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Colbern C. Stuart III
E-Mail: Cole.Stuart@Lexevia.com
4891 Pacific Highway Ste. 102
San Diego, CA 92110
Telephone: 858-504-0171
Facsimile: 619-231-9143
In Pro Se

Dean Browning Webb (pro hac vice)
Email: RICOman1968@aol.com
Law Offices of Dean Browning Webb
515 E 39th St.
Vancouver, WA 98663-2240
Telephone: 503-629-2176

Eric W. Ching, Esq. SBN 292357
5252 Balboa Arms Dr. Unit 132
San Diego, CA 92117
Phone: 510-449-1091
Facsimile: 619-231-9143

Attorneys for Plaintiff California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Defendants

Case No. 3:13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION RE:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESTRAINING
ORDERS

Date: March 27, 2014
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Courtroom: 4C

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
SUBJECT TO COURT APPROVAL

Complaint Filed: August 20, 2013




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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1
II. FACTS ..................................................................................................................... 2
A. Procedure for Obtaining a Domestic Violence Restraining Orider ..................... 3
1. Completing the Forms ....................................................................................... 4
2. Penalties For Violating Domestic Violence Restraining Orders .................... 12
III. DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................ 13
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits .................................................................. 14
1. The Abuse Standard is Content-Based, and Therefore Presumed Invalid .. 14
2. Abuse is Void for Vagueness ...................................................................... 21
B. Irreparable Harm ................................................................................................. 23
C. Balance of Equities ............................................................................................. 24
D. Public Interest ..................................................................................................... 24
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 25



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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (S.D. Cal. 2004) ....................................... 13
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564 (2002) ....................... 16, 19
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) ............................................................................. 23
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) ......................................................................... 13
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) ................................................................ 17
Burbridge v. Sampson, 74 F.Supp.2d 940 (C.D.Cal. 1999) ........................................ 14
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) ........................................... 17, 18
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) .............................................................. 19
Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1995) ........................................................ 13
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ............................................................................ 13
Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998) ........................................... 15
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974) ...................................................... 17
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949) ..................................... 17
Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) .................................................. 14
Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn, 26 Cal.4th 1013 (2001) . 14
Gonzales v. Superior Court, 180 Cal.App.3d 1116, 22 Cal.Rptr. 164 (1986) ............ 14
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) ..................................................... 22
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) ............................................................... 13
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) ................. 22
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) ........................................... 22
In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137 (1968)............................................................................... 13
International Socy for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116
(E.D. Cal. 1978) ....................................................................................................... 25
Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F. 3d 1182 (2010) ................................................................... 13
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) ................................................................... 23
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) .................................................... 19
Madsen v. Womens Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) ....................................... 13

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Mardi Gras v. City of San Luis Obispo, 189 F.Supp.2d 1018 (C.D.Cal. 2002) .......... 14
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984) ........................................................................................................ 18
Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973) .................................................................... 18
Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) .......................... 13
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.415 (1963) ................................................................... 18
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371U.S.415, 433 (1963)............................................................ 23
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) .............................................. 17
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964) ............................................... 17
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) ...................................... 17
New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982) .................................................................. 17
Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997) .......................... 13
Overstreet v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union No.
1506, 409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) ...................................................................... 19
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1977) .......................................................................... 13
Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................ 13
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ............................................................ 13
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ................................................ 18
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1992) ........................................................................... 13
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 903, 907-10, 153 Cal.Rptr.
854, 59 P.2d 341 (1979) ........................................................................................... 14
S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................. 23
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) .............................................................................. 14
Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, in and for County of Carson City, 303
F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir.2002) .................................................................................... 25
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) ................................................................... 13
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network Of W. New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) .................... 13
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,

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127 (1991) ................................................................................................................ 16
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) .................................................................... 18
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ....................................................................... 13
Stevens v. Rose, 298 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................................. 13
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) .................................................................. 19
Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................... 13
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ...................................................................... 13
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)..17, 19
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) ............... 22
United States v. Call, 874 F. Supp. 2d 969 (D. Nev. 2012) ........................................ 13
United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d 582 (6
th
Cir. 2012) ........................................... 22
United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)............................................. 13
United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) .............................................................. 21
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) ................................................................. 23
United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460 (2010) ........................................................... 16
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) ............................................................ 18
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) .......................................................... 22
Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir.2003) .......................................................... 13
Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................. 13, 14, 25
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748
(1976) ....................................................................................................................... 17
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) ...................................................................... 13
Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) .............................................. 23
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442
(2008) ....................................................................................................................... 18
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) ........................................................ 13
Watts v. United States, 394 U. S. 705 (1969) ........................................................ 17, 18
White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................... 24

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Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) ..................... 14
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) .................................................................... 13
STATUTES
Cal. Fam.C. 3026 ........................................................................................................ 7
Cal. Fam. C. 3027 ....................................................................................................... 7
Cal. Fam. C. 6320 ....................................................................................................... 7
Cal. Fam. C. 6320.5 .................................................................................................. 11
Cal. Fam. C. 6924 ....................................................................................................... 7
Cal. Fam. C. 6320 ..................................................................................................... 11
Cal. Fam.C. 3190 ........................................................................................................ 7
Cal. Fam.C. 6203 ........................................................................................................ 7
Cal. Fam.C. 6300 ........................................................................................................ 6
Cal. Fam.C. 6302 ...................................................................................................... 11
Cal. Fam.C. 3011 ........................................................................................................ 7
Cal. Pen.C. 243(e)(1). ............................................................................................... 15
Cal. Pen.C. 422 ......................................................................................................... 18
Cal. Pen.C. 166 ......................................................................................................... 6
Cal. Pen.C. 836(c)(1) ................................................................................................ 6
Cal. Pen.C. 13700(a) ................................................................................................... 7
Cal. Pen.C. 13700(b) ................................................................................................... 6
Cal. Pen.C. 311 .......................................................................................................... 18
Cal.Pen.C. 11165.6 ..................................................................................................... 7
Cal.Pen.C. 242 .......................................................................................................... 15
Cal. Pen. C. 653m ....................................................................................................... 8
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech And Child Custody Speech Restrictions 81
New York University Law Review 631, 649-662 (2006) .......................................... 14

