25.

Some samples of such exploitation are given below:-

(a) Exploitation of media by coercion e.g. repeated attacks on 'Punjab Kesri' in
Chandigarh and attacks on media-persons in Kashmir including Lassa Kaul of Door
Darshan and Yusuf Jameel of BBC.
(b) Use of media by militants to ensure that government negotiators are under
pressure to keep promises.
(c) Active collusion between media and militants. Reporters and photographers of
'Dee Spiegel' are known to have accompanied members of a Baader-Meinhaf gang in
an attack.
(d) Exploiting the insatiable appetite of journalists for 'scoops' and 'exclusives' leading
to indiscretions on their part e.g. clandes- tine press conferences have become
common.
Media Manaaement by Security Forces
26. Having seen the profound impact of media on almost all aspects of
low intensity conflicts the imperative of effective media management by
the security forces needs no emphasis, However it would be na'ive and
disastrous to mistake 'media management' for 'news management' and
attempt the later.
27. Access and Freedom. Maximum possible access to the operations of security
forces should be provided to the media to derive the full benefit. The media should be
free to report what they see subject only to constraints of ensuring operational security
and troop safety.
28. Selection of Media. Media should be selected with care to cover operations
keeping in mind their circulation, class of audience and credibility, Regional and
vernacular media should not be overlooked.
29. Controls over Media. Certain minimal controls over media are inescapable,
particularly to ensure operational security and troop safety. However there should be
no restrictions on factual reporting even of
incidents of failures of security forces. Controlled media may be a tempt- ing option
for the much harasses security forces but it suffers from a number of serious
drawbacks, such as:- .


(a) It is against the democratic principles of 'freedom of expression' and 'citizen's right
to know'.
(b) Loss of credibility of media.
(c) Leads to exaggerated rumours.
(d) Imposition of controls conveys an image of exaggerated strength of militants and a
panic reaction of the government.
(e) The void created by controlled media is filled up by foreign media, which is also
equally accessible.
(f) Indifferent coverage of terrorist's acts by the controlled media may lead to a raise
in the level of terrorism to attract media attention.
30. Self Restraint. Voluntary self restraint by the media ensuring that their social
obligations and responsibility override their professional zeal and rivalry is a better
option. Exercising due restraint in comments, analysis and presentation of news
coupled i with a marginal coverage of terrorist acts is the ideal.
Peace time reportina of Military matters bv Media
31. With the advent of English and Regional news channels, very few people see
these foreign TV channels as their TRP ratings would testify. Because the Press is
fragmented, competitive, and sometimes ignorant of military realities and constantly
caught between the demands of the market and those of journal1stic ethics, the quality
of coverage of military events is inevitably uneven at best. Today, the situation is
aggravated by the fact that newsrooms are no longer "old-boys networks," inclined to
accept some of the military's more traditional ways as part of the journalistic
landscape. The tendency of unprepared reporters, charging from crisis to crisis,
unaware of the issues at stake or of how the military functions, is to frame complex
matters in simplistic ways. Frontline reporting will be mostly by twenty something
reporters who are neither bound by the traditional parameters of restraint exhibited by
eld~r journalists of yore, nor can they afford to miss the deadlines. With enormous
pressures, their attention span will be short. Therefore, if one cannot quickly and
credibly put across one's viewpoint, one ends up losing half the battle even before it
begins. We are experiencing the advent of parachute journal-ism-the practice of
dropping into a trouble spot whoever happens to be in the newsroom with directions
to provide - an immediate story regardless of his or her background or experience.
The advent of sound bite journalism, 3D-second news stories and two columns
because the Press is fragmented, newspaper stories also contributes to the lack of
context and background of news reporting.
32. In India, civil military relations have been strained in the recent r past due to a
couple of instances. First, it was the date of birth controversy about the serving Chief
of the Army. It involveda few missing documents and a legal tangle. Even as it was
solved with all honours retained, other set of controversies seem to have emerged.
These new controversies perhaps have been blown out of proportion, probably
because the DaB controversy was still fresh in mind. During this second phase of the
controversy, corruption, under- performance and under-preparedness came into
picture. However, the icing on the cake was the whole supposed coup expose by the
Indian Express. Figment of imagination, undoubtedly at its worst, was at play in
creating a script that would create yet another dud like Agent Vinod! Has the media
been mature on reportage and expose? It's one thing for a let- ter to be leaked, but it's
completely different for the media to publish it without even giving it a second
thought.

CHAPTER -V: CURRENT STATUS OF MEDIA MANAGEMENT IN
INDIAN ARMED FORCES
"One difficulty is that the media have little or no memory. War correspondents have
short working lives and there is no tradition or means for passing on their knowledge
and experience. The military learned a lot from Vietnam and these days plans its
media strategy with as much attention as its military strategy"
-Philip knightly Organisation for Media Manaaement
1. The exiting organisation for media management in the Indian Armed forces is a
highly centralised structure based on the colonial philosophy of controlling and
restricting the flow of defence-related information to keep the military aloof from the
society rather than providing information encouraging the media to report on defence
matters.
2. The Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) in the Ministry ofDefence (MOD) is the
umbrella organisation for maintaining interaction with both the media and the public.
It is headed by a civilian officer of the rank of Director from the Indian Information
Services (liS) and has a network of both liS and service officers, on deputation, at 25
locations in the country. On policy matters DPR comes under the Joint Secretary
(General) (JS (G)) of the MOD, who has immense power to overrule the Director on
any matte~2.
3. Functions of Public Relations Officers. The Regional offices of the DPR are
collocated with various Command Headquarters and Public Relations Officers
(PROs) are located at important places. It must be noted that the PROs are not
answerable to the local formation com- manders and are directly controlled by the
DPR. The formation is only responsible for their local administration less discipline.
Duties of PROs are as under:-


(a) Act as advisers to local formation commanders in matters re- lating to policies and
activities that can be projected through pub- licity in the media.
(b) Disseminate factual material to the press.
~
(c) Maintain close liaison with editors, correspondents, audio-
visual media and Central and State Government Information offi-
cers.
(d) Supplement written material with oral briefings.
(e) Organise and facilitate press conference, press briefings and interviews.
(f) Cover ceremonials, functions, visits and other important
activities of the Services including aid to civil authorities.
(g) Coordinate proposals for visit of press parties and conduct
their briefing.
(h) In conjunction with General Staff (Intelligence) of the con-
cerned Command Headquarters, scrutinize dispatches prepared
by Press from the security point of view before release.
Media Policy
4. The DPR acts as the link between media and the MOD including the three defence
services besides all other departments under the MOD, namely the Department of
Defence Production, Department of
Defence Research and Development, National Cadets Corps, Coast Guard and the
Territorial Army. The DPR is also responsible for publica- tion of the armed forces
periodical 'Sainik Samachar'.
5. The media policy appears to be primarily that of propaganda rather
than facilitating the media to gain access to the military and report what
they perceive. The policy has been aptly summarised as under by Col P
N Khera, formerly Joint Director, Public Relations, and currently the
Chief Producer of PTI TV:-
(a) To focus the attention of the nation in general through the media that our armed
forces have the best weapons with excellent and dedicated personnel.
(b) Highlight the rigorous training schedule to drive home this
message.

(c) Give an assurance to the Jawans, Airmen and Sailors that their future
is safe and their families would be well taken care of
should something happen to them during operations.
6. Budqet. The DPR gets an annual grant of Rs 55 lakhs. Of this amount, 'Sainik
samachar', published in 13 languages takes way Rs 30 lakhs. The remaining Rs 25
lakhs forms the net annual expenditure of the entire Ministry of Defence on publicity.
7. Restrictions on Media Coveraqe. In the interest of operational
security and troop safety certain restrictions have been laid down.
Following are some of the important items of information forbidden for
both correspondents as well as photo journalists:-
(a) Operational plans and intentions.
(b) Details of defences.
(c) Description of classified weapons and equipment or
proposed modifications.
(d) Details of weapons and equipment received from foreign countries, except when
officially cleared.
(e) Nomenclature of units and formations and their deployment.
(f) Names of commanders and principal staff officers, particu-
larly between those ranking from Lt Colonel to Major Genera
~ (g) Operational capabilities of airfields.
(h) Details of casualties inflicted and material damage caused by
enemy action.
Trainina
8. Media Traininq for the Army. Even though media training is a much talked about
subject, there is very little of actual training that an officer undergoes let alone troops.
The first rudimentary lessons of media
handling are taught only at the Defence Services Staff College. Even the officers
selected for tenure in the DPR undergo only familiarisation
training for six weeks including a brief period of attachment with news agencies or
leading news pares. As yet there is no formalised system of training formations in
media handling during exercises. On the other hand in USA, the Joint Readiness
Training Centre, Fort Chafee has been conducting 'Media on the Battlefield' training
for soldiers since 1990. Media training has been incorporated into their combat
training.
