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Augustine's Compatibilism
Augustine's Compatibilism
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Augustine's compatibilism
KATHERIN A. ROGERS
In analysing Augustine's views on freedom it is standard to draw two Abstract: distinctions; one between an earlier emphasis on human freedom and a later insistence that God alone governs human destiny, and another between pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian freedom. These distinctions are real and important, but underlying them is amore fundamental consistency. Augustine is a compatibilist from his earliest work on freedom through his final anti-Pelagian writings, and the freedom possessed by the un-fallen and the fallen will is a compatibilist freedom. This leaves Augustine open to the charge that he makes God the ultimate cause of sin. In analysing tinctions. alone One notes an earlier emphasis that governs view of pre-lapsarian or wrongly, wrongly, unless On turned but Augustine's on human human freedom, towards views on freedom it is standard of his thought to draw two dis over time, from Augustine's choose distinctions rightly only are
development
and post-lapsarian
can choose
is a more
that although
are ultimately agents being very clearly that he held different, of the will This causal
on freedom. And
though Augustine,
and after the Fall are that the basic nature and the
an examination is of more
and choice
interest. From his day to ours, philosophers by the later Augustine's in the salvation of fallen man. For example,
theologians
second Council
of Orange
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416
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
the same problem are ultimately issue being will While rightly, Council
of rational agents in this case the elect responsible? the to The backed it is up to if the fun causes
factors
the agent
set the tone for the later development it upheld agent analysis the necessity to persevere, of freedom of un-fallen and gratuity and insisted is the same willing They views
thinking
on this issue.
received salvation.1
and if the mechanics then the difficulties over-zealous freedom and pose
the same as after the Fall, do not stem to his basic philosophy
anti-Pelagianism.
that philosophy. by a rational agent, is the inevi the effect. The occur, but the For instance
First, some definitions I shall mean table product 'Inevitable' some other 'ceteris paribus' cause the view of causes here means
remarks are in order. By 'determinism' from the conscious the cause necessitates be the case choice might can occur. take many take place. agent himself.
agent on the brink of causally the instant before Causal the mad should nition; necessitation neurosurgeon implant its cause a chip
by a boulder if
forms. So, for example, free-will literature that makes to my is operant to the agent an instance defi since a brain event according
of contemporary
that produces
the agent,
it the of in of
is the chip and ultimately agent cannot a desire evitably This but fail to choose such in the agent, choosing second example
neurosurgeon,
the implanting
X, the desire to be
for A is determined. less obviously The chain of causes It might the agent the desire, is longer, be argued less the to of it towards leads
determination
determinism. as drawing
is somehow
nature
of the event,
as impelling would.
a chunk
the toy off the edge of a table, and another you might that itmoved
try to deny in a
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Augustine's compatibilism
417
it did. But you put the iron in and you held up the magnet the toy so that it wouldn't is causally one necessitated does not seem follow by factors to make its attraction outside implants a difference itself, and
that it was
last case:
the neurosurgeon
of the rational
and the desire the addition determinacy inevitable, back these God, This choice causal choice of which the agent's choice. produce certain cases
lead inevitably
of the cognitive of the choice and the causal outside if, instead
to a cause
neurosurgeon,
is no less determined.2 'determinism', determinism. have makes focusing on a it in its is still in rather than on universal choice might if the mad causes On this definition a non-determined the choice Or take a choice of particles the source of nor
is possible
to implant
determined,
although brain
is the indeterminate
in the agent
is determined
result of indeterminacy.
'Compatibilism' determined (The freedom to choose Augustine's Compatibilists Compatibilism are advanced outlines Choice comes that it is consistent is nonetheless and most to believe morally that a given and that the agent that Augustine, terms, between responsible significant choices variations it will Iwill suffice argue, between inevitably for that choice. freedom, must on or, be made the theme the is essentially options chooses and that. in
to turn to God or to sin. That will be our topic.) that morally today, and responsible countless Here which, or 'free will' literature. as compatible with determinism. to sketch
typically
of a standard is caused
of compatibilism
Augustine's position.
