I

An
Introduction
to
the
Issues
M i c h a e l L . P e t e r s o n
God and Evil
This page intentionally left blank
estview
A N rnbci th,: Pcrscits Books Group
God and Evil
An Introduction to the Issues
Michael L. Peterson
ASBURY COLLE61:.
All ri;;Ins rc-sei.- -, .d. Primed in ihe ITnitc.1 States of Anleri, - .1. No pail of ;his p,:blie,1-
lion mayreproduced oi trans:iiiiied inn m or Is% Ainor
mmucmLintliniinr,otoi-iniOrm.uion
reiricy a1
.'stem, '. iihoi perinkSi( in U1\\I miin(
Copyright1998 by Wcsiview Press.. A .\1, ol Perseus 9floks Group
Publislied in 1998 o the lniirJ Siaies .1rnet - 1.- ri hy, West ic...\\ Press , 5500 Central
Aseinie,olorado 80.1101-2877, and in the I. 'lined. 1<irt..4,1oin by \Vest \
pres,, 17 1-lid'sRoad.. Citinnor I fill, tiNtord
911
Libiary of Cr-im,-re-cs Caidlogingin-Piii)iicalion Data
Peterson ; 114
-1 ,-H ic i 1, I
GAi rid ciiintroduction to the issues / by Michael L.
Pelerson.
p. cm.
Includys hiblioym-aphical references ..ind huh:\ .
ISBN 0-81K-1-2848 9ii; 8133. 2849 7
1, Good and eii, 2. R.Philo.sopliy1, fitle,
1111-101.1'4 7 098
214-1.1.:21 98-18429
Gil'
'the riper inert in this publication in-ts the requirements of the z-V,.ricail National
Standard or Permanence of Papci ;or Primed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.
P E R S E U S '
1 3 0L)
1 . ) . 1 . : A l , kND
1 09
87654
For. my sons,
Aaron and A da
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Prifiicr
ix
1 The Problem of Evil and Its Place
in Philosophy of Religion
Evil in Human Existence, 1
Evil and Religious Belief, 6
The Philosophical Difficulty, 8
The ClasNilication of Evil, 1 0
Notes, 1 4
Suggested Readings, 1 5
2The Logical Problem of Evil

1 7
Statement of the Problem, 1 7
The Structure and Strategy of the A rgument, 1 9
Versions of theA rgument, 23
The Burden of Proof, 27
Notes, 31
Suggested Readings, 31
3The Function of Defense

33
The lee Will Defense, 33
'The Compatibilist Position, 35
The Incompatibilist Rejoinder, 37
The Current State of the Debate, 41
Notes. 43
Suggested Readings, 45
4The Probabilistic Problem of Evil

47
A n Initial Skirmish, 47
A Modified Prohabiliiv A rgument, 49
vii
viiiCfni leHIS
Three Probabilistic Arguments from Evil, 52
Reformed Epistemology and Evil, 56
Notes, 61
Suggested Readings, 64
5The Problem of Gratuitous Evil
Can There Be an 1..idential Argumentfrom Evil? 67
Versions ()f the E\ idential :\rgument, 69
Anah- ting he Evidential Argument from
Cyrattlitous Exit, 73
The Appearance of Evil, 74
Notes, 79
Suggested Readings 81

6The Task of Thcodicy

The Prospects for Theodicy, 85
Augustine's Free Will Tiheodicy, 89
Leihniz's Best Possible World Thcodicv, 92
Hick's Soul -Making Theodicv 94
Whiteheats Process Theodicy, 99
Theodicv and the Assessment of Theism, 103
Notes, 103
Suggested Readings, 108
7The Existential Problem of Evil
The E\perience olGratuitcws Evil, 111
Evfl and Personal Identity, 114
The logic of Regret, 11.7
\istentiat Authenticity and Evil, 119
The Defeat of Horrendous Evil, 124
Notes, 127
Stig.,,ested Readings, 130
67
85
111
131
Preface
This volume is an introduction to the problem of evil as it is currently
discussed in professional philosophy. I have designed the book for use
in an
acadeini,.- setting, \\ ith hopes that both student and scholar may
find many points interesting and pros ocative. I also trust tliat the seri-
ous and thoiqtlit lid person outside academia may bencni from my
treatment of this perennially important subject.
No proiect of this sort is a purely priN ate undertaking. Over the
years. I ha\ e benefited fioni hk:lpfiddiscussions on the problem of e i i
with .1l\ in Plantinga, Edward Madden. Peter !lark:, William Ilasker,
Da\ id Basinger, Bruce Reidienbach, and Jerry Walls. I ha
c appreci-
ated the encouragement of the Asbury (.oIicge administration during
my writing. I am also thankful to Pew Charitable Trusts tin- funding
my research during the 1992 -1993 academic year.
I am not completely sure why I continue to be fascinated by the
problem ol evil in all ()fits permutations. In part, I am astonished by
the great profusion of suffering and evil around us and am driven to
ponder it ()a behalf of those who ask, "Why'?" And, in part. I am stag
gered at the capacity br evil within us and ant thereby drawn to the
issues oil -it- ern:lig God and evil. Although I and conscious or
the
strange mi %lure of good and evil in our world, I am more mindful of
how important it is to orient oneself propel - I\ toward these realities.
I dedicat e this hook t o my sons, Aaro n a nd Adam, in w ho
m I take
great pleasure and delight. They ,ire certainly two immeasurable
kgoods in HIV lire that show mc just how much \ aim: there is in a world
that cc intains oil. Their goodness e en makes me a better person. My
fatherly hope fOr them is that they vill resist oil in all its forms and
that they will love and seek the FpOd in all things.
Mil/PIC/L. 1-',.n.rsoil
ix
This page intentionally left blank
1
The Problem of Evil and
Its Place in Philosophy of Religion
Something is dreadtUllv \\ Fong v,ithodd. An earthquake kills
hundreds in Peru. .1. pancreatic cancer patient suffers prohmged, ex-
crtIciating pain and dies. A pit bull attacks a tv.o vear old ehild, an-
giilv ripping his flesh and killing him. f. lountless multitudes sultcr the
ra\ ages of war in Somalia. A crated en ft leader pushes empty five peo
plc to their deaths in Waco, Texas. Millions starve and die in North
Korea as famine la\ ages the land. Horrible things of all kinds happen
in our world- and that has been the sin r\ since the dawn of civiliza-
tion. "foday's news media thrive On things that are wrong in the
world, on bad things that hapixn to people every day. Television pa-
rades vivid images of xvar, murder, doastation, and suffering before
our eves. Newspapers report rape, abuse, mayhem, and disaster.
Evil in Human Existence
In June 1991, 1 iwr mnaga/ine asked the question, - Whv:""Why
does e\ii happen?
"I
In the co\ cr essay, journalist I .ance Morrow re-
\ ic\As the millHlude of oils that haunt our consciousness
lii tiers Auscilv, it/u Saddam Flussein's invasion of Ku \\nil ,
KKI: auirnmizs of black men in precivil rights Mississippi to the
AIDS epidemic. Right there in a popular magatine, Morr,
raises
age old questions in an article starkly titled "F.Ail." Is evil an cntitv?
Or is evil the immoral and inhumane actions of persons? What ab, }Lit
bad and hurtful things that are out of our control, such as disease,
floods, and mental illness? Is nature responsible? Why
, does evil seem
27he Pol'hi OfPhi to.,-eq.by or liritgiou
so fascinating and alluring to the human mind while gond seems so
uninteresting and boring? Does evil serve some purpose, or does it
just happen? Why has the human race not seemed able to understand
evil, to COilqUer It. 1 - ) shin it out?
a ighthil people raise penetrating questions about evil and seek to
understand what it reveals about the human condition Ii a feature arti-
cle in the ' New Ml' 111110. .1 Mutt Rosenbaum seeks to probe
the meaning o.ne \A The cmer or the magazine reads "Evil's Rack, - and
Rosenbaum's article inside carries the title "Staring into the I leant of
the I !earl 1)arkness." Rosenbaum's piece sets the stage by recounting
how Susan Smith of Butialn, South Carolina, murdered her two young
sons. l le rehearses the facts that a
Vk hole nation its LIMWS all too well:
Susan Smith drowned her two little boys by strapping them into the
child safety seats in her Nlaida and sending the car rolling down an em-
balikinent into 101111 D. Long Lake. She then manuLict tired all "ordeal"
to deflect attention trout her crime.
ltlaviitii.
on racial prejudice, she
claimed that an .\iricali Ameriean car locker had kidnapped her two chil-
dren, and she pled desperateh n i television for a search for the car
jacket- and the children. Yet, within nine days, she confessed to killing
three Year-old Michael and tOurteen month old Alex.
Rosenbaum ( -6serves that one local talHoid called Smith's action an
"evil deed." What is impressive about this pronouncement is that the
secular news media would make it. In a day vhcn electronic and
printed media typically prefer to assume a "relatiyitv of values"
avoiding difficult issues abon: morality, theology, IL meaning of life,
and our place in the cosmos it was blurted out. Here it was. Some-
thing was actually declared "eN il"pttre, unadulterated, unmistak-
able o ii iv\ the press. Now all the hard uuk....stions are laid on the
table and have to he laced: What is evil? Why do humans have the
seemingly \.)st capacity to harm others? If there is a guoct God, why
does he permit innocent people to suffer?2
There is something, about the Susan Smith case that L:\ okes our
harshest moral judgments and gets us asking all of those hard ques-
ti( )11s. Ro,enbaum cannily ohm:nes that "the great tabloid stories are
the ones that raise theological questions." Yet he quickly acknowl-
edges that we cannot talk about evilor about good, for that mat-
ter without some definitions. Those definitions lead us to larger
theories about the origin and existence of evil in our midst, and those
theories lead us to even larger conceptions of the meaning of lite and
the nature of whatever Supreme Being might exist.3
;J. d P hilosoph:: (c' Z. cliff ir ) ; / 3
Although iur age is acutely conscious of the widespread existence
of evil in human life, past ages have certainly been aware of its pro-
found significance. Almost no ()tiler theme recurs in great literature
more often than that of humanity's capability for evil. In ancient
Greek tragedy, tiff example. the tragic hem is a persim of noble status
and lofty aspirations \\ ho is eventually undone because of a profound
character flaw, known as imbni's (pridc). All of the tragic hero's other
virtues become disjointed as his flaw subtly ruins his lite. Russian au
thor
Fkodiir 1)(),stoesslo, rum
scornfully the comf(uling notion that
humans are always rui,mal and good, In a famous passage 6'ml? Thu
BiwIt/c; -,v Kai -am/L:4w, l) mstc cssL pri.)tests such \ ild optimism about
humankind: - 1 can't endure that a man of lofty mind and heart be-
gins with the ideal of the Madonna and ends with the ideal of Sodom.
What's still inote an till is that a man w ill, the ideal olSoilom in his
soul does not renounce the idea! oldie Madonna, and his heart Ina\
be on tire with that ideal, nenuineh on tire, just as in the d o
youth and innoi.ence. -4 hit human inability to live up to our own
high ideals i , a perpetual puzzlement.
The paradoxical depra\ ity and crsity of humanity arc treated
quite poiimanti\ n 1);: . . . 11; 1 Hyde. Robert Louis Stevenson's
iriglitening table records how the decent Dr. Jekyll came under the
power of a transtOrming drug: "It severed in tie those provinces of
good and ill which di\ ide and compound man's dual naturc. I wax iii
no sense a hypocrite; both sides of rue were in dead cal - nest; I was no
more myself when I laid aside restraint and plunged in shame, than
when I labored, in the eye of day, at the furtherance of knowledge or
the relief- of mirrow and sulferirm.":
.\s time. ncnt on, the thought of oil represented in the person of
Mr. Hyde no longer iilicd Jek\II \\ ith ICH'Or: "I sat in the ,un on a
bench; the animal \\ :thin me li king the chops of memory, the spiri-
tual side a little drowsed, promising subsequent penitence, bin not
yet fumed to begin. I began to he asa are of the temper tci' my
thoughts, a greater boldness, a c(nitempt of aingeri solution of the
bonds 01. 01.-, ligation. - ''
The a pk..I ike creature had diabolically gained control ot Jekyll:
This was the shocking tiling; that the slime or the pit seemed to utter cries
OiCCN; th,rl the .1111111. 01'.OU',dmii "!..e!. liCs ila;i2d and `:inilcd; that what
dead, and had nil shape, should imciiip the offices oflife. And this
aitziain. that the insurgcht horroii ',vas knit to him clo,cr the:Clth,cr
4
;the / . ) ; ' 01) 11' and P h11o ,-0pby of' R u
than an eve:, kw cagedhis flesh, k\ here he heard ii IllUttir and iiii it
strin:e 10 he horn; and ai eveFy hoar of.vcakness, ;1rd in he confidence
of slumber pre ailed against him, and deposed iiin out of life. 7
Dr. Jekyll confesses the terrible truth that he is radically both natures:
"It was the curse of mankind that ... H thc agonized womb of con-
sciousness these polar twins should be continuously struggling." 8
Paul, the early Christian evangelist, recognizes the war within him-
self: "I do not understand rm ,wn ,ict ions. For I do not do \1 hat I
want, but I do the very thing I hate.. I can will what is right, but I
cannot do it. For I do n it do the good I w ant, but the e\ii I do not
alit is what I d 9 In a similar ein, St. Augustine recounts his Ull-
happ,
predicament in his (
' 0126. 7. r . viony: "I was bound, not with an-
other's Irons, but by my ow n iron will. My will the enemy held, and
thence had made a chain tOr nie, and bound me.""" This peHoital as-
pect of C\ ii most , losely coincides with what the Judeo-C nristian
Scriptures describe as
Once we recognize the existence of something that can reasonably
be called personal evil. we must then also recognize that it has collec-
tive c well as individual dimensions. Org,anized crime s\ ndicates, mili-
tant emerging nations, oppressive social structures, and profit crated
multinational corporations are, in a real sense, the social extensions or
personal evil. On both individual and corporate levels. .)ne of the sad-
dest features of human evil is its strange admixture with good or appar-
ent good. Marriages are wrecked for lack 1' mini understandiiT,, ed
neat ional communities arc undermined by disagreement about how' to
pursue common ikicals, political parties arc thmw n into disarray by ex-
cessive .11111)111(in, and r i ls are ripped apart by struggles for power.
Although kleare perplexed by humanity's capacity tor evil, even the
best of us ,'.re sometimes hurt and even ci uslied b the impersonal
forces oH lie Lull\ crse. 1 hese forces know in
n rig 0 111, 11 mi
n agendas o
r
purposes and tend to thwart all that w c hold dear. Herman Niel\ ille
deals with this theme in Ifobv Dick, Captain Ahab P ei1uod, forty
years a \1 Haler 111 the first hall - of . the last century, sets out fi-om Nan_
t ticket on what appears to be a long w haling cruise. Little does anyone
know that Ahab's journey is not seaman's business hut a quest tOr the
meaning of life. Ahab had lost a leg in an earlier en,:ounter with Nlobv
Dick, a great w hire \\ hale , then the terror of the seas, and is now bent
on destroying Thc captain is obsessed with the meaning, of human
existence in the face of overwhelming natural forces. Ironically, the
atilvilaadPialosoph:.'qf cli,alaa
whale is whitetl(1 1 often
1 ,1 1 -'1 1
Mb( dite N\ hat is sacred and
holv; but the whale is fearsome and hostile to human values and, in the
end, triumphant. Isitmad, the ship's only survivor, claims that in losing
his life Ahab discovered its int:ailing." The modern world knows all
too welt that this disturbing picture of hfe life being ruined and finally
snuffed out 'V forces beyond its control - is a realistic one.
'Fhere is 11(1 denving that persons often tall victim to psychological
and physical tOrces beyond their control. But quite apart from how
these n ees affect human interests. they certainly cause much pain
and death \e hin nature itself. As Alfred Lord Tennyson reminds us,
nature is "red in tooth and Jaw." urvival of the Iciest is built into
the mechanism of animate n. 1 1 1 Ie. Fe animals are free from : 1 1 tack
bv stron. , er animals or from suffering and death due to shills in Weir
environment. ,Althotigh animals do not possess the higher self-
consciousness of humans, 'L fl obyiously lc(...1 pain and endure
suffering. Thoughtful pcoplc tirtil it Very puf/ling that the world
should work in such a Way as to maim, torture, and destr(w large pro
portions of these subhuman creatures.
At the end of an catalii , g of ills that plague the sy brit] comes death.
All things es entually die. But death is a particularly acute problem for
the human species because \\ e humans sense that our existence has
value and worth, that our agendas have merit, Iii
I we deserve touo on
living and building our lives. And yet death stands as the Unal enemy,
the last evil we must face; it puts an end rt)t only to our doing and un-
dergoing further evils but also to our pursuing our most cherished
dreams. 'rims, death is radically foreign to all that is within us, Ludwig
Wittgenstein observes: "I )eat h is not an eY cm in life: we do not live to
experience cleath." 1 .?. Death is the end ()Hite. II F, Lovell Cocks writes
that the icrinination of one's own personal existence is the "great hu-
man repression, the LIMY ersal - Loinplex.' I )\.ing is the reality that pe,
sons] dare not lace, and to escape \\ hide !Hey I summon all I their) re-
cotirces. --' Those who have thought and hard about the lunran
conditi(m know that death is arguably the ith..)st fearsome orali esils.
ponderintz e il in the world, we 1 1 1 01 " be tempted to echo the
sentiment in the chorus of T. S. Eliot's .'li,ani>e; In
aic Catlydral:
Ilert. isPI,city, here
/5no aillWStay.
ill the time. Ili/certain
the profit, ce;vi; in the
6

