Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Keep It in "Park": How The CPSC Is Stretching The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Beyond The Breaking Point
Keep It in "Park": How The CPSC Is Stretching The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Beyond The Breaking Point
2009 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202.588.0302
Washington Legal Foundation
WLF
Vol. 28 No. 11 August 23, 2013
CPSCs MISUSE OF RCO DOCTRINE
BODES ILL FOR CEOs AND CONSUMERS
by
Sheila A. Millar and Kathryn M. Biszko
On June 19, 2013, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied a request by the National Association
of Manufacturers (NAM), Retail Industry Leaders Association, and National Retail Federation to intervene in
the Consumer Product Safety Commissions (CPSC) case of In re Maxfield and Oberton Holdings, LLC, et
al. Industry members had hoped to help challenge the Agencys unprecedented decisions to (1) name a
dissolved corporations former CEO individually as a respondent in the recall case; and (2) apply the
responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine outside the criminal context. Although the ALJ denied this
request, CPSCs effort to expand the Agencys enforcement powers raises broad public policy concerns,
including whether its actions will chill reasonable objections to CPSCs future recall demands, unduly expand
the definition of childrens products, jeopardize expected legal protections of incorporation, and extend the
RCO doctrine into uncharted territory.
Background. The case of Maxfield and Oberton (M&O) began in 2011, when the companys
Buckyballs magnet novelty item for adults came under CPSC scrutiny following reports of ingestion
injuries. M&O initially worked with CPSC to develop more robust warnings on the top, side, and carrying
case, updating packaging and labeling to specify that the products were for adult use only, including strong
warnings about risks from accidental ingestion, and voluntarily recalling all magnets without the new
warning. M&O then obtained a letter from CPSCs General Counsel indicating that the product could be
legally sold. However, CPSC later decided that the new warnings were insufficient, and in July, 2012 the
agency filed an administrative complaint seeking to force M&O to recall the product and refund the purchase
price to customers. Because the agency sought to completely stop M&O from selling its only product line,
this became a bet-the-company case.
M&O strongly objected to CPSCs decision and launched a public relations campaign to tell the
companys side of the story. As part of the campaign, M&O CEO Craig Zucker appeared on radio and
television shows, criticizing CPSCs attempt to ban the product and claiming that the agency was employing
bullying tactics to put an American small business out of business. For example, the agency reportedly
pressured retailers to stop carrying Buckyballs, and it issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to effectively
ban the product in September, 2012.
1
On December 27, 2012, M&O filed a Certificate of Cancellation with
the state of Delaware, and dissolved as a corporation. It established a Liquidating Trust to settle any
outstanding claims. Even though this development meant that Buckyballs would no longer be available for
sale anywhere, even on the companys website, CPSC continued to pursue its complaint against the
company.
2
In response to the notice of M&Os dissolution, CPSC filed a second amended complaint in February
2013 seeking to add Mr. Zucker, both individually and as an officer of the former corporation, as a
1
77 Fed. Reg. 53781 (Sept. 4, 2012).
2
In the Matter of Maxfield and Oberton Holdings, LLC, CPSC Docket 12-1 (2013).
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 42
Copyright 82013 Washington Legal Foundation ISBN 1056 3059 2
respondent. CPSC argued that Mr. Zucker should be held individually liable for conducting a recall and
refunding the purchase price to customers. Despite Mr. Zuckers objections, an Administrative Law Judge
granted CPSCs motion on May 3, 2013. Oddly, the Agency did not seek to add the Liquidating Trust as a
respondent, nor did it seek to add Mr. Zuckers co-owner (who had not personally criticized the CPSC in
public). In the meantime, in April, 2013, a number of retailers did announce recalls of the products in
cooperation with CPSC.
If CPSCs efforts to hold Mr. Zucker personally liable succeed, this case will set a disturbing
precedent, giving CPSC added leverage in negotiating recalls and penalties with product manufacturers,
especially small businesses and owner-operated businesses.
CPSAs Recognition of the Corporate Form. Although the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA)
establishes criminal and civil penalties against individuals for statutory violations, it does not confer authority
on CPSC to compel an individual to carry out a recall. In opposing CPSCs motion to name him individually,
Mr. Zucker argued that the plain wording of CPSA Section 15 only authorizes the manufacturer, distributor
or retailer to conduct a recall. In some cases, the manufacturer, distributor or retailer could be an individual
who conducted business without forming a corporation or partnership, but that was not the situation here.
Mr. Zucker argued that because manufacture and distribution were handled by a legitimate corporate entity,
not personally, he could not be subject to personal liability under Section 15.
Mr. Zucker further argued that under U.S. corporate law, an officer, director, or shareholder of a
corporation is not responsible for the debts or obligations of the corporation.
3
Indeed, the general
presumption is that individuals are not responsible for the actions and liabilities of their corporate employers
except in rare instances where Congress has decided to supersede this protection by statute.
4
Courts will
pierce the corporate veil to hold shareholders or officers liable for the actions of a corporation under
exceptional circumstances, such as where the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose,
and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote injustice.
5
Mr. Zuckers actions do not
justify disregard of the corporate form.
The Park Doctrine and CPSC. Despite these arguments, the ALJ agreed with CPSC and held that
the responsible corporate officer doctrine permitted Mr. Zucker to be added individually as a respondent. The
RCO doctrine, also known as the Park doctrine, began as a legal mechanism to hold high-ranking corporate
executives criminally liable for violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), even absent
knowledge of or participation in the violation. Supreme Court cases United States v. Dotterweich and United
States v. Park (reaffirming Dotterweich) held that a corporate agent who stands in a responsible relation to
a misdemeanor may be held criminally liable for FDCA violations, even if the corporate officer did not play a
direct role in the misconduct.
6
Although the Park doctrine originated in the food and drug context, it also has
been applied in the context of other public health and welfare statutes. Most notably, the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act expressly provide that a responsible corporate officer may be held liable for violations
of those statutes.
7
In its recent ruling, the ALJ held that it must only determine whether, under the RCO doctrine, Mr.
Zucker could be held individually responsible for the alleged CPSA transgressions of the corporation.
Because the CPSA relates to the publics health and safety, the ALJ reasoned that Dotterweich and Park
controlled in this case. The ALJ found the complaint sufficiently alleged liability under the RCO doctrine,
citing CPSCs argument that Mr. Zucker was responsible for ensuring Maxfields compliance with
applicable statutes and regulations . . . . [and] personally controlled the acts and practices of Maxfield,
3
See Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 1995).
4
The Model Business Corporations Act states: [A] shareholder is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation
except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct. Model Bus. Corp. Act 6.22(b) (1984).
5
SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666, 672 (Conn. 1991) (quoting Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. &
Paving Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 412 (Conn. 1982)).
6
320 U.S. 277 (1943); 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
7
See 42 U.S.C. 7413 (c)(6); 33 U.S.C. 1319(c)(6).
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 43
Copyright 82013 Washington Legal Foundation ISBN 1056 3059 3
including the importation of Buckyballs and Buckycubes.
8
This interpretation misapplies the Dotterweich and Park precedents and positions the case to expand
CPSCs authority significantly beyond the scope of its governing statutes. Mr. Zuckers conduct in refusing
to agree to a voluntary recallinstead insisting that the Agency meet its statutory obligation to first prove that
the product posed a substantial product hazarddoes not even rise to the level of a regulatory violation, let
alone criminal conduct that might implicate the traditional RCO doctrine.
Section 21 of CPSA states that any individual director, officer, or agent of a corporation who
knowingly and willfully violates Section 19 of the Act shall be subject to criminal penalties.
9
Section 19
violations include the sale and distribution of a product that is explicitly banned or otherwise prohibited under
a CSPC regulation. A suit against a corporate officer who violated Section 19 would look a lot more like a
Park doctrine type case by holding a corporate executive responsible for violations of a statute or regulation
on his or her watch.
However, in pursuing this case, CPSC is seeking an administrative determination that Buckyballs
adult magnet sets do in fact present a substantial product hazard within the meaning of Section 15(a)(2) of
CPSA. If this finding is made, CPSC further seeks an order compelling a recall of the product and a refund of
the purchase price to consumers. Crucially, the sale and distribution of the product do not violate the statute
unless and until Buckyballs are classified as a substantial product hazard. Hence, given the present posture
of the matter before the ALJ, the equitable policy served by the RCO doctrine could not possibly have been
satisfied in this case, much less merit application in a civil matter.
