EU HOMS REPORT ON JERUSALEM 18 March 2014

1. JERUSALEM AND THE PEACE PROCESS

1. If there is to be a genuine peace, a way must be found through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states. Jerusalem has strong emotional value, not only for Palestinians and Israelis, but also for millions of Muslims, Jews and Christians around the world. Its historic, cultural and religious significance for the three Abrahamic religions ma es Jerusalem uni!ue. "or this same reason Jerusalem is one of the most difficult of the final status issues to solve. #et, since the last $oM%s report Israel has continued to implement a policy regarding Jerusalem that is further entrenching the separation of Jerusalem from the rest of the &est 'an , thus creating more obstacles to peace and a negotiated two(state solution. ). *hrough the implementation of its policy Israel is changing the status !uo on the ground and cementing its unilateral and illegal anne+ation of ,ast Jerusalem. *he continued e+pansion of settlements in and around ,ast Jerusalem- the continued construction of the separation barrier- the restrictive .oning and planning leading to increased numbers of demolitions and evictions- the restrictive residency permit system and the implementation of the Israeli Absentee Property /aw- the discriminatory access to religious sites- the continued closure of Palestinian institutions- the inade!uate provision of resources and investment leading to an ine!uitable education policy and difficult access to health care for the Palestinians in ,ast Jerusalem, all systematically undermine Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, the universal character of the city and its potential as a future capital of two states. 0. In the )1 2ctober Municipal elections, the turnout was less than 13 among Palestinian voters in ,ast(Jerusalem. As in all previous Municipal elections, this boycott was again a signal that ,ast(Jerusalemites refuse to accept the Israeli anne+ation. *he price to pay for the boycott is the fact that issues of planning and delivery of services are in the hands of a Municipal council without any Palestinian representation, and without any constituency among Palestinians in ,ast(Jerusalem. 1. 4ince the resumption of the peace negotiations in July )510, an unprecedented surge in settlement activity has occurred. *his appears to be part of an Israeli wider strategy aimed at using settlements, road constructions, par s and tourism comple+es to e+pand Jerusalem deeply into the &est 'an and to include the settlement blocs of Ma6ale Adumim, 7ush ,t.ion and 7ivat 8e6ev. If carried through this strategy will result in ,ast Jerusalem being split from the rest of the &est 'an and impact on the contiguity of a future Palestinian state. *he timing of the settlement announcements coinciding with releases of Palestinian pre(2slo prisoners, show that settlement advancement is a matter of political choice. 9. In the course of )510, settlement activity also included non(residential pro:ects. ,+amples included the adoption of plans for the Mount 4copus 4lopes ;ational Par and the ,me <efaim ;ational Par , as well as the continued construction of the 'egin $ighway e+tension cutting through the Palestinian neighbourhood of 'eit 4afafa in southern ,ast Jerusalem. *he creation of national par s is part of what appears to be a broader Israeli policy to establish a %green belt% of national par s in order to further isolate ,ast Jerusalem from the rest of the &est 'an . =. In addition the Israeli authorities, in con:unction with settler organisations, are using archaeology to promote a one(sided historical narrative of Jerusalem, placing emphasis on its biblical

and Jewish connotations while neglecting the Christian>Muslim historic(archaeological ties to the same places. ?. Adding to these negative trends, )510 saw heightened tensions at the $aram al( 4harif>*emple Mount. @iolent incidents were triggered by a sharp rise in the number of visits by Jewish radical political and religious groups, which were not coordinated in advance with the &a!f responsible for the site. Many of these visitors challenged the status !uo by attempting to pray at the site or raise Israeli flags. *hese groups were strengthened by speeches by some Israeli Ministers and a political debate in the Anesset on bringing the $aram al 4harif>*emple Mount under Israeli control. *here remains a significant ris that incidents at this highly sensitive site, or perceived threats to the status !uo, may spar e+treme reactions locally as well as across the Arab and Muslim world, and have the potential to derail the peace negotiations.

2. SETTLEMENTS
B. *oday over B55,555 people live within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries as unilaterally defined by Israel after 1C=?. Around 0C percent of the city6s inhabitants are Palestinians. 4uccessive Israeli governments have pursued a policy of transferring its population into the occupied Palestinian territory including ,ast Jerusalem in violation of international humanitarian law, specifically the $ague Convention and the "ourth 7eneva Convention. 2ut of a total of more than 915,555 Israeli settlers living in the occupied Palestinian territory, over )55,555 now live in settlements inside ,ast Jerusalem. C. ;o settlement announcements were made in ,ast(Jerusalem during the first seven and a half months of )510- while construction continued, there were no new plans deposited for public review, no hearings were held on pending plans, no statutory plans were approved and no new tenders were published. *his de facto free.e on announcements is li ely to have been lin ed to the D.4.%s determined efforts to :ump(start negotiations. $owever, with the restarting of peace tal s, this free.e came to an end and settlement e+pansion has resumed at an unprecedented rate. A significant number of the plans are for settlements located on the southern perimeter of Jerusalem, close to 'ethlehem, but also in areas east and north of the city, threatening to cut off ,ast Jerusalem from the rest of the &est 'an . 15. At the end of July )510 the Israeli(Palestinian peace tal s resumed and were followed by the release of )= Palestinian prisoners E the first of four planned rounds to release 151 Palestinian prisoners detained in Israel since before the 2slo agreements. &hile the Palestinian side E as part of restarting the negotiations E had agreed to free.e its strategy to see access to D; fora in e+change for the pre(2slo prisoner release, the prisoner release was followed by the announcement of many new settlement tenders and the re(publication of previous tenders by the Israeli government. Around the first release, new tenders for 0C? units in ,ast Jerusalem were published and formal statutory approval was given to plans allowing for the construction of an additional BC1 settler units. 11. *he second tranche of Palestinian prisoners was released at the end of 2ctober. Again the release was followed by an announcement of new settlement units in ,ast(Jerusalem by the Israeli governmentF tenders for additional =CB new units were published and statutory approval was granted to plans for the construction of additional 1,901 units. "ollowing the third release in Gecember, tenders for =55 units were announced in early January. "ollowing each round of prisoner releases, the Israeli government additionally re(published a number of tenders that had previously failed, for a total amount of 10C= units.

