2.

Cognitive Rhetoric

2.1. Background; classical rhetoric; Aristotle
2.2.Types of rhetoric
2.3.Cognitive rhetoric
2.4.Cognitive rhetoric and critical thinking
2.. !vervie"
2.1. Background; Classical Rhetoric; Aristotle
A good precedent of Aristotle#s $Art of% Rhetoric $in three &ooks% is 'socrates# Against the
(ophists) the opening declaration of his (chool of Rhetoric; ho"ever) the *a+or sources in
the field also include Aristotle#s e,act conte*porary -e*osthenes $3.4/322%) other authors
"riting in the peripathetic tradition) and then the fa*ous speeches and "ritings of the
Ro*an teachers of rhetoric Cicero $101/43% and 2uintillian $303/3A-%; all these for* the
essential &asis and fra*e"ork for all su&se4uent contri&utions in the field.
Classical rhetoric divides co**unication into three *ain co*ponents5speaker)
*essage) and audience5to "hich a fourth one is i**ediately added) i.e. the conte,t) "ith
t"o *ain concerns) the place in "hich the *essage "as hear or seen and the purpose of this
*essage.
As far as the speaker is concerned) classical theory finds that his6her character is
a&solutely i*portant) i.e. "hether he is kno"n to the audience) "hether he is relia&le or
trust"orthy $co*pare "ith 7ayne C. Booth#s relia&le and unrelia&le narrators in his
Rhetoric of 8iction) 1911%; &oth Aristotle and 2uintillian e*phasi:e that speakers should
*ake sure that they see* polite) friendly) and "ell/disposed to the audience) that they
should de*onstrate co**on sense and good +udg*ent) plus a spotless *oral reputation.
This character and disposition of the speaker should &e favoura&ly reflected on the "ays
in "hich the *essage is co*posed) in &oth its content and style; the *essage should also
suit appropriately the audience) the place) and the purpose of the discourse; the
precalculated effect "ill &e produced only it the delivery is "ell organi:ed and controlled
fro* all points of vie" $i*ages) turns of phrase) facial e,pression) gestures) etc%. 'n so far as
the *essage itself is concerned) ancient rhetoric and its *any follo"ers) do"n to *odern
se*iotics) see*s to have taken for granted that a co**on code for co**unication is the
latter#s necessary and sufficient condition) since it assures an initial process of encoding
perfor*ed &y the speaker and a final process of decoding carried &y the audience. But it
has gradually &eco*e o&vious that hu*an languages are e,tre*ely rich codes) so that a
nu*&er of i*plications occur; $a% the sa*e *essage can &e encoded in t"o or several
different "ays; $&% a *essage encoded in so*e "ay can &e decoded in another "ay; $c% the
coded) very fre4uently) can co**unicate *ore that is actually encoded; $d% there al"ays is
the possi&ility of paraphrase or translation in the general *eaning of the "ord< This "ill
for* the &asis of *uch "ork in conte*porary cognitive rhetoric) "hich no longer vie"s the
coded co**unication of a "ell/defined paraphrasa&le *eaning as the nor*) &ut rather
treats it as a never/encountered theoretical li*it $-an (per&er and -eirdre 7ilson a*ong
others%; paraphrasa&le and unparaphrasa&le effects are no longer treated as a departure
fro* the nor* $consider here the "ays in "hich cognitive stylistics departs fro* traditional
stylistics%) &ut are treated as nor*al co**unication. Thus) (per&er) 7ilson and others
define co**unication as a *ore or less controlled *odification of the *ental landscape) of
the cognitive environ*ent of the receiver &y the sender rather than as a process of *eaning
&eing reproduced fro* the co**unicator#s into the audience#s head. 7e "ill pro&a&ly
have to return to these aspects.
The audience is far fro* &eing an inert participant) and the speaker) in order to
co**unicate successfully) effectively) has to kno" his audience) its interests) and
e,pectations) its intellectual level) its *oral and social concerns and so on; the for*ulation
of the *essage) ho" you encode and trans*it it are funda*entally deter*ined &y the kind
of audience you address.
The *essage design also depends on the place "here the co**unicative event takes
place; this is true for &oth oral $*eeting roo*) a*phitheatre) open space) large &uilding<%
and "ritten $*aga:ine or ne"spaper) &ook) &ulletin &oard) co*puter screen% *essages; in
other "orks) the content) style and for* of presentation depend very *uch on the cultural
conte,t in "hich the co**unication takes place.