CPSC argued that the addition of Mr. Zucker was appropriate, saying it simply allows the court to
identify a responsible corporate official who can carry out an Order in this proceeding.
10
The CPSC further
alleged that the liquidating trust contains woefully insufficient funds to provide compensation to consumers
and that justice requires the court to require Mr. Zucker to provide the requested relief.
11
This policy
argument has far-reaching implications, as it breaches the most basic protection from personal liability
ostensibly offered by the corporate form. Compelling a former officer of a dissolved corporation to
personally refund consumers for products which have not yet been determined to pose a substantial product
hazard misreads consumer product safety law, but imposing personal liability absent any showing of
undercapitalization or other fraudeven if a substantial product hazard determination had been made
undermines the business communitys ability to rely on the protection of the corporate form.
Public Policy Considerations in Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine. Product
manufacturers, distributors, and retailersand individuals managing these companieshave a legal right to
challenge a government agencys determination that a product recall is warranted based on legitimate, but
different, interpretations of applicable statutes as applied to specific facts. Individuals do not check their free
speech rights at the door when they disagree with agency actions and exercise their rights to object.
Although CPSC plays a valuable role in protecting the public, it has not been granted absolute power
to halt commerce without demonstrating a need to protect consumers from danger, consistent with its
statutory authority. Those circumstances do not appear to be present in this case. Instead, CPSC is seeking to
disregard the valid corporate form, raising questions about whether other individuals involved in product
safety decisionsespecially those who disagree publicly with initial Commission decisionscould face
exposure to personal liability if they resist a voluntary recall request.
Beyond the clear economic danger to companies and corporate officers, this precedent could harm the
cooperative relationship between corporations and the CPSC. This action creates a perverse incentive for
corporate officers to avoid reporting product hazards to the CPSC, out of fear that their personal finances and
8
Order Granting Complaint Counsel's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaints in Docket Nos. 12-1 and 12-2 at 14,
CPSC Docket 12-1 and 12-2 (2013).
9
15 U.S.C. 2070(b) (2011).
10
Reply in Support of the Complaint Counsels Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaints in Docket Nos. 12-1 and
12-2 at 2, CPSC Docket 12-1 and 12-2 (2013).
11
CPSCs claim that the liquidating trust lacked sufficient funds also ignores the fact that the vast majority of consumers in a
product recall like this do not return the product.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 44
Copyright 82013 Washington Legal Foundation ISBN 1056 3059 4
familys welfare could be put at risk. Such a disincentive is contrary to the general interests of the CPSC and
the public, who depend upon corporate cooperation to monitor and report potential product hazards.
Another concern is whether the Commission is improperly seeking to re-categorize an adult product
as a childrens product. Defining childrens products was a seminal issue during discussions of the
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) in 2008. Suggestions that childrens products be
defined by their appeal to children were rejected in favor of defining childrens products as those designed
or intended primarily for children 12 years of age or younger.
12
A statement by a manufacturer about
intended use, including a label if such statement is reasonable, representations in packaging, display, or
advertising about whether the product is appropriate for use by children, whether the product is commonly
recognized as being intended for use by a child, and the Commissions Age Determination Guidelines are
factors to consider.
Here, the warnings and distribution mode illustrate that the primary intended users were adults.
Warnings are a commonly accepted tool to help adults make sure children are not exposed to unsuitable
products, and there is no legal duty to manufacture products that are always safe for childrenthus the Keep
Away from Children warning found on many household products. From matches, lighters, and fireworks to
butcher knives, chainsaws, and superglues, numerous dangerous but useful legal products are sold intended
solely for use by adults. Hence, the decision to pursue a Buckyballs recall against M&O and Mr. Zucker
raises troubling questions about the ability of any manufacturer to make good-faith decisions about the
intended user demographic (adults) and to utilize strong warnings about hazards if a product attracts
unwanted attention from under-age consumers.
Another immediate implication of this lawsuit, if successful, is that that the corporate form would no
longer protect former officers after dissolution if CPSC seeks a recall of a product. NAM et al. outlined just
some of the questions about how this doctrine would be applied within the context of CPSC rules regarding
reports of potential product hazards and recall negotiations, saying, in their motion to intervene:
The equities do not support setting aside all the protections of the business entity where there has
not been alleged or pleaded any arguable wrongdoing on the part of the individual. In this case,
Mr. Zucker directed the actions of a limited liability corporation that marketed a legal product.
Further, he relied repeatedly on CPSC guidance about marketing and labeling of the product in
doing so. Then CPSC staff changed its mind. To now suggest that Mr. Zucker should be exposed
to potential personal liability, and the attendant costs of defending himself, as a result, is
inequitable in the extreme
13
Not only does this decision attack the essential nature of the corporate form, whose very purpose is to
shield individuals from liability for corporate acts, but it utterly misconstrues the RCO doctrine. Using that
doctrine to find a CEO personally liable for conduct that was not even a regulatory violation, let alone
criminal, risks creating a new standard: strict personal liability for merely failing to agree to an agencys
request. Such a precedent would eviscerate the voluntary nature of the recall process, empower the CPSC to
engage in backdoor rulemaking, and leave business owners unable to rely on clear rules known in advance.
Supplanting standard rulemaking processes legislated in CPSCs organic statutes through this action
undermines principles of administrative law.
Conclusion. In an increasingly regulated marketplace, business owners should not have to fear
personal and financial ruin for alleged offenses that are decided retroactively, such as substantial hazard
findings under the CPSA. Accountability for wrongdoing adds to our confidence in product safety; however,
government shakes that confidence when it takes actions that are perceived as unfair. Allowing the Agencys
pursuit of an individual corporate employee personally under Park and its progeny to move forward under
these facts is just such an example.
12
15 U.S.C. 2052 (a)(2).
13
Memorandum in Support of Zuckers Request for Interlocutory Determination of Status as Proper Party to Proceeding at 2, CPSC
Docket 12-1 and 12-2 (2013).
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 45
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CAUSE OF ACTION )
1919 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 650 )
Washington, D.C. 20006, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No.: _____________________
v. )
) Judge: _______________________
UNITED STATES CONSUMER PRODUCT )
SAFETY COMMISSION )
4330 East West Highway )
Bethesda, MD 20814 )
)
Defendant. )
__________________________________________ )
COMPLAINT
This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking
the release of records requested by Cause of Action from the United States Consumer Product
Safety Commission.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This Court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552(a)(4)(B), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(E)(iii), and 28 U.S.C. 1331.
2. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(e)(1)(C) and
5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B).
PARTIES
3. Cause of Action (COA or Plaintiff) is a non-profit, nonpartisan organization that
educates the public on how government transparency and accountability protects economic
opportunities for American taxpayers. In furtherance of this mission, Plaintiff regularly requests
Case 1:14-cv-00541 Document 1 Filed 04/01/14 Page 1 of 7
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 46
2
access to the public records of federal government agencies, entities, and offices, and
disseminates its findings.
4. The United States Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC or Defendant) is
an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 552(f)(1). Defendant has possession, custody, and
control of records to which COA seeks access and that are the subject of this Complaint.
FACTS
5. This matter involves a FOIA request related to CPSCs efforts, through heavy-
handed regulatory overreach, to shut down a number of successful and responsible businesses,
including one that was operated by Mr. Craig Zucker.
6. Mr. Zucker is the former General Manager of Maxfield and Oberton Holdings,
LLC (M&O), a now-dissolved company that previously imported and sold Buckyballs and
Buckycubes, rare earth magnetic adult executive desk toys that CPSC seeks to recall and ban.
7. Buckyballs are small magnetic spheres, a few millimeters in diameter. When
many are placed together, they can be formed into innumerable shapes and patterns.
Manipulating Buckyballs into different shapes and patterns is an entertaining way to relieve
stress and exercise the mind. Buckycubes are small magnetic cubes that M&O marketed and
sold using the same safety program developed for Buckyballs.
8. Buckyballs and Buckycubes are completely safe when used as intended. Like
many other products, they may cause harm if ingested. For this reason, M&O never marketed its
products towards children.
9. On July 10, 2012, without warning or evidence of a statistically significant
number of injuries, and after years of working side-by-side with M&O in the development of its
safety program, the CPSCs Office of Compliance issued a preliminary determination that
M&Os products were defective and that its safety program would not work.
Case 1:14-cv-00541 Document 1 Filed 04/01/14 Page 2 of 7
This matter involves a FOIA request related to CPSCs efforts, through heavy-
handed regulatory overreach, to shut down a number of successful and responsible businesses,
including one that was operated by Mr. Craig Zucker.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 47
3
10. At this point, CPSC initiated an all-out effort to shut down M&O. CPSC
immediately began contacting many of M&Os major retailers, telling them that Buckyballs
and Buckycubes were unsafe and requesting them to stop selling the products.
