Reagan Doctrine

1
Reagan Doctrine
U.S. President Ronald Reagan
The Reagan Doctrine was a strategy orchestrated and
implemented by the United States under the Reagan
Administration to oppose the global influence of the Soviet Union
during the final years of the Cold War. While the doctrine lasted
less than a decade, it was the centerpiece of United States foreign
policy from the early 1980s until the end of the Cold War in 1991.
Under the Reagan Doctrine, the United States provided overt and
covert aid to anti-communist guerrillas and resistance movements
in an effort to "roll back" Soviet-backed communist governments
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The doctrine was designed to
diminish Soviet influence in these regions as part of the
administration's overall Cold War strategy.
Background
The Reagan Doctrine followed in the tradition of U.S. presidents
developing foreign policy "doctrines", which were designed to
reflect the challenges facing international relations of the times, and propose foreign policy solutions to them. The
practice began with the Monroe Doctrine of President James Monroe in 1823, and continued with the Roosevelt
Corollary, sometimes called the Roosevelt Doctrine, introduced by Theodore Roosevelt in 1904.
The current postWorld War II tradition of Presidential doctrines started with the 1947 Truman Doctrine, under
which the United States provided support to the governments of Greece and Turkey as part of a Cold War strategy to
keep those two nations out of the Soviet sphere of influence. The Truman Doctrine was followed by the Eisenhower
Doctrine, the Kennedy Doctrine, the Johnson Doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine, and the Carter Doctrine, all of which
defined the foreign policy approaches of these respective U.S. presidents on some of the largest global challenges of
their administrations.
Origins of the Reagan Doctrine
Carter administration and Afghanistan
Main article: Operation Cyclone
"To watch the courageous Afghan freedom fighters battle modern arsenals with simple hand-held weapons is an inspiration to those
who love freedom."
U.S. President Ronald Reagan, March 21, 1983
[1]
Reagan Doctrine
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President Reagan meeting with Afghan
Mujahideen leaders in the Oval Office in 1983
At least one component of the Reagan Doctrine technically pre-dated
the Reagan Presidency. In Afghanistan, the Carter administration
began providing limited covert military assistance to Afghanistan's
mujahideen in an effort to drive the Soviets out of the nation, or at least
raise the military and political cost of the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. The policy of aiding the mujahideen in their war against
the Soviet occupation was originally proposed by Carter's national
security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and was implemented by U.S.
intelligence services. It enjoyed broad bipartisan political support.
Democratic congressman Charlie Wilson became obsessed with the
Afghan cause, and was able to leverage his position on the House Appropriations committees to encourage other
Democratic congressmen to vote for CIA Afghan war money, with the tacit approval of Speaker of the House Tip
O'Neill (D-MA), even as the Democratic party lambasted Reagan for the CIA's secret war in Central America. It was
a complex web of relationships described in George Crile III's book Charlie Wilson's War.
Wilson teamed with CIA manager Gust Avrakotos and formed a team of a few dozen insiders who greatly enhanced
the support for the Mujahideen, funneling it through Zia ul-Haq's ISI. Avrakotos and Wilson charmed leaders from
various anti-Soviet countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and China to increase support for the rebels.
Avrakotos hired Michael G. Vickers, a young Paramilitary Officer, to enhance the guerilla's odds by revamping the
tactics, weapons, logistics, and training used by the Mujahideen.
[]
Michael Pillsbury, a Pentagon official, and
Vincent Cannistraro pushed the CIA to supply the Stinger missile to the rebels. President Reagan's Covert Action
program has been given credit for assisting in ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
[2][3]
Heritage Foundation initiatives
With the arrival of the Reagan administration, the Heritage Foundation and other conservative foreign policy think
tanks saw a political opportunity to significantly expand Carter's Afghanistan policy into a more global "doctrine",
including U.S. support to anti-communist resistance movements in Soviet-allied nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. According to the book Rollback, "it was the Heritage Foundation that translated theory into concrete
policy. Heritage targeted nine nations for rollback: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Libya,
Nicaragua, and Vietnam".
