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Journal of Pragmatics 22 (1994) 325-373

Toward a pragmatics of emotive communication*

Claudia Caffi, Richard W. Janneyb
* Dipartimento di Scienze Glottoetnologiche, Universitri di Genova, Via Balbi 4, I-16126 Genoa, Italy b Department of English - EZW, University of Cologne, GronewaldstraJe 2, D-50931 Cologne, Germany

Abstract
The task of developing a unified pragmatics of emotive communication poses many interesting challenges for future research. This paper outlines some areas in which more work could be done to help coordinate present linguistic research. After briefly reviewing some pioneering historical work on language and affect, the paper discusses the following concepts, all of which seem to be in need of further clarification: emotive meaning, involvement, emotive markedness, degree of emotive divergence, objects of emotive choice, loci of emotive choice, and outer vs. inner deixis. Competing categories of emotive devices in current studies of language and affect are reviewed, and a simplified framework is proposed, consisting of: (1) evaluation devices, (2) proximity devices, (3) specificity devices, (4) evidentiality devices, (5) volitionality devices, and (6) quantity devices. It is argued that only with consensual categories and objects of analysis can investigators start focusing on, and comparing findings about, emotive linguistic phenomena from a unified point of view. Finally, some distinctions between potential perspectives, units, and loci of emotive analysis are proposed, and the paper concludes with a call for increased discussion of how research on language and affect might be better coordinated in the future.

1. Introduction:

Metatheoretical views from a fuzzy periphery

Presently, a vast amount of linguistic data on language and affect is being collected in pragmatics that cannot be fully compared or interpreted due to the lack of a unified, overriding conceptual framework. If we look at the growing body of literature on language and affect, it is difficult to discern a consensual theory, a consensual object of investigation, or a consensual analytical methodology. Investigators

* We would like to express our thanks to Horst Amdt and Klaus HSlker for their valuable comments on the line of reasoning presented in this paper, and free them, at the same time, from any responsibility for deficits in the final product. Parts of the paper are adapted from a forthcoming book by Richard W. Janney entitled Speech and Affect: Emotive Uses of English. Stankiewicz (1964: 267) used the expression fuzzy periphery to refer to the no mans land of emotive language. His original statement was: I see no reason . why we should be reluctant to admit the existence of a fuzzy periphery. 0378-2166/94/$07.00 0 1994 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved SSDI 0378-2166(94)00040-L

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presently seem to be proceeding in an ad hoc manner, operating on the basis of sometimes very different assumptions, producing findings that are interesting on an individual basis, but which cannot be fully accounted for from a unified point of view. Yet, if there is anything that we can be intuitively sure of as users of language, it is our awareness, deeply rooted in our everyday experience as communicators, that feelings and language are intimately interconnected in speech and writing. In this paper, we would like to make some modest suggestions about how linguists working in this area might begin cooperating in investigating affective features of language from a more unified, systematic, pragmatic point of view. We do not presume to be able here to fully answer all of the metatheoretical and methodological questions potentially raised by our suggestions, but we do believe that it is important to draw attention to the lack of coordination in current research, and to suggest the feasibility, at least, of bringing order to this endeavor. The complexity of the interface between language, people, and affect is implicit in the observation that: (1) we can all express feelings that we have, (2) we can all have feelings that we do not express, and (3) we can all express feelings that we do not have, or feelings that we think our partners might expect or wish us to have, or feelings that it might simply be felicitous to have in a given situation for particular reasons. In short, we all seem to be capable of producing, modifying, and modulating linguistic and other expressions of affect more or less at will, in very subtle ways, in order to fit the personal and interpersonal exigencies of different occasions; and we are capable of negotiating agreement about the intersubjective significance of our expressions of affect. In this broad sense, at least, the expression of feelings and attitudes in language does not seem to be that much different from the expression of ideas: both processes are cognitively mediated - if perhaps in different ways, to different extents, and to different purposes (cf. Arndt and Janney, 1991). But how do we do this? On the basis of what type of linguistic knowledge, or what type of broader underlying pragmatic capacity? Is the ability to produce and interpret expressions of affect in speech and writing rooted in knowledge of some hitherto underexplored emotive subcode within the code of language, as suggested by Stankiewicz (1964), Volek (1987), and others? Is it rooted in knowledge of hitherto only partly investigated uses of the affective tools, devices, or resources of language, as suggested by Irvine (1982), Labov (1984), Ochs (1986), and Ochs and Schieffelin (1989)? Or is it perhaps rooted in knowledge of a much wider, metacommunicational pragmatic nature, for which we presently have only dim metaphors, as suggested by Watzlawick et al. (1967), Friedrich (1986), Arndt and Janney (1987), and a few others? Behind questions like these, there are naturally some even more basic metapragmatic questions (cf. Caffi, 1993). For example, how far do present pragmatic conceptual frameworks, descriptive approaches, and analytical procedures actually go in accounting for this complex, if apparently effortless, everyday ability? Is a unified investigation of language, affect, and human interaction even within the present scope of linguistics? Is a new, even more integrative, interdisciplinary effort perhaps called for? For lack of space, these questions will remain only implicit in the following discussion. Instead, we will have the following, more restricted, aims: first,

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we will review some old and new approaches to language and affect that seem to be of potential interest in developing what we would like to call a pragmatics of emotive communication; second, we will discuss some conceptual and methodological constraints on current research on language and affect, pointing out some underlying linguistic issues at stake in this research; and third, we will present a rough sketch of some conceptual distinctions that we feel could be helpful in approaching emotive communication from a unified, pragmatic point of view. The paper is not programmatic in spirit, but exploratory. That is, it is not an attempt to impose our own sketchy, preliminary ideas about various problems that seem (to us) to need to be dealt with in present studies of language and affect on others working in this area, but rather an attempt to clear ground for further discussion, in the hope of encouraging suggestions about how studies of language and affect might be better coordinated in the future. I .I. Some preliminary definitions I .I .I. The emotive capacity One of our underlying assumptions will be that all competent native speakers of a given language possess what might metaphorically be called an emotive capacity: that is, certain basic, conventional, learned, affective-relational communicative skills that help them interact smoothly, negotiate potential interpersonal conflicts, and reach different ends in speech. These skills are related, to performances of linguistic and other activities that broadly can be interpreted as signs of affect, or as indices of speakers feelings, attitudes, or relational orientations toward their topics, their partners, and/or their own acts of communication in different situations. Successful interaction depends to a certain extent on a mastery of these conventional skills. We will assume that explaining what the emotive capacity is, where it comes from, and how it is used to reach different ends in linguistic interaction, are fitting goals of pragmatic research. 1.1.2. The notion of afSect The decision to focus on language and affect implies some body of underlying assumptions about what affect is to begin with. The great diversity of phenomena studied under the rubric of affect in different branches of science underscores the truism that affect means many things to many people - not only across disciplines but also within disciplines, among different investigators. Like other terms used in science, the term affect is a figure of speech, a metaphor, which, reified by scientific practice, enables us to approach certain ranges of conceptualized phenomena as independent objects of study, and define certain other ranges of phenomena as beyond the scope of investigation (cf. Sarbin, 1986: 87). Western psychologists commonly distinguish between feelings, a broad, complex class of subjective personal sensations or states of inner physiological arousal (cf. Besnier, 1990: 421); emotions, a restricted subset of empirically investigable phenomena within this general class that are relatively transitory, of a certain intensity, and are attached to, or triggered by, particular objects, ideas, or outer incentive

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events (cf. Kagan, 1978: 1617); moods, which are said to be of longer duration than emotions, and not necessarily attached to specific inner states or definite objects (cf. Davidson, 1984: 321); and attitudes, or transitory feeling states with partly uncontrollable subconscious psychobiological components and partly controllable expressive components, which are said to be instrumental in maintaining social and psychological equilibrium and adapting to different situations (cf. Plutchik and Kellerman, 1980: 30). The term affect is usually reserved for feeling states that are ascribed to others on the basis of their observable behavior in different situations (cf. Besnier, 1990: 421). In cognitive psychology, notions of affect range from hot to cold extremes (cf. Mandler, 1990: 21). At the hotter end, affect is used almost synonymously with emotion, as defined above. At the cooler end, it is used to refer simply to human preferences, attitudes, or likes and dislikes, and to adaptive choices related to these (cf. Mandler, 1990: 21-22). This latter perspective, which is incidentally of great potential interest for pragmatics, sees affect as a state of interpretive action and arousal that results from goal-directed cognitive appraisals of perceptions of inner and outer processes in different contexts (cf. Lazarus, 1982: 1024; Lewis et al., 1984: 271). In linguistics, on the other hand, the term affect is often used simply as a broad synonym for feeling, and is regarded as subsuming not only traditional psychological notions of emotion, mood, and attitude, but also notions of character and personality, and notions related to interactional linguistic phenomena such as masking, hedging, undercutting, and so forth (cf. Irvine, 1982: 32; Ochs, 1986: 254; Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989: 7). In the following pages, in keeping with standard linguistic usage, we will use the term affect in this latter, broader sense - apologizing to psychologists in advance for blurring important theoretical distinctions - as an overriding, generic term for linguistically expressed feelings, attitudes, and relational dispositions of all types (cf. Ochs, 1989). I .I .3. Emotive communication We would like to suggest that pragmatics should focus broadly on what Marty (1908), at the turn of the century, called emotive communication: the intentional, strategic signalling of affective information in speech and writing (e.g., evaluative dispositions, evidential commitments, volitional stances, relational orientations, degrees of emphasis, etc.) in order to influence partners interpretations of situations and reach different goals. Marty contrasted the notion of emotive communication to the notion of emotional communication, which he regarded as a type of spontaneous, unintentional leakage or bursting out of emotion in speech (cf. Amdt and Janney, 1991). According to Marty, emotive communication influences partners interpretations of situations by suggesting what he called states of affairs that coincide with ones own declared feelings and desires in the widest sense (Zustanden, die dem kundgegebenen eigenen Ftlhlen und Wollen im weitesten Sinne entsprechen) (1908: 364). Martys wording is important here, because it underscores the notion that emotive communication, by this definition, has no automatic or necessary relation to real inner affective states. Rather, it is related to self-presentation, and it is

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inherently strategic, persuasive, interactional, and other-directed by its very nature (cf. Parret, 1984: 583; Robinson, 1986: 659; Amdt and Janney, 1991: 526-532). Emotive communication, thus viewed, is hence less a personal psychological phenomenon than an interpersonal social one. This aligns Martys (1908) idea of emotive utterances conceptually with Ballys (1909) and Sapirs (1927) notions of social emotional displays, Biihlers (1934) idea of relational traffic signals, and Blacks (1949) notion of persuasive employments of affect. We could say that the function of emotive communication, in Biihlers terms, is essentially appellative: emotive uses of language impose a kind of communicative valence (kommunikative Vulenz) on the situation, influencing partners perceptions of what literally is communicated at the ideational level (cf. Biihler, 1934: 31). During interaction, we tend to perceive others as opening up or closing down, being responsive or reticent, making signs of approach or withdrawal; we perceive their relative strength or weakness, their fuller or lesser presence, their attentiveness or disinterest (cf. Frijda, 1982: 112). All such perceptions are rooted in, and depend on, emotive displays. The prerequisite for interpreting emotive activities, according to Frijda, is often merely only the ability to view a piece of linguistic or other behavior as the possible starting-point of its own continuation (1982: 112). It is the capacity, for example, to view positive behavior as a possible starting point for agreement or cooperativeness, negative behavior as a possible starting point for disagreement or conflict, confident behavior as a possible starting point for selfassertiveness or determination, uncertain behavior as a possible starting point for compromise or resignation, and so forth. In all cases, the interpretation of emotive activities involves an appreciation of interpersonal relations and self-presentation strategies (cf. Frijda, 1982: 112). In this sense, following Biihlers (1934) discussion of the appellative function, emotive communication seems to be more closely related to notions of dramatic performance (role performance) and rhetoric (persuasion) than to traditional notions of emotional expressivity (cf. Amdt and Janney, 1991).

