CI llLDR[\. 5 C.-";\·!R()"i~I[.~TS QUARTERLY.

8(1)
.... '?' r:".'l e >lQ! C-"J,C", > FJWHor.mentS Quar,erly

The Young Child's Experience of Space and Child Care Center

Design: A Practical Meditation

David Kennedy
Child and Family Studies
.\rorthern Michi<zan Unit'ersit

The physlCal, perceptual, and cognitive differences between adults and young chlldn'
have significant Implications fur the deSign or child care centers. This ;InK!\.' cC'n<itdL'r-
fl rst how architecture intluences child ren', development, then the d ifiL'rl'm,l." b.:-: \\ L'L'r
how young children and adults experience and use space and then th.:- prol:i.:-m l):
dC~lgnlng colle....tlve <pace for young chIldren that is responsive to those dIfferences. Fill!
broad, quahtat,\,c characlen'-tlcs of optimal ,htld care centers are id\.'ntiflcd: that 1!1,'~' r\.'
omehke, have an unfInished character, have an open relationship to the natural \,'\HIJ,
JnU proVIde an overall vanety and balance of kinds of spaces.

It IS one of the mysteries of human development characteristics of Ii ved experlenCC-SenSM\'

that when we get old enough to reflect on what it
is like to be young chlldren, we hardly remember
beIng young children ourselves. This amnesia
about our childhoods is engra....ed not only in our
Fersonal \'iew of our own past, but In 0ur
relationships with the very young. Although we
recognize them immediately and unconditionally
as our own, \'I.'e face them across an abvss of
memory and experience.
\ll.'rlcau-Ponty (196-+, p. 137) referred to children
as "polymorphs." "It is," he said, "true both that
adult functions are already represented in the
child, and that they don't have the same meaning
as they do in adults. [It is like) a game of chess:
All ~he pieces are there from the beginning, and
yet the game changes their arrangement." And
Schactel (1959, p. 285), in a classic statement,
explained "childhood amnesia" as a result of adult
memory structures being "unsuitable to
accommodate early childhood experience." The
adult's mode of experiencing has changed, he
claimed, to such an extent that he or she "is not
even capable of imagining what the child
ex pet;ences."
YOU"lg children see the world from two to three
fee~ at:.:ve the ground, instead of five to six feet.
Th~lr sense of time does not seem to be the same.
The differ:?nces in cognitive and perceptual
modes an~ less obvious, but their behaviors signal
affective and volitional F'<1ttL'rns, ,1
"polymorphous" form of se\,uahty, palterns 0i II'..'
of the material en"ironment, appr0'lChes to SP,Kl'
and equipment, to range and pilthwily-th,ll
adults both recognize and find nliC'(1. This raper 1-;
about those differences-which, In Y011n~
children anyway, seem to be uni\'ers,ll clcr(I~'
cultural, socioeconory1ic, and far.1illill systL'ms-
and about their brOad impliciltions t,lr IhL'
architecture of child care cenlcr',.l II I~ neccsScHY
to Identify these differences a:1d c0nsldcr thL'1
design implications because cldults gL'nerallL'
design and build environments in the IInJge 0t
their own experience of time, space, and
relationship. They arc egocentric in this regard,
in the classic Piagetian scn~ of not being able to
be anything else. Those adults, however, wh0
presume to plan envir::>nments specifically for
young children are in a peculiar position: If they
are, as Schactel claims, "not even capable of
imagining what the child experiences:' how <He
they to imagine architectural space-especially
the communal space of child care centers-for
such a creature, one both like and profoundly
unlike themselves? The importance of such
planning should not be underestimated, for in a
society where childcare is increasingly
collectivized, the c.haracter of that communcll
space will be 0.1e major vehicle of social
reproduction, and contribute to the formillion of n
modal adult personality.

Requests for reprints should be sent to David Kennedy, Child As any artifact reflects its artificer, archilectllrill
and Family Studies, Northern Michigan University, space talks back to us and tells liS how we sec Clnd
Marquette, MI 49855-5366,

-----------
3& YOl];\;C CHILO'S SPACE A.'\JO CHILD CARE DESIG\i
think. Typical school space for chtldren, with Its
fanatical. impoverished regularities, tells us that
\\'e see children as basically irregular and chaotic
beings, ra w matenal out of which the product
. ddult" IS made, through an intensive pattern of
Intcrdctlons whose major characteristic is rigorous
denial ot the unique form of children's
('\Fx·ricnc.:-. It tells liS that childhood, a temporary
and a lesser condition, is not \....orthy of its own
,Hchllecture. School architecture seems to imply
that childhood should not be "indulge"; that the
\\',lY we become adults is through acting like
aJlI1t~, which in turn seems to imply that children
must be made into adults through behavioral
raIning, as opposed to the assumption that one
ypically becomes an adult in the natural course
("If evcnts.
Although school architecture is a lamentable
monument to adult egocentrism, those of us who
presume to be decentered in this regard are not
necessarily brought any closer to beIng able to
Imagine what the young child experiences.
HO\\'ever, sensitivity to how the lived experience
of children is not being served architecturally can
sharpen our interpretation of how it might be.
Ve learn to become both archaeologists of our
own lived experience and interpreters of the
experience of children. We work for a "fusion of
horizons" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273), a dialogue
·....·ith children's lived experience, which results in
Increased understanding. It is on this basis that
we can then approach with more confidence the
design of architectural space that is responsive to
voung children'S lived exp€rience.