Throughout the 1980s, the Heritage Foundation's foreign policy expert on the Third World, Michael Johns, the
foundation's principal Reagan Doctrine advocate, visited with resistance movements in Angola, Cambodia,
Nicaragua, and other Soviet-supported nations and urged the Reagan administration to initiate or expand military and
political support to them. Heritage Foundation foreign policy experts also endorsed the Reagan Doctrine in two of
their Mandate for Leadership books, which provided comprehensive policy advice to Reagan administration
officials.
[4]
The result was that, in addition to Afghanistan, the Reagan Doctrine was rather quickly applied in Angola and
Nicaragua, with the United States providing military support to the UNITA movement in Angola and the "contras" in
Nicaragua, but without a declaration of war against either country. Addressing the Heritage Foundation in October
1989, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the Heritage Foundation's efforts "a source of great support. No Angolan
will forget your efforts. You have come to Jamba, and you have taken our message to Congress and the
Administration".
[5]
U.S. aid to UNITA began to flow overtly after Congress repealed the Clark Amendment, a
long-standing legislative prohibition on military aid to UNITA.
Following these victories, Johns and the Heritage Foundation urged further expanding the Reagan Doctrine to
Ethiopia, where they argued that the Ethiopian famine was a product of the military and agricultural policies of
Ethiopia's Soviet-supported Mengistu Haile Mariam government. Johns and Heritage also argued that Mengistu's
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decision to permit a Soviet naval and air presence on the Red Sea ports of Eritrea represented a strategic challenge to
U.S. security interests in the Middle East and North Africa.
[6]
The Heritage Foundation and the Reagan administration also sought to apply the Reagan Doctrine in Cambodia. The
largest resistance movement fighting Cambodia's communist government was largely made up of members of the
former Khmer Rouge regime, whose human rights record was among the worst of the 20th century. Therefore,
Reagan authorized the provision of aid to a smaller Cambodian resistance movement, a coalition called the Khmer
People's National Liberation Front,
[7]
known as the KPNLF and then run by Son Sann; in an effort to force an end to
the Vietnamese occupation. Eventually, the Vietnamese withdrew, and Cambodia's communist regime fell.
[8]
Then,
under United Nations supervision, free elections were held.
While the Reagan Doctrine enjoyed strong support from the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise
Institute, the libertarian-oriented Cato Institute opposed the Reagan Doctrine, arguing in 1986 that "most Third
World struggles take place in arenas and involve issues far removed from legitimate American security needs. U.S.
involvement in such conflicts expands the republic's already overextended commitments without achieving any
significant prospective gains. Instead of draining Soviet military and financial resources, we end up dissipating our
own." Wikipedia:Citation needed
Even Cato, however, conceded that the Reagan Doctrine had "fired the enthusiasm of the conservative movement in
the United States as no foreign policy issue has done in decades". While opposing the Reagan Doctrine as an official
governmental policy, Cato instead urged Congress to remove the legal barriers prohibiting private organizations and
citizens from supporting these resistance movements.
[9]
Reagan administration advocates
The U.S.-supported Nicaraguan contras.
Within the Reagan administration, the doctrine was quickly
embraced by nearly all of Reagan's top national security and
foreign policy officials, including Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger, UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and a series
of Reagan National Security advisers including John
Poindexter, Frank Carlucci, and Colin Powell.
Reagan himself was a vocal proponent of the policy. Seeking
to expand Congressional support for the doctrine in the 1985
State of the Union Address in February 1985, Reagan said:
"We must not break faith with those who are risking their
lives...on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua...to
defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours
from birth. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense".
As part of his effort to gain Congressional support for the
Nicaraguan contras, Reagan labeled the contras "the moral equivalent of our founding fathers", which was
controversial because the contras had shown a disregard for human rights.
[10]
There also were allegations that some
members of the contra leadership were involved in cocaine trafficking.
[11]
Reagan and other conservative advocates of the Reagan Doctrine advocates also argued that the doctrine served U.S.
foreign policy and strategic objectives and was a moral imperative against the former Soviet Union, which Reagan,
his advisers, and supporters labeled an "evil empire".
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Other advocates
Other early conservative advocates for the Reagan Doctrine included influential conservative activist Grover
Norquist, who ultimately became a registered UNITA lobbyist and an economic adviser to Savimbi's UNITA
movement in Angola,
[12]
and former Reagan speechwriter and current U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, who
made several secret visits with the mujahideen in Afghanistan and returned with glowing reports of their bravery
against the Soviet occupation.