2. Historical notes on language and affect A reasonable first step toward developing a unified pragmatics of emotive communication, we would like to suggest, is to reflect on the history of similar endeavors in the past, and see what lessons can be drawn from these. Throughout the history of linguistic thought, we can find an unstable balance between the necessity of abstraction and the necessity of not losing sight of living language. Emotive communication inherently belongs to the latter. Solutions to the problem of the relation between language and affect vary according to the roles assigned to these two competing needs. The problem of the relation itself, however, has always been present in theoretical reflections on language - present, and yet often somehow repressed, due to the difficulty of solving it in a fully satisfactory way. It figures, for example, in Sublimes (Pseudo-Longinus) &3oq (1st century A.D.), and in the semiotics of passions of the 70s (cf. Greimas, 1983; Parret, 1986; Fabbri and Pezzini, 1987), in the acrus signatus (as opposed to the actus exercim) of medieval scholastic philosophy,

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and in the entangled problem of connotation (for a good historical survey on connotation, see Garza-Cuarbn, 199 1). If we look for theories that explicitly make the linguistic expression of affect a central concern, however, the list of possible candidates becomes shorter: we can find significant forerunners not only in linguistics, but also in rhetoric, philosophy of language, and linguistic stylistics. In particular, Aristotles rhetoric, Martys philosophy of language, Ballys linguistic stylistics, and Prague functionalism offer precious insights. Each of these approaches is famous, and at the same time extremely complex, making any attempt to explain the many subtle differences between their underlying views of language and affect potentially a subject of volumes of philological and exegetical analysis. Here, we will simply mention, in a very cursory way, some reasons for their relevance. 2.1. Rhetoric:
Aristotle and the argumentative perspective

If pragmatics - envisioned here as dealing with the whole reality of communication, including its emotive aspects - could choose a prestigious ancestor, it should be ancient rhetoric. Aristotles Rhetoric can be seen as a metapragmatic treatise on the construction of the shared knowledge necessary for effective emotive communication. Starting from what today would be regarded as a social psychological perspective, Aristotle analyzes different kinds of argumentation which must fit different types of audiences. In Rhetoric I, (A), 3, 1358b, perhaps an original source of the recurring semiotic triads in philosophy and linguistics throughout the ages, Aristotle states that discourse is comprised of three fundamental elements - the speaker, the topic, and the hearer. In the present century, Aristotles rhetoric of persuasive discourse has been pursued in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas Trait& de largumentation. La nouvelle rhetorique (1958), a work of great potential interest for pragmatics, which focuses on complex emotive strategies stemming from speakers continuous efforts to adapt to their addressees. Interestingly, some basic aspects of Giles and Couplands (1991: 60ff.) accommodation theory are anticipated by, and subtly analyzed in, the Traits. The main problem dealt with by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is how speakers build up a consensus, or a communion of minds, with addressees through the strength of their arguments, and by the capacity of these to trigger the addressees emotive participation. What makes the classical rhetorical perspective a refined precedent of a pragmatics of emotive communication is mainly its strong intersubjective orientation. In classical oratory, emotive activities are regarded as semiotic phenomena with communicative potential, regardless of whether they are sincere or not, and regardless of which mode (verbal, prosodic, or kinesic) they are performed in. It could be claimed, in fact, that emotive uses of language have been studied throughout most of Western intellectual history as rhetorical techniques. Rhetorical communication and emotive communication share some crucial features: both trigger a surplus de sense, both presuppose shared knowledge on the speakers and hearers parts, and both rely on the hearers cooperation and willingness to under-

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take the inferential steps necessary to give utterances intended meanings beyond their literal ones. One interesting goal for a pragmatics of emotive communication would be to begin attempting to account for emotive rhetorical techniques from a new, more systematic, unified, point of view. This would require, among other things, rethinking and reinterpreting many important rhetorical insights of the past, and perhaps re-evaluating some modem contributions in this area such as Lausbergs (1960) and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas (1958). Helpful recent research in this direction has been done by Mortara-Garavelli (1988). 2.2. Philosophy of language: Anton Marty Anton Martys (1908) discussion of emotive ;iujerungen, at the turn of the century, may be regarded as an important pioneering philosophical contribution to later linguistic studies of emotive communication.2 To Marty, as said earlier (see section 1.3), we owe the insight that we must first distinguish between emotional (cathartic, expressive) and emotive (instigative, appellative) affective uses of speech before we can begin to investigate language and affect from a systematic pragmatic point of view. In the present connection, Martys main contribution was his discussion of what he called interest-demanding (interesseheischende) utterances: that is, utterances signaling momentary evaluative stances or volitional states, which are performed by speakers to strategically guide partners attention and influence their behavior. For this category, he invented the term emotive utterances, apologetically adding that One must excuse the new term on the grounds that in present linguistic usage, no better term for the whole class is available, as words like proclamation, request, wish, command, etc. all have a narrower meaning (Man entschuldige den neuen Terminus damit, da8 im bisherigen Sprachgebrauch ein fur die ganze Klasse passender nicht vorhanden ist, da die Namen: Ausrufung, Frage, Wunsch, Befehlsatz usw. alle einen engeren Bedeutungsumfang haben) (1908: 275). Later, Btihler (1934) integrated Martys distinction between emotional and emotive uses of language into his notions of the Ausdruck and Appell functions of language. According to Marty, emotive communication is rooted in the relationship between explicit forms of linguistic expression and their potential implicit significance for interpreters. Marty noted that speakers habitually modify explicit forms of linguistic expression in order to emotively color them and steer interpretations of their implicit, intended significance (1908: 524ff.). The linguistic activities involved in emotive communication, he said, are not cathartic in nature, but intentional, informative (Mitteillung), persuasive (uberzeugung), and/or coercive (Beeinflussung). An utterance, he argued, is like a stenograph or a rough sketch of an idea: while the basic conceptual coordinates for interpreting it are provided by the linguistic code,
* Martys philosophy was much more linguistically as is evidenced by the title of Martys major work, oriented, for example, than his friend Brentanos,

Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeine

Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie (1908).

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the task of filling the utterance into a meaningful cognitive-emotive whole is left largely up to the interpreter (1908: 145). In interpreting an utterance, he said, the partner must assign relative importance to the concepts referred to, and must reconstruct most of the implicit relations between these concepts and the speaker, the topic, and the context in which the utterance is made. Inferences about such implicit relations are influenced, in part, he maintained, by the form of the utterance. He concluded that the potential emotive interpretations of utterances are restricted by the perspectives on events that the utterances explicitly sketch out. In Martys view, although notions like, for example, You must do x, I want you to do x, Please do x, It would be nice if you did x, Ill be unhappy if you dont do x, Would you like to do x? , etc., may all perhaps potentially be in mind at the moment that a speaker makes an utterance meant to express a general idea like do x, the stenographic nature of utterances themselves requires speakers to select only one version. Insofar as only one version can be uttered explicitly, the others remain implicit. Marty claimed that for this reason, it is constantly necessary for speakers to reduce complex thoughts into simplified, explicit verbal sketches on the one hand; and by the reverse logic, it is constantly necessary for partners to expand simplified verbal sketches into complex thoughts on the other. From this, he concluded that the literal information that passes back and forth during conversation is thus inevitably always only a small, selective percentage of what potentially may be meant by the speaker, and what potentially may be understood by the partner (1908: 168). Emotive expressions, he said further, can be distinguished into two main subclasses: (1) those related broadly to evaluation, e.g., expressions of acceptance or rejection, agreement or denial, like or dislike, etc., and (2) those related to what he termed interest, e.g., expressions of wishes, desires, and feelings related to these (1908: 276).4 He regarded this second category as linguistically more complex than the first one. In sections 3, 4 and 5, in which we discuss the categorization of emotive communicative activities in psychology and linguistics, we will see that Marty seems to have been quite correct. His category of interesseheischende _&&erungen seems to have certain similarities with the psycholinguistic notion of the motivational potency of utterances (see section 4) and with notions of linguistic involvement (see section 6), both of which are associated with a multitude of linguistic activities. A pragmatics of emotive communication can scarcely ignore Martys contribution to later distinctions in Btihlers Sprachtheorie,5

3 Marty would not have subscribed to the view of language as a conduit of meaning. 4 Martys sub-class of evaluative phenomena corresponds roughly with psychological concepts of positive and negative attitudes and their intensity. His sub-class of interest-related phenomena corresponds roughly with psychological concepts of individual conation or motivation and its urgency. 5 In a review of Marty (1908) Biihler remarked that whereas Wundt concentrated on language mainly as Ausdruck (emphasizing emotional expressivity), and Husserl, in his strong opposition to Wundt, focused mainly on language as Darstellung (emphasizing the referential function), Marty dealt with the Ausdruck (emotional) and Appell (emotive) functions, but ignored aspects of language related to Darstellung.

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and to the Prague School notion of the expressive-emotive tion 2.4). 2.3. Linguistic stylisties: Charles Bally

function

(see sec-

Charles Ballys linguistic stylistics is also of special interest: not only for pragmatic approaches to emotive communication in particular, but also for pragmatics tout court, because style (understood as expressivity in Ballys approach), is regarded not simply as an auxiliary or accompanying feature of the linguistic system, but as a constitutive one. Style, as defined by Bally, makes it possible to establish a link between affect as a psychological category, and grammar (understood in a broad sense as also including the prosodic resources of language) as a social category. Ballys stylistics is of extraordinary linguistic relevance mainly because, in it, affective values are embedded in the linguistic system itself, and not simply added to, or superimposed on, the linguistic system. As is well-known, Ballys stylistics is a stylistics of language (while Vosslers and Spitzers, for example, are stylistics of literary texts). Bally defines stylistics as follows : Stylistics studies the expressive facts of language from the viewpoint of their affective content, in other words, the expression of feelings through language and the action of language on feelings (La stylistique Ctudie . .. les faits dexpression du langage organise au point de vue de leur contenu affectif, cesta-dire lexpression des faits de la sensibilite par le langage et laction des faits de langage sur la sensibilitb) (1970: 16 [ 19091). Following Bally, two abstract fundamental tendencies, or modes of communication, are dialectically at work in language: the intellectual mode (the mode pur) and the affective mode (the mode v&x). These two modes do not constitute a true dichotomy, but are rather ideal poles of a continuum: a message, that is, will be more oriented toward one of them or the other. The intellectual, logical mode is, above all, an abstract possibility which offers the identifying term: that is, the neutral choice - for example, in a series of affective synonyms representing possible choices for the speaker (and not only words, but also whole sentences and expressions) - against which the expressive choice can be detected, compared, and evaluated. There is a continuous silent process of comparison at work in communication: Words are understood and felt only through a continuous and unconscious comparison among them in our mind (les mots ne sont compris et sentis que par une comparaison incessante et inconsciente qui se fait entre eux dans notre cerveau) (1970: 22 [1909]). In Ballys view, there are two main types of affective features: first, natural affective features (caractkes affectifs naturels), which are connected with notions of intensity, evaluation, and beauty (1970: 300, 170ff. [1909]); and second, evocative effects (effets par &vocation), which are connected with the capacity of linguistic choices to evoke the milieu where their employment is most natural (les milieux oti leur emploi est le plus naturel) (1970: 30 [1909]). While natural affective features of language are implicitly centered on the speaker, he says (partly prefiguring later notions of the expressive function), evocative effects are centered mainly on

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the addressee (cf. Segre, 1985: 314), and are related to subcodes and registers of language that project different tacit definitions of the partners social status, professional affiliations, respective cultural levels, and so forth.6 Bally further distinguished between two types of formal expressive processes @rocedesformels) and linguistic features connected with these: first, what he calls direct processes, which involve lexical choices; and second, indirect processes, which involve prosodic and syntactic choices that go beyond single words (1970: 250ff. [ 19091). Ballys exemplifications of these two types of expressive processes and their formal features deserve careful attention in modern pragmatics. There is not enough room in these sketchy notes to fully discuss Ballys contribution to the understanding of affective aspects of language, but it is worth emphasizing that Ballys approach is not restricted to the lexicon. His notion of modality in the analysis of sentences is an important step that clears the way for the representation of ways in which speakers subjective attitudes are formally embedded in sentences. According to Bally, a sentence is comprised of a modus (similar to the modern notion of modality) and a dictum (similar to the notion of propositional content). The modus, which is expressed by verbs of propositional attitude like think, rejoice, hope, etc., is the heart of the sentence (cest lame de la phrase) (1965 : 36 [ 1925]), and represents the speakers attitude toward the propositional content, or the dictum, in Ballys terms, in its active, operative mode. The link between the intellectual and emotive modes, rediscovered within the theoretical unit sentence (see section 7.7.2), finds its formal abstract representation here. Starting from this conception, Bally develops a refined analysis of different types of dislocation (la phrase segmentee), which, in many respects, anticipates both the Prague studies of the thematic progression of texts in theme-rheme, and modern pragmatic analyses of right- and left-dislocation.

6 While there are certain similarities between Ballys natural/evocative distinction, Martys emotional/emotive distinction, and Bilhlers expressive/appellative distinction, it would be a mistake to assume that these notions are all synonymous. Ballys discussion is, in a sense, more linguistically oriented than those of Marty and Biihler. Rather than discussing different reasons or psychological motivations for making linguistic choices, that is, Bally is pointing out two different basic types of linguistic stylistic choice: his natural affective features are related mainly to intrastylistic choices, or choices within a given style or register between different linguistic form tokens and arrangements; and his evocative features are related mainly to interstylistir choices, or choices between different styles or registers of speech per Se (cf. Amdt and Janney, 1987). Notions somehow close to Ballys more explicit notion of modality can be found in the following definitions: the intellectual subscription to an act can be accompanied by a more or less lively sympathy toward that act (lassentiment intellectuel que nous donnons a un act peut etre accompagne dune sympathie plus ou moins vive pour cet acte) (Brunot, 1922: 539); Every sentence of colloquial language . . . is comprised of two distinct elements: the idea and its presentation There is also a feeling which accompanies the experience and which is expressed at the same time as the experience . It is the affective presentation (Toute phrase du langage courant renferme deux elements bien distincts: lidee et la p&sentution de celle-ce .., I1 y a aussi un sentiment qui accompagne lexperience et que le sujet exttriorise en mCme temps quelle .._ Cest la prf?sentation affective) (Camoy, 1927: 1).