42
Media representatives (played by their Public Affairs personnel) appear during
exercises to interview soldiers and commanders. The interviews are videotaped and
played back later to bring out lessons.
9. Traininq for the Media. A beginning was made in this direc-
,...
tion when the DPR started the War correspondents Course of six weeks duration for
the national media from 1995-96 onwards this course has been thrown open to the
regional media too. The course provides a primer on the three services, which is not
really adequate for a defence correspondent. Field training by way of incorporating
the media in exercises is also not conducted.
Drawbacks
" -
10. Existinq Media Policy
~ (a) lack of Well Defined Policy. A clear well defined me- dia policy laying down the board
objectives, priorities, techniques and the means for different type of operations is
lacking. Whatever policy one could gleam from published literature is far too overtly
propaganda oriented to enhance the credibility of the Army.
(b) Citizen's Riqht to Know. The media policy of the Gov- ~ ernment of
India is yet to recognise the 'Right to know' as a basic
feature of democracy. This is borne out by the constraints imposed in dealing with
media by the Official Secrets Act (OSA) 1923, which itself is based on the British
OSA 1911. As per the Act, both
.;- the communicator and the receiver of any unauthorised informa- tion are guilty irrespective of its
damage potential. Given the preva- lent tendency to over-classify documents from the
security angle, almost any information on defence can be construed as
unauthorised.
(c) lack of Transparency. This is apparent from the fact that media is not permitted to
cover the various exercises and tactical operations during low intensity conflict. Sadly
folly of such lack of transparency has been driven home at great cost during the
Charar-e-Sharif episode in J&K.
(d) Nealect of Reaional Media. This is a serious drawback considering that regional
media has greater impact on the local population, especially on emotive issues
involved in low intensity conflicts.
.
(e) Budaet nd Resources. For the entire defence set up of a country of this size a
budget of Rs 55 lakhs, including Rs 30 lakhs for 'Sainik Samachar' alone is just a
pittance. The PROs are not authorised a single vehicle let alone other essential
equipment and gadgets.
11. Existina Oraanisation.
(a) Command and Control. It is a universal principle in management that the provider
of a service is answerable to the receiver. However, the PROs are not accountable to
the local formation / station commander on the premise that their services
are meant foe other services and departments under the MOD. As a result their
command structure is too loose and unviable particularly for the crucial media
coverage of operations of the services.
(b) Coordination. Recent spate of coverage of certain developments indicates a clear
and perceptible lack of coordination between PROs of different organs of the MOD.
A case in hand is the large number of reports indicating that the Arjun tank has been /
in being inducted into the army, which have been appearing it was later clarified that
the tank was still undergo-
f: ing various stages of trials.
(c) Rank and Status of DPR Officials. The DPR is headed by an officer of the rank of
'Director' and the senior most Army offi- cer in it is a Colonel. This rank structure is
too low in the hierarchy to provide the requisite to the organisation and is bound to
curb its functioning. Contrast this with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and
the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), in which the chief spokesman is a full time
officer of the rank of Joint Secretary who also participate in policy making. "-
(d) Quality of PROs. Without denigrating the efforts of DPR it would not be incorrect
to state that officers deputed to it are
generally those who have their career behind them. On the other hand a number of
Foreign Secretaries, such as Mr J N Dixit, Mr G Parthasarathy and Mr Salman Haider
have been the spokesmen of MEA.
(e) Number of PROs. Considering the size of India's armed forces and the recent
media explosion existing number of PROs is woefully inadequate. As a result not
even corps sized formations have dedicated PROs on their staff, even when engaged
in operations.
12. Traininq. World over glare of media on the military is on the increase and its
impact on the outcome of operations has also increased. However, the level of media
training imparted to the PROs, commanders, staff and troops in the Indian Army has
not kept pace. Even the Training of war correspondents is quite inadequate.

CHAPTER -VI: MEDIA -A FACILITATOR OR A DETRACTOR
TOWARDS NATIONAL SECURITY?
"Force and not opinion is the queen of the world, but it is opinion that
R uses the force."
Pascal
Introduction
1. The mass media is quite often referred to as the "Fourth Estate".
Indeed, the impelling force the media holds in its mighty paws --TV,
print, internet and radio- is immeasurable; it possesses the potential to
make or mar political power structures. Attempts to curb the media
have uncertain success probabilities and can rarely be set into motion
without negative communications; real time data transfer and internet
have rendered electronic media so potent and powerful that efforts to
keep it on a leash are destined to flounder.
2. Another important factor is the speed and the global reach of the
new international media. The capacity for independent assessment and
reporting has been reinforced by an increasing independence in
communications and dissemination of information through the global
media. The capacity for independence increases the potential for the
media to break loose from military constraint. Also, globalisation has
conferred on the media formidable power to influence national and
international public opinion. Large news corporations like CNN, BBC,
..:c AI Zalzeera, Times Now and NDTV have global impact and today can be
found in the offices of nearly every senior government and military
official throughout the world. As one columnist noted, "In times of crisis
or high drama America automatically turns to CNN. In bars, airports,
aircraft, hotel lobbies, corner shops and anywhere else where people
might pause and watch, the news pours out in a steady, heavy stream."
3. As George Esper points out, 'The Vietnam War's two famous
filmed sequences were the point blank execution by pistol shot to the
head of a Vietcong prisoner.. .and that of the little Vietnamese girl
.running naked down the road, her body burned by napalm '
4. More recently, the infamous photo of a dead Iraqi mother holding her dead infant
daughter after a gas attack on Halabjah in March 1988 depicts the cruelty of Iraq's
Saddam Hussein against his own
countrymen. Coalition offensive actions against Saddam's forces in the 1990 Persian
Gulf War ceased abruptly after images of the "Highway of
r- Death" were broadcast and published producing perceptions the
coalition was "piling on" destruction. One also remembers video footage of Captain
Vikram Batra's "Yeh dil mange more" after capture of Tiger Hill during the Kargil
conflict.
5. Today the 'ubiquitous;' media can bring the graphic realities
conflict almost instantaneously into the public's living room bringing the conduct of
conflict to the scrutiny of everybody, not just the military and politicians. In our
country, the STAR and lEE channels transmitted the triumphs and tribulations of the
Kargil conflict as well as the high drama and tension surrounding the hijacking of IC
814 right into the homes of the people across the country and the region. For the first
time people realised that these events were not something which were being tackled
by just the military or diplomats in some far-off lands but were happening right in
their precincts, in their minds.
6. However, on the flip side, India's nuclear weaponisation in 1998 and the Kargil
War in 1999 provide two vivid examples of how this media coverage could be
harmful to the national security. The Western media's approach which had its agenda
on nuclear non-proliferation was
swallowed "hook, line and sinker" and the media here sought to project that India was
not in need of nuclear weapons. At the height of the Kargil
.-: War, ridiculous analyses were made to explain that Indian Army was not ready yet
or alive to the threat. Media's faulty analyses on threat
perceptions were proved wrong by the breakout of the Kargil War, as is discussed in
the subsequent chapters.
Indian Media Imperialism
7. It is disturbing that in the last couple of years, a few phenomenon has been
emerging which can best be described as "Indian media imperialism". It has arrogated
to itself the powers to set the national
.Ii agenda from national security to political and economic complexions and policies.
Indian media's adventure in these sensitive areas and some actions call for deep sense
of responsibility and sensitivity.
8. The Tehelka Tapes. India witnessed the spectacle of Thelma tapes that attempted to
show political corruption in defence deals. The media bigwigs in both electronic and
print have gone berserk in projecting the tapes as some extraordinary and
unprecedented little realising the immense harm it could cause to national defence
preparedness and possible loss of confidence to international investors. By itself, the
Tehelka tapes could have been dismissed as cynical attempt by an individual, but the
way the senior generation of India's media fraternity have sought to rally round Tarun
Tejpal reflects sadly on their lack of realisation in relation to national security affairs.
9. India's national security stands endangered not by the revelation through Tehelka
tapes but by the perceptions it sought to create public in the mind of the Indian that
the entire machinery of the Indian state is rotten. It is unbelievable that in the sting
operation, the investigation team did not come across anyone who had rejected
outright the offer of wads of notes.
10. The Tehelka tapes in terms of effect will impede all the important recouping of
Kargil war attrition of military hardware, and even normal replacements and fresh
purchases will take a back seat for a while
leading to inadequate war preparedness.
11. If the aim of the expose was to highlight the political corruption, there was no
need to subvert senior Indian army officers by inducements of cash and liquor. It
appears that all the officers are purchasable. Aren't the journalists too?
