of sperms and of blood;
Urine and faeces as long as it grows;
I its essence a foul heap of flth;
What mad desire attracts you towards it?
What is the pleasure of lying on the belly of a woman,
Wo is nothing but a mass of flth
Covered with a skin whic moisture permeates 1"
In fact, this body is in its whole self and always essentially" repulsiv
e.
e thi
.
rd perversion consists in being so deluded as to seize upon it
as
oethlng lovely, and to feel an inclination (abhinivesa) for it
.
Finallyg the fve skandhas are devoid of a self empty of the own-being
of a self, because their attributes do not confo;m to those that must
be
;i
e
:
d
of a
'
se
lf. For the skandhas are
u
nstable and doomed to
rise a
n
d
e fourth perersion cons
ists in seizing upon them
a
s one s own
self
1 Explaied
d
.
3
1
8. Rep
rin
t
e
d : 11 my
ar
t
i
cl
e in
East and West vi
i
4, 1957, pp. 31
3
-
P!
a
!annap
a
da
XI
II 460
e
1
t
XI
I
3, 1
9
5
1
g pp. 91-.
8 P'a, gnod 'tour t'
'
'
.
&
1959
,
p. 1
90
.

e
n s
ee
J
.
MAY, Candrakirtl, Prasannapad
iMadhyamaka
vrt
t
i,
4 lit t . m 1 s own-being (t); see p
age
3
9
.
34
`
and feeling an inclination for them; one settles down i that whic is not
one's self as if it were one's own self.
These are the four perverted views, whic are the root-cause of mental
confusion (sammoha)."
Continuig the Hnayanistic trend of thoughts, the Mahiyaa makes six
innovations: 1. it adds a ffth vlparyasa, "the realistic error", whic is
regarded as more fundamental than the other four; 2. in oter words, it
maintains that any form of discrimination is equivalent to an itellectual
perersion; 3. it claims that, like everthing else, the perverted iews, as
well as their objects, have no real existence, 4. repudiates the distinction
between conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, on whid the Hmayaa
theory of the viparylsas was based, 5. distingishes several stages in the
rejection of the perverted views, and 6. believes that only a Bodhisattva,
steeped in perfect wisdom, can completely overcome them. Te Mahayana
teacings about "perverted views" are scattered through a nuber of trea
tises, and it may be of some value to combine the various incidental hints
given to us into one single more or less coherent account.
1. The realistic error: "All dharmas have arisen (samutthlta) from the
perverted views, they are unreal, non-existent, wong and false. As long
as he courses in any dharma whatsoever (conceived as an objective reality),
t
he
Bodhisa ttva courses in perverted vews, and not in that whim is real" e.
Candrakirti 7 points out that it is a mere viparyasa if the six kinds of objects
are apprehended as real, although in fact they are "merely imagined and
devoid of ow-being", and the error is of the same kind as if one were to
ascribe reality to a mirage or a dream. Jacques MAY8 lists a number of
instances where the asad-viparyisa is mentioned in Mahiyana works. A
commentary to the MahayinasCgraha
9
explains that te imaginary car
acter of the world as it appears lies in that though viparasa it gives the
impression of being an object when in fact it is not. Te falsehood of this
view is illustrated by the well-known simile of the traveller who imagines
that the water in a mirage is real water, when it is not. In its discussion
of viparyasa the Likivatlra Sutra
20
says that "if holy men wit regard to
this world whim is but a whirl of confusion and error (bhrantl) for the
Mahiyina documents often take the four vlparyasas just for grated, e. g.
Ugr
adattapariprccii in Sllfisamuccaya 198, 11-13 Dhylyltamufllsftra in Pras.
XVI
29
6; Sataahasriki Prajiiparamlti 418
~
Paicavilsatt 118; A1tasaharlki
XX
371
~
Satasihasriki XLIV 108 " Paicaviqsatl fol. 404 sq., A11asihasrlkiVI 139;
Nagarjuna, Le traite deJa grande vertu de sagesse, 11, 1949, p. 10?6. -Likewise
the
y
continually refer to the corresponding three mark, although they often
subJect them to a radical re-interpretation, as in Vlmalakirtinlrdesa e. 3 where
Vimalakirti says to Mahikityiyana: "Ultimately all the elements neither arise
nor cease l this is the meaning of impermanence. The fve grasping skandhas are
empty through and through, ad do not spring from anything: this is the meaning
of suffering. There is no duality of self and no-selfr this is the meaning of no-self"
(p
. 19 of R. RoBINSoN's typed translation (1953); cf. also p. 3
5 ibd.
8 Suvikrintavlkromiparipfcca 64 b65 a
.
.
1 Pra. XXIII 45'-.
8 p. 166 n. 519.
9 B. LAMOTE,
II 1, 1938, p. 90.
35
notion that 'there is something', then their notion of te object (vaslu} of
holy cognition is not the correct one: To say that 'there is something is the
prattling of fools and not the talk of holy men". Or the Suvikrantavikrimi
pariprccha 1: "Forming with regard to something unreal the notion that
it is real, they are seized by the perverted views, and it is hard to set them
free; in this way all the foolish common people err about, not associated
with anything, .not dissociated

