Kuhn: Thoughts on Thought Experiments

The purpose of this essay is to discuss how thought experiments, with regards to Kuhn,
not only aid us in understanding the world but also our conceptual apparatus. I will begin by
giving a brief definition of what a thought experiment is; then proceed to explain their purpose,
how they are able to fulfill it with regards to Kuhn. In the end of the essay, I will exhibit that
thought experiment do aid us in our understanding of the world and our conceptual apparatus by
refuting three different critiues about thought experiments.
Thought experiments are experiments that are simulated within the mind. !ccording to
Kuhn, they are done not only to grasp a better understanding of the world but also of our
conceptual apparatus; they are governed by the rules of how the scientist understands nature
"Kuhn #$%. This means that the situations that the scientist creates within the experiment must be
similar to the way he would normally apply his concepts to in the real world "Kuhn $%. The
scientist would not be able to create accurate observations of the real world within his thought
experiment if his thought experiment does not employ to what he is already familiar with. &or
example, it would hardly be plausible for a scientist to understand falling bodies within a world
in which gravity does not exist if he has no prior experience in a world in which gravity does not
exist.
There are three things that thought experiments do according to Kuhn. It aids us in
understanding the world, our conceptual apparatus and aid to bring about a paradigm shift. The
primary purpose of a thought experiment is to aid in 'the elimination of prior confusion by
forcing the scientist to recogni(e contradictions that had been inherent in his way of thin)ing
from the start* "Kuhn $%. If successful, the thought experiment would lead to situations in which
the scientist is forced to revised the way he understands the world. &or instance, if a thought
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experiment is created well enough, it can contribute to a paradigm shift as the conceptual view of
the world due to the contradictions that the anomaly that the thought experiment has presented
"Kuhn +,%. Kuhn says that 'discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly* and the
anomaly is what exhibits the idea that 'nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced
expectations that govern normal science* "Kuhn +,%.
.nderstanding produced by thought experiments are not meant to understand the world,
but rather it aids individuals to learn their concepts and the world together "Kuhn #$%. /ow the
thought experiment teaches the individual about their concepts and the world is by confronting
the scientist with a contradiction or conflict implicit in his mode of thought; the conflicts 'arose
not from his mental euipment alone but from difficulties discovered in the attempt to fit the
euipment to previously unassimilated experience* "Kuhn ,0%. In this passage, Kuhn discusses
how nature plays a role in teaching the individual about the world and his conceptual apparatus.
1ue to the paradox that the thought experiment presents him, the scientist unveils a portion of
how nature wor)s with his inability to fit how he views the world with nature actually functions.
The way his conception does not fit shows him that he views the world is not actually how nature
wor)s.
!s it was mentioned before, a well created thought experiment can bring about an
anomaly and in turn bring about a crisis within the paradigm "Kuhn +,%. This is done by forcing
the scientific community into awareness of the anomalies presented by thought experiment. The
pattern of research of the community changes and one by one the research is turned towards the
anomaly. 2hen attention is turned to the anomaly, the area of the anomaly is explored; this in
turn leads to ad3ustments within the paradigm. The crisis is 'induced by the failure of expectation
and followed by revolution* "Kuhn ,+%. 4nly when the ad3ustment to the new fact, 'until the
,
scientist has learned to see nature in a different way,* does the paradigm change become
complete "Kuhn +0%.
5ow, for a thought experiment to be effective 'it must, as we have already seen, present a
normal situation which the man who analy(es the experiment feels well euipped by prior
experience to handle* "Kuhn #6%. !s it was mentioned before, what this means is, in order for a
thought experiment to wor), it must first be governed by the rules that the person performing the
experiment is familiar with. If the scientist is to perform a thought experiment otherwise, it
would lead to purely speculative results. &or instance, if he was to perform a thought experiment
in a world in which he has no understanding of its nature, then he would not be able to learn
anything as he has no point of reference for the result of the experiment, for example, he would
not )now wherein the contradiction lies within the experiment. In Kuhn7s words, for the scientist
to learn anything of value from the thought experiment, 'the conflict deduced from it must be
one that nature itself could present* "Kuhn ,$%. The experiment therefore, depends upon the prior
experience of nature "Kuhn #$%.
