Basis for Battle

Ethnic Conflict is often a multidimensional and sometimes misleading story, making it almost impossible to find a definition of, but it often involves much more than the struggle between two groups of different religion, race or language as often thought, and has come to encompass the struggle for land, respect, rights and freedoms, resources, and power along with others. Some would argue that with the effects of globalization it has also begun to involve much more than the two parties at hand, but brings about allies or enemies from countries all over the world. The history of the Kurdish conflict is no different than any of this, dating back to the 16th century when the region was split between the Safavid and Ottoman Empires, the people of the area have since endured a battle over principle, safety, and of course, more recently, oil.1 With all disputes boiling down to the land loss over 500 years ago and the consequences of such, whether or not a future independent Kurdish state is possible depends on the nature of these grounds, and the resolution of the three resulting battle fronts mentioned above. The grass roots nature of ethnic war is the difference in what two si des see to be right or fair, as well as sustaining the innate desire for a sense of belonging; when such ideals are challenged or taken from a group, their willingness to fight for it increases drastically. When the Ottoman Empire, one the Kurdish population so supported, began to threaten the authority of the emirs in fear of an independence movement, they were consequently threatening the livelihood of the Kurdish population in the region. For the first of many times, the Kurdish

Judah, T. (2002, February). In Iraqi Kurdistan. Survival , 39-51.

people were denied tenure to something rightfully theirs; and it sparked the willingness to fight, and the battle for power to be returned, that is still so evident today.2 The rug was once again pulled out from under the Kurdish population at the fall of the Ottoman Empire. With the alleged acceptance of the Treaty of Sevres, there was promise that Kurdistan would receive autonomy and possibly independence; however for numerous reasons including increasing Turkish dominance and Britains suspicions of the Kurdish intentions, the treaty was dissolved and Iraqi Kurdistan was put into British mandate.3 From a realist

perspective similarities can be drawn to Cuba and its situation during the cold war; both at one time were colonised nations fighting for independence -although Cuba with its own state and Kurdistan a part of others- they both lacked complete self governance, through either th influence of other nations or the empire itself. In Cubas case there was trust put in the Soviet Union during the Cold War when they promised weapons and means of protection for to the island nation in return for their cooperation during the war, but in the end the Soviets had themselves in mind and used Cuba as a pawn for their larger scheme, leaving them right where they left off; just as the British promise to Kurdistan for independence was abolished in the self interest of the British Empire.4 Foreign involvement also influences both nations, as the Americans played a large part in suppressing Cubas independence movement, Turkey often does the same in Iraq, through

Calgary, U. o. (1998). the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. Retrieved february 6, 2011, from The Islamic World to 1600: http://www.google.ca/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/imageislam/ottosafa1600.gif &imgrefurl=http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/islam/empires/safavid/abbas.html&usg=__ZCa9gy40Yl 0N3T0cBzbWO8bT_VE=&h=554&w=750&sz=57&hl=en& 3 World Directory of Minorities. (2008). Kurds. Retrieved february 2, 2011, from World Directory of Minorities: http://www.faqs.org/minorities/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Kurds.html 4 Sens, A., & Stoett, P. (2010). Global Politics origins, currents, directions. Toronto: Nelson Education Ltd.

the threat of violence if nothing else. If an independence movement were to be successful in the Iraqi Kurdish territory, the Turkish Kurds would be considered a risk to the government in that they may attempt the same thing, resulting in the governments loss of land and power. To avoid such international thumbscrews as put by Tim Judah, Kurdistan must pretend that their intentions are not to achieve independence, but instead be satisfied with a federalist system and remain for now, in tact with Iraq.
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The Kurdish region of Iraq is in many ways equipped to sustain itself, including the forces of its 175,000 man Peshmerga, however during the horrific chemical attack of Halabja, neither the Kurdish fighters, nor the international community were successful in defending the region.7 In the eyes of the Kurdish population, this was letdown number two on the United States behalf.8 Its not possible to truly understand the desire for independence until such attacks are taken into account; after all, what bigger sign does one need that theyre not welcome in a state? One lesson that was learned, and quite possibly put the Kurdish people on the path to realism themselves, is that US support comes solely when there are benefits to be gained for them. Much of their involvement has failed to show a true stance on the Iraq Kurdistan situation, and rather attempts at minimizing the fighting and economic standoffs in the region. Their reasons for such lay in the continued production of the surrounding oil companies, and their supply to the US, which means a unified Iraq, must be kept as such.9
10

5 6

Judah, T. (2002, February). In Iraqi Kurdistan. Survival , 39-51. Logan, D. (2009). Thoughts on Iraqi Kurdistan, present realities, future hopes. Iran and the Caucases , 161-186. 7 Schorn, D. (2007, August 5). Kurdistan: The Other Iraq. Retrieved February 6, 2011, from CBS news, 60 Minutes: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/16/60minutes/main2486679_page2.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentB ody 8 Judah, T. (2002, February). In Iraqi Kurdistan. Survival , 39-51. 9 Axe, D. (2005). Kurdistan Rising. New York: the Village Voice News. 10 Singh, S. (2011, february 1). Class Lecture.

