January 17, 2014

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

205 NEWBURY STREET
PORTLAND, MAINE 04101-4125

RE: STATE OF MAINE v. GINA TURCOTTE
KEN-13-514


This letter is attached to ask the court to accept my Appeal Brief even
though it was not filed within the time required.
Appellant is without her own transportation, living on social security
disability income and is not a licensed or practiced attorney. Most of
Appellant's preparation for this Appeal Brief was focused on researching court
rules and procedures ensuring technical precision which effectively delayed the
final production of this document.
In light of the numerous constitutional due process violations committed
by Appellee throughout this entire matter, Appellant asks the court and
Appellee to offer leniency and accept this untimely filing.
Thank you.
In Peace,

GINA TURCOTTE
41 LAMBERT AVENUE
AUGUSTA, MAINE






MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
SITTING AS THE LAW COURT

KEN-13-514



GINA TURCOTTE


APPELLANT


v.


SECRETARY OF STATE


APPELLEE




APPEAL BRIEF FOR APPELLANT






Gina Turcotte
APPELLANT
41 Lambert Avenue
Augusta, Maine

i
Table of Contents

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................................... 1
NOTICE OF COMPANION CASES .................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................................................ 2
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............................................................................... 9
1. WHETHER FAILURE TO FILE MEDICAL EVALUATION RISES TO 29-A
MRSA 2458(2)(D) INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE.

2. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
APPELLANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE.

3. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY
SUSPENDING THE LICENSE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
INCOMPETENCY OR CONSULTATION WITH MEDICAL ADVISORY
BOARD.

4. WHETHER OFC. DOSSANTOS NOTIFIED APPELLANT OF ALL
REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL NOTICE' ON MARCH 7, 2011.

5. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN MARCH AND APRIL 2013.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 9
STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................... 11
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 12
ii
1. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
DETERMINED 'FAILURE TO FILE MEDICAL EVALUATION' IS THE
EQUIVALENT OF 'INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE'.
2. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
DETERMINED APPELLANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR
VEHICLE WITHOUT SUPPORTING EVIDENCE.

3. SECRETARY OF STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY SUSPENDING
THE LICENSE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY
OR CONSULTATION WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.

4. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
DETERMINED OFC. DOSSANTOS NOTIFIED APPELLANT OF ALL
REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL NOTICE' ON MARCH 7, 2011.

5. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
FAILED TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN MARCH AND
APRIL 2013.

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................... 19



iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
DICTIONARY

Blacks Law Dictionary, 1st Edition

CONSTITUTION

United States Constitution, All Pertinent Due Process Clauses

Maine Constitution, All Pertinent Due Process Clauses

CASES

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500, Supreme Court 1964
Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, 7, 838 A.2d 1157
Carrier v. Secretary of State, 60 A. 3d 1241, Me Supreme Judicial Court 2012
Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, 11, 896 A.2d 271
CWCO, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 1997 ME 226, 6, 703 A.2d 1258, 1261
Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, 12, 55 A.3d 411
Haines v. Kerner 404 US 519
Liberty Ins. Underwr. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, 15, 957 A.2d 94
McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, 5, 896 A.2d 933
Norris Perry v. Secretary of State, AP-00-02
STATUTES


29-A MRSA 2412-A(1-A)(A)

29-A MRSA 1258

29-A MRSA 1258(4)

29-A MRSA 1258(5)

iv
29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D)

29-A MRSA 2458(4)

