Its designed to be printed on a large Customizing the Content: The placeholders in this formatted for you. placeholders to add text, or click an icon to add a table, chart, SmartArt graphic, picture or multimedia file. T from text, just click the Bullets button on the Home tab. If you need more placeholders for titles, make a copy of what you need and drag it into place. PowerPoints Smart Guides will help you align it with everything else. Want to use your own pictures instead of ours? No problem! Just right Change Picture. Maintain the proportion of pictures as you resize by dragging a corner. INTRODUCTION LITERATURE REVIEWED DATA SERIES RESULTS RESULTS CONCLUSIONS The result from the Cointegration test shows that the data series do not have a long-run equilibrating relationship. This makes sense because if we consider factors such as the addictiveness of cigarette consumption and smokers income level across time periods, cigarette demand do not necessarily need to move together with prices. Our CUSUM chart indicated a possible structural break at or before April 2007. The short term forecasts are also very close to the actual values. This could suggest that the effect of the tax increase on smokers became more pronounced six years after the tax and price increase confirming initial evidence from Becter and others that the long-run effect of cigarette price increase exceeds its short-run effect. So government tax policies aimed at reducing cigarette consumption might not be as effective as desired in the short-run. The best option to reduce cigarette consumption in the short-run is to totally ban its production and sales. From the plot above, we can see an increase in the average retail price of cigarettes in 2001. This is precisely in March when the act that enacted an overall increase in the excise tax on cigarettes was in process to becoming a binding policy. Cigarette companies anticipated this policy and increased the prices of cigarettes. According to the United States National Institute on Drug Abuse, On average, adults who smoke die 14 years earlier than non-smokers. (NID, December 2012). Smokers in countries such as Canada with almost free health care programmes usually cause more liabilities to the countries. So such countries resort to policies such as increased taxes on cigarette production and sales in order to reduce the demand for the good while, at the same time, increasing the awareness of smokers to the various health effects of smoking through cigarette packet labels. In June 14, 2001, a tobacco tax amendment act was assented in Canada. The act increased excise taxes on tobacco sticks by $1.00 per 200 sticks nation-wide (JLW, 2014). Also, in the same month of 2001, Canada initiated and implemented the use of picture-based health warnings on cigarette packages (TLRC, 2014). Cigarette taxes are usually excise taxes. Excise taxes are considered indirect taxes, meaning that the producers or sellers who pay the taxes to the government are expected to recover the tax by raising the price paid by the buyers. So, for the purpose of this research, we will work with the assumption that any increase in cigarette excise tax will translate to equal increase in the price of cigarettes. Below is an example of a cigarette packet label. For this research, we will be using two data series from CANSIM Statistics Canada. The first series is a monthly data on the average retail price of cigarettes (per 200 sticks) from January 1995 to January 2014. The second series is also a monthly data on the total sales of cigarettes in Canada (x1000) from January 1995 to January 2014. Here, we will impose the neoclassical market clearing equilibrium model that cigarette supply equals cigarette demand. This even makes intuitive sense as cigarettes do not get spoilt. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH First, Engle granger test for cointgration to see if the series have a long-run equilibrating relationship. Second, we will use a CUSUM chart and a Chow test to determine if there was a structural break in the series for total sales of cigarettes after the tax and price increase. Lastly, we will try and forecast one year observations after the major price increase with previous observations and compare our forecasts with our actual data to see if there was a major difference between our forecasts and the actual data as a result of the price increase. The correlogram from gretl for the differenced total sales series (Yt) identifies our ARIMA forecast model to be AR(2): Yt = -6.86 - 0.63 Yt-1 0.45 Yt-2. The parameter estimates are both significant. The table below shows 12 months forecasts of total cigarette sales from march 2001 to march 2002. The long-run Effect of Taxes on the Demand for Cigarettes in Canada By Aminadoki Tamuno-omie Holy (7691959) The CUSUM chart above shows that the series of the total sales of cigarette has a structural break at or before April 2007. However, we are more interested in checking whether there is a structural break in 2001 as a result of the excise tax increase A chow test of the series testing the null hypothesis of no structural break in March, 2001 gives us a p-value of 0.0045658. This p-value is significant at the 5% level leading us to conclude that there is a structural break at or before march 2001. METHODS Actual value (Xt) Forecast of differenced series (Xt+1) Predicted values (Xt+1= Xt - Xt+1) 3883 0.13 3882.87 3704 0.05 3703.95 2877 1.46 2875.54 3585 0.94 3584.06 4375 1.12 4373.88 3528 0.26 3527.74 3324 0.31 3323.69 3653 0.17 3652.83 3421 0.25 3420.75 3427 1.8 3425.2 3239 0.63 3238.37 3242 1.13 3240.87 3378 0.31 3377.69 First is by Garry Becker, Michael Grossman, and Kevin Murphy in 1994. They test the model of rational addiction considering the price elasticity of cigarette consumption. They find out that 10-percent permanent increase in the price of a cigarette reduces cigarette consumption by 4 percent in the short run and by 7.5 percent in the long run (Becker, et al, 1994). Thus, the long-run responses of smokers to price changes exceed short-run responses. The second is by Chaloupka, Cummings, Moley, and Haran in 2002. They find out, from the evidence tobacco companies provided, that tobacco control efforts that aim at raising tobacco prices and limiting price related marketing efforts achieve reductions in tobacco use (Chaloupka et al, 2002). The last one is by Jerome Adda and Francesca Cornaglia in 2006. Adda and Cornaglia estimate the behaviour of smokers to compensate for increases in the price of cigarettes caused by tax hikes. They used data on the number and type of cigarettes smoked and the cotinine concentration measured in large amount of smokers in the United States to show that smoking intensity increases by 0.4% for every 1-percent increase in taxes (Adda and Cornaglia, 2006). In other words, in order to compensate for a price increase and a decrease in number of cigarettes bought, smokers smoke a given cigarette more intensively. In this, they show that economic studies in the past that have advocated higher excise taxes to discourage smoking, by ignoring compensatory behaviours of smokers, have had their studies bias in the estimation of the rational addiction model. Estimate the impact of smokers income level on cigarette consumption Estimate the rational addiction model of cigarette consumption using current data. When we conduct ADF Unit Root tests on the data series with the model, it is shown that the series are both not stationary at the level data but stationary at first difference (d=1 in both). Thus, we will conduct most of our analysis on the first differenced series. Cointegrating Regression: Sales = 4813.90 23.2533 Avg Retail Prices The asymptotic p-value of our cointegration analysis is 0.4697. This is not significant at the 10% level of significance. We will fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration and conclude that our data series do not have a long-run equilibrating relationship. 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Total_Cigarette_Sales forecast