11. M&Os retailers almost unanimously caved in to the governments pressure and
intimidation.
12. In a good-faith effort to regain CPSCs favor and to save its business, M&O
submitted a voluntary Corrective Action Plan that proposed further expansions to its already-
robust safety program, including a child-resistant carrying case, the possibility of adding a
bittering agent, enhanced warnings, additional retail signs, and programs to further public
awareness of the danger of ingestion.
13. CPSC received the plan at 4:00 p.m. on July 24, 2012. On information and belief,
CPSC never read it. Instead, CPSC filed an administrative complaint against M&O on July 25,
2012, initiating a proceeding to order M&O to stop selling all of its products and to conduct a
total recall of all of its products already sold. See In the Matter of Maxfield and Oberton
Holdings, LLC, CPSC Docket No 12-1 [hereinafter CPSC Proceeding], available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Recalls/Recall-Lawsuits/Adjudicative-Proceedings/.
14. On August 27, 2012, CPSC issued a news release stating that CPSC staff
estimates that small, high powered magnet sets were associated with 1,700 emergency room-
treated injuries between 2009 and 2011. The majority of injuries (70 percent) have been to
children 4 to 12 years of age. News Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commn, CPSC
Starts Rulemaking to Develop New Federal Standard for Hazardous, High-Powered Magnet Sets
(Aug. 27, 2012), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/en/newsroom/news-releases/2012/cpsc-starts-
rulemaking-to-develop-new-federal-standard-for-hazardous-high-powered-magnet-sets/
[hereinafter CPSC Press Release].
Case 1:14-cv-00541 Document 1 Filed 04/01/14 Page 3 of 7
10. At this point, CPSC initiated an all-out effort to shut down M&O. CPSC
immediately began contacting many of M&Os major retailers, telling them that Buckyballs
and Buckycubes were unsafe and requesting them to stop selling the products.
11. M&Os retailers almost unanimously caved in to the governments pressure and
intimidation.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 48
4
15. Without retailers willing to sell M&Os products in the face of CPSCs campaign
of duress and intimidation, the agency forced M&O out of business in a matter of months. On
December 27, 2012, M&O filed its certificate of cancellation with the Division of Corporations
of the Delaware Secretary of State and ceased to exist.
16. On February 11, 2013, CPSC moved to amend its complaint in the CPSC
Proceeding to add Mr. Zucker personally as a respondent. See CPSC Proceeding, CPSC Motion
for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Memorandum in Support (Feb. 11, 2013),
Docket Entry 29. The amended complaint seeks an order requiring Mr. Zucker to personally
conduct a full recall of M&Os products at an estimated cost of $57 million. Id.
17. CPSC has never filed an action to require an officer or former officer of a
company to personally conduct a recall. Suggesting that M&O has only purported to dissolve,
CPSC argues that Mr. Zucker must stand in the companys shoes because he exercised personal
control over its acts and practices. Id.
18. Amidst general concern over CPSCs heavy-handed tactics and its unfounded
legal theory regarding Mr. Zucker, COA sent a FOIA request to CPSC on November 12, 2013.
This request seeks access to the following records:
A. [A]ll records . . . underlying CPSCs estimate [that small, high-powered magnet
sets were associated with 1,700 emergency room-treated injuries between 2009
and 2011]. These records should include, but are not limited to, all responsive
reports of harm submitted to SaferProducts.gov, all responsive cases reported
through the National Electronic Surveillance System (NEISS) database,
responsive information contained in the Injury or Potential Injury Incident (IPII)
database, responsive information contained in the In-depth Investigation Database
(INDP), and relevant incident data received from the North American Society for
Pediatric Gastroenterology, Hepatology and Nutrition (NASPGHAN).
B. All records . . . related to the drafting, preparation and clearance of the April 12,
2013 CPSC recall release regarding the recall of Buckyballs and Buckycubes
by six retailers (CPSC Recall Release 13-168).
Case 1:14-cv-00541 Document 1 Filed 04/01/14 Page 4 of 7
18. Amidst general concern over CPSCs heavy-handed tactics and its unfounded
legal theory regarding Mr. Zucker, COA sent a FOIA request to CPSC on November 12, 2013.
This request seeks access to the following records:
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 49
5
C. All records . . . comprising the monthly progress reports of the six retailers who
agreed to participate in the Buckyballs and Buckycubes magnet recall that was
announced on April 12, 2013 (CPSC Recall Release 13-168).
D. All records . . . reflecting, regarding or referencing, and all communications
between, CPSC staff and Strong Force, Inc. regarding the product marketed as
NeoCube magnet sets.
E. All records . . . generated, downloaded or created by CPSC and/or its staff
containing, discussing, reflecting, regarding or referencing expressions of public
criticism or concern with respect to: (1) their conduct concerning the recall of
Buckyballs, Buckycubes, NeoCube or any other magnet sets, and/or (2) their
actions against [M&O] and/or Mr. Craig Zucker.
F. All records . . . generated, downloaded or created by CPSC and/or its staff
referencing or concerning Mr. Craig Zucker.
Ex. 1.
19. In order to expedite CPSCs response, COA disclaimed any interest in obtaining
the identity of any manufacturer other than M&O or Strong Force, Inc. Id.
20. COAs FOIA request included a request for a public interest fee waiver, as well as
a request to be recognized as a representative of the news media. Id.
21. By letter dated November 19, 2013, CPSC acknowledged receipt of COAs FOIA
request and assigned it a case number: #14-F-00079. CPSC did not invoke or request any
extension of the statutorily mandated time period within which to respond to COAs request,
stating merely that there may be delays in providing the records and that the records would be
made available to you at the earliest possible date. Ex. 2.
22. This acknowledgment letter has been the only update of any kind provided by
CPSC regarding COAs request. COA has made multiple attempts to obtain a status update from
CPSC to no avail.
23. For instance, on January 6, 2014, COA emailed CPSC requesting a status update
on COAs request. COA received no response. Ex. 3.
Case 1:14-cv-00541 Document 1 Filed 04/01/14 Page 5 of 7
21. By letter dated November 19, 2013, CPSC acknowledged receipt of COAs FOIA
request and assigned it a case number: #14-F-00079. CPSC did not invoke or request any
extension of the statutorily mandated time period within which to respond to COAs request,
stating merely that there may be delays in providing the records and that the records would be
made available to you at the earliest possible date. Ex. 2.
22. This acknowledgment letter has been the only update of any kind provided by
CPSC regarding COAs request. COA has made multiple attempts to obtain a status update from
CPSC to no avail.
19. In order to expedite CPSCs response, COA disclaimed any interest in obtaining
the identity of any manufacturer other than M&O or Strong Force, Inc. ff Id.
20. COAs FOIA request included a request for a public interest fee waiver, as well as
a request to be recognized as a representative of the news media. Id.
23. For instance, on January 6, 2014, COA emailed CPSC requesting a status update
on COAs request. COA received no response. Ex. 3.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 50
6
24. On February 3, 2014, COA again emailed CPSC requesting a status update. COA
received no response. Ex. 4.
25. The FOIA and CPSCs regulations both require that CPSC respond to COAs
request within twenty (20) working days. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6); 16 C.F.R. 1015.5.
26. It has been more than 90 working days since COA submitted its FOIA request on
November 12, 2013.
27. Through the date of this Complaint, CPSC has not responded to COAs request
beyond issuing a routine acknowledgment letter. Ex. 2. CPSC has thus failed to comply with its
now long-expired statutory deadline by which to make a determination on COAs request.
COUNT I
Violation of the FOIA: Failure to Comply with Statutory Deadlines
28. COA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-27.
29. COA has exhausted its administrative remedies under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(C).
30. CPSC has improperly withheld agency records requested by COA by failing to
make a determination on COAs request within the time limit set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)
and in CPSCs implementing regulation, 16 C.F.R. 1015.5.
RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, COA respectfully requests that this Court grant the following relief:
a. order CPSC to produce, by a date certain, all reasonably segregable, non-exempt
records responsive to COAs FOIA request;
b. provide for expeditious proceedings in this action;
c. award COA its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in this action pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(E); and,
d. grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Case 1:14-cv-00541 Document 1 Filed 04/01/14 Page 6 of 7
24. On February 3, 2014, COA again emailed CPSC requesting a status update. COA
received no response. Ex. 4.