5 MRSA 10003

5 MRSA 10004(3)

29-A MRSA 2482

MAINE MOTOR VEHICLE RULES

29-250 Motor Vehicle Rules Section 2

29-250 Motor Vehicle Rules Section 3


Page 1 of 24
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Appellant's case is heavily laden with constitutional violations by
Appellee "that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties" Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 US 500, Supreme Court 1964.
Appellant is not a licensed nor a practiced attorney and has no formal
legal education or training. Appellant has a long and diverse administrative
work history involving proper application of various laws but has a very limited
knowledge of court rules, procedures and appellate process.
Hence, Appellant asks the law court to honor United States Supreme
Court's precedent in Haines v. Kerner 404 US 519, which stipulates, "the pro se
complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers" and excuse Appellant's minor technical errors as harmless
errors having no influence on the merits or outcome of this case.
Appellant has expressly reserved and continues to expressly reserve all of
her natural and common law rights as protected and guaranteed by the federal
and Maine Constitutions, on and for the record, nunc pro tunc. Appellant also
expressly reserves her right to amend without leave of court.
NOTICE OF COMPANION CASES
There are three (3) companion cases to this instant case, not including
Violations Bureau companion cases, which are docketed under:
AUGDC-CR-2011-512
AUGDC-CR-2011-513
AUGSC-CR-2012-286
Page 2 of 24
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant became transient in September 2007 after a micro-burst
tornado seriously damaged her rented home in Windsor, Maine which
consequently caused her residency to become stopgap and unstable for several
years. Appellant has since lived in a few dozen different places with some
lasting only a few days.
Consequently, Appellant was unable to keep a current mailing address
consistently on file with Appellee which prevented mail from being delivered to
Appellant which caused Appellant to unknowingly fail to fulfill a request for
medical evaluation in November 2009.
The record shows two medical notices were returned as undeliverable on
November 10 and December 29, 2009 by the United States Postal Service.
Appellee issued Appellant a violation free credit on December 31, 2009.
The record shows Appellee did not post pertinent public notices in their
attempt to contact Appellant and follow due process, nor were public notices
issued of a potential 'health or safety hazard' caused by Appellants alleged
'incompetence to drive a motor vehicle'.
In fact, no actual notices were served on Appellant at all.
Despite the record clearly showing Appellant had not received nor been
served with the required actual notices, Appellee ignored and violated
constitutional and procedural due process and suspended the license on
January 5, 2010 pursuant to 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) without holding a
preliminary hearing, without receiving any reports of adverse operation,
Page 3 of 24
without having clear and sufficient evidence of incompetency, without having
clear and sufficient evidence of a health or safety hazard, and without any
advice of the Medical Advisory Board or any other competent medical
professional.
Appellee maintained the administrative medical suspension for 397 days
beyond the statutory limitations imposed by 5 MRSA 10004(3) Action without
Hearing.
On February 10, 2011, Augusta Police Ofc. DosSantos initiated a traffic
stop without probable cause that a crime had been, was being, or was about to
be committed, which resulted in Appellant being released from the scene after
being issued a Violation Summons and Complaint for failure to obey a traffic
control device. Ofc. DosSantos did not indicate in any way that license
#1491178 was suspended or revoked. (AUGDC-CR-2011-512) (VB#2576761)
On March 7, 2011, Augusta Police Ofc. DosSantos, without probable
cause that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed, and
with full knowledge the license was suspended for medical reasons, initiated a
traffic stop and twice asked Appellant if her license was suspended which
Appellant twice denied; this communication served as Appellants first actual
notice of the medical suspension only. (AUGDC-CR-2011-513)
Ofc. DosSantos asked Appellant if she knew any reason the medical unit
would have to suspend the license. Appellant denied any knowledge insisting
the license should be active.
Page 4 of 24
Ofc. DosSantos told Appellant he had no knowledge of the basis for the
medical suspension, the statutory authority for the suspension, nor did he
inform Appellant that she had a right to request an administrative hearing.
Ofc. DosSantos did not fulfill the requirements of actual notice under 29-
A MRSA 2482 or Motor Vehicle Rules 29-250, Ch. 2, Section 2 Notice of
Opportunity for Hearing during the March 7, 2011 traffic stop.
Ofc. DosSantos issued two (2) Uniform Summons And Complaints under
29-A MRSA 2412-A(1-A)(A) for February 10 and March 7, 2011. (AUGDC-CR-
2011-512/513)
Appellant called the Medical Unit at Bureau of Motor Vehicle upon her
arrival home on March 7, 2011.
Appellant contacted her physician on March 8, 2011 fulfilling Appellees
request for a medical evaluation with a signed declaration by Appellants
physician that Appellant was not using any medication at the time of the 2010
suspension, nor currently. (Physician's Report, March 8, 2011)
In fact, Appellant ceased taking all pharmaceuticals in 2006.
Appellant never received any type of verbal or written notice prior to
March 2013 that she was entitled to an administrative hearing or the license
had been suspended pursuant to 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) for incompetency.
