Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 Jurisprudence Final Exam Fall 2010 1) In his extensi e !

!or"# $a!%s Empire &'el"nap (ress# 1)*+)# ,onald D!or"in sets out -oth his o!n conception o. !hat la! is# as !ell as /eneral principles to cate/ori0in/ and understandin/ competin/ ision o. the la!1 2is !or" co ers -road as !ell as speci.ic aspects o. le/al philosoph3# and attempts to secure an explanation o. the la! adheres -oth to our empirical experience o. la! in practice# and our moral and social intuitions a-out !hat la! ou/ht to -e1 2e accomplishes this -3 considerin/ past le/al philosoph3# demonstratin/ their !ea"nesses# and .inall3# in li/ht o. those !ea"ness to conclude on his o!n theor3# that o. $e/al Inte/rit31 D!or"in -e/ins -3 considerin/ the t!o historicall3 dominant theories o. !hat la! is: natural la!# and the 4plain5.act ie!16 2e descri-es these opposin/ conceptions o. la! as .ollo!s1 7atural la!# simpl3 put# understands la! as s3non3mous !ith moralit3# or 8ustice1 9here are metaph3sical principles o. la! that are aspired to# and in the a-sence o. coherence !ith these metaph3sical principles# there is no la!1 :on ersel3# the 4plain5.act ie!6 asserts# 4la! is onl3 a matter o. !hat le/al institutions# li"e le/islatures and cit3 councils and courts# ha e decided in the past16 Id. at ;1 D!or"in de.ines -oth o. these approaches as Semantic 9heories o. la!1 9he3 set out to sa3 !hat la! is o-8ecti el31 For the plain5.act theorist# there is no one !ho does not a/ree on some le el that la! is em-odies in institutions1 2e /oes on the re8ect such approaches in that the3 amount to a metaph3sical rei.ication o. lan/ua/e# that .ail to account .or the ariet3 o. opinion and usa/e that mani.estl3 exists in meanin/ o. the term la!1 In their place he ad ances and interpretati e theor3 o. la!# that does not loo" to di ine some (latonic .orm o. la!# or positi istic lin/uistic con ention# -ut rather accepts that la! is a social phenomenon# and see"s to interpret it as its o-8ect1

Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 <ithout /oin/ into to excessi e detail# D!or"in sets out a interpretation o. the social phenomenon o. la! should loo" li"e1 First he notes that there are three phases o. interpretation in the social practice o. la!1 9he .irst is 4pre5interpreti e#6 it is the period in !hich -asic institutions and practices are .ormed1 <hile there is potentiall3 some interpretation that /i es rise to them# it is e=uall3 plausi-le that such practices arose .rom con ention or other means1 9he second phase is the 4interpreti e#6 !ith practices in place# one can consider !hat uni.3in/ principle i. an3 the3 express1 9he .inal phase he terms 4post5interpreti e#6 this is ho! a le/al s3stem is altered in li/ht o. interpreti e decisions1 2e .urther notes# that as !ith all interpreti e acti ities# it is important that there -e some common plateau o. !hat the o-8ect o. interpretation is on a -asic le el1 2e concludes that: 9he most a-stract and .undamental point o. le/al practice is to /uide and constrain the po!er o. /o ernment in the .ollo!in/ !a31 $a! insists that .orce not -e used or !ithheld# no matter ho! -ene.icial or no-le these ends# except as licensed or re=uired -3 indi idual ri/hts and responsi-ilities .lo!in/ .rom past political decision a-out !hen collecti e .orce is 8usti.ied16 Id. at )31 <ith this ru-ric in mind# D!or"in /oes on to consider arious interpretations o. our le/al s3stem

2a in/ re8ected Semantic 9heories o. la!# D!or"in mo es on to discuss three competin/ Interpreti e :onceptions o. la!# thus .urther narro!in/ the ran/e o. possi-le# and pro-a-le explanations a aila-le1 In considerin/ !hether a particular conception o. la! is true# D!or"in sets out t!o criteria .or consideration1 >i en the .act that le/al philosoph3# as D!or"in limits it# is an interpreti e act# !ith a /i en societies le/al practices as its o-8ect# the .irst =uestion that should -e as"ed is !hether a /i en conception con.orms !ith the realities o. the s3stem it addresses1 9he second criteria considered# is !hether a /i en interpretation sho!s the le/al s3stem in its -est li/ht1 In D!or"in%s 4plateau6 .or le/al interpretation# this amounts to !hether

Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 or not a /i en interpretation 8usti.ies the use o. coerci e .orce in our le/al practice1 ?sin/ these t!o criteria D!or"in considers three opposin/ interpretations o. la!: :on entionalism# (ra/matism# and Inte/rit31 2e concludes that Inte/rit3 is the most satis.actor3 o. the three conceptions# in -oth .idelit3 to the realities o. our le/al practice# and in 8usti.3in/ the use o. coercion in that practice1 9he :on entionalist interpretation holds that 4the collecti e .orce should -e trained a/ainst indi iduals onl3 !hen some past political decision has licensed this explicitl3 in such a !hat that competent la!3ers and 8ud/es !ill all a/ree a-out !hat that decision !as# no matter ho! much the3 disa/ree a-out moralit3 or politics16 Id. at 11@1 D!or"in ac"no!led/es that this conception is remar"a-l3 similar to le/al positi ism# -ut notes that it does not claim that no other conception o. la! exists# it merel3 claims that this happens to -e the one that exists in our s3stem1 :on entionalism is -ased on the supposition that the 8usti.ication o. coercion is rooted in the principle o. 4protected expectations16 It asserts that coercion is onl3 8usti.ied !hen la!s are clearl3 promul/ated to the pu-lic# and it can expect the outcomes that the le/al s3stem prescri-es1 From this claim D!or"in deduces t!o post5interpreti e principles .or :on entionalism1 First# that the 8urist is -ound to past con ention# and there is no act o. le/al decision ma"in/ that can circum ent this principle1 Second# that in cases !here the la! is silent# there is no 4spirit o. the la!6 or /eneral principles that can -e used to di ine the correct le/al decision1 'ecause the la! is -ound to its principle o. protected expectations# an3 un.oreseen# hidden# or deduced principles !ould iolate this central tenet1 As such# in instances !here the la! is silent# the 8ud/e must ma"e le/al rulin/s -ased on moralit3# prudence# or other criteria1 2o!e er# he ma3 not turn to past similar cases1 Bnl3 explicit statements can -e considered -indin/ con ention1

Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 D!or"in re8ects con entionalism1 In his ie! it .ails -oth in accuratel3 descri-in/ the la! as it is# and in 8usti.3in/ coercion1 Bn the .irst account# it .ails to ac"no!led/e that 8ud/es do# in .act# ma"e extensi e use o. precedent in come to conclusions in hard cases# that are not explicitl3 dealt !ith in statute or precedent1 I. :on entionalism is accuratel3 descripti e o. our le/al practice# this !ould -e nonsensical1 Bn the second account# he sees this interpretation as .ailin/ to 8usti.3 the s3stem# in that protected expectations are not enou/h to explain the s3stem as a !hole1 First# he notes# that a iolation o. expectations# is not immoral# unless it /oes a/ainst expectations that !ere set out clearl3 in the .irst case1 As such# :on entionalism accomplishes little in 8usti.3in/ the use o. coercion# i.# .or example it is promul/ated that 8udicial decision !ould -e -ased on personal moral discretion1 In this instance# expectations !ould not need to -e protected# tin that there are none1 2e .urther ar/ues# that there can -e no appeal to :on entionalism as a practical concern# in that there is no reason to assume that political li"e !ould -e -etter ser ed -3 -lind adherence to past rulin/s# rather than a consideration o. chan/es# and current circumstances1 9he second ie! ad anced -3 D!or"in is that o. (ra/matism1 9his ie! re8ects the reliance on the past !hole cloth1 It assumes that la!ma"ers and 8ud/es should ma"e decisions -ased on !hat is most sound prospecti el31 2ere the pro-lems are more /larin/1 2o! can this interpretation .it our le/al s3stem# !hen 8ud/es al!a3s loo" to past la! to determine their particular rulin/sC 9he pra/matist must ma"e the assertion that the 8ud/e does not need to re.erence past cases# -ut ma3 .ind it expedient to create the 4no-le lie6 o. reliance on precedent in order to .ull3 a..ect his le/al rulin/ on the /eneral pu-lic1 <hile this explanation is certainl3 possi-le it is not plausi-le in an3 sense1 It !ould -e exceedin/l3 stran/e .or the ast literature o. le/al doctrine and case la! to exist i. it !ere all merel3 su-ter.u/e1 Similarl3# this interpretation

Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 does nothin/ to 8usti.3 the use o. coercion1 It denies the existence o. indi idual ri/hts -3 necessit3# as each la! ma"er can alter and chan/e the current le/al re/ime to .it !hat is most utilitarian1 As such# there is no need to 8usti.3in/ coercion# -e3ond its practical alue in a /i en societ31 D!or"in%s .a ored interpretation o. our le/al s3stem is that o. Inte/rit31 2e de.ines this principle is the demand that our la! are created and interpreted in such a manner that the3 are coherent !hen ta"en as a !hole1 2e -e/ins his discussion -3 considerin/ ho! Inte/rit3 is conceptuall3 distinct .rom that o. Justice and Fairness1 2e then uses this to sho! that Inte/rit3 accuratel3 descri-es our le/al s3stem%s practices# thus succeedin/ in his .irst criteria1 2e then considers !hether Inte/rit3 8usti.ies the use o. coercion# and does this -3 appeal to the notion o. associati e o-li/ations1 Finall3 he descri-es ho! this principle shapes the decision5ma"in/ o. 8ud/es in a h3pothetical le/al case1 'e.ore considerin/ D!or"in%s speci.ic ar/uments re/ardin/ Inte/rit3# it is important to .irst consider a potent o-8ection to the .oundation o. his interpretation1 9he notion that internal coherence is the central /uidin/ principle o. our le/al s3stem assumes a certain personi.ication o. collecti e action1 Simpl3 put# !h3 is coherence o. concern in a social practice such as the la!# !hen the la! is the production o. thousands o. indi iduals separate actions1 9here is no solitar3 collecti e that can -e ta"en to account .or its h3pocrisies1 2o! then# can Inte/rit3 ser e as its central principleC D!or"in attempts to a oid this o-8ection# -3 simpl3 statin/# that apart .rom an3 rationale# the .act remains that !e do personi.3 institutions in -oth theor3 and practice1 2e considers the instances o. an car manu.acturer that sells de.ect products1 2e ar/ues that !e .ind the corporation lia-le in that case apart .rom its constituent indi iduals1 2e .urther claims that !e

Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 cannot simpl3 sa3 that the .indin/ o. a corporation as lia-le# is simpl3 a shorthand .or the intersection o. all contri-utin/ acts# -ecause !e hold the shareholders principall3 lia-le# despite the .act that the3 had no direct in.luence on the sale de.ecti e product# and .urthermore# did not e en directl3 add capitol to the enterprise in the tradin/ o. their shares on the mar"et1 2e -rin/s .urther examples o. personi.ication in practice# in terms o. sentiments o. national responsi-ilit3 .or past !ron/s1 2e notes that althou/h present da3 >ermans had no direct responsi-ilit3 .or the 7a0i atrocities# there is a sense o. &at least attenuated) responsi-ilit3 that persists1 D!or"in%s response# !hile lac"in/ in theoretical explanation# does pro ides solid e idence that institutional personi.ication is common place in our le/al and political .rame!or"1 <ith the idea that the la! is# at least in practice# concei ed as a personi.ied unitar3 entit3# D!or"in mo es on to .urther re.ine the concept o. Inte/rit31 2e .irst considers ho! Inte/rit3 is distinct .rom notions o. Justice and Fairness1 Justice# in this ie! are the moral decisions that !e ma"e as to the ri/htness o. a /i en la!1 ?sin/ the =uestion o. a-ortion# Justice considers !hether the act o. a-ortion should or should not -e allo!ed1 :on ersel3# Fairness# is the procedural ri/ht to e=ualit3 in the political and le/al arenas1 (rinciples o. Fairness include the notion o. representati e ma8oritarian rule1 Each indi idual has a .air shot to ha e his moral 8ud/ments -ecome articulated la!1 9hus accordin/ to D!or"in these t!o concepts are distinct1 An indi idual opposed to a-ortion mi/ht sa3 that its le/ali0ation in American in un8ust# -ut !ill not ar/ue that the le/al mechanisms that made it so !ere un.air1 :on ersel3# such an indi idual !ould sa3 that its ille/alit3 in a theocratic dictatorship is 8ust# despite the .act that the la!%s passin/ !as un.air1 D!or"in uses the distinction -et!een Justice and Fairness to demonstrate that a third cate/or3# Inte/rit3# exists independent o. the t!o1 9o this end he considers a le/al outcome =uite

Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 .orei/n .rom !hat American%s are used to1 2e as"s# i. Fairness and Justice are the onl3 principles that matter in our le/al s3stem# !h3 do !e insist that a /i en la! -e applied uni ersall31 <h3# .or example# can !e not le/ali0e a-ortion .or a =uantit3 o. !omen e=ual to the percenta/e o. oters !ho desire its le/ali0ation1 D!or"in claims that in terms o. Fairness# there can -e no o-8ection to such a compromise# as it respects the ie!s o. all citi0ens in the communit3# and /i es oice to their moral 8ud/ments1 Similarl3# he ar/ues that in terms o. Justice# this outcome !ould -e superior to that o. -lan"et ille/alit3 or le/alit31 For the indi idual !ho opposes a-ortion# !ould it not -e more 8ustice to pre ent at least some prospecti e a-ortions# rather that ta"e the all or nothin/ approachC 9his h3pothetical alternati e to our current s3stem points to the existence o. a third uni.3in/ le/al principle# that o. Inte/rit31 Independent o. Justice and Fairness# Inte/rit3 dictates that the State personi.ied# stri e .or internal coherence1 9here.ore# such 4chec"er-oard6 solutions# as D!or"in terms them# are unaccepta-le in our le/al s3stem1 2e /i es .urther credence to this ie!# ar/uin/ that this principle is enshrined in the :onstitution itsel.# in the E=ual (rotection clause# !hich demands that la!s -e applied e=uall3 to citi0ens# thus demandin/ that the le/al s3stem include internal coherence on a .undamental le el1 It is thus demonstrated that Inte/rit3 does con.orm to the realit3 o. our le/al s3stem1 'e3ond not contradictin/ an3 common practice o. our la!s# it ser es to explain an important phenomenon# !hich cannot -e ade=uatel3 understood !ithout it1 $ater in the text D!or"in .urther demonstrates that the principle o. Inte/rit3 ser es to explain the manner in !hich 8udicial decisions are made# in a manner more satis.actor3 that its competitors1 9he reliance on precedent in this ie!# is not simpl3 a dr3 de.erence to -indin/ con ention# not a .arce desi/ned to conceal pra/matist 8udicial .iat1 ,ather# a 8ud/e must loo" to past rulin/s in order to insure that coherence o. the la!# or its Inte/rit3 is maintained1 9his is true not simpl3 !here extant case la! touches on

Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 an issue directl31 ,ather# e en in cases !here explicitl3 promul/ated la! is silent on a /i en topic# it is essential that a 8ud/e consider the past# to insure that his rulin/ con.orms not simpl3 to his o!n moral 8ud/ments# -ut to the train o. implicit le/al thou/ht -e=ueathed to him or her1 2e explains this concept -3 re.erence to !hat he calls a 4chain no el16 2e considers !hat an author !ould do i. /i en part o. Dic"ens% 4A :hristmas :arol#6 and as"ed to complete it# !ithout "no!in/ the -oo"s actual endin/1 2e contends that it !ould -e exceptionall3 di..icult .or an indi idual to construct the last chapter o. this no el such that Scroo/e is irredeema-l3 e il1 It is not that such an endin/ !ould -e impossi-le to ima/ine# -ut that it !ould stand in sharp interpreti e dissonance !ith the proceedin/ chapters1 Similarl3# he ar/ues# 8udicial reliance on precedent relies on the interpretation o. past le/al decision to decide !hether his o!n conclusions con.orm !ith the interpreti e s!eep o. past thou/ht# thus insurin/ the coherence and Inte/rit3 o. 8udicial decision5ma"in/1 9he =uestion then remains# ho! and i. Inte/rit3 ser es to 8usti.3 the use o. coerci e .orce in our le/al s3stem# !hich he lin"s !ith the idea o. le/itimac3 o. rule1 A.ter considerin/ a num-er o. competin/ ie!s and dismissin/ them# D!or"in settles on 4o-li/ation o. communit36 as the correct 8usti.3in/ principle in le/itimatin/ the use o. coercion1 2e ar/ues that the stron/est# and perhaps most meanin/.ul sense o. o-li/ation stems .rom institutions such as .amil3 and communit31 Despite the .act that .amilial ties are non5consensual# an indi idual%s o-li/ation to his or her parents and si-lin/s is an almost un-rea"a-le -ond o. mutual o-li/ation1 D!or"in ar/ues that similar -onds o. o-li/ation exist in the political communit3# -ut that -oth are predicated on certain .eatures that stren/then this sense o. o-li/ation1 2e ar/ues that an associati e o-li/ation must -e -ased on mem-ership in that association that is: special &i1e1 exclusi e o. other associations)# personal &i1e1 the3 run directl3 .rom one indi idual mem-er to

Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 another# not /enerall3 in the communit3)# per asi e &i1e1 encompassin/ a /eneral concern .or mem-ers# not speci.ic contractual o-li/ations)# and e/alitarian1 2e ar/ues# .or example# that in a .amil3 !here a dau/hter%s marria/e is determined -3 her .ather# that this !ill iolate the sense o. o-li/ation to .ollo! her .ather%s rules# i. it .lo!s .rom a lac" o. /ender e=ualit31 In other !ords# i. her lac" o. choice is the result o. !omen -ein/ o. less alue than men# then her sense o. o-li/ation to .ollo! such a rule is hi/hl3 eroded1 I.# on the other hand# the reasonin/ -ehind such a rule is concern .or her !ell-ein/# then there is a sense in !hich i/norin/ her .ather%s !ishes is iolati e o. somethin/# and there.ore# she !ill -e .eel the need to at least apolo/i0e in .loutin/ her arran/ed marria/e1 <ith these .our criteria o. associati e o-li/ation# D!or"in ar/ues that Inte/rit3 as the -asis o. the political communit3# ser es to stren/th our sense o. o-li/ation# and thus le/itimi0es political authorit3 and coercion1 Bur le/al communit3 is special# in that it is -ased on shared principles o. 8ustice and .airness that are coherentl3 articulated in a manner uni=ue .rom competin/ communities1 It is personal# in that the societ3%s le/al principles are acti e in each indi iduals o-li/ations to!ards another1 It is egalitarian# in that the re=uirement o. coherence# demands that the la! -e applied to e er3one in the same manner1 And .inall3# it is pervasive# in that le/al o-li/ations in this interpretation are not limited to speci.ic iterations or con entions o. practice# -ut stem .rom the 4chained no el6 o. past 8udicial and le/al thou/ht1 (rinciple# not simpl3 articulated la! -inds us1 D!or"in ar/ues# that -ecause these .our .actors are thus stren/thened -3 the interpretation o. our le/al s3stem as Inte/rit35-ased# and as such that interpretation is success.ul in 8usti.3in/ coercion1

Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 5) In A Datter o. Interpretation &(rinceton ?ni ersit3 (ress# 1));) Justice Scalia ad ances a ie! o. statutor3 interpretation "no!n as textualism1 2e ar/ues that despite the ast histor3 o. common la! 8urisprudence# and le/al education -ased on those decisions# the lion%s share o. !hat a .ederal 8ud/e%s acti ities are composed o. is rooted in textual interpretation1 2e !rites dispara/in/l3 a-out ho! the le/al esta-lishment has .ailed to present co/ent theories o. statutor3 interpretation# despite its u-i=uit3 in le/al practice# and presents his o!n theor31 <hich in short# is .idelit3 to the plain meanin/ o. a statute# !ithout concern .or its le/islators non5expressed intentions1 Scalia%s ar/ument -e/ins !ith an attac" on the mode o. statutor3 interpretation that /i es special importance to the intent o. the le/islature1 2e raises three principle o-8ections to this approach1 First# he ar/ues that it does not ta"e account o. another principle o. statutor3 intperpretation# namel3 that statutes are to t-e interpreted in such a manners as to e- consistent !ith other statutes1 I. the interpetation o. a statute is -ound in the speci.ic intentions o. the le/islatures that passed it# then this concern .or coherence !ould -e nonsensical1 It is hi/hl3 impro-a-le that an3 le/islati e -od3 passes la!s !ith the totalit3 o. a /i en code in mind !hen it it passed1 Bn the contrar3# the3 o.ten arise .rom spe.ici policial pressures and e ents# and ta"e little account o. theoretical le/al coherence1 Scalia !ould ar/ue that i.# ho!e er# statutor3 interpretation is limited ot promul/ated la!# di orced .rom the intentions that /a e rise to it# then there is /reater sense in see"in/ textual coherence across a /i en code1 In that the plain meanin/ o. a text should -e considered in the context o. the lar/er -od3 o. text it is contained in1 Scalia ac"no!led/es that this ie! o. statutor3 interpretation in ol es a sort o. le/al .iction1 Euotin/ 'ishop%s treatise on statutor3 interpretation# Scalia notes that !e are not see"in/

