President Lee and the NGOs: a new variable for policy-making?

Introduction
2008 will be remembered as the year of success for Korea’s civil society. It amassed more than 200,000
people to protest against the government policy on beef import. The protest sustained for more than 2 months,
and in that process the civil society added other contestable issues like the Grand Canal Project and educational
reform. Eventually, President Lee announced to renegotiate the beef import policy. However, the celebration
became ephemeral, because the administration was determined not to be influenced again. From the
administration’s perspective, the nature of this protest imposed great threat, because progression of the protest
encompassed policy concession on not just the beef issue but on other issues such as education policy and the
Grand Canyon Project. That threat increased incentives to crackdown on the civil society to preserve other
policies from being influenced. The administration persecuted the planners of the protest, increased surveillance
on the NGOs, and attempted to rescind funds for NGOs. As the government appeared serious about restraining
the civil society, 2009 looked to drift away from the successful previous year. However, the administration’s
efforts fell short of producing anticipated impact. Despite the hardship, the civil society has been active in 2009.
Like 2008, the civil society went to work, protesting to stymie major government policies like the Grand
Canyon Project and the Media Ownership Law.
This paper, using these two cases, examines NGO’s impact on government policies. More specifically,
this paper investigates why NGO’s were able to stymie the Grand Canyon Project but not the Media Law
Revision. Paradoxically, the public opinion on both policies did not favor enacting both policies. However, the
Grand Canyon Project was stymied by President Lee, while the Media Ownership Law was passed by the
National Assembly. From the sunset, one can make a simplified argument that the National Assembly is
dominated by the conservatives in favor of the law, and that the executive branch is more likely to be sensitive
to the public opinion. This structural argument maybe true, but doesn’t shed light on the relationship between
the NGOs and the dynamics of policy community. To fulfill this objective, this paper examines the role of
NGOs, the public opinion, and the government policies. The paper first assumes that the NGOs impact policy
not directly but through affecting the public opinion, which affects the government policies. In the paper, I
argue that the investigation by Lee administration on NGOs and the perceptions of Evil MB NGOs created were
critical to divergent outcomes in the two policies. Therefore, I argue that the misperception created through the
vicious cycle between the President and the NGOs have led to different policy outcome, not the structural
difference between the executive branch and the National Assembly. Throughout the paper, I hope to shed light
not only on the narrow scope of functions of the civil society but on the policy dynamics of South Korea at a
macro level and the civil society as a component to it.