[13]
Rohrabacher was led to Afghanistan by his contact with the mujahideen, Jack
Wheeler.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Phrase's origin
In 1985, as U.S. support was flowing to the Mujahideen, Savimbi's UNITA, and the Nicaraguan contras, columnist
Charles Krauthammer, in an essay for Time magazine, labeled the policy the "Reagan Doctrine," and the name
stuck.
[14]
"Rollback" replaces "containment"
U.S.-supported UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi.
The Reagan Doctrine was especially significant because it
represented a substantial shift in the postWorld War II foreign
policy of the United States. Prior to the Reagan Doctrine, U.S.
foreign policy in the Cold War was rooted in "containment", as
originally defined by George F. Kennan, John Foster Dulles, and
other postWorld War II U.S. foreign policy experts. In January
1977, four years prior to becoming president, Reagan bluntly
stated, in a conversation with Richard V. Allen, his basic
expectation in relation to the Cold War. "My idea of American
policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say
simplistic," he said. "It is this: We win and they lose. What do you
think of that?"
[15]
Although a similar policy of "rollback" had been considered on a
few occasions during the Cold War, the U.S. government, fearing
an escalation of the Cold War and possible nuclear conflict, chose
not to confront the Soviet Union directly. With the Reagan
Doctrine, those fears were set aside and the United States began to
openly confront Soviet-supported governments through support of rebel movements in the doctrine's targeted
countries.
One perceived benefit of the Reagan Doctrine was the relatively low cost of supporting guerrilla forces compared to
the Soviet Union's expenses in propping up client states. Another benefit was the lack of direct involvement of
American troops, which allowed the United States to confront Soviet allies without sustaining casualties. Especially
since the September 11 attacks, some Reagan Doctrine critics have argued that, by facilitating the transfer of large
amounts of weapons to various areas of the world and by training military leaders in these regions, the Reagan
Doctrine actually contributed to "blowback" by strengthening some political and military movements that ultimately
developed hostility toward the United States, such as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
[16]
However, scholars such as Jason
Burke, Steve Coll, Peter Bergen, Christopher Andrew, and Vasily Mitrokhin have argued that Osama Bin Laden was
"outside of CIA eyesight" and that there is "no support" in any "reliable source" for "the claim that the CIA-funded
bin Laden or any of the other Arab volunteers who came to support the mujahideen".
[17]
However, the American aid
that was given to Pakistans ISI to give to the mujahideen, created long lasting links between mujahideen and
Pakistans secret service. Later, during the Afghan civil war Pakistan sought to promote a faction that would promote
Reagan Doctrine
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its interests, and potentially help Pakistan in a feared new conflict with India. This led to Pakistani support for the
rise of the Taliban, who were later willing to become allies of Al-Qaeda.
Controversy over Nicaragua
Historian Greg Grandin described a disjuncture between official ideals preached by the United States and actual U.S.
support for terrorism. Nicaragua, where the United States backed not a counter insurgent state but anti-communist
mercenaries, likewise represented a disjuncture between the idealism used to justify U.S. policy and its support for
political terrorism...The corollary to the idealism embraced by the Republicans in the realm of diplomatic public
policy debate was thus political terror. In the dirtiest of Latin Americas dirty wars, their faith in Americas mission
justified atrocities in the name of liberty .
[18]
Grandin examined the behaviour of the U.S.-backed contras and found
evidence that it was particularly inhumane and vicious: "In Nicaragua, the U.S.-backed Contras decapitated,
castrated, and otherwise mutilated civilians and foreign aid workers. Some earned a reputation for using spoons to
gorge their victims eyes out. In one raid, Contras cut the breasts of a civilian defender to pieces and ripped the flesh
off the bones of another.
[19]
Professor Frederick H. Gareau has written that the Contras "attacked bridges, electric generators, but also
state-owned agricultural cooperatives, rural health clinics, villages, and non-combatants". U.S. agents were directly
involved in the fighting. "CIA commandos launched a series of sabotage raids on Nicaraguan port facilities. They
mined the country's major ports and set fire to its largest oil storage facilities." In 1984 the U.S. Congress ordered
this intervention to be stopped; however, it was later shown that the Reagan administration illegally continued (See
Iran-Contra affair). Gareau has characterized these acts as "wholesale terrorism" by the United States.