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Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 Cal. L. Rev.
291, 319 (1987) ........................................................................................................ 21
Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L.
Rev.79 (1991). .......................................................................................................... 21
Loretta M. Frederick, Kristine C. Lizdas The Role of Restorative Justice in the
Battered Womens Movement, September, 2003 ..................................................... 15
TREATISES
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004) .............. 23



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Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(a) enjoining Defendants from (1) use of or reliance on the abuse standard defined
in California Family Code sections 6203 and 6320 as the threshold showing for
issuance of any domestic violence restraining order, and (2) production, distribution,
use, and issuance of the JUDICIAL COUNCIL DV Forms identified herein.
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence is a serious national concern. United States Department of
Justice statistics indicate that despite a decrease in frequency of intimate partner
violence over the last twenty years, incident rates for nonfatal domestic violence remain
at two tenths of one per cent of the population.
1
Voluminous research, writing, and
debate regarding the causes, nature, and appropriate means of eradicating this social
malady have not resolved the controversy among researchers about how to eradicate
the offensive persistence of domestic strife.
The solution legislated by the state of California and enabled by Defendant
JUDICIAL COUNCIL is a courageous initiative consisting of a body of laws,
regulations, policies, formwork, and practice standards guiding the behavior of social
workers, criminal prosecutors, public and private civil attorneys, judges, court staff,
administrators, and law enforcement animating unique oversight and restrictions on
those most likely to be involved in domestic violence crimes: Families.
2
Thousands of
studies commissioned by state and federal governments have shown in abundance that
families are statistically more likely to commit crimes of domestic violence. One
attorney for the United States Department of Justice recently explained that every
domestic relationship is a potential powder keg warranting special government
attention.
3
Even more studies proving this clear point are ongoing, yet the final solution

1
Report of United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Intimate Partner Violence in the U.S., p. 3; Declaration of Colbern Stuart (Stuart
Decl.), Ex. P.
2
For purposes of this motion, Family shall include those relations described in
California Family Code 6211. Stuart Decl. Ex. A, P3012.
3
Transcript of November 10, 2008 oral argument of Counsel for Petitioner United

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to how undesirable family discord will be fully exterminated remains illusive. Stuart
Decl. 34-34.
In pursuit of this end, state and local entities in California devote special
attention to families in order to deter behavior which may lead to injury. This Motion
asserts that one embodiment of Californias scheme to eradicate domestic violence
preventive restraining ordersfails to properly observe constitutional boundaries.
Specifically, to what extent may police powers be deployed onto families to accomplish
desirable goals of domestic violence deterrence without overstepping constitutional
restrictions on the use of state-sponsored tools of coercion?
This Motion offers that Californias present scheme to eradicate domestic strife
penalizes behavior that (1) is expressly protected by clearly-established fundamental
state and federal constitutional rights, (2) violates no law, (3) causes no compensable
injury, and (3) may not found any action in equity outside of the jurisdiction of
domestic relations courts. Among the wide array of appropriate tools available to the
state of California in responding to undesirable behavior, Californias coercive
intervention scheme has overstepped clear constitutional boundaries, is of unproven
efficacy, is widely abused as a tool for fraud and extortion, and demeans the integrity
and effectiveness of our civil and criminal justice institutions. Based upon these
deleterious consequences and the strong likelihood of prevailing on questions of law,
Plaintiffs seek an order enjoining substantial ongoing illegal interference with the
protected liberty interests of citizens of the United States and the State of California.
II. FACTS
California county courts deploy local police power to restrain citizens through
issuance of Domestic Violence Restraining Orders under section 6320
4
of the

States Nicole A. Saharsky, United States v. Hayes, Doc. No. 07-608, Stuart Decl. Ex.
Q, pp. 2, 8.
4
(a) The court may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party from molesting,
attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing,
telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls as
described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting,

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Domestic Violence Prevention Act, California Family Code 6200 et seq.
According to Defendant C. GOLDSMITH: In San Diego County, more than 200
restraining orders are issued weekly, often for domestic violence.
5
Detailed below,
these restraining orders restrict and compel a wide variety of conduct, including speech,
association, expression, and movement, and dictate use and enjoyment of vested real
and personal property rights of an identifiable class of United States citizens in
violation of those citizens fundamental rights under the constitutions of the United
States and State of California.
A. Procedure for Obtaining a Domestic Violence Restraining Order
Domestic violence restraining orders are issued by county Family and Criminal
Division judges. Stuart Decl. Ex. C, (P3101-03). In Family Court, the orders may be
obtained by litigants represented by counsel or appearing in propria persona. Id.
Litigants and counsel may prepare their own motions, but may also use pre-printed
forms designed and distributed by Defendant JUDICIAL COUNCIL. Cal. Fam.C.
6226. A packet of Applicant and Respondent forms and various instructional
documentation is attached to the Stuart Decl. as Exhibit C. (JUDICIAL COUNCIL
Forms)
The JUDICIAL COUNCIL Forms are used by and made available from various
public and private entities including:
Courts: County court clerks and judges maintain and distribute JUDICIAL
COUNCIL Forms for their own use and by lawyers and litigants. Ex. D
Public Social Workers and Administrators: Entities such as Defendant
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO make forms available from county Family Law
Facilitators offices, courthouse staff, self-help centers, county Internet websites, and

either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance
of, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a
showing of good cause, of other named family or household members. Stuart Decl.
Ex. A, P3028.
5
Elizabeth Marie Himchak, Judge Outlines Reasons for Domestic Violence
Increase Pomerado News, March 2, 2012. Stuart Decl. Ex. B, P3052-53.