The Grand Canal Project

On June 16, 2009, President Lee Myung Bak announced that he will no longer pursue the Grand Canal Project.
The Grand Canal Project has been one of President Lee’s primary campaign pledges coming into the office in
early 2008, as he emphasized positive economic impact of it. He stressed that the Grand Canyon Project will
create over 50,000 jobs and the canal reduced cost of transporting goods to different cities, boosting the
competitive edge for Korean export companies. The canal also had some potential to become a center for tourist
attraction.
Unfortunately, not everyone agreed with President Lee. Lee faced fierce opposition from NGOs that
transcended environmental, ideological, cultural, political preferences. Together, they formed the “Committee
for Opposing Grand Canyon Project.” The committee mainly functioned through a website with the
involvement of numerous NGOs and CSOs. Some of the NGOs supporting the website included Citizens for
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Protecting Kaya Mountain, United Front of Catholic Citizen in Chungju, Catholic Environment Group, Kang
Nam Seo Cho Environment United Activist Group, Kang Dong Environment United Activist Group, Protecting
River Network, River Environment Advocacy United Group, Cultural City Organization, Dentists Preserving
Healthy Society, Opposing Movement Organization, United Beef Organization, and SPR (Solidarity for
People’s Right).
The committee played an instrumental role organizing one of the largest scale candlelight vigils in Korea’s
history. Before the vigil took place in early May, the committee’s website relayed and spread information about
the protest. The rate at which the information spread was explosive, because it served not only as an information
hub for numerous different NGOs and CSOs, but also for numerous influential blogs. The website posted links
to those blogs, which meant that the information relevant to protests would spread and reach members instantly.
This was not just applicable for protests but for other critical events as well.
To capture the dynamic of the information relay, the following presents a case study with some evidence. As of
today, October 29, 2009, the website has 42,087 members and over 30 blogs. If an announcement or critical
information was posted on the committee website, these blogs would tag that information onto their blogs and
disperse it. Since the blogs have lists of other blogs as well, the information relay would trigger its own
distribution cycle. Furthermore, the committee’s website itself has links to other broad scale websites, such as
the People’s Committee on Preventing Mad Cow Disease—a committee formed by over 1,000 NGOs and
members of progressive parties, with the common purpose to stymie the beef negotiation. Once information is
posted on this committee’s website, the relay cycle repeats, reaching millions of people. In essence, the
mobility the committees provided to protesters to spread and exchange information was paramount to the
candlelight vigil in 2008 that amassed more than 150,000 protesters and continued on for more than three
months.
The committee was also effective in coordinating the activism of the Grand Canyon Project during the
candlelight vigil. Because the candle light vigil included issues other than the Grand Canyon Project, such
coordination was crucial in effectively underscore the project’s importance. The committee decided to hold a
protest specifically dedicated to the Grand Canyon Project on June 15. Moreover, in collaboration with the
People’s Committee on Preventing Mad Cow Disease, both committees decided in joint effort to hold debates
on the Grand Canyon Project and the Mad Cow Diseases. Furthermore, they announced that if the government
doesn’t comply with their demands by June 21, they will increase the magnitude of their protests on June 18 and
21.
On June 19, 2008, President Lee announced that if citizens didn’t want the Grand Canyon Project, he will not
pursue it. The decision appears to have been heavily influenced by the NGOs since the date on which President
Lee made the announcement was a day before the deadline (June 19) the NGOs requested the President to
renegotiate the beef agreement and rescind the Grand Canyon Project. The changes of public polls also indicate
that the NGOs were able to influence the public opinion. Public poll by Donga Ilbo indicates that before
President Lee started his presidency, more citizens favored the Grand Canyon Project than opposed it, at 48.7%
versus 39.8%. However, polling conducted by SaeGae Ilbo in early June indicated that 48.9% now opposed the
project, and 36.5% recommended a gradual implementation after examining the environmental effects on each
river. Only 5% fully supported implementing the Grand Canal Project. As illustrated, the public opinion
affected by the protests appears to have influenced his decision. In June, when the protest was at its apex,
President Lee’s approval rating was at its lowest, at 15.2% and 21.6%. Examining the periods where the
protests started and intensified, there is a big drop in the rating, from 24.9% and 29.3% in May to 21.6% and
15.2% in June (please refer to the graph below). Given that the magnitude of the protest reached the apex by
early/mid June, we can conclude that President Lee’s decision was affected by the change in the polls.

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Battle Continues: Second Round
The celebration of success was short-lived for the NGOs. President Lee’s ambiguous statement left NGOs and
the rest of Korea’s civil society in confusion about the possibility of the project being pursued at a later date.
Indeed, the state of confusion was an appropriate term describing the challenge NGOs now faced as it was
difficult to interpret President’s ambiguous statement. Some NGOs interpreted his statement at the face value,
meaning that he will not pursue the Grand Canal Project, but that he will continue on with current projects such
as Hang Gang Canal Project and Kyung In Canal Project. Other NGOs interpreted the statement as completely
abandoning the canal projects. According to Donga Ilbo’s interview with a high ranking official working in the
office of Chief of Staff for President Lee, “not abandoning all canal projects for sure.” This remark posed a
concern for NGOs, because it left a possibility that current Canal projects are a linear progression of the Grand
Canal Project.
An accurate assessment of President Lee’s intention was the most difficult job that the NGOs faced. If President
wanted to pursue the Grand Canal Project, discreet strategies were available. President Lee doesn’t have to
announce that he will build the Grand Canal Project. Rather, he can gradually “build necessary stages.” He
could start the project without immediately passing the National Assembly by taking budgets from different
budget items. Because the budget items were not necessarily organized by projects but also by utilities and
sectors, President Lee could allocate the budget for the project from these items and use the drawn resources to
build the Grand Canal Project in the short term. Indeed, he can continue building his current canal projects in
Kyung In and Hang Gang. Eventually, all canals can be linked together, when opportunities open.
In retrospect, the NGOs had difficulty measuring President Lee’s intention. The difficulty that the NGOs faced
was further exacerbated, when the administration started investigating on the NGOs involved in the candle light
vigil. Since the beef and the canal protest ended around the end of July, the investigations persisted, and
increased in magnitude. The administration first tried to persecute the influential actors of the protest. The legal
justification was that these actors had not followed the appropriate procedures in organizing protests. The
targeted group was People’s Committee on Preventing Mad Cow Disease. Although Committee for Opposing
Grand Canyon Project was not targeted, since most NGOs in the Committee for Opposing Grand Canyon
Project were also members of People’s Committee on Preventing Mad Cow Disease, the detrimental effect was
equivalent to targeting both committees. From October to November, high ranking members of the NGOs were
arrested. By arresting high ranking members, fear would deter NGOs from organizing protests.