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Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 le/islati e intent# -ut the 4meanin/ !hich the su-8ect is authori0ed to understand the le/islature intended16 Id. at 1;1 9his some!hat cr3ptic statement is elucidated !hen considered in the context o. Scalia%s next attac" on le/islati e intent1 7amel3# that in a democrac 3# there is no le/itima03 to la! that is not promul/ated1 2e /i e credence to this ideal -3 re.erence to the ?nited States as a /o ernment o. la!s# not men1 9his notion o. /o ernmental le/itimac3 is -ound up in the notion o. 4protected expectations6 that D!or"in discusses &and re8ects) in $a!%s Empire1 In this ie!# ha in/ sta-le le/al expectations is essential to the le/itimac3 o. la!1 As such# an indi iudal%s expectations !ould not -e ade=uatel3 protected -3 statutes !hose meanin/ !as hidden a!a3 in deep interpretations on intent1 9here.ore# Scalia assumes that the onl3 meanin/ 4allo!ed6 to a statute# is that !hich is most easil3 accessa-le to the indi idual# namel3 the plain meanin/ o. a text1 Further credence is /ranted to the connectin/ o. Scalia%s textualism !ith D!or"in%s notion o. the :on entionalist concern .or protected expectations# in Scalia%s statement that 49he rule o. la! is about .orm16 Id. at 251 For Scalia# the principle irture o. la! appears to depend on :on entionalist tendencies !hich .a or .orm o er content1 Scalia%s .inal ar/ument a/ainst considerin/ le/ilati e intent rests on the assertion that this !ill lead to 8udicial a-use o. po!er1 In Scalia%s ie!# 8ud/es are meant ot -e interpreters o. la!# not its authors1 2e sees the alidit3 o. le/islati e intent in statutor3 construction as a dan/erous inroad a aila-le to the inscrupulosu 8ud/e# -ent on en.orcin/ his o!n political 8ud/ments extra5 le/al1 9his 8ud/e !ill -e a-le to manipulate the meanin/ o. a statute more easil3 in Scalia%s ie!# than it constrained to plain meanin/1 9his ar/ument# ho!e er# is =uite !ea"# in that in instances o. most liti/ation surroundin/ a statute# the reason a la!suit !as plausi-l3 possi-le !as -ecause o. am-i/uit3 in the meanin/ o. a statute1 In other !ords# in instances !here statutor3 interpretation is needed# it is necessaril3 in instances o. textual am-i/uit31 9his -ein/ the case# it

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Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 is hard to see ho! ta"in/ an account o. le/islati e intent ser e to allo! an3 .urther opportunit3 to the 8ud/e to ac unscrupulousl3 than simpl3 ma"in/ a -ad5.aith plain meanin/ interpretation1 Scalia%s most persuasi e ar/ument .or the exclusion o. intent as a criteria .or interpretation lies in his practical s"ecptacism a-out the accurac3 o. le/islati e histories1 2e notes that e en i. should -e concerned !ith in esti/atin/ the intents o. le/islators# there is little sense in !hich recorded histories o. de-ate and comities reports can actual re.lect the intents o. those !ho enacted a la!1 :onsider the .ollo!in/1 A :on/ressional committee considers passin/ a ne! re/ulation on the use o. coal in an area !here it !ill detrimentall3 a..ect its ecos3stem1 9he committee in ersti/ates and de-ates the issue extensi el3# considerin/ the costs and -ene.its o. sucha re/ulation# and decides in dra.tin/ the -ill# that the interest o. disallo!in/ out!ei/h allo!in/ -ecause o. the ne/ati e impact such pollution !ith ha e on the area%s econom31 7o! that -ill# stripped o. its rationale is presented to the !hole .o the 2ouse od ,epresentati es1 <hen ,epresentati e John Smith otes .or the la!# it is possi-le &and li"el3) that he has not read and is not .amiliar !ith the committees reports and rationale1 2e ma3 ha e oted .or the -ill -ecause# -e thin"s the aesthetic alue o. a coal5.ree en ironment !arrants its re/ulation1 I. this -ill -ecomes la! and is the su-8ect o. liti/ation# !hose intent mattersC 9here cannot -e said to -e a unitar3 le/islati e intent that transcends its indi idual enactors1 Similarl3# committee reports and other .orms o. le/islati e histor3# !hile educational as to the intents o. some enactors# cannot -e said to -e e en a .air indication o. all its enactors intentions1 In the a-sence o. a coherent notion o. a unitar3 intention .or a /i en statute# it seems that the onl3 !or"a-le option a aila-le is to consider the meanin/ o. a statute to -e limited to its text# as one can at least sa3 that all mem-ers o. :on/ress ha e accented to its passin/1 A .urther o-8ection mi/ht -e raised that e en the text cannot -e said to -e authoritati e