There are three example within the essay ! &unction for Though Experiments, that Kuhn
uses to show us how conceptual reform and a new understanding of the world due to thought
experiments manifests itself. The first example that Kuhn presents is 8iaget7s laboratory
experiment. In this experiment, the children are as)ed to answer which car they thin) is faster
and how they )now that the car that they pic)ed is the faster one. The point of the experiment is
to get the children to learn by showing a contradiction within their perception of the world. !t
the beginning of the experiment, the sub3ects based their decisions on which car is faster by
which car arrived at the finish line first; Kuhn calls this as goal-reaching criterion, which is bases
the notion of faster on the which car reaches the finish line first "Kuhn 9%. /e tells us that if goal-
0
reaching is the only criterion that children use to decide the concept of faster then there is
nothing else that for the children to learn within the experiment "Kuhn 9%. :ut the children, as we
shall see in the next example, employs more than one criterion when trying to convey us their
notion of faster. 2hen they are as)ed in another experiment, where the red car started later than
the blue and had to move more rapidly to catch up, which car is faster, the respond would have
the red car as the answer. 2hen as)ed why, the children would respond that they saw it move a
lot uic)er than the blue; Kuhn calls this as the perceptual blurriness criterion, which is bases the
notion on faster on the ob3ect7s movement. ;o, based on both goal-reaching and perceptual
blurriness criterion, we can conclude that the children were able to learn an adult7s conception of
what 7faster7 is within 8iaget7s laboratory "Kuhn 9%. Kuhn points out that the the example is meant
to show how learning would wor) if people are put into certain situations and how they become
aware of the contradictions within situations. &or the experiment to be worth anything, as it was
mentioned earlier, the situation presented to the individual must be relevant <it must exhibit cues
in which the sub3ect would usually employ "Kuhn #=%.
The second example that Kuhn uses to show us how thought experiments wor) and how
they can aid us in understanding the world and our conceptual apparatus is !ristotle7s paradox of
motion "Kuhn #0%. The experiment is set up with two bodies on top of an incline. 4ne would
travel perpendicularly along the height of the incline, while the other would travel along the
frictionless slope. >alileo as)s the participants to suppose that if the two bodies were to start
from a similar rest point, then they would acuire a similar terminal velocity and mean speed
when they reach the bottom. 2hen the two bodies are dropped and reach bottom, the participants
are as)ed which of the two is faster. The experiment creates a situation in which the participants
have to pic) a certain concept of speed when deciding if the motion along the perpendicular is
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faster, eual or slower than the motion along the incline "Kuhn #+%. The purpose of the
experiment is to create a paradox and lead the participants into state in where they can start a
conceptual reform.
The last example that will be touched upon is the scenario of a scientist living within a
world of uniform speed "Kuhn #@%. 2ithin this example, Kuhn stresses the fact that 'from
thought experiments most people learn about their concepts and the world together* "Kuhn #$%.
/e argues that 3ust because thought experiments rely only on data that we already )now, does
not mean that there is nothing that thought experiments can teach. 2hen the individuals run the
thought experiment they are the ones that 'runs the ris) of self-contradiction*, ergo, they will
learn something new about their conceptual world and the nature of the world that experiment
reflects "Kuhn #@%. In order to full understand what he means, he tells us to imagine a world
where motions all occur at uniform speed. Kuhn says that if we were to find a scientist within
this world and that scientist consistently employed his concept of physics, then there is nothing
wrong with his science or logic; the scientist has embodied within his concept of speed that only
uniform motion occurs within his world thus his 'concept functioned in part as a law of nature*
"Kuhn #@%. 2hat Kuhn is trying to show in the prior example is that, since the the concept of the
scientist functioned as a part of the law of nature, it would be difficult for him to recogni(e the
contradictions within his concept. ;o this is the area where the thought experiment becomes
useful. 2hat I mean is that if the thought experiment brought the scientist to the awareness of an
existing paradox due to his conceptual scheme then a conceptual change within the scientist and
his understanding of the world would occur as how he thin)s about the world would no longer be
consistent.
+
There are many arguments against the effectiveness of thought experiments, but for the
sa)e of brevity I shall present three criticisms. The arguments will be bro)en in three separate
parts and they are from Aichael :ishop, !lisa :o)ulich and Ian /ac)ing.