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Since the administration anticipated similar effects by cutting budgets, the second phase of the investigation
started with financial sanctions. The ministry of unification announced that it will cut all allocated budgets for
NGOs involved in People’s Committee on Preventing Mad Cow Disease. The legal justification was that the
protests caused by the committee destabilized the country as a whole, producing contrary effect to the
unification movement. Through these actions, the administration hoped to disrupt the NGOs from further
protests on other issues. Indeed, the NGOs dependent on that budget would have a difficulty sustaining their
organizations and ultimately take less part in protests.
Despite these measures, it did not hinder the NGOs from pursuing their activism. Part of the reason is that most
NGOs communicated through blogs and websites, which the government had much difficulty tracking down.
Moreover, financial sanctions did not impose serious damage. Indeed, it can even be argued that the sanctions
had the opposite effect of creating a stronger unity against President Lee’s administration. For example, some
NGOs were not targeted, but they voluntarily gave up their government- allocated budget for they believed the
funds to be unjustly distributed. One of those organizations is Peace Network. Although it was not targeted with
financial sanctions, director Wook Sik Jung believed the sanctions to be unjust, and voluntarily returned the
fund.

Furthermore, the government crackdown did not produce the anticipated effect, because the movement against
the Grand Canyon Project was province based, rather than being exclusively based in Seoul. The Lee
administration focused its resource and energy on Seoul, because 2008 candlelight vigil centered on Seoul in
city hall. It was the administration’s best interest to prevent another protest at magnitude of the 2008 candlelight
vigil. However, the protests were happening in places other than Seoul, such as Incheon and the actual
construction sites of the project where the citizens and interest groups had most at stake.

The government investigations, plus the difficulty in monitoring the real intentions of the government kept the
NGOs vigilant to any actions that triggered alarm. For example, when real estate prices were going up in the
regions of the canal in February 2009, NGOs started to speculate that some signs of the administration’s effort
to build Canal had surfaced. They intensified their activism in those regions by devoting more time and energy
campaigning for opposition signatures. They would also intensify their criticism and at times accused President
Lee of starting the Grand Project without the consent of the citizens. When approximately 1.5 million dollars
were allocated in a revised supplementary budget in March 2009 to build Hangang Canal, environmental NGOs
were alarmed that the extra revenue was not allocated to address consider any environmental concerns. Again,
the NGOs heavily criticized President Lee for his apparent apathy towards the environment. On March 25,
environmental NGOs protested at Kyungin Canal construction site, speculating that the extravagant cost
incurred in building a canal at Kyungin is economically unreasonable and inefficient. They also protested that
the government, in the effort to only complete the construction of the canal, has ignored safety protocols and
other protocols on the environment. On January 5,, NGOs in Incheon, People’s Committee on Incheon and Joint
Movement on Opposing Kyung In Canal, joined forces to start another candle light vigil. They announced that
they will continue protesting until June 21.
Although we cannot know for sure whether President Lee was actually pursuing his Grand Canal Project,
activisms by NGOs on all canal related activities appear to have contributed to negative public opinions. The
latest poll conducted on February 25 suggested that 55% were against the project and 30% supported it.
Compared to the last poll taken in December 2008, more than 5% has increased in opposition. Furthermore, the
opposition to the Grand Canal Project was palpable. Indeed, in April general assembly election, the Grand
National Party announced that it will drop the Grand Canal Project and other canal projects from the party
agenda. Although there is no polling on the Grand Canal Project in April, the approval rate of the president
sharply decreased after the announcement—71% of citizens disapproved President’s performance.