he Probkin Tvil

of
0 late late late, late is tliz tin/ c,
too late, and rotten thL- year:
Epii the wind, and bitter the sea. and
grey the sky,g,..ev .
Unfortunately, this prolbund and inconsolable pessimism appears to
be natural and warranted when the troubles of humanity arc taken se-
riously,
All of the had things that happenhorrors that we human beings
commit toard one another, awful ex ems that occur in nature, and
terrir)ing ways in which nature threatens hunian interestsfall under
the rubric of e\ ii Simply put: Ther("rs evil in the world. It is in the
nexs. It is in our 1/4()Inn)on experience. Popular periodicals exen grap-
ple with it. Quite apart from any precommitmem to a specific theory
of evil and I n ns oil fits in to a larger iruerpretation of lilt. % there is a
virtual consensus that somethingn deepl\ \\ ro
; 1g v., ith our \\ orld,
that things do not al \\ s seem 11) go as they should, and that much
too often cseuits happen that are utterly dreadful. It is in this broad
sense that x\c say, - Evil exists."
Evil and Religious Belief
As people through the centuries have reflected on the meaning of lift,
they have had to come to grips with the persistent and pervasive pres-
ence of evil. It is not surprising, then, that every major religion ad-
dresses evil within its unique frame of rclerena. 1- I or Ruddhism, evil is
inherent in human existence, making nonexistence (1,, i;Tilliot the goal.
For Hinduism, oil belongs to the world olillusiont and cyclical
rebirth tsilimiri-a) from which k1 c must seek to find release. For Zoroas-
trianism, c\ 11 is an eternal cosmic principle that opposes the good.
In 77;. .Sui.Ted 'anupv, sociologist
Peter lierger writes that one fine-
ton of every religion is to provide a a oliunderstaiidimtg ()flitting
the events of life into a meaningful patient, l le explains that religion
imposes order and lax tidness on experiences that seem to be chaotic
and destructive most notabh, the phemnnena of suftk.H-ing, and death.
Thus, religion imposes a /1011105 , or lawful ex.planatirm, on otherwise
anomie feat tire, of existence, Berger is 'a' tit qut ging on this point:
The .1m,inie phenomena must not only he lived through, the\ must also
be explainedto Wit, explained ill Lcrills of the uontos established in the
Rcliole);/
SOCiCeVill iILiCSiit n An explanation oi these phenomena 111 lerrn, nfreki-
giou,1{>?,..\1 1 1 ,1 1 C1 'er tiegrCCof tho ffetic,11 sc phis; icat ion, may
be e.Cl d a theodic+. It is important to stress ken: particularE
the same poi t has dread!, been made ...tclicr lly ith reSp_it to religious
leOtirnations, that , uch an C Nr1.111.1ii011 need not entail a compleN.. :he.
reticalstem.pe,isant who conunents up,yn the death of a
child by retelling IC)41 or God is engaging in theo ,.ic, its much as
the 'learned /1Co .'.010:111 V, II( writes a treatise to demonstrate that the
feting (0: the innocem doe, not negate the conception ota God both.
good and ail powerfill. All the same, it is possible to LtilIerentiate theodi-
cies ill ci(d their ikgree or raii0r1 ,01 ' , , that k, the degree to which
the clua'l a theory that cohcrer:th and consistentk e \plains the phe-
nomena 1 0 i. 1 1 1 C. s001 1 iIi 0. : 1 '1 1 1 S 0C;1 0 uver,1 1 1 licit (>1 the Atli% ci.se. Such a
theory, or course, once it is socially established, maY he tett-acted on di'=
leren foe:, 0C sophistication throughout the society. 'flu's, the peasant,
wh,...n he speaks alit Cut the V% . 1 1 1 1 1 . . 1 1 Thel1 110,,10 Cr illal'-
ticulatciv, the majestic thcodicy constructed livtheologian.l
So, what religious system says about eil reveals a great deal about
Ndiat it tales ultimate reality and humanity's relation to it to be.
Hence, the credibility of a religion is closely linked to its ability to
give its adherents categories tbr thinking aboUt the presence of evil.
A:though evil poses a challenge Mat every major religion must ad-
dress, the challenge to Christianity is particularly formidable. There
seems t+ he a serious 1C11Si011 bC1 Weell ITA1 ( hristian thcology affirms
ab(mt [he unrivaled nuwer, unlimited knowledge,. and unrelenting love
of God, on the one handmd what it admits about evil in God's cre
aced order, on the other. Nlanv persons think that the Christian God
if. I le really exists and is I he source and guarantor of valuewould not
alloy, the
y, orld to be as it is. Ink is the cru% of the issue for Christian
belier: . it -His 11...di t i tma
il y
been known as the
problem nicsil, Thromdt-
(nit 111S101- V, theokTians and philosophers hat e Wrestled \\ 1 1 1 1
this prubleM. ThOugh1 1 1 1 1 and sensitive laity base also ihit, the need lbr
at least a general explanation of him to relate God and On. Tile co-
1 1 1 . 1 1 1 drt1 1 1 1 seem, Ulla\ Oidable. A fter resie\Ning all the evils that haunt
our c.- omemporar \ consciousness, I .arice Morrow raises this precise
problem at the end of his I line' maga/.ine articled'
Some thinkers believe that unless Christian l' alievers have an ac-
ceptable solutiun to the problem (It Nil, they have no ri ,..T.ht to hold
their distincti\ e theological position or to ask others to adopt it,"
Philosopher. 1. tY, Settle argues that grappling \\ ith
the problem of
8he Prob.!OfPi11o.qq.0volbtritgiou
evil is a - prolegomenon to intellectually honest theology,"'" Thor
Hall proposes that the ability or inability to generate an ans\\ er to the
vexing problem of evil is the litmus test of the "reasonableness of the-
oh)gy." I fall says that Christian thinkers must "he capable ()Ihandling
honestly the actualities of human existence (realities which we all
know) while at the same lime providing a framework for explicating
responsibly the essential affirmations of the iaith (altirmatilms which
are given within the historical tradition).")
The position that is put under direct pressure by the presence of
evil is known as "theism." Theism maintains that there exists a
Supreme Icing who is omnipotent, omniscientind perfect I\
Ro\\ e calls this position "restricted iheism."-'.; Theism as such
is not uselfliving religion but tOrms what we might call the basic con-
ceptual lOundation ti)r sc\ cral li\ ing religions: ( .hristianitv, Judaism,
and Islam. The total belief frame orks of these actualin -
\ c adding, certain other snilicant religious belie l's to restri, ted
theism. Restricted theism conjoined ' hi other religious claims con-
stitute, what Rim,: calls "expanded theism,"
The present stud\ treats many of the important discussions related
to the basic theistic foundati(m of Christian belief (i.e., restricted the-
ism). Ariel all, insofar as c 1 presents a challenge to theism, it pre
sents a challenge to any version of expanded theism. However, this
study also considers some issues related to larger sets of Christian be-
,
liefs (i.e., various Christian versions of expanded theism). These sets
of Christian beliefs parl:icularly come into play \Own considering vari-
ous responses to the challenge posed by evil. These larger sets of
C,hristian beliefs are constituted, of cour,e, by rotrieted theism con-
joined with additional propositions about (;od's general purposes in
the world, the role of Jesus ( :hrist, life alter death, the hunian condi-
tion, sin, and SO forth. The spc:ilie propositions with which restricted
theism is augmented drawn triml such n irecs as clit IL h cr eeds,
hihlical interpretationmd common (Itristian experience determine
the exact NerSi()11 of expanded theism at issue. Althotl..7.11 \xe may refer
to any one or these versions as - ChrisnaliitV" or -( .hristian buliCt" or
"Christian tlicolop, - C kvill more regularly use the more precise
rubric "Christian theism."
The Phi losophi cal Di ffi culty
Let us say that the essential problem here tbr theism (and thus tbr any
version of Christian theism)that of reconciling belief in an all-
;.;. ;fvdr cliffie);;9
p(MCIll1L, all-knoss ing, 1;:.d deity with the belief that there is evil
in the world. But exactly 'hat kind of a problem is this? Speaking
more precisely, the difficulty for theism lies in rebutting an argument
that alleges some kind of conflict between beliefs about God and be-
liefs about eyil\n argument from evil or, really, any one of several
arguments from evil has a structure, premises, and conclusion. It is
actually the conclusion of att, given argument from evil and the rea-
sons fOr that conclusicsn that arc a "problem" for theism. In the for
losving pages, I ss III use the term probirin r+fcril simpls .is a synonym
cril.: 2 And there is not just one problem or argu-
ment Iron) evil; tHere are mans different argoinents. Scholars
have ideno Ned seseral major types of arguments from (nil, noting
theft Les strategies as ss ell as characteristic theistie responses.
These arguments has c sarious roots. For one thing, the problem of
e s i i expresses a kind of moral protest and so insolyes categories
good and oil. Tor another thing, the problem 115 015 es religious be-
liels about the existence and nature of God, giving it a distinct theo-
logical aspect, Yet the problem of evil is best underst. x as a philo-
sophical problem. In its traditional role, philosophy clarifies and
analyzes our beliefs, examines them t n logical consistencY and coher-
enCemd evaluates their adequacy tbr explaining important human
phenomena. These philosophical features make the discipline of phi-
losophy the natural home field for the problem of evil,
There are, of course, many areas of philosophical concern, and each
is deternied by the exit set of ideas and issues that are examined:
philosophy of science, philosophy- or mind, philosophy or language.
philosophy of art, and so ti .v.h. Each ofthese areas seeks to bring the
kes insights and interesis of philosophy to bear upon thr Ries ant
topics. This means that typical philosophical questions about reality
knowlesic epHemologv). and value (moral Psis
and axiology') are appropriate. And questions about the structure and
acceptability of relevant arguments .logic) are always in order, The
subject at hand, the problem of . il, Calls Wit hilt Ns hat is traditionally
known as the philosophy of religion. It is thc task of philosophs ofre-
li ,..cion, then, to bring these characteristic quest ins to bear on signifi-
cant religious concepts and beliefs, such as those related to God, mir-
acle, prayer, and faith,
Philosophers of religion have always been deeply interested in the
question of wherher there are rational grounds for either belief in
God or disbelier. in God. Impressive arguments have been con-
structed to show that God exists such as the ontological, cosmolog-
10

1
1 . ) ; . 01. ,h
,.// and pi,
ito.q, pby ,,f'
and teleological arguments.'; Like ise, a number of sett
guments have been ads anccd to show that God does not exist.
Among those arguments against God's existence, none has been
more prominent than the problem of evil. In the experience of evil
and reflection upon it, humanity reaches the extreme limitT con
fronting the deciske question of the meaning of life, of the sense and
nonsense or reality. Hans KOng states that the problem of evil is "the
rock of atheism"because so many people believe it to be in-
tract able. This accounts for the lhcly and ongoing discussion of the
problem in philosophy of religion.
Rlit why, one might ask, should this philosophical problem be rele-
% ant to faith? Faith is personal commitment. deep abiding trust, inn
cons iction. Faith is much more than abstract reasoning. Why should
the intricate arguments and counterarguments of philosophers affect
religious faith at all? :\ SellSibie ,111SWCI', it \`,()Iild seem, runs along the
t011o\N ing lines. Although, granted, faith is ;;/,,w,' than itle - e intellec-
tual assent to a set of lx.diek, it is at least intellectual assent. Although
faith is a personal trust in God, that trust is based on a number oHm-
portant beli,fi.about what God is like and how persons ma\ have a re-
lationship to him. These beliefs are subject to philosophical scrutiny,
clue. and defense. .1 hus, therc really is no responsible way to insu-
late religious faith from philosophical reflection. And there is certainly
no way to insulate it from the philosophical problem of evil.
The Classification of Evil
Recognizing the problem of evil as a seri, mis challcitge tam (i an the-
, it might seem advisable to begin our in \ cstigation with a precise
definition olekil. lh the attempt to offer a specific definition at
this point :reqiientiv ladens the meaning of with prek.i mceived ideas
anti thus hinders ()biCCh1e discussion- St)Ille thinkers, for cum*, de-
fine "es il - in theological terms as "sin" and consider the problem only
in this light, reducing all evils to spiritual rebellion against God and its
consequences, Other thinkers define - oil" as - finitude" and then treat
all evil -even hinnan perversityas the inevitable results or creaturely
limitation. Definitions of "evil" could be proposed and debated indefi-
nitely. Therefbre, it is advisable for present purposes to leave open the
question of definition and proceed with a broad, commonsense notion
of evil evoked by the things we typically call "evil."
Regardless of how we define it, we arc all aware of the ex ence
and profusion of evil. It is endrely possible to identify a whole spec- -
rfRi.4171();/11
truni of events and experiences as "oil." The set of commonly recog-
nifed evils includes, at the VcrY least, such things as extreme pain and
suffering, physical dct,,rmities, psychological abnormalities, the pros-
perity of had people, the demise of good people, disrupted social rela
tions, unfulfilled potential, a host of character defects, and natural
cat ast rophcs. This list specifies the sorts of things that are commonly
considered evil without prejudicing later discussions. In philosophical
parlance, this list indicates the xtension 01 the term "evil" (i.e., all
!Things to which the term applies) without speed\ ing its exact inten-
yion (i.e ., .ill that the term implies). The eloquent eighteenth-century
skepi ic David Flume followed this approach when he listed a sam-
pling of the world's ills: "a huspita tillof diseases, a prison crowded
Vii h malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed w it h carcasses,
a fleet linindering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny,
famine, [and] pestilcnce."25
il indeed h1 ,, many faces, faces w ith 55 Ilk Li ac are all too 1:1miliar.
Sine the ide raiue of evils can he er!, eonfusing., most ',Hos+)
phers make a helpful distinction between monil and natural
In marking- out the difference between the tw 1.)r()ad kinds of evil,
Al\ in Plantinga writes that "we must distimutish between .,: ,v0 ;7 : 1 L T /7
and natural The tOrmer is evil which results fr,)in free human ac
ti itv., natural evil is am other kind or\'. Plantinga admits, the
distinction is not \ cry precise. \ et this same point is made by John
Hick: "Moral es ml is evil what we human beings originate: iTLICI,
idOtHmci perverse thoughts and deeds. Notttral evil is the evil
that originates independently of human actions. in disease bacilli,
cart hquakes, storms, droughts, tornadoes, etc."?
F1.% ard ladden and Peter Hare provide a similar classification:
Phy4ral'al sh.til sac. denotes the terrible pain, suffliring, and un-
timely death caused by events like MT, flood, landsi:dc, hurricane,
earthquake. ucal .5 aveind i -amine and by diseases like cancer, lcprosv,
and ietanu,---as well as the iirinplin , dLifeets and deformities like blind-
ness, de.dlICSS, d111111111C,S,ShriVCied limimhs,and insanity by which so
many sentient beings arc L.- heated ui the lull be:It:fits ()I
crildc. m r.-e ,
.. both ithwal NI Ttmgdoing such as lying, Lrhcating. steal-
ing, 1. (muring, and murdering and character deli:cis like greed, deceit,
t'r
3r dice and seltishness..::'
Other authors do not depart far from this same general approach.
Although we could debate the exact boundaries between natural
and moral evil, the basic distincti in performs a helpful classificatory
12

7he Ptol'h'tii Of n R
function. It not only helps clarify our thinking about oil but also al-
loss s us to divide the general problem of evil into subsidiary problems
related to moral and to natural evil and thus guides further stages of
inquiry. In his penetrating treatment of the problem of evil, David
Hume shows he is aware of this important distinction. Hume ob-
serves that:, in nature, "the stronger prey upon the weaker" and "the
weaker. too, in theft turn, often prey upon the strongermd vex and
molest them without relaxation. - Acknowledging that humanity can
organite into societies and thus avoid some o! the harm nature might
do, he insists that humans morally mistreat each other: "Oppression,
injustice, contempt, . . violence, seditiun, \ ,Ar, reachery, fraud
1w these they mutually torment each other, arid they would soon dis-
soh e that society which they had formed were a in ti for the dread of
still greater ilk 'a hid) 111LISI their separation.''-
Quite apart from technical philosophy, the distinction between nat-
ural and in evil runs through most great literature. "The Tyger"
by William Flake is a pm\ erful poetic expression of the problem of
natural evil. The poem forcefully raises the issue of \\ 'nether a certain
instance of natural evil (e.g., the threat of being, attacked by stronger
animals) could have been created by the God of the Christian faith.
7 : 1 2 7 1 - 7 .1 1 ): 41 .7 .1 I'll 1 1 /
In the linists or the niabt,
ti/Jai immortal band 0 1 - eve
Could frame 1 1 .1 1 'fiVY 'via iii
In what Ills/am deeps oi
Bt;- ii,,/ the.Jire I/id/le eves?
On ?PIMwinfis daii he asp;"t.:
VI:/al the hand do ii Sei flit?
And what shwthici . and who/ art,
Could/he sinews of' thy heavi
A 1 1 l1 ilCarl
I t hat dread hand: iiiil ii/ii ni 1 0 7 01. fill
rbr 1 )0 n Wei'? Irlint the ail: " n ?
.T 1 1 t . 0 1 1 1 1 CC 1 POS thy L I/Y in
Win the 7 1 1 1 1 . i I what- dn..ad grasp
1 )a7 -e its dea
111Y limn's 1 -1 1 7 1 ): : '
7 7 , /: I" TY7, y y.y r
]i((j/)//
IRf11,lWa