by desire. The rational agent deliberates about what itmost desires and to a conclusion
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418
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
is not
the author
of his reason
Perhaps being
are to
in turn be shaped
Still, there
is a beginning
choose what the agent pre-volitionally judges most desirable, because that is how motivation works. This is determinism since, under the circumstances, the
choice outside is inevitable of the agent. and the causes which naturalist lead to it are the product universe where the reasoning of factors and desires In a non-theist,
which determine the choice are the product of the processes of blind nature. In
a classical status Since theist universe in being such as Augustine's, from moment product all that has real ontological by the divine will, they are from means is sustained the choice to moment
given by God.3
is the inevitable of causes which it is free because do not originate what 'freedom' the agent, caused, pulsion, patibilism, within him; it is determined. Nonetheless, behaviour, being forced considered
is the ability to follow one's rationally considered desires. Natural necessity, i.e.
non-deliberative i.e. an agent's of one's like the falling of a rock, is unfree. And com to act against desires, argues action. his will, The And agent is unfree. But choosing version of com to be at in that it can be held options this standard
on the basis
is the essence
of voluntary
originator
of his own choices and judgements. him most. have chosen had been have choices
in that they arise from factors he has open because thus, his choice he could have just that in he that is the The
he can choose whatever is correct concludes, rewarding as a whole. which This genuinely if his desires and
attracts
morally a salutary
responsible.
and punishing
he could have chosen significant theist For the classical to moment. produce
the praise
the free choice him, and which originating created causality causes It is correct will of God.
of the agent
in him
cause
agent has only a kind of 'secondary' in general. possess, Secondary causality upon in total dependence and actions So it is equally, the cotton
power power
the context
of explaining
is caused
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Augustine's compatibilism
419
we make
as merely argue,
secondary
it is of to
to see how He can justly hold us responsible of sin. Augustine, agents to be morally Iwill
and escape
being, Himself,
this problem.
One who If (contrary free will Augustine the nature pre-lapsarian that morally the aspects desires choice. dependently holds created to what was I will radically responsible, position judges moral of
and after the Fall, then presumably libertarian. in which originates solely the agent in the conscious faces
choice may
and motivations,
be traced back
true of the actual freedom. An agent libertarian freedom 'from our freedom. and
to be essential
which existed absolutely from itself, likeGod, might recognize only one option
(the 'best of all possible since selves', its choice For created agents perhaps) and yet choose with though, comes ifwe is generated possibilities entirely may from itself. are to choose libertarian desires, be necessary status to enable from God, to conflicting our choice.5
alternative
If all that has genuine our desires can endow way which dom, choice, but us with
are from Him. But ifwe are subject sufficient entails 'primary' agency and constitute not only desire will 'win out'
for a creature,
that the agent be the ultimate possibilities. It is important allows one entail genuine in the history of choice,
('from oneself-ness')
such alternatives
immorally
lying, but quickly decide truthful character in that God caused cemented freedom. to choose to choose with just your
it out of a long-established
you are now, you really could not have is the result of past choices which conflicting choice On desires in you such
to be able
libertarian
be motivated there is a
reasons. Nonetheless,
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420
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
predates
Augustine
by him.6 If it is true that at some key literally open options, then there is no each to the we to be But is, you can
did you opt for this over that?'. That interests. it which Nonetheless, holds when
character
of one over the other, that you choose as before, argued, but
that there is absolutely everything the other they must would choice.
the scope
and that his compatibilism his career Augustine is my weight; along is borne that:
'My love
in a particular that we
by its weight,
[is that]
in
response towhat repels us least). One tempting understanding of freewill, that we are self-movers, is consequently ruled out of court.We have no motives for acting independently of what we perceive to be the good in acting.12 This certainly works suggests compatibilism express as I have a compatibilist defined doctrine it, and the later anti proof text.13 The and
Grace and Free Choice, written begins free choice and so we deserve in us the praiseworthy
clearly, once grace For, has been
an excellent beings
that human
('good merits')
or absence
But
to exist,
but
through
that grace.