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Ballys importance for a pragmatics of emotive communication rests finally in the fact that he restores the crucial role of emotive expression in language; and he goes further, assigning affective language, the mode vecu, supremacy with respect to intellectual language. Whenever we speak, he says, we are called upon to choose the most effective ways of expressing our ideas and feelings; and our feelings come first. In saying this, Bally completely subverts de Saussures dichotomy between lungue and parole. The subversion, however, was never made explicit in Ballys works, where we find nothing but words of devoted assent to the master whose notes he, together with Sechehaye, so carefully collected and edited into the Cows (1916). Perhaps this explains divergent, often critical, interpretations of Ballys viewpoints later (cf. Stankiewicz, 1964; Braselmann, 1982; Chiss, 1987). Without entering into exegetical discussion here, it may suffice to quote a touching passage, which has the flavor of a confession: [after acknowledging the Saussures importance for his work] Nevertheless, this incomparable master did not particularly dwell on the questions which I later came to love, I mean the questions concerning expressive language, the vehicle of affective thought (Toutefois ce maitre incomparable ne sest pas attarde specialement aux questions qui mont passion5 plus tard, celles notamment qui concement le langage expressif, vehicule de la pensee affective) (Journal de Gendve, 10 April, 1957, quoted in Hellman, 1988: 109). Once we recognize the true significance of affect in Ballys stylistics, which has nothing to do with the whimsical expression of idiosyncratic emotionality or irrationality, but rather comes very close to the Latin afSicere (to affect, to do something to something, to influence something or someone), it becomes possible to share Braselmanns (1982) and Wunderlis (1990) conclusion that it is reductive to see Ballys works merely as studies of expressive language. His research, beyond being stylistic, is, in fact, eminently pragmatic: it is centered on the active social character of language, viewed as the tendency by which speech is moved to serve action (la tendance qui pousse la parole a servir laction) (1965: 18 [ 19251). The social nature of affective language is never blurred in Ballys research: one can show what one is thinking and feeling only through expressive means which are understandable to others (on ne peut montrer ce quon pense et ce quon sent soimeme que par des moyens dexpression que les autres peuvent comprendre) (1970: 6-7 [1909]). Ballys work paves the way for models of linguistic communication based on intersubjectivity, such as those developed by Benveniste and Bachtin later in the century, and makes him, as Wunderli (1990: 385) says, one of the important forerunners of modem pragmatics (einer der wichtigen Vorlaufer der heutigen Pragmatik). 2.4. Linguistics: Prague functionalism Finally, important contributions to the study of language and affect have also come for several decades from the Prague School, which has dealt with the affective functions of language since the very beginning (cf. Dane:, 1989). The second and third statements of the third thesis of the Prague Linguistic Circle (1929), for example, are directly concerned with this issue. After distinguishing conceptually between

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internal and manifested speech (in a manner, incidentally, that is reminiscent of Martys earlier distinction between inner and outer manifestations of language),8 the writers state that the features important for the characterization of language are the intellectuality and the emotionality of language manifestations. Both these features either interpenetrate each other or one of them prevails over the other (1929: 88). In the Prague functionalist view, intellectual speech is always socially oriented; emotional speech, on the other hand, may be itself an outlet of the speakers emotion (Martys emotional function Btihlers Ausdruck function); it may also have a social orientation: for example, when it aims at causing emotions in the hearer (Aristotles persuasive goal, Martys emotive function Btihlers Appell function). Among works in the Prague functionalist tradition that are particularly relevant for modem studies of language and affect, at least Mathesiuss studies of linguistic means of reinforcement (Verstiirkung) and emphasis (Emphase) have to be mentioned. Mathesius (1964) distinction between reinforcement and emphasis may be summarized as follows: whereas reinforcement is mainly a lexical matter, involving choices of graded suffixes, marked lexemes, slang, and so forth, emphasis is mainly a matter of syntax and prosody, and involves choices in sentences in which the particular Satzmelodie and intonation express the emphatic orientation of the speaker to the content (emphatische Einstellung des Sprechenden zum Satzinhalt) (1964: 430). Roman Jakobson, who was a protagonist of Prague functionalism from the outset, includes, within his widely-known six functions of language, a function called the expressive or emotive function, which is speaker-centered, and is based on the expressive (Ausdruck) function in Biihlers (1934) Organon-model. In Jakobsons words, this function aims at a direct expression of the speakers attitude toward flawhat he is speaking about . . . The emotive function, laid bare in the interjections, vors to some extent all our utterances, on their phonic, grammatical, and lexical level (Jakobson, 1960: 354). In hindsight, it is rather unfortunate that Jakobson combined Martys (and, to a lesser extent, Biihlers) clear distinction between the emotional and emotive functions of language into a single function in his model. Nevertheless, Jakobson makes explicit reference to Martys contribution, pointing out the informational capacity of emotive elements of messages, and stressing the systematic - and not yet adequately studied - character of this capacity. In this connection, Jakobson offers the famous example of the forty different interpretable messages communicated by the phrase This evening in Stanislavskijs Moscow Theatre, and understood by the audience. After Jakobson, working within a much narrower conceptual framework, Stanckiewicz (1964) repeatedly emphasizes the systematic character of expressive devices in language. Stanckiewicz aims at restoring the primacy of cognitive aspects of affective linguistic forms, narrowing the range of affective phenomena potentially relevant to linguistics to features such as expressive phonemes, expressive derivation, suffixes, Biihler did not always draw a clear distincand so forth. According to Stanckiewicz,
* The fact that Marty taught for many influence later on the Prague School. years in Prague gives rise to intriguing conjectures about his

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tion between emotive phenomena which are contextually conditioned and emotive features which are embedded in the code (1964: 266). Here again, it could be argued, we find a certain lack of clarity with respect to differences between the expressive (subjective, personal) and emotive (intersubjective, interpersonal) functions of signs of affect in speech. Stanckiewicz himself seems to have recognized the problem of the failing interpersonal orientation of a strictly code-centered approach: practically every word can be endowed with emotive connotations if it is placed in an appropriate social situation or verbal context (1964: 242). The history of concepts of expressivity and emotivity in the Prague functionalist approach has been dealt with in detail recently by Volek (1987). Finally, it remains to be said that, over the years, the Prague School linguists have raised many important foundational questions about relations between language and affect, some of which are still waiting for adequate answers. One problem that especially needs to be addressed - which is related to the concept of markedness as first defined in Prague phonology, and is potentially very important for studies of emotive communication (cf. Hiibler, 1987, and see section 6 below) - is: from where must we begin in order to detect, and make inferences about, emotive connotations in the first place? As Bally said, two opposing tendencies appear to be operative in expressivity (les tendances opposees de lexpressivite): expectation (lattente) and surprise (la surprise) (1965: 69 [1932]). The crucial point generally seems to be the divergent choice from some type of expectation. We will go into this matter in more detail in section 6.

3. Psychological dimensions of affect Another step toward developing a unified pragmatics of emotive communication - in addition, that is, to reconstructing the history of related endeavors in the past would be to start working on developing systematic concepts about the underlying nature of what Black (1948), Richards (1948), Stevenson (1948), Alston (1967), and others earlier in the century called emotive meaning. 3.1. The issue of emotive meaning The issue of how emotive activities function as substitutes for what they mean, denote, signify, or index has important implications for studies of emotive communication (cf. Ogden and Richards, 1923; Black, 1949). Regardless of how we ultimately analyze emotive linguistic phenomena, initially, we depend, to a greater extent than we perhaps like to admit, on assumptions about what emotive signs are signs of, and about their potential meanings and interpretations in different situations. We need such assumptions in order to designate conceptualized emotive activities as objects of analysis in the first place (cf. Janney, 1981; Amdt and Janney, 1987: 13-20). The decision to study emotive communication from a pragmatic perspective implies underlying interpretive assumptions (or biases) of some kind from the very outset, and these should be stated explicitly in advance.

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Almost fifty years ago, Black (1948: 112-l 13) argued that confusion in approaches to emotive language in America during the 1920s to 40s were due mainly to the lack of a consistent and coherent theory of emotive meaning ; and today, we still lack linguistically useful theories of emotive meaning (cf. Volek, 1987: 249). As a consequence, linguists studying emotive communication are sometimes forced to adopt (or adapt) interpretive categories derived from Western psychological notions of underlying basic dimensions of affect (cf. Brown and Gilman, 1960; Wiener and Mehrabian, 1968; Dittmann, 1972; Arndt and Janney, 1983; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Dane& this issue). Gaps between psychological and linguistic approaches to affect, however, presently make it difficult to imagine directly transferring concepts from psychology into linguistics without first considering their compatibility, descriptive adequacy, and explanatory power in the linguistic context. Psychological studies often do not take language and interaction fully into consideration; and linguistic studies, on the other hand, often shy away from psychology. Although potentially useful models of emotive meaning were devised many years ago in psycholinguistics (cf. Osgood et al. 1957; Davitz, 1964, etc.), there has not yet been much apparent interest in incorporating these into current studies of emotive communication. As a result, the work of many linguists who presently are most actively addressing issues related to language and affect tends to remain psychologically rather uninformed. 3.2. Dimensions of affect in psychology In psychology, there is a tradition of tripartite distinctions between metaphorical basic dimensions of affect reaching back to about the turn of the century (cf. Gallois, this issue) (see Table 1). The term dimension was first used in connection with affect in studies of mood in the 1950s (cf. Nowlis and Nowlis, 1956). It was originally a means of suggesting that affective states are not static, stable mental things (e.g., fixed qualities, traits, or characteristics of mind), but dynamic, gradient mental processes that must be represented and measured on variable, more/less scales (cf. Osgood et al., 1957). Western psychologists tend to agree about three broad basic dimensions of affective experience: (1) a positive or negative evaluative dimension, (2) a power, control, or potency dimension, and (3) an activity, arousal or intensity dimension (see Table 1). The psychological view, at the most reduced level, is that people typically respond affectively to objects of appraisal9 (if and when they respond) mainly by feeling positively or negatively evaluatively inclined toward them, and by feeling in some sense either in control of them or not in control of them; and these affective orientations tend to vary in intensity or strength. The resilience of psychological distinctions such as these for the past several decades seems to argue in favor of using related dimensions, at least, for comparing assumptions about emotive meaning in linguistics.0
The issue of objects of emotive appraisal is dealt with in section 8. lo Osgood et al.s (1957) categories of evaluation, potency, and activity Table I, as these have been the most widely recognized psycholinguistic have been subject to the most rigorous empirical testing.

are used to organize the list in terms in recent decades, and

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Table 1 Basic psychological dimensions of affect Authors Wundt (1912) Osgood et al. (1957) Leary (1957) Gough (1957) Brown and Gilman (1960) Davitz (1964) Averill ( 1975) Russell (1978) Amdt and Janney (1983) Daly et al. (1983) Amdt and Janney (1987) Russell (1991) (+/-) Evaluation (+/-) pleasantness (+/-) evaluation (+/-) like (+/-) affiliation (+/-) solidarity (+/-) valence (+/-) affect (+/-) affect (+/-) ego-threat (+/-) affect (+/-) affect (+/-) pleasure (or affiliation) (+/-) Potency (+/-) relaxation (+/-) potency (+/-) dominance (+/-) power (+/-) power (+/-) strength (+/-) control (+/-) agressiveness (+/-) ego-nearness (+/-) control (+/-) assertiveness (+/-) dominance (or power) (+/-) Activity (+/-) arousal (+/-) activity

(+/-) activity (+/-) intensity (+/-) intensity (+/-) ego-involvement (+/-) intensity (+/-) intensity (+/-) arousal (or activity)

4. Emotive categories in linguistics An important question that naturally arises in connection with psychological notions such as those represented in Table 1 is whether they might be useful as underlying interpretive categories for a pragmatics of emotive communication. It would seem that their usefulness depends on the degree of fit that can be established between them and present linguistic emotive categories. Are psychological and linguistic emotive categories compatible? The issue of degree of fit is relevant for three reasons: first, naturally, because it invites us to consider where present linguistic findings fit into the vast body of findings about emotive phenomena in other branches of science (cf. Buck, Gallois, this issue); second, because it invites us to consider the extent to which linguists presently agree about the underlying nature of emotive phenomena per se (cf. Dane& 1989, and this issue); and third, because it invites us to consider the extent to which linguists are presently focusing on the same - or at least related - phenomena as objects of investigation. The present section addresses these issues. Table 2 lists some categories that have been used in recent decades in linguistic studies of emotive communication. The terms are organized according to Osgood et al.s (1957) original psycholinguistic categories (evaluation, potency, and activity) in order to facilitate a comparison of notions of affect in linguistics and psychology. Assuming that at least some degree of conceptual fit between linguistic and psychological categories is desirable if we wish to argue that the emotive capacity, however we ultimately define it, is psychologically (in addition to socially and linguistically) grounded, what is the present situation in linguistics?