But this docs not finish the matter. There are any
number of ways in which architectural space can
respond to lived experience, whether a child's or
an adult's-from the prison, the yurt, a Victorian
house, to the typical classroom or adventure
playground. Authoritarian architecture responds
to its inhabitants, but its response is coercive,
domineering, and totaliZing. Therefore, even if we
were, with scientific precision, capable of
knowing what the child experiences, it would not
necessarily imply a way to respond to that
experience. Environments that cater to childhood
experience the way certain environments cater to
adult lust, for example, -"Playland," etc.-are,
somehow, as far from reality as the traditional
classroom. So we must add to this inquiry a
developmental dimension, which obliges us to see
the child from the perspective of the whole
lifespan-that is, <l~ a tutur~ adult. Thl~ I~
necessary because "adult" ilnd (hd-i lr,'
mutually necessary; "child" can onl~' be \1L'l1n\'d 111
relation to "adult:' and \'isa versa. E\'C'I"Y child :-
directed towards "growing up" \\'ith ,1 kln\i \'
amor ,fali, and e\'erv. adult carries cln·(,riCln.li
child, lurking," as Ortcg.1 y Gel ......L·t ~.lld In Ih,
d~pth of his eyes" (1Y'\~. p. 131). I hl~ '111.11111,~
our search for an optimJ.l archltectllr;~ f('f th\·
young child: it must be not only rcSpcnSl\'L', 1''11
educati\'e. It must Inter.let with the child In .1 \\ ....
that both lends itsclf tn Ihc rhllJ's Ch.H.Ktl'!'I~I"·
manner of being in the world. and .11 ....., dr.lI\'" iii
child forward, through childhood tLl\\',H,j ,11'
optimal adulthood.
But what is an optimal adulthood? That'llh"qll'n
must be asked by those designing sp,w:.' t,1r (htl,l
care centers, and will be tdken up belOh', Ft1r thL'
moment, it may be defined as an adulthood Ih.lI
is in a hermeneutical relationship With Its O\\'n
childhood (Lippitz, 1986; Misgeld, 19R5), i.e., In an
interpretive relationship, characterlzcd both by J
certain distance and a drive for mutualitv and
understanding. But even granting this rJthl'r
circular definition, how Ciln architectural dcsicn
presu mc to influence this relationshi p? BetMl'
that question can be addressed, it is nCCL'sc;,lrY to
reflect on how architectural design iniluenccc;
lived experience; and then on the differentl,1]
relationship between the lived exp('rience oi
children and of adults.
ARCHITECTURE AND EXPERIENCE
Architecture, as Yi-Fu Tuan (1977, p. 116) has
explained, actually defines and clarifies lived
experience. Architectural space gives "insidc" and
"outside"-which are already given in the body-
world matrix of perceptual awarencss-a
consummate, habitable expression, and thus
brings them to a clarity that was only inchO<lte
before. Not only does "the body respond ... to
such basic figures of design as enclosure and
exposure, verticality and horizontality, mass,
volume, interior spaciousness, and light," but as
language does for thought, the built environment
refines and defines the otherwise "diffuse and
fleeting" spatial world, and thereby sensibility
itself. [t defines lived sensations for us by
providing them a context through which they arc
lived. To build is to "establish a world in the
midst of primeval disorder" (Tuan, 197i, p. 104),
 YOUNG CHILD'S SPACE A:'-JD CHILD CARE DESIC;\J
I: also "demarcates and intensifies the forms oi
:;,.)clal life" Architectural space works either to
eliy the world of social roles and relationships
'l' g., the authority figure has m()re space, and
ets the \'iew) or to transform them in some way.
The house functions as a "text encoding the rules
(Ii beha\'lor and even a whole world view" (Tuan,
1917, pp. 112, 116).
Architectural space teaches as well; to a
nonliterate people the house may be not only a
shelter but also a ritual place and the locus of
economic activity_ Such a house can com-
municate ideas even more effectively than can
ritual. [ts symbols form a system and are vividly
rcal to the iamily members as they pass through
the dIfferent stages of life.
It is worth remembering that young children are a
"nonliterate people" and carry the identifying
marks of adult nonJiterate mental culture, Ong's
descriptions of the noetic modes of primary oral
culture are also true in some ways of the young
child (1982).2 Although our young children are
placed in a highly literate culture and arc rapidly
internaliZing the psychological modes of literacy,
they still inhabit the organic, personalistic, oral
cosmos which Ong associates both with
nonliterate peoples and with the ancient and
medie\'al \vorlds. 3 As in nonliterate cultures, the
house is the young child's first definitive text,
\\'hich forms and instructs lived experience.
At its best, architectural space evokes the original
human boundaried space of paradise. Through its
internal richness, and the security of its
boundaries, it protects against danger, excess, and
indeterminacy from both within and without, It
transforms space into place, i.e., into a space that
has acquired "definition and meaning" (Tuan,
1977, p, 136). It is "primal" space, in that it is
"fused," or "joined" with the person for whom it is
meaningful; it has become incorporated into the
person's reflexivity. The house has long been
recognized in depth psychology-in dream work,
or example, and in young children's drawings, as
well as in lived experience-as an image of the
self. As Marc 0977, p. 67) describes it:
Its [the house's] reality is durable and
tangible: the place whence all human
activities have emerged. It provides the
necessary base from which consciousness
is formed, consolidated and expanded,
~l
and the self ddi ned The h,'lu:.l' I' t hl'
hearth, the (("lmm0n g,ounJ i'l 1110..'
psyche's growth and transform~tlPn,
All of this is particularly significant \\'hl'n arr!l,·,j
to young children. It would seem t("l tndl\.Jk th.lt
architecture for young children carrit::i \.'\en m0r\.'
iconic power than it docs for adults. As mu,-h
childhood autobiography (CC'e, 19~-I, p. 1~:-) ,lnd
our own personal arche010gies Sh0\\'. 'h(,ll~l' [('r
the child is cosmos in intensifIed and ~\'mb(llt(,
form, a world whose ordl.'r "t('u(he:" rL,\" ..ll" ,1thl
instructs," If architectural spuce IS m0r,'
interlocutive, speaks more 10udly, In J nwrL'
educational voice, to young children th,ln Ii'
adults, then this underscores the imr0r1.1ncL' ClI
thinking carefully and refiectl\''''Y ,1bollt thL'
spaces in which groups of children spend up to
twelve hours a day. We arc ch~llenged to
imagine environments that "teach, reveal. and
instruct," if only because we know Ih"t in default
of our imagining them, they will instruct anyw<lY
and contribute to the kinds of adults \\'h0, hanng
internalized their characteristics and effects, ore
likely to perpetuate them-whether Ih"y .Ire
authoritarian or dialogical. But if dialogIcal. In
dialogue with what? This brings us to th\.'
question of how young children's livl"j
experience is different from adults',
THE YOUNG CHILD'S LIVED EXPERIE:,\CE
OFSPACE
It seems reasonable to assume that the cxistcnll,ll
space of the young child is more like infant space
than adult space. Infant space is probably not
"space" in the sense in which we understand the
term, but a person: Space is originally given in
the person of the caregiver, and any real topos it
has is in this form. It is fundamentally personJI.
interlocutive, and interactive, a multisensorial
space of action, which is as oral, tactile, and
kinesthetic as it is visual. It is the space' nf an
object reached for to connect with, to introject
through the mouth, or explore synaesthetically,
Or it is the space of an object from whose
threatening presence we shrink.