from anything, and yet tied with bonds".

In its discussion of the dedication of merit to the enlightenment of all beings
the Atasihasriki 12 states that it would be a case of perverted perception,
thought and views 13 if one were "to treat as an objective support 24 or a
sign 15 an entity or object which does not exist". One would be as guilty of
perversion as a person who, under the infuence of greed, hate or delusion,
would discriminate
1
6 a non-existent entity and ponder on it, - thinking
that there is permanence in the impermanent, etc." Perversion can be
avoided only if one does not perceive the thought whic makes the dedica
tion, and does not identify it as 'this is that thought'
11,
and if one realizes
that the dharmas qedicated to enlightenment are all "extinct, stopped,
departed and rever

sed, and that Buddhahood, the dharma to which they

are dedicated, can never be extinguished
1
8
B
ut if a person should perceive
signs and make discriminations, then he would be "one who perceives the
truly real in that whic is not truly real as if it were truly real" 19 As fnally
another Sitrato puts it: If someone "falls in love" with the phantom of a
woman created by a conjurerg he may well try to purge his mind of greed by
refecting on that non-existent woman as impure,. imperanent, etc. On the
whole his activities are rather futile, and so are those of the Hnayanists who
strenuously think of dharmas as impermanent, etc., when in fact they are
unproduced
2t
and unborn. They surely labour under a delusion. The man
in question produces the notion of a woman with regard to what is nt
a woman, and he imagines something whid is not real". What he does IS
to superimpose a fction on something whic does not exist22
2. Furthermore, any kind of discrimination is regarded as a perversi
.
on,
and so is any afirmation or negation 23, any assumption of separate reabty.

pp .

106-7
.
u VII 98 b-99 a.
t2 A
VI 139.
.
.
Abhl -1 k- p 333
These
t
hree kinds of viparyisa are defned 1n smaya an ara
u lramb(ikuryit; H(arib
had
r
a} p. 333, make the special marks 1nto a rang
of observation.
.
1 k
. 1s nimlttikuryit; H. 333, by defning their genera mar s.
J9
vikalpya adhyaropya H 334.
n
A
VI 142.
ts
A
VI 149 and H 348.
te
A
V115t. .
20
quoted Pras. XXIII
463h t of a moot poit
w
hether an uproduced dhara is
2
1 It seems t b
e so
me
w
t
a
The
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
e
d
reade
r m
a
y compare pag
es 2
1
8
a
nd
peranent or 1peranen.
205 of the Lankavatcua.
1 5

645
2
2
asat-samdropa. ee. !
k

_
May
fa vi
n
paryaa-arthenety anadhyaropanapavOda-
23
MadhyintavlbhagatJ a P

arthena B @ vlparyiso hl vikalpa.
36
.
;
Sucness alone lies outside the range of perverted kowledgeu. To seie
o nything as existent or non-existent, on any kind of mutiplicity (vici
trJta}, that is "perersion"; in fact, perversion is te automatic result of
assuming multiplicity of ay kind u. e ver belief in separate dhara is
due to a perversion of perception

28
A
ny kind of duais as sum is peri
cious, a sign of fall from grace, and any kind of division 1 is alien to te
Dharma. For, as a Sutra has it 2: "Te dharc nature of te Tatigata has
not been brou
g
ht forth from duality
sa
. Terefore those who course in duality
do not make ri
g
ht eforts, but their eforts are all wrong". Intent, as so often,
on mystifcation the Large Prajiaparaiti conveys the same message in a
series of pronouncements whic have at least the merit of showing te
manifold meanings of whic the word prapatca so is capable s1 There the
attribution of permanence and impermanence, etc., to the skadas is de
scribed a somethig whic delays (prapaica) the Bodhisatta, and whic
should therefore be avoided. In a genuine. reunion (abhisamaya) the multi
plicities (prapaica) of existence and non-existence no longer exist, and
re-union takes place when these obstacles to spiritual progress (prapaica)
are absent. Intent on that whic is free from discursive ideas (aprapaicyo
niprapaicyo), one should therefore not cause any delay (aprapalcyan na
prapaicayali) by thinking that carmas are peraent or impermanent, etc.
"For own-being causes no delay (prapaicayati) to own-being, nor non-exist
ence to non-existence. But apart from own-being and non-existence one
could not apprehend ay other dharma whic mi
g
ht cause delay, or whereby
or wherein one might be delayed