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In retrospect, President Lee’s ambiguous statement and crackdowns have not produced the intended
consequences. They promoted a contrary effect, where feared NGOs became more vigilant and attempted to
work against any movement that seemed related to the Grand Canal Project.
The Media Law revision
Background
On December 5, the Grand National Party (GNP) introduced the Media Law revision in Republic of Korea’s
279th National Assembly. The revision eased the cross-ownership restrictions between television stations and
newspapers. If passed, newspaper corporations such as Chosun, Dong A, and Joong Ang Ilbo would be able to
own up to 30% of Ground (지상방송) television stations. The revision also encouraged foreign ownership. It
would enable foreigners to own up to 60% of Korea’s television stations. The revision abolished limits imposed
on corporations owning satellite channels and allows corporations to own up to 30% of ground stations as well,.
The Grand National Party claimed that the Media Law revision will create more than 40,000 jobs and enhances
quality of Korea’s media industry.
However, the progressive parties strongly disagreed with the GNP. They argued that the revision strengthened
conservative influence on not just the print news but also on television. Indeed, the revision would allow three
conservative newspaper companies—Chosun, Dong A, and Joong Ang Ilbos—to increase their conservative
influences to television. Furthermore, the progressives asserted that corporate ownership of television station
would reduce broadcasting neutrality, where television station owned by corporations will not be able to
criticize corporations. The progressive parties also questioned positive economic externalities. They questioned
the number of jobs created through the revision, since corporations will more likely to consolidate their
businesses, resulting in potential redundancies.
Since the revision law was introduced, the conservative and the progressive parties have clashed. The
progressive parties tried to prevent the GNP from entering standing committees. In order for the Media Law
revision to reach the floor of National Assembly, it must first pass two standing committees. First, the
Committee on Culture, Sports, Tourism, Broadcasting & Communications, and then (법세사법위원회) Legal
Judiciary Committee. On December 20, 2008, the progressive parties occupied Cultural Broadcast
Communication Committee, physically preventing further debate. The provocative action was an attempt to
block the revision from moving forward. Outnumbered 16 to 8 by the GNP in the committee, the Progressive
parties knew there would be no debate, but only the decision to promote the revision.
When the speaker of National Assembly announced that he wouldn’t bypass the standing committees for a
direct floor vote in the National Assembly until January 8th, 2009, the progressive parties also physically
occupied the National Assembly,. Eventually, a bipartisan panel on the Media Law revision was created to
further investigate this issue on March, 2009. However, two panel chairs maintained strict adherence to their
political ideologies. Such behavior was prevalent in other members of that committee, including representatives
from CSOs and NGOs. The GNP chose conservative NGOs, while the progressive parties chose progressive
NGOs that opposed the revision. The political competition between the conservatives and the progressive
defined the revision from the beginning to the end.
But when the legislation was passed, there was no competition. On July 22, 2009, in the floor vote, only the
National Assembly men of GNP were present and voted. With no progressive party members present, 149
National Assembly men and women voted to pass the revision.
Public Opinion, Civil Society, and the Revision