A space that is alive and personal is quite
different from the idealized, visually dominJted
space which we find reified in adult architecture.
Typical Western adult space is static, segmented,
and schematized. It is a space of abstraction,
-to YOLJ!'.:G CHILD'S SPACE A..\JD CHILD CARE DESIG0J
..;cparation, removal, of an overwhelming
"Qlcctl\·it:-·, \,'hich docs a\..; ay with time and the
~ody. This space is reified in our public
.Hchttecturc, which is so vast. regularized, and
isassociated from touch and kinesthetics that It
,lssumes a sort of demonic spirituality (Sommer,
--l). But if we accept the normative psycho-
Jnalytic premise that "original" is also "originary,"
hen through an archeology of our own adult
perception, \\IC find the personal, interactive space
uf mfancy underlying the genetic and cultural
strata of adulthood, and still the basis of our
mtcrlocutive reaction to anv architecture. In the
originary condition, as Macmurray's 0961, p. 80>
classic formulation puts it, "It is the whole Other
that is personal," and it is through a process of
depersonalization that we eventually arrive at the
concept of an inanimate object. Thus, for the
Infant, and for all of us on a fundamental level,
perception is a being-addressed by a living world.
Although the visual, as Erikson 0977, p. 46) has
pointed out, is chief among the senses in "the
establishment of a rudimentary sense of reality in
the infant," it has a different valence within the
overall intemal balance of the infant's sensorium.
Vision becomes more powerful than the other
senses; it serves to get the infant in touch with the
object, in order to encounter it with all the senses.
.-\s Lewin (935) has argued, the object is one
polarity of a field which includes the body. This
body-world field is dynamic, relational, and
Interconnected. The young child's sense of the
character of space shrinks and expands according
to the motivational, affective valences of the field.
Space is not only alive and personal, but
libidinized: It is charged negatively or positively
with the attractiveness or balefulness of the
object, which beckons or repels.
Even the lived space of the four, five, and six-
year-old is, relative to the adult, quite
undifferentiated between body and environment.
In Lewinian terms, the field is not articulated.
There is still high and primitive integration. The
relationship is what Merleau-Ponty (1968, p.l38)
calls "chiasmic." "Where," he asks, "are we to put
the limit between the body and the world, since
the world is flesh?" The world which I am placed
in forms a unity with me the perceiver. Since it is
a part of my awareness and I am alive, there is no
part of the field of perception that I could with
any final certainty call "dead," "inanimate," or
reduce to some lesser level of being.
Adults also interact continuallv dnJ ,h n,lTlllt.l:i,
with objects 10 space, but they h,l\'C k,lrnl'd t,) \.1..
so in order to separate from thcm, tt' ~ut th·~ ~)
aside, and to transform them t(IT S(lme kind ('I l h
(Heideggcr, 1977). This IS, to be slire. a lorm "
introjection. bu tit f011l1\vS much nilrr<'\\'l'r Ii nl'<;
In a much more systl.'matlc w"y. 1 hroll~~h
looking, adults can get enough of an Idea ab<'llt
the properties of almost any 0bj,'ct th,1t thc;' dc,
not fecI compelled to touch It eXcl'pt tor Srl."'ClilC
predetermined purposes. Things havc thl'!r
places. For the young child, on the 0thcr h,H1,i. th\.,
function of the object is largely the pk',1SllTC , t tho
interactIOn itself.
The space of the young child is mythlcdl. In thc
sense des< -,bed by Merlcau-Ponty (1CJ6~, p. ::~:;)
when he speaks at "a mythical space In whIch
directions and pOSitions are determined by the
residence in it of great affective entitIes." These
affective entities are, as we have seen, persons
first-the primary space of the caregiver-then
the primal space of the home, which is affectively
determined by the human presences that suffuse
it. Lewin 0935, p. 79) has called the young
child's space "psychobiological," in that It I~
"quaSi-physical, quaSi-social, and quasi-mental"--
a systematic field of relationships of dynamic
tension in continuous transformation. Casslrer
(1955, pp. 84-85), calls the originary space
mythic as well, and describes it as positional: i[
has no abstractly determined constant apMt from
one's place in it. "E\'ery point, e\'cry clement
possesses ... a kind of tonality of its own ... a
special distinguishing character which cannot be
described in general concepts, bu t which is
immediately experienced as such." [t is
"distinguished from the abstract space of pure
cognition by [the] foundation of individual
feeling on which it rests and from which it seems
inseparable."
The adult develops, through typification (Hart,
1979; Piaget &: Inhelder, 1967; Schutz &:
Luckmann, 1973), a neu tral space, approachable
by a coordination of perspectives, the "view from
above." For the young child this kind of space is
already on the horizon of experience, part of the
telos of development. But it is still linked to
persons, and to the personal aspects of the
environment. The presence or absence of
significant persons changes the total structure of
the psycho-spatial environment, especially its
feeling of security or insecurity (Lewin, 1935).
 YOUNG CHILD'S SPACE A\iD CHILD CARE DESIG:-..