All danas, in fact, are free fom all

multiplicity (niprapa:cya), because tey have no ow-being.
3. Since discrimination is the basic error, the recognition ofte perverted
views" as perversions cannot be regarded as tre knowledge having ultiate
validity: for they make a distinction between permanence and impera .
nence, ease and ill, self and not-self, te lovely and the repulsive. The
position has been stated with some clarity in the Suvikrintavikrimlpari
PTCci32: "All dharma have arisen from (-sautthita) perverted vews. But
a perverted vew is not associated wit, or dissociated from, anytig;
because with regard to it no objectively existing entity (vastu), or even its
possibility (sambhava) can be appreheded. For a pererted view is u

eal,
ibd
. it is said about tathati: vlkaipa-anilambanatvin na vlparyaavastu.
26
L
ankavatlra p. 219 v. 111. Similarly pp. 28
0-1, vv. 120-1_26.
.
28
S
addharmapuiarika XIII 218: samj:i-vlparasa-prldurbhuta.
prabheda, Pras. XXIII 463.
2 quoted in Pras. XXIII 463.
2 na dvaya-prabhivlta. See J. MY p. 194 ad E. CoNE, Va}raccedlkl, 195?,
pp. 98-9 for the shades of meaning.
.
8 Some years. ago I bad some corespon
dence about this ter w1th Prof.
Lessing, ad his manifest interest i the p
roblems ipvolved sems to me to
justify to some etent my offerig just this particular contnbution for his
Festscrllt. .
AlidasasihasrJka, Gilgit Ms, d. 69, f. 259 b-260 a, . Pafcavlmiatl- fol.
491-3. Te Abhlsamayilankira regards this passage as a d1scussion of the error
(vipratipatti} concernin
g the pererted views (V 8, 11).
32 VII 98b.
.
37
false, fraudulent in its nature, and vain. No dharma ( real entity) whic.
could be called 'perverted view' is therein apprehended. 'Perverted view'
that is an unfounded disquisition (vipratilambha) of beings, a teasing of
beings, the imagining of what is unreal on the part of beings, vain conceits,
vapourings, futile disc.oursings (prapaica) on the part of beings. Just as a
litUo dtild, when teased with an empty fst<
3
, forms the notion that there is
son1 cthi ng real in it: just so the foolish common people are teased by a
perverted view which has never been 3-, and in their delusion think to
themselves that this is real". "Wen perverted views have been cognized
as unreal, and also the fact that perverted views do not exist in perverted
views, then all dharmas have been fully understood as unperverted" 35.
4. The Hnayana theory of the viparyisas had been based on the assump
tion that the conditioned dharmas are actually impermanent, ill, etc., and
defnitely distinct from the Unconditioned, whic is actually permanent, etc.
The Mahayana, pursuing its own logic, naturally questioned this assumption.
In emptiness the distinction between the conditioned and the unconditioned
is . swallowed up. Nagarjuna points out that obviously "the impermanent
does not exist in the empty" 36, and Candrakirti s7 infers that "if imper
manence has no existence, how can a permanence, or an assumption of per
manence, whic contradicts it, constitute a perversion' '' Nagarjuna devotes
an entire capter38 to the subject, and his arguments, as interpreted by
Candrakirti, can be summed up as follows: Greed, hate and delusion, the
basic klesas, result from imaginations s
9 In greed we are attracted by what
is agreeable, falsely and by mere superimposition; in hate we are repelled
by what appears to be disagreeable, without suficient reason, arbitrarily and
by mere superimposition; the delusion results from the four perverted views
whic superimpose the attributes of permanence, ease, self and attractiveness
on the data of experience whic do not contain them. Since it is obviously
wrong to conceive the impermanent as permanent, one might well believe
that it is right to regard the impermanent as impermanent. In the Hnayana
this had indeed been the intention of this teaming. But it would be clearly
untrue to attribute impermanence, ill, etc. to emptiness, or to dharmas whic
are empty of own-being, or to dharmas of whic the own-being has never
been produced. Both permanence and impermanence are misconceptions
indicative of perersity 4o, "Since there is thus nothing that is not a perverted
view, in relation to what could a perversion be?" The implication here is that
correlative terms give sense only in relation to one aother, and that one
of the pair alone and by itself can neither exist nor be conceived. In oter
words, . in a universe where there is only perversion there can be no per-
ss see F. EoGERTON, Buddllst Hybrid Sanskrit Dictlonary, 1953, s. v. ulipaa
and rikta-mu!ti.
M The text

