John Michael DiDonato

Paradigm Shift Paper

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The Change in New York City Policing Strategies
Today, New York City is often cited to be the safest big city in America, and multi-city
comparisons using FBI data on crime do in fact reveal that New York City has the lowest crime rate per
population amongst the top twenty five most populous cities in the country (Jacobson 1). However, this
was not always the case in New York City. Throughout the 1980s, New York had one highest crime rates
in the country and was considered to be one of the most dangerous places to live (Glazer 289). During
the 1990s, New York City experienced a remarkable reduction in crime that has led to the low crime
levels of today. Centering this significant reduction in crime, were dramatic shifts in policing strategies in
the New York City Police Department. New York City policy makers in the 1990s adopted new policing
strategies that were largely based off the broken windows theory in an effort to combat the citys large
crime rates. The effects of these policing strategies are still highly controversial and disputed in America
today.
In order to better understand the policing changes that took place in New York during the
1990s, it is important to grasp the context which proceeded these changes for several reasons.
Evaluating the crime rates, policing strategies, and conditions of New York City before the shift in
policing strategies as well as and the criminological theories circulating nationally during this time will
help provide evidence for the rational causes behind the shift, will highlight the nature of the changes
themselves, and will provide a base in which to measure the effects of the shift.
Throughout the 1980s, crime was continually increasing in NYC and eventually peaked in the
year 1990. The Federal Bureau of Investigations Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics confirm this
continual increase and reveal that the largest increase in crime occurred during the latter part of the
decade between the years 1985 and 1990. During this time, violent crimes, the total of all murders,
forcible rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults, increased by 28%. Delving even more into these
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statistics reveals an outstanding increase in the number of murders in New York City. Murders increased
by 55% between 1985 and 1990 from 1,683 in 1985 to 2,605 in 1990. To help place this number of
murderers in perspective, in 1990 New York accounted for over 11% of the nations murders. This revels
that New York truly was one of the more dangerous places to live during this time period ("Uniform
Crime Reporting Statistics." 1).
Evaluating the crime levels before the policing shift serves a dual purpose. One purpose of
evaluating crime statistics is to reveal a rationale and cause for the change in policing strategies. The
growing rate of crime during this time period reciprocated a call to reduce the amount of crime the city
was experiencing. Evidence for this fact lies in the decision of New York leaders to implement new
policing strategies. These new strategies were designed as a method to deal with the issue of crime.
Therefore without the existence of crime, New York would never had a reason to change their original
policing strategies. The dramatic shift of policing strategies was clearly underlined by the cause to deal
with the separate but connecting issue of crime. Many shifts in society and government are underlined
by separate but connecting issues, and such is the case in the shift of policing methods in New York City.
Another purpose of evaluating crime before the shift is that it provides a basis to measure the effects of
the policing shift. The change of crime before and after the shift is a logical determinant to assess the
impacts of policing strategies since the main objective of policing is to control and reduce crime. Though
many have used New Yorks reduction in crime as a criteria to judge the effectiveness of its new policing
methods, many disregard the shift in policing strategies and attribute the crime change to an array of
other reasons. When later assessing the disputed effects of the shift in policing strategies, different
frames a thought will be discussed with each attributing the change in crime in regards to their own
explanations.
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The nature of policing before the 1990s shift resembled the traditional policing strategies of
investigating and solving major crimes and responding to emergency calls. Most police patrolling during
this time was done in vehicles and was largely random and reactive. Little to no technology was used to
assist the NYPD in any of their tasks. Also, divisions existed between specialized squads, detectives, and
the police and these separate parties maintained their own objectives without employing the use of the
other very much. Though these are only a few of the qualities of policing before the shift, they are some
of the most defining characteristics of the traditional methods of policing (Brereton 3). It is important to
understand the nature of traditional policing strategies as it can help identify a contrast between the
strategies prior to the police shift and the strategies after the shift. Identifying a contrast in these
strategies, highlights the existence of a shift and also aides in better understanding the natures of the
new policing strategies.
There is little resemblance between New Yorks subway system in the 1980s and New Yorks
subway system today. In many ways the subway system in the 1980s exemplified the condition of the
city as a whole. The 1980s subway system has been described as chaotic, filthy, its floor littered
with trash and the walls and ceiling thick with graffiti, and ridden with panhandlers and petty
criminals (Gladwell 136). In fact, William Bratton who served as the chief of the New York City Transit
Police Department said, It was like going into the transit version of Dantes Inferno. (Gladwell 137).
The conditions on the streets of New York were not much better. During the 1980s, New York like the
rest of the country was experiencing a crack epidemic and this was evident as drugs were openly sold in
many neighborhoods (Katel 133). Amongst the open drug deals was other prevalent disorderly
behavior such as the acts of panhandlers and squeegee men, public urination, graffiti, public
drunkenness, littering, vandalism, and prostitution (Sridhar 1842). Encompassing all of the New York
during the 1980s, as well as the rest of the country, was a slowly recovering economy (Glazer 307).