1). *hus, in the five months period from mid(August )510 to mid(January )511 almost as many new units were put to tender in ,ast Jerusalem as in the four previous years put together 10. In ;ovember )510 the Ministry of Construction published tenders to engage architects and town planners to develop plans for a total of )1,555 new units. 2f these, 1,955 units were planned in ,ast Jerusalem and an additional 1,)95 units in the highly controversial ,1 area :ust outside ,ast Jerusalem. *he vast amount of units attracted international criticism and Prime Minister ;etanyahu eventually too steps to free.e the tenders. 11. "urthermore )510 witnessed a significant increase in settler violence. *he so called Hprice(tag attac sI became far more common in Jerusalem. 4ome of these acts of violence were randomly directed against Palestinians, others against Muslim and Christian holy sites and institutions. 4ome Jewish holy sites have also been targeted. *ensions ran particularly high during the Muslim month of <amadan and the Jewish $igh $olidays. Gedicated units within both the Police and the 4hin 'et J4haba K have so far largely failed to apprehend the perpetrators. 19. *he police have also reported an increase in violence E mainly stone(throwing ( directed at Israelis traveling through the Palestinian neighbourhoods of ,ast Jerusalem. *here have also been some incidents of damage to Jewish property over the past months.

3. NATIONAL PARKS
1=. 4ettlement pro:ects can go beyond residential construction and ta e the form of the creation of national par s. 2n )? ;ovember )510 the plan for the Mount 4copus 4lopes ;ational Par was officially approved by the Gistrict Planning Committee, despite ob:ections from Israeli Minister of ,nvironment Peret., the ;ature and Par s Authority J;PAK itself, local residents and ;72s. *he Par %s plan creates geographical contiguity, providing a strategic lin between the 2ld City, *.urim @alley ;ational Par , Mount 4copus, ,1 and the settlement of Ma%ale Adumim. Moreover, it impedes the e+pansion of the Palestinian neighbourhoods of al(*ur and Issawiyyeh, which are in dire need of new housing units, schools, and clinics. It would also put 195 houses in al(*ur and al(Issawiyye at ris of demolition if the plan is e+ecuted. *he Plan also contradicts the Jerusalem 2utline )555 Plan, which allows for urban e+pansion in this area. 2ver the last two decades, residents of the two neighbourhoods have developed their own outline plan, and have had what seemed to be promising discussions with municipal authorities. *he current ;ational Par Plan is in breach of all these previously agreed(upon arrangements. 1?. ;on(residential settlement activity such as the creation of national par s has the following implicationsF *he authority of the area in !uestion is transferred from the municipality to the ;PA, which does not have any obligations to the residents of the area. As a result, the declaration of a national par often violates private ownership while at the same time severely undermining the urban development and e+pansion of the surrounding neighbourhoods Administrative and developmental powers for touristic, archaeological and educational pro:ects within the national par s are often transferred to ideological organisations. 4uch organi.ations promote their own Jewish historical narrative of Jerusalem, at the e+pense of Muslim and Christian narratives-

4. ARCHAEOLOGY
1B. Archaeology continues to be used as a political and ideological tool in Jerusalem%s $istoric 'asin, where the Israeli 7overnment has outsourced archaeology to private Israeli pro(settler

organisations. A case in point is 4ilwan > &adi $ilweh, where the Israeli authorities have entrusted the management of the various archaeological sites to the settler organisation ,l%Ad, which now operates the LCity of GavidL tourist centre. ,l%Ad has entered into a partnership with the Israeli Anti!uities Authority which is paid directly by ,l6ad to carry out the e+cavations. *hese are ta ing place without any ind of Palestinian involvement or international oversight. *he archaeological digs include the e+cavation of tunnels underneath 4ilwan, the Muslim Muarter and in the immediate vicinity of the $aram al(4harif>*emple Mount. Moreover, the Jewish Muarter Gevelopment Company JJMGCK is currently in the process of handing over to ,l%ad the management of the e+cavation area 4outh and &est of the $aram al(4harif>*emple Mount Jthe Gavidson centreK. 1C. *wo more tourist sites along the lines of the LCity of GavidL visitors centre are being planned by ,l%AdF the Aedem Compound and the 4pring $ouse J'et $aMa%ayanK. *he plan for the former, deposited for public review in ;ovember )510 and currently being fast(trac ed through the planning process, provides for the construction of a ma:or multi(purpose structure JHthe Aedem comple+IK on the site of the 7ivati Par ing lot, opposite the 2ld City%s Gung 7ate, at the entrance to &adi $ilweh>4ilwan. As regards the latter, on )1 January )511 ,l%Ad deposited plans for public review to build a tourist compound above the 4pring $ouse, at the bottom of &adi $ilweh at the northern edge of 4ilwan. 'oth plans are part of an apparent wider strategy to consolidate Israeli control over the $istoric 'asin by creating an e+clusively Jewish tourism trail along and around the 2ld City, detaching it from its Palestinian surroundings and advocating a singular Jewish narrative. )5. 2n the &estern &all Pla.a, the Gistrict Planning and 'uilding Committee has approved the construction of 'eit $aliba, an initiative of the &estern &all $eritage "und, a governmental organisation under the :urisdiction of the Prime Minister6s office. *ogether with the Aedem Compound, its construction will alter the s yline of the 2ld City, the walls of which have been recognised as D;,4C2 &orld $eritage. Moreover, archaeologists fear the construction of both pro:ects ris damage to the archaeological site over which they are to be built.