has uccedena, whic I do not understand.

ss
Suv. 66 b.

ae Madhyamlkakirlka XXIII 13. na-anitya1 vldyate .unye
Pras. p. 461..
as
i. e. dapter XXIII.
. ,

salkalpa = vitarka, Candrakirti, 'discursive reasonmg.

4o valparityam, Pras. XXIII 462.
38
version at all, at least by way of an attested fact. Some of Nigirjuas, or
perhaps Candrakirti's, arguments in support of this somewhat paradoxical
thesis seem to be invalidated by a number of eqivocations. The viparia
are sometimes treated as psycological attitudes, sometmes as logical pro
positions, and sometimes even as an ontological condition, wit te result
that it is hard to avoid the suspicion that a cerain amount of sophistry is
involved.
Nevertheless the conclusion, whatever may be the route that has led
to it, is quite sound, as can be seen when we consider one by one the four
dualities whic form the theme of the perverted vews.
In the case of the fourth viparyisa the fctitious nature of the opposition
between the "lovely" and the "repulsive" is quite obvious. Te elaborate
meditations on asubha, whic are so often recomended, are cl
e
arly no
more than the self-defence of celibate mons who resist the pressure exerted
on their libido. They do not, however, refect the factual existence of things,
their "ow-being", or their dharmic constitution. Te ofesiveness of
entrails is no more a ultimate fact tha the allure of swelling breasts seen
through silk in the sun.
As for the distinction between permanence and impermanence, the Maha
yanasa.graha
4
1 observes that on some occasions te Lord has pronouced
dharmas to be peranent 42, on other occasions be has described them as
impermanent
4
a, and on others again a neiter permanent nor impermanent.
Asaiga attempts to account for these divergences by the special categories
of the Yogacarins, whic do not concer us here. Te most extensive
Mahayana treatment of the problems pose.d by the relationship of perma
nence and impermanence is found in the Lankavatirasitra, although its dis
cussions are not always very clear. Pages 204210 discuss the question
whether the Buddha assigned impermanence to all worldly things when
he taught that "impermanent indeed are all composite things, doomed to
pass away once they have been produced". Te Buddha concludes his ex
position by saying44 that he is "neither for permanence nor for imperma
nence". It would, indeed, be futile to describe things as either peraent or
impermanent, because tere are no exteral existents, but merely one's own
mind; because a variety of marks is inacceptable; because all duality is the
result of that false discrimination whim begets and nourishes kara and
41 E. LAMOT, 11 1, p. 126.

e
.
g
. Lqnkavatara p. 116. Here the text seems corrpt _ and NANJio's ed

ion
offers a doice of no fewer th
an fve reading
s. Only the frst part seems fauly
certai,
H
b
e
cause the genesis of their marks is really a non-genesis". The second
either says that all dharmas are permanent because of their permanence (so Tib.),
or because of their impermanence (so the other documents). In
o
ther passages
s
ome
things are being called "peranent", but not
, as would appear fro
m
SuzuKI's
translation on p. 204 gold vajra ad the relics of the Buddha. They do not
. remain the same until the
'
end of time" but for a kalpa, and are instanced as
exceptons to the universality of momentriness, whic is the topic of pp. 24- .