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Just as the NGOs and the CSOs were active in the Grand Canal Project, they were active in the Media Law
revision process. An NGO called Media Action (미디어 행동), was most proactive and took initiative to
organize and collaborate with opposition parties. Second, the Media Action took the initiative and proposed to
all opposition parties, and the numerous CSOs and NGOs, to unite against the “Evil MB (Myung Bak) Policy.”
On January 13, 2009, the Media Action sent proposals to the Democratic Party, Democratic Labor Party, New
Jinbo Party (진보신당), ROK Party (창조한국당), and Jayou Party(자유선진당) to urge to unite against “evil
MB (Myung Bak) policy.” It stressed that only a united front consisting of citizens and different parties can
dispel such policy. As the result, numerous members of CSOs and NGOs joined the regional trip with the
Democratic Party. Furthermore, the Media Action planned numerous events and contests to buttress its coalition
against the revision policy. It opened contest for citizens to submit creative and compelling visual images
opposing the revision. It also held discussion forum for citizens to better understand the nature of this policy.
However, not all NGOs were against the revision, and they formed their own coalition to support the revision.
On February 12, 2009, different NGOs gathered and officially launched a united coalition “Center for Citizens
Advocating Media Reform” (미디어개혁 국민운동본부). The group consisted of about 200 religious groups,
NGOs, and CSOs. Some of noticeable groups included (United Federation for Patriotism)애국단체총협의회,
(Newright United Group) 뉴라이트전국연합, and (Press Media Group) 전언론인협. Together, they mostly
engaged in activities in support of the Media Revision. They argued that the revision will increase competition,
and diversify the available programs. To advance their cause, they mostly engaged in two different types of
activities. First, they collected signatures from citizens to support the law. In April, 2009, they announced that
they collected over ___ signatures. Moreover, they also concentrated on specific groups, such as professors. In
April, they also announced they have collected over ___ signatures from professors and academics around
Korea. Second, they opened discussion forums, where they articulated their cause for supporting the revision
and also educated citizens who lacked prior knowledge.
Center for Citizens Advocating Media Reform’s activism was different from the one initiated by the Media
Action Group. Although Center for Citizens Advocating Media held similar view with the Grand National
Party, they did not pursue collaboration of any kind that the news media reported. However, majority if not all
activisms the Media Action Group engineered collaborated with the progressive party. The different style of
activism was demonstrated in their individual pursuit. While the Media Action mostly continued its
collaboration with politicians and engaged in protests in front of broadcasting buildings, the Center for Citizens
Advocating Media Reform focused mostly on disseminating their view to the citizens and collected signatures
instead of actual protests. Although the Media Action did engage in discussion forums, the forum tended to
focus on urgency to battle “Evil President Lee’s Policy” rather than on the contents of Media Law Revision per
se.
CCAMR’s performance may have contributed to the change in the public opinion from December 2008 to
March 2009. The opposition to the revision in the public opinion dropped from 63% in December 2008 to
48.4% in March 2009. One explanation why CCAMR was effective was because it had different platform and
strategy than its counterpart. The two different organizations had different approach to their activisms. The
Media Action’s central strategy revolved around politics, but CCAMR’s strategy focused on policy. The Media
Action mostly collaborated if not entirely with Democratic Party. The Media Action traveled with the
Democratic Party members, and when the Democratic Party Members held interviews and protest, the Media
Action would be on their side. Furthermore, the Media Action’s central slogan was focused on “Evil President
Lee’s Policy” rather than on the contents of the Media Law Revision per se. That slogan was used to mobilize
the coalition, and also was used during discussion forums it held. Most importantly, there was no noticeable
scale of protest that the Media Action organized. However, organizing a large scale protest was not feasible
during this span, because NGOs were depleted of time and human resources. This was because the Media Law
Revision surfaced in December, and there was simply no time to strategize. Although the law was passed on
July, it was never fixed or scheduled to pass in July. Indeed, the GNP wanted to pass the law as quickly as
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possible, and if the National Assembly speaker directly brought the issue to the floor on January 8th, or even in
March, the revision would have passed then. Therefore, the perceived window of opportunity was short, and the
NGOs were not able to organize a grand scale protest. This point is a sharp contrast to the Grand Canal
situation. In the Grand Canal case, NGOs and CSOs had a large window of opportunity, because it was
President’s campaign pledge. Therefore, even before President took the office, they were able to prepare and
organize.
On the other hand, although CCAMR held similar view with the Grand National Party, it did not pursue
collaboration of any kind that the news media reported. Instead, it focused on obtaining approval signatures
from citizens and concentrated on educating and informing citizens by holding forums. CCAMR’s approach
worked, because the Media Law revision was an ambiguous subject that ordinary citizens had hard time fully
understanding. Indeed, one can argue that the Media Law Revision increased and decreased diversity of
programs. It increased, because foreigners would now be able to invest in the broadcasting station, and they
would broadcast variety of programs. But at the same time, through the political lenses, the revision decreased
the variety, because it would allow more corporations and newspaper companies whom are mostly conservative
to invest and dominate. Elusive framing of the revision created an information gap for the citizens.
However, their impact doesn’t appear to have lasted, as the polls conducted on June reported that 58.9%
opposed the revision. Perhaps that’s because the scale of activism by both sides was small in magnitude than the
one during the Grand Canal Project. Unlike the Grand Canal Project that utilized the “Committee for Opposing
Grand Canyon Project” so effectively, both sides don’t appear to have utilized the websites as a nexus to relay
information or to effectively coordinate. For example, the Media Action doesn’t even have a website that
captures its initiatives on the revision law. Indeed, it only has a blog for its own work. The CCAMR is slightly
better, but not much different. In its website, it lists its major accomplishments that member NGOs have
achieved since 2008. But it doesn’t include much about its accomplishments on the revision law. Moreover,
there is no links to other blogs and other organization’s website. Furthermore, the site was used more as a
description of the organization, rather than as a method of communication.
Another reason the CCAMR was not able to sustain its activism maybe due to lack of incentives and small
interest base. In the Grand Canal Project’s case, there was continuity in activism in different regions, because so
many interest groups were dependent on this policy. Therefore, they had stronger incentives to sustain and
actively protest. However, the Media revision only affected corporations and staffs working in newspaper and
television industries. Even involved organizations were religious and humanitarian groups who are engaging in
activism due to their belief, not for their survival.
Regardless of which faction affected the public poll in which way, the paradox arises from the GNP’s decision
to ignore the public opinion and unilaterally pass the Media Law Revision. One argument is because it is not the
public opinion per se that affects politicians, but the marginal change of the public opinion that matters. This
was the case with Grand Canal Project. When President Lee first came into the office, the public opinion on the
project was evenly divided, with some polls measuring more support. However, the latest public opinion before
President Lee’s renouncement reported that only 30% supported and 55% opposed the project. On the contrary,
in the Media Law Revision case, although the public opinion changed in the process, the latest poll before the
vote was no different from the poll when the revision was first introduced—both were close at 63% and 58.9%.
One explanation may deal with the political structure—that the executive branch is more sensitive than the
legislative branch. The burden is more concentrated on the executive branch than the legislative branch. If
President’s policy is a disaster, the public opinion is likely to blame the President. However, if the National
Assembly passes a terrible legislation, the blame is dispersed, and one can even take a risk that he won’t be
accountable. In order for this assumption to be valid, we must assume that the GNP members are willing to take
risks because the public polls will not hurt their decisions.