26. It has been more than 90 working days since COA submitted its FOIA request on
November 12, 2013.
27. Through the date of this Complaint, CPSC has not responded to COAs request
beyond issuing a routine acknowledgment letter. Ex. 2. CPSC has thus failed to comply with its
now long-expired statutory deadline by which to make a determination on COAs request.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 51
7
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: April 1, 2014 /s/ Allan Blutstein
Allan Blutstein
D.C. Bar No. 486156
/s/ Reed D. Rubinstein
Reed D. Rubinstein
Senior Vice President for Litigation
D.C. Bar No. 400153
Cause of Action
1919 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Suite 650
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 499-4232 (telephone)
(202) 330-5842 (fax)
reed.rubinstein@causeofaction.org
Counsel for Plaintiff
Case 1:14-cv-00541 Document 1 Filed 04/01/14 Page 7 of 7
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 52
VIAE-MAIL
Office of the Secretary
()1l cAUSE
- , oACTION
Advoeates lor Govenun.ent AeeountabUity
A 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Corporation
November 12,2013
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Washington, D.C. 20207
Attn: Information Quality Guidelines
Re: Petition for Disclosure and Correction
Dear Sir/Madam:
This is a Petition for Disclosure and Correction in accordance with the Information Quality
Act {IQA);
1
the information quality guidelines issued by the Office of Management and Budget,
(the "OMB Guidelines");
2
and, IQA Guidelines issued by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC or the "Commission").
3
This Petition seeks: (a) disclosure of the data and
methods needed to determine whether influential information disseminated by the CPSC regarding
(1) magnets sold under the trade names Buckyballs and Buckycubes and (2) a defunct company
called Maxfield and Oberton Holdings, LLC ("M&O") meet IQA requirements, and (b) correction
of disseminated influential information that does not appear to meet statutory and OMB information
quality requirements.
I. REQUESTOR' S IDENTITY
The requestor is Craig Zucker, through his counsel, Cause of Action, Inc. a 50l(c)(3)
government accountability organization.
The CPSC has illegally named Mr. Zucker, M&O's former CEO, as an individual
respondent in the matter titled: In the matter of MAXFIELD AND OBERTON HOLDINGS LLC, et
1
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-154 (App. C), 44 U.S.C. 3516 Note.
2
67 Fed. Reg. 8452-60 (Feb. 22, 2002).
3
Information Quality Guidelines, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM' N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/Research--Statistics/Information-Quality-Guidelines/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2013) [hereinafter IQA Guidelines]. OMB Guidelines set the minimum information quality
standards that CPSC must meet in this case. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3516 Note, Congress allowed
agencies to create administrative review and correction mechanisms with OMB approval, but
mandated agency compliance with quality standards contained in the OMB Guidelines). To the
extent that CPSC's own guidelines are less stringent, they do not apply.
1919 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Suite 6so
Wash in on, DC 2ooo6
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 53
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12, 2013
Page2
a/.
4
Mr. Zucker has suffered significant economic andre utational injury due to CPSC's violation
of the IQA, the OMB Guidelines, and its own IQA guidelines and as a conse uence ofCPSC's
wrongful dissemination of the information that is the subject of this Petition. CPSC's information
quality violations and wrongful dissemination drove M&O, Mr. Zucker's former employer, out of
business. Therefore, Mr. Zucker is an "affected person" entitled to seek and obtain IQA correction.
II. SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE INFORMATION THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS
PETITION.
A. The influential information that is the sub ect of this Petition includes the following
statements disseminated in an A ril12, 2013 recall announcement:
1. These products contain defects in the design, warnings and
instructions which pose a substantial risk of injury and death to children and
teenagers.
2. These retailers have agreed to participate because Maxfield &
Oberton has refused to artici ate in the recall of all Buckyballs and
Buck cubes.
3 In July 2012, CPSC staff filed an administrative complaint against
Maxfield & Oberton Holdings LLC, of New York N.Y., after discussions with the
company and its reQresentatives failed to result in a voluntary recall plan that CPSC
staff considered to be ade uate to address the very serious hazard osed by these
roducts.
4. CPSC has received 54 reports of children and teens ingesting this
~ r o d u t with 53 of these reguiring medical interventions
5
The influential disseminated information that is the subject of this Petition also
includes the following statement contained in a CPSC news release: "CPSC Sues Maxfield &
Oberton Over Hazardous Buckyballs and Buckycube Desk Toys Action promQted by ongoing
harm to children from ingested magnets. "
6
4
U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n Docket 12-1 (consolidated).
5
Recall Announcement, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, Six Retailers Announce Recall of
Buckyballs and Buckycubes High-Powered Magnet Sets Due to Ingestion Hazard (Apr. 12, 2013)
[hereinafter Recall Announcement], available at http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Recalls/2013/Six-
Retailers-Announce-Recall-of-Buckyballs-and-Buckycubes-High-Powered-Magnet-Sets/.
6
News Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, CPSC Sues Maxfield & Oberton Over
Hazardous Buckyballs and Buckycube Desk Toys Action prompted by ongoing harm to
children from ingested magnets (July 25, 2012) [hereinafter News Release] , available at
http://www .cpsc.gov I en!N ewsroom/N ews-Re1eases/20 12/CPSC-Sues-Maxfield--Oberton-Over-
Hazardous-Buckyballs-and-Buckycube-Desk-Toys-Action-prompted-by-ongoing-harm-to-children-
from-ingested-magnets-/.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 54
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12, 2013
Page 3
Ill. GROUNDS FOR DISCLOSURE AND CORRECTION.
Background
The IQA provides, in relevant part, that OMB "shall ... provide policy and procedural
guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies," and
that agencies must "establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and
obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply."
7
The law requires that CPSC disseminate only accurate and objective information that is
supported by scientifically-sound data. It also requires the Commission to ensure that Mr. Zucker
and others have meaningful access to the data and methodological information needed to test and
rePJOduce CPSC's claims and assertions}
Information quality is a direct function of objectivity and reproducibility.
9
As the OMB
Guidelines make clear, the public's capacity to test objectivity and reproducibility depends entirely
upon the full and accurate disclosure of data and research methods.
10
According to CPSC:
Under the OMB information guidelines three aspects of quality must be considered:
utility, objectivity, and integrity. In addition, for influential data, higher standards of
transparency and reproducibility must be met. CPSC's guidelines use the definitions
of the key statutory terms such as 'information,' 'disseminate,' 'utility,' 'objectivity,'
'integrity,' 'influential,' 'transparency,' and 'reproducibility' as defined in the OMB
guidelines.
11
The IQA bars CPSC and other federal agencies from disseminating inaccurate, imprecise,
unsupported, or misleading information, as it has done here. Correction is the congressionally-
mandated remedy. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Zucker is entitled to such relief.
The Disseminated Influential Information of Concern
A. Influential information disseminated in the April 12, 2013 recall announcement:
12
7
44 U.S.C. 3516 Note.
8
OMB Guidelines Ill(2), (3), V(3), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459-60.
9
Jd. at V(3), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459-60.
10
!d. at V(3)(a), 67 Fed. Reg. at 8455-58 (agency must identify sources of disseminated
information so public can assess for itself the objectivity of that information and have access to full,
accurate, transparent documentation and error sources affecting data quality).
11
IQA Guidelines, supra note 3.
12
See generally Recall Announcement, supra note 5.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 55
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12,2013
Page4
l. contain defects in the design, warnings and instructions,
which ose a substantial risk of injury and death to children and teenagers. "
Grounds for Disclosure/Correction: The claim that "defects in the design, warnings and instructions
... pose a substantial risk of injury and death" in the recall announcement, and on the CPSC
website, is the "dissemination" of"influential" scientific or statistical information because it (a)
concerns health and safety risks and (b) was designed to influence important private sector
decisions regarding the purchase and/or use of the subject products.
13
CPSC has wrongfully failed to define precisely the alleged "defects " or to disclose the
erformance standards needed for the design, warnings and instructions to avoid being termed
such. Indeed, CPSC has an on-going administrative rocceding in which the very guestion of
whether these products contains a " roduct defect" is being adjudicated.
14
Until that adjudication is
com Jete, the uestion of whether these products contain any kind of "defect" has not been decided,
and the unqualified statement to the contrary in CPSC's recall announcement is inaccurate.
Therefore, the "defect" claim fails the IQA's utility test because, without objective performance
metrics against which the relevant design, warnings, and instructions rna be tested, it is impossible
for the ublic to evaluate whether this information is useful or not.