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cooperating agencies such as the Legal Aid Society, Volunteer Lawyers Program,
restraining order clinics and classes, and county law libraries. Ex. D;
Quasi-Private Social Workers Advocates: Private or quasi-private agencies
such as Defendant ALLIANCE, the San Diego Family Justice Center and entities such
as the YWCA, and Center for Community Solutions. Ex. E;
Law Enforcement: Cooperating public law enforcement entities such as the
City of San Diego Police Department and San Diego County Sheriffs Department. Ex.
F; Cal. Fam.C. 6250;
Prosecuting Attorneys: The San Diego City Attorneys Office Domestic
Violence Unit and the County of San Diego District Attorneys Office Family
Protection Division and victim advocate services therein. Ex. G;
Private Attorneys and Legal Organizations: SDCBA and many divorce
attorneys provide, refer, or advise regarding use of the JUDICIAL COUNCIL Forms
and laws for their private clients. Ex. H.
1. Completing the Forms
The process for completing the JUDICIAL COUNCIL Forms is described in the
INFO forms of the Applicant and Respondent packets. Ex. C, P3101. Audio/video
instructions are available at http://wp.me/p4aG7J-I8. These instructions are
incorporated herein as if set forth in full. Stuart Decl. 9.
An applicant may complete the forms on her own, hire an attorney, or obtain
assistance from public employees such as city and county social workers and
administrators, including court clerks, Family Law Facilitators Offices workers,
District Attorneys Victim Advocates, San Diego Family Justice Center employees.
Quasi-public social workers such as ALLIANCE and Center for Community Solutions
offer similar services. Stuart Decl. Exs. D-G, 9. A summary of the relevant steps in
the process for obtaining a domestic violence protective order follows.

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a. Step One: Initiating the Request for Restraining Order: Judicial Council Form
DV 100
Form DV 100 (Stuart Decl. Ex. C, P3105) provides a boilerplate checklist for
the filer identified in (1) to check I ask for the court to order the person identified in
(2) as follows:
1. Personal Conduct Orders: Orders enjoining the person in (2) from a wide
variety of behaviors including acts described as: Harass, attack, strike, threaten,
assault, (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy personal property,
disturb the peace, keep under surveillance, or block movements and Contact, either
directly or indirectly, in any way, including but not limited to, by telephone, mail, or
e-mail or other electronic means.
2. Stay-Away Order: Orders requiring the person in (2) to stay at least ____
yards away from a variety of persons within the Domestic Relations Class, and
locations such as churches, schools, workplaces, residences, vehicles, and open-ended
any other locations the person in (1) requests.
3. Move-Out Order: Orders requiring the person in (2) to move out and not
return to his or her home.
4. Guns or Firearms and Ammunition: Orders requiring the person in (2) to
not own, possess, purchase or receive a firearm or ammunition.
5. Record Unlawful Communications: Orders granting the right to record
communications made to me by the person in (2) that violate the judges orders.
6. Animals: Possession and Stay-Away Order: Orders granting the person in
(1) the sole possession, care, and control of the animals listed below and that the
person in (2) stay at least ___ yards away from and not take, sell, transfer, encumber,
conceal, molest, attack, strike, threaten, harm, or otherwise dispose of identified
animals.
7. Child Custody and Visitation: Orders creating or altering existing child
custody orders for children of one or both of the person in (1) and (2).

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8. Child Support: Orders requesting child support orders and altering existing
child support orders.
9. Property Control: Orders that the court give only me temporary use,
possession, and control of the property listed here:______
10. Debt Payment: Orders that the person in (2) to make these payments while
the order is in effect: _____
11. Property Restraint: Orders that the person in (2) not borrow against, sell,
hide, or get rid of or destroy any possessions or property, except in the usual course of
business or for necessities of life. I also ask the judge to order the person in (2) to
notify me of any new or big expenses and to explain them to the court.
12. Spousal Support: Orders that the person in (2) to pay spousal support to
the person in (1).
13. Lawyers Fees and Costs: Orders that the person in (2) pay some or all
of my lawyers fees and costs.
14. Payments for Costs and Services: Orders that the person in (2) pay for lost
earnings costs for services caused directly by the person in (2) (damaged property,
medical care, counseling, temporary housing, etc.)
15. Batterer Intervention Program: Orders that the person listed in (2) to go
to a 52 week batterer intervention program and show proof of completion to the court.
16. Other Orders: Any other orders against the person in (2) requested by the
person in (1).
The Forms and California law provide that orders may be issued by any superior
court and without notice to the restrained person in (2). Cal. Fam.C. 6300, 6320(a)
(Stuart Decl. Ex. C, P3023, P3028). Upon issuance, law enforcement are required
to arrest the person in (2) for any violation. Cal. Pen.C. 836(c)(1), 13700(b) (Stuart
Decl Ex. C, P3117; Ex. I, P3387, P3404-06). Violation of the orders can be charged
as a felony. Cal. Pen.C. 166, 273.6 (Stuart Decl. Ex. C, P3117, Ex. I, P3269-70,
P3308-10).

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i. Standard for Issuance of Domestic Violence Restraining Orders: Abuse
The remedies available under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act are invoked
upon an applicants single showing: The existence of abuse. See, Cal. Fam.C.
6203, 6320 (Stuart Decl. Ex. C, P3101, 3108-11, 3118, 3124).
6
Though abuse is a
simple word in laymans parlance, comprehending the concept as used within the
Domestic Dispute Industry requires study. The lesson begins with the JUDICIAL
COUNCIL Form description of abuse:
(25) Describe Abuse
Describe how the person in (2) abused you. Abuse means to intentionally or
recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to you; or to place you or
another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or to
molest, attack, hit, stalk, threaten, batter, harass, telephone, or contact you; or
to disturb your peace; or to destroy your personal property. Abuse can be
spoken, written, or physical. (For a complete definition, see Family Code
6203, 6320).
Following the references one looks to Family Code 6203, which provides:
For purposes of this act, "abuse" means any of the following:
(a) Intentionally or recklessly to cause or attempt to cause bodily injury.
(b) Sexual assault.
(c) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily
injury to that person or to another.
(d) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to
Section 6320.