Classical rhetoric advised classical speakers to have a clear) definite) practical purpose
in *ind) i.e. to kno" e,actly "hat they "ere trying to achieve; *oreover) that purpose
should not &e lost sight and control of throughout the presentation) fro* &eginning to end.
Aristotle hi*self dies not really have a consistent definition of rhetoric) since in his theory
of the persuasive he see*s *ore interested in applying nu*erous concepts and argu*ents
co*ing fro* his ethical) psychological) and especially logical "ritings; thus) at the very
&eginning of Book ' he *ostly atte*pts to situate rhetoric in relation "ith dialectics) "ith
"hich it has several co**on features; &oth are concerned "ith &oth sides of an opposition)
rely on the sa*e theory and practice of induction and deduction) &oth apply the so/called
topoi a.s.o. =ence also our i*pulse of dedicating a section to the relationship &et"een
rhetoric and critical thinking. There are) ho"ever) significant differences &et"een the t"o
disciplines; "hile rhetoric can &e used in practical and pu&lic *atters) dialectic can &e
applied to a&solutely anything; rhetoric is concerned "ith particular topics $a&out "hich
"e cannot gain general kno"ledge%) "hile dialectic is concerned only "ith general
4uestions; as distinct fro* dialectic) rhetoric can and does use non/argu*entative *eans of
persuasion $Aristotle#s rhetorician is one "ho is al"ays a&le to see "hatever ele*ent that is
persuasive%< As a *atter of fact) even though he never puts it in these "ords) Aristotle#s
rhetoric is the art6techne of identifying and applying in any given situation the *ost likely
*eans of persuasion.
Consistently enough) even though classical rhetoric tended to e*phasi:e the relevance of
pathos in the process of persuasion) Aristotle insisted on all the three co*ponents) ethos)
logos) and pathos) and particularly on logos) itself underlined &y ta,is) i.e. the
configuration) ordering) and structuring of the discourse; the good rhetorician is pri*arily
an e,pert in syllogis*s. 7hile the ethos and the pathos are constructed &y the discourse
itself and are shaped during the evolution of the discourse $are internal to it%) the logos
gro"s out of argu*entation.
Conse4uently) three technical *eans of persuasion are possi&le) having their origin) as
already suggested) $a% in the character of the speaker) $&% in the $e*otional% state of the
audience) and $c% in the logos or argu*ent itself. The speaker *ust appear as relia&le or
credi&le &y displaying practical intelligence $prag*atics%) a virtuous character) a good "ill.
The tricky point here $"hich) again) "ill &e taken up &y cognitive rhetoric% is that the
speaker does not actually have to &e virtuous) &ut *ust appear so through "hat he says;
conversely) a pre/e,isting good character does not guarantee a good rhetorician. 8inally)
the *ood of the audience $very *uch like the +ury in a court of la"% depends a lot on ho"
the orator can arouse e*otions) can *otivate the* and) ulti*ately) *ake the* &etter
persons.
The third co*ponent) ho"ever) the argu*ent or logos is the *ost po"erful *eans of
persuasion) through either induction $proceeding fro* particulars5e,a*ples5to the
general or universal%) and deduction or sullogis*os $general suppositions the results of
"hich point to individual cases%; the deduction in dialectics has its for* in rhetoric as the
enthy*e*e; the inference fro* pre*ises to a conclusion is guaranteed &y pre*ises alone
$sayings) short argu*ents &ased upon a contradiction or parado,) even prover&s%.
>any enthy*e*es fall under the heading of a topos $place) location% and for* thus an
argu*entative sche*e &ased upon the *e*ori:ation of a nu*&er of ite*s &y associating
the* "ith successive places $the *ere *ention of a place *akes us recall
things6ele*ents6enthy*e*es%.
Aristotelian rhetoric and its long follo"ing contains 4uite a nu*&er of other technical
ele*ents) &ut "e can su* up &y evaluating &riefly "hat the old *aster has achieved; he
hi*self concedes that his art of rhetoric can &e *isused) i.e. even though it *ay look as a
*ental tool) rhetoric can &e used &y all sorts of persons $politicians included%) for &oth good
and &ad purposes; on the other hand) it could &e o&+ected here that rhetoric see*s to &e
useful only for those "ho intend to conceal their real ai*s $"hy "ould one need rhetorical
tools instead of &eing straightfor"ard and tell the truth3%. Aristotle#s point of vie" here is
that affecting the decisions of an audience $a +ury or an asse*&ly) for instance% is a *atter
of persuasiveness) and not si*ply of kno"ledge; "hat is +ust and true does not al"ays
appear as such to each and every one; Aristotle#s ?people@ have a natural disposition for
the true) +ust as there also e,ists a gap &et"een co**only held opinions and "hat is true)
and this gap can &e &ridged &ecause of a funda*ental affinity &et"een the persuasive and
the true) &et"een rhetoric) therefore) and dialectic) or rhetoric and critical thinking.