9
e. g.
Laikivatira pp. 1151 .. because the genesis of their marks involves
Im
pe
ranence".
44 pp. 2089, tsl. Buddhst Texts, ed. E. CoN, 1954, no. 180.
3
11 its evil consequences; and because the three marks (i.e. impermanence,
111 and not-self) have issued from nothing but verbal discriminations.
The Larkavatira is very concerned to show that ultimate reality is neither
permanent nor impermanent, not only in the sense that both these marks are
merely absent and inapplicable, but in the sense that they are transcended.
1Thc Pennanent and Unthinkable" whic is ultimate reality and the "Suc
ness ,,hidl the Tathagatas have attained within themselves through their
holy(arra)cognition" is specifcally called "permanent, because it is like
space, Nirvaia and stopping 5 Here "permanent'' may, howeer, well
mean "non-impermanent", as suggested by the somewhat cryptic remarks
on pp. 60,13-61, 2 and 61,9-12. For in fact the Tathagata, '1Who has gone
beyond all idle reasonings (sarvaprapaica-atita)" is neither permanent nor
in1 permanent -6 Pages 217-19 explain why that should be so, and why in
fact the Tathagata is in a condition in whic he is positively not imperma
nent, and also not permanent in the usually accepted sense. "The triple
world, as distinct from the Tathagatas, originates from the discrimination
of unrealities. Where there is duality, there is permanence and imperma
nence, but fron1 non-duality [these two can] not [arise]. The isolated is
indeed non"dual, because all dharmas are marked with non-duality and
non-production. For that reason the Tathagatas are neither permanent nor
impennanen t. As long as there is verbal discrimination, so long there are
the faulty notions of permanence and impermanence+ Fools seize upon these
notions whic are impeded by the extinction of all those n1ental (or intellec
tual) processes which are based on discrimination, but not of those whic
arc based on the insight into (absol ute] solitude (or isolatedness)."
"Those who always see the Buddhas
As free fron1 both permanence and impermanenceg
And yet as brought forth from (prabhavita) these two,
They are not swayed by the fals views.
With either permanence or impermanence
Eforts made for enlightenment are bound to be futile.
Knowledge based on discrimination is worthless;
May thus all thought of permanence and impermanence be
impeded I"
Jll and ease are also both equally unreal. Nagarjuna devotes his 12t
chapter to sho,ving that "ill" is not real, partly because its production cannot
be explained, and partly because those who believe
.
to xprience t are as
unreal as the objective factors whic seem to occasion 1t. S1nce il11s about
as real as "the scent of fowers growing in the sky (khapupa)' , its

pparent
reality is indeed nothing but a delusion and a result of v1paryasa. The
irreality of sukha seemsg on the other hand, nt to have atrcted muc
comment, very largely because it is only too obv1ous to all th1nk1ng people
45 Pp. sg-1. On
'
p. 218 the same
,
is said of the "cognition whic marks his
attainment of re-union (abhisamaya) .
Pp. 189190.
40
. Lie'vise, both sell and not-sell are equally alien to true reality. Nigi .
JUna 7 states that in some places the Buddhas have spoken of a "self" 's,
at others they have taught a "not-self" 49, and in addition they have also
taugh that there is neither a self nor a not-self&o. Cadrairti
st
eplains
this aphorism convincingly by poiting out that the Buddhas are physicias
rather than teacers, that they always consider te mentaity ad spiitual
maturity of their interlocutors, and vary teir teacings in accordace with
it. There are exceedingly coarse-graied people, like the Carvias, corres
ponding in .Europe to the medanical materialists and to David Hume, who
deny the existence of a self in suc a way that the spiritual life is deprived
of any meaning. To convert them, the Buddhas have spoken of a "self".
There are others, more refned, but still given to egoism, and conrmed i
their self-seeking by their belief in the exstence of a self. The Buddas
teac them the non-existence of a self so as "to weaken their attacent
to the false view of personality and to engender i them a desire for
NirvaJa". Other people, fnally, are "near to Nirvia, free from all love for
self, and capable of really understanding the true words of te Buddha 1 Tey
are taught that tere is neither self nor not-self. The view of a not-self is in
fact no more true than that of a self, to whic it is an antidote. . Just as the
people who have no cataract do not perceive the hairs, fies, etc., seen by
those who suffer from this eye-disease, so the Buddhas canot at all see as
real the self or not-self whic fools have imagined". Likewise in his
Ratnavali52 Nagarjuna says:
uin real truth no self or not-self ca be got at.
The Great Sage has made us ward offal views about them.
Wat can be seen or heard He has pronounced to be neither truthful
nor fraudulent.
Ay thesis must lead to a counter-thesis. Neither one nor the other is
to the point (arthata).
Tis theory is by no means confned to the Midhyamikas, and is already
stated in