13
1 .1 . 1hi'li the st-(7)1,-110;1';1spi'ars,
And tpateiwii licaren thrl frari,
Did bc smile his

5 ,,e (
Did he H , ho Wadi' . 1,11111 Make llIt'e?
7::,arr! in)nidtt)
f; f
ell'i resI S
1 1 7 .1 a: immortal band (0' L : vt'
Dart _Ironer thy . ti'a syrn nit
We also find the problem or moral oil in great no els. Dosto-
e% SkN ' sssie I b nrfitilt:rs C0111.1inc,.a poil. .4nant treatment-
of the problem. Nan karamazo\ asks his brother Ahosha, \\ ho is a
0 1 1 1 1 0 dM. monk, the piercing Lutestion of . why God allows
ci'tiek1 )innocent children. Ivan ICICMICSSIV CIL1111CrslICS St01"k:, 1
the torture and murder of children a littlebeaten by parents and
then left o\ ernight in an outhouse to treete, a young serf boy torn to
death by a lando\\ ner's hounds tOr thr, ming, a stone at one of them,
an unborn child cut from its mother's w( will by imading Turks, and
on and on. Then. I\ an cries: "Listen! I took the case of children only
to make nay case clearer. Of the other tears of humanity \\ latch
the earth is soaked from its crust to its center, I will say nothing. I
have narrowed rnv subject on purpose. I am a bug, and I recognive in
all humility that I cannot understand \\ hr the world is arranged as it
is. ... But then there arc the children, and what am I to do about
them? That's a question I can't answer."''
In the next six chapters, I explore the major atheistic arguments
from evil as well as important theistit.-. responses. I discuss the
stren gths an
d \\ caknesses on both sides and point directions C(n. fur-
ther discussion. III he process, I ill not only anal\ te rra
iny technical
issues related to God ,Ind CV11but also attempt to de\ clop a sense of
the deep significance of this issue in human life. I address three prob-
lems of oil that express arious logical and epistemological concerns:
the problem, probabilistic problem, and e\ idential problem.
The theistic responses to the logical and probabilisti,. problems that I
exarrimc can he described as defensive. The typical theistic response
to the es identiA prvt)1Qm
that I inspect comes under the rubric of
theodicv. I also explore what can be called the existential problem of
evil, which expresses the intensely personal and moral aspects of the
issue.
14
7he Probhltub' ipby of R 1,
f
Notes
1

,Vorrow, " 1 -1 0," I iiur. J une 10, 1991. pp.

2. The use of dlegcndcr pronoun here does not imply that God
is male. Historical iudeo-Christian views ot G
od hav e atlirmc d that scsitaijiv
a ereatureiv reality not reIlcocd fl God, Iv us(' J trmas culine Dronouns
when rtsfttrring to God Hit011L
d
tOlL Ilus book, :hen, follows the tradition :hat
requires UN 11)1.1SC liii eileet Cali/11V 1C1111', and images lit talk about, God,
avoid using my new, revised Clod language here, which would raise some VCry
interesting btu also very sophisticated coruro\ ersies. I retain traditional usage
simoh Ioi the sake or economy and 1.t,et :tug on a. :11ciSstlet-, at han,t.
3. Ron R.o.senbaum, - startn;; into the I Ireart of the Fleart of Darkness,"
itul, lune 4, 1995): F, o-44, 50-511, 61, 72.
4. hvodor 1)ostoex sky, lbe B6ith1J/Ts Karti.;://ror. trans. Constance Garnett
(New. York: Norton, 1076),p. 97.
5, Robert Louis Stexenson, Thc.ve if Dr. J ekyll and 1 Ir. 11 e
(London: Folio Society, 1948), p. 124.
6, Ibid., p. 127.
7. Ibid., p. 146.
8. Ibid., pp. 124-125.
9. Rom, 7:15, 18b-19Revised Standard Version, Paul's lamentation
should be read in context: Sec 11a mu. 7:15-20.
10. Augustine, Gnit1-5.cioi/s,
11. Herman Melville. Ifoliv Dirk, eds. H. Havrord and H. Parker (New
York: \V. W. Norton. 1 9O7 .
).a discussioi ofthis vision litre, see I ICIU'V
A. Nivcrs, Traoeffv:Velly otiIthaca: (nen Ulu ersity Press, 1956
57 77ind Richard Sewail, The 1 ',non( Nev' Haven: Yale
s 19596
pp . 92_1 9S .
12. 1 ud :14 NViirgenstem, Tradrillotrans, D. F.
Pears and 11. 1. McGuinness (I indon: Rout ledge &1970,
proposition 6.4311, p. 147.
13. II 1:.1- ....)\:-.:11(ondon: James Clarke, 1943), p. 55,
tti i ",-,yi
ti''
I he
( "ow p I ere Ii C NeuV York:
11,11C01111.,111",ICC, 1952
p. I
So.
15. Such illattcrs we discussed in John Box\ Iser,01...m,t11;7Lyt-1:';
Relirtion.c
qrthe
(m 1-1 ri
C:In ill':"c
v Press ,
197(1),
16. l'cicr IIergcr,Nacied Canopy Nc-\\: York: 1)oubieday, 1967 j, pp,
53-54.
17. Morrow, "Fx1,"S I.
I S. In response, some ihrigians hold the belie\ ers may instead argue
Mat they do not iCC a tilcudio:, A nurnIN..r of approaches are p(issible here.
hot- example, a believer may 51111...0 t he problem or evil does not
conclusivelx disprove her position, she need n o t answer it. Or a believer may
argue that she has comineim), proof of (Ioi.t's existence on other grounds
71.ic? ,1 it , ;/ t:15
and lane,: :11,11 she knokis the problem ot evil must have si'inc answer. She
may ci en sax 1;ia: her belief in God is so basic dial it supersedes ctiforts to
prirve or ill , pro-\ e it. "1.': his line of thc>ught is discussed in Chapter 4.
Lair tu iv that there are differing opinions about
:Inv \\.I5

)idinf7r,hCpmbicrn 01'
evil ear isti comfortably accepted. .\ tier
ail, Christianpurports tore,ei, ant features of human eds.-
tence, butdoes not seem to hi well iii:o the explanation.
there is at IC l A prima 1,1C/C CsISC i IIA I iliC liCisT must IllAkC good
her Jain,aodressing the problem ules I.
19.4.'. VV. Settle,
-
A Prolegonienon to Intelleetitak! . Holiest Theology,"
Philo.copbi;ial Fiwuni 1 I 97S ;: 30. 110.
20. i'm r 1 liii.I lieodie. as a Test of
the Rea ,01 1 u,kricss of Theot ogy,
Rch:ilioit it; Life 43 1974 21)4.
21 kviiiiarn R
cve, Fvi l
and T h e Th e i s ,; H ypol h es i s. .\ Response to
kst 1%1:16 i.19S4 I: 95.
22. Dailicl Ilkmard-NnyLici . N.:1;\ecn thcIA:. evil"
and 1:',CCvii's in his edited volume ihr
l'n;jI iii Bloomington: Indiana 1...ilivAisity Press, 1990 pp. NI mi.
23. lot disk:Liss:0,n )1 . inns] or the in,Cior issues related to khether there
ace cm i, ana i ,:roun d s
h r b
e li ev i r ,,
Michael Peters
on,
lasker. 11: . (tic Reichenbachmil David Basinger. Reasou anti
Lit(it it/on to ite Pi; ior Itel2iid ed. ..New York: OIiird
Univcrsit Press. 1998
24.11ans Khnn. ();; Bcini.i!r ms. Edward Quinn IGaen
City, N.Y Dull 19761, p. 432,
25.1.)1,11Timis Conce.'ii;.: 13;f1 Nr;tuniil Reli. ition,
cited in
Michael 1.. Peterson, ed.. ifir P;ifil, 2. - 1;?SC hiTI'd R(Notre
Dame,ersit:, of Notre D.u,.e l')92 p. 42.
2o \hi"

F
RilVids..Eerd-
mans., 1977 , p. 30,
27, John 1 liek.,,:;id the Godv. ed. (Ness York: Harper &
Row. 1975 , p. 12.
28. Edward ladder and Peter 7747 Concept of Goci uri ng
field, Ill.:les C. Thomas. 19oSi, p. 6.
29, H time 5pioicd In Pcterson, ed.. 1 Itc Probli -,w 4;/ lit/i. p..11
30. William Blake, ": - Fhe I ger, - 11 Irt able 131cd. Alfred 1:a/in
(Ness York: Viking Press, 1%8 p. 109,
31, Doquoisky, lire Biotitea in iwtrL-.0r, pp: 221-225,
Su ggcsted Read ings
Lannt,, Albert. 17,, - .1,:!inc. Translated by Stuart Gilbert. Ness 'Irk: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1948.
16he Piobhi of and Phito. ,- opby
Davis, Stephen T. "Why Did This I lappen to Ale= The Patient as a
Philosopher." 1);. th. yton BillitVin 65 (1)72 61 (7,
flick, John. "The Problem ()CFA ii." I 1 7111. Lneyrlopedin qt Pbilo. vophy. Edited
by Paul Edwards, Neb.\ York: Macmillan and trec Press, 1967, pp.
136-111,
Flume, David. Dinio/tuc., Crwr:,-ning Nett/ Rd/non. Parts 10 and 11.
Ebhted I. IL D. Aikk.sn. No\ Yorl,: }Una Publishim.b 1955.
Lewis, .INurPain. New York: Macmillan : 1962.
Macl.eish, Archibald. / . B. 1; ostcHi: longinon Mifflin, 1986,
Alelvillc, I lerman.Eincd by 11. 1lay!Ord and Ilershel Parker.
NewW. . Norton, I 967,
Pc 1 erson, 1 lii . l Icd . VicProblemofIntir ,c/c, - ted Rc:!iiili,t1S. Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press : 1992.
Pike, Nclst bn, ed. God 0 1 1 1 1 Era: Rradii,VIS ii, 1 /U' ihreth?ifiCal Problem of Evil,
Englewood Chit's. N.J.: Prem. :et:1E1k 1964.
IV:escl, Etc. Nifilit. "translated by Stella Rud ay. No\ York: Bantam Books,
1960.
qf God. 'i ranslated by MarionN.Yiesel. New York: Schocken
Books, 1979.
2
The T .ogcal Problem of Evil
The problem of evil has both theoretical and existential dimensions.
The theoretical problems deal with logical and epistemic relationships
between propositions about God and oil. The existential dimension
of the problk.mi pertains to one's deepl\ personal response to evil and
overall sense or the worth of human existence. Leaving discussion of
the existeriial problem until Chapter 7, , I devote the intervening
chapters to three important statements of the theoretical problem.
During the 1970s and 1 980s, philosophers came to make a distinc-
tion between two broad versions t f the thcoretiCal lie log-
ical problem revolves around the question of consistencv among key
theistic propositions. The evidential problem involves evaluating
propositions about God in terms of the facts of evil. I discuss two
ways of ad' ancing the evidential problem in Chapters 4 and 5. Here I
focus on the classic logical problem of evil.
Statement of the Problem
The logical problem o': evil (also called the a priori problem and the
deductive problenC, arises on the basis of an alleged inconsisteno be-
tween certain claims ab(no God and certain claims about evil.' T"Iis-
torieallk. the discussion of this problem has de\ eloped as critics at
tempt to expose an inconsistency among theistic beliefs and theistic
philosophers attempt to show why there is no inconsistency.
Oxford philosopher J. L. Mackie sums up the atheistic challenge:
"Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support,
but that they are positively irrational, that several parts of the essential
17
1 8The I ofiicif7P;. 0:5 71-ili of Ti , ii
theological doctrine arc inconsistent with one another.' since being
logically consistent is necessary for a set of beliefs to be rational,
Mackie's charge is very scrimp,. Mackie clearly and forcefully states
the logical problem: "In its simplest form the problem is this: God is
omnipotent; God is vhollv good; and vet evil exists. 'there SCCMS to
bC Some COntradiCtiOn
between these three propositions,
so that if
anv two of them were trite the third would be false. Rut at the same
time all three are essential :arts of most theological positions; the the-
ologian, it ,ccrns, at once must adhere and cannot cowls/twilv adhere
to all thr..,:." 3
If Mackie and other critics are right, then the dilemma lacing the
theist is whether to retain his theistic position and the propositions
that constitute it (and thus be saddled with a contradiction) or to re-
linquish one or more of the releymit propositions and thereby escape
the contradiction). To embrace a contridicHon is irrational, but to
swicilcr an key theistic belief is to abandon standard tilt:ism.
Two centuries ago, David Hume (following IThicurus) posed the
difficulty with stark clarity: "Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not
able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not v Ming? Then he is
male\ ()lent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?" 4 Or
consider H. J. McCloskey's succinct statement: "The problem of evil
is a very simple one to stare. ['here is evil in the world; yet the world
is said to be the creation of a good and omnipotent God. How is this
possible? Surely a good omnipotent God would have made a world
free of evil of any kind." 5 Similar expressions of the logical problem
arc abundant in the philosophical literature.
If we isolate for closer inspection the propositions that critics com-
monly h:\ e in mind, we get the following list of propositions:
(1) God exists;
(2) God is all-powerful;
(3) God is all-good;
(4) God is all-knowing;
(5) Evil exists.
The set of beliefs (1)(4) is what Rowe calls "restricted theism," a po-
sition that the theist, by virtue of being a theist, must accept. How-
ever, the typical theist also accepts (5 as an element in his overall po-
sition. The critic, then, maintains that the set (1)(5) is logically
inconsistent.
771 1 , I 0. 1 7 ,61 1 Pvolilein of Evil