J p':'chologlCal environment that is affecti\'ely
'll",lre', the :'oung child tends to inhabit the edges
,,~ hl~ or her Itfespace, and these edges are
~tc1ntl: ('xpanding as the child responds to the
beckoning challenges of the world. The spatial
1"'.'1 r(lnment Invites engagement and
:r.ln~l(lrmJtl\.'C action (Suransky, 1982), It
,'j-.llkngcs the young child to "excorporate" self in
Interaction wIth objects, and in this interaction,
th' (hilJ constructs and discovers the meanings
lIt ohll'ctS (Vandenberg, 1971). Thi ngs call out,
nil!, as with adults, to be overcome and put aSide,
bllt to be played with-the stairs call out to climb,
he ball to throw, the empty container to be filled,
the filled container to be emptied, the puddle to
be splashed in, ....·ide-open spaces to run in, etc.
\loreover, it is through this interaction that
J.Jifcrentiation of self from world comes about:
TIHoul;h "open communion," or "living directly
Into the world" (Vandenberg, 1971, p. 60), the
bllundaries between subject and object take
hare.
The :'oung child's project is to master the world
through parlicipation in its play, resulting in that
relative independence from the world which
chtlrtcrizes adulthood. But while independence
may be the unconscious aim of the child's project,
11l.·r project is distinct from that of adults. In
Heldegger's (1977, p. 21) words, the adult's
prOject is to "pursue and entrap nature as a
calculable coherence of forces," what he calls
"enframing." This is the project of a being already
fully separated from nature, The young child
plays in a unity with nature, and through that
play, separation develops. The environment
provides the aliment for this process, which,
although it is characterized by "open
commu nion," is in that very communion a
movement of "primal distancing" (Vandenberg,
1971, p. 61), an equilibration process resulting in
increasing separation. One is increasingly able to
put things aside, to use only the part that can be
regulated and secured-stored, distributed,
placed in reserve for future use. In adults,
mastery becomes the ability to resist the call of the
environment to play, and to shape it from a
distance for what Heidegger (977) called the
standing reserve.
The project of the young child resembles that of
the artist. The artist may be said to be the adult
who has resisted what Suransky (1982) calls the
"false dichotimization" of work and play. For both
4
artist and (hild, somethi ng emerge,; Irrm t: 1 _
engagement \...·ith the envirc'1nment. cl !='rlldlld 111,,(
is relatively unexp<'ctl'd. because It has e'm('n~l',t
through intcracti ve ria y tha t a \lows ltlr ere,) In l,'
outcomcs. The artifact \\'hich ('merges frC'm the'
interaction is a representation of the CIl,'t'1l1nh'r It
is not a part oi the standing reSl'T\·C'-thl· t'lIt,\'1ne
of strategies of domination-but d s:·ml',..I\ l'1:'
transformation. It stands In a different IllC,lmn~
relationship to the en\·IT()nmt'nl. It rl'~I~t~ th~'
status of standing reseT\'e, it is ··un-cnfr,lme"lbJco.
a transformation of the cnvironml'nl.
I n this cond i tion of "pu re a ssi mila tlO n.· sracc
becomes the boundaries of the self, ior the world
of dramatic play is at the command of the
imagination. Winnicott's <1971, p. 51) notion of
transitional or "potential" space expresses this
very well:
This area of playing is not i:1Ol'r pS~'chlC
reality. It is outside the individual, but it
is not the external world ... Into this play
area the child gathers objects or
phenomena from external re,llily and
uses these in the sen'ice of ... Inner t1r
personal reality... In playing, the child
manipulates external phenomena in the
service of the dream and invests chllsen
external phenomena with dream meaning
and feeling.
The phenomenon of transitional space points to a
fundamental difference between adults and
young children in the balance between inner and
outer spatiality. Perhaps we could say that
waking space and dream space are less separated
in young children than in adults. In the dream,
space and time both "happen to" us and arc
completely self-produced, The dream space has a
mysterious, inchoate, symbolic function, full of
meaning. The tower, the winding staircase, the
building with innumerable rooms through which
one wanders-all are the self as much as they are
the object.
Dramatic play could almost be described as
"dream work." It requires and builds a sense of
time and space apart, a protected milieu (Kel1y-
Byrne, 1989), in order for that existential location
to emerge, which Winnicott (19il, p. 50) describes
as on the "line between the subjective and that
which is objectively perceived" ~r, as Huizinga
(1955, p. 10) has described it that "temporMv
 17
-t_ YOLiNG CHILD'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIG:'-.'
\,'orlJ \\'1thln the ordinary world, dedicated to the
!'C'rl,lrmance or an aCI apart."
DE\'ELOP\1E:'\TAL IQEALS A.,.o STYlES OF
:\BSTRACTIO:"."
"l' nOI" H'turn to the question: How do \,·:e
i011agJne architectural spacc--€specially collective
~pace-i(lr the young child, a ~ing both like and
profoundl;, unlike us? The answer depends on
(lur Ideas of chtldhood and adullhood, and the
nature of the transformation lhat separates them.
E"cry cducator and every designer of educational
.ettings has ideas about these, implicit or
(Ilherwise. Such ideas are normative, and vary
ilcrOSS ti me a nd space-every age and el'ery
culture has its Ideal adult. Notions of the ideal
adult arc in the process of dramatic change in the
western industrialized countries. Confronted
I,'ith the growing possibility of planet death,
adults who are still "in touch" with the
environment on a fundamental level are
constructed as an ideal. It is precisely this quali ty
\,'hich I have indicated is characteristic of infants
and young children. This suggests that children's
environments and educational program be
constructed to foster the conservation rather than
the atrophy of this quality, thus encouraging the
de"elopment of responsible adults in the sense of
being responsive to their environments and
therefore less liable to maim or pollute it.
How then, assuming we support this ideal of a
new sense of responsibility (Jonas, 1984), do we
build environments that encourage children to
grow into such adults? There are two basic
variables to consider, one psychological and one
cultural. Psychologically, the reality is that young
children are involved in a distancing process:
They are replacing the immediate with the
mediated, with the typified "stock of knowledge"
(Schutz & Luckmann, 1973); the totality of
concrete experience with the universality of the
language-<:ontrolled concept; the wholeness of the
perceptual image with the inclusiveness of the
abstract, logical, operational structure (Piaget,
1969). That is the young child's developmental
dialectic: Experience itself results in more
articulated, differentiated, and hierarchically
organized mediating structures.