12. Had it happened in the United States and Britain, the Tehelka team would have
been criminally prosecuted for the production of tapes and the means they employed.
Knowing full well that such laws do not exist in our land, the team resorted to a so-
called journalistic venture without a sense of responsibility. Their intention and
modus operandi are not legally justifiable or morally defensible.
13. In a recent media reporting by DNA Army Chiefs letter to the PM highlighting the
discrepancies and information of highly classified nature has led to debate whether
journalists are immune from disclosing their source in the provision of existing laws.
In India no statutory provision exempts scribes from disclosing source in criminal
proceedings, no Supreme Court verdict either, on parameters of this privilege.
High Courts have generally tilted balance in favour of public interest over journalistic
privilege.
The India Media-see the mirror
13. Lest the views in this paper are dismissed as biased, a quote by experts in original
from a paper by Michael J O'Neill former President of the American Association of
Newspaper Editors is pertinent. Michael 0' Neill's observations given below serve a
good purpose as they enable holding a mirror to the Indian Media and enable it to
introspect:-
(a) " It is well known that media are more devoted to conflict than to tranquillity,
and war is routinely defined as news, while peace is not. What is good for the world,
in other words, is not necessarily good for the business."
(b) "Although journalists see themselves as champions of the common weal, their
fellow citizens put them down in the popularity basement with lawyer's politicians."
(c) "The facts that many of the most fateful issues facing the world lie beyond the
reach of conventional journalism because it is a system that specialises in action and
confrontation rather than in the more subtle forces of changer."
(d) "Like diplomats, newspapermen and women are notoriously ~ resistant to
change. They were almost the last to see how they would be affected by the
communication revolution. So institutional reform may seem remote."
14. Michael O'Neill lists five phenomenon which are especially relevant and need to
be focused on when the media fraternity introspect a change. These phenomenons
are:-
(a) "Persistence of the journalistic tradition that is superficial, poorly informed and
essentially reactive..."
(b) Lack of media self-censorship or control as a result of information and news
explosion, and emergence of multiple outlets and activist reports.
(c) ".. .Wildfire spreads of new technologies that on the one hand are democratising
communications but on the one hand are neutering the journalist gatekeepers who
traditionally apply standards of accuracy and balance to protect the public against
dangerous distortion of news".
(d) Destructive and invasive influence of journalism..
(e) High cost of preventive journalism that profit chasing multi-media and chain
owned newspaper are unwilling to pay.
15. The above observations though pertinent, may be dismissed by the Indian media
fraternity as observations made in the American context. But they are pertinent as the
Indian media itself attempts to adopt the Western templates not recognising that
India's national security environment and political and social milieus are different.
Reeta Sharma a noted Indian journalist observes:-
(a) "I am baffled with the role the Indian media is playing these days. Whether it is
electronic or print media, both appear to have lost the sense of perspective."
(b) "Almost the entire electronic and print media had gone Berserk highlighting the
heightened passion of the relatives of the passengers (IC-814 hijacking to Kandhar)
without keeping the wider perspective in mind Which pushed the government to take
a decision which was not in the national interest?"
(c) "Why was the media questioning (Indian government actions against Pakistan
following Dec 13 attack on Parliament) it, that too in a frivolous manner displaying
the bankruptcy of wider perspective?"
16. India's National Security Issues and Indian Media Record.
Limitations of space prelude a detailed expose and hence only some
main issues can be highlighted:-
(a) India's Nuclear Weapons Test 1998. The Indian media went
berserk in politicising the issue. It chimed that there were no
national security threats in evidence justifying it. Within seven
months the Kargil War took place.
(b) Pakistani Proxy War in J&K. The media has been to- tally
irresponsible. India's strategic sensitivities are constantly ig-
nored and there is a competition to adopt extreme liberalist
views. One theme often stressed is of Kashmiri alienation. Had
that been so, Pakistan by now would have inflicted a Bangladesh
on India.
(c) Kargil War. Instead of marshalling the nation into a co- hesive force,
the Indian media playing partisan political roles at the height of the war,
were busy stoking controversies as to how it
happened.
(d) Agra Summit. The summit had more to do with India's national
security interests than political diplomacy. The Indian
Media went berserk in focusing and projecting General
Musharraf's view point than advancing India's electronic media space to
defend and advance their country's interests.
(e) India's Military Mobilization December 2001. Pakistan did not have
to use ISI to spy on India's mobilization efforts and moves of its strategic
formations. _The Indian media was doing the
job.
17. The stark conclusion that emerges from the above analysis is:-
(a) Indian media does not have a wider perspective of India's national
security issues.
(b) Indian media is in no mood to apply brakes or observe self-restraint on
its wayward and insensitive treatment of national
security issues.
~ (c) Indian media's (especially electronic media) analysis and over-analysis of
national security issues by groups of former diplomats, generals and
national academia's arm chair strategists distort national security
perspectives. All these gentlemen can only draw on their outdated
experience and none of them are privy to latest inputs. Also in many cases,
reticence is their first casualty after retirement.
(d) Indian TV anchors discussing national issues do not have the political
and strategic maturity to discuss national security
issues as their Western counter-parts do.
(e) Indian TV debates on national security issues tend to cut out
development of contrary views and perspectives by imposing commercial
breaks, or go hectoring themselves.
18. Concluding, Michael O'Neill needs to be quoted: "News events are
routinely converted into TV movies, suitably mangled for emotional
Impact, and then the news show broadcast fake news interviews to promote
the movies in a seamless circle of falsified fact". National
t Security cannot be subjected to this process.
Media durina Indo-Pak Karail Conflict.
19. Much has been written and spoken about Kargil since without doubt,
much more will be articulated about it in the years to come. It was, as
Major General Ashok Mehta called it, "India's first war on televi- sion".
The whole episode-a manifestation of the festering and chronic problem
of Kashmir-brought to the fore several issues worthy of the media's
attention. Claims and counter-claims by India and Pakistan played
cacophonic ping pong, while watching nations pontificated on the hazards
attendant upon non-NPT, non-CTBT states in possession of
\- nuclear weapons. The military, in its proud tradition of detached profes-
.
sionalism, went about its business with an I-have-got-a-job-to-do de-
meanour, setting for itself well-defined, attainable military objectives and
achieving them with consummate and courageous expertise. Difficult ter-
rain and weather conditions, paucity of some pieces of equipment and
accoutrement and high causality figures did not deter them from doing
their bidding. All this while, the media worked overtime to quench the
--public insatiable public craving for news on
Kargil.
20. Since the 1971 war, there have been great changes in the kind of TV
coverage available to the common man in India-thanks to a prolif-
.' erate cable TV regime and Vast improvements in the field of information
technology. The intervening period has also witnessed the glamorous and
copious coverage of the Gulf War by CNN-rendering the TV viewer a
virtual ringside spectator of the events thereof. These two fac- tors-the
refined information flow milieu and the exemplary CNN cover- age of the
Gulf War-should have predicated for media coverage of the Kargil episode
a seamless relationship between the media on the one hand and the
political/bureaucratic/military centres of influence on the other. Weeks
after Kargil has been ousted from front-page status, the fact continues to
rankle that neither the media nor the military seem con- tent with the
manner in which each engaged the other in a love-hate re-
.lationship. Why then has the military been accused by some of having "lost the war
on the information front" in Kargil?
52
To be able to answer this and related questions, a brief look it left nec-
essary at defence journalism in India.
21. Defence Journalism in India. VC Nataranjan and AK
Chakraborty trace the history of defence journalism in India back
to 1909 when 'Fauji Akhbar' a journal of the British Indian Army
was founded; today it contin- ues to exist in the garb of 'Sainik
Samachar'. Indeed, the defence forces were the pioneers in the field
of public relations in India. A Directorate of Public Relations,
working directly under the Commanders-in-Chief, regu- lated the
flow of the war fronts. The British made all efforts to keep India
correspondents from interacting with the armed forces personnel
with the country -a state of affairs that lasted a long time after the
British had
gone.
22. Thus when its first war was thrust upon independent India in
1962, the military and the media were not ideally placed for
efficient informa- tion flow. The media could not provide to the
public an accurate picture of the situation in NEFA during the war
as it was not given access to the battlefield; media persons during
had to be content with sitting in Tezpur and receiving official
handouts. As a result, rumours and facts intermin- gled freely in the
media coverage in the war. Perhaps the right lesson were learnt
from the experiences of the 1962 war and therefore, in 1965 and
1971, the situation was quite different; the media was provided ac-
cess 0 the forward areas and every efforts was made to keep a
smooth flow of communication. Consequently, in both the wars,
enemy disinfor- mation Endeavours were effectively combated.