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Table 2 Linguistic emotive categories Authors Labov and Waletzky (1967) Hymes (1972) Gumperz (1977) specifying keys Chafe (1982) involvement/detachment focus: indices of linguistic distancing from concrete events Irvine (1982) Labov (1984) loaded terms emphatic particles intensity maximizers intensity minimizers
_-_-involvement ___~____~_____~~_____

(+/-) Evaluation

(+/-) Potency

(+/-) Activity intensifiers

_~~ affectkeys_----___---____----__intensifying keys emphatic particles

Tannen (1984)

focus: indices of emotional interest in, or identification with, the topic, the needs of the partner, or the interaction itself Ochs (1986) affect specifiers distance from the proposition commitment or position with respect to the message focus: indices of confidence or uncertainty Hiibler (1987) involvement: attachment or detachment vis-a-vis the speech act focus: indices of an emotive identification with the speech act Volek (1987) evaluative excitizers emphasizers and particularizers unspecific excitizers and intensifiers affect intensifiers

Schiffrin (1987)

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Table 2 (cont.) Authors Fairclough (1988) (+/-) Evaluation (+/-) Potency (+/-) Activity affect minimizers affect maximizers -------------stancemarkers--_---------affect markers evidentiality markers focus: indices of positive or negative affect
@hs~dSchieffelin

Biber and Finegan (1989)

focus: indices of certainty or doubt

-------_---------___---affectkey~-----------------------

(1989) affect specifiers Wowk (1989) Katriel and Dascal commitment (1989) focus: indices of cognitive commitment to the belief, state, etc. expressed by the utterance
__________----involvement __

affect intensifiers intensity of affect

topical involvement focus: indices of weak/strong attentional orientation to the topic interactional involvement focus: indices of weak/strong attentional orientation to the speech situation and/or the participants Besnier (1990) positive/negative affect directionality of affect focus: indices of self vs. outside focus of a message intensity of affect

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Table 2 (cont.) Authors Lutz (1990) (+/-) Evaluation (+/-) Potency of affect (+/-) Activity

personalization

focus: indices of personal distance vs. nondistance Amdt and Janney (1991) value-ladenness focus: indices of positive or negative affect assertiveness focus: indices of confidence or uncertainty intensity focus: weak ment indices of strong or affective involve-

Table 2 shows that there are currently many competing emotive categories in linguistics, and these do not always refer to exactly the same things (cf. Besnier, this issue). This lack of consensus at the categorical level, it can be assumed, reflects a corresponding lack of consensus at the epistemological level. Which broad categories of phenomena are currently being studied, and how are these being conceptualized and labeled for analytical purposes (see section 7)? Linguists presently appear to distinguish most clearly between emotive categories related to the psycholinguistic dimensions of evaluation and activity in Table 1: that is, between (1) categories related to positivelnegative orientations, e.g., notions of affect specifying keys (Hymes, 1972; Gumperz, 1977), loaded terms (Irvine, 1982), affect specifiers (Ochs, 1986; Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989), evaluative excitizers (Volek, 1987), positive/negative affect markers (Biber and Finegan, 1989; Besnier, 1990), value-ladenness choices (Amdt and Janney, 1991), etc., and (2) categories related to morelless intense orientations, e.g., notions of intensifiers (Labov and Waletzky, 1967), affect intensifying keys (Hymes, 1972; Gumperz, 1978), emphatic particles (Chafe, 1982; Irvine, 1982), intensity maximizers and minimizers (Labov, 1984), affect intensifiers (Ochs, 1986; Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989), unspecific excitizers and intensifiers (Volek, 1987), affect maximizers and minimizers (Fairclough, 1988), the intensity of affect (Wowk, 1989; Besnier, 1990; Arndt and Janney, 1991), etc. With respect to the potency dimension, however, which is the central psycholinguistic motivational category in Table 1,I there seems to be less agreement. Here, a variety of phenomena are presently being studied, and it is not clear whether all of them can, or even should, be included within a single category. From a psychological standpoint, at any rate, it can be said that most of these phenomena are related in some sense to approach and avoidance behavior. Leaving current linguistic notions of involvement temporarily out of consideration (see section 5), we can outline four broad linguistic categories that are commonly associated with the potency dimenI According phenomenon, connections. to Volek (1987: 249), the motivational structure of emotive signs appears as a crucial since their semantics is not based on representation, but rather on direct associative

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sion: (1) categories related to near/far orientations, e.g., notions of the distancing of language from concrete events (Chafe, 1982), the speakers distance from the truth of the proposition conveyed (Ochs, 1986), the speakers position with respect to the message (Schiffrin, 1987), the speakers degree of personal distance from the message (Lutz, 1990), the directionality of affect (Besnier, 1990), etc.; (2) categories related to clearlvague orientations, e.g., notions of clear/vague signals (Wiener and Mehrabian, 1968), clear vs. fuzzy uses of words (G. Lakoff, 1972), particulizers (Volek, 1987), linguistic specificity phenomena (Arndt and Janney, 1991), etc.; (3) categories related to confdentldoubtjhl orientations, e.g., notions of the speakers cognitive commitment to the message (Schriffrin, 1987; Katriel and Dascal, 1989), modality markers (Chafe and Nichols, 1986), evidential certainty and doubt markers (Biber and Finegan, 1989), etc.; and (4) categories related to self-assertivelunassertive orientations, e.g., notions of politeness principles (Leech, 1983), supportive strategies (Amdt and Janney, 1985), indirectness (Blum-Kulka, 1987), face saving strategies (Brown and Levinson, 1987), relational work (Watts, 1989), self vs. outside focus of the message (Besnier, 1990), linguistic assertiveness (Arndt and Janney, 1991), and so forth. In Table 3, the categories above are compared with the psychological categories discussed earlier. Are they finally compatible? The answer to this question seems to be a qualified yes, but only in a general sense. In order to analyze specific instances of emotive communication in terms of categories such as those listed in Table 3, a pragmatics of emotive communication seems to need various conceptual and methodological bridges: first, from a linguistic standpoint, it would seem that investigators need to agree in principle about how emotively significant linguistic contrasts are recognized as such in natural discourse (see section 6); second, emotive categories like positive/negative, near/far, clear/vague, confident/doubtful, self-assertive/unassertive, more/less intense, etc., need to be connected with specific types of linguistic choices (see section 7); and third - and an issue of deepest concern from a pragmatic point of view - a systematic interpretive account of linguistic emotive choices and their inferred objects and objectives must be devised (see section 8). Although each of these problems is naturally too complex to be adequately discussed in a paper of this length, later, we will make some modest preliminary suggestions about how these might be addressed. But before doing this, we would like to briefly discuss the present status of the central notion of involvement in linguistics.

5. Involvement: An entangled notion As said in the preceding section, the lack of agreement in linguistics about emotive categories is particularly evident in the middle column of Table 2, in the categories associated with the psycholinguistic motivational notion of potency (cf. Osgood et al., 1957). If we look more closely at this middle column, we notice one term that has been used so often in pragmatics in connection with emotive communication that it deserves special consideration: the term involvement. Here, we will

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Table 3 A comparison of psychological Evaluation and linguistic emotive categories Potency Activity

Psychological categories

Main contrasts

positive/ negative

powerful/ unpo werful unaroused

Linguistic categories

Evaluation

Proximity

Specificity

Evidentiality

Volitonality

Quantity

Main contrasts

positive/ negative

near/far

clear/vague

confident/ doubtful

assertive/ unassertive

more/less intense

present a sketchy overview of some current notions of involvement in pragmatics, making no claim to completeness, and attempt to clarify a few basic distinctions. The discussion will focus on: (a) what involvement is; (b) what involvement is opposed to; and (c) what linguistic units are pertinent to different studies of involvement. 5.1. The notion of involvement The folk-psychological notion of involvement is sometimes used in pragmatics as a sort of bridging category between the broad psychological categories discussed in section 3, and the narrower linguistic ones discussed in section 4. Involvement comes from the Latin involvere (in + volvere), meaning literally to roll, to wrap up. Still present in its etimology, is the idea of movement, with the mildly negative connotation of danger of potential entanglement. Understood in this sense, the term nicely encapsulates the idea that getting involved in the dynamics of human emotive communication can be a risky move.* Unlike traditional linguistic notions of expressive language, expressive derivations, and so forth (see the discussion of Jakobson and Stankiewicz in section 2.4), which tend, in their code-centeredness, to presuppose a person not in a WITH, as Goffman (1981: 78) puts it, the folkpsychological notion of involvement suggests immediately that emotive communication has an interpersonal relational dimension. Here it is worth mentioning that in well-known psychiatric research, the parameter of involvement has been used to
* In the Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (1971), involved and the substantive involvement is paraphrased implicated, entangled, engaged, . entangled condition . . . complicated state of affairs, imbroglio. is paraphrased by by embarassment

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assess expressed emotion (EE) in schizophrenics relatives discourse (cf. Vaughn and Leff, 1976).13 5.2. Linguistic definitions of involvement In linguistic literature, we find that the term involvement is used in widely different ways: for example, (1) with reference to speakers inner states as preconditions of interaction: unlike commitment, involvement is not a social but a mental state and, as such, it is not rule-governed (cf. Katriel and Dascal, 1989: 291); (2) with reference to speakers emotive identifications with speech acts, as a sort of addition or complement to the Gricean sincerity condition (cf. Htibler, 1987: 371); (3) with reference to uses of linguistic techniques and strategies as conventionalized ways of establishing rapport (cf. Tannen, 1984: 30): conversation, like literature, seeks primarily to MOVE an audience by means of involvement (cf. Tannen, 1984: 153); (4) with reference to overall rhetorical effects, or senses of vividness evoked by the strategic use of narratives, reported speech, imagery, and so on (cf. Tannen, 1989);i4 (5) with reference to speakers cognitive orientations to shared discourse topics (cf. Katriel and Dascal (1987: 285) on topical involvement), which, in some other approaches, are associated with notions of saliency and fore- and backgrounded information in thematic organization: and finally (6) with reference to metamessages of rapport, successful communication, shared feelings, etc., as means of enhancing social cohesion (cf. Tannen, 1989: 13). In the list above, we could say that there is a movement from an individual psychological orientation to an interpersonal social orientation, via a rhetorical-stylistic orientation. Clearly, these three orientations call for different theoretical standpoints, rely on different assumptions, and refer to different designated realities (cf. Caffi, 1992). Echoing Besnier (this issue), we can say that linguistic notions of involvement are presently heterogeneous. Involvement is a pre-theoretical, intuitive, rather vague, unfocused notion, which has not yet been employed in a technical way, and whose present use, even within individual frameworks, is inconsistent. As is shown above, the term is used variously to refer to preconditions (inner states), techniques (rhetorical-stylistic strategies), messages (messages of rapport, shared feelings), and effects (the result of happy or cohesive interaction) of communication. Deborah Tannen alone uses it in three different senses (see above). In view of this, it seems reasonable to ask which uses of involvement are most helpful from a pragmatic standpoint. As to the usefulness of employing involvement to refer to emotive techniques, we have already pointed out the difficulty of attempting to distinguish clearly between emotive features of language assumed to be embedded in the code and features that are contextually or cotextually conditioned (cf. also Stankiewicz, 1964: 266). The root of this problem is simply that in
I3 We are indebted to Giuseppe Car& Dipartimento di Psichiatria, Universiti3 di Pavia, for having brought this to our attention. I4 It may be worth mentioning here that such strategies are called figures of presentation in rhetoric (cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958: $42).

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studying emotive communication, we deal not simply with signs, but with indices, in Peircean terms: that is, we investigate signs which point to, or are associated with, things that may be emotively significant, but whose significance ultimately can only be decided on external contextual or cotextual grounds. The hypothetical, conjectural nature of indices of affect tends to make it difficult to avoid constructing correspondingly hypothetical, conjectural typologies of emotive devices (see section 7). As to the usefulness of employing involvement to refer to inner states, we can note that this practice has a history in psychology, where the notion of ego-involvement has sometimes been contrasted to notions of ego-threat and ego-nearness, and has been interpreted as a dimension of inner affect somewhat similar to Osgood et al.s (1957) activity (cf. Amdt and Janney, 1987: 135ff.). One problem with this idea from a pragmatic standpoint, however, is that the notion of involvement as an inner state, like the notion of involvement as a message, is viable only as long as we can establish inferrable connections between emotive activities and their observable external effects. In a pragmatics analysis, as in everyday interaction, we do not usually deal with remote causes or slippery and fathomless inner states, but with effects. A partners hypothetical inner state is a projected reality, a sort of implicature, hence defeasible, which can only be assigned by an act of inference (cf. Sbisa, 1990). Precisely because of the potential confusion between observable outer effects and inferrable inner states, the notion of involvement lends itself easily to a sort of circularity. As Besnier (this issue: p. 285) points out, some linguists presently seem to assume that involvement is the result of the .. . use of involvement strategies, and the ... use of involvement strategies is the result of involvement. An ancient rhetorical notion lurks behind this critical remark: the notion of emphasis (cf. Lausberg, 1960), to which modem treatments of involvement add little additional insight.i5 In order to escape this circularity, it would perhaps be helpful to shift from a taxonomic point of view (focused on developing lists of signs of involvement), to a functional, inferential point of view that concentrates on investigating the mechanisms involved in the construction of shared presuppositions and background expectations about others feelings and attitudes. From such a viewpoint, involvement would be regarded as a kind of unsaid. The question would then become: what entitles hearers to abductively assign feelings of involvement to speakers? What types of assumptions, display rules, and inferences are required? If we were to start from this end of the problem, perhaps we could begin to provide - more than ad hoc lists of signs of involvement - lists of pragmatic constraints linked to different types of interactions and different types of texts, which account for variations in the ways in which (and extents to which) speakers express involvement under different conditions. Rather than starting with definitions of the emotive meanings of signs of involvement, that is, we would simply start with choices of words, syntactic arrangements, discourse patterns, and so forth that are
Later (see section 8.2), we suggest that in order to add anything new to ancient rhetorical treatments of emphasis, modem approaches to involvement will have to open up and incorporate the relevant findings of empirical social psychological work such as Wiener and Mehrabians (1968).

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hypothesized to be of potential emotive significance (see section 7.7.2 on micro- vs. macro-choices), and then, using these choices as independent variables, we would investigate their uses and effects in different types of contexts and cotexts, looking for variations that confirm or contradict these hypotheses. 5.3. What is involvement opposed to? As said, in psychology, the notion of ego-involvement is sometimes opposed to notions of ego-nearness and ego-threat (cf. Amdt and Jarmey, 1987). In order to clarify linguists understandings of the concept of involvement, it may be useful to look at the paradigmatic oppositions to this notion in the literature. Glancing through some random examples, we find that in linguistics, involvement is opposed to the following concepts: (1) detachment (Chafe, 1983); (2) integration (Chafe, 1983);16 (3) considerateness (Tannen, 1984); (4) commitment (Katriel and Dascal, 1989); and (5) sincerity, in the Gricean sense, as presupposed in unmarked utterances in Ballys mode pur (see section 2.3) (Hiibler, 1987). Again, these oppositions, like the definitions listed in the preceding section, are rooted in different conceptual frameworks, and are based on different (to a certain extent, incompatible) assumptions, whose discussion is beyond our aims. Here, we will just mention an interesting line of reasoning in Htiblers (1987) discussion of involvement, which points to how we perhaps might conceptualize oppositions to this notion. Htibler argues that if the concept of involvement is to be analytically useful, it must be regarded a continuum: that is, we must regard both detachment and attachment as modes of involvement (1987: 373):
Either mode can be said to represent the speakers involvement equally . They just represent different solutions to the methodological question of how to externalize ones involvement in terms of linguistic behaviour. The mode of attachment represents the mode of living ones involvement. The mode of detachment is a mode of suppressing it . the attempt not to appear involved is too obvious not to be communicatively relevant.