. THE HARAM AL!SHARI"#TEMPLE MOUNT

)1. *he $aram al(4harif>*emple Mount is one of the most important religious sites in the 2ld City of Jerusalem and a holy site for both Muslims and Jews. 4ince 1C=? the site has been under de facto Israeli security control but is administered by the Jordanian Islamic authorities J&a!fK. In line with the long standing status !uo, visits from all faiths are permitted but without the right of non( Muslim prayer on the $aram al(4harif>*emple Mount. 7iven the importance of the site, any threat or perceived threat to its integrity and to the status !uo not only raises tensions locally but has the potential to provo e e+treme reactions regionally and globally and, as such, represents a potential threat to the current peace negotiations. )). Palestinian residents in the &est 'an are granted access during Muslim holidays only, with some age restrictions. ;o such permits are given to Muslims from 7a.a. 7enerally, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and permit(holding &est 'an ers have unrestricted access to the site, unless the site is closed for security reasons. )0. 2n 01st March )510 Aing Abdullah II of Jordan and President Abbas signed an agreement reaffirming the role of the Jordanian Aing as custodian of the Islamic $oly 4ites in Jerusalem and his responsibility for safeguarding and preserving them, particularly the $aram al(4harif. *he signing came at a time when the Palestinians accused Israel of an invigorated LJudaisationL of the 2ld City. )1. 4trong pressure by some Israeli cabinet members and the so(called %*emple Movement% has been e+erted in the course of )510 to change the status !uo of the $aram al(4harif>*emple Mount. A

debate in the Anesset has ta en place in "ebruary )511 on bringing the *emple Mount under full Israeli control. 4uch legislative move would contradict the 1CC1 Israeli(Jordanian peace agreement, in which Israel stated it would "respect the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem". "ollowing the debate in the Anesset, the Prime Minister%s spo esperson said that "The policy of the government of Israel has been and continues to be the maintenance of the status quo at the Temple Mount, including freedom of access for all faiths to the holy sites., )9. Above all, a source of great concern are the almost daily visits to the $aram Al(4harif>*emple Mount by Jewish national(religious activists continuing a trend from )51). 2ften acting in a provocative manner, these groups claim full Israeli control over the site, at times violate the ban on non(Muslim prayer as well as clash with worshippers, while some have even called for the destruction of the Al(A!sa mos!ue in order to build the *hird Jewish *emple there. In Gecember, in an apparent attempt to curb these visits, both of Israel6s Chief <abbis JAsh ena.i and 4ephardiK re( stated the longstanding $alachic prohibition on Jews visiting the site for reasons of ritual purity. 4imilarly, during his Id al(Adha message, Prime Minister ;etanyahu stressed the importance of maintaining the status !uo. )=. Conversely, some Palestinian politicians as well as representatives of the &a!f dismiss Jewish historical ties to the *emple Mount, putting in doubt the historical e+istence of a Jewish temple on the Mount. Moreover, there have been incidents of stones thrown down at Jewish worshippers at the &estern &all. )?. Gevelopments in and around the $aram al(4harif>*emple Mount are occurring against the bac drop of intensive settler(related activities, emphasising the Jewish character and history of the 2ld City and its surroundings at the e+pense of the Christian and Muslim narratives. *hese developments are a threat to the status !uo and are fuelling concerns that the $aram al( 4harif>*emple Mount, could undergo a development similar to the Ibrahimi Mos!ue>*omb of the Patriarchs in $ebron, with a temporal and territorial division in access to the site.

$. PLANNING% DEMOLITIONS% E&ICTIONS AND DISPLACEMENT

)B. *he planning regime of the Jerusalem Municipality remains a source of concern as it places severe restrictions on Palestinian building activities, thus creating a housing and basic infrastructure shortage for Palestinian residents as well as development constraints. Around 9)3 of the Israeli( defined municipal area of ,ast Jerusalem is unavailable for development and 093 has been designated for settlement use. As a result, less than 103 can be used for construction to meet the needs of Palestinians. Much of this land is already built(up- the permitted construction density is limited and re!uired planning and building standards are hard to apply. *ogether these ma e the application process difficult and e+pensive. At least 003 of all Palestinian homes in ,ast Jerusalem lac Israeli(issued building permits, placing over C0,555 Palestinians at ris of displacement. )C. In )510 there were CB demolitions, almost e!ualling the combined total from )511 J1)K and )51) J=1K. 2f these 0C concerned livelihood>commercial structures and )1 inhabited dwellings and different types of infrastructure. Gemolitions in ,ast Jerusalem are carried out by a number of Israeli authorities, including the Jerusalem Municipality, the Ministry of Interior, and the Israeli ;ature and Par s Authority. "ollowing the receipt of demolition orders from the Israeli authorities, 1) of the structures were demolished by their owners in order to avoid having to pay substantial fines. 05. *he demolition of homes and other property due to a lac of Israeli building permits is one of the primary causes for the displacement of Palestinians in ,ast Jerusalem. *his has resulted in )CB

Palestinians Jincluding 190 childrenK being displaced in )510, by far the highest number since )55C, and e+ceeding the combined annual total for )511 JBBK and )51) J?1K. In terms of impact almost 155 other ,ast Jerusalem Palestinians were affected in )510, due to the demolition of structures related to their livelihood. 01. As far as evictions1 are concerned, one incident was reported in )510, when in May settlers too over two shops in the 2ld City Jerusalem following a court ruling in favour of the settlers who claim ownership over the buildings. 'y contrast in )51), )) Palestinians, including 15 children, were evicted in four separate incidents in ,ast Jerusalem.