The record shows no adverse report of unsafe operation nor the advice of
the Medical Advisory Board supporting any type of suspension.
Appellee deleted the medical suspension on March 8, 2011. (Dr. Record
1491178, 4/06/12 09:45:18, Page 3)
Page 5 of 24
Appellee issued a violation free credit to Appellant on March 8, 2011 for
the calendar year 2010. (Dr. Record 1491178, 4/06/12 09:45:18, Page 3)
On March 8, 2011 Appellant went to the District Attorneys office to ask
for a dismissal of AUGDC-CR-2011-512 and AUGDC-CR-2011-513, which the
District Attorney explicitly rejected.
On July 5, 2011, Appellant appeared at her bench trial for AUGDC-CR-
2011-512 and AUGDC-CR-2011-513 and submitted a certified public copy of
driving record #1491178 to the district court judge showing no suspension
existed on February 10 or March 7, 2011, which the court rejected.
Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendre vis compulsiva on July 5, 2011
to AUGDC-CR-2011-513.
AUGDC-CR-2011-512 was dismissed.
Appellant repeatedly expressed to the court that she had not received
actual knowledge or notice of any suspension until March 7, 2011 and that all
charges must be dismissed for Appellees failure to comply with actual notice
requirements under 29-A MRSA 2412-A(1-A).
Appellant was not represented by nor did she waive her right to counsel
in criminal prosecutions of AUGDC-CR-2011-512 and 513.
Appellant did not have actual notice of the specific statutory authority
of the medical suspension until March 2013 thereby being unaware of her
right to request an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension nunc
pro tunc.
Page 6 of 24
In March 2013, Appellant discovered the statutory authority of the
medical suspension while reviewing evidence for AUG-CR-2012-286.
On March 18, 2013, Appellant sent her first request for administrative
hearing to Appellee.
Assistant Director Susan Cole rejected Appellant's request on March
20, 2013 stating Appellants current suspensions did not allow for an
administrative hearing.
On March 28, 2013, Appellant sent her second demand for an
administrative hearing claiming the medical suspension was commenced
improperly, without sufficient evidence to support the suspension, without
required notices and in violation of due process, which was sent directly to
Robert OConnell, Director of Legal Affairs, Adjudications and Hearings.
On April 2, 2013, Mr. OConnell denied Appellants demand for an
administrative hearing specifying, Your request for an administrative hearing
on a license suspension of which you became knowledgeable two years ago
and that was terminated two years past is denied as untimely.
On April 8, 2013, Appellant sent a third demand for an administrative
hearing and notice of violation of procedural due process to Appellee again
demanding an administrative hearing and the opportunity to review the
evidence which supported Appellees decision to suspend the license without
notice or opportunity for preliminary hearing.
On April 10, 2013, Mr. OConnell again denied Appellants demand for
administrative hearing specifying, I am in receipt of your correspondence of
Page 7 of 24
April 8, 2013 in response to my letter of April 2, 2013 to you denying your
request for an administrative hearing. As I advised you in that letter, my
decision represents final agency action in this matter. You may seek judicial
review of this final agency action pursuant to the provisions of 5 M.R. S.
11001-11008.
At no time has Appellee disputed or contested any facts in the record.
On April 22, 2013 Appellant filed a Rule 80C Petition and Application
and Affidavit to Proceed without Payment of Fees which was ordered on April
25, 2013 by Judge Murphy.
On May 24, 2013 Appellant filed an Affidavit and Request for Default
Judgment for Appellee's failure to file the Certified Record on time.
On May 28, 2013 Appellee filed the Certified Record with the court.
On May 29, 2013 a Notice and Briefing Schedule was mailed to both
parties.
On May 31, 2013, Appellee filed Respondent's Motion to Enlarge Time
to File Record Nunc Pro Tunc.
On June 27, 2013, J. Nivison ordered Appellee's Motion to Enlarge
Time to File Record Nunc Pro Tunc.
On July 6, 2013, Appellant filed a Motion to Enlarge Time to File Brief.
On July 12, 2013 J. Murphy ordered Appellant's Motion to Enlarge
Time to File Brief setting the deadline to file the brief for July 15, 2013.
On July 15, 2013, Appellant filed the Rule 80C Brief with the court.
Page 8 of 24
On July 31, 2013, Appellee filed Brief of Respondent with the court
accompanied by a letter stating in the event the Petitioner requests oral
argument, Respondent waives its right to be present for the argument.
On August 14, 2013, Appellant filed Petitioner's Reply Brief.
On September 18, 2013, Appellant filed a letter with superior court
requesting that oral arguments be scheduled.
On September 21, 2013, superior court scheduled oral arguments for
October 9, 2013 at 11:00am.
On October 9, 2013, oral argument was held with J. Murphy presiding,
Appellant was present and prepared but Appellee was absent as noted.
J. Murphy took Appellant's argument under advisement. Tape 1767,
Index 6245-7380.
On October 24, 2013, J. Murphy affirmed Appellee's decision of April 2,
2013 indicating, "actual notice was given to Turcotte by a law enforcement
officer, who during a traffic stop, personally informed Turcotte that her driver's
license had been suspended... Turcotte's request for an administrative hearing
to challenge the January 5, 2010 suspension was untimely...."
On November 1, 2013, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and
Application and Affidavit to Proceed without Payment of Fees which was
ordered on November 6, 2013 by J. Murphy.
Appellant's appeal was docketed by the law court on November 15,
2013.