From a pragmatic analytical point of view, this is something of an improvement over the present situation, because it breaks with the simple equation of involvement with emphasis (cf. Lausberg, 1960), and makes it possible to consider detached communicative behavior as also potentially emotively relevant. Within this more dynamic notion, the rhetorical forms of subtraction, for example (reticence, ellipsis, preterition, understatement, silence, etc.), can be regarded as cold means of emotive expression. This adds rich new possibilities for the analysis of emotive communication. 5.4. Linguistic units in studies of involvement In present studies of involvement, it seems to be recognized - although not always foregrounded, as in ancient rhetoric (see section 2.1) and in Ballys linguistic stylisI6 Chafe (1983) speaks of the involvement and fragmentation of oral discourse, as opposed to the detachment and integration of written discourse.

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tics (see section 2.3) - that impressions of involvement result from clusters of linguistic, prosodic, and other features. Many studies mention (but few actually analyze) the importance of prosodic and other vocal activities as signals of involvement (e.g., speech rate, frequency, rhythm; pitch prominence, contour, gradience, etc.) (for a review, see Selting, this issue); and a few recognize the importance of kinesic activities (e.g., gaze, facial expression, body posture) (for a review, see Arndt and Janney, 1987). But most studies tend to focus mainly on linguistic units such as the following: (1) channel (oral/written) (Chafe, 1983); (2) conversation (Tannen, 1984; Katriel and Dascal, 1989); (3) narrative style (Tannen, 1989); (4) utterance (Katriel and Dascal, 1989); (5) speech act (Hubler, 1987). The list shows that the linguistic units presently being chosen as relevant to the study of involvement - like present definitions of involvement (see section 5.2) and present notions of conceptual oppositions to involvement (see section 5.3) - are not homogeneous, and share no common theoretical framework. So far so good. But if the notion of involvement is to be incorporated into an integrative pragmatics of emotive communication - for example, an approach like the one advocated here, which takes psychological, linguistic, and rhetorical stylistic findings into account it is clear that precisely from a theoretical standpoint, some crucial problems need to be clarified both at the local utterance level and at the global discourse level (see section 7.7.2). In particular, at the utterance level, it is important to clarify the relation between notions of involvement and modality, on the one hand, and between notions of involvement and felicity conditions (especially the sincerity condition of a speech act), on the other. Also, the relation between involvement and commitment needs to be clarified (cf. Katriel and Dascal, 1987). As is well known, the main linguistic means of commitment in the epistemic modality are Urmsons (1952) parenthetical verbs, and modal adverbs like probably, which modify the claim to truth of an assertion. These are called evidentials in another tradition. If commitment is defined as a sign of subscription (neustic in Hares terms) (cf. Hare, 1970; Lyons, 1977), then involvement, it seems, could be defined as the emotive subscription to the utterance. However, such a definition, which is to some extent plausible, would first have to be grounded on an empirical basis (see section 8). At the discourse level, it is important to clarify the relation between involvement and interaction-types and text-types, since these latter put constraints on the kind and amount of involvement allowed. A solution might start from an emit definition of contexts, as in sociological and anthropological work (cf. Besnier, 1990). Once again, however, here, we face the problem of the margins of freedom: we can start making inferences about partners behavior and about their involvement only when partners can choose among different, equally possible, communicative alternatives. Clearly, choice is much reduced, at times approximating zero, in highly ritualized types of interaction (e.g., institutional interaction). It seems evident that there is an inverse relation between the strictness of the conventions that are expected to be met in any given interaction-type, and the speakers freedom of emotive choice: the more ritualized the interaction is, the less apparent the choices will be that trigger emotive interpretations.

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6. Emotive contrasts Another step toward developing a unified pragmatics of emotive communication is to agree about how emotive activities are recognized and interpreted as such to begin with. What constitutes an emotively significant linguistic contrast? The way this question is answered has important implications for how we finally represent emotive contrasts as objects of analysis, and how we explain them from a systematic point of view.
6.1. Divergence

Following a line of rhetorical reasoning that goes back beyond Montesquieus (1758) Plaisirs de la surprise to Ciceros (55 B.C.) concept of praeter expectationem and Aristotles (330 ca. B.C.) concept of &poo66~qzov, and which figures prominently in studies of style shift in sociolinguistics (cf. Gumperz, 1982; Labov and Fanshel, 1977) and literary stylistics (cf. Riffaterre, 1960), we can hypothesize that emotive significance is associated mainly with features of discourse that strike interpreters as being in some sense unusual, unexpected, or surprising in the situation. The figures and tropes of classical rhetoric are essentially techniques for producing discourse patterns that diverge from the matter-offact . .. presentation of thoughts (Baily, 1981: 30).18 The notion that surprising divergence is emotively significant is very much in keeping with modem homeostatic views of language perception and cognitive appraisal. At the most reduced level, it is sometimes said, interpreters project something like hypothetical further courses of events, which are either confirmed or disconfirmed by partners subsequent behavior. Unexpected events tend automatically to call attention to themselves (cf. Sperber and Wilsons (1986) notion of relevance) by destabilizing interpreters situational assumptions (cf. Amdt and Janney, 1987: 55-63). In homeostatic terms, unexpected behavior leads to a sort of interactive destabilization, which triggers a post-destabilization reorganization of interpretive assumptions,

I7 Selting (1985: 180) defines a style shift as the alternation of one speech style with another speech style in the context of the same communicative event. s Such activities are dealt with in rhetoric under the concept of style (L. elocutio, utterance, expression; G. lexis, speech, diction, word; G. phrasis, way of speaking). The categories of classical rhetorical stylistics - (1) position, (2) repetition, (3) quantity, (4) appel, and (5) substitution, as Plett (1991: 28) says, are essentially categories of linguistic divergence: that is, categories of variational possibilities in utterances or sentences, in which different grammatically definable elements are respectively (1) rearranged, (2) repeated (3), expanded or compressed, (4) adjusted in some sense, and/or (5) replaced in order to create different persuasive emotive effects. The first four categories, usually referred to as the figures, consist mainly of variational possibilities in which words preserve what Lanham calls their ordinary meanings, but are placed in significant arrangements of some kind (1969: 116). The last category, usually referred to as the tropes, consists mainly of uses of words to suggest things other than their ordinary meanings, as in metaphor (1969: 116). Rhetorical stylistics could thus be regarded, in the present connection, as an early approach to studying techniques for producing emotively marked, surprising or divergent patterns in discourse (cf. Fraser, 1980: 349).

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and leads to fresh interpretive hypotheses based on new assumptions (cf. Janney, 1992: 470-473).19 6.2. Markedness A methodological problem that has never been fully resolved in studies of divergent uses of language (whether in rhetorical stylistics, linguistic stylistics, sociolinguistics, or modem discourse analysis), is the problem of the unmarked, neutral form: the standard of comparison against which a linguistic activity can be said to constitute an emotively significant contrast (cf. Caffi, 1992: 273-275). Assuming, with Kasher (1984: 68), that what we are looking for, from a descriptive point of view, are contrasts between linguistic alternatives that are in some sense diRerent while essentially similar, we must specify what such linguistic choices vary in relation to. Sapirs (1927: 893) solution to this problem, which has greatly influenced American functional linguists, but which also has a long, independent tradition in the Prague School concept of markedness (see section 2.4),20 was to suggest that the analysis of emotive features of discourse must begin by focusing on variations, however minimal, from what he called nuclear patterns of behavior.2 Sapir claimed that we cannot adequately represent emotive contrasts without first, in every instance, assigning some type of baseline or background to the activities in question, and then noting degrees, or positing scales, of divergence or markedness in relation to this background.22 In Sapirs view, in order for a description of an emotive contrast to represent what really matters emotively - that is, the emotively relevant variation in the perceived situation, as opposed to the individual token activity per se - a form of representation must be developed that focuses on, or somehow captures, the relaIn this connection, Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983: 93) remark that the divergent characteristics of unexpected utterances also have important implications for their semantic organization, their influence on memory, and their interactive effects. It is also worth mentioning that from a literary semiotic perspective - for example, Lotmans (1970) - an artistic text is defined as informative precisely because it surprises, escaping routines. * The typological notion of markedness was originally developed by the Prague School linguists, who first used it to assign marked and unmarked values to categories of phenomena in phonological systems (cf. Trubetzkoy, 193 l), and later used it to describe categories of morphosyntactic and semantic phenomena (cf. Jakobson, 1932). ? The notion of nuclear patterns has a long history in linguistics, which cannot be dealt with in detail here. It may be noted, however, that in prosodies, nuclear patterning has been used as a metaphor for certain core features of intonation (cf. Trager and Smith, 1949; Chomsky and Halle, 1968). In linguistic stylistics, it has been used as a logical or statistical norm for identifying so-called deviations among pre-selected linguistic features of texts (cf. Darbyshire, 1971; Akhmanova, 1976). In the Prague School tradition, it has sometimes been used as a metaphor for unmarked syntactic patterns against which distinctive features or disruptions of normal word order are identified (cf. Jakobson, 1960; Stankiewicz, 1964; Volek, 1987). And in some sociolinguistic work, it provides the unmarked, neutral baseline condition against which emotive features of speech like emphasis and intensity are said to be defined as marked for affect (cf. Labov, 1984). 22 Sapir regarded this as essentially a conventional linguistic background (1927: 893). The following discussion attempts to show that emotive contrasts can be defined in relation to contextual and cotextual backgrounds as well.

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tionship between a hypothetical nuclear pattern, and a certain range of potential choices that vary significantly in relation to this pattern, and can hence be regarded as marked choices. It is always the implicit variation against some type of anticipatory schema (cf. Atkinson and Allen, 1983) that matters emotively, he said, not the individual activity itself (Sapir, 1949: 542).23 Assuming that the recognition of emotive markedness, at the most reduced level, involves anticipatory schemata and divergent activities,24 it becomes appropriate to ask what types of anticipatory schemata are involved in the marking of emotive contrasts. The following are some potential candidates: 6.2.1. Linguistic anticipatory schemata Linguistic anticipatory schemata, we might say, consist of common assumptions about language, its vocal, kinesic, graphological, and other supporting systems, and their usual manifestations and meanings in everyday discourse. Implied here are general expectations about words and meanings, pronunciations, syntactic arrangeand syntactically/semantically appropriate ments, graphological conventions, accompanying prosodic behavior and kinesic activities. In some modem syntactically oriented approaches to emotive communication, linguistic anticipatory schemata are tacitly assumed to provide the tertium comparationis for recognizing emotively marked divergence in individual utterances or sentences independently from other contextual and cotextual factors .25For example, if we assume that a syntactic question requires a rising intonation (Is that right P), a syntactic question with a falling intonation represents a divergence (Is that right L); if we assume that in a syntactic statement, the predicate follows the subject (Id like to know what happened), a statement in which the predicate precedes the subject represents a divergence (What happened, Id like to know); if we assume that the pronunciation of good is [gud], a pronunciation like [gu: : : :d] represents a divergence, and so forth.

23 Pilot experiments with students reported in Garfinkel (1967) provide many examples of the importance of this point. In one experiment, Garfinkel sent students home with the instruction to be more polite than usual with their parents, and note the results. The students reports overwhelmingly showed that their polite behavior was interpreted in the intimate, family context, as an attack. The parents consensus responses, in cases where it did not stop, were, in this order, and with increasing intensity: (1) is something wrong?, (2) why are you doing this?, (3) youre trying to make me mad! [breaking off contact]. In these cases, it was not the polite behavior itself that caused the problem, but the divergence from the parents contextual behavioral expectations (see the discussion of contextual schemata in section 3.2.1). 24 Here, for lack of space, we will not go into the interesting motivational and attitudinal processes involved in the perception of emotive contrasts. These are discussed, however, in Amdt and Janney (1987: 63-70). 25 For example, many techniques dealt with in classical rhetorical stylistics under the term dispositio (cf. Plett, 1991), and some phenomena dealt with in modem discourse studies of foregrounding, topicalization, left/right dislocation, etc., depend indirectly on linguistic anticipatory schemata for their tertium comparationis (cf. Prince, 1981; Given, 1984; Horn, 1991). Without notions of normal syntactic patterning, that is, they could not be defined as objects of analysis. The same is true of many modem studies of emotive prosody (see Selting, this issue).