6
Abuse appears in several contexts in the Family and Penal Codes, including
child abuse, (Cal. Fam.C. 3011, 3026, 3027, 6924, 7020, Cal.Pen.C. 11165.6),
abuse of parental authority (Fam. C. 7507), sexual abuse (Cal Fam.C. 6220, Cal.
Pen.C. 11165.1), substance abuse (Cal. Fam.C. 3190), drug abuse (Fam.C.
6929), and spousal abuse and domestic violence-oriented abuse (Cal. Pen.C.
13700(a). This Motion is directed only to the definition relating to abuse as defined
in domestic violence restraining orders provided at Cal. Fam.C. 6203, 6211, 6300,
6320. Stuart Decl. Exs. A, I.

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The next step, Family Code 6320, provides:
(a) The court may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party from molesting,
attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering,
harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying
telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying
personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or
otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the
other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of
other named family or household members.
One then looks to Californias Penal Code 653m,
7
which provides in relevant part:
653m. Telephone calls or contact by electronic communication device
with intent to annoy
(a) Every person who, with intent to annoy, telephones or makes contact
by means of an electronic communication device with another and addresses to
or about the other person any obscene language or addresses to the other
person any threat to inflict injury to the person or property of the person
addressed or any member of his or her family, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Nothing in this subdivision shall apply to telephone calls or electronic contacts
made in good faith.
(b) Every person who, with intent to annoy or harass, makes repeated
telephone calls or makes repeated contact by means of an electronic
communication device, or makes any combination of calls or contact, to
another person is, whether or not conversation ensues from making the
telephone call or contact by means of an electronic communication device,
guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision shall apply to telephone
calls or electronic contacts made in good faith or during the ordinary course
and scope of business.

7
Stuart Decl. Ex. I, P3329-3330.

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(g) For purposes of this section, the term electronic communication
device includes, but is not limited to, telephones, cellular phones, computers,
video recorders, facsimile machines, pagers, personal digital assistants,
smartphones, and any other device that transfers signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, or data. Electronic communication device also includes, but is not
limited to, videophones, TTY/TDD devices, and all other devices used to aid or
assist communication to or from deaf or disabled persons. Electronic
communication has the same meaning as the term defined in Subsection 12 of
Section 2510 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
With fundamental liberty and vested property rights at jeopardy, one would be well
advised to continue the research, because several defendants hereto continue to
expand the conceptual dragnet on public (and private) websites, brochures, flyer,
seminars, and books. Defendant JUDICIAL COUNCIL expands on its instructions
describing abuse at its Internet website:
Abuse is a repetitive pattern of behaviors to maintain power and control over
an intimate partner. These are behaviors that physically harm, arouse fear, prevent
a partner from doing what they wish or force them to behave in ways they do not
want. Abuse includes the use of physical and sexual violence, threats and
intimidation, emotional abuse and economic deprivation.
8


8
JUDICIAL COUNCIL website: http://www.courts.ca.gov/1258.htm to:
http://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined/. Stuart Decl. Ex. J, P3340-41.
The lesson continues. One would also be wise to understand the San Diego County
District Attorneys Offices policy for charging abuse to include behavior that
undermines the victims self-worth or self-esteem, or controls the victims freedom.
For example: Humiliation, controlling what you can or cannot do, deliberately making
you feel diminished, isolating you from friends or family, denying you access to money
or other basic resources, undermining yourself [sic] worth . . . constant criticism, use
of the children against you. Economic Abuse: your partner controls your money
and other economic resources. For example: Withholding money at will and forcing
you to beg for money, putting you on allowance, preventing you from finishing your
education or from gaining employment, intentionally misusing family resources. The

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Form DV 100 provides a space to describe the most recent abuse, identify
witnesses to the abuse, and additional space to detail abuse of you or your
children and other related history of abuse. An applicant may use a form DV 105
to supplement form DV 100 to request child custody and visitation orders. The Forms
solicits no other evidence.
9

b. Step Two: Notice to Party to Be Restrained: Judicial Council Form DV 109
In addition to Judicial Council Form DV 100, the party (1) completing a Form
DV 100 is instructed to provide notice to the party to be restrained (2) by completing
Judicial Council Form DV 109. Ex. C. A detailed audio/video presentation explaining
the instructions for completing form 109 is available at http://wp.me/p4aG7J-I8.
Form DV 109 includes instructions to the person in (2) to be restrained as
follows:
For information about responding to a restraining order and filing your
answer, read Form DV-120-INFO , How Can I Respond to a Request for Domestic
violence Restraining Order?
Whether or not you respond in writing, go to the court hearing if you want
the judge to hear from you before making orders. You may tell the judge why you
agree or disagree with the orders requested. You may bring witnesses and other
evidence.
At the hearing the judge may make restraining orders against you that could
last up to five years.
The judge may also make other orders about your children, child support,

involved idoms of abuse, domestic violence, harassment, batter, and obscene
language are further explained at volume too extensive to include in this pleading.
See Stuart Decl. Ex. G, P3231-32; 7.
9
See also, Stuart Decl. Ex. C: Forms DV-100-INFO (Request for Temporary
Restraining Order); DV-500-INFO (Can A Domestic Violence Restraining Order
Help Me?; DV-505-INFO (How Do I Ask For A Temporary Restraining Order?;
DV 520 (Get Ready for Court Hearing); CR 6001-6001 (Detailed DV Form
Instructions); FM-1013 (Declaration In Support of Ex Parte Application for Orders);
Custody and Visitation Orders (Ex. C, P3134-3171).