A CIA manual for training the Nicaraguan Contras in psychological operations, leaked to the media in 1984, entitled
"Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War". recommended selective use of violence for propagandistic effects
and to neutralize government officials. Nicaraguan Contras were taught to lead:
...selective use of armed force for PSYOP psychological operations effect.... Carefully selected, planned
targets judges, police officials, tax collectors, etc. may be removed for PSYOP effect in a UWOA
unconventional warfare operations area, but extensive precautions must insure that the people concur in such
an act by thorough explanatory canvassing among the affected populace before and after conduct of the
mission.
James Bovard,Freedom Daily
Similarly, former diplomat Clara Nieto, in her book Masters of War, charged that "the CIA launched a series of
terrorist actions from the mothership off Nicaraguas coast. In September 1983, she charged the agency attacked
Puerto Sandino with rockets. The following month, frogmen blew up the underwater oil pipeline in the same
portthe only one in the country. In October there was an attack on Puerto Corinto, Nicaraguas largest port, with
mortars, rockets, and grenades blowing up five large oil and gasoline storage tanks. More than a hundred people
were wounded, and the fierce fire, which could not be brought under control for two days, forced the evacuation of
23,000 people.
The International Court of Justice, when judging the case of Nicaragua v. United States in 1984, found that the
United states was obligated to pay reparations to Nicaragua, because it had violated international law by actively
supporting the Contras in their rebellion and by mining the Naval waters of Nicaragua. The United States refused to
participate in the proceedings after the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
The U.S. later blocked the enforcement of the judgment by exercising its veto power in the United Nations Security
Council and so prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation.
[20]
Supporters of the Reagan administration have pointed out that the United States had been the largest provider of aid
to Nicaragua, and twice offered to resume aid if the Sandinstas agreed to stop arming the communist insurgency
against the military government in El Salvador.
[21]
Former official Roger Miranda wrote that "Washington could not
ignore Sandinista attempts to overthrow Central American governments."
[22]
Nicaraguas Permanent Commission on
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Human Rights condemned Sandinista human rights violations, recording at least 2,000 murders in the first six
months and 3,000 disappearances in the first few years. It has since documented 14,000 cases of torture, rape,
kidnapping, mutilation and murder.
[23]
The UN International Commission of Jurists found that the Sandinista
Peoples Courts aimed to suppress all political opposition. The Permanent Commission on Human Rights identified
6,000 political prisoners. The Sandinistas admitted to forcing 180,000 peasants into resettlement camps.
[24]
Leading
Sandinistas saw the revolt as a popular uprising. The Contras became "a campesino movement with its own
leadership" (Luis Carrion); they had "a large social base in the countryside" (Orlando Nunez); "the integration of
thousands of peasants into the counterrevolutionary army" was provoked by "the policies, limitations and errors of
Sandinismo" (Alejandro Bendana); "many landless peasants went to war" to avoid the state collectives, and Contra
commanders "were small farmers, many of them without any ties to Somocismo, who had supplanted the former
[Somoza] National Guard officers" (Sergio Ramirez). Thus, it is not universally accepted that the majority of Contras
resorted to terroristic tactics.
[25]
Jamie Glazov, comparing the Sandinistas to the Khmer Rouge, wrote, "the Sandinistas inflicted a ruthless forcible
relocation of tens of thousands of Indians from their land. Like Stalin, they used state-created famine as a weapon
against these 'enemies of the people.' The Sandinista army committed myriad atrocities against the Indian population,
killing and imprisoning approximately 15,000 innocent people..."
[26]
Covert implementation
As the Reagan administration set about implementing the Heritage Foundation plan in Afghanistan, Angola, and
Nicaragua, it first attempted to do so covertly, not as part of official policy. "The Reagan government's initial
implementation of the Heritage plan was done covertly", according to the book Rollback, "following the
longstanding custom that containment can be overt but rollback should be covert." Ultimately, however, the
administration supported the policy more openly.
