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A Diversified Muslim Identity
A Diversified Muslim Identity
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OPINION COMMENT
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election
voting
politics
election
preferred and acceptable factor in voting. This takes us to our second question, which is related to
the idea of strategic voting by Muslims.
Do Muslims vote strategically?
NES data suggests that the Congress is the first choice for Muslims at the all-India level, followed
by the Samajwadi Party (SP), the Left parties and the BJP. This trend is quite consistent.
This national picture needs to be seen in relation to State-specific data. The BJP, which turns out
to be the third choice for Muslim voters at the all-India level, gets a very different response in
States. For the sake of clarity, we may compare the BJPs performance in Uttar Pradesh and
Gujarat.
In the 2004 election in U.P., 2.50 per cent voted for the BJP. This rose to 5 per cent in 2009. On
the contrary, the BJPs performance in Gujarat is very different. In 2004, 18.60 per cent voted for
the BJP; this went down to 12.40 per cent in 2009. In Gujarat, we
found a very clear polarisation of Muslim votes between the Congress and the BJP. U.P.,
therefore, has virtually failed to get Muslim support in the last three general elections. In fact, the
party could not maintain its national average in the State.
This inference need not to be exaggerated. The performance of political parties in a State depends
on State-specific political configurations. The availability of viable political alternatives
determines the voting behaviour of electorates.
Politics in U.P. is dominated by a number of strong political players, who associate themselves
with various caste-religious communities in the State. On the other hand, politics in Gujarat is
quite polarised where regional parties have not yet carved out a space for themselves. In this
sense, the constituency-level configuration of party and candidate plays a more significant role
for the Muslim electorate in Gujarat. Thus, Muslim voting to any particular party in States is not
an outcome of any national strategy; rather, the voting preferences of Muslims, it seems, are
constituted at the grassroots level.
Does caste affect voting?
The Muslim caste is not taken as a serious political factor by political observers. In fact, the
increasing role of Pasmanda Muslim politics, which has been quite active in mobilising various
marginalised Muslim communities, especially in U.P. and Bihar, has not been given adequate
attention. NES has tried to look at the impact of Muslim caste in electoral politics.
The difference between the voting behaviour of Muslim Other Backward Classes (OBC) and other
Muslims is not very significant; yet, the plurality of Muslim political attitude is quite apparent.
We also find that Muslim caste groups change their political preferences quite considerably. For
instance, in 1999, other Muslims (read as non-OBCs, or Ashrafs) overwhelmingly voted for the
Congress (45 per cent) in comparison to Muslim OBCs. But, in 2004 and 2009, this equation
changed almost completely and the Congress managed to win over the Muslim OBC support. The
case of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is more revealing. As a political party, it is officially
committed to the political ideology of Bahujan that seeks to fight against caste-based
discrimination. The party, however, does not evince any interest in the Muslim caste question.
Yet, data suggests that Muslim OBCs (which includes Dalit Muslims as well) are more inclined
toward the BSP in comparison to other Muslims.
Muslim caste-based voting patterns, we must note, becomes more complicated at the State level.
The case of Bihar is very relevant, where the Janata Dal (United) has offered a space to Pasmanda
political groups in order to consolidate itself among marginalised Muslims. This trend is quite
relevant because a number of Pasmanda Muslim organisations have already passed the
resolution (Political Agenda of Pasmanda Muslims in Lok Sabha Elections, 2014) seeking direct
political support for caste-based Muslim reservation and other demands.
This discussion offers us a rather complex picture. Muslim communities, like any other social
group, participate in electoral politics and follow established norms and patterns. Yet, the
distinctiveness of Muslim identities is always asserted in political terms. This is the reason why
anti-Muslim violence (Gujarat 2002, Assam and, more recently, the Muzaffarnagar riots)
emerges as a serious political issue for Muslim electorates, at least in the region-specific sense.
And, at the same time, the inclusion of Muslims Dalits in the list of Scheduled Castes,
reformulation of OBCs to accommodate more Muslim castes, and economic safeguards for
Muslims artisans and small businesses have become equally powerful Muslim concerns.
Interestingly, political analysts as well as political parties still evoke the old idioms of secularismcommunalism to deal with this discursively constituted and highly diversified Muslim political
identity.
This kind of political-intellectual apathy cannot help us in appreciating the fluctuating patterns of
Muslim electoral behaviour. There is a need to give up the top to bottom approach. Instead, we
have to pay close attention to Muslim engagements at the local and regional levels to make sense
of the role of Muslim votes in the 2014 election.
(Hilal Ahmed is assistant professor, CSDS. )
Keywords: Electoral behaviour of Indias Muslims, Indian politics, Muslim vote bank