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spousal support, money, and property and may order you to turn in or sell any firearms
that you own or possess.
Form DV 109 indicates that a judge need only find reasonable proof of a past
act or acts of abuse (Cal. Fam. C. 6320 and 6320.5) to issue an ex parte restraining
order lasting up to five years.
10
Cal. Fam.C. 6302; Ex. C, P3118, P3125. The court
may issue any order ex parte (Fam. C. 6320). Ex. C, P3118, 3120.
The Form does not advise the person in (2) of possible objections, ramifications
for completing the form as instructed, or to seek assistant of counsel.
c. Step Three: Responding to a DV 100 Form: Judicial Council Form DV 120
Upon being served with a form DV 100 and 109, JUDICIAL COUNCIL Form
DV 120 and DV-120-INFO instruct the person in (2) to review the DV 100 form and
complete and file a written response on Form DV-120. Stuart Decl. Ex. C. Form DV-
120 provides a list of check-boxes to agree or disagree to the requested order.
The form instructs the person in (2) to tell your side of the story. It provides no
advice as to rights, privileges, or immunities, or other options for responding.
Audio/Video instructions for completing Form DV 120 are available at
http://wp.me/p4aG7J-I8.
d. Step Four: Issuance of Restraining Order
A judicial officer receiving a request for a restraining order may grant the order
with or without hearing, and may use Form DV 110 Temporary Restraining Order.
Ex. C, P3113-17. If a court holds a hearing, it may issue an order on Form DV 130
Restraining Order After Hearing which is substantially identical to Form DV 110.
Stuart Decl. Ex. C, P3156-3161. A court may include child custody orders using Form

10
This citation to the Family Code is incorrect. Neither Cal. Fam.C. 6320 nor
6320.5 require a finding of reasonable proof for issuance of any order. The statutes
require a finding of good cause only when a party requests to extend an order to
cover other named family or household members. Such extensions may be issued
in the discretion of the court. In fact, the Family Code articulates no burden of
proof for issuing any order depriving the person in (1) of the rights identified herein.
Ex. A. Neither reasonable proof nor good cause are defined under California
law.

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DV 105. Ex. C, P3153-55. A court may also issue a California Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System (CLETS) Information Form to provide law
enforcement with information that will help them enforce any JUDICIAL COUNCIL
Form order. Ex. C, P3122.
2. Penalties For Violating Domestic Violence Restraining Orders
Forms DV 110 and DV 130 (court orders) advise the person in (2):

The Court has granted the temporary restraining orders checked below. If you
do not obey these orders you can be arrested and charged with a crime. You
may be sent to jail for up to one year, pay a fine of up to $1,000, or both.

If You Do Not Obey This Order, You Can Be Arrested and Charged With
a Crime
It is a felony to take or hide a child in violation of this order.
If you travel to another state or to tribal lands or make the protected person do
so, with the intention of disobeying this order, you can be charged with a
federal crime.
If you do not obey this order, you can go to jail or prison and/or pay a fine.

The form orders include boilerplate Warnings and Notices to the Restrained
Person in (2) including instructions relating to child custody, visitation, support, and
enforcement by attaching assets and income, interstate travel, real and personal
property use and enjoyment, firearms and ammunition. Ex. C, P3116.
The Forms include boilerplate Instructions for Law Enforcement stating the
order is effective when made (without notice to the restrained person), and that If
an officer has probable cause to believe that the restrained person had notice of the
order and disobeyed the order, the officer must arrest the restrained person. Ex. C,
P3117. The JUDICIAL COUNCIL makes the forms mandatory and represents that

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the forms are approved by DOJ. See, e.g., Ex. C, P3113, P3118, 3138.
III. DISCUSSION
The JUDICIAL COUNCIL Forms and the abuse standard enable private
parties to deploy state police powers to burden citizen rights guaranteed under
numerous provisions of the Constitutions of the United States
11
and the State of

11
The abuse standard burdens many fundamental rights. Personal Conduct
orders offend First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access justice (prohibition on
contacting an opposing litigant). Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047,
1057 (9th Cir. 2007); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977); Cornett v. Donovan,
51 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1995). Stay Away orders burden the fundamental right of
free movement. Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013) (stay
away injunctions); Madsen v. Womens Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 759 n.1 (1994)
(buffer zone injunction); In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 14142 (1968) (anti-picketing
injunction); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network Of W. New York, 519 U.S. 357, 390 (1997)
(illegal buffer zone). Property Control, Property Restraint, Move-Out, and
Guns or Firearms and Ammunition orders offend vested property rights under the
Second, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221,
1229 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (vested property rights); Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1089
(9th Cir.2003) (vested property rights); D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (The
right to bear arms for the defense of himself and family and his homestead as one
of the three indispensable safeguards of liberty ... under the Constitution); United
States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Call, 874 F.
Supp. 2d 969, 976 (D. Nev. 2012) (collecting Second Amendment cases). The
Instructions to Law Enforcement deprive fundamental criminal procedure rights. See
Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (probable cause for
a criminal offense); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008). Criminal sanctions for
property control or debt matters may aid and abet extortion. Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu,
335 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (pro-arrest policy to enforce payment of money or
debt may constitute extortion); Stevens v. Rose, 298 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Arrest to enforce property dispute held extortion). Custody Orders must survive
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1977); Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1992); Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F. 3d 1182 (2010);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); parental authority to control movement of
children: Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997);

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California.
12
This Motion addresses one category of deprivation immediately
disposable as a matter of law: Illegal interference with freedom of expression under the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, 2(a) and 26 of the
California Constitution.
"A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction
is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7 (2008). The First Amendment analysis of both statutes and policies relating to
enforcement of protective orders such as the JUDICIAL COUNCIL Forms is identical.
See, e.g., Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013).
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1. The Abuse Standard is Content-Based, and Therefore Presumed Invalid
The JUDICIAL COUNCIL Forms and abuse standard burden expression