'. RESIDENCY STATUS

0). <estrictive measures continue to apply in relation to the IG and residency status of Palestinians from ,ast Jerusalem. *his is lin ed to Israel%s demographic policy Jas stated in official planning documents such as the Jerusalem%s Master Plan )555 ratified by the Jerusalem Municipality in )55?K, which aims at preventing the Palestinian population in ,ast(Jerusalem from e+ceeding 15 percent of the municipality6s total population. *he revo ing of residency rights of Palestinians in ,ast Jerusalem is in violation of international law. 00. Dnli e Israeli citi.enship, permanent residency is not automatically passed on to children in case one of the parents does not hold residency status. "urthermore, permanent residency is not automatically transferred through marriage. Conse!uently the resident spouse has to apply for family unification. *he legal procedure for these cases is a long, e+pensive and e+tremely comple+ process. Dntil conclusion of this process, the children and spouses in !uestion cannot legally reside in Jerusalem, thereby increasing their vulnerability. 01. According to the Israeli Ministry of Interior%s figures, between 1C=? and )51), Israel revo ed the residency status of 11,)50 Palestinians from ,ast Jerusalem. In )51), Israel revo ed the residency of 11= ,ast Jerusalem Palestinians, including =1 women and )C children. In such cases, the Israeli authorities do not provide information about the grounds for revocation. At the same time, in )51), Israel LreinstatedL the residency status of 0) ,ast Jerusalem Palestinians. 09. In May )510, the Anesset approved a number of regulations related to the population registry. *hese regulations concern the current IG cards used by citi.ens and residents and the future, electronic(biometric cards. 2ne of the provisions contained in the regulations stipulates that IG cards will e+pire and re!uire renewal every ten years. *he introduction of an e+piry date on their residency cards has generated ma:or concerns among Palestinian Jerusalem residents, who already need to prove to Israeli authorities on a regular basis that Jerusalem is their Lcentre of lifeL.

8. ACCESS AND MO&EMENT

0=. *he route of the separation barrier and its associated permit regime continue to have a serious negative social, humanitarian and economic impact on ,ast Jerusalem. *he barrier disconnects ,ast Jerusalem from the rest of the &est 'an and physically separates Palestinian communities within ,ast Jerusalem. 0?. In the Jerusalem area, the barrier is 1=B ilometres long, of which only three percent runs along the 1C=? 7reen /ine. *he main reason behind this deviation was the integration of 1) Israeli
1

,victions relate to the ta e(over of e+isting buildings, while displacement results from the actual demolition of a building.

settlements Jand space for their future e+pansionK and the future integration of settlements beyond the municipal boundary Jas unilaterally defined by Israel after 1C=?K such as Ma%ale Adumim. 0B. *he route of the barrier changes the de facto boundaries of Jerusalem and, in some cases, runs through the middle of densely populated Palestinian neighbourhoods. As a conse!uence, a number of Palestinian communities within the Israeli defined Jerusalem municipal boundary find themselves on the L&est 'an L side of the barrier. *hese communities need to cross chec points to access the health, education and other services to which they are entitled Jand pay ta+es forK as residents of Jerusalem. *he barrier also affects at least 1= &est 'an localities outside of the Jerusalem Municipality but now situated on the LJerusalemL side of the 'arrier. *he ),955 residents in these communities face uncertain residency, impeded access to basic services and the ris of displacement. 0C. Gespite ongoing legal proceedings throughout )510, barrier construction in the form of levelling and tunnelling has continued in the area of Al &ala:a south(west of Jerusalem. *he currently pro:ected route of the barrier will leave the village residential area intact, yet agricultural lands will be isolated, leading to a de facto confiscation of privately owned Palestinian land. In the case of Al &ala:a there have been 11 stop wor >demolition orders issued to date, affecting 11= people. Also, the 4upreme Court is currently considering two cases in the southern perimeter of Jerusalem where the Israeli authorities plan to e+tend the separation barrier. *he e+tension of the barrier in 'attir would severely harm daily life in the village, as well as threatening the uni!ue environmental, archaeological and historical character of the area. As for Cremisan, construction of the barrier would cut off the Cremisan @alley from the 'eit Jala community. 9B Jmainly ChristianK families and a convent would conse!uently lose access to their lands. 15. Palestinians who do not hold Israeli citi.enship or a residency right in Jerusalem need a permit to enter the city. *he permit is difficult to obtain and is sub:ect to a number of conditions, e.g. time(limited, a ban on driving a car or staying overnight. "or those Palestinians who are granted permits, access is restricted to four out of 1= barrier chec pointsF 7ilo, Malandiya, 4hu6afat and 8aytoun. Permits are suspended during security closures and often during Jewish holidays. 2n the other hand, during <amadan, the need to obtain permits to enter Jerusalem is temporarily suspended for certain categories of Palestinians that are not deemed a security ris . 11. *he LJudea and 4amaria onlyL visa regime for third country visitors and for foreign residents of the &est 'an has been applied throughout )510. *his regime severely restricts ,D citi.ens% freedom of movement and prevents free access to Jerusalem and ,D member states consulates located there. 1). Also in )510, the D; registered over )55 access incidents involving staff attempting to enter Jerusalem. A ma:ority of these incidents were the result of re!uests to search D; vehicles, in violation of the Convention on D; Privileges and Immunities, to which Israel is a signatory.

(. EDUCATION
10. ,fforts to provide education for Palestinian children of school(age in ,ast Jerusalem continue to face numerous challenges includingF a chronic shortage of appropriate facilities- planning restrictions which thwart efforts to correct this- threats to the legal status of some e+tant institutions- access and movement restrictions for both teachers and students- a shortage of trained teachers, and an overall absence of coordination amongst the different educational providers operating in ,ast Jerusalem Jmunicipal, private, Aw!af and D;<&AK. <ates of drop(out are high, especially among boys and in the secondary cycle Jgrades 11(1)K. According to the latest estimates, 0=3 of children fail to complete the full twelve years of schooling.