Congressional votes
While the doctrine benefited from strong support from the Reagan administration, the Heritage Foundation and
several influential Members of Congress, many votes on critical funding for resistance movements, especially the
Nicaraguan contras, were extremely close, making the Reagan Doctrine one of the more contentious American
political issues of the late 1980s.
[27]
Reagan Doctrine and the Cold War's end
As arms flowed to the contras, Savimbi's UNITA and the mujahideen, the Reagan Doctrine's advocates argued that
the doctrine was yielding constructive results for U.S. interests and global democracy.
In Nicaragua, pressure from the Contras led the Sandinstas to end the State of Emergency, and they subsequently lost
the 1990 elections. In Afghanistan, the mujahideen bled the Soviet Union's military and paved the way for Soviet
military defeat. In Angola, Savimbi's resistance ultimately led to a decision by the Soviet Union and Cuba to bring
their troops and military advisors home from Angola as part of a negotiated settlement. In Cambodia, the Vietnamese
withdrew and their allied government collapsed.
All of these developments were Reagan Doctrine victories, the doctrine's advocates argue, laying the ground for the
ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union.
[28]
Michael Johns later argued that "the Reagan-led effort to support
freedom fighters resisting Soviet oppression led successfully to the first major military defeat of the Soviet
Union...Sending the Red Army packing from Afghanistan proved one of the single most important contributing
factors in one of history's most profoundly positive and important developments".
[29]
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Soviet troops withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1988, following a
nine-year occupation.
However, there is considerable disagreement over the
importance of Reagan's role in the disintegration of the
Soviet Union.
[30]
Thatcher's view
Among others, Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990, has credited
the Reagan Doctrine with aiding the end of the Cold
War. In December 1997, Thatcher said that the Reagan
Doctrine "proclaimed that the truce with communism
was over. The West would henceforth regard no area of
the world as destined to forego its liberty simply
because the Soviets claimed it to be within their sphere
of influence. We would fight a battle of ideas against communism, and we would give material support to those who
fought to recover their nations from tyranny".
[31]
IranContra Affair
U.S. funding for the Contras, who opposed the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, was obtained from covert
sources. The U.S. Congress did not authorize sufficient funds for the Contras' efforts, and the Boland Amendment
barred further funding. In 1986, in an episode that became known as The IranContra affair, the Reagan
administration illegally facilitated the sale of arms to Iran, the subject of an arms embargo, in the hope that the arms
sales would secure the release of hostages and allow U.S. intelligence agencies to fund the Nicaraguan Contras.
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Death of Savimbi
In February 2002, UNITA's Jonas Savimbi was killed by Angolan military forces in an ambush in eastern Angola.
Savimbi was succeeded by a series of UNITA leaders, but the movement was so closely associated with Savimbi that
it never recovered the political and military clout it held at the height of its influence in the late 1980s.
End of Reagan Doctrine
Tomb of Afghan mujahideen resistance leader
Ahmad Shah Massoud, in Afghanistan's Panjshir
Valley.
The Reagan Doctrine, while closely associated with the foreign policy
of Ronald Reagan and his administration, continued into the
administration of Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, who
assumed the U.S. presidency in January 1989. But Bush's Presidency
featured the final year of the Cold War and the Gulf War, and the
Reagan Doctrine soon faded from U.S. policy as the Cold War began
to end.
[32]
Bush also noted a peace dividend to the end of the Cold War
with economic benefits of a decrease in defense spending. After the
presidency of Bill Clinton, a change in United States foreign policy
was introduced with the presidency of his son George W. Bush and the
new Bush Doctrine, who increased military spending from the former
presidency of Bill Clinton.
In Nicaragua, the Contra War ended after the Sandinista government,
facing military and political pressure, agreed to new elections, in which
the contras' political wing participated, in 1990. In Angola, an
agreement in 1989 met Savimbi's demand for the removal of Soviet,
Cuban and other military troops and advisers from Angola. Also in
1989, in relation to Afghanistan, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev
labeled the war against the U.S.-supported mujahideen a "bleeding
wound" and ended the Soviet occupation of the country.