15
Furthermore, the absence of such metrics means that CPSC fails the IQA 's presentation
objectivity test because it is impossible to determine whether its statement is accurate, clear,
com Jete and unbiased, as the law commands.
16
CPSC's "substantial risk" claim is also a particularly egregious IQA "substance" objectivity
violation. The OMB Guidelines state:
'Objectivity' includes whether disseminated information is being presented in an
accurate, clear, complete, and unbiased manner. This involves whether the
information is presented within a proper context. Sometimes .... other information
must also be disseminated in order to ensure an accurate, clear, complete, and
unbiased presentation. Also, the agency needs to identify the sources of the
disseminated information ... and, in a scientific, financial, or statistical context, the
supporting data and models, so that the public can assess for itself whether there may
be some reason to question the objectivity of the sources. Where appropriate, data
should have full, accurate, transparent documentation, and error sources affecting
data quality should be identified and disclosed to users.
17
13
OMB Guidelines V(8),(9), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
14
See In the Matter of Maxfield and Oberton Holdings, LLC, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm 'n
Docket No. 12-1 (consolidated case).
15
Id V(2), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
16
Id at V(3)(a), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
t7 Id
Zucker v. CPSC,Briefng Book Page 56
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12, 2013
Page 5
CPSC had a duty to provide "a high degree of transparency" about the data and methods that
it used to determine substantiality.
18
Yet, without some context, such as relative risk ratios, and
disclosure of its supporting data and models, CPSC's substantial risk claim cannot be evaluated for
accuracy or bias. Based on CPSC's own statistics, nursery equipment, toys, household cleaning
chemicals, single-load laundry packets, and trampolines are statistically far more dangerous to
children than Buckyballs and Buckycubes.
19
Even blankets cause a higher rate of
hospitalization and death.
20
Because CPSC fails to ut the alleged risk osed by Buckyballs and Buckycubes in
context, and offers no metrics for measuring substantiality, it wrongfully denies Zucker and other
members of the ublic their right to test and regroduce the CPSC's findings and violates the IQA's
utility and objectivity tests.
21
Furthermore, because CPSC claimed the products in question posed "a substantial risk of
injury or death," it was required to apply the test contained in the Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments.
22
This required CPSC to specify (a) each population addressed by any estimate of
risk; (b) the central estimate of risk for the specific populations affected; (c) each appropriate upper-
bound or lower-bound estimate of risk; (d) each significant uncertainty identified in the process of
risk assessment effects and the studies that would assist in resolving the uncertainty; and (e) peer-
reviewed studies known that support, are directly relevant to, or fail to support any estimate of risk
18
Jd. at V(3)(b)(ii), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
19
See, e.g., infra note 20.
20
According to CPSC, "nursery equipment" causes injuries requiring emergency room treatment at
the rate of 31.0 per 1 00,000 individuals in the population, and hospitalization or death at the rate of
1. 7 per 100,000. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, NATIONAL ELECTRONIC INJURY
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (NEISS) DATA HIGHLIGHTS- 2012 at 1, available at
http:/ /www.cpsc.gov/Global!Neiss _prod/20 12NeissDataHighlights.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
(the ''NEISS Data Highlights"). "Toys" cause 78.5 injuries requiring emergency room visits per
100,000, and hospitalization or death at the rate of2.2 per population of 100,000./d. CPSC has
never claimed that the injury rate for Buckyballs and Buckycubes even begins to approximate
these numbers, much less the numbers for "Sound recording equipment" (emergency room
treatment at the rate of 12.4 per 100,000 population, and hospitalization or death at the rate of 1.1
per 100,000 population), "blankets" (emergency room treatment at the rate of 4.4 children per
100,000 population, and hospitalization and/or death at a rate of 0.4 children per 100,000
population), or "Glass bottles and jars" (emergency room treatment at the rate of 12.4 children per
100,000 population, and hospitalization and/or death at a rate of 0.3 children per 100,000
population). !d. at 2-4.
21
OMB Guidelines V(2),(3), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
22
42 U.S.C. 300g- 1(b)(3)(A)-(B); OMB Guidelines V(3)(b)(ii)(C), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 57
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12, 2013
Page6
and the methodology used to reconcile inconsistencies in the scientific data.
23
CPSC, however,
wrongly failed to do any of these things and violated the IQA's utility and objectivity tests.
24
Reguested CPSC Action: Mr. Zucker re uests that CPSC disclose the statistical and scientific
metrics used to determine that there were "defects" in the R_roduct design, warnings and
instructions, and to determine substantiality with resQect to the alleged risk.
Mr. Zucker also requests that CPSC clarify and disclose all of its statistical and scientific
bases that supposedly support its determination of, and provide context for, the claims of risk,
injury, and/or hazard "substantiality" it made relative to Buckyballs and Buckycubes.
Mr. Zucker also requests that CPSC replace the phrase "These products contain defects in
the design, warnings and instructions, which pose a substantial risk of injury and death to children
and teenagers" on CPSC website with the phrase, "CPSC believes that the misuse of these products
by unsupervised children could, under certain circumstances, result in potential injury".
2. "These retailers have agreed to participate because Maxfield & Oberton has
reffised to participate in the recall of all Bucky_bal/s and Buckycubes. "
Grounds for Disclosure/Correction: The claim that "These retailers have agreed to participate
because Maxfield & Oberton has refused to participate in the recall of all Buckyballs and
Buckycubes" in the recall announcement and on the CPSC website is the "dissemination" of IQA
information.
25
It fails the IQA's quality test because it is inaccurate.
26
Maxfield & Oberton did not
"refuse to participate" but no longer exists and, therefore, cannot participate in any recall.
Requested CPSC Action: Mr. Zucker requests that the current statement, "These retailers have
agreed to participate because Maxfield & Oberton has refused to participate in the recall of all
Buckyballs and Buckycubes," be replaced by the statement, "These retailers have agreed to
participate because Maxfield & Oberton no longer exists and therefore cannot participate in a recall
of all Buckyballs and Buckycubes."
3. "In July 2012, CPSC staff filed an administrative complaint against Maxfie
& Oberton Holdings LLC, o New York, N.Y., afler discussions with the
com any and its representatives failed to result in a volunta recall plan
that CPSC staff considered to be adequate to address the very serious hazard
osed by these roducts."
Grounds for Disclosure/Correction: The claim that the subject products pose a "very serious
hazard" in the recall announcement and on the CPSC website is the "dissemination" of"influential"
23
67 Fed. Reg. 6458.
24
OMB Guidelines V(2),(3), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459-60.
25
Id. at V(5), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
26
ld. at V(3)(a) (stating that "disseminated information" must be presented "in an accurate, clear,
complete, and unbiased manner").
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 58
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12, 2013
Page 7
scientific or statistical information, for it concerns health and safety risks and was designed to
influence important private sector decisions regarding the purchase and/or use of the subject
products.
27
However, CPSC has failed to define recisely what a "very serious hazard" is or provide
metrics so that Mr. Zucker and other members of the public may distinguish between a "very
serious hazard" a "serious hazard," a "moderate hazard" and no hazard at all. Therefore C SC'
the "very serious hazard" claim fails the IQA's utility test, because without objective performance
metrics, it is impossible for the public to evaluate whether this information is useful or not.
28
Similarly, CPSC's failure to define the term "very serious hazard" in its own right and in a relative
sense violated its IQA "substance" objectivity obligations.
29
Furthermore, CPSC had a duty to provide "a high degree of transparency" about the data
and methods that it used to determine why the products here were determined to be a "very serious"
hazard.
30
Yet, without some context (such as relative risk ratios) and disclosure of its supporting
data and models, CPSC's "very serious hazard" claim cannot possibly be evaluated for accuracy or
bias and the claim fails the IQA's "presentation" objectivity test. As noted in A(l) above, based
on CPSC's own statistics, there have been no deaths due to the misuse or ingestion of Buckyballs
and Buckycubes, and as noted in the NEISS Data Highlights supra, skateboarding, household
cleaning chemicals, single load laundry packets and trampolines (among other products) are
statistically far more dangerous. Without some appropriate context and definitional clarity, it is
impossible to determine whether CPSC's statement is accurate, clear, complete, and unbiased as the
law commands.
31
Furthermore, because CPSC claimed the products in question posed "a very serious hazard,"
it was required to apply the test contained in the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments.