11. *here remains a chronic and growing shortage of classrooms and a large number of substandard, unsuitable and>or overcrowded facilities in use. An estimated ),)55 additional classrooms are re!uired in ,ast Jerusalem to meet the needs of the school age population, which is growing at a rate of 0(13. Progress has remained very slow on the Israeli 4upreme Court6s decision of July )511, which stipulated that the 4tate should by )51= provide the physical infrastructure to allow all ,ast Jerusalem students the option to attend municipal schools. 2nly 1B new classrooms, in two municipal schools, were provided by the Israeli authorities in )510. In this situation, many families find no alternative than to enrol their children in fee(paying private schools. Aw!af schools, five of which have pending demolition orders, cannot for the most part e+pand e+isting facilities as needed, nor build>purchase new buildings, due to planning and .oning restrictions. In )510, two municipal indergartens were opened in 'eit $anina. $owever, for the vast ma:ority of indergarten age children, who are technically eligible from the age of 0 under the "ree ,ducation /aw of Israel to attend indergarten, no facilities are available. 19. Meanwhile, on 10 "ebruary )511, the Jerusalem /ocal Planning and 'uilding Committee approved a plan to build a #eshiva in the ,ast(Jerusalem neighbourhood of 4hei h Jarrah, on a plot of land which is designated by the area%s Master Plan Lfor educational buildings to benefit the local populationL. Mayor ;ir 'ar at has publicly ac nowledged the disparities in levels of education between ,ast and &est Jerusalem. At the launch of an Academic Centre for Arab 7irls in ,ast Jerusalem in "ebruary )511, 'ar at said that the Municipality was Hinvesting heavily in eastern Jerusalem... building new classrooms, indergartens and developing infrastructure.I 1=. 7iven the growing isolation of ,ast Jerusalem from the rest of the &est 'an , &est 'an IG( holding students and teachers re!uiring a permit Jas well as ,ast(Jerusalemites living on the other side of the barrierK can face a range of difficulties from delays, harassment, and non( renewal>revocation of permits. <esearch suggests that over )555 students and more than )95 teachers must cross chec points on their way to and from school on a daily basis. 'oth access difficulties and lac of recognition of Al(Muds university degrees contribute to the alarming shortage of maths and science teachers in particular. 1?. ,fforts by the Israeli authorities to remove the PA(developed curriculum from ,ast Jerusalem schools have intensified in )510. As was reported last year, since March )511 municipal schools have been obliged to use the Israeli(edited version of the PA curriculum,. "or non(municipal schools still using the PA unedited curriculum JAw!af schools, some private schoolsK, problems in ac!uiring new te+tboo s continue, since the Israeli authorities have for some years prevented the transfer of these boo s through the chec points into Jerusalem from where they are produced near <amallah. 4ince private schools tend to receive some funding from the Israeli authorities most now use the Israeli( edited version of the PA curriculum as well. *hree municipal schools have introduced the Israeli curriculum in Arabic, as an optional alternative, from the beginning of the )510 school year. 1B. As was reported last year, despite the ongoing efforts of Al Muds Dniversity JAMDK over many years, the issue of its status has not yet been resolved and its degrees remain unrecognised by Israel, thus barring its graduates from the Israeli :ob mar et. 7raduates of the faculties of medicine and education are the principal victims of the situation, which has contributed to a shortage of doctors and teachers in ,ast(Jerusalem. 1C. 'ecause of their pro+imity to the separation barrier, Al(Muds Dniversity6s Abu Gis campus is the site of fre!uent raids by and clashes with the IG". In recent years these raids and attac s have become more fre!uent, with two incidents in the )511(1) academic year, )= incidents in )51)(10 academic year, and )9 from the beginning of the )510(11 academic year to end January. *he raid

which too place on )) January )511 was unprecedented in scale and resulted in the hospitalisation of )5 students and employees.

10. HEALTH
95. "or ,ast(Jerusalemites, who are entitled to and thus often affiliated to Israeli health insurance, the !uality of health services varies. "or instance, the !uality of tertiary health care meets Israeli standards, but there appears to be difficulties in access to secondary health care as allied care professionals or medical specialties such as mental or social health are practically none+istent in ,ast Jerusalem. *he level of primary health care services is also much lower than in &est(Jerusalem despite the affiliation to the same health system, due to a scarcity of clinics, emergency centres, and to the sub(contracting of primary health care services to private sector, which affects the !uality of the service. Jerusalemites residing on the L&est 'an sideL of the separation barrier face difficulties in accessing health care in Jerusalem, and may conse!uently find themselves in life threatening situations in case of emergency. 91. *he Palestinian health system relies heavily on the si+ ,ast Jerusalem hospitals, to provide !uality tertiary care or specialised care not available in the rest of the &est 'an or in 7a.a. &est 'an and 7a.a referrals now represent more than 953 of all admissions to the ,ast Jerusalem hospitals Jwith the ma:ority re!uiring intensive careK. &est 'an and 7a.a patients need permits to access Jerusalem, and as the Israeli permit policy is not transparent, obtaining a permit is often a lengthy and difficult procedure hindering access to appropriate and timely health care. In )510, nearly )53 of permit re!uests were denied for unspecified security reasons or without e+planation. Patients and their companions aged 1B(15, especially men, are the most affected. Children and patients with disabilities have been put in a particularly vulnerable position by the re:ection of permits for their first(degree relative escort. As for cancer patients and certain other categories of chronic patients, Israel continues to issue permits for only 1(0 months. *he situation is also highly critical for patients needing emergency treatment available only in Jerusalem as access for Palestinian(operated ambulances to ,ast Jerusalem is very limited, even in cases of e+treme emergencies. In )510, direct access of Palestinian ambulances was denied by Israeli authorities in C53 of emergency cases. 9). More than two thirds of ,ast Jerusalem hospital staff hold &' IGs and re!uire permits, which are issued for a ma+imum of si+ months at a time, to access wor . Permit(holding medical personnel, e+cluding doctors who have special permits, are allowed to cross on foot or in hospital(provided shuttles, and only through chec points at Malandiya, 7ilo and 8aytoun. A newly established Israeli practice allows medical staff, who are spouses of Jerusalem residents and who hold one(year residence permits, to receive si+(month permits for entering Jerusalem through all chec points. 90. All si+ ,ast Jerusalem hospitals are increasingly affected by the financial inability of the PA to pay referral costs of &est 'an and 7a.a patients. PA debts towards ,ast Jerusalem hospitals have tripled since )51) and represent appro+imately 05 million ,D<. *he delivery of essential health services provided by these hospitals as well as their survival is now :eopardi.ed as PA debts continue to increase.