the Kayapaparivarta&s: "To believe i a self is a extreme vieW;
to believe i a not-self is an extreme view". In te middle between the two
lies the Middle Way, "the contemplation of dharmas as they really are""
5. On the basis of all this new insight three stages in the removal of the
pe
rerted vews must be distinguished. I. On the frst, we recognize them
for
what they are, acquire the belief that they are likely to be erroneous,
and intellectually cease to regard things as more pemanent, bliss-bestowing
and owned than they actually are. We also come to understand that we can
XVIII 6.
4 See the quotations at Pra. XVIII 354. They are made mud of by the Pudgala
vadins and their modern successors.
See the qotations ibd.
5 In this connection one may also remember the canonical accout of the
. occasion when the Buddha refused to tell the Wanderer Vaccagotta whether the
self
exists or not. See B. LAMOT, Trate, pp. 32-, H. 0LBNBERG, Buddha, 1959,
pp. 281-;
508.
" xvm
35660.
41
never be upset by anything that actually happens, but that the disturbance
ivdridbly drivcs fron1 the way we view it, and that, once the perverted
vtcws arc ,,.1thdrav.n from the situationg all upsets can be traced to some
disordl'red passion in ourselves, for whic the external event merely
provides the occasion.
.
11.. <)n the second ve reject them also with our 'vill and en1otions- We
case to .seck for permanence in impermanent things, give up all hope of
dfriving happiness cf any kind from worldly things, and it would not occur to
us to call anythi ng our own. For the frst stage .only )ntelligence is required,
for tht' SCcond an uncommon capacity for detacment and self-effacement. In
fact on this stage the growth of two cardinal virtues provides us with an
Cvcr rnore in1penetrable armour against the upsets of life, in that trance
(san1icihi) generates an unshakeale inward calm, while wisdom (prajf
sho,\s thC disturbng event to be utterly insignifcant.
Ill. The frst two stages can be reaced also by the Hinayanists, whereas
the third is accessible only to those who apply the methods of the Mahayana
and \\'ho through them can con1pletely reject 50g completely overcome56 the
perverted views. We step above, or transcend, perverted views when 1.
Wt se( no longer any diference between impermanence and permanence,
etc., and 2. when we meet with no object with which we could associate either
th three marks or their opposites ,;7, Abolished is then the difference between
intp(rmancncc and permanence, suffering and ease, self and not-self, delight
ind disgust. Truly, then one has stepped above all that can upset.
It is obvious fron1 the Samidhirija 58 that the Mahayana is concerned wit
describing things as they appear on the highest spiritual level of effortless
and completed self-extinction. That SUtra identifes the man who has crossed
to the other shore with the man who is "free from perverted views (avipa
ryCsta-cittal)", and then proceeds to defne his freedom from the viparyasa
as the state in whic he does not review or apprehend any dharmas whic
ntight cause greed, hate or delusion. Candrakirti 59 maintains that the insight
into the paradox of the absence of all perversions {see p. 38) is greatly
2 II 3-.
p. 87.
. -
s
. For a good explanation of this term see S. ScHAYER, Ausgewahlte Kapztel aus
der Prasannapada, 1931, p. 70 n. SO.
ss
parivarjayitavya Paicavi.sati 221 Sataslhasrlka 1465, i the description
of the ffth bhumi. _ The commentary to the Vibhanga says that eight of. the
vippallasa are forsaken on the path of the Streamwinner; the perverted perceptions
and thou
g
ht whic mistake the repulsive for the lovely are attenuated on the path
of the Once-Returner, and forsaken on the path of a Neverreturner; the perverted
perceptions and thou
g
ht whid mistake ill for ease are forsaken on t

e path
.
of the
Arhat. - The correlation of the abandonment of the pe

verted v1ews With the

bhimis of the Mahayana is rather obscure, and requtres further study; cf.
Dasabhimika pp. 29,12, and 63,3.
o
. .
sa
atik
r
a
n
t
a in the H[daya. For the context see my Buddhist Wisdom Books,
1958, p. 7.
. -
-d- p
i t' 221
s7 sarva-vastinim anupalabdh1tam upa aya, ancav rsa 1
5 quoted in Pras. XXIII 472.
n p ras. XXIII 469.
42
benefcial because it removes ignorace and all its consequences. The deeper
understanding of ignorance, whim now incidentally includes witin it all
that the Hnayanists prized as "wisdom g automatically elimiates it by
showing tat it is not there. It i not by fighting against the pervered
views, but by simply not apprehending tem, that te Yogin puts a stop to
ignorance. And the Suvikrantavikripariprc
ci so
add "Were non-perver .
sion has been understood (in the sense that pererted views are unreal,
see page 38) 61 no perverted view is left, and thre is also no more need for
practice ( carya). "If someone no longer discriminates about his practice, this

