Does the moral truth undamentally depend on our attitudes

Are the attitudes in question belies

Do moral claims express belies
Lrror 1heory
Relatiism,Subjectiism Quasi-Realism
Is moral knowledge possible
Moral Skepticism
Can moral terms be deined in non-moral terms
I moral and non-moral terms co-reer, do
they name the same property
Analytic Naturalism

Can the reerence-ixing relation or any moral
term be described wholly in non-moral terms
I moral terms cannot be deined or hae their reerence-
ixing relations described in non-moral terms, might they
still reer to properties that are identical with,constituted
by,constitutie o one,s, named by non-moral term,s,

Anti-Realism
Is moral knowledge a priori
!" $%&'& ()'*+ $',$%-
Realism
Non-Naturalism

Intuitionism Moral Sense 1heory
.&/

Line Color: General Border Color: Border Corner Color:
01223 ~ \es 4562 ~ Metaphysics '27 ~ Actual View
'27 ~ No )18392 ~ Semantics 458:; ~ Possible View
<61=52 ~ Continue 01223 ~ Lpistemology
Non-Cognitiism ,except Quasi-Realism,
and lictionalism ,some orms,
I a moral term has a non-moral deinition, do the
term and the deinition name the same property
Non-Reductie
Analytic Naturalism
]

,Non-,Naturalism is the standard label or these iews. 1echnically, we need another leel o questions to determine whether the properties in question are natural or non-natural. \e could then distinguish, e.g., Analytic Naturalism rom
Analytic Non-Naturalism, or ,standard, Non-Naturalism rom Autonomous Naturalism.` Since these distinctions are rarely, i eer, discussed, I set this issue aside here.

]
\ou will see no more epistemic green on this branch o the chart. 1ypically, epistemic access on synthetic naturalism inoles both ,a priori, access to the correct reerence-ixing relation and either a priori or a posteriori access to the
releant relata.

]
Setting aside the possibility o reduction without property identity.
Synthetic Naturalism
]

Reductie Analytic
Naturalism

Reductie Synthetic
Naturalism

Non-Reductie
Synthetic Naturalism
]

Can we say anything inormatie about the metaphysical
nature o these non-natural properties
Robust Realism Quietism