However, for various reasons, 1987 saw the beginnings of
constricted defence information flow.
23. Currently, the Directorate of Public Relations (Defence)-a part
of the Ministry of Defence (MOD)-lnteracts with the media on
matters re- lated to defence forces. However, although its raison
d'etre is the de- fence forces, the representation of the defence
forces is only at the Lieu- tenant Colonel/ Major and equivalent
level; no specific
corps/regimenUbranch for these officers exists and they could be
from any branch, service or arm. In contrast, the Directorate is
headed by an officer from the Indian Information Service who is of
the rank of Director (equivalent to a Brigadier in the Army or a
Director in the Indian Adminis- trative Service).
The current incumbent is of the rank of additional Principal
Information Officer (Equivalent to a Major General of the
Indian Army or a Joint Sec- retary of the IAS). In short, the
bureaucracy has a complete and unques- tionable hold over the
organisation for handling of the media on military affairs. This
was the state extant in May 1999 when the military and the
media first learnt from an alert shepherd of the Kargil
infiltration.
24. Militarv. Media and the Bureaucrats. If some newspaper and periodical
reports are to believed, the antiquated Officials Secret Act and adherence to
its letter and spirit are very close to the heart of the de-
fence establishment in India. It might be contextually appropriate to men-
tion here that the Henderson Brookes Report on the 1962 war continues
to be classified even today. Madhu Trehan reported the following con-
versation between her and an Army off!cer at a checkpoint en route to
Kargil:-
"So how long have you been here?"
" "That is a military question?"
"Sorry. How long do you think it will last?"
"That is a military question."
"Oh! Do you think the Pakistanis will withdraw?"
"That is a military question."
"Hmm. ..Which was the last movie you saw?"
25. The above is a rather droll exchange which appears to have
over- stated a bit the case against Indian military penchant for
secrecy. None- theless, when similar reports from other
journalistic sources are read to- gether, there does seem to be a
point against the defence forces regard-
..ing the frequently overdone reticence. This military behaviour seems to
be especially applicable to its interaction with the media,
perhaps be- cause the media's callous handling of sensitive
information and frequent adulteration of facts with feelings,
wishful thinking and, even worse, irre- sponsible rumours.
26. When operations began in Kargil, the media would have
liked to be kept in the picture about the military aspects by
knowledgeable,
operational personnel from the defence and the military would
have liked to project non-sensitive details of operations to the
media through
~ authoritative spokesmen. Indeed, the daily media briefings were, in the
initial days, conducted by senior offi_cers from the Army and
the Air Force-Officers who were at the decision making level in
their respective Headquarters (HQ).
The Director of Offensive Operations at Air HQ (an Air
Commodore), during a media briefing referred (Quite rightly) to
the situation in Kargil as "war". By coincidence or otherwise,
his place was taken by the Assistant Chief of Air Staff
(Operations), an Air Vice Marshal, for the next day's briefing.
Incidentally, the Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
him- self was to refer to the "war-like situation" in Kargil just a
few days later (on 30 May 1999) while the Defence Minister,
Shri George Fernandes, stated on 06 June 1999 that a "war-like-
situation prevails along the Line of Control". Consequently, it
was not long before the daily media briefing was commandeered
by the MEA with a joint Secretary from that ministry taking the
cardinal position at the daily sessions with the media. The
service representation thereafter at the daily media briefing was
trimmed down to the Colonel/Group Captain level. An
interrogatory look is war- ranted at the fact that media briefings
on a purely military operation were in fact presided over by the
MEA. Irrespective of the manner in which the daily briefings
were conducted, some episodes out of the Kargil story could
have been handled better.
27. Shortcominqs and Lessons-Media and the military. One
feature of the media coverage during the initial part of the
Kargil conflict was the rather scanty and feeble effort to
highlight the fact that Kashmir was not "a long-disputed
territory" and that the LOC was the subject of a bilateral treaty
between India and Pakistan. Such mundane but factually
pertinent facts just don't make news, and hence is of not material
concern for the media czars. Eventually though, the media did
warm up to the theme and diplomatic mileage was drawn out of
this morsel of fact. The result was a perceptible shift in the US
State Department stance towards India and Pakistan. In end-
May, The New York Times had, in its first editorial on the
subject of Kargil, sternly admonished India and Pakistan for the
hostilities. By end-June the same paper had turned sympathetic
towards India and had appreciated its restraint. After Nawaz
Sharif's visit to the US, the paper was talking of Pakistan's bad
miscalculation and chastis- ing Islamabad.
28. Then there was the matter of reports in almost all sections of
the press and TV about how, during the winter months, the
Army had va- cated several posts that had been occupied by the
infiltrators. The re- ports were however, inaccurate. The areas
infiltrated into were only cov- ered by regular patrols and did
not have posts that had been vacated by the Army. In
subsequent statements, the Defence Minister and the COAS
were at great pains to streets this point.
However, the ponder able point is why the media should have made
such reports in the first place.
29. An unnecessary controversy was raked up by some media
reports that the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) had not been
agreeable to the idea of carrying out air strikes during the
initial days of the conflict and that the Prime Minister had to
intervene to order air strikes. It is quite unlikely that the CAS
had the ultimate authority to say yes or no to the use of the air
force (as implied by the media reports) even if he may have
had
reservations on that matter-an opinion that he would be fully
entitled to as a seasoned professional. Any qualms that were
existent had been
about the use of Mi -35 helicopters, which were not suitable for
the elevation of almost the entire area of operations.
The use of fighter
aircraft in anger, a decidedly escalatory, course of action,
would have necessitated government approval. The air option
was indeed exercised after a joint briefing in the Operations
Room of the Military Operations
Directorate in Army HQ where the COAS and the CAS
decided to present a case for doing so to the Cabinet
Committee on Security.
However, the point being made is that, following the
speculative reports in some sections of the press, there was no
immediate clarification
issued on the subject so that irresponsible conjecture could be
nipped in
the bud.
30. The loss of two Indian fighter aircraft on May 27,
1999 was one
information battle India lost in the Kargil war. The two
aircraft were lost
in the morning hours on May 27 but there was considerable
delay in the issuance of an authenticated version of what had
actually transpired. Meanwhile, the Pakistani PR machinery
went into overdrive and splashed international media with
reports that Indian fighter aircraft had intruded 15 kms into
Pakistani airspace and had been shot down by Pakistani
SAMs inside at around 1630 hours. All refutations thereafter
by Indian sources and insistence by the air force spokesman,
Air Vice
Marshal SK Malik, that both aircraft had been flying on the
Indian side of the LOC served only as rearguard action. Had a
pro-active stand been taken promptly the damage could have
been minimized. In defence of the air force media strategy it
would be worthwhile to mention the fact that throughout the
period of operations, the air force gave out
measured, well contemplated statements, devoid of hyperbole
and painstakingly accurate in detail. As a result no statements
from air force sources ever needed to be amended, modified
or retracted.
56 ~
31. An opportunity on the media front was squandered when the grossly mutilated
bodies of six Indian soldiers were handed over by the Pakistanis on June 9, 1999.
Earlier, the body of Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja had been handed over; there was
unquestionable evidence of his having been shot dead after he had ejected from his
aircraft. That
barbaric act should have prepared us for fresh gruesome acts and we should have
lost no time in storming the international media by providing a firsthand view of the
bodies and splashing explosive pictures on all newspapers and TV screens. Instead,
even a full day later the bodies had been taken over, MEA and Army spokesmen
could not even confirm whether organisations I.ike the international Committee of
the Red Cross and the United Nations Commission for Human Rights would be
present during the post mortem.
32. Similarly, when the first dead body of a Pakistani soldier was recovered with his
identification papers intact, the media reported it only in one-line statements. The
import of the discovery was enormous but the media could not or did not give it its
due importance; perhaps the absence of any conclusive evidence (a picture, or better
still, the identification papers themselves) detracted from the credibility of the report.
It is understood that this could not be done because of procedural delays in the
authentication/inspection of the relevant documents at the appropriate level. By the
time the documents could have been made available, their value to the media would
have been negligible.
33. The debate on a possible crossing of the LOC by India and Pakistan held territory
which tickled the nation's imagination for many a day was also kindled dangerously
by the media, but failed to ignite into any damaging blaze because it lacked the fuel of
military inputs on the mechanics of launching attacks across the LOC.
34. A minor debate, highly irrelevant at the time, was also kept alive throughout the
period of the operation about the daily cost of operation on the LOC. In the Absence
of any authoritative figure being available, the media kept up its kite flying exercises
in guessing the right figure. Understandably, the estimates varied enormously from
each other.