ractice of hi

may well be call.ed a "non . practice".
6. In the Mahayana, ontological ad soteriological views always go hand
in hand, and the fuller and deeper understanding of Ue perverted views is
closely connected with the distinctive features of a Bodhisattva's life.
People may be said to make a difference between permanence ad
impermanence if they hurry out of this impermaent world ito the peranence
of Nirvaa. The
y
may be said to igore tat diference if they postpone entry
into ever-lasting Niran.a, do not object to living in the impermanency of
"birth-and-death", and do not mind how long it takes to reac personal
liberation,-treating time as the insigifcant thing that it is. "Seeking all
kowledge without seeking it before the time,-this is te Bodhisattva's
course
et.
The identity of ill and. ease is not disclose. d to those who wish to avoid
suffering at all costs. But it can be experienced b
y
those greatly compas
sionate heroes who joyfully welcome suferig if and when it helps other
creatures, for "suffering endured for the sake of others brigs happiness"
ea.
Many attempts have been made to drive out the fear of suffering by some
kind of spiritual reasoning: suffering is a part of the benefcial purose of
the Absolutef there are cosmic and karmic reasons for it; it adds to the
harmony of the wholei it has a "sacramental" meaning, ad sanctifies our
life: evil is really nothing, and only the good is something; and so on. All
this is rather cold comfort to the sufferer, and Cadide has, on the whole.
found more followers than