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6.2.2. Contextual anticipatory schemata Contextual anticipatory schemata, we might say, consist mainly of expectations about kinds of communicative behavior that different types of speakers or writers are likely to produce in different discourse situations. Implied here are both (1) relatively nonnegotiable global assumptions about human values, feelings, desires, motivations, interpersonal attitudes, and social affiliations in ones culture, and assumptions about how these are typically communicated in different situations;26 and (2) relatively fragile, hypothetical, predictive situational assumptions about how specific partners may be likely to act in the immediate situation (cf. Amdt and Janney, 1987: 109-l 13).27 In much sociolinguistic research, contextual anticipatory schemata are assumed to provide the tertium comparationis for recognizing instances of emotively marked divergence from expected communicative styles, strategies, or speech choices in different situations. Here, the standard of comparison is less closely connected with specific linguistic forms than with general expectations about broad patterns of linguistic behavior in different hypothesized contexts.28 For example, if we assume that parents usually call their children by first name (mother admonishing son: Johnny, stop that), a parent who does not do this tends to generate notice (John James Smith, stop that); if we assume that new employees are not usually intimate with their bosses (new employee thanking boss: Thank you, Mr. Jones), a new employee who is very informal or personal tends to generate notice (Thanks, Frank); if we assume that married partners do not talk like strangers (man asking his wife for the butter at the breakfast table: The butter), a married partner who is unexpectedly formal or polite tends to generate notice (Marge, would you mind if I asked you to pass me the butter ?); if we assume that academic advisors are there to help students (advisor, on seeing a troubled-looking student walk into the office: Can I help you?), an advisor who does not sufficiently emphasize his or her willingness to help tends to generate notice (What do you want.), and so forth. 6.2.3. Cotextual anticipatory schemata Cotextual anticipatory schemata, we might say, consist mainly of expectations about types or successions of verbal and/or nonverbal activities that are likely to occur in particular stretches of discourse, given the communicative events preceding them (cf. Prince, 1988). Here, the unit of analysis is extended discourse, and anticipatory schemata based on perceptions of prior speech activities or prior texts provide

x6 Many anthropological linguists, most recently Besnier (1990, and in this issue), have pointed out that global assumptions are highly culture-bound. Hence, any approach based on assumptions such as those described here must be especially careful about making claims to universal applicability. This has been a source of recent criticism of Brown and Levinsons (1987) theory of universals of politeness (cf. Janney and Amdt, 1993). * Situational assumptions may be based on knowledge of generalized others and how they might be expected to act in different situations (see global assumptions), or on knowledge of specific partners and their previous behavior in similar situations. 28 The lack of a direct connection to specific linguistic forms is viewed with suspicion by many conversation analysts, who sometimes tend to regard studies of these types of contrasts as methodologically questionable (see Selting, this issue).

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the tertium comparutionis for recognizing features of discourse that are emotively marked. The analysis focuses mainly on linguistic or other patterns that diverge from previously established patterns (cf. Selting, in this issue). For example, against a background of informal speech, formal speech forms a contrast; against a background of formal speech, informal speech forms a contrast; against a background of neutral, nonevaluative language, a strongly evaluative lexical choice forms a contrast; against a background of smooth, evenly accentuated speech, unexpected pauses, repetitions, unusually emphatic prosodic markers, etc. form contrasts, and so on. 4.3. Degree In addition to specifying what emotive contrasts diverge from, we must also specify how they diverge. This latter issue is complicated by the fact, pointed out by Ruesch and Bateson (195 l), Stankiewicz (1964), Watzlawick et al. (1967), and others long ago, that emotive contrasts are analogic, more/less phenomena, and require a descriptive approach based on notions of gradient relationships. The issue of gradient descriptive frameworks is discussed in passing by Labov (1984: 44), and is dealt with in detail by Brown and Levinson (1987: 85ff.) and Given (1989). The original discussion of gradient contrasts, however, goes back to Aristotles reflections on the representation of rhetorical strategies in Rhetoric (330 ca. B.C.). Aristotle recognized that different ways of expressing things often involve choices of degree rather than of type, and he emphasized, like Sapir (1927) and the Prague functionalists later, that the notion of variation presupposes some kind of standard - an assumptive steady state, which is regulated by considerations of metapragmatic appropriateness, which Latin rhetoricians called aptum and Greek rhetoricians called rrp&rov (cf. Lausberg, 1960: $1078; Mortara Garavelli, 1988: 1 15)29 - against which variations can be recognized as distinctive features, and in terms of which they can be explained as functional, goal-directed aspects of discourse (see the discussion in section 6.1). His solution to this problem was to introduce the notion of matters of degree, which he defined as follows (Rhetoric I (A), 7,1363b):
When one thing x exceeds another, y, x may be regarded as y plus something more; and the thing exceeded, y, may be regarded as that which is included in X. Also the terms greater and more are always relative to a less, while great and small, [and] much and little are relative to the average magnitude of things.

Following this line of reasoning, the contrastive significance of an emotive speech activity lies mainly in its capacity to be regarded as standing in some type of direct or indirect relation to more or less of x, where x is regarded as an implicitly neutral, unmarked midpoint on an emotive continuum such as positive/negative, near/far,
29 Classical rhetoric offers many interesting insights and solutions to problems of emotive language. Its main shortcomings are its static, taxonomic tendency, and its lack of an empirical, psychologically grounded basis. But we should not forget its lessons. An important future task would be to redefine its intuitions within an integrated approach.

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clear/vague, confident/doubtful, assertive/unassertive, or intense/unintense (see section 4). The degree of divergence in the direction of greater or less X, from this standpoint, becomes a measure of the emotive markedness of the speech activity in question.30 On the basis of this assumption, it is possible to conceive of potential ranges of emotive choice as existing on more/less scales analogous to those in Table 4.

7. Types of emotive devices In specifying phenomena that can be analyzed in a pragmatics of emotive communication, it helps to shift the focus of analysis somewhat away from propositional content, and redirect it toward what we might call the emotive identifications or global affective tonality of the units analyzed. Notions of emotive identification and affective tonality are historically related to Martys (1908) idea of emotive coloring (emotive Farbe), Ballys (1909) idea of evocative effects (e#ets par evocation), and Buhlers (1934) idea of communicative valence (kommunikative Valenz). Common to all these ideas is the classical rhetorical notion that uses of language are capable of coloring, or casting a type of emotive valence, over situations that evokes different moods in partners (cf. Marty, 1908: 525), and influences their feelings and behavior (cf. Biihler, 1934: 31). Bally characterized this as the ambient, relational, affective impression indirectly evoked by the utterance in the social and interpersonal context in which it is produced (1909, I: 221). Following these writers, we might hypothesize that the phenomena to be investigated in a pragmatics of emotive communication are those related to the evocative effects of the units analyzed. In keeping with present terminology, we could think of these broadly as emotive framing devices, indices, or markers. Six broad ranges of devices would seem to qualify as likely candidates for analysis: (1) evaluation devices, (2) proximity devices, (3) specificity devices, (4) evidential@ devices, (5) volitionality devices, and (6) quantity devices. 7.1. Evaluation devices [central distinction: positive/negative] This category potentially includes all types of verbal and nonverbal choices that suggest an inferrable positive or negative evaluative stance on the part of the speaker with respect to a topic, part of a topic, a partner, or partners in discourse. Currently often studied in work on morphological word-formation devices (cf. Volek, 1987;

3 Labov (1984) employs a similar line of reasoning as underpinning for the descriptions used in his analysis of intensity markers in American black city street-talk: Intensity operates on a scale centered about the zero, or unmarked expression, with both positive (aggravated or intensified) and negative (mitigated or minimized) poles. A feature notation with [+/-I intensity is therefore not appropriate. Instead, 1 will refer to position on an ordinal scale where features marked for intensity raise an expression to a value greater than zero, and those marked for deintensification lower expressions to values less than zero (1984: 44).

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Table 4 Token features, emotive categories, and degrees of emotive markedness Token feature Emotive category Less +-------_---------------______-f [context: buying a watermelon] This ones better This ones good More

Morphological choices

Evaluation (positive)

This ones best

Lexical substitutions

Evaluation (negative)

[context: describing a politician] Hes conservative Hes reactionary

Hes fascistic

Terms of address

Proximity (social)

[context: introducing someone] Id like you to Id like you to meet Dr. Jones meet Robert Jones [context: commenting on a proposal] The idea is That idea is interesting interesting

Id like you to meet Bob

Choices of determiners

Proximity (spatial)

This idea is interesting

Choices of verb tense/aspect

Proximity (temporal)

[context: asking someone who has just visited an ill acquaintance about the condition of the acquaintance] How did she feel? How does she feel? How is she feeling?

Choices of pronouns

Specificity

[context: asking for help in a group] Can anyone help Can someone help me? me?

Can you help me? [said to a specific person]

Choices of modal verbs

Modality (confidence)

[context: responding to a request for an opinion] I hope it will turn I think it will turn I know it will turn out well out well out well [context: suggesting its time to leave] Do you think its Should we leave time to leave? now? [context: commenting on a new dress] Its nice Its ni:ce [context: calling the dog] come come

Choices of agent/ object status

Volitionality (self-assertiveness)

I want to leave now

Sound duration

Quantity

Its ni: :ce

Prosodic stress

Quantity

COME!

Lexical repetition

Quantity

[context: replying to a repeated request] OK, Ill do it OK OK, Ill do it OK OK OK, Ill do it!

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Dressler and Merlini Barbaresi, 1994), the emotional lexicon (cf. Lutz, 1982; Jefferson, 1984), lexical substitutions, and so forth, it potentially includes all discourse activities that can be interpreted as indices of pleasure or displeasure, agreement or disagreement, like or dislike, and so forth, e.g.: smiling vs. frowning facial expressions, friendly vs. hostile voice qualities, choices of emotion terms, evaluative vocatives, diminutives, gradable evaluative adjectives, evaluative predicative adjectives, antonymic adjective pairs, valence verbs, evaluative viewpoint adverbs, adverbs of manner, and various types of stylistic substitutions. 7.2. Proximity devices [central distinction:

nearlfar]

This category potentially includes all types of verbal and nonverbal choices that vary metaphorical distances between speakers and topics, topics and partners, and/or speakers and partners in discourse space or time (cf. Levinson, 1983: 54ff.) (see also section 8.3). Proximity is essentially a subjectively experienced spatiotemporal dimension of linguistic emotive experience. One reason for varying distances in discourse, it is sometimes said, is to identify with (approach) or mitigate (avoid) the potential effects of expressed messages (cf. Fraser, 1980; Haverkate, 1992). Proximity phenomena are generally discussed in connection with notions of deixis: e.g., person deixis, place deixis, time deixis, social deixis, emphatic deixis, and so forth (cf. Fillmore, 1975; Lyons, 1977: 667ff.; Levinson, 1983: 54ff.; Haverkate, 1992). The main categories of proximity phenomena are: (1) spatial proximity markers, which regulate metaphorical distances between inner and outer events (demonstratives: This/That is a good idea), or between events near at hand versus events at a distance (See here/there!); (2) temporal proximity markers, which regulate metaphorical distances between now and then events (present vs. other tenses: I am/was very sorry I said it), or between immediate and nonimmediate events (simple vs. progressive aspect: How are you doing/do you do); (3) social proximity markers, which regulate metaphorical social or interpersonal distances (terms of address: Id like you to meet Bob/Dr. Robert Adams); and (4) selective order proximity markers (often discussed in the literature under terms such as order of reference, foregrounding, topicalization, given vs. new information, left/right dislocation, etc.), which regulate distances between concepts in discourse, e.g.: initial referent versus subsequent referents (Judy was there, and Tom and Janet), agent status versus object status (Steffi beat Martina vs. Martina lost to Steffi), adjacent referents versus nonadjacent referents, active versus passive constructions, etc. (cf. Li, 1976; Li and Thompson, 1976; Gundel, 1977; Hopper, 1979; Given, 1984; Prince, 1981, 1988; Horn, 1991). We will return to this important category of emotive devices in section 8. 7.3. Specificity devices [central distinction:

clearhague]

This category potentially includes all choices of words, parts of speech, word organization patterns, conversational techniques, and/or discourse strategies that vary the inferred particularity, clarity, or pointedness of references to topics, parts

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of topics, the speakers self, or partners in discourse. It also includes choices that focus more narrowly or broadly on referents. Specificity can be regarded here as the extent to which a conceptualized object of communication is referred to directly by name, so to speak, as opposed to only implied, suggested, alluded to, generalized, genericized, or otherwise hedged or indirectly hinted at. Specificity phenomena include choices of particular versus generic referents (e.g., definite vs. indefinite articles: I left my/a book in your office), whole referents versus parts of referents (e.g., The dinner/salad was great), ones self versus hedged selves (e.g., I/One doubt[s] if thats right), particular vs. habitual actions (viewpoint adverbs: I [generally] agree with that), particularized others versus generalized others (definite vs. indefinite pronouns: Can you/someone help me?), particular vs. general reference (e.g., I like that/things like that), and various rhetorical brevity, amplification, and substitution techniques. 7.4. Evidential@ devices [central distinction: confidentldoubtjiil] This category potentially includes all choices that regulate the inferrable reliability, correctness, authority, validity, or truth value of what is expressed (cf. Chafe and Nichols, 1986). It is one of the most ideationally oriented emotive categories, which explains why it has been given relatively much attention in linguistics in comparison with some other categories of emotive phenomena. The uses of evidentiality devices that are of main interest in an emotive approach are those that suggest attitudes of confidence or doubtfulness with respect to expressed information (e.g., judgement: That is/might be right) or intentions (e.g., prediction: I will/could come tomorrow). Often discussed in the literature under notions of hedging (G. Lakoff, 1972; Brown and Levinson, 1987), commitment to the proposition (Lyons, 1977; Schiffrin, 1987), evidentiality (Chafe, 1986; Biber and Finegan, 1989; Haviland, 1989), and identification with the topic (Tannen, 1989), this category includes various epistemic modality phenomena: uses of evidential modal auxiliaries (may/might), objective vs. subjective epistemic verbs (know/believe), linking verbs (is/seems), parenthetical verbs, and modal adverbs (obviously/possibly). It encompasses signs of certainty vs. doubt, things known vs. things thought, and things that are vs. things that seem. Modality can also be inferred from kinesic activities (shoulder shrugs, puzzled or doubtful facial expressions), from intonation (fallingrising pitch curves), and from various types of extended discourse strategies. 7.5. Volitionality devices [central distinction: self-assertive vs. unassertive] This category potentially includes all speech choices, sentence framing techniques, and discourse strategies used to vary levels of inferred self-identification or self-assertiveness vis-a-vis partners, and all choices used to cast selves or partners in active versus passive discourse roles. The study of interpersonal volitionality phenomena is one of the central pursuits of modern Western politeness research (cf. Blum-Kulka, 1987; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Janney and Arndt, 1993). Selfassertiveness is indexed in discourse, for example, by choices of self vs. other pro-