Media durina American-IraQi War
35. Media Was Biased Toward Military in Gulf War. The US
media displayed appalling lack of objectivity in the media
coverage of the first Gulf War. Its willingness to accept the US
version of the story without expressing even the most obvious
of reasonable doubts has made the credibility of the "free
media" seriously suspects.
36. By acting as a cheerleader to the military, the media is
putting the democracy at risk. The stabilizing forces in a
democratic system are the checks and balances. People can
respond to either excesses or
deficiencies of the administration only if there exists a fl9w of
accurate information. Thus a free and fair media forms the most
essential part of the balancing mechanism in a democracy. The
partisan US media tried to portray the administration as the
"good guy" and that it should go easy on this "good guy",
especially during a tough time like the war. A few
examples in the succeeding paras elaborate the farce enacted by
the US media.
37. Just two or three days before the US alleged that Saddam
Hussein ordered pumping crude into the gulf, the coalition had
acknowledged the bombing of a loaded Iraqi oil tanker. Not a
single reporter questioned the military officials on the
possibility that the leak could be from the bombed tanker.
38. Then the military said that it stemmed the spill. No questions or
reports on the details of this alleged operation were heard or seen from
the media. This oil spill was described as environmental terrorism by
Saddam. No reports were offered on the environmental effects of
bombing nuclear plants, chemical and biological weapons factories, and
depots.
39. President Bush was shown several times, angrily alleging
that Saddam set fire to Kuwaiti oil wells. Again the media was
not concerned with the possibility that the fires could be due to
a few of the thousands of bombing missions being conducted.
40. The media promoted the two or three TV clips a day that was
released by the military when they were flying thousands of raids
every
day. No questions were asked about the possible mistakes. The abstract
aD-percent success rate reported by the military got its share of
publicity
co, without even being explained. Even after the British military showed one
~ guided bomb hitting the wrong target, no hard questions were
forthcoming from the media about the civilian damage.
.
41. No ethical questions were raised about the merciless
destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure, including water
supply and sewage pipes. NO analyses were offered on the
consequent diseases. At the same time unabated propaganda
was being aired about Saddam's immorality, his despicable
gassing of the Kurds being cited as the leadin-g example.
Noticeably, this atrocious act attracted more attention from
the US media after his invasion of Kuwait. If the media was
really concerned about Saddam's moral standing they
should have questioned his actions three
I~, years ago, not when the administration was looking for reasons to get
rid of him. This tireless destruction of the Iraqi cities and towns was not
\,! even compared with the scorched-earth policy that Saddam has been
" accused of following.
42. Even after the TV networks got back into Baghdad, no pictures or
reports of civilian casualties were except in the case of the bombing of
a --bomb shelter. However, numerous pictures of injured and crying
children
were shown from Israel after every Scud attack that resulted in
casualties. Surprisingly, no children in the occupied territories went
hungry or cried in spite of weeks of curfew.
43. "Free" and "fair" US Media. The TV networks spent hours
analysing the war strategies with their "military consultants," all
seemingly completely unconcerned with the death and destruction
being
caused by the war. It was a rarity to see anyone with anti-war
sentiments
or concern for human life being interviewed on TV.
44. The media does not seem to realize the damage it is doing to the
international security environment by portraying a war fraught with
human misery as a kind of a game. Discussions of military strategies
presented with miniaturised Middle East maps equipped with toy tanks
and airplanes, video clips of guided bombs blowing up targets, etc. do
not really help people understand the realities of war. 45. The realities of
war are children losing mothers, husbands losing wives, brothers losing
sisters and thousands of people, young and old, losing legs, hands and
eyes and having to live with it for the rest of their lives. Coupled with
this, large-scale homelessness, widespread diseases and grinding poverty
will also prevail after the war. This is the real picture of war. By
projecting wars as totally bloodless games, the media,
Consciously or not, is desensitizing the people to human
misery.
.
46. This kind of attitude on the part of the media has dangerous
implications for the future. Historically, it's precisely during these times
of war that governments of all kinds have committed the most serious
crimes. On many occasions they have used small-scale wars to divert the
attention of the media from tough domestic issues. If tne media
excuses the administration from tough scrutiny, leaders will find more
and more room to overstep their authorities. Thus ultimately leads to the
abuse of power with the obvious ramifications in the national security
context.
47. Gulf war-II. It is an old axiom that once a war begins, the truth is
the first casualty. In operation "Iraqi Freedom" this certainly seems to be
the case. Both coalition and Iraqi forces were engaged in an all-out
psychological war. The media -both Western and Arab-is playing a
key role in this struggle.
48. American Forces employed media extensively as a means of
psychological warfare. They used radio and television broadcasts,
leaflets, and loudspeakers to induce large numbers of enemy soldiers to
desert. Over a seven-week period, some 29 million leaflets in at least 14
varieties were dropped behind Iraqi lines. This form of operation was
deemed very effective.
49. The Iraqi decided not to leave the entire field to the Americans and
tried to fight back. They began to broadcast in English for the "benefit"
of the American and British troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. Their aim
was to demoralize the soldiers by utilizing the fact that they were
thousands of miles from home. In 1991, however, Iraqi psychological
warfare was not very well researched. In consequence, Baghdad radio
told Allied soldiers that while they were in the desert of Saudi Arabia,
their wives and girlfriends were sleeping with Tom Cruise, Tom Selleck
and Bart Simpson!
50. "Everybody's lying all the time and it's hard to say what's going on. I
stopped listening," said Prof. Martin van Crefeld, a military historian from
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, to Haaretz newspaper. It seems that
there are plenty of examples. Both sides are providing
unchecked, and probably inflated, numbers of enemy casualties. On March
26th, a British officer announced that the Iraqis had suffered 750 casualties
in A-Najaf. That was the same day I which sand storms nearly paralyzed
coalition forces. How was this number obtained? The Iraqis, on the other
hand, gave a daily report of planes they have shot down, tanks they have
destroyed and allied troops they have killed. Coalition forces very rarely
corroborate these figures. The aim of these awesome numbers is to strike
fear into the heart of the enemy.
51. Ideally, the "watch-dog" of truth should be the media. In the
previous Gulf War, the Media relied on briefings and data provided by the
military. Reporters were barely allowed to visit the actual battlefield. In
operation "Iraqi Freedom," some 600 western reporters were
"embedded" in coalition forces. One might even say "too embedded". In
Iraq, the embedded system raised many questions about journalistic
integrity or independence. The 'embedding' system had reporters relying on
the soldiers for their safety and it seems that they completely
sympathized with their protectors. It was not unusual to hear a reporter
saying: "we" captured; or "we" are firing, etc. This is Second World War
style journalism -mobilized and patriotic. This sort of reporting may be
moving, perhaps even thrilling, but does it convey the true picture of how
the war is coming along?
~ Media and Public Opinion
;
52. The relationship between the military and the media is changing,
propelled by certain momentous developments, in all the major democracies
of the world, including India. This scenario of change, which has evolved
over a number of years, has shifted the balance towards the media and in the
process, thrown up a new series of challenges to the military. In such
circumstances, the military as well as the media, must take a long hard look
at how they interface and make the necessary changes to re-establish a
relationship in which the military and the media will be able to successfully
work alongside each other to the benefit of both and for the society at large.
53. Putting things in their perspective, in the Indian setting, Lt Gen Arjun Ray
theorizes, "with each passing day, Indian media is becoming more competitive and
consumerist; and perforce more investigative, with greater quantum of critique and
commentary by professionals. The
media is also asking more questions than ever before. We have to shut up or put up
with it News is like any consumer commodity and people are hungry for
sensationalism! Media caters to the taste of the
readership and government and security forces must appreciate what therefore makes
a good copy. They need to come to terms with this fact of life.
54. Armed forces of many democratic nations have recognized the power of the
media to influence and even determine popular support as well as government
policies. A major reason for the defeat of the United States of America in Vietnam
was the loss of popular support at home. US media played an important role in
determining the public opinion, hence deciding the outcome of the war itself. During
the recent Gulf War, the same US army Forces turned the corner and made the very
best use of media as a weapon of war.
55. Wars in the 21 st century are being referred to as information wars. The recent
Gulf War, which the whole world followed on their television screens, was a good
pointer of things to come. Some are not new,
others are. One however, is fundamental: the nature of warfare has changed
dramatically. The combatant who wins the information
campaign prevails. It was for this reason that the combined might of the NATO
military machinery, frustrated in its attempts to bring the Yugoslav people, to their
knees finally declared TV stations legitimate military
targets and committed what K Subramanyam called "one of the most heinous
assaults on the freedom of information". Closer home, we were witness to the
profound effect that the media had during the Kargil War.
