Privacy Based Approaches for Preventing Selective Jamming in Wireless Networks

BKSP. Kumar Raju & R. Rajeshwara Rao Dept of Computer Science and Engineering, JNTUK University college of Engineering, Vizianagaram AP, India E mail : pavan0712@gmail.com, navap0712@gmail.com

Abstract - Wireless networks is still an emerging field in terms of security. Taking advantage from unreliability nature of wireless medium, antagonists can easily accomplish numerous attacks. Among those attacks, selective jamming is more clever technique in which jammer will target and corrupt only the messages of high importance. There are existing methods to prevent selective jamming in internal threat model like strong hiding commitment scheme(SHCS), cryptographic puzzle hiding scheme(CPHS) in which they focused only on the correct message delivery to the receiver node. But on the other side, jammer node can solve the puzzle by taking the entire packet, making the adversary to know the secured message that was transmitted. Here, we propose three novel techniques to prevent selective jamming by ensuring privacy. Moreover, we initially demonstrate a mechanism to identify the existence of selective jamming. Later, we derive a solution to know the exact node that is performing selective jamming. Keywords Medial node, Packet classification, Selective jamming, Wireless networks.

But, in Selective Jamming, the assaulter will expend fewer resources [10], [15] and can create drastic bad consequences. Taking this as ground principle, we can assign a tagline for the selective jamming as less effort, more impact scheme. The assaulter who does the selective jamming will target on specific sender node (SN) and receiver node (RN) and thereby corrupt only the significant packets (e.g. Route REQ / REPLY, ACK) that travel between them. Selective jammer (SJ) node will use packet classification methods [7], [4], [15] to know whether the packet is significant or not. To achieve this selective jamming, the SJ node should be an internal part of network which makes it to know all the networks secrets in an easier way. Finally, all these things make assaulter to perform selective jamming with less energy consumption. II. DETECTING THE SELECTIVE JAMMER If selective jamming is achieved by the adversary for a packet then receiver cannot recover that packet. SJ is just like a normal node but has more computational capabilities than other nodes. We show this SJ node detection in two steps: (1) Initially, we confirm whether there is a presence of selective jamming between specific SN and RN. If there is selective jamming, we will go for the next step: (2) Identifying the exact node that is performing selective jamming. The corresponding procedures of these two steps are shown in the following subsections (A and B): A. Checking the Existence of Selective Jammer

I.

INTRODUCTION

Wireless networks are prone to diverse set of attacks due to its shared medium. Well-designed network architectures may address various security threats [2], [3], [6], [9], [12], [17], [19]. However, wireless networks are even sensitive to number of attacks. From the existing security threats to be resolved, we kept our center of interest on Selective Jamming which is the recent headway on the bad side of technology. We do have various traditional jamming attacks like constant jamming, random jamming, deceptive jamming etc [1], [14], [18]. To have any of these attacks, the antagonist has to spend more vigor but the impact on the network degradation is less. Moreover, there are wide varieties of techniques to prevent several traditional jamming strategies in [5], [8], [11], [13], [16], [21].

As shown in Fig. 1, SJ has targeted on SN and RN which classifies each and every packet sent by SN to RN but it only corrupts the significant packets (SP). It will not do any harm to the insignificant packets (IP). The reason behind this is, corrupting only the significant packets would create more bad impact on SN and RN rather than corrupting all [7].
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There is a best existing method called as Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) with consistency checks [1], which is used to detect various types of Jamming in wireless networks. We have just used the basic idea behind this and proposed a novel approach for the detection of selective jamming. Since, SJ will corrupt all the significant packets leaving the insignificant ones, the number of significant packets that are recovered at RN are zero. During significant synchronization time (T ss), SN will maintain a count of both significant Packets (CSP)SN and insignificant packets (CIP)SN ,which are later used by it to know SJ node existence(As shown in Algorithm 1). Moreover, RN will also maintain the count of received significant and insignificant packets from SN i.e (CSP)RN and (CIP)RN (As shown in Algorithm 2), during Tss, Where Tss is used by the SN and RN to find whether they are under selective jamming or not.