2.2. Types of Rhetoric
'n spite of the long line of Aristotelian follo"ers for *any centuries) rhetoric ca*e 4uite
soon to &e regarded as the rival of logic and also fell into a field of study that &rought it
closer to literary study) "hence) for instance) the develop*ent of such approaches as
rhetorical literary criticis* or the co**only accepted synony*y &et"een rhetorical
figures and literary figures of speech.
An i*portant shift occurred &et"een the Renaissance and Anlighten*ent $1B
th
and 1.
th
centuries%5including the Ra*ist revolution5"hen a difference ca*e to &e noted &et"een
the cognitive and perfor*ative *odalities of language) or &et"een language as a referential
code and language as a pheno*enon of code; the sciences of the language fall *ore and
*ore under the ru&ric of dialectics and the cognitive *odalities of this co*ple, code are
e*phasi:ed; language is no longer a reflection or a su* of signifiers) &ut it can) &y itself)
give access to kno"ledge of the outside "orld; this revolution *ay also &e regarded as the
da"n of *odernis*.
A couple of centuries later) so*eone like Ca*es Berlin "as to distinguish a*ong types of
rhetoric according to "here the real is located in each of the*; if the real is located in the
self) the rhetoric is e,pressionistic; kno"ledge is a *atter of discovering and e,pressing the
self and represents essentially a personal vision $fro* Dlato to Berkeley) =u*e and 8reud%;
language is thus a transparent *ediu* through "hich &oth the sender and the receiver get
a version of the real; passively accepting ideology) e,pressionistic rhetoric i*plies that
kno"ledge varies fro* individual to individual) though there *ay &e a certain a*ount of
general kno"ledge co**on to all *e*&ers of a co**unity; there is one *ore connection
here) co*ing fro* the fact that as it e*phasi:es on individualis*) e,pressionistic rhetoric
can &e used to pro*ote the principles and values of capitalis*.
'f kno"ledge is thought to &e constructed socially and it is the product of the dialectic
&et"een individual and co**unity as inscri&ed in the language) then the rhetoric is social/
episte*ic; social/episte*ic rhetoric conse4uently clai*s ideology as its o"n and also clai*s
that) &eing generated &y a society through language) an alteration of the language has as its
effect an alteration of the society) and this type of rhetoric can &e used for that purpose; it
looks like a ne" version of the structure of rhetorical revolutions) &y "hich a change in the
do*inant rhetorical theory produces a change in society; this *ay have as an i*plication
the su&ordination of "riting to reading on one hand) or of regarding the audience as the
e4uivalent of an ideological te,t that can itself &e read and analy:ed; finally) social/
episte*ic rhetoric *ay &e seen as producing audiences prepared to 4uestion and su&vert
the do*inant *ainstrea* ideology.
'f the real is located in the *aterial "orld) the type of rhetoric "e are having is
cognitive) "hich again o&viously assu*es that language is a transparent *ediu*; it is
produced &y late capitalis* in the late 20
th
century) and its practitioners are thus shaped as
to *aintain the e,isting econo*ic) social) and political conditions.
8ro* a different point of vie") that sends us &ack to the Aristotelian dile**a) there is a
type of prag*a/rhetoric) that takes logic as the ground in discourse construction; it
distinguishes and co*&ines at the sa*e ti*e the co**unicative "ith the persuasive
intention) &oth logos and ethos therefore.