Page 9 of 24
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. WHETHER FAILURE TO FILE MEDICAL EVALUATION RISES TO 29-A
MRSA 2458(2)(D) INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE.

2. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
APPELLANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE.

3. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY
SUSPENDING THE LICENSE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
INCOMPETENCY OR CONSULTATION WITH MEDICAL ADVISORY
BOARD.

4. WHETHER OFC. DOSSANTOS NOTIFIED APPELLANT OF ALL
REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL NOTICE' ON MARCH 7, 2011.

5. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN MARCH AND APRIL 2013.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Suspending any license without providing required notices, hearings and
following procedural due process is a violation of the Maine Constitution.
Appellee improperly determined that 'failure to file a medical evaluation'
was equivalent to 'incompetent to drive a motor vehicle' and then abusively and
capriciously suspended license #1491178 under 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) on
January 5, 2010 because Appellant did not receive, was not aware of and did
not comply with a request for medical evaluation in November and December
2009. Both notices were returned to Appellee by the USPS effectively nullifying
any notice Appellee attempted to serve. There is no evidence Appellee posted
public notices as required by 5 MRSA 10003.
The record shows no evidence of adverse or unsafe operation, no
recommendation by the Medical Advisory Board in support of indefinite
Page 10 of 24
suspension for incompetence, no evidence whatsoever of incompetence and no
proof that all elements of actual notice of suspension were provided to
Appellant prior to March 2013.
Appellee improperly denied Appellant's request for administrative hearing
as untimely because Appellee incorrectly claims that actual notice was given to
Appellant by Ofc. DosSantos on March 7, 2011 during a traffic stop.
Appellee's erroneous claim that Ofc. DosSantos provided Appellant with
all required elements of 'actual notice' on March 7, 2011 is unsubstantiated
and wholly false.
The Maine Legislature has established clear rules indicating form,
content and delivery of suspension notices which mandate strict compliance
with all elements of actual notice and which must be supported by evidentiary
proof of the alleged actual notice.
"The statutory authority for suspension of a driver's license by the
Secretary of State in this case is set forth in section 2458(2)(D) which authorizes
the suspension if the licensed driver 'is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle.'
Although this is a decision of the Secretary of State or his designee, the Secretary
does have available the assistance of his Medical Advisory Board which may, at
the Secretary's request, interview drivers whose competency is in question. 29-A
MRSA 1258(4)." Norris Perry v. Secretary of State, AP-00-02
However, 5 MRSA 10003. Right To Hearing stipulates, "an agency may
not amend or modify any license unless it has afforded the licensee an
opportunity for hearing in conformity with subchapter IV, nor may it refuse to
Page 11 of 24
renew any license unless it has afforded the licensee either an opportunity for an
agency hearing in conformity with subchapter IV or an opportunity for a hearing
in the District Court. In any such proceeding determined by the agency to involve
a substantial public interest, an opportunity for public comment and participation
must also be given by public notice in conformity with subchapter IV.
When Appellee suspends a license pursuant to 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D)
without providing a hearing or making evidentiary findings, Appellee must
adhere to 5 MRSA 10004(3) Action Without Hearing, "Health or safety hazard.
The health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a
significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's
action, and acting in accordance with subchapter IV or VI would fail to
adequately respond to a known risk, provided that the revocation, suspension or
refusal to renew shall not continue for more than 30 days."
Clearly and convincingly, the record does not contain "competent and
substantial evidence which supports the results reached by the agency." CWCO,
Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 1997 ME 226, 6, 703 A.2d 1258, 1261. "The
remaining issue is whether there were findings not supported by the evidence.
Again, the issue is not whether the court would have the same decision based
upon the evidence, but rather whether there was any evidence of record to
support the agency's findings." Norris Perry v. Secretary of State, AP-00-02
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Because the Superior Court acted as an intermediate appellate court, we
directly review the Secretary of State's decision." McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006
Page 12 of 24
ME 50, 5, 896 A.2d 933. We review issues of statutory and constitutional
interpretation de novo. Id. We first look to the plain meaning of the statute,