Understanding the condition of New York can help serve as an additional criteria to judge the effects of
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the shifts in police policy. More importantly, though, understanding the condition of New York as a
whole helps explain why the particular new policing strategies took root and not others. The declining
conditions of both the subway and the streets prescribed perfectly to conditions set forth in the broken
windows theory which became the backbone behind all the changes in policing strategies.
The broken windows theory is a criminological theory of two social scientists, James Wilson and
George Kelling. In 1982, the two published an article in the Atlantic Monthly that focused on the effects
that an environment can have on crime (Sridhar 1842). Their theory states that if a broken window is
unattended to and not fixed or repaired, it indicates that no one cares about the area and that no one is
in charge. With this indication, a sense of disorder and lack of authority will ensue in the area which will
lead to more and more broken windows (Wilson and Kelling 2). Extending this thinking, Wilson and
Kelling insinuated that in a city, relatively minor problems are all the equivalent of broken windows,
invitations to more serious crimes (Gladwell 141). The conditions of New York mirrored almost exactly
the conditions set forth in the broken windows theory and provided a straightforward answer as to why
New York was experiencing such high crime rates. The theory postulated that if New York could address
the minor crimes and the disorderly behavior prevalent in the city, then the issues of the more serious
violent crimes that were plaguing the city would be solved. The existence of the broken windows theory
does not explain the cause for the shift in policing strategies, but rather helps explain the nature of the
shift.
Now that the pre-shift crime rates, policing strategies, conditions, and criminological theories of
New York have been discussed and assessed for their importance and relevancy, the shift itself may be
examined. The shifts origins can be traced back to when Rudy Giuliani became the Mayor of New York
City in 1994. Giuliani, conscious of New Yorks crime problem, campaigned vigorously to stop New Yorks
crime epidemic by changing the structure of policing. When asked to identify New York Citys crime
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problem, Giuliani replied, It's the street tax paid to drunk and drug-ridden panhandlers. It's the
squeegee men shaking down the motorist waiting at a light. It's the trash storms, the swirling mass of
garbage left by peddlers and panhandlers, and open-air drug bazaars on unclean streets (Boland 1). It is
evident from Giulianis response that he prescribed to the broken windows theory as his reply echoes
the same message found within the article written by Wilson and Kelling. As one of his first acts as
mayor, Giuliani appointed William Bratton as the New York City Police Commissioner. Bratton, the
former chief of the New York City Transit Police Department, also believed in the broken windows
theory and had started a movement to clean up New Yorks declining subway system that had been
described earlier (Gladwell 137). Together, these newly empowered men caused a paradigm shift in the
policing strategies of New York City.
With the full support of the mayor, Bratton began to implement a new policing strategy known
as zero-tolerance policing that focuses heavily on quality of life crimes. The actions of panhandlers,
squeegee men, graffitists, litterers, fare beaters, and all the disorderly behavior previously described
were considered to be quality of life crimes. The NYPDs new strict approach to dealing with these
crimes drastically contrasts their old method of policing. In New Yorks tradition policing system, these
misdemeanors were usually overlooked because major crimes attracted most of the polices attention.
In order to effectively enforce these laws, officers were often sent on foot to the streets, subways, and
public places to address those committing these disorderly offenses (Glazer 303). Violators who could
produce an ID were given a summons for a court date. Others were arrested providing legal cause for a
search. The tactic also produced the arrests of a sizeable number of bail jumpers and other wanted
criminals, some charged with serious crime (Katel 135). The subtle shift from vehicle based patrolling to
foot patrolling, allowed for a much closer watch of street activities and subsequently resulted in the
deserving arrests of wanted criminals who would have otherwise avoided arrest.
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An even more important shift that occurred in policing strategies involving patrolling was a
change from reactive patrolling to proactive patrolling. Brattons introduction of technology became the
main driving force behind the zero-tolerance laws and proactive patrolling. The computer statistic
system known as Compstat used known crime data to calculate likely places and times where crimes
could occur. With knowledge of these crime hotspots, the NYPD became more proactive and instead of
just responding to crimes like in a traditional policing model they went out to prevent them (Marshall 3).
In addition, Bratton removed previous barriers between officers, detectives, and special units. Local
commanders were empowered to deploy detectives and specialized units to assist in tackling crime
problems in designated areas (Brereton 3). This decentralized policing made it possible for local
commanders to give a total policing effort to ensure that their areas remained clear of crime. This
total effort could have never occurred in a traditional model of policing because of the divisions that
existed (Marshall 3).
The dramatic shift of focusing on quality of life crimes was accompanied by other important
shifts that dealt with changes in patrolling habits, technology, and the NYPDs structure. These
secondary shifts were necessary to aid in supporting and enhancing the prominent zero-tolerance laws.