2.3. Cognitive Rhetoric
Again in the Aristotelian vein) cognitive rhetoric co*&ines &asic intentional co*ponents
"ith e*otive co*ponents or other psychological aspects involved in the co**unication
&et"een speaker and hearer; no" the roles of sender and receiver change alternatively in
the production of discourses $see literature#s ?the author is dead@ or the various aspects of
reception theories and types of discourse analyses%. 't see*s o&vious5at least fro* our
e,plorations this far5that cognitive rhetoric is the heir of traditional rhetoric. Cognitive
rhetoric &asically focuses on the co*posing process $thus) especially in "riting% and the
psychological i*plications involved) the *ind &eing studies as a set of structures and
processes perfor*ing in a rational *anner; conse4uently) the process of education for*s
an i*portant part of the research efforts. Truth &eing i*possi&le "ithout language) one of
the assu*ptions is that the "riter *ust consider5very *uch like the old rhetorician5the
role of the discourse and of the audience in *aking *eaning) &ut also that of society &y
and large. Another assu*ption is that everything is a te,t and each te,t represents cultural
codes that) in turn) represent hierarchies) "hich a good thinker $a critical one%) a good
"riter or a good citi:en has to 4uestion; one has to think critically $see ne,t section% a&out
all this variety of te,ts around us) a&out "ho produces the*) and &y resisting these cultural
codes "e can effect changes in the culture "e share; thus $Ca*es Berlin% rhetoric &eco*es a
political act) "hich is different fro* the fact that rhetoric is used in politics; once again) in
cognitive rhetoric) kno"ledge is the result of a dialectic that involves o&server) *aterial
conditions) and discourse co**unity.
(ince our *ain purpose is not a consistent presentation of cognitive rhetoric) &ut rather
its inclusion in the larger set of disciplines kno"n as cognitivis*) "e *ay confine ourselves
to listing -an (per&er#s nine conditions fro* his 19B ?Rudi*ents of Cognitive Rhetoric@;
they also are part of a larger pro+ect defined as a cognitive approach to ver&al
co**unication kno"n as Relevance Theory. =is central concept is that of ?cognitive
environ*ent@5the *ental landscape6&rainscape36 in the addressee#s head *odified as a
result of the co**unication process controlled) to so*e e,tent at least) &y the addresser.
The essential *ove here is fro* considering ?denotation@ and ?connotation)@ or) closer to
the issue) ?*eaning@ and ?rhetorical effects)@ to including &oth under the concept of
?cognitive effects.@ As a result) inference plays an i*portant role; instead of the audience
adopting the decoded *eaning patterns as thoughts of their o"n) co*prehension is
achieved through inferential processes that e,ploit largely unconscious processes for
evidence; so the processor of any given piece of infor*ation o&tains a relevance of its
cognitive effect that is an inverse proportion "ith the effort involved in the processing; the
greater the conscious effort) the lesser the relevance for the ?processor.@ The principle of
relevance consists in the fact that any utterance conveys si*ultaneously the presu*ption of
its o"n relevance; other"ise) the listener does not pay attention) and this type of rhetoric is
&ased on ho" to clai* so*eone#s attention. The listener is presu*ed to atte*pt to identify
the effects the speaker could have anticipated and thus the relevance is guaranteed. !nly
intended effects $co*pare "ith 7i*satt and Beardsley#s ?intentional fallacy@ in literary
studies% are considered to *ake the *essage ade4uately relevant to the audience; if a
presu*ption of relevance is co**unicated then the interpretation is consistent "ith the
principle of relevance) the guiding criterion in the co*prehension process; in other "ords)
no interest in the process) no co**unication takes place. And in Aristotle#s "ords) his
*ight *ean kno"ing "hat you audience#s e,pectations are.
But here are (per&er#s conditions $translated &y (arah Cu**ins% that have to &e *et in
order for the speaker to &e a&le to *ake his point;
1. There e,ists a conceptual representation of the utterance such that the proposition
e,pressed &y the utterance is in the restricted field of relevance $the audience kno"s
and understands "hat the co**unicator is talking6"riting a&out; one does not go to
listen to a lecture in genetics or "atch a TE co**entary on rhetoric unless one has
so*e interest in one or another of the topics and also has so*e &ackground
kno"ledge to go "ith it.
2. The proposition uttered is neither too infor*ative $the kno"ledgea&le receiver *ight
feel insulted) or take it as a "aste of ti*e%nor too uninfor*ative $assu*ing a higher
level of cognition than the case really is) for instance%; it is *a,i*ally relevant $in
that it contains &oth sufficient infor*ation and its relevance as "ell%.
3. The linguistically deter*ined focus ranking $the accessi&ility of the voca&ulary and
the organi:ation of the discourse% of the entail*ents of the proposition corresponds
to their degree of relevance $"hatever connotations the proposition *ight have are
accessi&le to the listener%.