if grace
is withdrawn,
falls, no
longer
standing upright, but cast headlong by free choice. Hence, even when a human
being to God. begins to have good merits, he ought not to attribute them to himself, but (6.13)14
heaven 'eternal
life, but
the good
life is itself a gift of grace. (9.20). And yet enough it is by our [God] causes against those
'It is certain
that we will when we will, but does not destroy and, once
it is good, helps
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Augustine's compatibilism
421
Our wills
are determined
by God's
grace
the good,
and yet
they are genuinely and rewarded. will is in control His good instances achieve Gera
free, and the created of the wills purposes; causing of those who hardening
agent who
is justly praised that the divine in order to a list of scriptural deeds the evil son of
In Grace and Free Choice, Augustine God has caused evil wills
even suggests
in which
Pharaoh's
causing
to curse David,
Who would not tremble before these judgments of God by which God does what he wills even in the hearts of evil persons, repaying them, nonetheless, according to theirmerits? ... For the almighty produces in the hearts of human beings even the movement of theirwill in order to do through them what he himself wills to do through them, he who absolutely cannot will anything unjust. (21.42) In the example cursing would hidden because actually Augustine least good causality, about have the son of Gera, God been obedient inclined This 'tells' him to curse David. Augustine else the just and was evil of God Rather, 'by his
says that this telling could not have been judgement of its own produces clearly human implying God toward
in the form of a commandment, this sin that man's to suggest and a hidden Unfinished with will which
the Calvinist
doctrine
sinful choices."5 Work primary I have Julian, (at of divine will is what and human called agency
expresses agency)
an analogy
secondary 'secondary'
that created
agency.
And from ifGod produces a good will will in a human being, He does it so that the good will being comes to be being that comes
through does
human that
creates
a human being.
not mean
the human
another
human
(5.42)
doctrine Julian,
of will
in these
but he considers
libertarianism,
Julian of Eclanum,
(5.41). But Julian goes on to hold to choose well the choice. If the movement
or badly, with no pre of soul arises from reasons to salvation critics on our of liber accident
factors determining
then Christ's
But he also
case,
that a choice
is a sort of random
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422
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
is even if the
crazier, choice
it was to sin
not,
is uncaused
if sin is something to blame These Augustine mid-39os, (5.56)? later works himself,
him genuinely
is really
this constitute
position
from that held by the early Augustine? to a change election to Simplician, written
Esau,
... in favour of the free choice of the human will, but God's grace triumphed. And it was only by reaching this point, that I could understand that the apostle had spoken with the clearest truth: What sets you apart?What do you have that you have not received? And if you received it,why do you boast as if you had not received it? (2.1) Some scholars argue that this work analysis this fiction of life.'16 To Simplician represents of the human for divine a significant will change in how Augustine saving action. not based as It is in relation to God's of the way [of libertarian from the 390s signals the will works. that God free choice] when a change in Augustine's 'Augustine to a
writes,
to believe petition
that election
is unconditional,
aid, and
effectual.17 But different the change patibilist metaphysics earlier writings, fundamental cian certainly respective made had always possible
as this may
in his earlier
in Augustine's
level of the basic workings constitutes an important and human are drawn him roles of divine assumed: would of the will without we
of the will. The argument realigning in Augustine's but on my metaphysics what we at which
in To Simpli
willing,
to choose
between freedom.
391-395) when
on human
the Manicheans,
proposed
two separate
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Augustine's compatibilism
423
wills
agent,
is somehow
In response,
had emphasized
good or bad through his own individual does not advance is fundamentally Even good choices, come
and single will, and so ismorally of the divine the position all goods, among as we
But in looking back from his later perspective, a view of the relationship different
in On Free Will he had maintained from God. and or small, are from God, is also from God, have to be seen it follows is numbered
goods' (Retractions,9.6).
interpretation as Augustine misrepresenting early work were we there clear evidence insists or blamed. of libertarianism And which is likened in On Free Will. Certainly be voluntary, movement for otherwise of the will like the
by natural
necessity
falling of a stone the good as our wills, libertarianism. we are drawn the driving about man not
in that it can turn towards in our own possession to possess it (1.12.26). of and so no evidence argues
in order
inconsistent
by our desires.
factor in all wrongdoing by his love of what and open which deception' to follow what drawn to choose telling
(1.3.21). (There will be a great deal more of the first sins.) And and immutable They is eternal
in the discussion
violence always
one's will',
give of what
of what
dialogue
had been
tarian at the time he wrote of the free-will problem without of moral God has made
of the free-will
defence
creatures with
is a very good
it the creature
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424
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
Augustine wholeheartedly defends both of these claims. But the free-will defence
goes on to argue the libertarian point that a genuine ability to choose the good in
theway required for created aseity and morally significant freedom, necessarily entails the genuine, alternative possibility of not choosing the good, but instead
choosing Gilson, possibility (2.19.52-53) which must always evil. Thus for example, it is not possible in discussing about by for God to leave us free and yet prevent that for Augustine, condition the text which 'the
us from choosing evil. Some scholars have attributed this position toAugustine.