interpreting its language "to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results,"
Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, 12, 55 A.3d 411
(quotation marks omitted), and attempting to give all of its words meaning,
Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, 11, 896 A.2d 271.
When a statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute directly, without
applying the rule of statutory construction that "prefers interpretations ... that
do not raise constitutional problems," McGee, 2006 ME 50, 18, 896 A.2d 933,
and without examining legislative history, Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003
ME 147, 7, 838 A.2d 1157, or the agency's interpretation, Cobb, 2006 ME 48,
13, 896 A.2d 271. "We look to legislative history and other extraneous aids in
interpretation of a statute only when we have determined that the statute is
ambiguous." Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149,
15, 957 A.2d 94. "A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to
different interpretations." Estate of Joyce, 2012 ME 62, 12, 55 A.3d 411."
Carrier v. Secretary of State, 60 A. 3d 1241, Me Supreme Judicial Court 2012.
ARGUMENT
1. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
DETERMINED 'FAILURE TO FILE MEDICAL EVALUATION' IS THE
EQUIVALENT OF 'INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE'.
Page 13 of 24
Appellant has been unable to locate any case law on point but Blacks
Law Dictionary, 1st Edition, defines incompetency as lack of ability, legal
qualification, or fitness to discharge the required duty.
The record does not show any evidence of adverse or dangerous
operation, lack of ability, lack of legal qualification, or lack of fitness by
Appellant to support any claim of incompetency. Additionally, the record shows
Appellant was issued three consecutive years violation free credits for 2008,
2009 and 2010 indicating Appellant had committed no violations and was able,
legally qualified and fit to receive those violation free credits.
Appellant did not receive actual notice of the request for medical
evaluation nor did Appellee post required public notices thereby preventing
Appellant from complying with its terms; however, even if Appellant had actual
notice but still had not complied with the medical evaluation request, there is
no evidence in the record to substantiate a license suspension for
"incompetency to drive a motor vehicle".
2. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
DETERMINED APPELLANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR
VEHICLE WITHOUT SUPPORTING EVIDENCE.
Nowhere in the record does Appellee claim to exercise any power under
29-A MRSA 1258(5) to suspend the license indefinitely for Appellant's failure
to submit to a medical evaluation. Instead, Appellee claimed authority under
29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) despite lack of any "showing by the Secretary of State's
records or other sufficient evidence" that Appellant was "incompetent to drive a
Page 14 of 24
motor vehicle". Appellee claims no other authoritative statutes in the December
17, 2009 suspension letter to support the January 5, 2010 suspension.
Upon Appellee deciding to suspend the license for incompetence under
29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) simply because Appellant failed to comply with a
medical evaluation request, Appellee knowingly and willfully failed to consult
the Medical Advisory Board under 29-A MRSA 1258 to determine if
Appellant's continued operation created any potential hazard to the public.
Appellee suspended the license under the statutory authority of 29-A
MRSA 2458(2)(D) citing incompetence; therefore, it is reasonable that Appellee
was also invoking 5 MRSA 10004(3) Action without Hearing because of the
alleged potential danger allegedly caused by Appellants continued operation.
If the law court finds that Appellant's failure to receive or comply with
the request for a medical evaluation rises to the level of incompetence to drive a
motor vehicle, the law court must specifically define the phrase 'incompetence
to drive a motor vehicle' and explicitly indentify the evidence in the record
which supports the determination of 'incompetence to drive a motor vehicle'.
3. SECRETARY OF STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY SUSPENDING
THE LICENSE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY
OR CONSULTATION WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.
The record shows no sufficient facts or evidence to substantiate or
support Appellee's decision to suspend the license for incompetence under 29-
A MRSA 2458(2)(D) without consulting the Medical Advisory Board.
Page 15 of 24
4. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
DETERMINED OFC. DOSSANTOS NOTIFIED APPELLANT OF ALL
REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL NOTICE' ON MARCH 7, 2011.
The final outcome of this case hinges upon the law court's decision if
Appellant received 'actual notice' of the December 2009 Notice of Suspension
for Failure to File Medical Evaluation as required by statute and motor vehicle
rules.