[33]
References
[1] Message on the Observance of Afghanistan Day (http:/ / www. reagan. utexas. edu/ archives/ speeches/ 1983/ 32183e. htm) by U.S. President
Ronald Reagan, March 21, 1983
[2] http:/ / www. globalissues. org/ article/ 258/ anatomy-of-a-victory-cias-covert-afghan-war
[3] [3] Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Paperback) by Peter Schweizer,
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994 page 213
[4] "Think tank fosters bloodshed, terrorism", The Daily Cougar, August 22, 2008. (http:/ / thedailycougar. com/ 2008/ 08/ 22/
think-tank-fosters-bloodshed-terrorism/ )
[5] "The Coming Winds of Democracy in Angola," by Jonas Savimbi, Heritage Foundation Lecture #217, October 5, 1989. (http:/ / www.
heritage.org/ Research/ Africa/ HL217.cfm)
[6] "A U.S. Strategy to Foster Human Rights in Ethiopia, by Michael Johns, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #692, February 23, 1989. (http:/
/ www.heritage. org/ research/ MiddleEast/ bg692. cfm)
[7] [7] Far Eastern Economic Review, December 22, 1988, details the extensive fighting between the U.S.-backed forces and the Khmer Rouge.
[8] "Cambodia at a Crossroads", by Michael Johns, The World and I magazine, February 1988. (http:/ / www. worldandi. com/ specialreport/
1988/ february/ Sa13957. htm)
[9] "U.S. Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The 'Reagan Doctrine' and Its Pitfalls," Cato Institute, June 24, 1986. (http:/ / www. cato. org/ pubs/
pas/ pa074.html)
[10] "In Reagan's Footsteps," Jewish World Review, November 14, 2003. (http:/ / www. jewishworldreview. com/ jeff/ jacoby111403. asp)
[11] "The Contras and Cocaine" (http:/ / prorev.com/ blum. htm), Progressive Review, testimony to U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Hearing on the Allegations of CIA Ties to Nicaraguan Contra Rebels and Crack Cocaine in American Cities, October 23, 1996.
[12] "Savimbi's Shell Game," Bnet.com, March 1998 (http:/ / www. findarticles. com/ p/ articles/ mi_hb1367/ is_199803/ ai_n6384825)
Reagan Doctrine
9
[13] "Profile: Dana Rohrabacher," Cooperative History Research Commons, September 17, 2001. (http:/ / www. cooperativeresearch. org/ entity.
jsp?id=1521846767-2190)
[14] "The Reagan Doctrine" (http:/ / www.time.com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,964873,00. html), by Charles Krauthammer, Time
magazine, April 1, 1985.
[15] The Man Who Won the Cold War, by [[Richard V. Allen (http:/ / www. hoover. org/ publications/ hoover-digest/ article/ 7398)]]
[16] "Think Tank Fosters Bloodshed, Terrorism," The Cougar, August 25, 2008. (http:/ / media. www. thedailycougar. com/ media/ storage/
paper1206/ news/ 2008/ 08/ 25/ Opinion/ Think.Tank. Fosters. Bloodshed. Terrorism-3401834. shtml)
[17] [17] See Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda (Penguin, 2003), p59; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden
(Penguin, 2004), p87; Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (Free Press, 2006), pp60-1; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The
Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (Penguin, 2006), p579n48.
[18] Grandin, Greg. Empires Workshop: Latin America, The United States and the Rise of the New Imperialism, Henry Holt & Company 2007,
89
[19] Grandin, Greg. Empires Workshop: Latin America, The United States and the Rise of the New Imperialism, Henry Holt & Company 2007,
90
[20] [20] "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision. Nicaragua vs United State (Merits)"
[21] Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, Nicaragua v. United States of America Merits, ICJ, June 27, 1986, Factual Appendix, paras. 15-8,
22-5. See also Sandinista admissions in Miami Herald, July 18, 1999.
[22] [22] Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua (Transaction, 1993), pp116-8.
[23] [23] John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America (University Publications of America, 1987) p143n94 (2,000 killings); Roger
Miranda and William Ratliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua (Transaction, 1993), p193 (3,000 disappearances); Insight on the News, July 26,
1999 (14,000 atrocities).
[24] [24] Humberto Belli, Breaking Faith (Puebla Institute, 1985), pp124, 126-8.
[25] Robert S. Leiken, Why Nicaragua Vanished (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp148-9, 159. See also Robert P. Hager, The Origins of the
Contra War in Nicaragua, Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 1998.