On Free Will writes the necessary its good use'.22 But of the evil use of free will was brought does not say exactly and achieve and open good without for the goodness he cites good
and happiness
is an intermediate
have a will
But this does not entail that God our free will.
aseity
In On Free Will Augustine creatures anything one would even so that they would
does
indeed
choose
but he never
in response.
Rather, he says that God has made creatures remain in sin. But even the that it should all of these strata of (3.5.14). Augustine good. And defence to remain
is a good
sort of thing, and it is better not exist at all. And of the whole the good creation angels
to say that God does not somehow his answer assumptions. in On Free Will creatures would developed
of why God did not bring the good gives seems to be an over a have concede things' best that of to the same question should
always a work
of Genesis,
after To Simplician to sin. Now, we in forbidden that it was that entails claim
genuinely
turn (convertere)
into good wills. that forAugustine as the free-will to good, with 'turned' wills would would have not be destroyed or rendered just be turned He (Cur noluerit, good, at least it, rather they would to? God only knows all men
ipsum est). We
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Augustine's compatibilism
425
one class of good the number inished' just different On Free Will, argument, defence,
creatures
would
not have
existed,
that is, those who of good kinds would with it. Thus, to offer
condition
of evil doers.
of the best kind of thing, from the free-will it is plausible one would
from On defence,
in looking
of a sketchy a libertarian
where
expected
a libertarian
as evidence
not assuming
metaphysics
Though always
on the roles
But if the later Augustine and justice of God, always held desirable, determine
leaves no room for genuine if this is difficult thus far seems of the intellect
the story of human one. Augustine it judges most nature which that God Here the will This condition. human
to square with
of sin? the Fall the human steps in with is inevitably grace, unless God and, story. But the grace which the present, will draw
post-lapsarian
And mankind
is in this fallen state because and Eve, and before for it. This a will which certainly though,
them Satan,
responsible creatures
to un-fallen
that God determines sees a distinction that he is a consistent that created and, agent
and the fallen will. thus is unable secondary sistently prove insists agency.
the difficult
consequence
is only a
though Augustine
that his view does not entail look at Augustine's and Grace (426/427
it, bears
the ultimate
responsibility
of the causes
Adam's
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426
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
be blamed ance
to persevere
if he didn't
receive
the persever
to enable
to do so, Augustine
If thatman had not abandoned this help through free choice, he would always have been good, but he abandoned it and was in turn abandoned. This help was, of course, such that he could abandon it if he willed to and could remain in it if he .... For he could have willed to, not such that itwould make him towill this (11.31) persevered if he willed to, but his not willing to do so came from his free choice which was at that point so free that he was able towill both good and evil. (11.32)23 We have seen that positing an ability will to choose between good and evil is con freedom is pres it is a
sistent with compatibilism. The question is this: is the difference between the
pre-lapsarian while ently being being and the post-lapsarian inexorably drawn drawn that the former has libertarian that after the Fall the will to sin, unless, while before drawn by God's towards the latter does not? Or is the difference downwards inexorably upwards to salvation,
grace,
time when Adam's in a condition presented compatibilist sort of natural its desires, drawn in the good,
the arising of new desires, the character a defective not have it. But freedom in him
it could
objects most
on that basis
to sin or to persevere be a can maintain sin by a of to persevere the creator responsi in it. So if was
that God did not make Adam with He might in the good more and inevitably than to abandon if pre-lapsarian by a desire have implanted judge
that he must
the created
then Adam
for which
bility. God might such a way pre-lapsarian source freedom intuitions company metaphysics essentially were of sin.
is compatibilist,
argument
Augustine perhaps
apparently
of free will. Compatibilism by causes to make discussion he discusses the difference seems independent the case
determined
there is very strong evidence clearest between general purely and most 12 of level, as 417 and spiritual,
for the interpretation The best way well-developed The City of God 425) where setting Augustine aside
of the causes
of the first sin, and that is in book have been written angels. At embodied and being the most
to understand
of the human
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Augustine's compatibilism
427
essentially between
the same.
in the ellipsis
But the fact that [Adam] did not will to remain in [agood will], is of course, his fault, as itwould have been his merit if he had willed to remain in it, as the holy angels did.When the other angels fell through free choice, the holy angels remained standing through the same free choice and merited to receive the reward due to their
remaining, ....