19
The Structure and Strategy of the A rgument
Before embarking on a complete discussion of the logical argument
from evil, it is helpful to review the general concept of incinisistenci or
coniradiction. 6 Actualh, there are several types of contradiction to
consider. One type is a certain kind of propositiona conjunctive
proposition in which one conjunct is the denial or negation of the
other conjunct. Consider the following proposition:
(6) Socrates is mortal., and it is take that Socrates is mortal.
The first conjunct (Socrates is mortal) and the second conjunct (it is
false that Socrates is mortal) cannot both be true. Wham e have here
is an ra. p. iicit 00111rridiCI
The prONC111, Or 011 that one who asserts a contradiction
cannot he ad\ ancing a position that is compktelr true, By
methods
found in any elementary
tc\t on logic, we can 1nov, I nit a contra-
diction is a proposition that is necessarily false. Interestingly. kiuina
the actual truth or falsity of the conjunk.- ts in a contradictory proposi-
tion is not required in order to km iw that it suffcrs from incon-
sistency. Presumably, few people commit such flagrant errors in think-
ing.
Nlacide speaks of a set of theistic propositions being inconsistent or
containing a contradiction. 1>nt what does it mean ihr a set to be in-
consistent or contradictory: We may say that a set of propositions is
explicitly contradictory iC one of the members is the denial or nega-
tion of another member. For example. consider the fbllow ing set:
(7) Socrates is mortal
(8) It is false that Socrates is mortal.
By conjoining these two propositi(ms, e e1 he I:uniliar L:ontradie-
tion (6:1. ,\ set from witich such a n i can he generated is
explicitly contradictory in the sense in glleinon.
i n 111:111V cae , h(Mse1 cr, a set of pronositions is contradictory but
the el mtradietion is not obvious, not explicit. In these more difficult
instanees, the charge of ihconsistency can still be made to stick if ordi-
nary rules of tOrmal can be used to deduce a contradiction!
Let us develop an example to show how this works. Call the follow-
ing set A:
20The I ojfic1f7P;.0:5701/ or Tvii
(9) If all men arc mortal, then Socrates is mortal
(10) All men are mortal
(8) It is false that Socrates is mortal.
Using the logical rule moth's poneus (if p, then q; p; thcref ire q), we
can deduce
(7) Socrates is mortal
from (9) and (10). Proposition (7) is logically inconsistent u it It (8).
Since it is not possible k r propositions 7) and (8) both to be trilL:. at
the same time; the set from which they are draw it is contradictory. We
shall say that set A istbriun/Ivroniradicriny because we can ded uce an
e \Then contradiction from its member propositions by the ia S 01'
f0311 -1,11
..\:11111 1,10.11V, u Cum* of a inconsistent setpropositions is a
simplified one; seldom do such casv cases occur in ordinary lire. In
fact, the propositions that torn! an inconsistency in an oppiment's po-
sition are sometimes not stated at all. So, the critic is faced with the
double task of first producing all of the relevant unstated propositions
and then drawing out the contradiction from the fully articulated po-
sition. In such cases, the sets of propositions in question arc implicitly
eon toydictory,
1.or third example, let us reflect on the following propositions as
forming an implicitly contradictory set:
(11) Socrates is older than Plato
(12) Plato is older than Aristotle
(13) Socrates is not older than Aristotle.
This stn.which I w dl designate Bis nut e plicitly contradictor\ ; it
is also not formally contradictory. We cJIltlot use the laws of logic to
deduce the denial of any of these propositions from the others. Vet
there is an irciportant sense in which set B is inconsistent or contradie-
t(wy. 'Plat is, it is ;Rd possib/c that its three members are all true.
Now it is 1/(iISS177711"tilli' that
(14) If Socrates is older than Plato, and Plato is older than Aris-
totle, then Socrates is icier than Aristotle.
me T.T7ical P;'011relli1-:'11
If we add (14) to B, we get a set that is formally contradict+ wv. Employ-
ing the laws of fOrmal logic, (11), (12), and (14) yield thc denial of (13).
Now we have succeeded in making the implicit contradiction explicit.
We were able to deduce the contradiction in this set because \ye'
employed an additional proposition that is accessariir true. There are
actually differentvarieties of mecssary truth. The truth of some
propositions such as (15) below can be established by the laws of
logic alone.
(15) If all men arc mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates
is mortal.
This CNpreSSeti truth of logic. Yet the truths of arithmetic and taath-
ciratics generally are also necessarily true, such as
(16) 2 +2 = 4.
Furthermore, there are many propositions that are n,:ither truths of
logic nor truths of mathematics but arc nonetheless necessarily true,
such as (14). A few more examples of this type of necessary truth
would be
(17 Bachelors are unmarried Indies
(18 Plue is a color
(19) No numbers arc horses.
Let us call the ty pe of necessity with which we are dealing here
broad1). ntrs.vity. There is a correlative kind of possibilit\ as
well: A proposition p is possibly true (in the broadh logical sense) just
in case its negation
or denial is not necessarily true in rhat same
broadly logical sense).
Necessit and possibility in the broadly1()gical sense must he distin-
guished fnmi another sense of necessity and possibilit\ . That other
sense is (awn/ or uatural necessity and possibility. For instance,
(20) Michael Jordan has leapt over the Sears Tower.
is a proposition that is possibly true in our sense of broadly
possibilin. Yet in the sense of causal or natural possibility, it is not
22The 1. 02fit'ff71); . o!ilrili of Tvi
possible at all. Human beingseven great athletes
d,, not have
the physical endowments required for such a feat. There are a number
of propositions, furthermore, about which it is difficult to say
whether they are or arc not pc)ssible in the broadly logical sense, thus
giving rise to philosophical controversy. For example, is it possible for
a person to gist H a disembodied state?
Vithout attempLing to settle the more subtle philosophical prob-
lems liirking in this area, we now are in a good position to dcline
what it means for a set of propositions to be
cow radid ory:
A set S o propositions is implicitly contradictory if ilicre is a neces-
sary proposition p such that the conjunction of p with S
contradictory set. '11ternatively, we might say: S is impliettiv contra-
dictory ilt here is Nk nue necessarily true proposition p such th. 01 1 1 '
ing just the laws ot logic, we can deduce an explicit contradiction
from p t()geLlier w ith the members i ii S,
Now that c have defined the concept ol nulicitcontradiction, \
are in a positi, Hi to understand How Mackie frames up the logical at
gument from oil. I- Iis atheistic challenge is (.,-,entially that theism is a
system of:inconsistent beliefs that is, that a contradiction can be de-
ri cd from central theistic propositions about God and evil. However,
the contradiction is not an explicit one. In addition, it does not ap-
pear that a formal contradiction can he deduced from basic theistic
propositions. So, Mackie and other critics who make this argument
arc faced with the task of supplementing the basic propositions of
theism with one or more necessary truths in order to deduce the fatal
contradiction. In fact, Maddc's strategy is to specify additional
propositions that relate to he meanings of key terms used in the orig-
inal set of thvistic propositions:
The contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it 1/4\ C need some
additional premises, or perhaps some quasi logical rules connecting the
icons "good," and "omnipotent." . 1 he additional principles are
that good is opposed to evil, in such a wa that a good thing akays
eJiiiiinnes evil as liar as it can, and than here are no limn., 10who': on
omnipotent thing can do. From these itollows that a go
od oniiiipot cut
thing eliminates es, il completely, and then the propositions that a good
omnipotent thilT C 1S,
an d iha
l coil
incompmihic
Here we have Mackie's way of generating the contradiction.
In the vigorous debate that surrounded the logieal problem, critics
typically used supplemental propositions from the following list:
The Lot Problem of Evil23
(1') God is a real being independent from the world
(2') An omnipotent being can bring about any logically possi-
ble state of affairs
(3')
A wholly good being is opposed to evil and tries to elimi
nate it as far as it can
(4') An omniscient being knows everything that it is logically
possible to know
(5') The existence of evil is not logically necessary.
One can readily see how each proposition here defines or extends the
meanings of central theistic claims. The atheistic critic maintains that
propositions such as these, together with the original set of theistic
propositions, generate a contradiction. Other supplemental proposi-
tions become relevant as we consider the several distinct versions of
the logical problem.
Versions of the Logical Argument
The atheistic critic's basic strategy is to demonstrate how the essential
theistic claims are implicitly contradictory. And these critics have not
differed significantly over the set of theistic claims that contains the
contradiction. As we saw above, the following set is frequently cited:
(1) God exists;
(2) God is omnipotent;
(3) God is omniscient;
(4) God is wholly good.
(5) Evil exists.
For brevity and clarity, let us abbreviate the theistic position expressed
by propositions (1)(4) in one complex proposition:
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists.
Any question about (G) is equivalent, then, to a question about one
or more of the propositions that are incorporated into it. Our subse-
quent analysis will focus on the issue between those atheists who ad-
vance the charge of inconsistency and those theists
who refuse to give
up (G) or any of its constituent propositions in order to escape the
charge. Such defenders (pant's- as true theists, whereas those who re-
24The f ofiicif 1'; . 0:571 - 11/ of
linquish or modify (G) are actually quasi-theists 9 1 1 0in \ Q. shall dis-
cuss in Chapter 6.
Actually, there arc three distinct versions of the h)gical problem of
evil, with each version being determined by exactly which pr
,
position
about evil it employs. As we have seen, many critics (Flume, Mackie,
McCloskey, and others) take the belief in the existence olcN
pressed in proposition (5) aboveto Corm an inconsistent set when
conjoined with set (1)(4). And clearly, this i6nin Wu ion of the prob-
lem has been the most NN kid) discussed. ilowever, other critics do
not believe that the inconsistency arises ,\ licn some proposition about
the sheer existence of evil is added to the sel or propositions (1)(4).
Instead, they hold that the more important loulcal problem of evil is
formed by adding to (I )(4) some proposition about the great extent
and prolUsion 01 cxi. Plantinga recogni/es that this second tOrmula-
tion of th.e problem is open to the critic \\ ho ould say that "God's
existence is not consistent NN ith the Nast amonut andrno1 1 1
evil the universe actually contains."
10 A third \ ersion of the logical
problem, a version that does not focus either on the sheer existence of
evil or on its profusion, has been raised byt.cw critics. 1. crcnCe
Penelhum, tOr example, insists that it is logically inconsistent tOr a
theist to admit the existence of a pointless evil." 11 The critic raising
this version of the logical argument assumes th,-,r, the theist believes
both that God exists and that pointless evil exists.
We may now distinguish three versions of the logical argument
from evil, depending on which pr,>blematic belief about evil the critic
attributes to theism. The critic can Col - mutate an argument to the el--
feet that (G) is inconsistent with any on( of the three propositions be-
low:
(E1 ) Evil exists;
(E0) Large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distribu-
tions of evil CNici
(F3) Gratuitous or pciint less evil exists.
Whcil conjoined c ith ( (3), each of the prccedinp; propositi,ffis det
e r-
mines a different fi)rmulation or version of the logical problem.
Let us develop a helpful taxonmm of the logical problem, as pre-
sented in Figure 2.1. All three versions of this argument here are ex-
actIN the same in having a purely deductive structure and a strategy of
denying an implicit contradiction.
I
is ino insistent

is inconsistent
with

with
5
1 ' 0. 1 7,611 P; . 01/11vii of Evil

5
1.1(iLKE 2.1 Versions of the Logical Argument from F t i
Since Version I is death the most influential and most 15 'kid% discussed
formulation, we shall treat it as the paradigmatic \ersion of the logical
problem oli!Ail and zke ii close attention. Besides, most of he inak sis
of Version I applies mittatis mittandis to Versions II and III
Hie essence of Version I is that the theist be l i eves u, the ex i s t e nc e
and reek ant perfections of God, on the one hand, and that tlierc
oil the other. The atheistic critic understands this set n beliefs to
be implicitly contradi, ton.. Casting the ditlicultv in ternIs iri . the pre-
ci s e propositions in\ ed, ha c the fothming logical situation.
The theist is officiailv committed to
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, vholly good God exists
as \yell as to
(E1 ) Evil exists.
Lim\ er, it appears to the atheistic critic that proposition (U), when
supplemented b.% the appropriate necessan propositions, entails
(E1 ) Evil does not exist.
No\\ if GLb ws entail (-1:4 ), then the theist is unv,itt inglv owninit
ted to both l and ( -T 1 '1 . This mckans that his beliefs arc inconsis-
tent because both) and (--F finurc into his theological position.
In order to \ indicate himsellrationallk, the theist must clarii iiid rec-
oncile the propositions that supposedly generate the elntradiction.
It is commonly agreed that the allencd contradiction is not imme-
diately forth, oming from propositions ;6 ) and F1 ). So, the critic
must invoke the strategy previously explained tOr exposing implicit
contradictions that is, she must add certain propositions to (U) and
26

Thr Temical Problem of 'Evil

(E1 ). Let us rex iev, a representative selection of auxilian propositions
often cited b\ the atheistic critic:
(1.1.) God is a real being transcendent ii.ont the \\ orld
(2.1) God can bring about an\ logicalh possible state of affairs,
including the elimination of evil
G;);..1 kiims e\ en thing that it is possible to know, inelud
incr,11,) ,, ,
, to eliminate evil
(4.1) God ahNays seeks to promote good and eliminate evil
(5.1) The existence of evil is not a logically necessary state of
affairs.
Now, from (G), together with

)-(5.
), it fbllows that
(El ) Evil does not exist,
a conclusion that clearly contradicts (E1 ). At this point, the atheist
seems to have made good her charge of inconsistency by deriving
from the theist's position two logically incompatible propositions:
and (E1). Oh\ iouslv, by the law of noncontradiction, these IN\ 0
propositions cannot PI 11)
be Irmo at the same time and