Culturally, the reality seems to be that Westerners
in the late 20th century are confronting the effects
I
of the growing schism bctwern r-cnplL' ,tnd thll
objects, and by extenSIon bellq:en p\.0riL' ,1nl
thl'ir eO\';rcmmcnts (Arl'ndt. I q:;t». Thl.' In\\lkrn
experience is one of a cumulatIve Ie.ss (If a ~n:-..:
of place In our buill en\'lronments whIch (l(IS
recursively to further reinforc\? 01lr sllbic(t-()I.~jC(
alienatIOn. This alienal10n can be ,1tmbllteJ ttl .1
number of ontological, histortcal, JnJ 5"(1.11
causes: The separation necessary III (pntlucr .J
nature perceived as threatening, \\'hdhcr the
black plague or the AmNtcdn wIIJ('rlll.'SS; th"
legacy of Platonic and Aristotelian (mtnlngll.''':; tn\.'
spirit/body split in the Christian trcldlllOn; I hI.'
reflexive influence of technolngy ,Ill
consciousness; the reproduction of SOCi,ll
hierarchy and domination in an i1~e oi hIgh
technology, etc. As Western Ii terJture ,It kasl
since the early 19th century demonstrates, th\.'
subject-world separation of modern Western
consciousness is haunted by a sense of a lost
unity, which for the overdeveloped 0r SCparJlcd
ego, manifests demonically as a "hl'art ot
darkness," as well as a nostalgia for childhood.
Given this separation, how do we design
communities for young children which encourage
them to grow into adults whose style nf
abstraction is not cut off from the subject-object
unity of the early years, and the creative. pla;,t'ul.
zone of the transitional space?
That goal was actually posited for modernity
almost two hundred years ago. For the
Romantics, in revolt against Enlightenment
epistemology, the task of education was to make
it possible for the human race to, as Coleridge put
it, "carryon the feelings of childhood into the
powers of manhood" (Plotz, 1979, p. 69). For
Emerson, the child was the "perpetual Messiah,"
for Wordsworth a "Mighty Prophet" (p. 68) of a
form of consciousness that is not in dangerous
separation from its object. As Plotz (p. 68)
summarizes it:
The romantics hold human perfection to
abide in that adult who remains most in
touch with his childhood life, who enters,
in DeQuincey's fine phrase, "upon the
whole of his natural inheritance." Such
continuity of consciousness and capacity
is crucial to adult fullness of being. To be
able to grow up without destroying or
maiming the child in oneself is to become
the best sort of adult.
 YOUNG CH1LO'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIGN
Ii the child IS in a continual state of
transformation toward abstraction and subject-
world separation, the Romantic ideal aims for a
lund of education-and therefore a kind of
en\'ironment-that gl;lides this series of trans-
formatIOns toward a more optimal separation, or
.,,;hat Kegan (1982) has referred to as "subject-
object truce." Assuming that the modem subject-
object truce is not an end-state. but a cultural-
hIstorical product, an adaptation to a certain
senes of circumstances, we must dare to assume
further that different circumstances will force
urther adaptations. The current circumstance of
an increasing threat of planet death, then, calls for
further adaptation, in the form of a style of
consciousness which lives more f~lly "in" to its
environment, rather than setting itself against it.
Such a style represents a recovery-in the sense of
4gehaben. or sublatIOn-not only of childhood,
but of certain aspects of "primitive" mentality.
And it involves a reformulation of the pair
adult/child in the West, where historically they
have been set in separation and contradiction. 4
At this point it would be well to remember Yi-Fu
Tuan's observation about the function of the
house for nonliterate people-a "ritual place," a
"locus of economic activity," a "system of
symbols," a communicator of ideas. Environ-
ments for young children, whether familial or
collective, are all of these things as well. They
function as a field or display of messages about
tht'ir uses. Their configurations call for certain
"stclOding behaviors" (Barker & Wright, 1955), that
carry through into adulthood. Given the
Romantic formulation, the best sort of environ-
ment would provide behavior settings that
encourage a kind of adult intentionality which
does not sacrifice the child to the adult.
Environments would both adapt to the young
child's intentional modes and foster the continuity
of those modes through transformations into
adulthood. The broad indications of the charac-
teristics of such environments that follow are not
an attempt to review or extend the definitive
work that has already been done toward
specifying these characteristics-in particular the
work of Prescott (984); Osmon (1971); Moore,
Lane, Hill, Cohen, and McGinty (979); and
Greenman (1988)S-but to ground that work in
the phenomenology of the child's lived
experience, the phenomenology of architectural
space, and the historical moment of the
child/adult pair in the West.
-tl
HOME, I~STITUTIO~,A~D HABITABLE
SPACE
Such an environment would, fIrst. rrcscnt ,1n
existential space that is habitable. The best modl'l
for habitable space is the home. lang (1983. p.
202) descnbes inha~ltlOb as "the eS5Cnlial teature
of subjective life ... an act of tran:,f0Trn,ltI0n
where space becomes place." He refers to the
home as "our second body." In the h0rn\.',
"everything ... has been tr,lnsmlllL'd thine'"
have truly become annexed to Ollr bmi\', an,j
incorporated." The child is typlc,l11y ,1SS(ICI.lkd
with the home because the h(1me i~ ..1 place III
subject~bject fusion. of the animated sp,Ke ~\'hidl
is the hallmark of childhood. 11 is a space 0/
privacy, intimacy, and empowerment. ,1nd
becomes almost sacred for its inhabitants.