56. Releasing Lieutenant General Depinder Singh's book on 19 November 1991 at
New Delhi, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw made a pertinent comment. He recalled
that in 1971 journalists were given full liberty to cover the operations and hence, they
received excellent cooperation. "On the contrary, everything was kept secret in the
IPKF operation. If the press had been given full freedom and taken into confidence,
the IPKF operation would have got a good press".
57. There are two major and indefensible curbs on the people's
right to' know about their country's defence policies and
operational
preparedness. One is the cult of secrecy practiced by
successive
Governments since independence and the other is the Official
Secrets Act, 1923. Both are hangovers of the colonial era. The
pertinent
provision (Section 5) of the Indian Official Secrets Act, 1923 is
based on Section 2 of the British Official Secrets Act, 1911
which, however, was repealed in 1989. Section 5 lays down
that, if any person having in his possession any document or
information which has been entrusted to him in confidence by a
government official, or which he has obtained as an official,
communicates it to any person, "other than a person to whom he
is authorised to communicate it or a Court of Justic~ or a person
whom it is, in the interest of the State his duty to communicate
it", he is guilty of an offence. So also is a person who receives
such document of information "knowing or having reasonable
ground to believe" that it is being communicated in the breach
of the.Act.
58. Terrorism can be viewed as a form of political
communication or a form of protest in which the militants
attempts to gain the attention of the public to promote a certain
cause by the use of violence. In addition, by this violent form of
communication, the insurgents often project their view through
the media to a large target audience. This they achieve by the
very news worthiness of their brutal acts, the reach being
directly linked to the viciousness of their actions and the
impunity with which their acts
are executed.
59. In India, the capability of the media in influencing public
opinion is unduly large, probably because of the lack of
analytical education among the rural masses. This power of the
media in influencing minds seems to have been well understood
by the militants, which points to a dedicated advisory assistance
from across the border. Against this background, the use of
violent means by the militants appears to be
deliberate and designed to inspire awe amongst the people in
general, and young impressionable audience, which they are able
to reach, is much larger than the victims of their acts.
60. Anti-militancy operations by the government agencies encompass
political, economic, social, military and police actions. A successful
campaign consists of a right blend of the above. Just as the militants
have been able to utilize the media towards achieving their ends, a
similar exploitation of the media by the authorities could provide a low
key and non-violent force multiplier to the government's efforts. The
effective co-operation with the media in conjunction with the counter
insurgency measures stated above could expediently sever the jugular
vein of the militant movement on Kashmir, and the same applies to the
insurgencies in other parts of the country.
61. The Malaise. The military has for long been obscured by
the security syndrome of secrecy, talking in hush hush terms
or not talking at all of defence. The military commanders
often mention orders and
instructions like the Special Army Order (SAO) 15/8/81 and
the Army Rule (AR) 21 to prohibit contact with the media.
In effect they are not 'fireman's' and in no way bar
interaction with the media, they only lay down guidelines
which should form the basis of this int~raction. Thus what is
required is a positive interaction of these orders. But what
exist are clear orders that defence services personnel are not
to communicate to the press any matters connected with
India's defence forces without "Central Government
permission".
~
62. Making his submission before the Press Council of India commit-
tee on defence coverage, a retired Army Chief commented, "The
bureaucracy whether in uniform or civilian clothes and politicians in
power find it more convenient to prevent awkward questions being
asked than in explaining what might have been poor management or
errors of judgment. In nine cases out of ten, when national security
interests have been pleaded for denial of information, the real cause has
been prevention of embarrassment to the establishment. Information is
needlessly classified at higher levels than necessary and almost
everything is classified, restricted or above. There are no penalties for --over
classification; only for failure to protect information."
63. Be what as it may, it would be unfair to blame only the military and
defence establishments for the unsatisfactory projection of defence
matters to the public. The media organisations themselves are
responsible for the media men's limited interest in defence matters and
consequently their limited knowledge of the subject both at the policy
and operational, levels. While the Indian papers and magazines have
specialists to report on political, economic, scientific or even sports
issues, it is dismaying that most of them (accept a few national dailies)
Ii. do not have specialist defence correspondents. By and large there is no
visible cadre of defence correspondents in the country.
The result is that specialization is missing.like anY other technical sub- ject, defence
needs intensive study, and a defence correspondent must do more than report
intensive study, and a defence correspondent must do more than report a visible
physical event, must understand and ana- lyze the forces behind the event and provide
the necessary perspective to readers and viewers for proper perception about the
events. In fact, a major drawback in the Indian media results from the fact that very
few, if any, of the media persons have a Service background. Unlike their Western
counterparts they have not seen national service. There is no content related to
defence or the forces in the syllabus of various courses of journalism being conducted
at various centres, in the country. The result is a situation of ignorance, especially in
the younger breed of journalists.
CHAPTER -VII: RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTED
MEASURES
"Every citizen should be a soldier. This was the case with the Greeks and
Romans and must be that of every Free State."
-Jeferso,
Letter, 1813.
Chanaes in Media Policy
1. Statement of Policy. The media policy must address the core issue of
defining the degree and kind of restraints to be, placed on the media during
peace, low intensity conflict and war in order to ensure positive media
coverage without loss of credibility, while not endangering operational
security and troop safety. It must lay down the media objectives, priorities,
methods, means and constraints for the three situations. The Government
should work out a coalition policy or a consensus policy on national security
and must make efforts to educate people in issues related to national security.
The Government must tackle the information policy, the transparency and
other important
issues related to national security.
2. Evolution of Policy. It is important that the media itself be taken Into
confidence while evolving such a policy. Considerable and as far as possible
open debate and discussion with eminent media persons, PR experts from the
industry institutions such as the Press Council of India and academic bodies
involved in teaching mass communications must precede declaration of the
media policy. It is not correct to use terms like; "Media Management" and
media as a "Force Multiplier", since free media is not part of the Armed
Forces and cannot therefore be managed or uses as a force multiplier. There
is a general ignorance about
problems with higher defence management, which needs to be
highlighted by media at national and regional levels. There is a need to
continually educate the public and media regarding India's strategic standing
and potential.
3. In the Armed Forces -Media interaction, free flow of information and
transparency should be encouraged. The future war will be fought under the
glare of media. Therefore we must train Armed Forces
66
personnel in understanding and conduct of Media. The nation,al security apparatus
in India requires radical restructuring to meet the challenges of the global and
regional security environment in the new millennium. The national security
encompasses much more than mere territorial
integrity and preventing military aggression. Therefore there is a need to hasten the
process of integration of the armed forces within themselves and with other agencies
that are concerned with national security and in this endeavour; both the Armed
Forces and Media have complimentary roles to play.
4. There is a need to make some fundamental adjustments to respective culture and
ethos of the Armed Forces and th~ Media. They should develop an understanding of
each other occupation,
functioning, requirements and limitations. Armed Forces should be more accessible to
media especially in low intensity conflict scenario. The information warfare and
media interaction in national security demand real time availability of intelligence,
total transparency in operations in low conflict environment in spite of hostile
propaganda launched by militants and their sympathisers against Armed Forces or
government agencies. All these challenges are required to be faced by close and
meaningful interaction between Armed Forces and Media.
5. Transparency and Media Pools. Transparency must form a
corner stone of the media policy as it will lead to greater public
understanding and awareness which in turn will lead to greater
appreciation and public confidence on the armed forces. This openness must be
reflected in positive encouragement to the media to cover
operations and exercises without endangering operational security and troop safety.
An effective way of achieving this is by forming 'Media Pools' at different levels
from services headquarters to corps. These pools must be composed of accredited
and security-cleared
representatives of different national and regional media and nominated by their
parent organisations. These pools must be activated during war, low intensity
conflicts and war and kept in readiness to be moved to the scene of action at short
notice. Such a system will facilitate the media to cover operations in remote
locations by being present at the scene of action, which it cannot otherwise do and
at the same time facilitate the army in planning for, handling and assisting media
without compromising on security.
For developing a healthy and fruitful relationship with the press Armed "
Forces should quickly respond or confirm a report if it is correct or deny if
it is wrong and stick to facts, however unpleasant they may be and leave
analysis to responsible media.
6. Accreditation of Defence Correspondents. Requisite
qualifications for defence correspondents, such as a degree in defence
studies and the War Correspondents course must be made mandatory
for a journalist to be accredited as a defence correspondent. The
accreditation must be reviewed periodically at which time other criteria
such as attendance of a refresher / specialization course must be
insisted upon. Efforts must be made to grant accreditatiQn to adequate
number of representatives of regional media, especially in areas affected
by or having the potential for low intensity conflicts.
7. There is a need to make some fundamental
adjustments to
respective culture and ethos of the Armed Forces and the Media.