11. ECONOMY% TRANSPORT AND IN"RASTRUCTURE

91. *he separation barrier has in effect isolated ,ast Jerusalem from the rest of the &est 'an . Gue to the e+tremely limited access, the city has largely ceased to be a traditional Palestinian economic, urban and commercial centre. In the course of )510 the policy of re!uiring entry permits and trade permits to ,ast Jerusalem remained in place. Israeli trade regulations continued to hinder

the import of goods and services from the rest of the Palestinian territory, while pharmaceutical, products remained entirely banned from entering the city. 99. In the course of )510 the economy of ,ast Jerusalem, which is mainly based on small and micro enterprises, deteriorated further. *he combined effect of growing Israeli administrative re!uirements, the aftermath of the global financial crisis, rising food and commodity prices and separation from cheaper Palestinian supplies further undermined the competitiveness of Palestinian entrepreneurs in ,ast Jerusalem. As a result Palestinians continue to move their businesses to the rest of the &est 'an or close them down. 2verall the contribution of ,ast Jerusalem to the total Palestinian 7GP has declined from 193 before the 2slo Accords to ?3 todayK. 9=. *he loss of businesses and declining trade relations have contributed to a contraction in the relative si.e of the ,ast Jerusalem economy and a structural shift from entrepreneurship to wage employment. As a result the ,ast Jerusalem labour mar et is increasingly focused on either the rest of the &est 'an or the Israeli labour mar et, where Palestinian employees wor under difficult conditions. Dnemployment is very high, especially among the young, the uneducated and the female population. Although the per capita 7GP in ,ast Jerusalem is higher than in the rest of the &est 'an , ,ast Jerusalem Palestinians must cope with higher prices and higher ta+es. *he number of Palestinians in ,ast Jerusalem living under the Israeli poverty rate is constantly growing. In )510 it reached B53 of the total ,ast Jerusalem Palestinian population and B93 among children. 9?. Palestinians constitute appro+imately 0C percent Jappro+. 0?), 555K of the population in Jerusalem, but the municipal budget spent on Palestinian neighbourhoods is disproportionally lower, not reaching above 153. Public services dealing with poverty, unemployment as well as healthcare in ,ast Jerusalem provided by the 7oI and Jerusalem municipality are insufficient Jthree offices in ,ast Jerusalem comparing to 1B in &est Jerusalem,K. Palestinian areas are characterised by poor roads, little or no street cleaning, limited sewage systems Jshortage of at least 95 m of pipelinesK causing health ha.ards and an absence of well(maintained public spaces ( in sharp contrast to areas where Israelis live Jin &est Jerusalem as well as in ,ast Jerusalem settlementsK. Access to Israeli ban ing and postal services in Palestinian neighbourhoods is limited. 9B. 4everal infrastructure>transport pro:ects serve to strengthen Israeli control over ,ast Jerusalem. *he light rail which connects Israeli settlements in ,ast Jerusalem with the centre in &est Jerusalem including a few stops in Palestinian neighbourhoods of 4hu%afat and 'eit $anina began passenger service in )511. In )51) the Jerusalem /ocal Planning Committee approved a plan e+tending the e+isting line to Jerusalem6s southern neighbourhoods J,in AeremK. Guring the )510 municipal campaign which lead to his re(election, Mayor ;ir 'ar at e+pressed readiness to develop two new light rail lines Jone of which would lin the settlement of 7ilo to Mount of 2livesK as well as a 1.9 ilometre long cable car that would bring visitors from 7erman colony>Abu *or in the 4outh to Mount of 2lives via the &estern wall Jthe terminal would be located outside the ramparts of the 2ld City, ne+t to the Al A!sa Mos!ueK. If implemented, these sensitive pro:ects would significantly increase the municipal transportation system6s contribution to the HunificationI of Jerusalem. 9C. In )51), the Jerusalem Municipality and the 7oI announced a 955 million ;I4 plan aiming at Hmoderni.ingI within five years the transportation infrastructure in ,ast Jerusalem and closing Hdecades of gapI between ,ast Jerusalem and the rest of the city. Guring recent years, a separate and inferior set of bypass roads for Palestinians has been set up around Jerusalem, in order to connect Palestinian neighbourhoods outside the separation barrier north and south of Jerusalem. *he declared purpose of the Israeli authorities for these roads is to secure a so(called Ltransport contiguityL for Palestinians living in the north and the south of the &est 'an , who are not permitted to travel from <amallah to 'ethlehem through ,ast Jerusalem. In )510, the Jerusalem Municipality