32
This
required CPSC to specify (a) each population addressed by any estimate of risk; (b) the central
estimate of risk for the specific populations affected; (c) each appropriate upper-bound or lower-
bound estimate of risk; (d) each significant uncertainty identified in the process of risk assessment
effects and the studies that would assist in resolving the uncertainty; and (e) peer-reviewed studies
known that support, are directly relevant to, or fail to support any estimate of risk and the
methodology used to reconcile inconsistencies in the scientific data.
33
CPSC, however, wrongly
failed to do any of these things and violated the IQA' s utility and objectivity tests.
34
27
!d. at V(8), (9), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
28
Id. at V(2), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
29
Id. at V(3)(a), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
30
Id. at V(3)(b )(ii), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
31
Jd. at V(3)(a), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
32
42 U.S.C. 300g-1(b)(3)(A) & (B); OMB Guidelines V(3)(b)(ii)(C), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
33
67 Fed. Reg. 6458.
34
OMB Guidelines V(2),(3), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459-60.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 59
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12, 2013
Page 8
Requested CPSC Action: Mr. Zucker requests that CPSC disclose the statistical and scientific
metrics used to determine that the subject products posed a "very serious hazard," rather than a
"serious hazard," a "moderate hazard," a "hazard," or no hazard at all. CPSC had a duty to provide
the "high degree of transparency" needed to allow Mr. Zucker and other members of the public to
reproduce CPSC's findings, to determine whether its claims were accurate and unbiased, and/or to
assess CPSC's compliance with its IQA duties. It also had a duty to comply with IQA's health risk
assessment transparency and utility obligations. Without full disclosure, Mr. Zucker's ability to
assess its IQA compliance is frustrated.
Mr. Zucker also requests that the phrase "In July 2012, CPSC staff filed an administrative
complaint against Maxfield & Oberton Holdings LLC, of New York, N.Y., after discussions with
the company and its representatives failed to result in a voluntary recall plan that CPSC staff
considered to be adequate to address the very serious hazard posed by these products" be taken
down from the CPSC website and replaced with the following: "In July 2012, CPSC staff filed an
administrative complaint against Maxfield & Oberton Holdings LLC, ofNew York, N.Y., after
discussions with the company and its representatives failed to result in a voluntary recall plan that
CPSC staff considered to be adequate."
4. "CPSC has received 54 reports of children and teens ingesting this product,
with 53 fJ!these requiring medical interventions."
Grounds for Disclosure/Correction: The claim that "CPSC has received 54 reports of children and
teens ingesting this product, with 53 of these requiring medical interventions" in the recall
announcement and on the CPSC website is the "dissemination" of influential information.
35
This
claim fails the I A's quality test because it is inaccurate.
3
Review of the website
Saferproducts.9ov suggests that there are at least two ingestions that did not require medical
interventions.
3
Requested CPSC Action: Mr. Zucker requests that the current statement "CPSC has received 54
reports of children and teens ingesting this product, with 53 of these requiring medical
interventions" be corrected to accurately report the data in CPSC's possession
B. Influential information disseminated in the July 25, 2012 news release, "CPSC Sues
Maxfield & Oberton Over Hazardous Buckyballs and Buckycubes Desk Toys Action prompted
by ongoing harm to children from ingested magnets. "
38
35
Jd. at V(8), (9), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
36
!d. at V(3)(a) (stating that "disseminated information" must be presented "in an accurate, clear,
complete, and unbiased manner").
37
http://saferproducts.govNiewlncident/1243200 (last visited Nov. 11, 2013);
bttp://saferproducts.govNiewlncident/1187028 (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
38
News Release, supra note 6.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 60
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12, 2013
Page 9
''CPSC Sues Maxfield & Oberton Over Hazardous Buckyballs and Buc/..ycube Desk
Toys Action prom ted Qy_ ongoing harm to children [Iom ingested magnets. "
Grounds for Disclosure/Correction: The claims that the subject products are "hazardous" and cause
"ongoing harm to children" in the recall announcement and on the CPSC website are the
"dissemination" of "influential" scientific or statistical information, for they concern health and
safety risks and were designed to influence important private sector decisions regarding the
purchase and/or use of the subject products.
39
CPSC has failed to define precisely what a "hazard" is or to provide metrics to evaluate the
bases for this designation. Therefore, the "hazard" claim fails the IQA 's utili!}' test because it is
currently impossible for the public to evaluate whether this information is useful or not.
40
Additionally, the lack ofmetrics means that the statement also fails the IQA's "wesentation"
objectivity test, because it is now im ossible to determine whether the claim is accurate, clear,
complete, and unbiased as the law commands.
41
Again, as noted supra, skateboarding, household
cleaning chemicals, single load laundry packets and tram olines are statistically far more
dangerous. Without the benefit of this contextual information with res ect to risk and "hazard"
CPSC's claim is biased and violates the IQA
The "Hazard" claim also violates CPSC's IQA "substance" objectivity obligations.
42
CPSC
had a duty to provide "a high degree of transparency" about the data and methods that it used to
determine why the products here were determined to be a "very serious" hazard.
43
Yet, without
some context (such as relative risk ratios) and disclosure of its supporting data and models, CPSC's
"hazard" claim cannot possibly be evaluated for accuracy or bias.
Furthermore, because CPSC claimed the products in question pose a "hazard," it was
required to apply the test contained in the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments.
44
This required
CPSC to specify (a) each population addressed by any estimate of risk; (b) the central estimate of
risk for the specific populations affected; (c) each appropriate upper-bound or lower-bound estimate
of risk; (d) each significant uncertainty identified in the process of risk assessment effects and the
studies that would assist in resolving the uncertainty; and (e) peer-reviewed studies known that
support, are directly relevant to, or fail to support any estimate of risk and the methodology used to
39
Jd. at V(8),(9), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
40
Jd. at V(2), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
41
Jd. at V(3)(a), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
42ld.
43
Jd. at V(3)(b)(ii), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
44
42 U.S.C. 300g-l(b)(3)(A) & (B); OMB Guidelines V(3)(b)(ii)(C), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 61
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12, 2013
Page 10
reconcile inconsistencies in the scientific data.
45
CPSC, however, wrongly failed to do any of these
things and violated the IQA's utility and objectivity tests.
46
CPSC's "ongoing harm to children" claim fails the IQA's presentation quality test because it
is inaccurate.
47
There is no evidence of"ongoing harm to children" from the subject products.
Absent ingestion, which happens only in statistically insignificant circumstances, there is no harm
to children, much less "ongoing harm," resulting from Buckyballs, Buckycubes or any other
magnets. Also, without some definition of what an "ongoing harm to children" is, or how the CPSC
defines "ongoing harm" in a given case, it is impossible to determine the utility, objectivity, and
reproducibility of this claim. Therefore, it fails the IQA's requirements.
48
The "ongoing harm to children" claim also violates CPSC's IQA "substance" objectivity
obligations.
49
CPSC had a duty to provide "a high degree of transparency" about the data and
methods that it used to determine that the products here pose such an "ongoing harm. "
50
Yet, none
is provided, and absent full disclosure of its supporting data and models, CPSC's claim cannot
possibly be evaluated for accuracy or bias.
Furthermore, because CPSC claimed the products in question pose an "ongoing harm to
children," it was required to apply the test contained in the Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments.
51
This required CPSC to specify (a) each population addressed by any estimate of
risk; (b) the central estimate of risk for the specific populations affected; (c) each appropriate upper-
bound or lower-bound estimate of risk; (d) each significant uncertainty identified in the process of
risk assessment effects and the studies that would assist in resolving the uncertainty; and (e) peer-
reviewed studies known that support, are directly relevant to, or fail to support any estimate of risk
and the methodology used to reconcile inconsistencies in the scientific data.
52
CPSC, however,
wrongly failed to do any of these things and violated the IQA's utility and objectivity tests. 5
3
Requested CPSC Action: Mr. Zucker requests that CPSC disclose the statistical and scientific
metrics used to determine that Buckyballs and Buckycubes pose an "ongoing harm to children"
and eZ})lain how CPSC determines what an "ongoin arm" is in any given case.
45
67 Fed. Reg. 6458.
46
OMB Guidelines V(2),(3), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459-60.
47
!d. at V(3)(a) (stating that "disseminated information" must be presented "in an accurate, clear,
complete, and unbiased manner").
48
/d. at V(2),(3), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
49
Id. at V(3)(a), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459.
50
/d. at V(3)(b)(ii), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
51
42 U.S.C. 300g- l(b)(3)(A) & (B); OMB Guidelines V(3)(b)(ii)(C), 67 Fed. Reg. 8460.
52
67 Fed. Reg. 6458.
53
OMB Guidelines V(2),(3), 67 Fed. Reg. 8459-60.