The first argument I shall present is :ishop7s critiue. In the essay 2hy Thought
Experiments !re 5ot !rguments, :ishop argues that 'thought experiments are not arguments*
":ishop +0?%. :y stating that thought experiments are not arguments, :ishop is claiming that it
would be difficult for us to postulate any type of )nowledge coming from thought experiments
":ishop +0+%. /is reasoning behind claim is, 'since we have two different arguments but only
3ust one thought experiment, the thought experiment cannot be the arguments* ":ishop +0?%. To
ma)e his point clear :ishop uses the Bloc)-in-the-:ox thought experiment by :ohr and Einstein
to illustrate his idea. It is important to note that we should put most of our attention to how the
scientists arrived to their conclusions, now on to the experiment ":ishop +0@%. The thought
experiment originates from 2erner /eisenberg7s uncertainty principle. The principle declares
that 'there is an irreducible limit to the accuracy to which pair of con3ugate variables "variable
pairs li)e position position-momentum, and energy-time% can be measured* ":ishop +0+%. In a
#90= conference, Einstein presented :ohr with a cloc)-in-the-box thought experiment. The
thought experiment consists of weighing a box full of photons during two intervals; before a
single photon is fired out from a shutter mechanism that opens and after the single photon is fired
out from the shutter mechanism. .sing Einstein7s theory euation of E C AB
,
, the photon7s
energy can be determined and in turn measure its time of passage to any arbitrary degree of
accuracy. Therefore, based on this thought experiment Einstein concludes that the /eisenberg7s
uncertainty principle is false ":ishop +06%. :ut the next day, :ohr showed that there is a
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fundamental limit to the measurement of the the photon7s weight "which entails also the energy%
at a particular time using any cloc)-in-the-box apparatus. !ccording to :ohr, 'there is an
irreducible limit to the accuracy to which con3ugate variables time and energy can be measured*,
hence the cloc)-in-the-box thought experiment failed. It could not show that at at particular time
the photon7s energy could be measured within any arbitrary degree of accuracy ":ishop +0@%.
:ecause of :ohr7s argument Einstein abandoned his attempt to undermine the uncertainty
principle.
!ccording to :ishop, the problem lies with both Einstein and :ohr analy(ing one thought
experiment and proposing two different arguments ":ishop +0@%. There are two arguments that
stem from the presented problem and only one can be true. The first is the arguments that were
put forth by both scientists were type-identical "wherein they are tal)ing a similar experiment,
but present it in a different way%. :ishop argues that the problem with the first argument is that
the account of the cloc)-in-the-box episode seriously misrepresented what happened ":ishop
+?=%. !nd the second is that the thought experiments proposed by :ohr and Einstein were
different to)ens "wherein they are not even tal)ing about the same experiment%. :ishop7s
reasoning behind the second claim is that if :ohr did not replicate the cloc)-in-the-box thought
experiment, then the thought experiment was not done properly. ;ince the thought experiment
convinced Einstein and the scientific community then :ohr had repeated the thought experiment,
thus the thought experiment is not type-identical to Einstein7s thought experiment ":ishop +?=%.
In the end, :ishop concludes that 'since we have two different arguments but 3ust one thought
experiment, the thought experiment cannot be the arguments* ":ishop +?=%.
The reason I am presenting :ishop7s argument is because he argues that we cannot claim
)nowledge from thought experiments as one thought experiment could postulate different types
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of arguments, wherein the individuals involved are no longer spea)ing about a similar
experiment. I am saying that through the existence of the different interpretations of thought
experiments we learn something about the conceptual apparatus which the scientist used to
analy(e the problem presented by the thought experiment; either way, the thought experiment
revealed something about the natural law and also how the scientist views the world, hence it did
its purpose. &or example, in the cloc)-in-the-box thought experiment, Einstein conceptuali(ed
the world with respect to special relativity in an attempt to undermine the uncertainty principle,
but through general relativity :ohr was able to show Einstein7s error. Through :ohr7s refutation
with the use of the thought experiment, Einstein was able to understand where he erred and how
the natural world wor)ed differently from the way he first conceptuali(ed it to be.
The second argument is from !lisa :o)ulich7s Dethin)ing Thought Experiments.
:o)ulich argues that some thought experiments are more li)e ordinary experiments, but when it
comes to function the continuity "thought experiments li)e ordinary experiments both in a sense
use a similar methodology% between thought experiments and ordinary experiments brea)down.
":o)ulich ,@6%. !ccording to :o)ulich, the reason for the brea)down is as follows:
!n examination of two thought experiments in contemporary physics reveals that the
same thought experiment can be reanaly(ed from the perspective different and incompatible
theories. This fact undermines those accounts of thought experiments that claim their
3ustificatory power comes from their ability to reveal the laws of nature... I conclude that, while
their interpretation presupposes a whole set of bac)ground theories and putative laws, thought
experiments nonetheless can evolve and be retooled for different theories and ends. ":o)ulich
,@+%
@
The first example she uses to prove her point is the thought experiment Doc)ets and Thread. The
experiment involves two roc)ets firing their engines simultaneously and gently accelerate
relativistically in the same direction, one following the other, with a thread connecting them.