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has continued naming all the streets in ,ast Jerusalem, in coordination with local Palestinian leaders Jmu htarsK. =5. In parallel, different pro:ects e+emplify the Israeli authorities6 intention to consolidate the connection between ma:or Israeli settlements and Jerusalem. *he first one is <oute )5, a mile(long bypass road aiming at reducing traffic :ams by connecting the north(eastern neighbourhoods of Pisgat 8eev and ;eve #a6a ov with the north(south 'egin $ighway JJerusalem main traffic arteryK. Gelayed by the ob:ections filed by residents of the Palestinian neighbourhood of 'eit $anina Jwhich it bisectsK, the construction of the road was completed in May )510. *he second one is route )1, a north(south road designed to connect <amat 4hlomo settlement to the centre of Jerusalem in the framewor of new housing plans in the northern settlements. Construction of this road began in early )510. =1. )510 was mar ed by a legal battle over the e+tension of a si+(lane highway through the center of the residential ,ast Jerusalem community of 'eit 4afafa. &hile the Israeli authorities insist that this pro:ect will facilitate traffic by connecting 'egin $ighway with the 7ush ,t.ion Hsettlement blocI, the residents of the Palestinian neighbourhood emphasi.ed the damage this pro:ect will cause to the community. @arious !uestions have also been raised concerning its broader political implications Jdisconnection of this Palestinian neighbourhood from a future Palestinian capital in ,ast JerusalemK. *his pro:ect too a ma:or step forward in January )511 when the 4upreme Court of Israel issued a final decision authori.ing the Israeli authorities and the contractor to complete the e+tension of this highway.

12. PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS

=). *he institutional and leadership vacuum in ,ast Jerusalem created by the prolonged closure of Palestinian institutions, in particular that of the 2rient $ouse and the Chamber of Commerce, remains a ey concern. *his void continues to seriously affect all spheres of life of Palestinians in ,ast Jerusalem Jpolitical, economic, social and culturalK. It fosters a growing fragmentation of society at all levels, the isolation of communities and a wea ened collective sense of identity. As some of the last Palestinian institutions in ,ast Jerusalem, , the si+ ,ast Jerusalem hospitals have an importance, over and above their value as vital providers of medical services to Palestinians.

13. RELIGION
=0. Jerusalem is a city of paramount importance to the three monotheistic religions and the location of many of their most sacred sites. <elations between different religious groups have been increasingly tense, fuelled by historical grievances, as well as by cultural, religious and political differences. @iolent attac s on Muslim, Christian and Jewish holy sites continue to ta e place across Jerusalem. *he Council for <eligious Institutions in the $oly /and in )510 recorded seven instances of attac s against Jewish religious sites, and si+ attac s against Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, which included five so(called Hprice tagI attac s. <eligious leaders have publicly condemned recurrent episodes of interreligious intolerance such as harassment and defamation of religious symbols. Christian and Muslim religious leaders argue that the 7oI is consolidating implementation of policies aimed at fundamentally altering the character and status of the $oly City of Jerusalem by stressing the Jewish character and history of the city at the e+pense of the Christian and Muslim narratives. Conversely, Israeli leaders point out the lac of Palestinian recognition of Judaism%s historical ties to Jerusalem and in particular the *emple Mount. =1. 'oth Christians and Muslims are mainly concerned about rights of access, freedom of worship, and freedom of pilgrimage to the $oly City. Guring Jewish holidays the permit system for

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&est 'an IG(holders is fro.en, reducing the numbers of Palestinian visitors. Moreover, the separation barrier seriously impedes the wor of religious organisations that provide education, healthcare, and other humanitarian relief and social services to Palestinians in and around ,ast Jerusalem. =9. "or Muslim worshippers, age restrictions often apply for "riday prayers at the Al(A!sa mos!ue, for security reasons. Guring <amadan )510, as the year before, access restrictions for &est 'an ers were significantly eased on "ridays and on /eilat al(MadrF men aged above 15 were allowed entry into Jerusalem without permits, together with women of all ages and children under 1).In addition in )510 men and women over =5 were allowed to visit any day of the wee e+cept 4aturdays. As a result, an estimated B55,555 &est 'an IG holders visited Jerusalem during <amadan. ==. 2n the occasion of the most important Christian religious festivities JChristmas and ,asterK, the 7oI ma es some accommodations for Palestinian Christians in the &est 'an , especially from the 'ethlehem(area, to access Jerusalem. *hese accommodations, based on permits, are limited in time and selectively enforced Ji.e. not all members of one family obtain the permitK. "or ,aster )510, no permits were given to Christians from 7a.a. Guring 7ood "riday and 2rthodo+ ,aster, Christian worshippers found access to the area around the $oly 4epulchre bloc ed by a series of chec points and were sub:ect to heavy(handed policing, while a significant number of armed Israeli security forces were inside the church. *his triggered strong reactions from the international community, as well as a :oint statement from Christian Patriarchs and heads of local Churches. =?. Palestinian Christian emigration has been continuous but has accelerated since )551. Moreover, lower birth rates among Palestinian Christians have contributed to the decline in their numbers. *he Christian Palestinian population in Jerusalem is now estimated at less than C,555, down from 01,555 in 1C1B. Church leaders cite as reasons for increased emigrationF Israeli(imposed family(reunification restrictions Jwhich have a proportionally bigger impact on the Christian community, given its small numbersK- the limited ability of Christian communities in the Jerusalem area to e+pand due to confiscation of church properties and building restrictions- ta+ation problems and difficulties in obtaining residency permits for Christian clergy. *his results in the progressive erosion of the Christian presence and of the Christian character of the $oly City.