the
sense. I rellee, anyone holding both propositions is irrational.
The reasoning behihd this indictment is not hard to grasp and re-
sembles the third example abo\ e, in which unstated bc.kliefi 14 had to
be supplied w order to set up the contradiction. Theists say that God
exists and has a definite character, it is natural to presume that God's
character can be used as a basis ti.ir explaining (and perhaps predict-
ing) his actions, even actions related to evil in the world. For present
purposes, this means that the terms in proposition (G) have spcciti
able meanings that can be delineated in additional propositions such
as (1.1) l.4.1). l'urthermore, there is no logical necessity that evil ex
ist, as indlCatCd by (5.11. From (16 teq.r..ether with I I.1)--(5.1) ) it is a
fairly elementary exercise in deductive logic to derive
(E1 ) Evil does not exist.
Yet evil does ,...xistind its existence is reCOgillled by the typical theist:
(F1 )Evil exists.
5
1
' T
0. 7,611 P ; . 01/ lein of Evil
The elassical logical problem as represented by Version I is thus
lOrgk.sti. This is the kind of case that AIackie and many other atheistic
critics artiailate.
Other propositions would have to be stated in order to forge VL r
sions II and III. Iror instance, a proposition much like the followin!_r.
would he needed in Version II:
(4.2) God's goodness \\ ould seek to prevent or eliminate large
amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of
evil.
Something like
(4.3) God's goodness W o u 1,d. not allov, gratuitous or pointless
evil to exist.
ss old(' be needed to articulate full\ Version III. But We need not pur-
sue discussion of these ersions here. The, strategy is the same tbr all
ersions ot the loieaJ problem o: k's il. The atheistic critic dens es a
contradiction from a set of propositions that the theist allegedly ac-
cepts. How shall the theist respond?
The Burden of Proof
In assessing the state of :he debate between the theist and the atheis-
tic critic, it is helpful to review how the logical problem of evil devel.
ops. t heist holds st el Of hclieR. and the critic claims that the are
inconsistent. This places the initial burden on the critic 1() stale the
inconsistenc , to draw it out, to make it ohs ions. The critic's strategy,
then, is :o attempt :o :.t,CileraCC a cow Lidiction from a designaftd sc.'t
of the theisCsbehek. Otherssise, II would not be possible to
make the atAusation that the theist's behetS arc inconsistent
Once the critic has made the opening foray, the theist must rk.vond
by shossinl,. \\ hat is ss Fong ss ith the critic's case.
Consider Version I of the 1()gical problem of oil, which we have
chosen as a model. Here the critic maintains that the theist holds con-
tradictory beliefs, (G) and ( E l ). In order to bring this contradiction
to light, the critic must shoat that (G) ultimately entails (E1 ). If the
critic can do this, she will thereby show that the theist's position in-
28i/u I qiiicif7P; . 0:57171/ of
volves both (F,A ) and (E1), the belief that evil exists as well as the be-
lief that evil does not exist. This is a plain contradiction. For Version
II, the critic's strategy would he similar. She would need to deduce
two propositHns from theistic commitments: one stating that there
are amounts, kinds, and distributions of evil that God would not al-
low and one indicating that those amounts, kinds, and distributions
exist. 1- his would constitute a c nitrad iCti(111. l'Or VCI- SiOn III, the re-
quired atheistic stirategy is now guile familiar. It must be proved that
the theisti.s contmitted to the belief that God would not allow gratu-
itous evil am/ to the beliefthat grat !nous evil existsagain, two con-
tradictory beliefs.
The significance of the charge of logical inconsistency is not diffi-
cult to etnlipadleild. Two propositions that are inconsistent cannot
both be true at the same time and in the same sense, such as
1 ) Kant is a great philosopher
and
(22) It is not the case that Kantis a great philosopher.
Any position involving such a contradiction, then, cannot he x1 11011y
true. In the issue over God and evil, the critic declares that it is not
possible h it' both (G) and some ( rop rnou to be true and
yet that, on sonic grounds or other, the theist is committed to both.
Although the burden of deducing a contradiction from theistic be-
liefs rests squarely on the shoulders ()Hie atheistic critic, Alvin Planti-
ng.' has correctly stated the conditions hat any critic must meet: "To
make ,....,(H)d his claim the atheologian tns provide some proposition
IA is ci tiuei' necessarily true, or essential to theism, or a logical
k.onsequences of such propositions.Ll Clearly, there is no lo12,ical
problem for the theist if he is not committed to each proposition in
the set or if the set does not really entail a contradiction.
It the
critic
uses an additional proposition that is necessarily true, then the theist
MU St accept it because it must be accepted by all rati(mal pot*. If
the additional proposition is essential to any theistic position, then
the theist must accept it by int c of being a theist. And of course, the
theist must accept any logical consequence of his propositions as well.
The critic's aim is to show that it is not possible that both (G) and
(E1) be true. If she can come up with an additional proposition or
i5c I 0. 1 7,611 P; . olilein 0,r Evil
29
set of propositions that the theist must accept and derive a contra-
diction from it together N\ ith the other rele\ ant theistic propositions,
the theist is in serious trouNe. Theist ie defenders, such as flamingo,
maintain that it is en winously difficult to come up \\ :di a proposition
that meets the conditions of being necessarily true, essential to the-
ism, or a lt,gical consequence of such propositions. On these grounds
alone, theists mav argue that it is far from clear that it is not possible
for both (G) and (F. 1 ) to he true.
Extendingthe theistic response further, Plantitiiza pioneered a
method for showing that it is possible for both (t ; and (E1 ) to be
truea method that can presttinably be used against the chaige of in-
con,istency aimed at (C) and any F like proposition. Succeeding at
this task is equivalent to dein.in the elaim made by Mackie and oth-
ers that it is not possible for both tt,it and (I' : t to be true. According
to Plantinga, the theist need not show that both propositions are in
fact true in order to rebut the critic's charge. Rebutting 'tile charge of
inconsistency relies on making, some line distinctions in the ineanity:s
of key theistic terms I e.g., omnipotence) and then on supplying addi-
tional n is that reflect a possible nnderstanding Of a theistic
to, orldiew. These math:met
,
. directly challenge the critic's auxiliary
definitions and tlaus blt,ck her ability to deduce a contradiction from
theistic beliefs.
Chapter tt't, I embark on a full scale discussion of what flamingo
and other theists have done tu defend against Version I of the logical
problem of evil. I particularly liens 4)1i a contemporary theistic re
sponse known as the I:ree Will Defense, which has already become clas-
sic. Howe\ Cr. I will first brieth rehearse some oft he basic trity% es that
theists can make to defend against Versions II and although these
ersiuns, unlike Version I. 1 . 1 1 1 e not attracted widespread interest.
In addressing the challenge posed H Version II .theists have main-
tained that critics ha, a not suaecssiiilly shown belief in God to impl\
that he would unit the' c\ il in the world to manageable amounts,
kinds, and distributions, "I - heists can construe divine goodness
power, and knowledge as able to allow very large amounts, extreme
kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil, God 'night do rids for a
number of different reasons: fin- example, to presen.e a wide range of
free human choices or to allow the regular operation of impersonal
natural objects. Theists taking this line in effect argue that they need
not accept some of the additional propositions that critics use to de-
duce a contradiction from key theistic beliefs. So, it is not clear that
30The / 02fit' ff7P ; . ,) ,' ,, h71/
critics can establish that theists hold beliefs that imply both that God
limits the amounts, kinds, and distributions of evil and that those lim-
its have been exceeded.
'Theists who respond to Version III grapple with the charge that
they arc CO] mnittcd to the pr i position that God would not allow gra-
tuitous evil, as welt as the proposition that gratuiums evil exists. The
working assumption of the atheistic critic here is that theism recog-
nizes the existence ol very severe evils ati long a i hey have some point
or meaning. I lime\ er, certain stock responses suffice to reline the
critic's lormulation Ir versi(m In. The theist can 1.-
11:c a yen,. trad-
tional approach ancl argue that he is not really committed to L)
that is, that he does not believe that gratuitous or pointless oils e
He can argue that his position neCcssil,Iles that all evils, no matter
how ScVerc, 111LISI be or justified. Many theists understand
their position in precisely this way. The theist who has this orientation
might e'en venture some explanaiion or ralige ol explanations de-
signed to cover particularly troublesome oils. Sonic theists, however,
construe their position differently and actually accept These the-
ists must take a different tack, then, in &tending against \ ersion III
of the logical problem. ihey can seek to point out that the additional
assumptions that the critic ciripkws to derive the contradiction such
as (4.3) are neither essential to theism nor necessarily true. Since
this line of discussion is very rare in the philosophical literature on the
logical problem of evil, I will wait to analyze it fully until Chapter 5,
where it surfaces in relation to the evidential problem.
We can now see that the issue beibre its turns on the ability of crit
ics, on the one hand, to show that theists must accept all of the
propositions they use to deduce a com- radicii,n and on the ability of
theists, on the other hand, to show that they need not accept all of
them. The only apprt yriate grounds for insisting that theists must ac-
ce pt the propositi o ns are that they ,ire either [rue, essential
tc.) tiltskill, Or .1 CollSek1llCilt7k7 of such plonoSitionN. I Li s ing framed the
debate in this manner, I must note that an impressive number of crit-
ics have been convinced that serious logical difficulties exist for the-
i sm, an
d they ha
\ e labo
red vigorously to bring them to light. Like-
wise, there arc a n111111)0' of theists who have taken seriously the
matter of logical inconsistency and have worked diligently to defend
against such attacks. At present, there is a large consensus that theistic
maneuvers have been very effective and that the burden still rests on
the shoulders of the critic to produce the contradiction. In the next
T. 01 7ical Pvolilein of E vil31
chapter, I wifi turn to the line of debate in the philosophical literature
that is widely thought to support this sentiment.
Notes
1.
The Col:owing yorks employ these din- ere:1i labels Tor: the proble-i -
Willi am Rime,
Au betnninctiou Encino and Bel-
momDickenson. 1978i. pp. 80-86; Mich,iel 1... Peterson, "Christi.in
Theism and the Problem ofEi.11)1'0/T71471i Sui.- / -
cry 21 1.1978): 33-46; and Alvin i1.1:11in,
A ,Study
Tir!t loam' histiticiitio7; of MitfGod (Ithaci: Cer iicH
P r os. ,
19o7 p. 28.
2.1. 1.. laelue, "1.5 ii an,.! Omnipotence," .1/imi 64 /1955): 200.
3. Ibid.
4, D,wid Hume, DiahwhYs mu Co - iling Nattn711ed. Henry D.
A iken (Ne,Licner,p, 66,
5. H. J. :\ 1i- ea isko. "The Pyobleui of Evil;;an Rill:aim:
30 (1962 187.
6.1 vsiH itfltsv Plantinga's discussion I hrow.i.hi e\po.sition. See Ius
Goff. EriirGrand Rapids, Micl..: 1-ierdmans, 1977). pp. 12-24.
7. lrvtnc. \ Copi and Carl Cohen. ha1011,
(iingicwood lift, N.J.: h niltCc Jail, 1998i, IT 342-391.
8. Mackie, "1iil)111:Upon:nee," p. 2u1)
9, Ibis terminology- is borrowed Irom Edwa
rd. Madden and Peter Hare,
115:.of' Gridneed, Ill.: Charles ( I. Thomas, 1968),
chap. 6, pp. 104 136
.
10. Fru, p, 55, Ai m
) ser remarks in his The
iO\Cor d:iar end,w 1yc. s , 19
141., p1,
. 190-49 1.
11. "I erenct:"I)\(I
Ind the Problan of Evil," in
1/ en11/ 10' Y in the 11.410.l. ,..ced. Baruch
BroilsI. EnglewoodPrenieiI Lill. 19,74), p.226.
12, 111.intinl:iii. God a /;d ();h'; p. 117.
Suggested Readings
Adai.:1,.. Marilyn Ni.Ind Robert M. Adams. ' IN P r oldcaiiLr il. New York:
Oxhird University Press, 1990,
Ahern, .\ I. B.Probliiin or Fri!. NessSeht1eken 114 1 0kS, 1 9 71.
II , CIF John S. 715( . 1. taiiy. Facc. c of I.:1'U.: 7 Licidodica I SV.kt(iliSfl NJ/ inc
2nd ed. GrandZonderv,in: 1991.
HoN. Anu 71.y. "Divine Omnipotence and Human l'reediim. -
nal 53 (January 1955): 135-144.
32Tim if ofiit'ff7P:..../,',, h- in
Gale, Richard.. On the Itinin ii ami Evi,vic - necainitridge
Unlyersily Press, 1991,
Mackie, J. L. "Evil and Omnipotence." Mimi 64 (19:55): 200.
"The Probleir or l:\ il." In The Miridrt' theism. OxfOrd -. Claren-
don Press, 1982.
McCloskey, I 1. I. Goil anif trii. The Hague: liiiis Nithorl, 19:7 4.
Peterson, MicItaL:. "Evil and Inconsistency."(-4 11S 1 2 . a fin ) 18 (July
197)): ?0
Peterson,ed. lbe Problem II l u ll: ,cli. - creti Rcaiiiiip. Notre
Dame.7,1. University of Notre paint' Press, 1992.
Nlt ,:hacl, William Haskcc, Brucc
aniBasinger.
Relief: All 1711- 1' 171111Ct101! l0the Phibis0/41-;
21d cd. NCN't YUI k: Oxluid Uijcisitv Press,
1998, cii d p. 0, pp. 110 145.
PlantGod anal ()Limi. 1I7ne:1.e .1 Stnaly of the 115/ 1011171 Ir li. V 11111. 717147111
BC11. C1 . in GULL 1111dia: ( .. 01 . 11eli
P I,:s, 1907
1O. 11ion, aim! Evil.and Rapids,LA:film...His, 1977.
,
'the