The changes outlined between the new policing strategies and the old strategies, clearly demonstrate
the existence of a complete revolution in policing, and at the heart of these changes stood the broken
windows theory.
Crime rates in New York City have been dropping since 1990 and continue to drop today. Many
contend that it was the policing shifts that took place in New York that are responsible for this reduction
in crime. Although crime was decreasing before Giuliani became mayor, crime took its most dramatic
decrease in the year that Giulianis measures were fully in effect. By the end of 1994, the new policing
strategies were fully implemented and there was a 10% decrease in the rates of violent crimes from
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1993. This percentage decrease is much larger than the 1.4% decrease between the years 1990-1991,
the 3.6% decrease between 1991-1992, and the 4.3% decrease between 1992-1993 ("Uniform Crime
Reporting Statistics." 2). There is a clear contrast between the rates of crimes before the shift occurred
and after the shift and some point to this as evidence for the new strategies effectiveness. Proponents
also look to other effects to support their claim. The policing shifts did help clean up the city and if
prescribing to the ideas set forth in the broken windows theory, then a cleaner and fixed environment
will produce less crimes which is what was presumed to have happened in New York. Looking at New
York policies today, Michael Bloomberg, the mayor succeeding Giuliani, has largely been faithful to the
strategies put in place by Giuliani and has especially focused on toughing gun laws in New York.
Bloombergs decision to continue on with these strategies, reveals his belief in their effectiveness on
crime (Katel 136).
However, there are many out there who dispute the effectiveness of the new policing strategies,
and attribute the decrease in crime to other reasons. These other explanations tend to focus on changes
within society. One popular theory revolves around the decline in the crack epidemic by the end of the
1980s. This theory states that when the crack epidemic was over so too was all the violent crimes that
accompanied it. Another explanation deals with the aging U.S. population. The theory dealt with the fact
that most crimes are committed by those in mid to early twenties so an aging U.S. population meant
that there were less people in this age range to commit crimes. A third theory centers on the economic
growth that occurred during the 1990s. Due to the growth of the economy, less people had to rely on
crimes to support themselves (Greene 178-182). Another theory involves the legalization of abortion in
the U.S. This theory proposes that children who were aborted would have been more likely to be
involved in crime, and that due to the legalization of abortion in 1973, a whole generation of likely
criminals who would have been at their peak of criminal activity was never born (Levitt 1).
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Understanding different perspectives of crime can allow for a greater insight on the disputed
effects of the shift in policing strategies in New York City. There are two camps that each provide their
own causes and prescriptions for crime. One group believes that crime is rooted in social conditions and
in order to deal with crime society must be dealt with. The other group generally views crime as the
result of dangerous individuals and prescribes tough measures against them (Katel 130).The zero
tolerance laws implemented in New York in the 1990s falls into the latter of these two ways of thinking.
Policy makers like Bratton and Giuliani will cite these laws as clear proof of New Yorks crime reduction
because they believe tough measures can thwart crime, while others will reject these measures because
they do not address society. Understanding these differences can help explain the controversy that
surrounds New York policing.
In addition to discussing the effects the policing shift had upon crime, there are noteworthy
social implications of Giuliani and Brattons policies that deserve consideration. In 1996, Amnesty
International reported that police brutality and unjustified use of force is a widespread problem in New
York City (Greene 176). Supporting this claim is the change in the number of complaints filed between
1992 where the zero tolerance laws were not yet implemented and 1996 where the zero tolerance laws
were implemented. During this time period there was a 60% increase in the number of complaints filed
against the police (Greene 176). Another social implication common with the zero tolerance laws is
racial targeting. Studies have shown adults arrested for misdemeanors, are disproportionately African-
American in their representation in the community (Sridhar 1843). The root of this problem continues
to exist New York today where stop-and-frisk laws are often seen as a form of racial profiling (Katel 143).
The shift in policing has also been seen to cause an unfair harassment towards homeless people. Due to
the nature of the laws, homeless people are often criminalized for being homeless and receive unfair
treatment (Sridhar 1843). The negative social implications of police brutality, racial targeting, and
harassment of the homeless exist and only add to the policing strategies controversy.
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Evaluating the pre-shift conditions of New York City reveals that crime rates were used as an
indicator for fundamental shifts in policing strategies, and that the condition of New York made the
broken windows theory an applicable explanation for New Yorks crime. The broken windows theory
eventually became the source of zero tolerance laws that focused on quality of life crimes. These new
laws and the police strategies that accompanied them were much different from the traditional policing
strategies that used to be used in New York. This contrast provides clear evidence that a significant shift
did occur in the way the NYPD operates. The crime reduction effectiveness and the social implications of
the shift continues to remain highly controversial. Through an overview of the shift in policing strategies,
it is evident that leaders view any negative social implication as being offset by the potential positive
effects the policies could be having on crime. From this, it is clear that leaders value the potential of
crime reduction more than the negative effects the laws have on society.

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