The space of the institution. on the other hand. 1$
the space of the ethical and the transcendent,
where privacy, intimacy, and ch0icl.' ,He iorg(lne
in the interests of cooperation, competit\0n.
disciplined work, and festival. In the institution,
one shares space with the stranger, who is one's
brother or sister in the human lomlly. Felr
children it is a place of transformation thT(lll~h
meeting with non-kin. including teachers ,lnd
peers. Historically, it is a setting charactenz\.\.i by
a high degree of external control dnd
organization, routinization. and limitaticms (In
personal choice (Proshansky & Fabian, 1987;
Rivlin, Bogert, & Cirillo, 1981; Wolfe & Ridin,
1987) where autonomy, individualization,
privacy, and adaptability arc at risk. In deSigning
child care centers, we are faced with tht'
extraordinary problem of producing a communal
space that combines in some new way these two
kinds of loci: Tempering the clannishness of the
home with the ethical clarity of the institution,
and the alienation of the institution with th\.'
intimacy of the home. What design clements
would lead to the transformation of col!ccti\'c
space such that the primary psychological and
behavioral ingredients of good home space were
present? [s it a question of a logical contradiction,
to wit, can home space and institutional space
ever be made one?-or of a social anc historical
contradiction which can be changed? Given the
increasingly numerous hours that young children
spend in institutional settings, the question is on
longer merely academic. For the young child in
child care, the home and the institution arc both
places of the most radical personal formation. In
4-i YOUNG CHILD'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIGN
and through these spaces, the cohort's subject-
(1bjl'ct style IS constructed. The I is distinguished
from the non-I. the animate from the non-
anImate, "mine" from "yours," the masterable
':-om the unmasterable, the controllable from the
u nC0ntrollable, the what-I-am-responsible-for
frClm the what-r-am-not-responsible-for
(rroshansky & Fabian, 1987). Settings that do not
provide for what Spivak (1984) refers to as
',lrchetypal places··-i.e., spaces that meet the
rundamental needs of emotional shelter,freedom
of mO\'emen t, terri toria lity, rea II y sufficient
storage, places for feeding, sleeping, grooming,
and excreting which are not affronts to taste and
privacy, etc.-lead to forms of deprivation that
could have effects on the future social fabric
(Wolfe, 1978). Most importantly, the lack of
awareness about the crucial human need for
personal space (Hall, 1966) and an optimal
measure of freedom and control in the built
environment threatens us culturally with the
ossibility of a "modal" personality that is
assive, helpless, and stimulus-ridden (Barnes,
198]).
This design problem of reconciling home and
institution has implications for the style of
subject-object relations demanded by the
historical moment. The personality best adapted
(pr planet survival would appear to be the one in
\\ hlch strong indh.idualism is tempered by strong
care for others. The balance between the home
and the institution is at least analogous to the
balance between the personal and the collective.
The individual who takes responsibility for the
other will emerge from a collective that takes
responsibility for-i.e., allows-the individual.
Analogously, the redefined "home" will nurture
the powers of childhood-relative subject-object
fusion, the conservation of "transitional" space, an
understanding of the liVing, interdependent
quality of the environment~ven in the face of
the demands of work and discipline.
NFINISHED ENVIRONMENTS,
EMPOWERMENT, AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
A second broad characteristic of the optimal
collective environment for young children is its
unfinished character. The fundamental
Ingredient of good home space, that which allows
it to become an "intimate hollow carved out of the
anonymous" (Lang, 1985. p. 202), IS the .1Qilll~ 1,1
act transformatively wlthm it. [nhabltln~ In\·\'h·\·...
incorporation, acquIsitIOn, lmtiatl\'e, l'mbrdLL'.
assimilation, transmutation, annexation (Ldng.
1985). The ability to do all these things requires ,1
measure of autonomy Within a spatl.11
environment, a threshold ('f l'mpo\\,erment QL'h'w
which they arc no longer posstbk Thus,
architectural space must not only be ,l(cessibk
but negotiable, and encouragc cholcc.
transformation through personal InltldtIVl'. an,i
the possibility of leaving one's mark on thL' l\'prlll
As we have seen, the chIld's project is wantlng'II)-
be-independently. In the Western devl'll'pmenl.ll
formulation, this project in\'olves it process
whereby temporary separation leads to
integration at a higher level. Functions separ,lk'
off and are regrouped in new hierarchical
relationships, making for increased tlexibJlity and
control. This process is an outcome of engaging
and interacting with the world. Through
climbing around in the world, leapIng in It,
swinging, sliding, running, crawling, h(1ppln~,
cutting, painting, and combining and 5eparatmg
all its various material manifestations, an
individual body image and sense of self del·elops.
Children come to i\ pla((' of lnuC'dSl'd
differentiation from the world through acti\'c!Y
exploring the limits of thci r fusmn WI th it.
This project of wanting-to-be-independently
through transformative action on the world leads
not just to internal diJferentiation of structures o(
consciousness; what also emerges from the child's
engagement with the world is a trace of his or her
interaction-a product. This product-unlike the
adult's, which is an organization according to a
predetermined taxonomy of use-is best
understood in the same way a work of art is
understood: as a symbol or an artifact of the
experience of transitional space, representing
both the inner and the outer. The block
construction, the painting, the piece of wood
bristling with nails, the costumed body, the
pattern of chips, the rapt exploration of water, the
part of the father, mother, or hero all are forms of
representation of the world which have emerged
through the child's transformative action.
Thus environments that allow engagement and
interaction lead to new outcomes both internally
and externally. Through these transformations,
the child is advancing developmentally; is
 YOUNC CHll.D'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIC:\
. coming to himself," i.e., he or she is becoming an
aJ1I11. Em'lronments that CONce us, that "do It all
t~r" us, d('ny the developing adult-the child-in
,~Il (If us. They are "adult" em'ironments in the
~cn5e In which "adult" is exclusi\'e from "child."
-l~el/ are "finished." Environments that allow for
transformation through representing the world
(ilnnot be completely fInished, because a
romplctely finished thing will resist
tran::.iormation through action (:\Jicholson, 197·H.
TranSllional srace welcomes the shape given tn it
['ya transformative act. So the bare platform in
the clearing (Cohen, Hill, Lane, McGinty, &
:-'100re, 1979) invites my act of dramatic
transformation, waits to become, as Huizinga
0955, p. 10) cal1ed it, a "consecrated spot."
Confronted with a chalkboard just at her height,
the young child will fill it with runic signs which
F,leam with inchoate, archetypal meaning.