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noun agents (I/do you want to leave), active vs. passive voice (I/it was decided that we wont go), declarative vs. interrogative vs. imperative mood (I want/can I have/give me the book), and assertive negation (Youre not going), and by some forms of inversion (Right you are/youre right), self-oriented appellative techniques (Did I agree? No, I said I might agree) and partner-oriented appellative techniques (Youll think Im crazy, but I said yes). 7.6.
Quantity

devices [central distinction morelless]

This category potentially includes all intensifying and deintensifying speech choices (cf. Labov, 1984): that is, all choices of quantity, degree, measure, duration, or amount of a given speech phenomenon. Following Volek (1987), quantity can be of almost any imaginable kind: intensity of activity, length of performance, quantity of an object, intensity of an adverb. Quantity phenomena include phonological elongations (Its huge/hu:ge/hu: :ge), unexpected prosodic stress or loudness (Im not/NOT excited), uses of interrogative pronouns as intensifiers (What a day!), emphasizing adjectives (It was a real/complete/total catastrophe), adverbs of degree (Im hardly/very/ absolutely happy about it), and stylistic choices such as repetition (Were happy, really happy, that you came) and intensifying appellative techniques (NO! Did she really say that?). 7.7. Analytical approaches: Some basic distinctions In order to develop a unified, systematic investigation those listed above, we need some basic distinctions approaches. Some potentially useful distinctions between tives, units, and loci of analysis are summarized in the simplified form. of emotive devices such as about possible analytical different possible perspecfollowing paragraphs in a

7.7.1. Perspective of analysis Emotive communication, we might say, can be studied from two different general perspectives : (1) as a process: from this perspective, emotive communication is viewed as an interactive achievement (cf. Selting, 1989, and this issue), and the use of emotive devices in conversation is considered a crucial parameter in assessing different types and/or degrees of emotive involvement in interaction. From this perspective, which is eminently dialogical, the significance of emotive signals is regarded as a matter of negotiation between the participants. (2) as a product: from this perspective, discourse, text, or interaction are viewed as givens, or as data. When this perspective is adopted, the emotive profile of discourse appears as a quality, and typically becomes of interest for stylistics. We could call the former perspective dynamic, and the latter static: the former perspective deals with discourse as an ongoing process, and the latter deals with it as an outcome or a result; the former, we could say, deals with tnonciations, the latter with enonces.An example of the difference between the two perspectives is perhaps

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that between the rhetorical notion of emphasis and Seltings (this issue) notion of emphatic speech style. 7.7.2. Units of analysis It is useful to keep the problem of perspectives of analysis distinct from the problem of units of analysis. Possible units of emotive analysis could be, for example, the utterance, the speech-act, the turn, the stretch of discourse, the text, and so forth. While shorter units of analysis (utterance, speech-act) might seem to be better approached from a static perspective, and longer ones (turn, discourse, text) might seem to be better approached from a dynamic perspective, this must not necessarily be the case. In fact, emotive phenomena at the utterance level can be studied as belonging to dynamic, interactional processes, and conversely, phenomena at the discourse level can be studied as static data, givens, or results. The choice of the unit of analysis is obviously linked to a different theoretical framework. At any rate, depending on which type of unit is selected as relevant to study, the analysis of emotive phenomena will tend to be centered at either the micro- or macro-level; and it should be mentioned that there are also various emotive devices between the microand macro-levels: for example, cohesion phenomena such as empathetic anaphora (cf. Conte, 1993). 7.7.3. Loci of analysis The study of emotive devices must further focus on .units of analysis in relation to specific loci of emotive communication. In current research, emotive communication is interpreted as having mainly the following loci, any of which could serve as a starting point for pragmatic analysis (see also section 8): (1) the speaker: e.g., in studies of formal phenomena such as emphatic particles (just, really) and distancing devices (indirect speech acts, agentless passive, modal verbs, hedging), and in studies of content-related phenomena such as egofocused discourse, self-disclosures, references to personal experiences and feelings, etc.; (2) the addressee: e.g., in studies of mitigating strategies, supportive moves (preventive and therapeutic), backchannels, and so forth; (3) the content: e.g., in studies, at the local utterance level, of marked lexemes, word-order, attitudinal operators on propositional content (evidentials, modal adverbs, evaluative expressions), etc., and in studies, at the global discourse level, of phenomena related to textual construction, such as anaphora, thematic organization, topic repetition, topic shifts, digressions, code-switching, etc.: (4) discourse management: e.g., in studies of quantitative phenomena such as the number of turns held; and in studies of qualitative phenomena such as interruptions, overlaps, hesitation phenomena, silences, etc. It should be noted that choice of the locus of analysis is not essentially a matter of exclusion, but a matter of creating a focused object. The use of the first person pronoun can, for example, from a stylistic standpoint, be analyzed with respect to different loci, e.g., the speaker, the addressee, the text.

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7.7.4. Form and content There is also one final analytical distinction that crosscuts the three distinctions just mentioned: this is the distinction between form and content. In the same, oversimplified fashion as above, we can add that emotive choices can be analyzed from either a formal viewpoint (e.g., repetitions, rhetorical devices, etc.) or a contenutistic one (e.g., disclosures, personal topics, sudden digressions, topic changes, etc.). This distinction, incidentally, is paralleled in rhetoric by the distinction between figures of speech and figures of thought.

8. Objects and objectives of emotive choices In the previous section, seven broad categories of linguistic devices which have a bearing on emotive communication were listed; and others might have been mentioned. It is easy to see that these devices cover a wide range of heterogeneous phenomena, all of which are in need of pragmatic investigation which clarifies their roles in emotive communication, and which takes the different perspectives, units, and loci of analysis referred to in section 7.7 into account. In order to start devising a systematic interpretive account of emotivity in language (as opposed to simply a description of isolated emotive contrasts), it is necessary to posit objects of emotive choice. Emotive choices cannot be analyzed without reference to their inferred objects and objectives. Actually, the very fact that they have objects and objectives is what distinguished them conceptually from spontaneous, cathartic emotional displays (see Martys Entladung, section 2.2), and it is precisely this that makes the analysis of their different forms and strategic functions in speech relevant from a pragmatic point of view. 8.1. The discourse triad again: Biihlers objects As said earlier, Btihlers Organon Model of language functions provides a means of identifying three broad ranges of potential objects of emotive choice: the speaker, the hearer, and the content. Following Btihler, these three elements may be regarded as constitutive of discourse. The loci of emotive communication inductively distinguished in section 7.7.3 can be redefined at a more abstract level within such a model, and it is possible to connect different types of emotive devices with them. 8.1 .l. Emotive choices and foregrounded discourse relations For each category of emotive devices listed in section 7, an abstract representation can be imagined, in which each of Btihlers three constitutive elements stands in a different relation with respect to the other two, according to the privileged direction of the relation at issue: i.e., according to which combination of elements is foregrounded or backgrounded. This makes it possible to distinguish different discourserelational Gestalten. For example, in connection with evaluation, specificity, and evidentiality markers, the speaker-content relation tends to be foregrounded, while the speaker-partner relation tends to be backgrounded. In connection with volition-

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ality markers, the speaker-hearer relation tends to be backgrounded. Quantity devices tend to crosscut the other categories, being related to expressive choices, which are directed toward an intensification whose scope can include different aspects of the speech act: the propositional content, the illocutionary force, or the act of utterance itself. Finally, and significantly, proximity markers can signal distance with respect either to what is said or to the addressee. Hence, in connection with proximity markers, both the speaker-content relation and the speaker-hearer relation can be foregrounded. 8.1.2. Emotive choices and foregrounded loci of interest The focus of emotive choices can also be seen from the viewpoint of which needs and requirements of which of Buhlers constitutive elements implicitly stand in the foreground. This concept can be extended to characterize different general emotive communicative styles (cf. Bartsch, 1991a,b), in which content-related emotive choices are seen mainly as reflecting the needs or requirement of the foregrounded locus of interest: the speakers, the hearers, or that of the content itself. Emotive choices, that is, can be predominantly speaker-centered, hearer-centered, or contentcentered: (i) speaker-centered: In speaker-centered discourse, the speakers (real or projected) personal feelings, attitudes, or desires stand implicitly in the foreground, and the speaker tends to determine the emotive profiles of communicative events. Here, the relevant strategies involve emotive self-disclosures (emotive Kundgabe), or the intentional declaring or making known of personal affective information for different purposes (cf. Kainz, 1941: 188; Fiehler, 1990). The topics chosen tend to be of immediate interest or importance to the speaker, who places her- or himself clearly in the actor role. Some related linguistic and rhetorical phenomena are autobiographical narratives, self-disclosures, and different kinds of emphasis. (ii) hearer-centered: In hearer-centered discourse, the partners well-being stands implicitly in the foreground, and the partners inferred needs or requirements tend to determine the emotive profiles of communicative events. The relevant strategies here, from the speakers standpoint, mainly involve displays of low assertiveness, and displays of positive evaluation of the partner and/or of topics or parts of topics inferred to be positively evaluated by the partner; also, proximity strategies are used that place the partner in the actor role and in close connection to positively evaluated topics. Some related linguistic and rhetorical phenomena include feedback requests, supportive back-channel activity, floor-yielding, positive face-saving techniques, mitigating strategies, and attuning strategies. (iii) content-centered: In content-centered discourse, content requirements stand implicitly in the foreground, and the topic tends to determine the course of conversational events and the selection of register. The relevant emotive strategies here are mainly transactional, and are focused on the anticipated reactions of the partner to the content expressed; the partners anticipated reactions influence the local and global thematic and argumentative structure of the speakers discourse. Some related linguistic and rhetorical phenomena include choices of content organization and presentation (e.g., backgrounding/foregrounding, theme/rheme progression, etc.),

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choices of types of argumentation (e.g., use of examples, narratives, reported speech), shifts in formality, and, at a micro-level, choices of evaluation, specificity, and evidentiality markers, etc. It may be observed that the distinctions above potentially supply criteria for individuating text types, and could conceivably be used in text-typology research (cf. Schroder, 1991) to take emotive features beyond Jakobsons original functions into account. In some cases, emotive features alone might suffice to individuate certain types of texts. For instance, the general emotive profile of category (1) could perhaps be used to characterize narcissistic texts, e.g., confessions, preliminary phases of doctor-patient interactions, memoirs, diaries, etc.; the emotive profile of category (2) might help characterize altruistic-supportive texts, e.g., certain therapeutic interactions, interviews, consultations, etc.; and the emotive profile of category (3) may help to characterize certain types of persuasive and/or informational-scientific texts. It may also be observed that within a given text-type - e.g., a scientific text some parts or sections, codified in rhetorical stylistic tradition, typically focus on different loci. For example, in scientific texts, there tend to be speaker-centered parts, e.g. opening declarations of aims, goals, desires, and various kinds of captatio benevolentiae; and hearer-centered parts, e.g., closing statements expressing hopes, reliance on hearer-reader benevolence, and so forth. Even in texts where emotive strategies are perhaps not usually expected, such as in scientific texts, there are conventional ways of conciliating la voix des faits et la voix du ccw- (cf. Caffi, 1991), enhancing impressions of scientific detachment, while at the same time meeting personal needs for self-expression and self-promotion. The voices of scientific expression vary across disciplines and cultures.3 8.2. tmmedicacy: Wiener and Mehrabians objects

Interpretations of most of the categories of emotive devices listed in section 7 have already been studied in a systematic, empirical fashion by two American social psychologists, Albert Wiener and Morton Mehrabian. Their stimulating book Language Within Language: Immediacy, a Channel in Verbal Communication (1968) represents an interesting exception to the trend of much social psychological research during the 1960s and the early 1970s, which concentrated on emotive communication mainly in nonverbal channels. 32 Wiener and Mehrabian define their

3 It might be noted in passing that in Jakobsons definition of the expressive-emotive function, as well as in Mathesius definition of emphasis (see section 2.4). emotive choices are viewed as being centered around Satzinhalt, and are equated with speakers attitudes toward what they are speaking about. Emotive choices in these classic functionalist models, that is, are mainly content-centered. 32 Another exception to this trend was the famous work of Roger Brown and his colleagues in the early 1960s (e.g., Brown and Gilman, 1960, on pronouns of solidarity; Brown and Ford, 1961, on forms of address, etc.). But nevertheless, as Amdt and Janney (1987) point out, an adequate account of emotive communication needs to pay equal attention to verbal, nonverbal vocal, and kinesic aspects of conversation. Verbal and nonverbal features of speech complement, and more importantly, often modi