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 62
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 12, 2013
Page 11
Mr. Zucker also requests that the phrase, "CPSC Sues Maxfield & Oberton Over Hazardous
Buckyballs and Buckycube Desk Toys Action prompted by ongoing harm to children from
ingested magnets," be taken down from the CPSC website and replaced with the following: "CPSC
Sues Maxfield & Oberton Over Buckyballs and Buckycubes Desk Toys."
If you have any questions about this request, please contact me by email at
reed.rubinstein@causeofaction.org, or by telephone at (202) 499-4232. Thank you for your
attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
REED D. RUBINSTEIN
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, LITIGATION
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 63
1
September 25, 2013 Release Number: 13-290
En Espaol
CPSC Chairman Inez Tenenbaum Announces 2013 Circle of
Commendation Award Recipients
CPSC Chairman Inez Tenenbaum honors five recipients of the 3rd annual Chairmans Commendation Awards. The
Chairmans award program recognizes people and organizations that have made significant contributions to consumer product
safety.
WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) Chairman Inez
Tenenbaum announced today the recipients of her 3rd annual Chairmans Circle of Commendation
Award. The five awardees were chosen for their significant, lifesaving contributions to consumer
product safety, in the United States and around the world.
It is my honor to recognize these selfless, dedicated individuals and high-achieving standards setting
organizations. Their research, advocacy and commitment to advancing the cause of consumer
protection have resulted in safer homes, both nationally and internationally. The lives they have saved
are untold, said Chairman Tenenbaum.
The Chairmans Commendation Award was created by Chairman Tenenbaum in 2011 to identify and
honor people, organizations, businesses, state and local governments and other groups who have
worked to reduce deaths, prevent injuries and improve consumer product safety.
At an awards ceremony today at CPSC headquarters in Bethesda, Md., the Chairman announced this years recipients of the Circle of
Commendation Award:
Dr. Joshua Sharfstein Dr. Sharfstein is Marylands Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene. Previously, he was principal deputy
commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the Health Commissioner of Baltimore, Maryland. Throughout his public service
career, Dr. Sharfstein has worked to promote public health and reduce injuries from unsafe products. His efforts in consumer product safety
include leading a petition that spurred the removal from the market of over-the-counter cough and cold medications for children under age 4,
investigating the lead levels of toys in Baltimore, which resulted in CPSC re-announcing recalls of trinkets with high levels of lead and adding
additional lead-tainted products to the recall list. In September 2010, Dr. Sharfstein and Chairman Tenenbaum partnered together on a public
warning from FDA and CPSC advising parents to stop using infant sleep positioners, which led to the products being removed from almost all
store shelves. Due to his leadership, Maryland became the first state to ban the sale of crib bumpers in June 2013. Dr. Sharfsteins actions
have vastly improved the safety of children in the U.S.
Dr. Toby Litovitz Dr. Litovitz is the Executive and Medical Director of the National Capital Poison Center, which she founded in 1980.
She is also a Professor of Emergency Medicine at Georgetown University and Clinical Professor of Emergency Medicine at The George
Washington University. From 1984 through 2005, she coordinated the Toxic Exposure Surveillance System (now called the National Poison
Data System), the nations only poisoning surveillance database. She also served as Executive Director of the American Association of Poison
Control Centers from 1994 to 2004. Dr. Litovitz published a nationally-recognized series of papers on button/coin cell battery ingestions and
has spearheaded several consumer awareness campaigns warning of the lethality of button/coin cell batteries. Her research and advocacy have
led to the development of stronger product warnings on button/coin cell batteries; improvements in icons to better show the hazard; stronger
warnings on electronics and packaging; increased security on battery enclosures for remote controls and other battery-powered products; and
child-resistant packaging for individual and multi-pack coin cell batteries. Her research has also led to several consumer product voluntary
standards being revised to address battery ingestion hazards.
Carol Pollack-Nelson, Ph.D. Carol Pollack-Nelson is an expert Human Factors psychologist, who has worked in the consumer safety
field since 1982. From 1988 through 1993, she served as a senior engineering psychologist at CPSC. Since then, she has been the President
of Independent Safety Consulting, in Rockville, Md., and is the current President of the International Consumer Product Health and Safety
Organization (ICPHSO). Ms. Pollack-Nelson has evaluated hundreds of children and adult products to identify potential hazards associated
with foreseeable use and misuse. Her participation in various voluntary standards development committees has led to revisions of standards for
Ca CC ro rr l Pollack- kk N - e NN ls ll on, Ph PP .D. Carol Poll ll a ll ck-Nels ll on is ii an exp xx ert rr Hu HH m uu a mm n Factors psyc yy ho hh lo ll gi ggs ii t, wh ww o hh ha hh s work rr ed in ii th tt e hh cons nn um uu e mm r safe ff ty tt
fi ff e ii ld ll sin ii c nn e 1982. From1988 th tt r hh oug uu h gg 1993, she hh serv rr e vv d as a seni nno ii r eng n i ggn ii e nn erin ii g n psyc yy ho hh lo ll gi ggs ii t at CPSC. Sin ii c nn e th tt e hh n, nn she hh ha hh s been th tt e hh Presid ii ent nn
of Ind nn epend nn ent nn Safe ff ty tt Cons nn ul uut ll in ii g n , in ii Ro RR ckvi vvl ii l ll e ll , Md., and nn is ii th tt e hh cur uu r rr ent nn Presid ii ent nn of th tt e hh Int nn ern rr a nn tio ii na nn l Cons nn um uu e mm r Produ dd c uu t Healt ll h tt and nn Safe ff ty tt
Orga gg ni nnz ii a zz tio ii n (ICPHSO). Ms. Poll ll a ll ck-Nels ll on ha hh s eva vv lu ll a uu ted hu hh n uu d nn reds of chi hhl ii d ll ren and nn adu dd l uut ll produ dd c uu ts to id ii ent nn if ii y ff potent nn ia ii l ha hh za zz rds associa ii ted
wit ii h tt fo ff reseeab a le ll us uu e and nn mi mms ii us uu e. Her part rr ic ii ip ii atio ii n in ii va vv rio ii us uu vo vv lu ll n uu t nn ary rr stand nn ards deve vv lo ll pme mm nt nn comm mm i mmt ii t tt ees ha hh s le ll d to revi vvs ii io ii ns nn of stand nn ards fo ff r
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 64
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of injury or death associated with the use of
thousands of types of consumer products under the agencys jurisdiction. Deaths, injuries, and property damage from consumer product incidents cost the
nation more than $1 trillion annually. CPSC is committed to protecting consumers and families from products that pose a fire, electrical, chemical or
mechanical hazard. CPSC's work to help ensure the safety of consumer products - such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters and household
chemicals - contributed to a decline in the rate of deaths and injuries associated with consumer products over the past 40 years.
Federal law bars any person from selling products subject to a publicly-announced voluntary recall by a manufacturer or a mandatory recall ordered by the
Commission.
To report a dangerous product or a product-related injury go online to www.SaferProducts.gov or call CPSC's Hotline at (800) 638-2772 or teletypewriter at
(301) 595-7054 for the hearing impaired. Consumers can obtain news release and recall information at www.cpsc.gov, on Twitter @USCPSC or by
subscribing to CPSC's free e-mail newsletters.
preventing head and neck entrapment on bunk bed ladders and side structures, integrated protective barriers on gas fireplace glass and full
body harnesses on hunting tree stands. She also provides independent technical consultation to manufacturers, test laboratories, consumer
organizations and products liability attorneys in the areas of product design and hazard identification, age grading, and warning label and
instruction manual design.
ASTM F15.22 Subcommittee on Toy Safety For 30 years, Subcommittee F15.22 has developed and shepherded the comprehensive toy
safety requirements found in ASTM F963 Consumer Safety Specification for Toy Safety, which includes requirements addressing
mechanical and physical properties in childrens toys; electrical, flammability and toxicological hazards; labeling requirements and more than
100 tests for toy safety. Thanks to the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, the ASTM F963 standard is now a federal toy
safety standard. This standard helps protect children younger than 14 from possible hazards that may not be easily recognized, but may be
encountered in the normal use of a toy. The standard was the first to address hazards posed by cup-shaped toys that pose a suffocation
hazard, toys with spherical ends that pose an impact hazard, and jaw entrapment toys, among a number of others. The subcommittee has also
spearheaded efforts over the years to proactively address safety specifications for batteries, heavy metals, and high-powered magnets in
childrens toys. The subcommittee is part of ASTM International, which is a globally-recognized leader in the development and delivery of
international voluntary consensus standards. About 12,000 ASTM standards are used around the world to improve product quality, enhance
safety, provide market access and trade and build consumer confidence.