to focus on the City of God text. First, in analysing Adam's situate about the discussion within the actual Genesis question can focus did not of how texts, the with Why distract from the philosophical will, Augustine angels
on the pure
of the good and bad angels. Secondly, The good by centring on the question: in the good? of the good this because them
the angels we
is clarified
did the bad angels first chapter bad angels'. but must bad angels of nature Augustine
the good
angels persevered
does not lie in their nature. The the one nature We (12.1). know and the
are not the result of an evil nature, 'No one pays retribution could have caused means have for faults to sin? which
be attributed
cause of this evil will, nothing something a willing agent which it caused by a
will be found' takes action caused bad. cause things again, There
cause, Augustine
an effect. There
for the will of the agent would not have been which
It is absurd
pre-existing
for the evil will lower down choice. There good cannot But,
does not have a will, one of those good these things are good for the evil choices in the good
on the scale of being which inferior, be the efficient just is no efficient cause cause cause
perverted possibilities.
of evil. Augustine
is an efficient
of the will
to persevere
and it is
grace is the active cause of the will to persevere the same explanation from the Creator, 'If the good without themselves or itwas for a good will later given to a it by this
in the fallen elect. Essentially the good will must It cannot come
holds for the good angels. Either theywere created complete with theirgood wills,
them by God. and then chose good will follows God. And be the case that they were created without angels were the operation better the good will of God, then
at first without
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428
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
than they were that they should in being, (12.9). but those be com or at this is are but to in advance
they might
and happiness
by participation
a position meritorious,
Scripture
plainly
proves
(5.57). When
know why
angels
But what
angels? There
is no efficient cause
to be said? Speaking
... that [the bad angel] himself produced lfecisse] the evil will though he was good
before the evil will, he should ask why he caused it, whether because he is a nature,
or because he ismade from nothing. He will find that the evil will arises [incipere]
not from the fact that he is a nature, but from the fact that that nature is made
from nothing (12.6). The cause only any more That makes through a number offered the thesis of the first sin 'is not efficient the higher good than we can see darkness of the evil will throughout but deficient'. The bad choice grasp consists its cause
is a case Augustine (2.20.54) all the way are have recent Even scholars at his death. There
Julian which
interpretations
drawn by its desires, which agent can be held created 'out of' or
do not result from a choice A first possibility nothing allows might mean is this: only
the un-fallen
to be saying
this in the
crypto-Manicheanism.
is quite different:
force or power. from When nothing, we say that all we
sort of thing
is possible
(not necessary)
because
is made
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Augustine's compatibilism
429
mean is this: things are either from God or from nothing. The Son and the Spirit are from God, for the one is begotten and the other proceeds, and they are co-equal with God. Created things are not from God in the sense of sharing the divine substance. Nor are created things made from some pre-existing substance. If creatures were from God as the Son and the Spirit are, theywould be God and so evilwould not be a possibility for them. This iswhy we say that it is creation from nothing which makes evil possible. (5.27-38) But this cannot evil will. Creation will, but were while question A second first sins sense writes, deficient it cannot created equally be all there is to the role of 'nothing' ex nihilo must function ex nihilo as an explanation as the deficient cause of the of the evil angels sin
of being without
unintelligible.
of cause.'25 Yet Augustine, can silence silence causal rather seem them. appeal to and to do to
darkness, when
our ears and eyes fail to perceive to the question, explanation, cause for one's
In answer
'Why didn't you see that rock?', although failure 'nothing', to see. The unintelligible, that would analogy
'Itwas dark'
that the first sins are utterly by the absence agrees with
of something
T. D. J. Chappell unintelligible.
that the first evil wills and wise. the choice must
be unmotivated.
Chappell
writes,
Such an action is, by its very nature, inexplicable, simply because the explicability of
an action supposed described, can only mean the possibility whatever specify of relating is aimed it to some good at which as correctly and hence it is to aim. But then if no good we at by an action to which
of course
cannot
any good
it is related;
something
but wonders
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430
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
have
done,
since
who could
certainly
He answers
his own soul and develop of God Augustine (3.25.74-76). to know inserts over
in an inappropriate after the text on or see to the that in choosing motivates argues
how attempting
the 'defective'
is like trying to hear silence evil consists which Later for example, own power.