Equipped with the right watering can, the three
: car old will dance industriously through every
sunlit nook and cranny where potted plants await
his ministrations.
Th0 en\ irnnment with its quota of transitional
sf.'acc IS a \'I.·orking environment. Like the artist's
studio, its unfinished character chal1('nges and
empowers. calling us to transformative action. It
t0aches ownership and participation-which are
necessary for a sense of responsibility-through
convincing us that the world is not a finished
rroduct into which we are placed passively,
either as victims or as "lucky." In fact, as Stokols'
and Shumaker's (1981) work suggests, the
rhysical environment, the social world, the
intrapersonal, and the interpersonal worlds are all
interactive and mutually entraining. All of these
components of the world are transformed
through critical and imaginative transactions with
v,'hat is unfinished into some new configuration
which is never final. As Bognar (1985, p. 190)
points out, "Real places have a continual
possibility for revision, reinterpretation,
reenactment and recreation. The 'spirit of place'
as a sense of totality and wholeness, therefore,
can be only imprecisely precise."
THE NATURAL AND THE BUILT
ENVIRONMENT
A third broad characteristic of the optimal
physical collective environment for young
children is the extent to which it is embedded in
the natural world in a way in which the elements
.+5
of nature are rec0gnlzL'J and livcJ \\'llh, r.llhl'r
than suppressed. The separation bel\\'C'I..'n pnsl'n
and nature which is the hallmark of the m01.kr
West is reified architecturally in Institutlon,1l
buildings whIch arc blind tn theIr n.\tural
surroundings. Such i1rchitecture then rl',Kts upon
consciousness, in thJt it trains hum.1n pen:cptlOn
to ignore nature and supports inlL'rpretrltlnns (If
nature as either a threat or a potcnticll nhlCct fl.,r
"the standing rescrve." But the r(,sp0nsin' ,1JUI..
like the child, remaln:::i "in touch" With n.lturl..·. Ipr
him or her, nature rL't,lins a lIVIng facl..',
[n its idealized form, the h0lI')L' IS .\
transformation of nature, made from n,llurL' ,1nd
based on nature's originary forms. A::. h'C'
approach the Zulu kraal lDuly. 1979), WI.' MI..' npt
sure for a moment if it is n,ltural 0r humanlv
constructed. so cunningly does it lISC the fl.'rms
and the materials of the landscape in \\ hich it ::'
placed. Yet the house goes \::>cyond natUrL', It
gathers nature-the forms, the patterns. the
textures, the kinds of light, the colors, the
domains and pathways-and reconfigures it in a
new interpretive focus. The house both opcns u~
to nature and protects us from it. [t IS dn 0lg,ln
through which we know nature clgaln. As
Lcvinas (1969, p. 156) c'<presscs it, "The d\\'('lli:l~
remains in its own way open upon the dement
from which it separates." The modern
institutional building. on the other hanJ,
generally turns stubbornly inward, away irom
nature, providing its O\\ln alternative "nclturc" 01
plastics, fluoresc~ts, and air conditioning
systems. It does voluntarily what a bUIlding on
the moon \vould be required to do.
A building that taught young children the
interconnectedness of the natural and the human
worlds would design the interfaccs between
indoor and outdoor to allow for optimal
continuity and the most-open possible interaction
between the two. The outdoors should enter the
building through windows, courtyards, and
intermediate spaces-covered terraces and
porches, etc.-and the outside made accessible in
all weathers through shelters-gazebos,
overhangs, protective trees and rocks, and
microclimates of all sorts (Moore et aI., 1979).
Further, collective space for young children
should lay bare the economics of the world by
making the kitchen, the garden, the workbench,
the solar panel, or the boiler room fully integrated
aspects of the environment.
..+6 YOUNG CHILD'S SPACE :\.':0 CHILD CARE OESte:\
VARlET)' :\:'\0 RICH~-ESS OF PLACE
F;nall:-·. a buliJmg lhat pro\'iJes for h.lbitatiC'n,
ransivrmatl\'e action, and hClghtened awarenes:,
,'" the naturJI ,,'orld must pro\"ide ior an o\'crall
\".Hld;: and bJlance among spaces; not only iM
the iunct10nal sp.1Cc-the classroom, the stage,
tl'e \,"orksh0p, \'r the as~mbly hall-but also for
\, hat Hart (1979, pp. 170, 204) calls "places of
:l'tJchmcnl, sec! usion. and quiel." L: nkss places
,'r \\llrk an\.! (Clcbr,lllon arc bJlanccd by pl'K\'s
!N 're~tlng, watching, dabbling introspecli\'ely"
chtldren do not experience the "Iivingncss" of
:;;~'atiality Itself. but only the people who inhabit
It. \,'ho may involuntarily drown out the still,
small \'OICe of place, Life then becomes associated
\, Ilh people only, and not only visual space, but
o,her organisms become deanimated, Thus the
prejudice is perpetuated that humans are the
only true living beings in the universe. and the
\'Ision of childhood-the interlocutive subject-
object relation whICh can lead to an adult sense of
relatedness and care-is suppressed. We need
places where we are no longer driven to act on
the world only to change it or produce something
from it. Rather. through special places-the
\\'indo\" nook. a textured wall, a small interior
courtyard-the world takes us to its heart, and
every object and configuration becomes a sign of
the unutterable truth of being itself. Such settings
can preserve and create a sense of meaning in the
\-,'orld.