to RN. The time Tss should be synchronized between SN and RN to the maximum extent as possible. To achieve this, SN just starts its T ss after sending its first packet; similarly, RN Starts its Tss after receiving first packet. Initially, SN has started its T ss. This makes Tss at SN to expire first then it waits for some time t, so that it may receive complaints from RN if any. As shown in algorithm-2, If (CSP)RN=0 and (CIP)RN !=0, after a time of Tss then RN thinks that it is under selective jamming with source as SN. Hence RN complains to the SN by passing the parameters (CSP) RN and (CIP)RN. Treating this complaint as significant one, the selective jammer may jam the packet containing complaint and thereby makes it not to reach SN. To avoid this, we make RN to use existing CPHS for transferring the complaint. This may make SJ to solve the puzzle and know the values in the complaint but this solving cannot be possible on before the complaint reaches the SN. Ultimately, the complaint will be taken by the destination correctly. If once this is done, SN can prevent the selective jamming as explained in section III. The adversary node cannot be underestimated which may intentionally leave one significant packet without corrupting it. This makes the receiver node to get failed with the condition ((CSP)RN = = 0) thereby makes RN to create a wrong feeling that it is not under selective jamming but actually it is. So to resolve this, we change the condition from (CSP)RN = =0 to (CSP)RN < threshold, by which RN can correctly predict the existence of selective jamming; To satisfy this condition SJ has to leave intentionally more than one significant packet between SN and RN, which SJ may not be ready to do . But, how threshold value has to be fixed? Since the RN gets the correct number of insignificant packets i.e. (CIP)RN, based on this, it predicts the minimum number of significant packets that it wants to receive within a time interval of T ss, which is then fixed as threshold. Otherwise, say RN has transmitted n significant packets to SN. Then RN needs to get the same number of acknowledgments (ACK) which are treated as significant packets. So, along with ACK significant packets to be received, there may be also other categories of packets which are significant. Taking this into account, threshold value can be fixed to a minimum value i.e. here n. The SN that receives these values ((CSP)RN, (CIP)RN will compare with its ((CSP)SN and (CIP)SN) values. Then this result will meet any of the possible cases shown below:

ISP
SP

SN

SP

RN

SJ

Fig. 1: Selective jamming attack

Algorithm 1: Maintaining Count at Sender Node

1: (CSP)SN=0,(CIP)SN=0; 2: sendToDest(); 3: startTimer(Tss); 4: if Pi==SP 5: 6: 7: // if packet is significant

(CSP)SN ++; else (CIP)SN ++;

8: end if 9: Goto(2) and repeat until timer expires; 10: Wait(t); We assume that, during Tss, SN will send at least one significant packet and one or more insignificant packets

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But in our paper, we address only the first case.

SN

RN

CJ

Fig. 2(a): Continues jamming B. Finding the Selective Jammer

Case-1: More difference in CSP values of (SN, RN) but very less difference in CIP values of (SN, RN) indicates, there is Selective Jamming between SN and RN, because RN received only insignificant but not significant Packets (SP). (As already shown in Fig. 1). Case- 2: More difference in both CSP and CIP values of (SN, RN) reveals two possible alternatives a) In Fig. 2(a), SN and RN are under continues jamming because continues Jammer sends high interference signals constantly. So, this makes both SP and IP packets not to reach RN. b) As shown in Fig. 2(b), there may be a presence of poor wireless link between SN and RN. But, there is no presence of Selective Jammer. Case-3: As depicted in Fig. 3, less difference in CSP values of (SN, RN) but more difference in CIP values of (SN, RN) indicates random jamming (RJ). Random jammer node jams only for some time tj and for the remaining time it will be in sleep mode. Moreover, RJ do not perform any packet classification which makes it to jam more number of IP than SP. That is, blindly it jams the packets which makes it to show variation in the count results and may even fall in other cases. Case-4: As depicted in Fig. 4, less difference in both CSP and CIP values of (SN, RN) indicates no jamming. If the total number of packets transmitted by SN is P n+. But, say RN received Pn packets. Due to unreliability nature of Wireless network, packets were unable to reach RN, Where is very less. Hence no Jamming exists over here. If CSP and CIP values of SN and RN are matched then also it indicates, there was no presence of jammer.