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However, this structural argument is not true. The key implication about the polling is that while we know what
that numbers mean, but we ignore what that implicates to the respective accountable policymaker. For example,
during the Grand Canal Project, President Lee was sensitive to the approval rating of the project because it was
his agenda. However, in the Media Case Revision, one can argue that the direction of accountability is
ambiguous, because citizens identified the revision law with President Lee, not the GNP. This is partly due to
the NGOs strategy in both the Grand Canal Project and the Media Law Revision. In both cases, they strategized
their approach as against the “Evil MB Policy.” This created a perception that somehow President Lee was
behind the Grand Canal Project and the Media Revision Law, when the political structure is not suited that way.
This perception gap appears when examining the approval rating of the GNP. During the span the Media Law
was introduced in December to when the Media Law was passed, the approval rating of the GNP is left
unchanged, from 29.5% in December 2008 to 28% in July 2009. This implies that there is a perception gap on
citizens with accountability on policymaking.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the executive branch is more sensitive from the public opinion than the
legislative branch through. It may be a phenomenal only for President Lee’s administration, since the citizens
appear to have perception gap in accountability of policymaking. This case should be further examined in the
future when a similar case arises: the National Assembly and President’s decisions differ despite opposed by the
public opinion.
Key points to emphasize for the future draft:
1. The polling: it is not the number of polling, but the gap in the change of polling that matters.
2. One policy affects NGOs in implementing another policy. The Grand Canal impacted the Media Law.
3. Incorporate below scenario as well.

Although different in style, the degree of tangible impact that each activity had on shaping public opinion is
questionable. Shortly after the GNP introduced the revision in the National Assembly, public polling was
conducted by Kyong Sal Il Bo. The results published on December 25, 2008 showed overwhelming opposition
to the revision. 63% of citizens opposed the idea of newspaper companies entering television business. Out of
citizens who opposed, 40.2% voiced their concern that certain newspaper company’s influence will become too
great, and 39.2% was concerned that criticism towards certain political party will no longer exist. On March 4,
2009, the poll showed 48.4% opposing, and 32.8% agreeing. Perhaps the decrease in opposing can be
contributed to the work by Center for Citizens Advocating Media Reform. However, that cannot explain the
latest poll results before the floor vote. According to Dong-A Ilbo’s polling on June 23, 2009, 58.9% opposed
the revision, while only 18% agreed. One can argue that the Center for Citizens Advocating Media Reform was
not able to sustain its advocacy towards the end, perhaps because of its tactical scale to not engage in protests.
Other explanation is that the organization was relative small compared to the organizational base during the
Grand Canal Project to sustain its impact. Examining just the sheer number of organizations involved this
argument sounds convincing. The Candle Light Vigil held in 2008 had over 1,000 NGOs participating. This
figure does not include CSOs and other kinds of organization. However, that argument would also apply to the
Media Action and its coalition as well. Finally, one last explanation maybe that there weren’t much involvement
in the revision issue as much as there was in the Grand Canal Project.

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