They should develop an understanding of each other occupation,
functioning, requirements and limitations. Armed Forces should
be more accessible to media especially in low intensity conflict
scenario. The information warfare and media interaction in
national security demand real time availability of intelligence,
total transparency in operations in low conflict environment in
spite of hostile propaganda launched by militants and their
sympathisers against Armed Forces or government agencies. All
these challenges are required to be faced by close and
meaningful
interaction between Armed
Forces and Media.
8. It is not correct to use terms like; "Media Management" and media
as a "Force Multiplier", since free media is not part of the Armed Forces
and cannot therefore be managed or uses as a force multiplier. The
involvement of the Armed Forces in low intensity conflicts requires
optimisation of all available instruments and there is an important role
for the Armed Forces in administrative and development functions to
generate confidence among local population in the existing government.
Media should be approached with this perspective.
9. Self Restraint by Media. Self restraint by media is any day
preferable to pre-censorship and will only enhance media
credibility. A list of sensitive issues on which the media must
exercise restraint and different sets of security guidelines for
covering defence matters during
peace, exercises, low intensity conflict and war must be evolved in . consultation with
the media and notified to the media and their organisa- tions such as the Press Council
of India.
10. Joint Security Review. A system of joint security review must be worked out in
consultation with the Press Council of India, Broadcast Regulatory Authority of
India and eminent media persons to replace the system of pre-censorship during
peace and operations. This will go a long way towards enhancing the credibility of
the armed forces.
11. Rapport with Media. A conscious effort needs to be made to build up a report
with media at all levels and more so at the level of
senior commanders and staff officers. Interaction by way of organising seminars and
guest lectures, mutual visits, inviting articles of eminent media persons in
professional military journals and writing papers for professional media journals
must be encouraged at all levels as a matter of policy. Such a policy will pay
handsome dividends in the longer
perspe
ctive.
12. Official Secrets Act. The Official Secrets Act 1923 must be revised to incorporate
the damage potential of a piece of information as the overriding factor in determining
whether or not its discloser and receiver are guilty. Such a recommendation has
already been made by the Press Council of India in 1982 and 1990. Such a step will
be a big stride towards recognition of the 'right to know' in a democracy.
Chanaes in Oraanisation
13. A major revamp of the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR), which acts as a
link between the services and the media, is a must. It has to become a genuine and
dynamic public relations organisation and not remain content with issuing 'bland'
handouts riddled with officials and conduct media parties to ceremonial functions. It
has to acquire the abil- ity and resources for gauging public opinion, conducting
opinion
research and taking proper anticipatory action.
14. The status of the DPR is extremely relevant, as he/she should be a person of
sufficient standing and seniority to have sat in important decision-making meetings,
so that what the spokesperson says is convincing and authentic. The Director is an
officer of the Indian Information Service and his rank was recently upgraded to the
equivalent of a Joint Secretary in the IAS or Maj Gen in the Army.
Despite this elevation, the DPR still comes under the control of JS (G) in ,
the Ministry of Defence who has powers to overrule all or any proposals
emanating from the DPR. The Director has not been authorised
to give briefings on operations in J&K, and disturbed areas of
north-eastern states. Nor can he give any information to the press
regarding
procurements, DRDO projects or developments in the
neighbourhood like missile tests by Pakistan. Thus the very
purpose of the elevation is being nullified.
15. The authority of the DPR should be matching that of the JS
who heads the External Publicity Division. He has two Director
level officers working under him. He also sits on important
policy meetings and thus can conduct briefings with authority on
subjects like armament
acquisitions, missile tests, and strategic relationships with major
powers and so on. A fairly definite indication of JS (XP)'s
authority was evident during the Kargil conflict when he was
allowed to hold daily briefings for the media along with an
official each from the Air Force and the Army.
16. Another problem is that of selection of PROs, who work
under the DPR. Until 1992, there was a three member
committee, comprising JS (G), Principal Information Officer
and the DPR, which selected officers for posting to the
directorate. This practice has been abandoned and postings are
made on an ad hoc basis and changes often take place without
giving notice to the press. This selection committee needs to be
revived because far from posting experienced and
knowledgeable
persons from the Army, Navy and Air Force, the
respective HQs
preferred to send officers with virtually no knowledge or flair
for PR or no thorough understanding of the Services themselves.
These postings carried no value in the career chart of the deputed
officers, who stood little or no chance of getting promotion.
17. Previously, PROs, before postings, were given the benefit of
familiarization training of about six weeks, which included attachments
with news agencies or leading newspapers. There used to be a
curriculum for such exposures. This practice, which has been fading out
over the years, should be imparted a new impetus with the would-be
PROs being given insights into the working of the media, understanding
their needs and operational compulsions and so on, besides being
media orientation courses at institutions like the Indian Institute of Mass
Communication.
18. In some concerned prominent quarters the suggestion has been made
that the directorate, which is currently a wing of the MOD, should be
placed under the respective chiefs of staff. Till independence the DPR was
under the Army. It is argued that with the.DPR once again
becoming a part of the services, there would be smoother execution of the
media projection policies.
19. An innovation since 1996 is the establishment of the Additional
Directorate General of Public Information erstwhile Army Liaison Cell
which has virtually taken over the task of providing information on
operational matters. It is headed by a Maj Gen at Army HQ in South Block
who functions directly under the Vice Chief of ,Army Staff and hence
enjoys better access to all formation commands in the country, which the
DPR does not have. In a way it is an encouraging
development, but the protocol between the Cell and the media should be
clearly defined in the larger interest of defence media coverage. Also, the
Cell needs to be relocated as it is housed in a prohibited area to which the
media has no easy access.
20. As regards the question of ensuring more in-depth and comprehensive
orientation of journalists on defence matters, the policy of 'catch them
young' should be followed. Right at the level of degree or diploma course in
mass media at the premier centres in the country, there should be
substantive portion as part of the regular syllabus on defence journalism
which should not include the specific skills of writing but also the nuts and
bolts of the working of three services and the various defence
establishments. The faculty should be drawn from the academia, services,
defence research organisations and the media.
21. The editors and the managements of the media set-ups should allow a
few select correspondents to focus on defence and national security matters.
They should not be put under pressure to churn out stories everyday or to
take up other 'beats' in addition to defence, thereby diluting their expertise;
they should be given the scope to take their time to do in depth stories as
and when required. To add substance to their output, besides making field
visits, they should also be encouraged to undertake intensive research
studies on related issues.
22. There is need to train different levels of media professionals, both defence
correspondents and analysts. It should be possible for a few select journalists to be
permitted to attend a part or whole of the courses at the Staff College or the National
Defence College. "Live-in" visits to training establishments of the three services.
Such as those in Hyderabad and Bangalore, would be helpful. Significantly, the media
are not welcome to visit any of the premier Regimental Centres, where
actual training is given to jawans.
23. Periodic briefings by Command chiefs, Service Chiefs etc. would go a long way
in keeping the media updated on the country's security. More budgetary information
should be made available. There could be an annual budget briefing including
services, defence production and DRDO. This will help Members of Parliament and
generally the country as well and produce better debate.
24. Finally, it is imperative for the media to maintain its credibility among both the
civilian population and the military. Jingoistic
drumbeating as well as exaggerating the threat of war clouds or loose talk of the
foreign hand should be scrupulously avoided. Loss of
credibility gives to rise to rumours so that more and more people turn to the foreign
media for information which should normally be available from one's own country.
This has an adverse effect on the morale of the people.
25. Quality of Public Relation Officers. Quality of PROs can be improved over a
period of time by laying down of suitable qualitative requirements for their selection
and protecting their career interests. Officers who have put in certain amount of
service in other arms and services and have a flair for PR, creative writing and other
such skills should be selected after screening. In war and proxy war situations, the
Armed Forces at all levels should be equipped with "Press Kits" and appropriate
backgrounders for journalists. Broad aspects of their
strategy can be released without compromising surprise and security of operations.
Chanaes in Trainina
26. Traininq of PROs. Upon selection for the PR, all officers must be put through an
orientation course in media management for duration of three to six months. The
syllabus and course material must be evolved in consultation with leading
management institutes, Indian Institute of Mass Communications and media
organisation including the Press Council of India. The faculty must also be drawn
from these organisations. This course should be followed by an attachment with
different types of media organisations, such as newspapers, periodicals, wire
services, radio and television for a period of up to six months. A refresher course
must be encouraged to obtain degrees in mass communications, public relations and
journalism. Selected officers can be sent to leading institutes. These officers must
contjnue to attend all arms courses as applicable for others.
27. Traininq of Other Officers. Media and its interaction must form part of the
curriculum at all stages of an officer's career starting from pre-commission training in
the academies to post-commission training in all arms courses right up to senior
levels. Commands and Corps must also hold cadres and seminars on this subject for
the benefit of other officers Innovative methods of media training must be
incorporated in all exercises and war-games for commanders and staff officers.