2hen the roc)ets reach a four-fifths of light speed they stop accelerating simultaneously and in
move in uniform velocity. To an observer at rest, the two roc)ets 'have been moving in tandem
and are still #== meters apart*; the uestion it presents is whether the thread between the roc)ets
brea) or not ":o)ulich ,9=%. !ccording to :o)ulich, there are two ways to approach the
problem: Einstein7s special theory of relativity and Eorent(7s ether theory.
&rom the perspective of the special theory of relativity, the thread brea)s because it is
Eorent(-contracted "to 6= meters% and can no longer span #== meters between the roc)ets. The
theory says that at initial separation the distance between the roc)ets is only 6= meters, but due to
relativity between the roc)ets, they do not accelerate and come to rest simultaneously and hence
grow from 6= meters to #66.6$ meters. ;ince the rest frame is #== meters, the thread brea)s as it
cannot reach #66.6$ meters between the roc)ets ":o)ulich ,9#%.
4n a similar note, special relativity theory7s rival the Eorent(7s ether theory gives the
same result. !ccording to the theory, motion is relative to a stationary ether frame. The ether is
the medium in which electromagnetic forces are propagated, this is also where molecular forces
are transmitted. ;ince the rope is made up of atoms "a nuclei with circular orbiting electrons%,
once the nuclei begin to move relative to the stationary ether, the orbit of the electrons become
ellipses and contract to the direction of the motion. It is postulated that as the atoms and the
molecules contract so will the rope, and if the thread is not strong enough to overcome the inertia
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of the roc)ets in an attempt to bring them together as it contracts, the thread will brea) ":o)ulich
,9,%.
;he argues that even though both theories agree on the thread brea)ing, the fact is that
they differ on the perspective on why it occurs and the explanation behind it; therefore, 'thought
experiments are no more bound to any one particular theory than ordinary physical experiments
are, and second, they can underdetermine theory choice in the same way too* ":o)ulich ,90%.
:o)ulich is saying that thought experiments cannot reveal any laws of nature or the scientist7s
conceptual apparatus due to thought experiments being malleable enough to be reanaly(ed from
different perspectives; because of the its ability to 'underdetermine "account for% theory choice*,
thought experiments undermines any usefulness we can get from it "she is pretty much saying
that it suits the needs of the theory that is being presented, ergo its pointless to use it%. :ut if we
ta)e a loo) at both the experiments again, it can be inferred that it does teach us something about
nature even though their approach at the two experiments are different. The fact that the two
experiments have corresponding results means that they are grasping an underlying concept
which unites the two theories "for instance, how relativity between ob3ects can lead to brea)%.
Thus, the contrast between the approaches of special relativity and ether theory to solve the
roc)ets and thread thought experiment exhibits that there is a law there, even though it is not
uite clear to what it is other than the fact that it exists.
The second example that :o)ulich presents us is the Einstein-8odols)y-Dosen "E8D%
thought experiment; it is an example of 'a thought experiment that has changed and been
modified over time* ":o)ulich ,90%. E8D is a thought experiment that tries to show that
uantum mechanics is incomplete through the paradox 'a particle can simultaneously have a
definite position and a definite momentum* ":o)ulich ,9?%. !ccording to :o)ulich, even though
#=
E8D presented the paradox, it was not necessarily right. There is evidence that Einstein disagreed
with 8odols)y and it was in fact he thought that the thought experiment showed that E8D could
not maintain both states, hence uantum mechanics is complete ":o)ulich ,90%. Even though
E8D gave a solution, the disagreement between Einstein and 8odols)y7s interpretation shows the
inconsistency that thought experiments presents as did the other interpretations of the thought
experiment in history":o)ulich ,90%. :o)ulich argues that if we ta)e a loo) at the history of
discussion of the E8D thought experiment, there many oversimplifications which led to the
misunderstanding of the thought experiment; therefore, what we should ta)e from it is that
thought experiments succeeds or fails depending on the 'reference to the intentions of the
proponent of the thought experiment* and that they can be 'rethought and retooled for new
purposes* ":o)ulich ,9@%. ;he says that it is 'the fact that the same thought experiment can be
rethought from the perspective of different and incompatible theories* is what ma)es the
argument that thought experiments aid us in understanding nature less plausible ":o)ulich ,99%.