larcp:don Press. 197-

. - Which 'Worlds. (audit (lc.d1lave a . cated?" ji/m-n i Philosdpig 70
(1973: 539 552.
Britec. "The Deductive Argument rrom I vil." .Nopifia
.1pri: 1981): 25-42.
1::77JT..d G',iod God. Ness York: Pordham I:Myers:1.y Press, 1982.
The Function of Defense
Just as we have eassiticd the two major \ ersions of the problem of evil
into the hijrical and cridential formuhlions. we may also classif the
two main responses to the problem as fiqi..n.q and r biOdir y. The Jill) of
defense is to show that antitheistic arguments front evileither logi-
cal or evidentialare not successful on their o' it terms. The general
aim of theodicy, by comrast, is to give p(tsiti\ e, plausible reasons for
the existence of evil in a theistic uni\ erse. Defense has come to be the
theistic strategy most closely associated with discussions of the logical
formul,Iton of the problem of evil. whereas thcodii..-v has come to be
associated with the idential lOrmulation. Much controversy has
arisen over the relative need for defense and thcodicy, and we shall
later see how these differences play out in the literature on God and
evil.
The Free Will Defense
The present task is to review. anti L-s'aluatc a very fascinating-, and in-
structik e part the debate over the logical problem. Takift,2, Version
I of the logical problem of evil as a point of departure, Alvin Plan-
tinga developed a response that has now come to he km mu as the
Free Will Defense. Plantina's famous Free Will Defense was pro-
duced in both 1967 and 1974 renditions) Since the later rendition
exploits the mo. .-4 current and h isticared ideas in tOrmal locic. I
will use it as the basis for the present discussion.
As we have seen, philosophers such as J. L. Mackie have charged
that it is logically inconsistent for a theist to believe that
33
34The FThavioo or Difisa
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists
and that
(El ) Evil exists.
This accusation is tantamount to claiming that it is not possible for
both propositi(ms to be true togetherthat the conjunction of (G)
and (E1 ) is necessarily false. The critics' strategy is to try to produce a
proposition that is at least plausibly thought to be necessarily true and.
whose conjunction u 1 h our original two propositions formally yields
a contradiction. Defenders insist that critics haN c neeproduced a
plausible candidate for this role.
In fact, manx theists thr(mgli the cenkiries --perhaps inspired most
notably by Augustine have thought that the theme irce \\ill pro-
\ id4..ss a basis for rejecting We critics' charge that Cod and evil are in-
compatible. Although full discussion. St. kugustine's view or oil
appears in Chapter (1, I must II( )Ic here his emphasis on di x inclv cre-
ated freewill: "If w...: man is a stood. and cannot act rightly unless he wills
to do so, then he must has e tree will, without which he can not act
rightly. We must not believe that God gave us free will so that we
might sin, just because sin is cthmnitted through free xNill." 2 The
point is that our humanity is of great value and that free Nyill is neces-
sary to our humanity. Human beings have moral significance because
we have the ability to make choices that arc morally riOn or wrong.
Yet God cannot give us the power to make morally right choices
without gix ing us the power to make. morall) wrong ones as w ell. So,
in order to hake the good of humanity itself as well as the good
choices that humanity might make, God must permit evil. Many the-
ists through the ceniuries have found St. Augustine's reasoning on
this matter Cr \
:\lsin Pl mtiE42-1\\ efl known
for
aPPIvill:4
ibis line of reasoning
scr specific manner to the precise way in which the charge of in-
consisten,..-y 55 as formulated. .\47.ainsi the logical problem, he crafts a
defense. t.inlike .\ugustine's discussion, w Inch affirms the reality of
creaturely free syu
, Plantinga's discussion turns on the pure logical
possibility of such. As Plantinga recognizes, the success of die defense
hinges m a certain understanding of what is meant by a person's being
free with resprct to an action. For the Free Will Defender, it a person is
free with respect to an action, then he is free either to perform or to
Plc
oft)t?.:Jsc
35
refrain from the action. No causal laws and antecedent conditions de-
tertnine that he will perform or not perform the action. In other
Words, at the time in question, it is within the pc son's power to per-
form the action and within his power to refrain from perioyming the
action. What it meatis tbr a person 10/70 ;prong ?pith respect to i/!:orolly
actioil is for it to be \\Tong tbr him to perform it and he
does or wrong for him no to and he does not.
According to Plantinga, a preliminary statement ofthe Frec Wilt De
tense ksas 1(fli(ro,A world containing significant:I\ tree (- Na-
turesho can freely choose between ;..!,( )0d and evii) is more aluable.
all other things being equal, than a \\ orld containing no free creatures
hatsoeer. God, of course, can create five creatures, but then he can-
not r i?If. q. ()I' deirifithiC that. ihC1 01115:ril..2.1.11 all ions. Doing this
w ( mi ld
preempt
the ir si g nifican t freedom.
I lence, th
er e is no w, ..0;
or
God to create creatures apahlc 01 flit ifgood without thereby creat
ing creatures capable ot iroral esil. Com erseh, God cannot
t he possibility In-loyal e\ithout eliminating the possibility lmoral
good. 'Fite tact, then, that ,,oine creatures have gone wrong in the exer-
cise of their freedom since the dawn of creation does not count against
God's omnipotence or goodness. Hayitu, gained a sense of this per
spective, %NC Inay
now state the central claim of the free Will Defense:
It is possible that God could not have created a uni\ c: se containing
moral good (or as much moral good as this one contains) without cre
ating one containing moral evil.
The Compatibilist Position
Critics, of c,)urse':re not unfamiliar with the recurring theme of five
Will in much theistic thought.Anton\ Flew and J. L. lackie raised a
\ cry important objection to the Free Will 1)eii.mse that had to he met
helbre the deli:use could be totally eltective. The objection resin
the claim that it is logicalk possible that there could be a world ton-
taining signilicanth tr ee beings who always do what is right. Since
there is 110 oflitradietioil or ileollsiStelliV in this claim, it Ulealls that
there are possible worlds containing moral good but no moral e\il.
Since God is omnipotentand thus can bring about any logically
possible state (d" affairsGod must be able to create a world eontaiii-
Mg- moral good but no moral e\ il. In other Nvords, God might ha e
made people so that they always freely do the right thing. As lien ex
presses it, If there is no contradiction here then Omnipotence might
36
or nefr iise
have made a world inhabited bv wholly virtuous people.".' If this is
so, then, as Flew says, the Free Will Defense is broken kicked," and
"we are back again with the original intractable .11itinomv." 4
Flew is not alone in voicing this line of reasoning. Mackie puts it
forthrightly:
If God bac made men such that in their free choices they sometimes
pre l'er wh,iis good and s, an u nme
s w hat is evil, why could he not have
made men such 01 ;tt thei ,1 1 ;ays Iroiy ehoos ic rood? If there is no
logical impossibility :: ! 1 a man's freciv choosing the gclod (III one, or on
several occasions, there cannot be a logical impossihilih in his freely
choosing the good on e cc\ occasion. God was not, then, 1:iced ii ith a
choice between making innocent antomari Ncii1 1 2,s \\ io, in
acting freely, would sonic : Ines go tong: there \\ as ()pen to him the
obviously better possibility or mal: ing beings who iii ud act Ircelv but
always go right, Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is
inconsistent NAilh
his being both ornnipoicin and wholly good. ,
The position championed here is known as compatibilism. It is the
view that freedom and determinism even di inc determinism are
compatible.
Put another way, the compatibilists' point is that the proposition
(23) God brings it about that human beings always choose what
is right
is logically consistent with the proposition
(24) human beings have free choice.
This position dirccly opposes the Free Will Defense, khich, as we
have already seen, relies on an ill(01/1/117/1biliSt pusir ion: the \joy that
(23) and (24) ,Ire 1041C,ItiV i114.7tHiSiStCtIt.
As %1 c v mId C \pCkl, the controversy bet ten Free Will Defenders
and critics historically rev dyed tround the issue i d\ key concepts
such as omnipotence and ticill should be 1111lICISIA>od. Although
the Free Will Defender may agree with critics that a v,orld in which
all persons freely choose to do \\ hit is right i' indeed a possible world,
he seeks to qualify our understandings of free i ill and omnipotence
in a kNa\ that avoids the dilemma presented by time critic. Obviously,
the critic here believes that an omnipotent deity can create just any
lop:kali\ possible world he selects. A 'holltf good
the world that is best on the whole, aworld thatwould surely
&TIT' to be one in which everyone freely does what is right. At this
point, we have come to the hotly contested claim that God could
have created any possible world he pleased.' The defender counters
that God, though omnipotent, could notc created just any possi-
bl e world. At thi s
point, we must pause to consider how Free Will
Defenders have come to frame the iss Jc of free will and omnipoi
in terms of contemporary ideas about possible worlds,
The Incompatibilist Rejoinder
Since 1) 1311111114,1 is credited with first puttin,, the Free Will Defense in
terms of the logit. of possible worlds, we will consider his \ indication
ofincompatibilism. We may say that a possible w orld is a way tiungs
((mid have been, a total possible stale of - affairs. .1inong states ()l at .
furs, some are actual, and some are not. For exampl
e , the Kr y
Wildcat' 11,7111 the "1 IP 'Yr basketbr7/1Nf. T./11., Dery is a
state of affairsisiti Viva/min Lincoln's itein,; the iirst p,-esidina 01,1-1)
Howe\' cr, the former is actual, whereas rue latter is nk>r.
Although the la:ter is not actual, it is still a possible state of affairs.
Possible states of affairs nuts', be distinguished from impossible ones,
and impossible ones must be further distinguished. l',0111
Be th's ha r-
ii,:g JP. pe,"est FL? fire ;ninnies /1,71 and John's hatrim squared
the circle arc impossible states of atlairs. The Former is causally or nat
uralh impossible; the latter is impossible in the broadh logical sense.
A possible w ()rid, then, is a possible state of affairs in the sense that it
is possible in the broadly sense. Although a possible world is a
state olatfairs, not es cry slate of affairs is a possible world. "to has e the
status ola possible w odd, a state of affairs must be
eon/ pick-or maxilu i d.
.tiociaies harina heel, evremed hv tIrliil.i7iif bendoel: is .1. possible state or
aflairs, but it is not complete or inclusive em nigh to be a possible world.
Completeness must now be defined..1 state of . affairs intlitfiff state of
afl tiirs is not possible that S obtain and S' fail to obtain. l.ikewise,
the conjunctive state of attairs S /tut not S' is not possible, A state of af
furs .' pit-hi/icy another state of at fairs S' if it. is Itot possible that both
ob-
tatty. In other words, S precludes 5' if the conjunctive state of affairs S
and S is impossible. Now. a complete or ma\imal state of affairs that
is, a possible world is one that either includes or precludes every other
38lhe Emir/ion Defr nse
state of affairs. It should be obvious that exactly one possible world is
actual and that at most one possible world is actual.
Corresponding to each possible world W, there is a set of proposi
tions that we may call the hook on W. A proposition is in the hook oii W
just in ease that state oF aftliirs to which it corresponds is included in
W. We might express this idea aiter nati\ clv as follows: A proposition
P is t:' ir c a wor ld U if and only il l'
wor th/ have beivi 1:wr W hod
bee' n actual it and only if it is not possible that IV is actual and P is
false. The book em II; then, is the set of propositions true in W. Books,
like worlds, are maximal or complete. A book on a world is a maximal
consistent set of propositions. The addition of just one proposition to
i t always yields an explicitly inconsistent set. There is exactly one Nook
for each possible world.
Possible worlds possess simile interesting features. For example, a
preposition p is possible if - it is H- Lie i . 0least one \\ orld and impossi
He true in n()iic. ;\ proposition 1CCCSSO 1'V if it is true in all possi-
He \N odds. Another tZ.ature of possible worlds is that persons as well
as other things exist in them. Clearly, eah of us exists in the actual
world, but we also exist in a great many worlds distinki from the ac-
tual world. These other worlds are simply possible but nt -tau-A. 8 To
say that s(miething exists in a possible widd means that it would have
existed had that world been actual.
As w c begin to turn our thoughts back toward Gikl's relation to pos-
sible worlds, we must note that it would not be technically proper to
say that God (r eales any possible worlds or states of affairs. \\'hat God
creates are the heavens, the earth, and so forth. In performing such ac-
tions as creating the heavens and the earth and all that they conlain,
God brings about a multitude of statesf o. .:or example, God
created Socrates, but he did not create the state (II affairs con
s i sting in
Socrates' existence. Strictly speaking, we in sti:t that (iod izentolizesa
state of affairs, such ,is the state of affairs owsistang in Socrates e \is
tencc. Accuracy, then, demands that we speak of
God as
possible w odd, w Inch is of cotars(' a total state of allatrs.''
Alter this brie! explanation of key ideas related to the logic fl'possi
He worlds, we can in rov return to our oriwnal question: Cotild God
ha\ e actualized just any possible world he chose? The seventeenth-
century German philosopher Gottfried Leibnif believed that it is
within the scope of omnipotclice to bring about any possible world . 1 ('
Flew and Mackie, moreover, have already argued that there are possi
ble worlds containing moral good but no moral evil. We know' that
Plc39
the books on\\ oriels form entirely consistent sets of proposi-
tions. Furthermore, as Flew and Mackie insist, if divine omnipotence
can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, even a complete
possible world, then God must be able to bring about a world con
taining moral good but no moral eil. Thus. G( id can make people so
that they always lively do what is morally right.
'Hie Free 1\111 Defender responds that it is not 01-vious that God,
though omnipotent, can bring about just ori ,, possible world he
pleases. FA en grantiiia- that God is . 1 1 1 0. - CSS. 1 1 1 beini.e., one that ex-
i st , i n eve:.,
p ssiblc
world), not e'en
possiNe orld is such that
God can actualizeIn worlds in v,hich the omnipotent God
chi - wises to create iree persons, we nillS1 remember that the ire,: ac-
tionsthose persons cannot be determined by causal la \N s and an-
tecedent c(inditions. \U we broadh, if a person is tree vdth respect to
an action A. then God does not brim; it ahmt Or C/Iii.Tit /0 be
nh
that she does .1 or FcCr..ii LIS tri tin doilli?" A. For if- (.0(.1
COUP'S i h be lb( case in any manner NN hat soever that the person either
does .\ or does not do A, then that person is not really free.
Plantinga dubs Hew and Mackie's contention "Lcibniz's Lapse." It
is the contention that
(25) God, if omnipotent, could have actualized just any possible
Nvorld he pleased.
The Free Will Defender claims to the contrary that the following is
possible:
(26) God is omnipotent. and it was not within his power to bring
about a world containing moral li s t wd but no moral evil.
Plant ing,i takes lor granted that GO cannot actualize a state of alt:iirs
including the existence of creatures who freely take some action or
other; this would be strong actualiiation, Ile then considers wra.k ac -
tualifati(m, whik. - 11 is all the critic really needs for his case, What is at
issue, then, isWhether there isSOMething. God could ha'e done, sonic
series of actions he c(mld ha\ c taken, such that if he had, a gix en pos-
sible world IV would has e been actual. Let us say that 11' contains
moral good but no moral evil.
To develop his case, Plantinga provides an argument based on the
peculiar behavior of counterfactual conditionals. Rehearsing Plan-
4017)e
ornefriise
tinga's own example, we may imagine Curley Smith, sometime mayor
of Boston, who was offered a S35,000 bribe to allow a disputed free-
way to be constructed. Suppose he accepted. Now, ponder:
(27) If Curley had been offered 520,000, he would have ac
cepted the bribe
and
(27.1) If ( :tide' had been offered $20,000, he would have re-
jected the bribe,
Next. 'think Or the puNsible \\ odds that include the allleCistietil Si.11C
affairs consisting, in Cuilty's in.i7127 ortivni N20.000. .111:n think (if i\t()
poy
,;iblc worlds, 1V and 11 , s hich are i.ynetiv filikr up to the point in,
tiThe when Curley responds to the bribe oiler. I ci us say that in TV
Curley accepts the bribe, and in W*, Curley does not. Let us call the
states of arfairs shared by Wand W* an initial world segment and even
suppose that (.;od could actualize this initial world segment. If Curley
accepts the bribe, then God could not have actualized lV if Curley re-
jects the bribe, then God could not have actualized IV. ,o. there is a
possible \orIt.1 TV* H. which Curley does not go wrong with respect to
the bribe otter, but whether IV* is actual was partly up to Curley and
not completely up to God. rhcrclorc, we have an instance of a possible
world IV*. in this ease ........that God could not have brought about.
Plant inga diagnoses (ItrIcyas sullering from what he calls
tin' US jp0/1,1
de/wavily, a terrible malady. After deli ning e he concept of an ithiiriditid
naliti or t.c., e/it- c
as
1W
set of all properties a person or thing possesses
in ever\ possible world w here he or it exists, Plant inga claims that it is
possible that ( essence suthrs
1-11 "" tr `" 15 ` "Id de
r" 'Iv' IC
Slates: "If an essence L suffers from transw odd depravity, then it was
not within God'1/4; powe r t o actualize a possible w orld II su,,:h that /:
0 mtains the properties is SOnilli.7771111' . . fiTC in IV -..11141 alniivs dOCS mi.M1
11101 ill W. "12 T lc then \ entities the further observation: It is possible
that es cry creaturely essence es cry essence, including, the property of
being created by God Slift+Th from transworld depravity. From this, it
follows that it is possible that God could not have created a world con-
taining moral good but no moral Oil.
Now the Free Will IX:tender has made his case against the critics.
He has argued that, although there are possible worlds containing
Pic41
moral good but no moral evil, it is riot within God's power to bring
them about. Although W* is possible, it is nor possible ror God to
bring it about. This establishes that the Free Will Defender's claim
that
(26) God is omnipotent, and it was not within his power to bring
about a world containing moral good but no moral oil
is possible. Hence, leibniis Lapsethe claim that God, if omnipo-
tent, can create any possible worldis false. The critic's ease rails.
Fheisin has been defended.
Fundament:11 to the Free Will Defender's case, of cot irse, is a cer-
tain understanding oi the metapHsics of freedom and its relation to
di\ Me onmipotenee. 1 . lh
I\e II1 neompatibilki u nder-
standing of this matter ;an then defend theismlaii u mniu thet bring
ing l
Wt. a 1,1 orld containing moral good but no in 1-al k a L
)0p-
erati \ C ClltUrk.% It requires the uncoereed 0)11ilirICTICe
tree creatures; it is not up to God alone. The power of an omnipotent
God is limited by the freedom he confers upon his creatures, given
that he chooses to create tree creatures at all.
The Current State of the Debate
It is now Nvidely acknowledged that the Free Will Defense adequately
rebuts the logical problem of evil. As it has turned out, atheistic crit-
ics made their best: case that the theistic helielS
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists
and
(L1 ) I exists
are inconsistent. Theistic &lendersAkin Plaminga, Keith Vanden,
Stephen T. Davis, and others articulated and amplified the H-
ce
Defense to show that these belie :s are not inconsistent. Thus, Version
I of the logical problem has been laid to rest.
Version 11 in our taxonomy of the problem is based on the charge
that the proposition
42
(CI) An omnipotent, omn
consistent with the proposition
funclioitftust.
'holly gtnid (., od exists
(F.') Large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing, distribu-
tions of evil exist.
According to Plantinga the same type of defensive maneuver used
against Version I applies to Version IL Focusing simply on the
amount of moral evil, Plantinga recommends that the theistic de-
fender argue that something like the following claim is possible:
(28) God is omnipotent, and it \vas not within his power to
brinia about a world containing as much moral,
good and
less moral Oil than this one.
Again, the theistic defender here would need to employ the same basic
assertions previously made in arguing against 'version I that God,
th()lign omnipotent, cannot actualize a state of atfairs consisting in all
agent Lively doing wliat is right, that all creaturcly essences might suffer
from transworld depravity, and so forth. .1 successful defense against
Version H shows, in effect, that God's existence is compatible with the
existence of as much evil as the real world does, in fact, coiltain, 14
In any event, the theistic defender's strategy against all versions of
ogical problem is to show that the two key theistic beliefs in
question are not inconsistent, that they arc logically compatible. This
is not to say that he must show that they are both true. This would be
too stning a requirement for the defender and inappropriate to the
nature oft he issue. A kind of minimalist response is all that the purely
logical problem ()C c\ !calk requires: At cusations that theism is in-
consistent can be met with ' indications
1 " ) " 1 "g It
"; not.
A s theists hay(' solidified their delensi\ c posit ion, they nave exposed
oitt. (0. mo Collacies by critics w ho advance all\ version of the logical
proNein olevil. It appears that critics either in- Jr the quesiion h select-
ing propositions to which the theist is not committed or our of
context propositions to which the theists OR committed alid impute
nt21 \ meaning,s to then? that arc not fillyconnected \s tab the theists'
n theolog,ical background bk.liefs. So, the critic 'night find a set of
propositions that involve a logical
omtradiction, but doing so is irrel-
evant unless the propositions genuinely represent theistic belief.
ib l' ulictionT. ) ,. . ftust-43
In the final analysis, the logical problem of oil does ru t seem to be
a promising a\ emit: of attack against Christian theism. 11- 4 )nically, the
atheistic challenger begins bv accusing the theist 4 )f committing a log-
ical mistake and ends up embroiled in logical fallacies herself. Al-
though Version I is by far the most popular tbrmulation of the prob
lem, it appears no more ctlective than the other two fOrmulations. All
of the tOrmulations of the argument arc now thought to exhibit eel-
tain syndromatic emirs.
Admitting that the rice Will DeCcnse is successful but remaining
convinced that a \ iable argurne:11 Cron) coil can still be mounted,
some critics h.nc shined the attention to what we inn call the ex iden
tial problem of eil. The\ mates that dctense against the logical prob-
leM establishes that no claim about e\ il, conjoined with other key
theistic beliefs, sets up an autoinatic contradiction. These critics
maintain that, although evil tics not to ca l theism to be inconsistent,
the facts of evil o)nstititte eidc.snoc against theism Using the lan-
guage or possible \A orlds thinking, they admit that the Free Will I )c -
tense shows that there is at least one possible world in \\ hich the
propositions "God exists - and "evil exists- are both true, nut they
maintain that this dues not show that it is reasonable to think that
God exists despite the evil in our world, the actual world.
Interestingly, theists seeking; further understanding of the intellee
tual commitments ot their faith have also considered \\ hailer rue log
ical p:oblem expresses the (mils at i4 mai o)ncern r elated to God and
cvii I lilts, thee also express strong interest in some ke.nd of evidential
problem of evil. The next chapters arc devoted to analyzing the exact
structure as wei!as the proper strategy for such a response.
Notes
1. . . \1\ in P lantilv. a, God ;UM/ Odle?'. titiedv tlf thi. Thitional
; ion or Belief in Gad (1111,. . ,:a: () men 1. niNcr sitv P r es. rn. 1 31 -1 55,
Plant ne,a, lb Natic. cA rft- c. . . - iliv\1 lpd: (. . . 1 1 arendon Press, 1 97-I: .
pp. 1 65 1 95,
2. Augusiire, Ca F. ,. . t Choir (Aura fleniamin and L. H.
FTlek , 31 \o. \1 904 ;. bk. 2, chap. I, p. 36.
.\inonv Flew,int! Onininotcnkv and I linl)an Freedom, - in
iholloi, eds. n i Fie \\ and Alasdair MacImyre
(No\ Yor:: Nlacnidian, 1 955) , p, 1 . 1 9,
5. J. L. Alackic.., "Fsil and Omn4, 0tence," Mind 64 (1955): 209.
44Emici.0efis;est.
6. "Sec Rob IAdams, Alust God Create the Best?" in 77. 1e-
. V . !:Tiet1 Wittlimp-, ed. Nlichad l' eter Non Oanle,1.1myersity
el Notre Dame Press. 19()21, pp. 2J 2; in the same volume, aim) see Philip
L. Quinn, - God, Moral Perfection. and Pi tssible Vorlds," pp. 2.89 302.
7. The classical It wallop: of . \Binideas on the logic of possible
worlds and 1110111 ogleIlk N'arltre of
CItell in Note I.
S. Blaiatniga, God, Freedih'il, ;lad 1:4 , 1/ !(.1'11A kapids,Lei dinans,
1977), p. 39.
9. Then.: a n... a mu ltit u de o
l thin
gs tha t c\ lq but that ood (?Cl not create.
In addition 10 the [act that God has :101 created slates oiallairs., he has not
created himsell or numbers, proposilions, propc - tiesmd so forth. These
ha\ L. no beginnings. God's activity results in sortie states ( 0 at airs beint_..; or
becoming, actual...See Plantinga.,Nittiinr t.if:Veces41y p. 169.
10. Gottfried WIlhelna Vll I .C11)1117., 11)(7H 7V.171';nitGthdPi',
the hit'd!. 1111 rit . Alai!" and thi fir 1P11.:\ustin 1-arrer, trans.
M. I Itiggard t London: Rodtledge & Kegan Paul. 1932 t, p. 127 129,
I. From t point forward, we assume that (.id necessary and nor a
contingent being, that God exists In all possible worlds.] he ..1110511011 bCti)ri.
US, thieti. 15 whether God can actuali4e just any possiblc world that includes
his existence. We Conow I iiJtis cit scu,,i on yhich St o ,-;ds God could
ha\ e created, from his ,Njir;:r,:fir!Vec..-ssitt., , pp. 169-174.
12. Plantinga, God, 1rofnit,, awl E r / I, p. 33.
13. A complete statement of the Free Will ft:Cense would need to take
into account all or the elements that Plantinga builds into it, such as a con-
cept 01 essences" fuller treatment of counterfactuals (it freedom, and SO
fort h .
SCC its