[26] Glazov, Jamie, Remembering Sandinsta Genocide (http:/ / archive. frontpagemag. com/ readArticle. aspx?ARTID=25257), FrontPage
Magazine, June 5, 2002.
[27] A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990, Robert Kagan, Simon & Schuster, 1996.
[28] "It Was Reagan Who Tore Down That Wall," Dinesh D'Souza, Los Angeles Times, November 7, 2004.
[29] "Charlie Wilson's War Was Really America's War," by Michael Johns (http:/ / michaeljohnsonfreedomandprosperity. blogspot. com/ 2008/
01/ charlie-wilsons-war-was-really-americas.html), January 19, 2008.
[30] http:/ / hnn. us/ articles/ 5569. html
[31] "The Principles of Conservatism," by Margaret Thatcher, Lecture to the Heritage Foundation, December 10, 1997. (http:/ / www.
margaretthatcher.org/ speeches/ displaydocument.asp?docid=108376)
[32] Excerpted from The Reagan Doctrine: Third World Rollack, End Press, 1989. (http:/ / www. doublestandards. org/ gould1. html)
[33] "The Soviet Decision to Withdraw, 1986-1988" U.S. Library of Congress (http:/ / countrystudies. us/ afghanistan/ 96. htm).
Further reading
Meiertns, Heiko (2010). The Doctrines of US Security Policy: An Evaluation under International Law.
Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-76648-7.
External links
Description and history
"The Reagan Doctrine: The Guns of July" (http:/ / www. foreignaffairs. org/ 19860301faessay7785/
stephen-s-rosenfeld/ the-reagan-doctrine-the-guns-of-july. html), by Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Foreign Affairs
magazine, Spring 1986.
Reagan Doctrine
10
Academic sources
The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter (http:/ / www. greenwood.
com/ catalog/ C4798. aspx), by Mark P. Lagon, Praeger Publishers, 1994.
The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (http:/ / www. questia. com/ PM.
qst?a=o& d=29069917), by Raymond L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution, 1994.
Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (http:/ / www. questia. com/ PM.
qst?a=o& d=98521364), by James M. Scott, Duke University Press, 1996.
"Freedom fighters in Angola: Test Case for the Reagan Doctrine" (http:/ / repository. library. georgetown. edu/
handle/ 10822/ 552556), The Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives, Georgetown University,
November 16, 1985.
"The Lessons of Afghanistan" (http:/ / www. unz. org/ Pub/ PolicyRev-1987q2-00032), by Michael Johns, Policy
Review magazine, Spring 1987.
"A U.S. Strategy to Foster Human Rights in Ethiopia" (http:/ / www. heritage. org/ research/ MiddleEast/ bg692.
cfm), by Michael Johns, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder # 692, February 23, 1989.
"The Coming Winds of Democracy in Angola" (http:/ / www. heritage. org/ Research/ Africa/ HL217. cfm), by
Jonas Savimbi, Heritage Foundation Lecture # 217, October 4, 1989.
"Savimbi's Elusive Victory in Angola" (http:/ / thomas. loc. gov/ cgi-bin/ query/ z?r101:E26OC9-320:), by
Michael Johns, Congressional Record, October 26, 1989.
"The Principles of Conservatism" (http:/ / www. margaretthatcher. org/ speeches/ displaydocument.
asp?docid=108376), by Honorable Margaret Thatcher, Heritage Foundation Lecture, December 10, 1997.
"The Ash Heap of History: President Reagan's Westminster Address 20 Years Later" (http:/ / www.
reagansheritage. org/ html/ reagan_panel_kraut. shtml), by Charles Krauthammer, Heritage Foundation Lecture,
June 3, 2002.
"U.S. Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The 'Reagan Doctrine' and its Pitfalls" (http:/ / www. cato. org/ pubs/ pas/
pa074es. html), by Ted Galen Carpenter, Cato Policy Analysis # 74, Cato Institute, June 24, 1986.
"The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations" (http:/ / www2. gwu. edu/ ~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/ NSAEBB2/
nsaebb2. htm), by Gary Webb, National Security Archive, George Washington University, August 1996.