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 44647 (1990) (The statist notion that
governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some
parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to the American tradition.). Content-
based restrictions on parent-child speech are unconstitutional. Eugene Volokh,
Parent-Child Speech And Child Custody Speech Restrictions 81 New York
University Law Review 631, 649-662 (2006). The right to travel with children is
fundamental. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 490 (1999); Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d
1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006). These additional deprivations will be addressed in due
course.
12
The California Constitution and California cases construing it accord greater
protection to the expression of free speech than does the United States Constitution.'
Gonzales v. Superior Court, 180 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1122, 22 Cal.Rptr. 164 (1986)
(citing Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 903, 907-10, 153
Cal.Rptr. 854, 59 P.2d 341 (1979)); Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway
Tenants Assn, 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1019, 29 P.3d 797 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 336 (Cal. 2001).
"The state constitutional provisions are more protective and inclusive of the rights to
free speech and press than the federal counterpart." Mardi Gras v. City of San Luis
Obispo, 189 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1035-36 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (quoting Gonzales, at 1123).
"[W]here state law affords greater protection to expression or free speech than federal
law, state law prevails. Mardi Gras, at 1035-36 (quoting Gonzales, at 1122);
Burbridge v. Sampson, 74 F.Supp.2d 940, 947 (C.D.Cal. 1999).

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based on content. Form DV 100 states: Abuse can be spoken, written, or physical.
A regulation is content-based if it is not possible to determine whether the expression
violates the restriction without looking at the content of the speech. Foti v. City of
Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 1998).
A court cannot determine if an expression is abuse without examining the
content of the accused expression. In order to perform the analysis necessary to reach
a finding of abuse, a judicial official must examine the content of the spoken,
written acts alleged to determine:
If the person in (1) is reasonably in fear of imminent serious bodily injury
(i.e.: Is the person in (1) claiming abuse reasonably in fear of imminent,
serious bodily injury because the person in (2) said/wrote/expressed
themselves in this way: _________?) (Form DV 100);
If the person in (2) threaten[ed] batter[ed]
13
harass[ed]
14

telephone[ed] or disturb[ed] your peace;
If the person in (1) is in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily
injury to that person or to another. (Cal. Fam.C. 6203(c));
If the person in (2) is (verbally or in writing) attacking . . . threatening . . .
battering, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making
annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, . .

13
Like abuse, there is no criminal analogue to the term batter under California law.
Cal. Pen.C. 242 defines battery as any willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another. See also, domestic battery Cal. Pen.C.
243(e)(1). Stuart Decl. Ex. I. However, in the parlance of the Domestic Dispute
Industry, batter has acquired a divergent meaning to describe certain behavior by a
man against a woman in a heterosexual relationship. This kind of violence, called
battering, is chiefly a problem of violence against women by men and should be
understood in the wider social context of mens subordination of women. The Role of
Restorative Justice in the Battered Womens Movement, Loretta M. Frederick, Kristine
C. Lizdas, September, 2003, p. 37 (available at
http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/articles/Role_of_Restorative_Justice_Battered_Wom
en's_Movement.pdf). See Stuart Ex. K.
14
Harass is defined under Cal. Pen.C. 646.9 as a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or
terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. As this term also sweeps
broadly to prohibit speech based on content, it is also likely unconstitutional, and will
be addressed in due course.

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. or disturbing the peace of the other party. (Cal. Fam.C. 6320(a));
If the person in (2) used obscene language with intent to annoy by
telephone or electronic communication (Cal.Pen.C. 653m(a));
If the person in (2) intended to annoy or harass in repeated telephone calls
or repeated contact by means of an electronic communication device
Cal.Pen.C. 653m(b) (the intent to annoy may only be determined by
examining the content of the communication).
The abuse standard and all laws, forms, regulations, and policies derived
therefrom define and burden expression based on content.
a. As a Content-Based Restriction on Expression, the Abuse Standard is
Presumed Invalid
Interference with non-commercial expression is rarely legal. The line between
permissible restrictions on expression and illegal ones has been drawn brightly by our
Supreme Court. [A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content. Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573 (2002).
As a result, the Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be
presumed invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their
constitutionality. Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 660
(2004).
Due Process balancing tests comparing the value of speech with the governments
interest in restriction are inappropriate formulas to analyze government interference
with non-commercial speech. In light of the substantial and expansive threats to free
expression posed by content-based restrictions, this Court has rejected as startling and
dangerous a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S.
[460, 461] (2010) (slip op. at 7). [C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been
permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional

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categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
2537, 2544 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
Abuse does not fit any of the categories of permitted interference.
15
The
definition of abuse is breathtakingly broad, including merely telephoning or
contacting a person with an intent to annoy, using obscene language, harassing
disturbing the peace of a person, as well as a vast array of behavior falling within the
ideological descriptions of domestic violence and abuse. Stuart Decl. Ex. J. These
categories are far broader than those historic and traditional categories [of expression]
long familiar to the bar.
Some of the expression falling within this definition of abuse may fall within the
traditional categories. True threats,
16
fighting words,
17
and obscenity
18
may

15
Among these categories are advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent
lawless action, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); obscenity,
see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); defamation, see, e.g., New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964) (providing substantial protection for speech
about public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974) (imposing
some limits on liability for defaming a private figure); speech integral to criminal
conduct, see, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949); so-
called fighting words, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); child
pornography, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982); fraud, see Virginia Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); true
threats, see Watts v. United States, 394 U. S. 705 (1969) (per curiam); and speech
presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent,
see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931), although a restriction
under the last category is most difficult to sustain, see New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). These categories have a historical foundation
in the Courts free speech tradition. The vast realm of free speech and thought always
protected in our tradition can still thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence to those
categories and rules.
16
Watts v. United States, 394 U. S. 705 (1969); Cal. Pen.C. 422 ("Any person who
willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury
to another person, with the specific intent that the statement ... is to be taken as a threat
...").
17
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942).
18
Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973) (Obscenity may be prohibited if:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary

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be properly restricted by narrowly-drawn statutes. Yet abuse as defined in the
statutes, regulations, forms, and policies that comprise it is not so tailored. As such, it
is presumed invalid.
b. Abuse Is Overbroad
Any regulation on speech beyond the historic and traditional categories [of
expression] long familiar to the bar is facially invalid as overbroad. [A] law may be
invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (citing Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, n. 6, (2008)); See also
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 799 (1984). Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." N.A.A.C.P.
v. Button, 371 U.S.415, 433 (1963).
c. Abuse Burdens Clearly Established Rights to Expression
Burdening abuse also interferes with clearly-established rights of expression.
Family Code section 6203(c) burdens expression by an effect on observer test;
burdening speech by looking to whether the expression places another in reasonable
fear. Such tests have been expressly rejected by our Supreme Court many times. See,
e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (speech causing emotional
distress); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (speech causing
anger, alarm, or resentment in others); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)
(words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force.).
Criticism, disagreement, or expression of disapprovaleven if targeted at specific
personsis protected speech. First Amendment jurisprudence establishes that
individuals ordinarily have the constitutional right to communicate their views in the
presence of individuals they believe are engaging in immoral or hurtful behavior.

community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters;
and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.); Cal. Pen.C. 311.

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Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,
461 (1987) (the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and
challenge); Overstreet v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local
Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1211 (9th Cir. 2005); Lewis v. City of New Orleans,
415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (statute prohibiting wantonly cursing, reviling, and using
obscene or opprobrious language held invalid).
d. Defendants Cannot Resurrect the Abuse Standard From the Presumption of
Invalidity
[T]he Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be
presumed invalid ... and that the Government bear the burden of showing their
constitutionality. Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660,
(2004); Alvarez at 2544. In addition, when the Government seeks to regulate
protected speech, the restriction must be the "least restrictive means among available,
effective alternatives." Ashcroft at 666. Defendants cannot establish that the burden
on expression falling within the category of abuse both (1) falls within one of the
above historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar, and
(2) is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.
Defendants are unlikely to carry their burden of showing that no less restrictive
means of achieving the statutes articulated interests exist. Ashcroft at 666. Like
statutes, injunctive relief should be no more burdensome . . . than necessary to provide
complete relief . . . . Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); Vasquez at
1037. California Family Code section 6220, the preface to the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act in which the definition of abuse appears, articulates Californias
interest:
The purposes of this division are to prevent the recurrence of acts of violence
and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the
domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution
of the causes of the violence.

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Stuart Decl. Ex. A, P 3014. The State of California seems to claim two enabling
interests: (1) to prevent recurrence of acts of violence and sexual abuse, and (2) to
provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period
sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.
Defendants bear the burden of persuasion here, and they face a significant hurdle in
parsing and analyzing this confusing section. While prevention of a recurrence of
crimes relating to sexual abuse (Cal. Pen.C 11165.1) and physical assault (Cal.
Pen.C. 240) are at least legitimate, the remaining state interests are not so easily
classified. Section 6220 references domestic violence. Under the California Penal
Code, the term domestic violence incorporates a more restrictive definition of
abuse than the broader definition used in the Forms and Family Code. (Cal. Pen.C.
13700(b): Domestic violence means abuse committed against an adult or a minor
who is a . . . [list of Domestic Relations Class members]); 13700(a): "Abuse" means
intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing
another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself
or herself, or another.) (Stuart Decl. Ex. I
19
). Thus, Defendants must explain how the

19
Californias definition of domestic violence has not achieved consensus within
the Domestic Dispute Industry. See, e.g., November 10, 2013 Transcript of Oral
Argument, United States v. Castleman, Stuart Decl. Ex. R:

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: Misdemeanor domestic violence
Melissa Arbus Sherry: Misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. So both the
word "misdemeanor" and the phrase" domestic violence" is a broad spectrum
of abusive behavior. It's characterized by a pattern of escalating abusive
conduct. It may start with something like emotional abuse, include isolating the
person from friends and family, include threats of violence, threatening to take
away the kids.

Congress has defined misdemeanor domestic violence more narrowly: 18 U.S.C.
921(a)(33)(A) provides:[T]he term misdemeanor crime of domestic violence means
an offense that . . . has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has
unanimously adopted Congresss definition for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(A).
See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 421, 430 (2009) (the seven justice majority

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State of California possesses a compelling interest in providing a separation for
purposes of resolv[ing] the causes of each act within the definition of abuse,
which abuse definition Family Code 6220 is referring to, and that the burdens of
the restraining orders are narrowly tailored to achieve that end. Aschcroft, supra, at
666. As California has disclaimed any interest to resolve issues of fault in dissolution
proceedings,
20
such an achievement seems dubious.
Finally, criminalizing abuse is not the least restrictive means for preventing
undesirable speech. For any electronic communications, filtering software, call
blocking, or simply disengaging have been asserted to invalidate similar statutes. See,
e.g., Ashcroft at 658; United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S.
803, 826 (2000).
2. Abuse is Void for Vagueness
A statute is void for vagueness unless it provide[s] a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494495 (1982); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285,
286 (2008); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010); Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is

and two justice dissent in Hayes adopt section 921(a)(33)(A)s definition of domestic
violence).
20
In 1970 California led the nation in the no-fault revolution abolishing
consideration of fault in a divorce. Family Law Act of 1969 (Former Cal. Civ. C.
4000-5138). After 1970, proof of adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful desertion, willful
neglect, habitual intemperance, conviction of a felony, or incurable insanity and cruel
and inhuman treatment that threatened the physical and mental well-being of the
Plaintiff were deemed improper and inadmissible to dissolution proceedings.
Former Cal. Civ. C. 4501, 4509; Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-
Fault Divorce Law, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 291, 319 (1987). Stuart Decl. Ex. L, p. 83. The
pre-1970 fault provisions were widely recognized to cause harm to litigants, children,
and the legal system itself, and widely recommended to abandonment by the American
Bar Association, many divorce law professional organizations, communities, schools,
and churches. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991
BYU L. Rev.79 (1991). Stuart Decl. Ex. M. Abuse did not reappear in the Family
Code until 1994 with the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Cal. Fam.C. 6203;
Stuart decl. Ex. A.