28. Traininq of Troops. Dealing with media must a part of various promotion cadres
for Non Commissioned and junior Commissioned Officers. In addition troops must be
briefed regularly and practiced in handling media persons during exercises.
29. General Staff Pamphlets. All Aspects of media management by the army
including the role and effect of media in various operations must be published as
General Staff publication. Current series of publications on 'Operations of War' and
'Counter Insurgency' must be modified to incorporate a chapter on 'media' in each
operation.
30. Traininq of Media Persons. Efforts must be made in consultation with the Press
Council of India, various media organisations, university Grants Commission and
leading universities conducting courses in journalism to incorporate defence
awareness programmes and specific aspects of defence journalism in their curricula.
Scope of the WarCorrespondents course must be enhanced and it should be made a
compulsory prerequisite for accreditation as a defence correspondent. An advanced/
refresher course should be designed for interested senior defence correspondents.
Training should also be impacted by
incorporating media in various formation level exercises and war-games.
Suaaested Measures for the Media
31. Media Advisory Committee. The union Government must appoint a
multidisciplinary committee comprising leading personalities in different
media, academicians in the fields of sociology, psychology and political
science, senior retired service officers, bureaucrats and police officers to
advise it on effective media and information policies. Such a committee
will prove to be immense value in fighting the low intensity conflict on a
psychological plane effectively. The media, both private'and government
controlled, must cooperate whole heartedly with such a committee. The
Armed Forces and the Media must be ready to listen to each other views
and resolve disagreements by balancing realistically their two seemingly
different interests -the people's right to know and issues where
confidentiality is must to preserve national
interests.
32. Press Council of India. This must be enlarged to include eminent
persons with experience in the fields of defence and national security,
preferably retired senior service officers. Its power must be increased to
enable it to evolve and enforce a code of conduct. Training of journalists
must form part of its responsibility on the lines of Indian Medical
Association.
33. Awareness of Defence Issues. The media must improve its awareness of defence
related issues by making concerted efforts in conjunction with DPR or its successor. It
must utilize every opportunity to interact with the defence services by way of
seminars, courses and visits. Media should also accept that in present competitive
reporting challenges, the requirement of educating and training their
Correspondents/reporters in matters related to defence and Armed Forces is a
prerequisite for objective reporting.
34. In the Armed Forces -Media interaction, free flow of information and
transparency should be encouraged. The future war will be fought under
the glare of media. Therefore we must train Armed Forces per- sonnel in
understanding and conduct of Media.
35. The national security apparatus in India requires radical restructuring to meet the
challenges of the global and regional security environment in the new millennium.
The national security encompasses much more than mere territorial integrity and
preventing military aggression. Therefore there is a need to hasten the process of
integration of the armed forces within themselves and with other agencies that are
concerned with national security and in this
endeavour; both the Armed Forces and Media have complimentary roles to play.
36. For developing a healthy and fruitful relationship with the press Armed Forces
should quickly respond or confirm a report if it is correct or deny if it is wrong and
stick to facts, however unpleasant they may be and leave analysis to responsible
media.
37. In war and proxy war situations, the Armed Forces at all levels should be
equipped with "Press Kits" and appropriate backgrounders for journalists. Broad
aspects of their strategy can be released without compromising surprise and security
of operations.
38. The Armed Forces and the Media must be ready to listen to each other views and
resolve disagreements by balancing realistically their two seemingly different
interests -the people's right to know and issues where confidentiality is must to
preserve national interests.
CONCLUSION
"It is no longer possible for a free country to fight even a limited war in a world of
modern communications, with reporters and television cameras on the battlefield
against the feelings and wishes of the people".
-James Reston, New York Times.
1. Impact of media on the conduct and outcome of modern day wars has always been
acknowledged by military leaders. Revolutionary developments in mass
communications technology and the resultant capacity of the media for instant and
graphic coverage of operations coupled with increasing democratic demand for more
information on all spheres of governmental activity including military have
transformed media into an important war winning factor, like never before in history.
2. Establishment of mature military -media relationship is a sine qua non for the
success of any information / media campaign, which will of necessity, be a part of
any military campaign in the future. Both military and the media must recognize that
it is not combat success alone but the political impact of combat that wins wars.
Political impact depends to a large extent on the communication of combat to the
citizens by the mass media, which is happens to be part of its primary role. Thus
military and media should see themselves as equal partners in success- ful conduct of
wars. Media has an even greater impact on all the participants of a low intensity
conflict, namely, government including security forces, militants and the society.
However, media is vulnerable to manipulation by the militants and sometimes an
illicit relationship develops between these two.
3. The nature of military -media relationship is a complex one. It is simultaneously
complementary (in contributing to the outcome of wars), symbiotic (both need each
other to fulfil their roles), adversarial (while military protects information and
attempts to pry open the shroud of secrecy and see through propaganda) and
subversive (military can prevent effective media coverage and media can assist the
enemy and adversely affect the outcome of battle).
4. Current state of media management in Indian defence establishment has a number
of serious lacunae. The media policy is largely a legacy of the colonial days. The
emphasis is more on guarding information from the public and less on sharing
information with the public. While most modern democracies recognize citizens 'right
to know', we are yet to take any concrete measures in that direction. Our PR
organisation is not responsive enough and displays lack of a creative / innovative
approach in interacting with media and arranging publicity. There are a number of
drawbacks in its organisational structure and training. More important ones are the
quality and number of PROs and their non-accountability to formation commanders.
5. Media management, today, is a combat support activity and as such is an essential
function of command and staff at all levels. This is the basis of the major
recommendations for improvement of media management. A major recommendation
is for restructuring the Directorate of Public Relations into a uniformed joint service
organization called the 'Corps of Public Relations' under the Chiefs of, Staff
Committee like the Directorate General of Armed Forces of Medical Services. Its
units and subunits must be allocated to various commands and corps. Other
suggestions are for a media policy that encourages transparency to the maximum
extent possible, establishment of PROs, posting PR staff officers in General Staff
branches of all formation
headquarters down to division / sub-area and intensive training measures. Suggestions
for the media include strengthening the Press Council of India, establishment of a
Broadcasting Council of India and specializing in defence journalism.
6. It is hoped that implementation of these suggestions and recommendations will go a
long way towards establishment of harmonious military -media relations and
contribute significantly towards the success of all our operations.
7. These concluding remarks are not intended to summarise the various issues
discussed earlier; instead it is pointed out that on matters concerned with national
security and more specifically, defence related subjects, there is a need for
introspection. We need to take a pragmatic look at our attitude towards considering
some inconsequential pieces of information as "official secrets" and safeguarding
them; perhaps regulated flow of that information would serve the national interest
better.
8. Similarly, the good old system of defence journalism -based on young, physically
tough and mentally alert reporters in uniform -needs to be given a thought; the fear
therein is that continuity may be achieved at the cost of objectivity. Finally we wish
to avoid the mutual dissatisfaction that was manifest during the Kargil episode; a
questioning look is warranted at the organisation and functioning of the defence PR
machinery. The foreseeable criticality of information Warfare in future Kargil -like
situations absolutely ordains it.
9. The Indian media, though now operating in the global arena, have so far not been
able to use, to the desired extent, this advantageous situation for authentic, objective
and substantive treatment of matters pertaining to defence, while the Indian armed
forces have yet to fully grasp the power and potential of the media in projecting their
correct im- age.
10. The media have been slow to rise to the challenge, limited as they are by the
need to complete, the cost of coverage, lack of specialist expertise and audience
expectations. Analysis of media coverage of the Falklands, Grenada, Panama and
the Gulf shows that some elements of the media were too willing to be swept along
with the tide of enthusiasm and to act as cheers leaders for their own forces.
11. The military commanders deployed on operations in conflict situations have today
found themselves more vulnerable to the pressures of the media than ever before. Any
conflict in present times, by its very nature, is a highly complex affair both in its
causes as well as its conduct. Bosnia was a prime example of the complexities of a
three-sided war, with shifting alliances overlaid with the complicated peacekeeping
framework carried out by a large number of forces drawn from a diverse group of
countries. Media persons, especially TV journalists, operating in such complex
circumstances, have little more than a few seconds at their disposal to unravel the
threads of this highly confused situation and then edit and simplify it in order for it to
be palatable to the general public. Such reporting, which is an integral part of the
"crash and burn" work culture of a journalist, may distort the reality of the situation in
the public's mind and can often lead to a lack of understanding of the military's role.
Nik Gowing a renowned journalist has described this as 'the tyranny of real time
news', which significantly diminishes the military's ability to limit or censor media's
output. He has further said, "This is the new reality. The media beaming back,