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14. RECOMMENDATIONS
In line with the reports from previous years, the ,D $eads of Mission in Jerusalem and <amallah have drawn up a set of recommendations with the aim of preserving the possibility for a two(state solution to the Middle ,ast conflict with Jerusalem as a future capital of two states, in accordance with numerous statements by the ,D, not least its Council Conclusions of B Gecember )55C. &hile most recommendations made in )51) are still valid and relevant, the current specific political circumstances, including in particular the ongoing peace negotiations, demand an immediate and particular focus on issues that represent an imminent threat to a successful outcome of the current peace tal s. <ecommendations to the ,D and its Member 4tatesF A. PRESER&ING THE &IA)ILITY O" JERUSALEM AS THE "UTURE CAPITAL O" T*O STATES 1. "urther strengthen ,D efforts to counter settlement activity in and around ,ast Jerusalem that constitutes a particular threat to the two(state solution, including through an intensified engagement with Israel and with relevant international partners. In particular see toF( a. Monitor closely developments on the ground in a coordinated manner in view of delivering timely and appropriate ,D responses on settlement mattersb. $ighlight the ris s that settlement construction, particularly in ,1, constitutes for preserving Jerusalem as the future capital of two statesc. Monitor and respond appropriately to forced transfer of the 'edouin communities in ,1d. Increase monitoring of settler violence, and the responses of the Israeli authorities to such incidents and advocate firm action and increased efforts to bring perpetrators :usticee. Consider possible conse!uences for nown violent settlers and those calling for such acts of violence as regards immigration regulations in ,D member states.

). "urther encourage current efforts to fully and +,,+c-./+01 .230+2+4- +5.6-.47 EU 0+7.60a-.84 and bilateral arrangements applicable to settlement products. In particularF( a. Continue to apply the ,D(Israel Association Agreement, in particular so that products produced in settlements do not benefit from preferential treatmentb. Continue to apply the L7uidelines on the ,ligibility of Israeli ,ntities and their Activities in the *erritories 2ccupied by Israel since June 1C=? for grants, pri.es and financial instruments funded by the ,D from )511 onwardsLc. *a e further steps to ensure that consumers in the ,D are able to e+ercise their right to an informed choice in respect of settlement products in conformity with e+isting ,D rules of origin and labelling, including other possible future measures-

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d. <aise awareness amongst ,D citi.ens and businesses on the ris s related to economic and financial activities in the settlements, including financial transactions, investments, purchases, procurements and services. 0. <egarding 9+280.-.846 in ,ast Jerusalem a. ,nsure close ,D monitoring on this issueb. In statements and in contacts with the Israeli authorities, highlight the ,D%s serious concern about the ongoing house demolitions and call for a halt to all demolitions in contravention of I$/c. 4trengthen the right to housing, land and property through continued support for legal actions on public interest cases and legal assistance to people facing demolition orders. ). MAINTENANCE O" A PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONAL PRESENCE IN EAST JERUSALEM 1. Press for the reopening, as stipulated in the <oad Map, of Palestinian institutions in ,ast Jerusalem in high level meetings with Israeli representatives as well with international partners. In that regardF a. 4upport and further strengthen the viability of the ,ast Jerusalem hospitalsb. 4upport the reopening of the 2rient $ouse. 9. 4upport the engagement of the Palestinian leadership in the political, economic, social and cultural development of ,ast Jerusalem. =. ,ncourage ,D and its Member 4tates to regularly host meetings with Palestinian officials in ,ast Jerusalem. ?. 4upport Palestinian artists and Palestinian cultural institutions in ,ast Jerusalem. Maintain the offer for ,uropean cultural events to be hosted by such institutions. C. ENDING EAST JERUSALEM:S SOCIOECONOMIC ISOLATION B. In statements and with relevant contacts, stress the ,D%s concern at the .4cr+a6.47 .680a-.84 8, Ea6- J+r;6a0+2 from the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory. C. ,+press concern about I6ra+0. 380.c.+6, which hinder Palestinian access to ,ast(Jerusalem, including its holy sites, and which contribute to the forced transfer of Palestinians from ,ast Jerusalem, and in that regardF( a. Call on Israel to remove restrictions on the movement of goods and services between the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory and ,ast Jerusalemb. Call on Israel to end discriminatory Israeli visa practises restricting freedom of movement of ,D citi.ens, including access to Jerusalem and ,D consular services located therec. Call on Israel to lift discriminatory restrictions on family reunification and end the practice of revo ing residency rights.

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15. In close co(ordination with relevant partners, further promote +c8482.c 9+/+0832+4- in ,ast Jerusalem as well as call for the re(opening of the Arab Chamber of Commerce. 11. In contacts with relevant interlocutors and in statements, reiterate the ,D%s serious concern at the 0ac< 8, a9+=;a-+ 3;>0.c .4,ra6-r;c-;r+ a49 6+r/.c+6 in ,ast Jerusalem. In that regardF( a. Call on Israel to support, in accordance with I$/, an improvement of basic social services Jsuch as those provided by ,ast Jerusalem hospitals, elderly and psychosocial care, secondary education, as well as *echnical and @ocational ,ducation and *rainingK to Palestiniansb. Call on Israel to assure the integrity of the Palestinian schooling system by maintaining the Palestinian curricula in ,ast Jerusalem schools- improving significantly school infrastructure as well as addressing the shortage of classrooms and of trained teachers in such schools. 1). Continue to provide assistance to ensure that Palestinians are included in the development of ;r>a4 8;-0.4+ 30a46 .4 Ea6- J+r;6a0+2 to help meet Palestinian housing needs and continue to support efforts to improve h8;6.47 c849.-.846 in ,ast Jerusalem, including in the 2ld City. D. STRENGTHENING THE RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY O" THE CITY 10. 4upport efforts to preserve the rich religious and cultural heritage of ,ast Jerusalem, including its Palestinian identity, which is at ris of further degradation. In this regard F( a. Call for mutual respect of cultural and historical ties of all Abrahamic religions to Jerusalem and its holy sitesb. 4tress the ,D%s concerns about access to ,ast(Jerusalem including its holy sites for Palestinians from the rest of the &est 'an and 7a.ac. Continue to monitor closely developments at the City of Gavid comple+ and new plans for the 4ilwan neighbourhoodd. ,+press serious concern about the increasingly tense situation at $aram Al 4harif>*emple Mounte. 4tress the importance of maintaining the integrity of the $aram Al 4harif>*emple Mount and of preserving the status !uof. 4upport and encourage inter(faith dialogue in Jerusalem.

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