pp. 17211.
BI-. Manlinkers, Hoth theists and their critics, have long- accented the
riniiple that 1.11i2/V al*C 110 Mriiii 3 O7Cal limits 1.() 1\ hal an ()InflipOICIII Can
di). in other words, Ciod has the a Hilly to bruw
; about my mir insir o pv
bit! state (dal:airs I i.e.1 slate ()1 the descripion of which is not
calis mconststent i .
God could bring about, tin- example, Mute polar bears
and triangles 1-)ecause they are intrinsicallv possible, but he could not bring
about married bachelors and square clicks because they arc intrinsically int-
possIble.
However. Plaminga revises the concept of oninmotence it I ajow for the
tact that :her,: are slates of alThirs that are possible iii thcni.,chics t i.e.. int ritt,i-
calk but that are not posmble Gml Iii bring about..this poini depends
to a propel understanding of the logic ot ccc will. If a person is
sneer to art action, then Whel!li.'1" she performs or refrains from perlOrming.
t hat aiticni IS up 1.11 her, in
k_tod, Although a ,,,o111
nts
Irceiv tb whm is [ - iglu Is co tainiv pi ssible, it is mit a state of alias that
55a, 551(0.1) God's power to creates, all of tlte free creatures in that world
would base to help bring it about by their own cc DC
Li Tu45
11NiStS eln (.ith: :11: aCii.M1S (dirce person. See
PlantThe Ni:.f.nrr. N. . r cessipp . 190 191.
For a helpful i-scussiontins mat, see William Winoright, "'Free:1(1111
and Omnipotence," ..\-us 2 (19O8) : 239-301.
Suggested Readings
Adams, Robert .Al. "v1iddle kin in ledge and the Prohlem of EviI." 1 MCi7:7:77:
(..)1Li: . ,..h.t 1977:: 100 -117.
-pkwi nga o
n i he Probiem of FOL. ' in.cdiled by
lames 'I( m11.-, et II and Peter van InNagen. Di ac . ccht: ReAel, 1985,
, 225 2SF'
IlasitTet, 1)avid. "t.Theism and the Free Will Defmie." Sophia
(Austi.n'ia 1 9 Ink 1980):
"Detcrtninisni ...ndiI: SoniclarificAtioas."Joitiwar
of Philm-i:phy 60 t 1982 103 I (O.
"DI\ 1c Onntisetence and the Pest or A11 Possible \\
of 1;:rine Lqz,, i;7 16 ( 1982143-148.
Freedom anti 1)tvire Omnipotence: Sonic Nen
on all ( )LiNr odics IF; 1979 r -1)1-510.
In 'What Sense Must ( h Do His Best? A
Philosaphi. of Rtl.;riimi 18 (1985161 161.
God (lreate the Rest . Possible World? A ReToni,e. -
Onar tz. r iv 20:1980;: 339-342.
CiitHil.in t Mich:lei I.."The lerce Will 1)etensc and Natural Faal." Inynn-
tiwar iP ifinnopijv R ci"oion 20(. 1986) : 93-108.
Oak', Ric:11,1H. "Freedom and the Frci:.Delensc.-Incny and
P nnd1990: . 397 123.
, (. .h! lift .\oni; c :Ned Ixi. cr cnc- y/ ' God. (. 1ml . n. ic: L. nNr i. . !ge Uni-
asiiv Press, 1 9 91.
"Ahltt God 1)0 1h. Best?"n71:ar ia/ Hy Ianina fin
i;Pi in R ell,anal 16 t 1984::
213-224.
and thc ProbIern
ici ly . 11196711.1 120.
Kane,Stanlei,. - 1 he Free- Viii Defense Defended. - ibc ;Vezi , . Sana'astici. nn
50 :.1970n -135 446.
\lavrodc',
, (teorgc. "The Problem 01' Fyil." In Beliefiy::1 Sot&
pi. acandb,. 0. 1. R oa. Nen,, York: Random I louse, 1 9 70, chap. 4.
Oakes, Rober: A. " A oand Free Will Tlicodicy." The
Neil, Nc4odusiitisin 10 (1972191-201,
Pike, Nelson,'lii:inga on lice Will and 1:511. " Keligiosis Studies 15
(1979 a 449-473.
46The Enheof nr.(7shse
- LNaSICI1CC, Necessit v, and (l." The Neil ,
5(1
(1976 ): 61
72.
"Tilt' Free Will
philos,,phy i n
editedla \
Black. London: Geo' ge Alicn and 1..:nA in, 1965.
God and1 linA .(slindl ,the it a tioiAa jug iihiation of Belief
in God. Ithaca: (:orncilerm \ Press, 1967.
Fri/.(. rand'un Eerdmins 1977.
r ,t rirc o ir,: cssify. ofOrd: liarendon1974.
\ tic Worid,( ;od I C :reatcdf "Ri1sphi,
(1973 539 552.
Quinn, Philip I,. -God, Moral
Perfection, and PossiNc wrwlds." In God: The
Contrwpoiaiy OL,ciosion.
edited by Fred eiiels. Som:ur and M. Darrol
Bryant . New York: Rose of Sharon Prey, 1982, pp. 197 213,
Rowe,in I.. - Nam inga on Pocciblisand Evil, - Jo//;'11t71 or/lidos-
ophy To 19'3 554-555.
Junes 1
- The Free Wdl Delensk: and Determinism." TNill) oii,l Phi-
loso /iifl 591): 3.10 353.
Smart, Ninian.
)mnnil
n ence, Evil and Supermen." Philiisdpbt 36 (1961):
188-195.
Stewart, ;Melville. lie G. / eatcr41(wil Ihsh-
Nve: AN Essay an the Rnthni t aily
Ncii York: St. Marini 1993.
Wainwright, Willi :am. - Christian '1 licisan andFree Will Deli.nise. -
innh ,1 jun;
phihirapin r,/o (1975): 243 25U.
j err\ 'I u I-re Will Defense, Cal inism, and the Good less
of God,"RiTicw 13 (January 1953 : 1)-33.
4
The Probabilistic
Problem of Evil
From the atheistic critics' point of view, the beauty of the logical ar-
gument from evil is that, if it could be made to x urk, it would be a
tour de f)ree for atheism. Critics could then ignk >re any alle.cdlv fa-
vorable evidence ar God's existence and declare theism patently irra-
tional. However, with what appears to be the decisive defeat of the
logical argument 1!.om evil by the Free Will Defense,' some critics
have dc eloped a different kind of ar!2:ument from evil. This other
type of . argument seeks to establish that the existence of God is still
somehow rationally unacceptable given the facts of evil. Philosophers
wielding thi , kind of argument say that evil somehow counts against
the existence of God, although it is not inconsistent with the exis-
tence of God. Since the mid 1970s, the number of these arguments
in the philosophical literature has grown significantly. Such argu-
ments have been variously labeled c\ idential, inductive, or a posteri-
ori,2 but one of the inure proininent formulations is now called the
probabilistic argument from evil. It is to this argument that I now
turn, leaving consideration of a more broadh conceived evidential ar-
gument until the next chapter.
An Initial Skirmish
Proponents of the probabilistic ar
g
ument maintain that evil makes
the existence of God /7nm/bd.* or zinitilTiv. let us consider an early
exchange between nontheistic and theistic philosophers along these
lines. Consider how
J.
W. Cornman and Keith Lehrer present the
problem in the guise of a provocative thought experiment:
47
48Thcor T.
\01,1 ,Acre111!c!,)0(.ill
knowing, and all-powerf I mid you_ N LTC 140111 (4
to c calk: :1 11'li\ which there were sentient beingsbeings that
are harp!, sit1T. cF.pn pleasure, eel pain; express love, anger, pity,
ihared 1/41.1ut KIHC 01k odd vomid you create? 1".1 mi
.uwtle
\dial
such a world would he like. Would Ii he like the one wilich ocinally does
)rid we Iic in? Wouldci.calea a a,i MICh as thi s one if
u had thd po ,,et and knowhtn\ to ieatk: ,n,rt logically possible
world? It your answer is "no," as 1 stTins ) he, titelt Von srhrold begin
to understand wiri the e\ ii Ol surtering and ;min 111 this world is such a
problemkir
anyone ,\ thinks L;oti created ;Ilk (i,..n thi s
world, then, it seems, we shouldc'e!iude that it is impn., bable that it
was created or sus:aimed lw anything- we would call Ciod. Thus, given
this particular k\ odd. 11 sCk.'llis duat se0)11Clildc: Z.11,1l it is i;11/1101"-
ail. God who, U he cists, created the world- esisi s. CollsC -
Ciiii:ifik, the licher that God does not exist, rather than the helierthat he
exists, (\mild seem t. be initificar i n cynic/re( 'sliii in this ia
Here we find the language of probability. Cornman and Lehrer are
saying that evil in the world makes the existence of God inipiobi7ble.
But let us try to extract the essential argument from their conunents.
Before proceeding, \le shall discount at the outset the rhetorical sug-
gestion that the reader's answer "scents" to be a negative one. fhis
phraseology imposes a bias on the reader and too hastily dismisses a
number of very important perspectives aN,LIT why the world contains
evil. I shall cover sonic of these perspectives later but here must clarify
the structure of the argument at hand.
One premise in Cornman and Lehrer's argument seems to be
(29) IlGod is omnipotent and omniscient, then he could have
created any logically possible world.
An(xlier premise SCOW, to be
(30) Ii God is all-good, he would choose to create the best
world he could.
From (29) and (30), they conclude
(31) If God is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good, he would
have created the best of all possible worlds.
49
Then they add
(32) It is unlikely or improbable that the actual world is the best
of all possible \ OrldS.
And from (31) and (32), it follows that
(33) it unlikely or improbable that there is an omnipo
c^ttt niseient, and all-good God.
this is a reasonahly accurate sketch of the. basic moves of the argu-
lt,'' how mi:dit theists respond?
Alvin flamingo thinks that the orgoiment e mlallts at Team two ma-
jor errors. I:or one, Lorninan and I .chrer incorporate into their argu-
ment i..ope.the claim that God, if omnipotent, can create
any logically possible world. We ha\ e already seen the error or Leib-
ntY's Lapse in our discussion of the Free Will Defense lOr the logical
problem. Thus, Plantinga maintains that the arg- ument as stated is not
sound because it incorpo orates this falsehood. We now know that it is
simply not true that God, if he exists, could have actualized any possi-
ble world. Another error in the argument is that it seems to presup-
pose that there i "a best of all possible worlds," a concept hat is in
coherent. Consider what we all know: that (sow any prime number you
designate, there is alw,1vs one that is greater. in like manner, Plan -
tinga reasons that, thr any world you mention (with however inane
dancing girls and deliriously happy sentient creatures), there is always
one that is better (with even more dancing girls and deliriously happy.
sentient creatures Plantiga pronounces the argument of Corn-
man and Lehrer incapable of showing, that the existence of evil in the
world. makes it unlikely that God exist
A Modified Probability Argument
We might, however, tr\ to 010;10V and strengthen Common and
Lehrer's argument in corder to make the best of their case against
ism. One way to) re\ ise it is to eliminate the claim that God can create
Just any logically possible world. The substitute claim can be made
that, among the logically possible worlds that were within God's
502i. P;..o:',, ,i(5 11/(ic 1'; . ,'):571- ili or Tvii
power to create, he could have created one cots a rnorc fa\ or-
able balance of good and evil. Another alteration would be to cast
this claim in terms of mitura/ evil rather than moral evil, since many
thinkers now grant that (;od could not do anything about the
amount of moral evil brought about by free human beings. NeY erthe-
less, they still insist that God can control the amount of natural evil.
With these two adjustments, does the argument fare any better?
Plantinga thinks that the modified argument still fails. He rebuts
this stmnger rendition of the argument by extending the Free Will
Defense the claim that it is possible that God cannot actualit.e any
possible \\ orld that .nc.ut.es free agCTICV. His point is that the evil in
the \\ orld does uot render the existence of God improbable. lie asks
US to consAer the 161low Mg proposition:
(31 ) the evil in this world is broadly moral oil: aild of all the
worlds God could have created, none contains a better bal-
ance of broadly moral good with respect to broadlY moral
evil.
In keeping with the earlier strategy of defense, Plantinga asks us to
consider that (34) is logicallv possible.
The reference to "broadly in \ral evil" requires comment. Plantinga
claims it is possible that what we normall\ call natural evil is really
broadly moral evil caused by nonhuman t -ree agents. ,; Traditional reli-
gion, for example, attributes much c' il to Satan (1 fo Satan and his
cohorts. These demonic spirits arc fallen angels \\ ho seek to spoil
God's creation. In this light, Plantinga states that., of all the worlds
God could have created, it is possible that none contains a better bal-
ance of broad!\ moral good and broadly moral evil than thi ,; onc.
Although we may ha \ c no evidence to confirm (34 L, Planting.'
points out that we do not appear to hay e any codenec that would dk-
(01 1 firIll it either. Rut how shall we iliiiik about this n hole business of
confirmation way? Let us say that a proposition p cowl/ 7/ ff
proposition q q is more probabic than not on p al( me: if, that is, q
would be more probable that not-e/ with 1 - k:spec, to what we know, if
p were the only thing we knew that was relevant to (1. And let us say
that p i iscw,fi 711 , 1 ifp confirms the denial of
I/.
Alti n there is
really no way to measure the quantity of evil in the
Plantinga rakes Cornman and Lehrer's argument to be about
the i;..1,./o/int and I . :1; 1m of evil. He then advances this proposition:
P.;14/ %Slit' PIP Tvii51
An
[lire arc 101 ' turps of evil.
Plantinga here coins the term "turp" as a basic unit of evil in order to
facilitate discussion. Here the expression "10" turps" names the past,
present, and future evil in the actual world.,
(hinting that (35) dues nut discontirm (34), Plantinga goes on to
say that neither does it disconfirm the following:
(36) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect; God
has created the N (Hid; all the c\ il in the \ n id is broadly
moral e\ il: and there is no possible world God could have
created that COM ains a better balance of broadly moral
good and broadlymoral evil.
I\-1(wv, if a proposition p comirms a proposition q. then it confirms
C\ cry proposition
q
entails; and if p diseontirms q
.
p disk:olitinns every
proposition that entails q. It seems clear that (35) does not disconfirm
(36); but (36 entails
(37) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect.
So, the existence of the great amount and variety of evil does not ren
der improbable the existence o 1n omniscient, omnipotent, and
whollY good God. ()Icourse, there may be fithc; things we know such
that the existence of t.;od is improbable with respect to them.
Nonetheless, the amount and variety of evil in this world does not
disconiirm God's existence,
I Jere we can see how the Free Will Defense works against the prob-
abilistic problem of evil. Against the logical problem, of course,
Plantinga established that
((A) An omnipotent, )mniscient, \\h( >h\ $40od God exists
,
and
(E1 ) Evil exists
are not logicallY incompatible. He accomplished this by showing- that
the consistent coniLmetion of a certain proposition about free vill and
a proposition asserting God's existence entails that there is eviL Now,
52

P;.0!,7(11/ elf Tvii

again the probabilistic problem, Plantinga employs similar &fen-
rategv ti) show that
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God ex
and
There arc 10" turps of evil
are not probabilistic:111\ incompatible.o I le does this by showing that
proposition (G) and a certain proposition about all evil being broadly
moral evil entail that God could not control the evil in the world.
Some critics as ++ ell as some theists have misunderstood Plantinga's
suggestion that possibly there are nonhuman free agents w hat tradi-
tional religion calk
-demons" or - Callen angels - who are ICTNF,ible
ti n' what we call natant' evil. This would, in (lick- 1, make all 'oil broadly
moral cvil. Sc\ eral thinkers rightly pointed out that neither classical
theism nor the living religions that embrace it (Christianity, Judaism, or
Islam) hold that denumic activity is the hest explanation of evil. Yet
there is a misunderstanding here that provides an opportunity to clarify
the nature of Plantinga's defensive strar- egv against the charge that God
could reduce the .nnount of evil. Plantinp,a does nor postniate that there
arc nonhuman tree creatures who create evil in (rte world; he is not of
tering this notion a hypothesis in order to explain an\ thing. Plan-
tinga's defensive strategy di )cs mg require that the claim that all natural
evil could be viewed as boiadly moral evil be irne or even probably t:we.
And he certainly does not have to be committed to its truth or even its
probable truth. In light ol a sophisticated theistic worlds ie.++, it could
even be fact HAIR' ja1s6 that demons create what we call natural e\ or,
in light of mane other things e know, it could be iritildv improbabh . .
But Plantinga's strategy requires only that it he poysiblc and consistent
with k(;) in order to accomplish its defensive ptirpose. 7
Three Probabilistic Arguments from Evil
Discussion of the prospects for a \ iable probabilistic argument from
evil did not end with Plantinga's critique of Loynrnan and Leh
Several atheistic critics have developed their own statements of the ar-
ent. The general strategy they follow is to argue that a proposi-
Lion stick as
14/PiPiVei:iJ'i 1 53
A great .um and variety of e'. it exists
is evi dence against the proposition
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists.
Philosophers have still thought it worthwhile to continue to probe
the issue of exactly how it is that (E) renders (G) improbable. In fact,
the probabilistic argument from evil could be framed and subse-
quently analyzed in terms of any of the thR'e
(11'1 - propositions
cussed in ( 'hart er 2. But we will pursue the argument that incorpo-
ratesas stated here.
Alter all, what, is the relationship that t ICsays hold.s het \+,
F.) and I. when he says the Cornier is evideni:e against the latter or
that (-.C, e which ;. the deni a l of G
;, is pr
obable with reTect to (E)?
In probability studies generallv, the robability of an \ proposition B
on the basis of the e\ idence .1 is depicted as P(B/A). The question,
then, is how to understand precisely h m. all
of this works i n the mat-
ter of God and evil that is. how to interpret the critic's claim that
P((G)/;\ En is low, less than .5. To comprehend this, of course, 'ac
must have s,;114.: idea of what the relationship is between an proposi.
dons B and A when A is cniricncc fir B or \\lien B is.1J1win-tide ?Pith re-
spect to A. Yet this
whole area of scholarship is notoriously unsettled,
with no clear consensus on how to define the evidential relationship
between propositions or on how to think about the probability of
one proposition given another proposition. Plantinga suggests that a
good starting place would be to view the relationship between pri)po-
sitions B and A as eonlormint2, to the calculus of probabilities. Fie
then c, insiders the three main interpretations of probability-...........persin-
alist, logical, and frequenc\. determine it ilicre basis
good probabilistic argument troll',cl us 1)Heil\ renew hi IT-
marks about the tirstinterpretations and thend e c on ho\.,
li e
treats the third.
According to i pen-ma/is/the probability ( (G) on
(F) reflects a person's credence Onicifou, which is the degree of belief
that she assigns to a gin. en pniposition, Pi. A i, or tl -tat she assigns to the
proposition ,al.;.en another proposition, Pf, A,- P). Plantinga pro-
nounces a personalist argument for the low probabilit\ of theism
based on e\ il to be nothing more than mere biographical in!- Orma.
t1 in, Predictably, an atheist 'a ill assign a low subjective pi obabilitv,
54 2/u p;..o:',i(511/(ic. ..P; . ,'):571 - ili of' T.
perhaps close to zero, to the hypothesis that God existseither on its
own terms or in view of the evidence as he sees it. So, it is not surpris-
ing that the atheistic critic maintains that Ps((G)/(E)) = < .5. A the-
ist, on the other hand, will assign a high subjective probability to
(CT) either on its own terms or in view of the evidence as she sees it..
Bet then it appears that a personalistic probability argument horn evil
tells only about the belief dispositions of the atheistic critic and noth-
ing about whether God exists or whether a k rational per se to be-
lieve that God exists given the ex idenee ()f
Plaminga maim .ins that an eN idential argument based on the logi-
cal thcoiy ol probability fares no better than the personalistic argu-
ment. I lere probability is a "quasi-logical relatic- in ()I' which entail-
ment is a special case."iu 'Frying to protect probability judgments
from the taint of subjecti\ ity. those prornuting this theory
think of
probability as a triad
of
entailment." of one propc)sition by an-
other. 11 In other words, one propositionlas au
d prit 1 1 1 probabil-
ity in view of another proposition ,l The idealk rational person,
then, should believe (A) to the exact degree it is entailed by (B). For
example, the probability of the proposition
(38) Friedrich cannot swim
=lye,
(39) Nine out of ten Prussians cannot swim and Friedrich is a
Prussian/German
appears to be .9i.e., N(38)
/(39)) = .9. So, the rational person who
knows nothing else relevant will believe (38) to the degree .9. How-
ever, if we consider
(40) Friedrich is a lifeguard,
then the probability (>1(38) changes dramatically!
Likewise, the critic offering an ar1 2. 1 1 1 1 1 ent IrOM eVil rooted in the
logical theory of probability might claim that the probability of
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, whollv good God exists
is low given, say,
ic Pi
.0 fit;
bi l CX.
But the theist might retort that the probabilitychanges signif
icantiv when we consider