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Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 under the criteria o. enactment# as it is unli"el3 that e er3 le/islator has read and understood the text he otes to put into la!1 <hile this mi/ht -e true# it spea"s more to o..icials dereliection o. dut3# than to principle1 E en i. most le/islators did nto read the text o. a -ill# it !ould render our le/islature inopera-le i. !e did not at least assume as such# .or the sa"e o. practical 8urisprudence1 As Scalia noted# in his ie! .orm is e er3thin/1 In the special case o. :onstitutional interpretation# Scalia%s claims -ecome more di..icult1 2ere he ar/ues that due to the special nature o. the :onstituion%s text# it is apparent that /eneral principles are articulated# rather the narro! enactments1 2e uses as an example the First Amendment1 In a completel3 narro! readin/ this amendment onl3 protects the ri/ht o. .ree speech and press# -ut does not spea" to the .ree use o. telephones or electronic pu-lishin/1 Scalia re8ects this readin/# and states that in the context o. 9he 'ill o. ,i/hts# it is apparent that speech and press are stand5ins .or /eneral principles o. communication1 Bne mi/ht o-8ect that this departs .rom the text and spea"s to intent# -ut he !ill counter that the text itsel. -ears out his expansi e interpretation1 9o elucidate the limits o. its expansi e lan/ua/e# he presents the counter example o. the Eit/ht Amendment1 9he prohi-ition on cruel and unusual punishment is certainl3 expansi e# /eneral lan/ua/e# -ut he notes that the death penalit3 cannot -e included in these cate/ories -ecause it is considered in the text o. the :onstitution itsel.# in the due process clause1 A/ain# Scalia -inds himsel. to the plain meanin/ o. the text as such1 2o!e er /eneral the meanin/ o. cruel and unusual is# it is apparent that execution is not included in these cate/ories1 Simpl3 put# !here the :onstitution is a/ue# its meanin/ is open .or construction -3 8udical authorit3# !here it is explicit it is not1 In his comment on Scalia%s lectures on this issue1 An interestin/ corollar3 o. Scalia%s contextual approach# is the importance o. a 4dated6

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Jurisprudence Shapiro Fall 2010 Exam ID: 2235 renderin/ o. textual meanin/1 In his ie!# !e cannot interpret the :onstitution accordin/ to the plain lan/ua/e o. our times# -ut onl3 accordin/ to common usa/e !hen enacted1 9his stipulation is consistent !ith the alues o. protected expectations mentioned a-o e# -ut has special importance !hen applied to the :onstituion1 9he :osntitution# accordin/ to Scalia# is mani.estl3 a document that see"s to ma"e permanent the alues o. the /roup that enacted it1 2e ar/ues that i. the .ramers !anted to simpl3 set a s3stem o. /o ernement that !ould chan/e as the times chan/ed# there !ould -e no need .or a :onstituion# -ecause the3 !ould trust .uture /enerations to act accordin/ to their o!n sense o. 8ustice1 9here.ore# he claims that the er3 extistance o. a 'ill o. ,i/hts# indicated that the text should e- understood in a dated sense# as it is an inherentF3 4counter5e olutionar3#6 conser ati e document1 9hus# despite the seemin/ appeal to the .ramers intent# Scalia a oids this pit.all in statin/ that the totalit3 o. the document itsel. spea"s to its 4dated6 interpretation1 9hus Scalia%s textualism can -e seen as a coherent mdoe o. interpretation that ie!s -oth minor statutues# and the :onstitution itsel. in a sin/ular# coherent interpreti e .rame!or"1 As !as mentioned a-o e# Scalia%s insistnec on this de ice o. interpretation stems .rom a commitment to the :on entionalist notion o. protected expectations as a central irture o. le/itimate /o ernment1 <hile this ie! o. la! has its o!n o-8ections# Scalia%s practical extention o. those ie!s cannot -e attac" as inconsistent or .ault3 in their o!n ri/ht1

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