(12.8) on how
sin of the evil angels, God, when pride exaltation?' Augustine Moreover philosophically bility problem Augustine, is the beginning
in The City of for a perverse from God, but and causal for sin. cause in the
he is elaborating
and Eve, Augustine is pride but desire a good, rational, lead it away
and knowledge
on the basis of desire. that the first sin is unmotivated of how cannot to assign escape the respective both responsibility is the efficient
of the good choice, sort of morally does not choose cause choice is both
of the perseverance
If the agent the bad and unin by desire element choice for is for a
Scott MacDonald telligibility some involved to sin ismotivated recognizably how a desire creature made Donald which, 'carelessness while inappropriate reasons'.
understanding
he refers to as 'primal' that the will object. succeed awareness of primal to attend desire,
suggests not
'deficient reasoning',
in practical desire
that Augustine's
act of sin into two components The act of will is not cause.29 of the inappropriate 'deficiency' ceding This succeed a 'deficient' reasoning motivation involves
is explicable
that the first sins are unmotivated, a lack of attention suggestion, but
is an interesting
as an interpretation
of Augustine,
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Augustine's compatibilism
431
the original
sins, he does not trace them to any preceding is not too serious a problem in not only reconstructive of primal [he] can claim
forMacDonald, interpretation,
that he is interested
to the problem
'Augustinian interesting
ideas such
of the first sins, the pro in a way which not. MacDonald -a that is adamant
could play the role of the deficient it is the initial to voluntary failure itself which
for the first sin. It seems avoided'.32 acts of will. following from But Augustine
is 'blameworthy
deficient
is not a voluntary
to MacDonald,
blameworthy.
Sometimes failures directed worthy, choice And, the bad, expect MacDonald as if it is the choice which for evil traces back to choices if the failures themselves acts and not of these results from the failing resulting from these of mis blame then the of the are instances in themselves causes, the control sin? sin, one is left with and the failure of that the failure way. We do not and so a of intel a it that incurs blame: and no attention, and 'culpability farther'.34 But which
the primal
deficient
phenomenon understanding
of the good
suggests innocuous
a causal
of not doing
something,
analysis
in general.
us towards
a non-compatibilist
interpretation
of Augustine,
does not solve the problem for the primal good main angels sin to God.
good on their own, but rather through as the efficient properly by causing to attend
the grace of God. So, on the present cause of the good wills to the relevant reasons. Without
hypothesis,
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432
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
they would
have
fallen,
to attend
grace. Perhaps we cannot but we know in practical Nor grace. MacDonald's reasoning and does
fail without
'Augustinian' as an explanation
of the role of the failure to sin and wrongdoing not what Augustine which causality
of primal
it is probably
an interpretation
interpretation
is that 'nothing'
the created
this is exactly what Augustine the good angels love than those who of bliss
says. In The City of God he explains stood firm. 'Either they received in it, or, if both were the others, cause certain This They them receiving more created never
grace of the divine equally achieved fall away' absent, chosen it didn't,
persevered
inevitably
and so they fell, not by natural with that the responsibility agents. The creatures arise naturally He could
but nonetheless
The problem to the charge first created to help when intimated implicates in the end, vacillating embracing But ex nihilo. They
is that it leaves Augustine's did not produce from nothing. the will to others Babcock
position
in a being made
that the origin of the evil will the God who is not uneasily an instance between of moral as caused position.37
itself and ultimately ... the first evil will, sees Augustine unintelligible grace, without hold that due are as
the view
and the view that it is explained either problematic reason to argue the only
the first sins are caused to a lack of grace responsible ontirely outside Pelagian works heaven for choices
inevitably
is the libertarian
are ultimately
tuition. The good angels of The City of God, book view, morally their good wills the good voluntarily. They are the appropriate
12, and the elect of the later anti agents. They choose praise. They merit caused by God. of moral
are efficiently
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Augustine's compatibilism
433
agent
ismorally
responsible
for the good of divine in the other grace. that the created
it
its will
in one direction
causality ismoved
direction will,
by divine
Though there are differences between the pre-lapsarian and the post-lapsarian
the difference not go as deep condition as the basic workings is not changed needed needs of the will. On
good condition.
a somewhat towards
to rescue him
from his sinful condition grace we are damned and all ultimately problematic
position.
on the part of the rational creature, 'the author of sin'. Augustine his view entails works by causes which the problem is not stem
is indeed, Nonetheless,
are determined,
that Augustine
to extremes
in the heat
the post-lapsarian
compatibilism is false.38
Notes
1. Rebecca Harden Weaver Divine Grace and Human Agency: A Study of the Semi-Pelagian did not attempt the difficult to persevere on his own, when rest upon Controversy task of trying to is the on the
(Macon GA: Mercer sort out just how origin of all good mind/body determined 3. Choices 4. Recently
University things.