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central notion of immediacy as the relationship between the speaker and the objects he communicates about, the addressee of his communication, or the communication itself (1968: 3). Their main concern is the analysis of verbal forms which reflect changes in the degree of separation or nonidentity of a speaker with respect to these three objects (1968: 23). In Wiener and Mehrabians experiments, variations in verbal degrees of separation between speakers and objects were associated by untrained raters in experimental groups with positive and negative affect. A high consensus scoring of different degrees of verbal immediacy was obtained by these raters. In the experiments, immediacy was basically studied ex-negative: that is, what raters actually detected and measured were nonimmediate communications. In Wiener and Mehrabians approach, the term nonimmediacy refers to any indication of separation, nonidentity, attenuation of directness, or change in intensity of interaction among the communicator, the addressee, the object of communication, or the communication (1968: 32). The primary nonimmediacy categories are the following: (1) spatiotempot-al categories, e.g., demonstratives, adverbials denoting spatial distance, uses of tenses where the relation between interactants is temporally displaced either into the past or into the future; (2) denotative specificity categories, e.g., over-inclusive reference (A: How was the party? B: Everything was wonderful ! ); (3) agentaction-object categories, e.g., the passivity category for instances in which the subject or the object or both are literally stated as being acted upon or driven to act by external forces (1968: 93); and finally, a category which the authors label (4) qualification and objectification, which includes mainly uses of modal adverbs and modal operators by which, according to the authors, the communicator, through his qualification, indicates the possibility that his statements may not be consensually shared (1968: 94). Although Wiener and Mehrabian did not use their designated objects (topic, addressee, communication) to distinguish systematically between their linguistic examples, it is important in the present connection to stress the high degree of fit between their categories of nonimmediacy phenomena and the categories of emotive devices listed in section 7.33 Wiener and Mehrabians experimental findings clearly suggest that (non)immediate linguistic choices are one important basis, at least, from which addressees begin making interpretive inferences about communicators affective experience. Emotive choices are learned, but not taught explicitly; nevertheless, as Wiener and Mehrabian show, they are ... responded to consistently by the members of a group (1968: 28). This strongly supports the hypothesis, expressed at the beginning of the paper (see section l.l), that speakers are endowed with a highly

each others effects, leading to complex interpretive inferences. This fact deserves more attention in pragmatics. 33 It may be noted that Wiener and Mehrabians spatio-temporal category is partly similar to the proximity category discussed in section 7, their denotative specificity category is partly similar to the specificity category, their agent-action-object category is partly similar to the vofitionality category, and their qualification and objectification category is partly similar to the evidentiality category. Wiener and Mehrabians categories, however, do not correspond with these others on all counts.

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refined, expressive and interpretive emotive capacity that needs to be accounted for in pragmatics.34 Wiener and Mehrabians work is an important contribution to the experimental, empirical clarification of how linguistic choices are interpreted systematically from an emotive point of view. 8.3. The deictic triad From the preceding remarks, and from the earlier discussion, it seems that distances in general, in the broadest sense, are of considerable importance in emotive communication. Now, before concluding the paper, we would like to consider the implications of this observation a bit more closely. Linguistically, as we said, distance seems to be regulated by different kinds of deictic proximity devices, or near/far markers (see section 7.2), which are all related in some way or other to what might be regarded as the egocentric orientation of the act of utterance. The proximity category hence appears to be basic, inasmuch as it constitutes a sort of bridging category between indexicality and emotivity. That is, speakers near/far attitudes are inferred on the basis of their choices of particular deictic references. 8.3.1. Outer versus inner deixis Let us dwell a bit on the zero-point of the deictic reference in such cases. In every act of utterance, according to Btihler (1934), the speaker is the deictic origo, or the deictic source of the system of spatiotemporal coordinates called into being by the utterance. Biihler calls this system the Zeigfeld, adding that the Zeigfeld can either be the real perceptual space shared by the partners, or an imagined perceptual space. The same chrono- or topodeictic cues can be used to make reference to a real Zeigfeld (e.g., Its here in the drawer) or to an imagined Zeigfeld (e.g., Here you will turn to the left). The former phenomenon is Btihlers demonstratio ad oculos; the latter phenomenon is Biihlers Deixis am Phantasma, where the speaker tacitly guides the hearers imagination (Phantasiesteuerung) (cf. Conte, 1988), in a sense inviting the hearer to join him or her, through an act of conceptual transposition (Versetzung), in an imagined space. It could be hypothesized that, in addition to Biihlers classic phantasmatic deixis, which evokes an intersubjectively shared, imagined, external world or outer space, there is a second kind of phantasmatic transposition: this is the Versetzung from different metaphorical places in what we might call inner space, where the speakers self or position within his or her own inner affective world becomes the deictic origo, the zero point of the act of reference, and objects of emotive communication are represented as being nearer to, or farther from, the speaker in this inner world. Versetzungen toward or away from the self in inner affective space (ones feelings, fantasies, attitudes, wishes, etc.) are sometimes implied by emotive uses of demonstratives. For instance, if a speaker uses an utterance like Those people who say X
34 It is worth noticing, incidentally, that Wiener and Mehrabian speak of variations, which is a more objectively detectable concept than the notion of choices, and one which fits very well into the interpretive category of emotive cotextual contrasts introduced in section 6.

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to refer to people in the same room, there is potentially a discrepancy between the outer and the inner Zeigfeld: that is, what is near outwardly (the people physically in the room with the speaker who say x), seems to be far away inwardly (those people). If the hearer is to interpret such an utterance correctly, he or she must infer, for example, that: (1) a metaphorical Verserzung from the speakers and hearers shared outer world to the speakers private inner world has occurred; (2) the zero point of deictic reference is now in the speakers emotional space; and (3) some type of complementary symmetrical Versetzung on the hearers part is necessary if she or he wishes to keep attuned with the speaker and correctly understand the speakers utterance. From such examples, we can conclude that the so-called inner world is not only something that we typically refer to in self-disclosures, when we explicitly talk about our feelings or attitudes; it can also be the deictic frame from which we refer to objects in a shared communicative setting. Throughout this paper, emotive devices have been associated indirectly with attitudes. One of the basic action tendencies connected with positive and negative attitudes, and the starting point of much emotive communication, is the tendency to approach or withdraw from attitudinal objects: the tendency, in other words, to establish emotive operating distances (nearer/farther) with respect to things. We are now in a position to make Frijdas (1982: 112) statement about peoples capacity to perceive each others approaching or withdrawing gestures (quoted in section 1.1.3) more precise. From a linguistic standpoint, establishing distance seems to be logically and chronologically prior to all other emotive activities. Before we can evaluate things, commit ourselves to things in different ways, or become more or less assertive with respect to things, that is, we must first point them out; and in this initial act of pointing to things, we plot our metaphorical positions or distances with respect to them. In this sense, proximity devices are fundamental features of emotive communication: they enable us to shift the deictic origo of utterances from points in outer perceptual space to points in inner subjective space, and they allow us to express subtle variations of inner distance with respect to our topics, our partners, and our own acts of communication. As said above, the linguistic devices (i.e., chrono- and topo-deictics) for outer and inner deixis - the latter of which is sometimes referred to as empathetic deixis (cf. Lyons, 1977: 677), emotional deixis (cf. R. Lakoff, 1974), or impure deixis (cf. Lyons, 1981: 232ff.) - are the same. This suggests that there is a certain isomorphism between the outer Zeigfeld and the inner Zeigfeld: a parallelism, that is, in the structuration of the intersubjectively shared external world of social processes, and the subjective internal world of individual affective processes, which can also be partly shared by partners in linguistic interaction. While the sharing is almost a given in the former case, it seems to be a product of highly complex, empathic inferential processes in the latter.35

3s We are not sure if the nature of the shift between the so-called primary meanings of deictic expressions, e.g., locatives and demonstratives, and their derived, so-called symbolic meanings is metaphorical, as is usually said. It could be argued that this shift is actually metonymic, since it is of the part

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8.3.2. Indexicality, egocentricity, and expressions of affect So far, the relation between indexicality, egocentricity, and expressions of affect has not been fully clarified. Here it might suffice to recall that, according to Btihler (1934), the deictic center of an utterance act comprises three elements: the ego-hicnunc. These are the I-here-now coordinates of the utterance (cf. also Rommetveit, 1974; Kamio, 1994). Many of Wiener and Mehrabians (1968) data (see section 8.2) tend to cluster about this deictic triad. Wiener and Mehrabians findings, as well as the findings of further research,36 seem to confirm that linguistic choices related to a non ego, lzon hit, or lzon lzu~lcperspective in an utterance (that is, a non-I, non-here, or non-now perspective) are systematically interpreted as signs of distance, nonimmediacy, or nonidentity: in other words, as signs of some type of withdrawal or separation of the self from the attitudinal object of communication. Non ego choices often involve impersonal constructions, passive or generic references, uses of the inclusive we, instances of hedging, and uses of modal adverbs that serve distancing functions. Non hit choices, on the other hand, tend to involve different kinds of indirect constructions and displacements, e.g., narratives of affective experience instead of direct expressions of affect, reported speech whose implicit message is this has not happend to me, but to others, and so forth. And non nunc choices, finally, tend to involve, for example, choices of the past tense, or the polite past tense (as in the Italian imperfetto), and hypothetical constructions that shift events into the future. The main recurrent features of all these emotive strategies are: (1) self de-responsabilization (as in the use of evidentiality markers to suggest uncertainty), (2) de-emphasis on the speaker or hearer as agents in connection with negatively evaluated things, events, or concepts, and (3) distance or vagueness with respect to either the content or the addressee of the utterance (via markers of low proximity, low specificity, and/or low volitionality).

9. Conclusions and implications At the beginning of this paper, we mentioned the lack of coordination in present research on language and affect, and suggested that it is perhaps now time for linguists to begin cooperating in developing a more unified pragmatic approach to emotive communication (see section 1). The conceptual foundations of a pragmatics of emotive communication, we suggested, can be reconstructed from earlier contributions of scholars such as Aristotle (330 ca. B.C.) in rhetoric, Marty (1908) in the philosophy of language, Bally (1909) in linguistic stylistics, Sapir (1927), the Prague Circle linguists (1929), Btihler (1934), and others in linguistics, Osgood et al. (1957)

instead of the whole type (pars pro toto); and Mohamed and the mountain, after all, to use Btihlers famous metaphor, are in these cases (different parts of) the same person. 36 Haverkate (1992) also uses the deictic origo of the utterance as the starting point for an explanation of mitigating strategies (cf. Fraser, 1980), although he does not quote Btihler. We share the point that choices related to the ego-hit-nunc can be strategically employed for mitigation purposes, but we do not think that a full account of the nature of these uses has yet been provided in pragmatics.

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in psycholinguistics, Watzlawick et al. (1967) in interactional psychology, Wiener and Mehrabian (1968) in social psychology, and many others. Regarded from a historical point of view, it seems that present interest in language and affect is not simply another emerging linguistic fad, but a natural extension of a long line of rhetorical, stylistic, and functional linguistic inquiry that has in fact never stopped, although it has sometimes been regarded by linguists interested in other aspects of language as rather outside the scope of the discipline. We suggested that the task of developing a unified pragmatics of emotive communication poses a number of interesting and challenging problems for future research. The issue of what emotive signs are indices of, and how they operate as substitutes for what they stand for, needs to be dealt with in more detail (see section 3). Notions of emotive contrasts need to be further clarified (e.g., contrasts like positive/negative, near/far, clear/vague, confident/doubtful, self-assertive/unassertive, more/less intense, etc.) (see section 4), and a more adequate account of emotive marking is required, which specifies what emotive contrasts diverge with respect to, how they diverge, and what types of anticipatory schemata (e.g., linguistic, contextual, cotextual, etc.) are involved in recognizing and interpreting them. Also, techniques for representing emotive contrasts need to be refined, so that the relevant contrasts can be dealt with more systematically in future analyses (see section 6). With respect to the coordination of analytical approaches, we suggested that the issue of the many currently competing emotive categories in linguistics needs to be resolved, so that investigators can start focusing on, and comparing findings about, the same types of phenomena from a unified point of view (see section 4). In this connection, the status of the notion of involvement especially seems to require more thought; if this term is to be employed in the future in an analytically useful way, investigators will have to start agreeing about how to conceptualize it and how to define the linguistic units pertinent to investigating it (see section 5). These issues naturally go hand in hand with the problem of isolating categories of emotive devices for investigation (e.g. evaluation devices, proximity devices, specificity devices, evidentiality devices, volitionality devices, quantity devices, etc.). Also, clearer distinctions between analytical approaches seem to be needed, including definitions of potentially relevant perspectives (e.g., process oriented vs. product oriented), units (e.g., utterance, speech-act, turn, discourse, text), and loci of analysis (e.g., speaker, addressee, content, discourse management) (see section 7). And finally, in order to develop systematic interpretive accounts of emotive communication, we will need to have clearer concepts about the possible objects and objectives of emotive choices in speech and writing (see section 8). From this sketchy list of problems for further research, it appears that much indeed could be done if linguists were interested in developing a more unified approach to emotive communication. The underlying implication of our discussion has been that the impetus for a more unified approach could possibly come from a pragmatics of emotive communication focused on two interfaces that seem of central relevance in explaining the emotive capacity: first, the interface between ideational and relational aspects of emotive choices (the what/how interface); and second, the interface between subjective and

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intersubjective aspects of emotive choices (the intrapersonal/interpersonal interface). The first perspective would connect the approach broadly with rhetoric and stylistics, and could be useful in developing more adequate descriptive accounts of emotive choices per se; and the second perspective would connect the approach broadly with psychological and social interactional research, and could be useful in developing more adequate interpretive accounts of emotive choices in different communicative contexts. It seems to us that a major goal of future pragmatic research on emotive communication will be to show that there are systematic, empirically grounded correlations between emotive devices (as described from the former standpoint) and their interpretations in different situations (as analyzed from the latter standpoint) that should not be taken for granted. Reaching this goal, we feel, will require a unified, coordinated interdisciplinary effort. We hope that the proposals advanced in this paper will help encourage further discussion about how this effort might best continue.

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