An overall pattern of spaces-spaces that hide;
enclose; open onto larger vistas; inhabit different
levels; connect intricately with other spaces; allow
different numbers of occupants; wander
coherently; afford different entryways; frame sky,
..,'ater, and trees with windows; etc.-builds the
animate, interlocutive quality which is the
originary vision, not just of childhood, but of the
deeper levels of human perception. Bognar 0985,
p, 90) speaks of a designed space which provides
a "richness of place," He describes it as:
. . .the concerted ability of the constituents
to induce a feeling of totality or to signify
eternity in the elusive phenomena of exis-
tence, regardless of how few the elements
and how "simple" the place may be. Such
an environment invokes what Aldo van
Eyck calls a "Iabyrinthian clarity," with
always another layer of "hidden"
meaning or "infinite" depth to discover,
Such rLKes teach the :>llrt ('If sul'l ...,,,,-!-,'l",.',
relation thaI was Idl..'ntliicd by Cl'I,'rld~. ,. '"
'lnllllll\'e reason," HI: ddmcd It ,lS llut lr.lllltll'l1
of thi nbs which arises \,'hen \,'l' ~'\':>::""':O:' .'11 rs\..'l\ ,"
<IS one I,'ith thl' wh0lc.' In «'ntra,t t" I!-,.lt \\'hh'~'
presents it~lf \,'hcn , . " Wl' th!n\.. l,i \"ur~\'I\'l'~ ,1'
scrara ted belO~s . ..lnJ pi".-\..' nJ lu rc III .1n lllh ...'sis !I'
the nlll1d, as object tl' :>1:bjl'Lt. Illlnl: hI llh'll~ilt
death to life" (Coven,lV, Hbl, p, ":'1 Intultt',\..,
reason IS the vcry form p( i lte or' ch d,ilw. ,...1
CHILDRE~ A'O RE-HL'\1A:'\IZ.\TIO'
This essay represents on I y a vcry ru,~ Imen tor::
beginning of a much larhC'r rdlc...-tlon. An
indeterminate number of other, lr:1portant
uestions remain to be taken up, FM l"'<ampk,
..... hat provisions for adults arc nccessar: In d Inll~
habitable child care center, which is. after all. n01
just a child- but an adult-child ((IIk-ctlve?
Further. is a truly habitable aJult-chdJ
collective-whatevcr the glory of its architectural
space-even pOSSible Without certain basic
requirements which han.' nothing to do \"ith
archi tectural space? I t is, for exa mple, a rguabJc
that no adult-child collective is truly habitable
without an appropriate, ratio of adulls to children,
That question leads even further, to the question
that grounds it: Is it callow idl..'alism even to
hope that we will ever attain to a cultural and
social situation in which we give full attention to
our children-the attention that they crave and
that we know results in more intelligent, more
productive, more cooperative, happier adults?
ft could be that our goal as designers and
advocates for children should be the
transformation of all institutional and public
domains into adult-child collectives. Rather than
feeling guilty about forcing children out of the
home, we could use the opportunity to force the
home back into public space, and reintegrate the
spheres of childrearing and productive work, in a
new and dialectically transformed configuration .
Returning children to the workplace after their
long banishment by the Industrial Revolution
may be a key element in the humanization of
work just as returning the streets to children
through limiting traffic and other hazards, and re-
cognizing the total urban area as a potential
play/learning environment for children may be
the key to re-humanizing our cities, While this
may seem a far-fetched ideal, the alternative
 YOLNG CHILD'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIG:'\
-eems to be the Increasing marginalization of
-:hI1JhC'oJ-at the same time that weapons
~:stems proliferate, environmental pollution
""'L'Cl'meS gl0bal, and dehumanized architecture
hJt hous~s,adult operall\'es of,a global system of
I:xploitation from which all traces of childhood
have been expunged expands. That might seem
0qually far-fetched, were it not actually
hilppening.
FOOT~OTES
. I recognize that children's experience of the
environment may differ according to their
ender, class, national, ethnic or racial pOSition
and is influenced by their health and physical
abilities. The focus of this paper, however, is on
children in general and how their environmental
experience is distinct from that of adults.
~ Ong identifies the psychodynamics of orality as
Incorporating the following cognitive, affective,
erceptuai, and social emphases: the magical,
illocutionary aspects of language; commu-
nication; formulaic expression; thc tendency to
"totalize"; the closeness to the "human lifeworld";
he "cmpathetic and participatory" mode of
apprehending the world; the prevalence of
concrete, contextual, and complexive forms of
categorization; the mythic and agonistic narrative
qualities; the "conservative holism" towards
persons and situations; the different forms of
temporalization 0982, Chapter 3).
3 This, indeed, offers an explanation for what has
been' called the "invention of childhood," in that
before the modern cosmos-rationalized by a
new sense of space, time, and causality; and
concerned with a new sort of objectivity which
issued from a changed subject-world
relationship-children and adults were not
constructed as different from one another as they
are now.
4 Ashis Nandy (987) has suggested that Western
adulthood, in its repudiation of childhood, is key
to understanding the Western ideology of
progress: 'To the extent adulthood itself is valued
as a symbol of completeness and as an end-
product of growth or development, childhood is
seen as an imperfect transitional state on the way
to adulthood, normality, full socialization and
humanness. This is the theory of progress as
applied to the individual life cycle. The result is
-1;-
the frequent use ()f childhood as .1 I.le<;l~n I'
cultural and pOlItlc,ll immatUrity M, It C0me.,; tll
the same thing, IOferiorit:-. Much of the pull ()t
the ideology of c011'nlalism and much ()f thL'
power of the idea of modernity can be traced ttl
the cvolutionary implications of the c0ncC'pt OJ
the child in the Western ''\'orld,-iew'' I r. 5:-).
; Prescott, \10ore, and their collcJ£urs, am(ln~
others, have addressed the d(,sl~n ()f space III
young children. Other wNk not Spl.'CIIIC,lIl\
about designing ennT0nments iM y(Hlnt;
children, but preparatory research iN tho~\'
doing so includes: (1) work at the interidce l'l
social psychology and em'ironmental deSIgn, e
on crowding, personal space, and intimacy
regulation ( Aiello, Th0mpson, & Baum, 1951;
Saegert, 1980; on perceived frecdom Clnd contr()l
(Barnes, 1981); and on transactions between
people and places (Spivak, 198-t; Stokols &
Shumaker, 1981); and (2) work at the interface of
social/environmental psychology and
architectural programming (Alexander et <11.,
1978; Altman, 1975; Bechtel, 1977; Chermaydf &:
Alexander, 1963; Moore, 1970; Proshil nsk~.. ,
lttelson, & Ri vlin, 1970).
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