the human
it is God who
a particular
position is
by factors outside
the agent,
the choice
or immaterial. the divine designer set up the inexorable that God laws in the it seems to me. of the will', Faith and 20 is not blameworthy be equally determined, like this, insisting sovereignty and freedom:
made
in a deist universe,
beginning
run on its own, would a view something agents and 'Sovereignty ('Divine
for the evil choices He causes Faith and Philosophy, Philosophy, 5. This
in his created
12 (1995), 582-589;
(2003), 371-378. is a position suggested of Free Will of Canterbury's of the will, especially principle in On the Fall of the Devil. I take it that it could be elaborated using Robert Kane's of plural voluntariness;
The Significance
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434
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
with
its concern
possibilities, Bobzien
is apparently
to the of
among
philosophers.
finds it first in the work of Alexander in Necessity, Cause and Blame suggests
in the second
uncaused
does,
I think, provide
an adequate
analysis
of libertarian advance
freedom
a choice
being uncaused
Second,
reward and punishment it here only to preclude 13.8. ad Galatas, and works 49.
to his choice.
I do not attempt
to solve the
I take it to be insoluble.
io. Idem City of God, 11.28. ii. Idem Expositio 12. James Wetzel 13. Dating D. Fitzgerald, B. Eerdmans, 14. Translation of The Works translation i6. Wetzel distinct cannot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 84.
of Augustine's
of Augustine
in Allan
(Grand Rapids MI: William to the Pelagians, a translator IV; pt 1, vol. 26 is not cited,
of Grace and Free Choice by Roland of SaintAugustine ismy own. is expressed and in the Enchiridion
(Hyde Park NY: New City Press, 1999). Where (26.100) written holds our actions'. between
(421/422 CE).
8.Wetzel deliberate
'There is no faculty of will, to one or another. following or desire. and not even more
to imply that the person than simply as motive ismade from intellect us with chooses
desire. But Augustine literally identical with forcefully. Our choices Wetzel's interpretation the desires. 17. I thank an anonymous Augustinian 8. The analysis Babcock knowledge libertarian dragged 19. InAgainst bound. 20. There are, of course, attempting claims.
argument
our desires. in accord with of these See William 34. To my a that the soul is when accepted
the importance
of Platonism. followers,
'Augustine
of Religious
16 (1988), 40-56,
to argue that Plato, or his ancient The Platonic image of wrongdoing of the unfree for lower things.
to be consistently
downwards Fortunas
by its desires
forced
to do something
tightly an
of the free-will
to absolve God of responsibility does offer one. that it is best freedom. theodicy philosopher between Philosophy among
free will,
created
21. I am not aware of any developed Canterbury is the first Christian to choose
of
to develop
theodicy
lines. In
his On the Fall of the Devil he argues literally open option 22. Etienne House, Gilson The Christian
that morally
for a created
good and evil. of Saint Augustine, consistently argues L. E. M. Lynch that Augustine (tr.) (New York NY: Random always held the view which
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Augustine's compatibilism
435
I have 143-164.
labeled
'compatibilist'; (1999).
we
inevitably
choose what we
judge to be most
desirable.
See 132-136,
23. Translation
by Teske
Ancient agency',
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
'Augustine
26. T. D. J.Chappell 28. Scott MacDonald University 29. Ibid., 130. 30. MacDonald's sentences 31. MacDonald 32. Ibid., 126.
Aristotle
and Augustine
Press,
of Genesis
Tradition
Press, 1999), 110-131, 121. is slender. He quotes support his hypothesis a paragraph (ii8). from On Free Will (3.18.50) which contains two
which
'Primal sin', 113. ascribes to the 'failing to attend' (132). One might is itself difficult that, while to assess. succeeding something. It is not an act, in attending But when
33. The status which MacDonald but is nonetheless to the relevant MacDonald attend comes an 'instance reasons
of agency'
suppose
is an act, failing is not, since of the process be explained seems of God might
to offer an example
to the goodness
the divine nature. But this is not a failure which misdirecting 34. Ibid., 126. 35. Ibid., 131. 36. Babcock 37. Ibid., 49. 38. Iwould comments like to thank Robert Brown, on earlier versions James Wetzel, 'Augustine on sin and moral agency', ones concentration (121),which
it is a failure which
consists
of this paper.
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