By using above cases, one can predict whether there is selective jamming between SN and RN or not. If confirmed, SN has to detect the node which is performing selective jamming. Since there are number of nodes between SN and RN, it is not an easy task to accomplish this detection. But, we resolve this by considering the weakness of SJ node. The solution is, SN simply broadcast the HELLO packet when SJ is busy such that it should not answer the HELLO packet but all the free nodes reply immediately. Since, SN does not know the state of SJ, it intentionally sends dummy significant packet (DSP) to RN by puzzling with computational capability more than that of SJ and this makes SJ to take the DSP and will be busy in solving that. The same DSP will reach the Receiver RN but it should not spend time and waste its energy in solving the dummy packet. So, we can place a restriction as if once complaint is passed by RN to SN, it should not receive any packets directly from SN until there was no selective jamming between SN and RN. DSP means it contains significant data but it is generated randomly by SN and not useful for RN. The reply from the nodes indicates that they are free nodes (FN) and the nodes which do not reply immediately are treated as Busy Nodes (BN). By using (1), we can find the selective jammer. {BN}= {BN} {FN}; (1)

Initially, we assume all the nodes within the range of SN and RN as busy Nodes (BN). On just before sending the HELLO packet, intentionally SN makes SJ node to be in busy state, making it not to respond with the packet immediately. So, we treat the nodes that replied quickly as free nodes. Hence, SJ will not be in free nodes list. For example, if there are five nodes within the communication range of SN and RN.

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Five Nodes={X, Y, Z, P, Q}

may not be done immediately. So, instead we can make SN to select an intermediate node that is free such that it should reduce the time to travel a packet to the destination (here RN).

SN
Fig. 2(b): Poor wireless link

RN
P1 P2

P3 P4
Pn

SN
RJ

RN

SN

RN

Fig. 4: No selective jamming

Fig. 3: Random jamming Initially, SN sends a DSP to RN, if selective Jammer node is in between SN and RN, then the DSP packet will be taken by SJ and will be busy in solving dummy packet. At that point of time, SN broadcasts HELLO packet and the nodes that are free will reply immediately. If the replied nodes are X, Z and Q; by using (1), BN= {X, Y, Z, P, Q}-{X, Z, Q} =>{Y, P}.Among Y and P, one is the selective jammer node. To know this, SN sends another DSP to RN which makes selective jammer to spend time on the DSP. Immediately, SN broadcasts the HELLO packet. Then the nodes which are free currently will reply immediately. If the replied node is {Y}; Then, by using (1), BN={Y, P} {Y} => {P}; here P is the selective jammer (SJ) between SN and RN. Finally, the node in the singleton set is the selective jammer node. To better confirm the node in singleton set is SJ, we repeat the same for number of iterations. This scheme works because a node which may be free during first HELLO packet may not be free during second or third and so on. Thus detection of Jammer may be time taken but ultimately we are detecting the culprit. III. PREVENTING SELECTIVE JAMMING ATTACK Identifying the node which does the selective jamming is useful. But, if we prevent selective jamming completely then it would be more beneficial. Since SJ jams the significant packets between specific sender node (SN) and receiver node (RN), if we make SN to send packets via an intermediate node then selective jamming may not be possible. If the intermediate node that SN wants to use is already busy then packet transfer

A. Choosing an Intermediate Node that is not targeted by Selective Jammer The intermediate node that can be selected by SN is any Free Node (FN) and then the communication happens through SNFNRN as shown in Fig.5. But, how SN knows the nodes which are free? To know this, it simply broadcasts HELLO packet and the nodes that replied quickly are treated as free. Then, SN selects any free node randomly and can have communication via selected FN. Even RN SN message transfers can be done via the same free node. As depicted in Fig. 5, actual communication can be achieved through a randomly selected free node. Since, SN is using one additional node to deliver packets to RN, which may increase the communication time. But, SN can reduce this time by taking closer free nodes into account. Closer free node selection can be done in two ways: a) selecting free nodes which are closer to SN b) Selecting the free nodes which are closer to RN. As shown in Fig.6, SN has its own communication range which is indicated with dotted Circle whereas the other circle indicates the RN range. Where, R2 = {SN} R3 = {RN} R1 = {SN} {RN} {R2} {R2}

Based on Fig.6, If SN got a closer free node (FNi) reply from R2 rather than from R1, then SN can reduce its communication time with RN. But, If SN gets a quick reply from a free node (FNj ) which is present in R1 then this makes SN to consider it as closer free node. Immediately, SN uses FNj as an intermediate node, but the communication SN FNjRN takes more time because FNj is not closer to RN. Hence, when SN wants to select a closer free node, it should consider the free nodes within the range of both SN and RN. But, how
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can SN know the common nodes between it and RN? There may be two possible solutions to achieve this 1) By using set theory; SN can find SN RN as shown in (2) SN RN = SN + RN (SN RN) (2)