Pagloss. Te Maiy
ana is not content with
inducing people to acquiesce in their sufferings, but more ambitiously
attempts to transcend suffering by identifying it wt its very opposite. If
the
recipient of this teacing is ladg in the highmindedness expected of
him
he
will, of course, feel no better off ta before.
How can the identity of self and not . self be fully understood by people
wh
o in their actual practice oppose teir ow advantage to that of others?
If a man exerts himself for the purpose of obtaining salvation and liberation
for himself, and if he enters the freedom of Nirila, whic cuts him off from
10
VI 67 a. . .
61
cf.
also Satasihasrlki 1411 Paicavillati 198: svabhavo hi prakrtir
a
v
i
paritata.
82
V
imal
akirtinirdesa, d. 5, p. 38 of RoBJNSON's tyed translation (1953).
88
C
andragomin: paraarthe dulkha suk!am; quoted in HAR DAYAL, The
Bodhisattva doctrine, 1932, 159.
43
o
t he other suf fering creatures whom le leaves behind, he can be said to make
a di fference between himsel f and others. Not so the Bodhisattva 64.
0 sum up: rhe perverted views were originally taught u. 1 . as an em
Pl rJ c
al l y verifi abl e mi stake whi d distorts easily ascertainable features of
the \\' Orl d around us, and 2. as a metaphysical error whic c:nsi sts in that
tnan, real l y i dent ical \th the Absol ute, looks for a realization of his true
sel f i n i dent i fying hi mself
.
with the things of this world whic in every
.respect are t he reverse of the Absolute. This is how far the Hinayana
i nt erpreted the viparyisa. For the Mahayana likewise they are based on a
tni sconccpt i on of man' s relation to the Absolutee
-
Though, of course, all this talk about man' s relation . to the Absolute is
clear
l
y essentially erroneous, because the very defnition of the Absolute
(as the Un-related) exIudes the possibility of suc a relation. To defne
perverted views as a misconception of the Absolute therefore constitutes a
tnani fest absurdi t
y
. In all rel igi ous thinking statements about the Absolute
are as unavoi dabl e as they are impossible- For the true nature of things ca
be found only in their relation to a inexpressible Absolutes In consequence
each of these statements i s as true as its opposi te, and any relation between
the fni te and the Infni t. that may be postulated is only provisionally
manufactu red in order to acieve some practi cal purpose. Either their
di fference may be stressed, thereby exalting the transcendence of the
Absol ute, or thei r i dentity, thereby exalting i ts immanence. Comparing
everythi ng in this world to its disadvantage with the Absoluteg the
Hinayanists aimed at the total :ej ection of the world, at a total renunciation
of al l that is not the Absolutep as essentially alien to us. The Mahayana points
out that once someone has given up everything for the Absolute, he simply
is the Absolute both nothing and everything else,
Ordinary persons confuse conditioned and unconditioned thingsg mistak
i ng the one for the other; the saints of the Hinayana neatly keep them
apart, and claim that people are upset because they cannot make the
division; the Mahiyinists again proclaim their samenessg and blatantly
i dentif
y
them. In other wordsg with the foolish common people we have
the affi rmation of the perverted viewsg with the Hinayanistic saints their
negationg and with the Mahayanists the negation of that negati one The
negati on of the negation may easily be mistaken for an affirmationg ad
the appearance may be created that the Mahayinistic saint has again
become an ordinary person- Thi s is one of te most untractable among the
problems whi c bedevil the study of the Mahayana. Ninetenth of the
paradoxes and obscurities of the Mahayana scriptures resut from the
inabi lity of ordinary language to do justice to the manifold meanings of
the two simpl e words "not " 68 and , is . Perhaps the muc-vaunted methods
of modern logic may one day clarif the issue. In the meantime there is
M For more details see HAR D1'AL, pp. 1618, 1 '9-1 81 .
85 As I have show in my article quoted in note 1 ..
.
This was quite obvious on page 40, in connectt on wt th the Lakivatira
views on permanence and impermanence.
44
"
muc scope for misunderstanding, ad to some extent modem "Zen" has
been tailored for people who believe that they can win te highest witout
in the least altering or reforming themselves. .
It should be quite obvious that no one can reac the third stage wthout
frst going through the second, and becoming totally danged i the process . .
Otherwise the thesis that all things are te samer and that one should not
want one thing more than another, will be regarded as equivalent to the
levelling of all _valuesr and to the proposition that one thing is as good as
another, ad that Shakespeare is no better than shove-halfenny. In fact,
however, we have to deal with an identifcation of all values whid leaves
their differentiation intact. It is ver hard to distinguish verbally the
transcendental state from that of the ordinary people. But that is merely
the fault of the language we use. "There is nothing holy here might be
cited in support of the profanisation of the world in whic no room any
longer is f9und for the holy. A passage in the Lankavatira 61 shows that
something very mud more subtle is itended. There we hear that tis
world, whic is but a whirl of confusion and error (bhrati) 68 also appears
to holy men (arya), though they remain without intellectua perversion or
non-pe
rversion, as long as they are free from the ideas of existence and
' non-existence. But if some outsider makes a distinction between a perverted
and an unperverted attitude to this bhrlti, then he arrives at a duality of
clans, - that of the holy men, and that of the foolish common people.
Finally it may be useful to say a few very inadequate words about the
type of person whom these doctrines aim- at producing. Te theory of
viparasas is ver muc akin to the philosphy of Epiktetos, according to
. whic the origin of all our troubles lies in tat we mstake that whic is in
our power for that whic is not. In conseqence we make things do that
whic
is not in them, instead of just following the nature of things". Te
difference betwen the Stoa and the Mahayina lies in that the Stoics try
to maintain te Nus, or reason, at all costs against uneason, whereas for
the Buddhists reason and nonsense are one and te sae. Because they
feel that they have something to maintain, the Stoic sages ae smewhat
rigid, ponderous, humourless, sour ad censoriousr whereas the Bodhisattvas
are ceerful, free and easy, and a bit naive. Since they have nothing to
defend, the Mahayaists can actually conform themselves even to the
nature of things as
they appear. But, and that is the difficulty, they o not
really return to the condition of ordinar people. They may be desp1cable
be
g
ga
rs
r
without any social position, but the carisma of the saint clings
f K
.
69
to them. Samantabhadra as a courtesan or the Ma . Jang u wan-ytn are
quite unlike the tarts who patrol the paveents round Picadilly Circus. These
67
pp. 1067.
d t. f 68
This is a word often used for the object of p
erverte percep on, c N
Abhlsamayllalkiriloka pp. 341-2.
.
.

Se
e e. g. D. T.
S
uzuu, Essays in Zen Buddhism, Th1rd Serxes, 1934r p. 312,
and P. SIERKSMA, The go
d
s as we shape them, 1960, pi. 28.
.
45
sages may be said to drift passively, but nevertheless they arduously
conti nue thei r struggles. What these people do can indeed be done, but it
cannot be thought. Logi c and consistency, so muc prized by the Stoics,
arc al ri ght as far as they go . . Jn the Mahayana they are abadoned for the
rhythm of a spi ri tual practice whi c is a law unto itself and leaves them
far behind.
Note: A large part of Dr. Conze' s article reproduces sections from his
book " Buddhist Thought i n Indi a" , meanwhile published by G .. Allen &
Unwin Ltd, of London.
46
W
'