4. An i*plicature is not *ore relevant that the relevance that i*plicates it $an
utterance *ay have propositional i*plicatures as "ell as le,ical or su&/porpositional
i*plicatures that (per&er calls gaps/ellipses) se*antic ano*alies or contra
dictions<; "hat is not e,plicit re4uires fro* the hearer to invent and add
constituents in order to $re%construct the sentence) and the relevance is the sa*e%.
. The co*plete interpretation of an utterance "ith a gap *ust *aintain the logical
functions e,pressed syntactically in the utterance $gaps cannot and should not &e
filled at rando* or) *ore interestingly) according to anything like "ishful thinking;
in other "ords) the gap should really &elong to the utterance%.
1. 'n a gapped utterance) the o*itted ele*ent fills a function "hich) on the &asis of
*o&ili:ed shared kno"ledge) can &e filled only &y conceptually e4uivalent
constituents) so that Conditions '/''' are *et $"hen the speaker is too uninfor*ative
5condition ''5and has not uttered the *ost relevant proposition of the conceptual
representation he "ished to convey) then the shared kno"ledge5conditions ' and '''
5does not allo" the gap to &e une4uivocally filled%.
B. An utterance takes on a figural value "hen *o&ili:ed shared kno"ledge is
insufficient to assign to it a conceptual representation in accordance "ith Conditions
'/E' and this deficiency is not attri&uted to the speaker#s inco*petence or
recalcitrance $literature is the &est case in point here; the figural value *ay &e
attri&uted to the speaker#s intention) &ut *ay also &e the result of other factors) such
as the evolution of the language outside the respective te,t) the co*ple,ity of the
reader#s capa&ilities of association or interpretation) the presence of an unusual
cultural conte,t<%.
.. 7hen an utterance takes on a figural value) the unsatisfied condition responsi&le for
its figural character is focali:ed; evocation is used to restore the condition and
there&y correct the initial conceptual representation $a second reading of the te,t5
or of the recording5"ill allo" the receiver to reali:e ho" the evoked kno"ledge
could &e invoked; any second reading of a co*ple, literary te,t "ill reveal aspects
that even the *ost attentive reader *issed the first ti*e%.
9. 7hen an utterance has received a sy*&olic interpretation under Conditions B and .)
the utterance act itself is sy*&olically interpreted. Attention is focused on the
inade4uacy of shared kno"ledge and a second evocation atte*pts to reconstruct the
conditions under "hich the first evocation "ould have &een superfluous5that is) the
conditions under "hich the infor*ation that "as first evoked could have instead
&een invoked $=a*let#s staging of a play that is a figuration of the play he is a hero
of%.
(per&er#s conclusion refers specifically to this ninth condition;
?<6'6f there is a difference) it is not &et"een different types of discourse &ut &et"een
different levels of conceptual representation. The figure is not in the te,t and is not a
function of the te,t alone. 't resides in the conceptual representation of the te,t and is a
function of &oth the te,t and shared kno"ledge. Rhetoricians *ay de&ate "hether)
alongside phonological) syntactic) and se*antic figures) there also e,ist figures of thought. '
have tried to suggest that there are only figures of thought) 6see Feorge Gakoff and >ark
Cohnson6 for "hich phonological) syntactic) and se*antic properties *ay play the role of
additional focali:ers) neither sufficient nor necessary) that trigger the *echanis* of figural
interpretation.@
$?Rudi*ents de rhetori4ue cognitive)@ in Doeti4ue<) 23) pp.414/41%
=is later co**entary $20015"hen (arah Cu**ins translated it for Rhetoric (ociety
2uarterly% contains an even *ore relevant conclusion) na*ely that the use of figures of
speech evokes ideas nut +ust a&out the topic of the utterance) &ut also a&out the shared
&ackground kno"ledge $i.e. a certain culture% of the ones involved in the co**unication
process.
=aving *entioned Gakoff and Cohnson) let us also re*ind contri&utions co*ing fro*
>ark Turner) "ho) alongside research done &y Ave ("eetser) Eera To&in) >anuel '*a:)
-avid Benyon) (ean >cAlister or >argaret 8ree*an focused on conceptual &lending5a
process of conceptual *apping and integration that pervades hu*an thought; there are
*ental spaces) "hich can &e arrayed in *ental space net"orks) "hich) in their turn) can
&eco*e conceptual space net"orks that contain several &lended *ental spaces; this theory
of conceptual &lending has &een applied in al*ost all types of cognitive disciplines)
including cognitive rhetoric; since *any of the ele*ents) *ethods) and principles co*e
fro* neuroscience and artificial intelligence) "e shall leave it at that here.