:efore I argue against what :o)ulich said, I will summari(e her claim. ;he argues that,
because thought experiments can be reanaly(ed from different perspectives and incompatible
theories, then it cannot reveal the laws of nature. /er main point is because thought experiments
can be molded to fit the needs of the individual interpreting it, it does not produce any
understanding of nature as the individual would 3ust be manipulating it to suit his needs. I will
now argue what :o)ulich stated. Fust because the thought experiment can be molded into
whatever a theory needs does not mean that it will be consistent with natural law. In more
Kuhnian terms, 'our sub3ects hand in their transactions with nature, successfully employed a
conceptual fabric different from the one ourselves. That fabric was time tested; it had not yet
confronted them with difficulties. 5evertheless, as of the time we encountered them, they had at
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least acuired a variety of experience which could not be assimilated by their traditional mode of
dealing with the world* "Kuhn ,6%. :ut in a simpler term, sooner or later, a well thought up
thought experiment will challenge the theory. !nd if the theory is sound and parallel to the laws
of nature then it will hold, if not, then a paradox will surface and proceed to remodel the
conceptual apparatus and teach the law of nature to the individual employing the theory.
The last criticism I shall entertain is Ian /ac)ing7s argument that thought experiments 'do
not have a life on their own* "/ac)ing 0=,%. /ac)ing tells us that for an experiment to be
effective, it must have a life on their own. 2hat he means by experiments having a life on their
own is, experiment are organic and they develop and change while at the same time 'retain a
certain long-term development which ma)es us tal) about repeating and replicating* them
"/ac)ing 0=$%. /ac)ing argues that since thought experiments do not have a life on their own,
then thought experiments are not effective. The reasoning behind the argument is that due to the
nature of thought experiments being fixed and largely immutable, it would be hard for it to
evolve and be used 'over and over in new context* "/ac)ing 0=$%. Thought experiments only
have one tension to expose, /ac)ing argues, thus they are stuc) as they can only 'reveal tensions
between one vision of the world and another* "/ac)ing 0=$%. ! thought experiment can only
present one thing to the scientist, the same idea that it presented to the scientist that did the
thought experiment before him; so when people rethin) the experiment from different
generations the same idea is being portrayed hence the uselessness of being an experiment
"/ac)ing 0=$%.
The reason I am presenting /ac)ing is because of his argument that since thought
experiments are not alive, and by being alive, he means thought experiments are not organic in a
way that they do not present anything new, develop and change as they are always the same, li)e
#,
the !ristotle7s uniform motion, then it is not useful. /ac)ing is saying that since thought
experiments are not useful, they would not aid in changing our conceptual apparatus and reveal
the the natural world. /e argues that they are used over and over again but there is nothing new
to be obtained from them. Blaiming that thought experiments stagnate and do not develop or
change is where I find /ac)ing errs. !ccording to :o)ulich, thought experiments do not
stagnate, but rather they change and become misconstrued; evidence for this is the numerous
interpretation of E8D throughout history ":o)ulich ,9@%. The numerous interpretations and ways
to present thought experiments is what :o)ulich presents to be the problem with thought
experiments. ;o now, if we follow :o)ulich7s argument that thought experiments are always
changing depending on the person interpreting, then we can suppose that they are alive by
/ac)ing7s terms, and if they are alive then it would mean that they would be useful and thus
present us with a new conceptual apparatus and an understanding of the world.
I agree with Kuhn with regards to thought experiments aiding us in understanding nature
and learning about our conceptual apparatus; it is a tool to be used in order to further our
understanding. In the essay above, I have outlined how it is possible for thought experiments to
aid us in learning our conception of nature and understanding the world; through contradictions
of the sub3ect7s view of nature and the inability of it to fit into the natural world. :ut unless the
conflict, which is presented by the thought experiment, has been encountered before by the
sub3ect unclearly, then he cannot learn anything from the thought experiment "Kuhn ,$%.
#0
2or)s Bited
:ishop, Aichael. '2hy Thought Experiments !re 5ot !rguments.* 8hilosophy of ;cience 66.?
"#999%: +0?-+?#.
:o)ulich, !lisa. 'Dethin)ing Thought Experiments.* 8erspective on ;cience 9.0 ",==#%: ,@+-
0=$.
/ac)ing, Ian. '1o Thought Experiments /ave a Eife of Their 4wnG Bomments on Fames
:rown, 5ancy 5ersessian and 1avid >ooding.* 8receedings of the :iennial Aeeting of
the 8hilosophy of ;cience !ssociation #99,., "#99,%: 0=,-0=@.
Kuhn, T. ;. '! &unction for Thought Experiments.* ;cientific Devolutions. Ed. Ian /ac)ing.
5ew Hor): 4xford .niversity 8ress, #9@?. 6-,$.
Kuhn, Thomas ;. The ;tructure of ;cientific Devolutions 0
rd
Edition . Bhicago, IE: The
.niversity of Bhicago 8ress, #996.
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