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to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them).
To understand what behavior is burdened under the Family Codes prohibition
of abuse, one of ordinary intelligence would be required to undertake the course of
study described at Section II.A.1(a)(i) above, including all caselaw interpreting the
statutes, as well as the numerous policies, customs, habits, and ideologies of entities
within the relevant local jurisdiction, which in this District includes the San Diego
District Attorneys Office, the CITY ATTORNEY, SDPD, the county Sheriff and
courts, and the ALLIANCE relating to the involved ideoms.
21

Its difficult to imagine how drafters of the 1994 DVPA could believe that the
breadth and ideologically lathered term abuse would lead to anything other than
confusion. Indeed, abuse standard appears to have been crafted by persons intending
to inject terminology burdening permissible categories of regulation and impermissible
ones.
22
The drafters might have recognized that subsequent judicial construction or
discretion at application could not cure their draftsmanship. See, e.g., United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature
could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to
step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988). Moreover, where a statute cleaves closely to
fundamental constitutional rights, deviant draftsmanship can be recognized only as a

21
Stuart Decl. 7, 11; Ex. G, J, K, P3231-32. The Supreme Court has recently
expressed unusual skepticism toward the Domestic Dispute Industrys etymology for
abuse domestic violence batter and related terms. The proper constitutional
scope and construction of these terms appears to be of new interest to our highest Court.
See Jan 14, 2014 transcript of oral argument in United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d
582 (6
th
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 49, (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013). Stuart Decl. Ex.
R.
22
E.g., Obscene language may exist within prohibited obscenity but is not itself
obscenity; reasonably in fear may the result of an utterance of fighting words or
true threats, but not all reasonable fear would be a result of true threats or fighting
words. Given that these historic and traditional categories [of expression] long
familiar to the bar existed for decades prior the 1994 enactment of the Domestic
Violence Prevention Act, one may assume drafters were aware of permitted
restrictions, yet oddly chose to ignore them, or worse.

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foul against a deviant drafter. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371U.S.415, 433 (1963)
(government must regulate speech with narrow specificity); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
B. Irreparable Harm
Since abuse burdens rights of expression, and the orders invoked by a finding
of abuse interfere with fundamental liberty and vested property interests, irreparable
harm must be presumed. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001 (9th Cir. 2005)
("irreparable injury sufficient to merit the grant of relief [established] by demonstrating
the existence of a colorable First Amendment claim"); When an alleged deprivation
of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of
irreparable injury is necessary." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,
2948.1 (2d ed. 2004). It is no defense that the deprivation caused by the orders may be
temporary. S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 1998)
("The loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."). Even the threat of issuance and
criminal repercussions for enforcement of the orders creates an irreparable harm by
chilling speech. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000) (government
conduct violates the First Amendment when it "would chill or silence a person of
ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities").
STUART and CALIFORNIA COALITION members and affiliates have
experienced past deprivations of protected rights under the abuse standard, and all
members of each of the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES in the state of California
are presently subject to deprivation. Stuart Decl. 36, Ex. B. Stuart is presently under
an order issued by Defendant Goldsmith in or about May, 2010 by use of the Forms
and remains at jeopardy for further deprivation in his relationships with his ex-wife and
son. Id. Such past and ongoing deprivation constitutes irreparable harm and standing
for purposes of this Motion.

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C. Balance of Equities
Enjoining Defendants use of the Forms and abuse standard would impose no
burden to any legitimate interest of any Defendant. Threats, fighting words, obscenity,
and obstruction of justice will remain crimes. Civil remedies for property damage,
reputational injury, and emotional injuries remain available. Enjoining use of the
JUDICIAL COUNCIL Forms will not prohibit individualized petitions for equitable
remedy in the case of truly irreparable damage should a need arise.
Yet continued reliance on the abuse standard will perpetuate deprivations of
fundamental rights identified herein, but also the means for committing extortion,
fraud, and abuse of process well-known to the Domestic Dispute Industry. See, e.g.,
Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 2003); Stuart Decl. 15-30, Ex.
N; First Amended Complaint allegations re: MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, DOYNE TERRORISM, OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE. Ending such disgraceful and malicious practices today is nothing short of
humane.
D. Public Interest
[T]he protection of constitutional rights is always in the public interest."
International Socy for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116, 125
(E.D. Cal. 1978). Protecting rights of intimate association with family and friends is
a public interest. Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013)
(enjoining protective orders that burdened constitutionally protected freedom of
intimate association, association with family members in public places such as
schools, churches, parks, libraries, stores, and restaurants and in the home);
Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, in and for County of Carson City, 303
F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir.2002) (Courts considering requests for preliminary injunctions
have consistently recognized the significant public interest in upholding First
Amendment principles.). Enjoining the constitutional burdens posed by the broad
abuse standard serves cherished public interests that are, without exception in a free

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society, in the public interest.

IV. CONCLUSION
Our communities have rightly mobilized to address the serious problem of
domestic violence. As awareness has increased, our experience and understanding of
its causes and variety of appropriate means of preventing and redressing it have
evolved. Unfortunately, in the present case the attention devoted to prevention of
domestic violence has led to an expansion of police powers beyond traditional shoals
which restrain such means, leading to deprivation and nefarious consequence. Given
the State of Californias ability to address domestic strife by a variety of effective,
efficient, and legal means, allowing the continued existence of an illegal form of
those many responses serves not to prevent the ill of domestic strife, but to compound
it into a widespread and demeaning social injustice.
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant the injunction.


Respectfully Submitted:



DATED: February 26, 2014 By: /s/
Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,
California Coalition for Families and
Children, PBC, in Pro Se

Colbern C. Stuart, III

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have
consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the
court's CM-ECF system per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b )(2)(E). Any other
counsel of record will be served by facsimile transmission and/or first class mail this
26
th
day of February, 2014.


By: /s/

Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,
California Coalition for Families and
Children, PBC
in Pro Se

Colbern C. Stuart, III