"How We Ended the Cold War" (http:/ / www. thenation. com/ article/ how-we-ended-cold-war), by John Tirman,
The Nation, October 14, 1999.
"Think Tank Fosters Bloodshed, Terrorism" (http:/ / thedailycougar. com/ 2008/ 08/ 22/
think-tank-fosters-bloodshed-terrorism/ ), The Daily Cougar, August 25, 2008.
Article Sources and Contributors
11
Article Sources and Contributors
Reagan Doctrine Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=595193660 Contributors: 72Dino, Ace of Raves, Adelson Velsky Landis, AfricaEditor, Afrique, Alan Liefting, Altenmann,
Amyzex, Andonic, Andy Marchbanks, Arj, Artdriver, Atrix20, Bellerophon5685, Bender235, Bkonrad, BlackAndy, Blue387, Bobrayner, Byelf2007, CWenger, Cactus Guru, CartoonDiablo,
Chisme, Chris Chittleborough, Chris.Cole.DC, Ciro612, Ckatz, Cornell92, Cypher z, DTMGO, David H Braun (1964), DavidLevinson, Decora, Descendall, Dino, Doc9871, Doh5678,
Dragonivich65, Drbreznjev, EdibleKarma, Edward, Ejrcito Rojo 1950, Everyking, Groggy Dice, Haeinous, Happyme22, HoyaProff, Ironislucky, J36miles, James084, Jefflayman, Jengod,
Jermtermfirm, John of Reading, JohnOwens, Johnnyboy19376, Joseph Solis in Australia, Josve05a, KI, Kaisershatner, Kalsermar, KansaiKitsune, Katydidit, KenFehling, Kuralyov,
Kwamikagami, Lao Wai, Lapsed Pacifist, Leonard G., Levineps, Liface, Lightmouse, LilHelpa, Lionelt, Loremaster, Lususromulus, MaGioZal, Mathmannix, MaulYoda, Mcgovernpeto, Mild Bill
Hiccup, Mitrius, Mjf08, Mogism, Mukogodo, NYCJosh, Numlockf6, ObjectivityAlways, Ohnoitsjamie, Ot, Ottawakismet, PAWiki, PTJoshua, Petri Krohn, PhnomPencil, PigFlu Oink, Pigman,
Porqin, Quarl, Rcsprinter123, Redthoreau, Rettoper, Reydeyo, Rougher07, Routlee, Ruhrfisch, Russavia, Rzuwig, Sadads, Salamurai, Sardanaphalus, Saxonthedog, ScierGuy, Seergenius,
Skeptiod60, SlimVirgin, Solidusspriggan, Soxwon, Sross (Public Policy), Stevenmitchell, TJive, Tec15, TheJazzDalek, TheTimesAreAChanging, TimElessness, Trachtemacht, Vanamonde93,
Vindalfr, Vints, Viriditas, Vzbs34, William.riker2335, Wolfkeeper, WulfTheSaxon, Yopienso, 200 anonymous edits
Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors
File:Official Portrait of President Reagan 1981.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Official_Portrait_of_President_Reagan_1981.jpg License: Public Domain
Contributors: Admrboltz, Amikeco, Catalaalatac, Color, Ds02006, Happyme22, Harpsichord246, Julia W, Kintetsubuffalo, MartinHagberg, Mogelzahn, R-41, Slarre, Takabeg, Tcho, Tom, 2
anonymous edits
File:Reagan sitting with people from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in February 1983.jpg Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Reagan_sitting_with_people_from_the_Afghanistan-Pakistan_region_in_February_1983.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Unknown,
possibly Tim Clary
File:Frente Sur Contras 1987.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Frente_Sur_Contras_1987.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Contributors:
Tiomono (talk) Original uploader was Tiomono at en wikipedia
File:Jonas Savimbi.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Jonas_Savimbi.jpg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Ernmuhl
File:Evstafiev-afghan-apc-passes-russian.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Evstafiev-afghan-apc-passes-russian.jpg License: Creative Commons
Attribution-Sharealike 2.5 Contributors: Mikhail Evstafiev
File:The body of Ahmad Shah Massoud.JPG Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:The_body_of_Ahmad_Shah_Massoud.JPG License: Public Domain Contributors: U.S.
Army photo by Sgt. Teddy Wade
License
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0
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