Committee CS-003, Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Committee CS-003 is a joint committee that covers Safety
Requirements for Childrens Furniture sold in Australia and New Zealand. The committee drafts, maintains, and interprets national and bi-
national standards relating to infant and child products. In April 2013, a test for mattress firmness developed by the committee was published
as a new Australian/New Zealand standard. The test, the first of its kind in the world, outlines a method of testing all horizontal infant sleep
surfaces. The test can be applied in laboratory, retail and home settings. On average, products that fail the test are three times more likely to
be associated with a fatal suffocation event than products that pass. A consumer version of the standard test method has also been invented.
This consumer test method is being communicated to families, empowering them to determine their own safe sleeping practices. The new test
method for firmness will also allow investigators inspecting the sleep environment of infant fatalities to assess the firmness properties of the
surface where a child is found.
preve vv nt nn in ii g n he hh ad and nn ne nn ck ent nn r tt ap a me mm nt nn on bun uu k nn bed la ll dders and nn sid ii e str tt u rr c uu tu tt r uu es, in ii t nn egr gg ated protectiv ii e vv barr rr ie ii rs on ga gg s fi ff r ii epla ll ce gl gga ll ss and nn fu ff l uul ll
body ha hh rn rr e nn sses on hu hh n uu t nn in ii g n tr tt ee stand nn s. She hh als ll o provi vvd ii es in ii d nn epend nn ent nn techn hh i nnc ii al cons nn ul uut ll atio ii n to ma mm nu nn f uu a ff ctu tt r uu ers, test la ll b a oratorie ii s, cons nn um uu e mm r
orga gg ni nnz ii a zz tio ii ns nn and nn produ dd c uu ts li ll a ii b a il ii i ll t ii y tt att tt orn rr e nn ys yy in ii th tt e hh areas of produ dd c uu t desig ii n gg and nn ha hh za zz rd id ii ent nn if ii i ff c ii atio ii n, nn age gg gr gg adin ii g n , and nn warn rr i nnn ii g n la ll b a el and nn
in ii s nn tr tt u rr c uu tio ii n ma mm nu nn a uu l desig ii n gg .
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 65
U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAF ETY COMMI SSI ON
4330 EAST WEST HIGHWAY
BETHESDA, MD 20814
Cheryl A. Falvey
General Counsel
Via Electronic and First Class Mail
Alan H. Schoem, Esq.
14809 Rolling Green Way
North Potomac, Maryland 20878
Dear Mr. Schoem:
July 20, 2012
Re: Request for Statement
Tel: 301 -504-7642
Fax: 301-504-0403
Thank you for your JuJy 17, 20121etter to CPSC Compliance Officer Joe Williams. You
state that Mr. William's letter to Brookstone concerned various types of aggregated masses of
small, powerful, individual magnets and that he asked Brookstone voluntarily stop selling the
magnets pending the outcome of our investigation. You fwther state that this communication to
.Brookstone is based on the fact that Maxfield and Oberton identified .Brookstone as a retailer in a
May 25, 2012 Full Report to the CPSC.
I can assure you that no violation of the disclosure restrictions has taken place for any
section 15 information Maxfield and Oberton submitted in its Full Report. Brookstone was
identified as a retailer independent from the section 15 report submitted by Maxfield and
Oberton. As you know, the Commission has determined that the referenced section 6(b)(5)
restrictions to not apply to information independently obtained or prepared by Commission staff.
16 C.F.R. 1101.63(c).
Furthermore, the Commission staff has statutory authority to investigate retailers when it
believes that they may be selling a product that presents a substantial product hazard. Your
suggestion of intimidation by the staff is unfounded and belied by the fact that some retailers
have not agreed to stop sale. As you acknowledged, the correspondence to retailers contained a
generic description of magnets. While you may represent to staff that the firm, Brookstone, is
selling only one type of magnet, staff has a duty to investigate fully and request information
under the circumstances.
At your reguest, I am confirming that it is not a violation of an law administered by the
CPSC for anx retailer to continue to sell Buckyball s and Buckxcubes. We are wi lling to
CPSC Hotline: 1-800-638-CPSC (2772) * CPSC's Web Site: http://www.cpsc.gov
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 66
Alan H. Schoem, Esq.
Page 2
July 20, 20 12
communicate that directly to the retailers that staff has contacted. As you note, staff requests
have been for voluntary action. If a retailer continues to sell your client ' s product it is not in
violation of any law CPSC administers until we have obtained a court order which is the next
ste in our rocess after the issuance of a PO or the finn voluntarily agrees to a corrective
actioJ1."1rbe scope of administrative action needed to be taken by the agency to address the
concem regarding a potential substantial product hazard is certainly mini mized to the extent we
can obtain voluntary corrective actions from manufacturers or retailers.
Sincerely,
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 67
HOME
LI BERTY BALLS
FOUNDI NG BALLS
BALL OF RI GHTS
MERCH
ALL PRODUCTS
THE STORY
MEDI A
BLOG
We make products to support the legal
battle of one individual against
government absurdity overreach
retaliation regulators and stand up for the
SI GNUP
CART ( 0)
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 68
rights of all Americans (thats you).
100% of the profits go towards the legal
fees of fighting the Consumer Product
Safety Commissions absurd case against
Buckyballs and Craig Zucker.*
GRAB YOUR BALLS
SEE ALL
SI GN UP
EMAI L ADDRESS
VI SA
MASTERCARD AMEX
MAESTRO
COPYRI GHT 2014 ASSEMBLE, LLC
*100% of the profi ts from Uni ted We Bal l wi l l go towards
the l egal fees of defendi ng CPSC v. Maxfi el d and Oberton
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 69
SHARE:
Tweet
2009 Buckyballs
Are The World's
Hottest Adult
Desktoy
Remember Buckyballs?
We do. We were part of the team
from Maxfield & Oberton, the
company that created Buckyballs
(and Buckycubes.) In July 2012,
after millions of units sold to adults
and years of closely and carefully
working with the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the company was sued by the
CPSC to force a full product recall.
2012 A Company Is Driven Out of Business by
Regulators
HOME
LI BERTY BALLS
FOUNDI NG BALLS
BALL OF RI GHTS
MERCH
ALL PRODUCTS
THE STORY
MEDI A
BLOG
151 Like
SI GNUP
CART ( 0)
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 70
In response, the company launched
its Save Our Balls campaign to try
to keep the business alive. Despite
overwhelming public support, the
company was spending more in legal
bills than it could earn. The company
dissolved in December 2012,
sending us into unemployment,
sadness, and sweatpants.
To this day, the products have
never been proven to be defective
and remain legal to sell today. In
fact, several companies
currently market identical
products.
[ But the CPSC decided to go
after only one guy: the former
CEO of Maxfield & Oberton and
outspoken face of Save Our
Balls, Craig Zucker. ]
SHARE:
Tweet
2009 Buckyballs
Are The World's
Hottest Adult
Desktoy
Remember Buckyballs?
We do. We were part of the team
from Maxfield & Oberton, the
company that created Buckyballs
(and Buckycubes.) In July 2012,
after millions of units sold to adults
and years of closely and carefully
working with the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the company was sued by the
CPSC to force a full product recall.
2012 A Company Is Driven Out of Business by
Regulators
HOME
LI BERTY BALLS
FOUNDI NG BALLS
BALL OF RI GHTS
MERCH
ALL PRODUCTS
THE STORY
MEDI A
BLOG
151 Like
SI GNUP
CART ( 0)
Zucker v. CPSC, Briefng Book Page 71
2013 The
Government
Targets an
Individual
In February 2013, the CPSC took an
egregious jaw-dropping
unprecedented action, filing suit to
hold Zucker personally liable for
the costs of a product recall, which
they estimate at $57 million
(more than the company ever even
did in sales!).
The move was a vindictive astounding departure from the cherished American principle of
limited liability, which protects responsible, law-abiding company officers from being
unjustly sued.
Consider this: A guy starts a small business adhering to all
regulations, laws, and taxes. Unchecked regulators drive that
company out of business. Then the same government regulators
target that guy for speaking out against their actions. NO BIG
DEAL, RIGHT?
NOT EXACTLY, MR. PUTIN. The governments case against
Buckyballs will have severe, far-reaching ramifications for the
future of American businesses and consumers.