The ally-instated no fly zone, of northern Iraq is to mediate the two sides for the time being rather than solve the problem permanently. Perhaps too much reliance has been placed on a country that shows little sign of complete Kurdish support. With Peshmerga and Iraqi national army at times not able to keep the peace along the green line, without American help, border protection is certainly going to be a hurdle the Kurdish need to overcome if they are to attain independence.1112 Realising such ulterior motives are present within the American agenda, as well as well as taking into account all international influences, much of Kurdistan was hesitant to have any involvement with the US 2003 invasion of Iraq, which could have quite possibly come with severe international backlash for the group; however with the ousting of Saddam Hussein through American efforts, now might be the time to take advantage of the help they can receive from their American associates, especially since it appears Kurdistan remains to this day without true friends, but rather just shifting alliances and interests.13 The Kirkuk region is of the most disputed between the Kurdish region, Iraq and even Turkey, and what lies in the region is what much of the recent conflict has come to be based on: oil. With the supply available in Kirkuk and northern Iraq the Kurdish society could become independently prosperous, however the Iraqi government has also known the power of oil money for many years and is no way about to sacrifice such a resource; especially when all else seems unstable. Many solutions have been suggested to the tug of war over the land, such as an article 140 in the constitution which recommending that the problem goes to a vote over to

11 12

Gunter, M. (2004). The Kurds in Iraq. Middle East Policy , 106-131. Anonymous. (2010). Too Late to Keep the Peace? Iraq's dangerous trigger line. The Economist , 50. 13 Judah, T. (2002, February). In Iraqi Kurdistan. Survival , 39-51.

who the land should belong.14

15

However the other aspect to the article was to reverse

previous arabization policies set in place by Hussein, which would mean the region would return to a majority Kurdish population; certainly not a motion the federal government was about to support.16 The Iraqi government has therefore used such reasoning (although as a cover for many others) to postpone the vote year after year; initially supposed to take place in 2007, it has still yet to.17 One discrepancy that lays cause to many issues over oil, is that the oil industry itself is a regional power, therefore in large part in the hands of the Kurdish government; however international affairs is a role of the federal government so the two conflict when it comes to multinational corporations looking to invest in Iraqi oil; something the Kurdish population is a big fan of.18 Recent federal recognition of Kurdish foreign oil deals as being legitimate leaves cause to believe that a resolution may seem closer than thought. Resolution over oil means much less desire for confrontation between Kurdistan and Iraq, leaving a glimmer of hope, not for independence but a much more civilized federalist nation. Although many other factors are at play when it comes to the centuries of conflict between the Kurdish minority in Iraq and Iraq itself, the main struggle is that over land for the 30 million people considered to be the largest nation without a state; a struggle built on the premise of principle, safety and oil.19 So as suggested by Darren Logan, the only just solution is one that protects the Kurdish people from a repeat of past abuses at the hands of Iraqs

14 15

NA. (2008). a Kurdish Conundrum. the Economist . Stansfield, G., & Anderson, L. (2009). Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil. Middle East Policy , 134-146. 16 (Stasfield & Anderson, 2009) 17 (Stansfield & Anderson, 2009) 18 (Stansfield & Anderson, 2009) 19 Stansfield, G. (2005). the Kurds: Nation Without a State. annual meeting of the International Studies Association (pp. 1-28). Honolulu: All Academic.

dominant Arab majority; meaning, writing the wrongs of the early 20 th century, fulfilling the terms of the treaty of Sevres, and eventually gaining independence. 20 Unlike many suppressed minorities, Kurdistan has been able to flourish with its isolation in the north, and is in many ways better off than the majority, however unfortunately for turkey and related states with Kurdish minorities they are setting quite an example for other Kurdish populations, and in many ways, for minorities around the world. As quoted by Tim Judah, If you are sick, you visit the doctor. He prescribes the medicine. You take a spoonful three times a day, and eventually you are better, you are free. However if you drank the whole bottle all at once, it would kill you.21 For the same threat of extinction, the Kurdish nation must be careful not to be too eager in pursuing their goals, and step on the toes of any domestic or international adversary along the way; however if they play their cards right, and are able to take advantage of the situation presented to them by US involvement in the region, there is cautious optimism that a solution can be found for the minority of Iraq.22

20 21

Logan, D. (2009). Thoughts on Iraqi Kurdistan, present realities, future hopes. Iran and the Caucases , 161-186. Judah, T. (2002, February). In Iraqi Kurdistan. Survival , 39-51. 22 (Judah, 2002)

Works Cited
Anonymous. (2010). Too Late to Keep the Peace? Iraq's dangerous trigger line. The Economist , 50. Axe, D. (2005). Kurdistan Rising. New York: the Village Voice News. Calgary, U. o. (1998). the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. Retrieved february 6, 2011, from The Islamic World to 1600: http://www.google.ca/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/imageislam/ottos afa1600.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/islam/empires/safavid/abbas.htm l&usg=__ZCa9gy40Yl0N3T0cBzbWO8bT_VE=&h=554&w=750&sz=57&hl=en& Gunter, M. (2004). The Kurds in Iraq. Middle East Policy , 106-131. Judah, T. (2002, February). In Iraqi Kurdistan. Survival , 39-51. Logan, D. (2009). Thoughts on Iraqi Kurdistan, present realities, future hopes. Iran and the Caucases , 161-186. NA. (2008). a Kurdish Conundrum. the Economist . Schorn, D. (2007, August 5). Kurdistan: The Other Iraq. Retrieved February 6, 2011, from CBS news, 60 Minutes: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/16/60minutes/main2486679_page2.shtml?tag=contentMai n;contentBody Sens, A., & Stoett, P. (2010). Global Politics origins, currents, directions. Toronto: Nelson Education Ltd. Singh, S. (2011, february 1). Class Lecture. Stansfield, G. (2005). the Kurds: Nation Without a State. annual meeting of the International Studies Association (pp. 1-28). Honolulu: All Academic. Stansfield, G., & Anderson, L. (2009). Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil. Middle East Policy , 134-146. World Directory of Minorities. (2008). Kurds. Retrieved february 2, 2011, from World Directory of Minorities: http://www.faqs.org/minorities/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Kurds.html