Selective Jammer can also classify each and every packet that is originated from SN, but it classifies the packets that are designated only to RN. Selective Jammer node, which is more familiar for energy conservation, will prefer this. Our schemes presented in this paper will have several benefits. Some of them are :a) privacy is achieved. Existing techniques [7] restricted the SJ node not to perform the packet classification, only for small time S. Meanwhile, the packet may reach the destination. After S, SJ node will solve the secured message that was transmitted between sender and receiver and thus violating privacy of the message. But in our proposed methods, packet may not be taken or cannot be decrypted by the SJ node, so it cannot solve and thus finally preserving privacy. b) Existing method like CPHS used the puzzles based on the Computational Capability (CC) of SJ [7]. But in our proposed technique, once SN and RN are known to each other that they are under selective jamming, they start using a free node and thereby no need to use the puzzling at all. But to get rid from other hackings or threats, any secured cryptography can be used based on the requirements. We are using a free node for accomplishing SN to RN communication but this may increase the communication time. So, SN reduced this time by selecting the free nodes that are closer to RN. Moreover, SN has to spend more energy to send the DSP, HELLO packets and for further processings, but we ignore this, because we are benefited in several other ways like achieving privacy, not using the puzzles, changing the free nodes to reduce the burden on a single free node. Moreover, in our paper we have assumed that there is only one selective jammer within the communication range of SN and RN. Each packet is puzzled with computational capability of SJ, this makes all the nodes which are acting like receivers to spend more time because their computational power is far less from SJ. So, our proposed techniques didnt use any puzzles and thereby saves valuable time of nodes. B. Embedding Future Key (EFK) Method:

FN FN

SN SN

RN RN

Fig. 5: Communication via FN

R1

SN R2 RN

R3

Fig. 6: Finding the free done closer to SN As a Second possible way of selecting the free node, SN can select the free nodes which are closer to the receiver node (here RN). In the previous case, SN just takes the replies from the free nodes which are common to both SN and RN and store it in a queue whereas in the current case (i.e. SN selecting closed free nodes to RN) SN stores the replied node along with time at which it has received the reply. Then, each free node timestamp is compared with the RN timestamp. The free node which has less difference in timestamp value can be treated as closer node to RN. Practically, in this solution, the packet transfer time can be reduced even though SN and RN are using an intermediate node. Packets generated by SN are delivered by FN to RN but, if FN has its own packets to send or receive, then it can also be resolved to a certain extent as, each node can also operate in full duplex mode [7].That is, when FN is receiving the data from SN, it can do its own data transmissions and vice versa. But, if a free node has its own data to send and receive at same time then real problem comes. In order to avoid this, SN has to use the selected free node only for a Time period T. Later, it has to select another free node by broadcasting the HELLO packet again. For each time T, when SN broadcasts HELLO packet, there is no need to make SJ busy by sending DSP intentionally. Since, currently SN knows the SJ node, even if SJ replies SN discards it.

In the previous method, we used the concept of free node to make the message not to be known for selective jammer which was transmitted between intended sender and receiver. Now, we will introduce a new method for the same but without using the notion of free node. We assume, there was a symmetric initial key (SIK) at SN and RN. By using SIK, the SN encrypts the packet that contains the data and next key (Kx). Upon receiving this, RN will decrypt the first packet it has received with SIK. This makes RN to know both the message and K x. By using Kx, RN can decrypt the next immediate packet sent by SN. This process is shown in the below Fig.7.
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SIK is only known to SN and RN. The first packet that SN sends to RN is encrypted by SIK and can only be decrypted by RN, thereby preventing the packet classification from SJ node (we have taken only the KX and data as the packet details for better clarity). The problem over here is, if one packet (P i) has lost in the network due to any reason then RN cannot decrypt any of the next packets (Pi+1, Pi+2.) that it has received from SN because there is a interlink age between keys of the packets. This makes RN to send ACK immediately after successful decryption of each packet.

encrypts the packet with UPK of RN and transmits to SN directly then SN cannot decrypt the packet because UPK of RN is not known to SN. But UPKs of all nodes is known to master node (MN). As step-2, MN receives the packet from actual source (RN) and knows that it was intermediate destination and the actual destination was SN. Then it makes the packet to be transmitted with the destination as SN, intermediate source as MN and with RN as actual source. Before MN transmits the packet, it decrypts the packet it received from RN with UPK of RN and then encrypts the same packet with UPK of SN. As step-3, SN receives the packet containing SIK by knowing that packet actual source was RN, MN was the intermediate source and it (SN) was the destination.