2.4. Cognitive Rhetoric and Critical Thinking
(ince everything *ay &e regarded as a te,t $&ecause truth is i*possi&le "ithout language%
and te,ts contain cultural codes that represent hierarchies) 4uestioning these hierarchies
can &e done &y 4uestioning all these te,ts $see supra%; and this is critical thinking) since this
is a process of thinking critically a&out te,ts around us and "ho produces the*; change in
the culture around us can &e effected through such kno"ledge of the te,ts) and kno"ledge
*ay &e regarded as the result of the dialectic involving o&server) the discourse co**unity
and the *aterial conditions of e,istence; people learn to think critically &y deconstructing
"ritten and non"ritten te,ts) &y dissecting the language as it is used culturally) i.e.
politically) socially) stylistically<
Thus) very *uch like rhetoric and cognitive rhetoric) critical thinking has a se*inal
i*portance in education and so it "ould not &e too *uch to 4uote at length fro* The
-elphi Report put together &y Deter A. 8acione and forty/si, co/"orkers in 199.;
?7e understand critical thinking to &e purposeful) self6regulatory +udg*ent "hich
results in interpretation) analysis) evaluation) and inference) as "ell as e,planation of the
evidential) conceptual) *ethodological) criteriological) or conte,tual considerations upon
"hich that +udg*ent is &ased. Critical thinking is essential as a tool of in4uiry. As such)
critical thinking is a li&erating force in education and a po"erful resource in one#s civic and
personal life. 7hile not synony*ous "ith good thinking) critical thinking is a pervasive and
self/rectifying hu*an pheno*enon. The ideal critical thinker is ha&itually in4uisitive) "ell/
infor*ed) trustful of reason) open/*inded) fle,i&le) fair/*inded in evaluation) honest in
facing personal &iases) prudent in *aking +udg*ents) "illing to consider) clear a&out
issues) orderly in co*ple, *atters) diligent in seeking relevant infor*ation) reasona&le in
the selection of criteria) focused in in4uiry) and persistent in seeking results "hich are as
precise as the su&+ect and circu*stance of in4uiry per*it. Thus) educating good critical
thinkers *eans "orking to"ards this ideal. 't co*&ines developing critical thinking skills
"ith nurturing those dispositions "hich consistently yield useful insights and "hich are the
&asis of a rational and de*ocratic society.@ $'nternet source%
't is easy to notice that cognitive rhetoric has its origin in *any of these aspects of
critical thinking; if rhetoric consists in "ays in "hich argu*ents are put together to
persuade) critical thinking is funda*entally &ased upon argu*ents) "hether deductive or
inductive; conse4uently) critical thinking fallacies $argu*entu* ad ho*ine*) ad
verecundia*) ad anti4uitate*6novitiate*) ad &aculu*) ad *isericordia*) ad populu*) ad
nu*eru*) ad ignoratia*) petitio principii and the rest% are rhetorical fallacies. >oreover)
in vie" of the assu*ption that *ost things can &e vie"ed as te,ts) critical thinking asks the
sa*e 4uestions as rhetoric; "hat is the purpose of the te,t3 7hat is the author trying to
acco*plish3 7hat issues or pro&le*s are raised3 7hat evidence is given3 's it perspective
+ustified3 (i*ilarly) critical thinking involves all the processes of rhetoric; logical thinking
and reasoning &ased on such skills as co*parison) classification) se4uencing) cause and
effect) patterning) "e&&ing) analogies) forecasting) planning) hypothesi:ing) and) o&viously)
criti4uing.
!vervie"
7ith critical thinking as its foundation and rhetorical principles) processes) and *ethods
ela&orated along a history of at least t"enty/five hundred years) cognitive rhetoric co*es)
at the &eginning of this century "ith a nu*&er of changes of e*phasis and a fe" theoretical
develop*ents. (ide &y side "ith social episte*ic rhetoric) e,pressionistic rhetoric and
prag*a/rhetoric *ore recently) cognitive rhetoric evolved as an interdisciplinary discipline
$dialectic) psychology) theory of argu*entation% "ith i*portant i*plications in educational
practice; intentionalis* and relevance are) *ost likely) its *ain clai*s to so*e originality
"ithin a long and co*ple, tradition.
-RAF!( AEA-AHA' /COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES) Ad.
IJniversitas KK'@) 'aLi) 2010