Appellee falsely alleges that 'actual notice' was given to Appellant verbally
on March 7, 2011 by Ofc. DosSantos of the Augusta Police Department during
a traffic stop.
There is no evidence in the record to support Appellee's claim that Ofc.
DosSantos satisfied requirements of actual notice by informing Appellant of all
elements subject to the provisions of 29-A MRSA 2458(4).
29-250, Ch. 2 Motor Vehicle Rules clearly state for Administrative
Hearings, subsection 2, Secretary of State upon suspending or revoking a
persons license...shall notify that person that the person has a right to and may
request a hearing. The notice must state:
1. The reason and statutory grounds for the suspension or revocation;
2. The effective date of the suspension or revocation;
3. The procedure for requesting a hearing; and
4. The date by which that request for hearing must be made.
There is no evidence in the record to substantiate the claim that Ofc.
DosSantos knew or informed Appellant of the reason or statutory grounds for
Page 16 of 24
the suspension, the procedure for requesting a hearing, or the date by which
the request for hearing must be made. The only knowledge Ofc. DosSantos
claimed to have or delivered to Appellant was the license was suspended by the
medical unit on January 5, 2010.
5. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
FAILED TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN MARCH AND
APRIL 2013.
29-250 Motor Vehicle Rules Section 3 requires, "If a request is made after
the ten day period and the Secretary of State finds that the person was unable to
make a timely request due to lack of actual notice of the suspension..., the
Secretary of State shall waive the period of limitation, reopen the matter and
grant the hearing request, except a stay may not be granted."
Superior Court indicated in their October decision that the waiver applies
only "if Petitioner can prove she did not have 'actual' notice of the suspension.
But these are not the facts of this case. On March 7, 2011, an actual notice was
given to Turcotte by a law enforcement officer, who during the traffic stop,
personally informed Turcotte that her driver's license had been suspended."
There are no facts in the record to substantiate Appellee's claim that
actual notice was properly given to Appellant by Ofc. DosSantos on March 7,
2011.
Appellant maintains Ofc. DosSantos confessed to having no knowledge
by which he was competent to provide actual notice of all elements as required
Page 17 of 24
by law. The only element of actual notice Ofc. DosSantos provided was that the
license had been suspended by the medical unit on January 5, 2010.
There is no evidence in the record that Appellant was given verbal or
written notice by the medical unit on March 7 or 8, 2011 of the statutory
authority for the medical suspension or of Appellant's right to request an
administrative hearing to challenge the evidence and basis for the suspension.
Appellee cannot substantiate by evidence in the record that Appellant
received actual notice prior to March 2013 of the statutory authority for the
medical suspension under 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons together with those reasons the law court finds
pertinent and persuasive, Appellant respectfully moves the court to find that
actual notice requirements were not met, immediately reverse the January 5,
2010 decision by Secretary of State to suspend the license under 29-A MRSA
2458(2)(D) for 'incompetence to drive a motor vehicle', void all companion
cases which resulted directly or indirectly from this medical suspension
(docketed under AUGDC-CR-2011-512, AUGDC-CR-2011-513, AUGSC-CR-
2012-286, including unidentified Violations Bureau summonses).
If the law court remands this action back to Secretary of State for proper
hearing, the final outcome will be a full nullification of the medical suspension
as well as all companion cases resulting directly or indirectly from the 2010
medical suspension so Appellant moves the law court to take the appropriate
action now nullifying the medical suspension and all corresponding violations,
Page 18 of 24
and issuing an order for a complete refund and forgiveness of all fines and
reinstatement fees resulting from this and the companion cases cited herein.
If the law court decides actual notice was provided as required by law,
and that "failure to file a medical evaluation" rises to the level of being
"incompetent to drive a motor vehicle", Appellant needs full definitive opinions
specifying the elements which caused Appellant to become "incompetent to
drive a motor vehicle" and the facts and evidence supporting those opinions.
Dated in Augusta Maine this 17th day of January 2014.
In Peace,

GINA TURCOTTE
41 LAMBERT AVENUE
AUGUSTA, MAINE

Page 19 of 24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 17, 2014, I filed and served the foregoing
brief by causing a copy to be electronically filed and served on all counsel of
record via the appellate CM/ECF system. I also hereby certify that I have
caused all necessary copies to be delivered to the Court by United States Postal
Service Priority Mail.

DATED: January 17, 2014 __________________________________________
GINA TURCOTTE