(1) (2) (3) (4) SN SIK

KX

DATA ACK

KY

DATA
(UPK.SN)

(UPK.RN)

ACK RN SIK

MN

SN SIK

RN

MN MN

MN

SN

SIK

RN

Fig. 7: EFK method for achieving privacy This is a good mechanism but network traffic can be increased. To reduce traffic, the number of ACKs should be reduced. This is done as, make RN to send ACK only after the immediate receiving of unrecovered packet. In this case, the ACK sent by RN belongs to the last successful packet that it received from SN. The ACK sent by RN can also be included with some details to identify the last successful packet that it received. Upon receiving this, SN will resend the packets from next packet of the ACK received ones. This scheme makes the number of ACKs transmission to be reduced. But the important question to be resolved is, how can SN and RN know the SIK? This can be solved with the help of master node. Master node is just like the normal node but has more computational power and even more memory space. We will assume that, at that time of network establishment itself each node is configured with unique private key (UPK) such that a node UPK is not known to any other node except the master node. Master node stores UPKs of all the nodes. Based on these criterias, SIK from RN can be transmitted to SN in the following (as shown in Fig. 8). As step-1, after RN knows that it was under selective jamming it will transmit randomly generated SIK to SN. But, this SIK should not be taken by the SJ node. To achieve this, RN will encrypt the SIK and other details with UPK of it (RN) and is transmitted to MN but not directly to SN. The reason for this is, if RN

SN SN

RN RN

SJ

Fig. 8: SIK transfer from RN to SN When SN wants to send data to RN, it encrypts both the data and Kx with SIK. Since SIK is also known to RN, it can only decrypt making adversary node not to have packet classification. Not only the first packet, any further packets cant be done with packet classification and thereby preventing the selective Jamming completely. Ultimate privacy of the message is achieved with less memory and less computational overhead. But, slightly communication overhead is more during the process of SIK transfer. We ignore this, when coming to the other benefits that are getting in. C. Using Asymmetric cryptography to prevent selective Jamming: In general, applying asymmetric cryptography on normal nodes is an overhead task. Each node has to store public keys of all nodes. But, a normal node cannot do this efficiently because it has less memory and less computational power. On the other side, asymmetric algorithms are very secure. So, in our approach to prevent selective jamming, we look into the usage of asymmetric algorithm(s) such that overhead (memory and computational) is reduced.

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Once SN and RN are known that, they are under selective jamming, RN will pass its public key to SN which indicates SN to encrypt by using RN public key when it wants to send packets to RN. Upon receiving the packets by RN, it will decrypt with its private key. But, how SN knows RNs public key? We solve this, by taking SIK exchange in EFK method as a base. After RN knows that it was under selective jamming by getting only insignificant packets from SN, it will send its public key to MN initially by encrypting with its UPK. Then, MN decrypts the packet and encrypts the same public key with UPK of SN. Finally, SN decrypts with its UPK to get public key of RN. Once public key is securely transferred by using this method, then the remaining communication between SN and RN are done securely with that public key at SN (encryption) and corresponding private key at RN (decryption).To avoid brute force attacks of public key, we can change public key and private key pair after certain time. This time can be known based on length of the key and also taking the computational capability of selective jammer in to consideration. Coming to the performance issues, memory consumption is low because SN which is under selective jamming stores only the public key of RN and computational overhead is also less and limited to two nodes which are under selective jamming. IV .CONCLUSION There are various categories in wireless networks like Ad hoc, sensor, WLANs. Jamming creates a bad impact on any of these wireless networks. Specifically, if Selective Jamming is done, the impact is even more. Selective jamming is treated as an internal threat model, so it would be difficult to detect it for a normal sender or receiver node. Here, we have proposed a solution to identify the exact node that is performing selective jamming, by initially checking the existence of selective jammer between specific sender and receiver node. Finally, we have given three novel approaches to prevent selective jamming by ensuring privacy of the transmitted message. V. REFERENCES [1] Wenyuan Xu, Wade Trappe, Yanyong Zhang andTimothy Wood, The Feasibility of launching andDetecting Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks, MobiHoc05, May 2527, 2005. B. Potter. Wireless security's future. IEEE Security Privacy Magazine, 1(4):68{72, 2003}. Y. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. Johnson. Ariadne: A secure On-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks. In 8th ACM International

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