God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evilex-

ist.
It is extremely difficult to see, therefore, hc.w a gi\en proposition can
just /ENT a certain probability on the basis of another propositi,.in a
matter Ion:: debated aithmg scholars or inducti\ Since there
is no reason to think that contingent propositions have a priori prob-
abilities, Planting,: coneludes that there is no reason to think, that a
proposition such as disconiirms (G.).
Although the personalist and logical theories of probability do not
seem to lend alt.'1111\to Making a decent atheistic argument from
a number of thinkers ha\ e eimsidercd \\ lietherflitpteliCy theOr y (or
statistical probabilitvI offers a more interesting and more prtnising
way of framing the argument. ,'recording to the equencv theory,
probability is a ratio: It is a measure cat the relative frequencv with
which the members of a specified class of objects or events exhibit a
certain property. 1 3 An insurance actuary, tier example, might compute
the number of thirty year-old males in a sample of 10,000 who survive
to their fortieth birthdays and get a result of 9,450. .bile probability
value, then, is .945. This value, in turn, becomes a predictive factor for
the underwriter in sk..ttinl.i, insurance rates. There are literally thousands
of situations in science, mathematicsind practical lire in which this
kind of statistical re
son.ng is entire lv
appropriate and helpfu l.
Wesley Salmon sitlagests that the irequencv theory can also be used
to coa elude that c\
11 111,11:CS God ' s existence' improbablethat is,
PKI.;/(E)) < Rut how are \\ e to understand this probabilistic
claim in trequencv terms? Salmon must sure!\ mean something like
the f(Olow mg: Arnong possible \\orlds that contain as much oil as
this one does tt11,1Ch 1S turpsi, there arc rclathcly few less than
half- that are divinely created3 5 Thus, proposition
(G) An oinnipotc.mt, ()inn

111, holly Sc d God e\ISIS

has a low probability value, i.e., below

But how would one arrive

at such a judgment? Should vc start by imagining hypothetical uni-
56P;.o:'. 1'; . o:571- ili
of
T.
verses (or what we have called "possible worlds- ) and simply estimat-
ing how many containing as much evil as this one were created by a
being who has the relevant theistic atti 'hates? Salmon would insist
that the number here would be relatively low.
Plantinga points out a number of serious difii;.7ulties in the frequen-
tist methods Salmon uses for arriving at the conclusion that
P(. (G)/( F = < .5. For one thing, how can ',he (requentist critic
count the possible worlds, which are theoretically infinite in number,
so that he may [Li Form his calculations? For another thing, what
about the dillerences in how the theist and atheist make a number of
initial assessmenis before arriving at a final value for PO G)/(F.))? Af-
ter ail, the nontheist would typic,dly a
ssess
the probabilit\ that there
would be less e\ il II our world if God did exist to be high, whereas
the I heist would Pc 151 certainly disagree.
Here Plantinga rt.c(Tatites the tact that such initial assessments are
ultimate' \ rk.lati\ e to the total
beilefset i,hat each party brings i,() the
probability judgment at hand and that the belief sets of the theist and
the critic differ in some irreconcilable \\ ays .''' We would expect the
theist and the atheistk critic to (..sagrek.s, for instance, on the success
of various independent arguments for God's existence, such as the
ontological and cosmological arguments. 1- taut surely, their assess-
ments of such matters will tbrm part of their respective total belief
sets, or, as Plantinga calls them, their respective "noetic frameworks."
These as well as other problems undercut any effort to mount a viable
frequency argument from evils
Reformed Epistemology and Evil
In the contemporary debates over God and evil, a certain pattern of
response has emerged in legal:kJ to both the logical and the proba-
bilistic arguments: challen,ge libm the critic followed by delenske
manemers by the theist. I n discussions of the logical argument, the
critic charg-es that belief in God and belief in evil are inconsigcni. [he
theist shields his belief sVSI em In MI ii iv charge by demonstrating that
theism is iior inconsisleni. Iii discussions of the probabilistic argu-
ment, the critic claims that God's existence is inipioinible in light of
the evil in the world. I he theist any,vcrS hi slims ing that God's exis-
tence: is not in/pia/a/1 1 c given e \ ii These detensi\ e responses are tech-
\ correct and instructive in many ways. We should note that
such responses are not geared to show that theism is plausible, proba-
P.;14/ % S lit' P IP r it
T P i/ 57
( ) 1 . true. They al- e also not aimed at showing either that theism
makes good sense on its own terms or that it makes better sense than
competing worid\ icws. The general derensi% c strategy is simply that
of protecting tlicistic beliefs while deflecting all challenges a strategy
that has become well recognii.ed and widely employed.
Interestingly, theists who have constructed defenses against various
challenges detected a recurring flaw in critics' attacks. In defending
against the logical problem or evil, theists took. exception to auxiliary
assumptions emploNed II\ their A l 1 1 6st iCNNought to deduce
a contradiction k\ it bin theism. As \\ His c seen, these critics con-
structed their arguments using propositions definnig such theistic
concepts as omnipotencc- and perfect goodticssdermitions that
tilted the contro\ cry, in then fa\ or from the outset. This. of course,
\\ As

an early indication or how different tlunl,ers int.\ itabl y
appeal
to
their on n backg.round nnOrmation in e\ al ,nu philosophical posi-
tions. Then, in defending against the probabi;istic problem ()1
theistic defenders ponned out that the atheistic critic could not avoid
assessing a number of probabilities based on things he already ac-
cepts. whereas the theist w(3uld clearly differ on such things. So, pre-
dictably, G will b
e
improbable with respect to things that the atheist
accepts but probable with respect to things that the theist accepts.
Continuing reflection on the construction of both logical and
probabilistic arguments has brought to light an impol :ant fact that
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists
must be probabilistically assessed on the basis of all the propositions
one knows or belie\ cs, This is w hat we mean when we talk of the re-
quirement of "total es idence." Discussions of this matter have be-
come couched in coals of one's "epistemic iramew oil:" or "noetic
structure. - Btu then, it is difficult to see how so 1 1 1 A n1 . of the 'argu-
ments front e 1 --both logical and probabilistic----are really objections
against theisni ri. men they are based on the atheistic critic's u 401 set of
beliefs. hen might we think of the objection hona evil now
Cleark, the discussion shifts an a in no it.s oriuinal locus on
whether ( El ) or (E) or any other (E)-like proposition per se proba
bilisticallv disconfirms the proposition that God exists. Instead, the
contro\ ersv revolves around a whole cont1/4.: , :t other beliefs within
which such a probabilistic judgment could c er be made. We may call
this context of total evidence one's erideiii - c n- 17. So, if there is going to
58lb(
be any kind of effectie probabilistic argument from c\ il, it \\ ill have
to run along these lines: For any theist T, there is a SCt of propositions
Ts that constitute his total evidence set; for any proposition A that the
theist accepts, he is rational in accepting A only if A is not- improbable
\\ ith respect to Ts. The critic's case, then, is that the existence of God
is improbable with respect to Ts.
Many philosophersincluding David Flume, W. K. Clifford,
Bertrand Russell, Antony Hew-, Michael Scriven, and others make
this kind of case. 1 " Flew maintains that it is rational to presume that
atheism is true ix., that theism is false) unless convincing arguments
for theism are advanced.m -Fhis places the burden of proof on the
theist, since there are propositions that all. rational persons believe or
ought to belie\ e that either oiler no support for (Co Or MA C it im-
probable. According to 1 1 1 0Nt critics, then, the theist is irrational kand
perhaps unethical) in believing in (lod because there is Hui,: !10 42\
idence kir the belief the iailtire of traditional theistic prooH
and because there is impressi\ e\ idence e\ il) ag,ainst the belief.
At this juncture, a number of important questions surface, questions
about what beliefs are properly included in a \vell - formed noetic
structure, what it means to be rationally entitled to hold a belief, and
what our episternic )bligations are.
In addressing such questions, Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolter
storff, William Alston, and George Ala\ rodes have developed a posi-
tion km m n a Reformed epistemology. RetOrmed epistemology is
relevant, first, to the critic's procedure of formulating reasons for nut
believing IC) and, second, to the critic's protest that defense against
these. reasons k ui unsatisfying minimalist approach. Plantinga and
other Refbrmed cpisieflU ilogists explain that the critic operates on the
,cieZeiiiiulis1 au milt ion that a person is rationally warranted in hold-
mu a belief only Ii lie holds other beliek that gke it good evidential
support. Conversely, one is not rationally warranted in holding a be-
lief ii there is good e\ idenee a,..zainst it. Ot course. "e idence'' h
e re
must be expanded to include one's total evidence sei.. this is a cry
natural way 4thinking abut rationa/ity.
Of course, the critic here takes the probabilistic argument from evil
to supply good evidene against (CI). When the theist provides a de-
fense showing that evil does not omit 17077111St it, the critic points out
that the theist is not entitled to hold (G) unless he can supply good
evidence Jar it. it is this whole ev identialist way ut looking at the mat-
ter that Reformed epistemology calls into question. Reformed episte-
P .; 1 4/ % Slit' PIPrit
Tvi1 59
mologists point out that those e\ idcntialists who raise serious chal-
lenges to theism also accept stronfijimudationifilsw. Strong founda-
tionalism is a way of looking at human knowledge as built or erected
upon "loundations." The general timndationalist position, then, is
that our beliefs 111,11 be divided into :WO kinds: those that are sup
ported by or rescue evidential support from other beliefs and those
that are accepted without being supported fw. still other beliefs. 1 his
second kind of belief throes the "basis - on v. hid] our entire strus:t tire
of belief and 1i1101N ledge ultimately rests. Foundational beliefs are
basic" and not "derived- from other beliefs.22
The. "strong" loundationalist vants to place very strict require-
ments on w hat sorts of .
belicaR n be in the foundations. Wanting to
allow only beliek. about which it is unpossible or nearl y impossible to
go wining, the foundationalist asserts that the ()nix beliefs that can be
properly basic are those that are either scirL -Fidriii i t hicorrifiihic.
Sd fe dent belief arc seen to be true anyone who understands
them (e.g., the simple truths of arithmetic, such as 2 2 - 4i. Ii or
rigihie beliefs are those that deal with one's immediate experience and
thus are th night to be immune from si.Tious doubt reports of
consciousness, such as "I am feeling pain" and "1 seem to be seeing
something green"). A strong foundationalist, then, maintains that
(SF) A
person is rational
in accepting a gik en belief onh that
belief is self ident or incorrigible or is del-is,
ed
form sell-.
ident or incorrigibk beliefs using acceptable methods of
logical inference.
The "evident ialisa challenge" to religious belief, then, is lig religious
belief to satisfy hcw requirements
ofevidenee.
laity nontheist rc.p;.., W. K. ( lifford. Ankinv Hew, and others)
err,m-J ,- e evident:Akin and strong fOundationalism, but a number
of
well-kuiowmi theists do as well Descartes. Locke, and Leibni7).
Historically, the twin assumptions of exidk.!ntialism and strong limn-
dationalism have created a certain way of ihinking about how reli-
gious belief 11111!,t. he justified. The theistic evidentialist is obliged to
ghe positive evidence fig belief in the existence ot (..dad, whereas the
evidentialist critic either must provide evidence for rejecting belie in
God or must point out that the theist's evidence is insufficient.
Plantinga has identified two serious difficulties with strong hbunda.
tionalism. For one thing, strong foundationalism is self referentially
60The P;..o:',, ,i(5 11/fic. P;. :5 71- ili of'T.
incoherent. It simply does not meet its o\\ n standards of e idenc, for
it is not self-evident, incorrigible, or logically derivable from beliefs
that are. For another thing, strong loundationalism is overly restric-
tive in regard to what kinds or beliefs can count as properly basic.
Strong, foundationalisin misrakenh, rules out various kinds of beliefs
that arc properly basic but that are neither self ident nor incorrigi-
ble. In fact, a carefulmalysis of our native noetic powers I sueh as per-
ception and mernor slim, that they produce hilmeriityht Or direct
beliefs in us. Such beliefs as "I see a tree in the quad now" and "I had
breakfast three hours ago" .11-: - properh bas!c" or me although they
are not held on the basis of other belief's in Inv evidential set. When
one is in ihnI11,1 cirettinstanees and oue's c
ognitke po wers are func-
tioning, properk, One is entitled to accept the beliefs formed by these
Iltul` C(:) gni-LiVe Po" crs. suck as
perception
and memurv-
Now we are read\ to understand the Rtlitrined epistemologists'
contention that belief in Gitd can be a properly basic belief. Plantinga
suggests that all rational persons have cognitive thculties that, under
appropttiate conditions, can form such a belief in them. Thus, I might
accept the belief that
(41) There is such a person as God
without appeal to my other beliefs. 'fhat is, it can be part of the limn
dations of my noetic structure without being derived by arguments
from foundational beliefs.
The relevance of Reformcd epistemologv u the discussion of God
and evil is that it changes hmny we think about the rationality of the
parties involved. And it is a natural component in defenskc manett-
Netts by theists. For one thing. Reformed epistemology e \plains how
the theism may be
rational \vithont mounting, sav1 probabilisilc
talent for di\ ine c\istclicc that is aimed attirnint2, the prohabilis-
tik argument from e\ 1. Tite theist may simply hold belief in God as
basic (without argument). Then, when a critic advances someversion
of the problem of oil and the theist reels us probativetOrce the the-
ist must Lk ii with the objection. The objection is a potential ditfttittlitr
of the basic belief in God; it threatens the theist's noetic structure.
But the onk actit in rationally required of the theist according to Re-
formed cpistemolog., is to tiitfcar the deteater, t-tt t to speak. Ibis may
he done by deft- nit- , showing that the critic's ease against theism does
not succeed, whatever that case may be (e.g., logical or probabilistic
P. i . o14/ S I61
problem of C\ P . Of ) Luse, it is entirely possible tbr the antitheistie
critic to respond by trying to defeat the delcater defeater and so on.
Thus, although one may be rational in 1 1 ,: lieving in God without dis
eursi\ e reasoning and argument, this would he a situation in N\ high
reasoning and argument is needed. Hokeer, the point of theistic ar
gunk-mat:ion in this case has changed from the positive enterprise of
showing that belief in God is rational because it is derived nii basic
beliefs to the project of showing that antitheistic at:.Acks do not reveal
it to he rationally substandard.
Notes
1.
Alukly,g nonthekric phili)sophc-
, \Nho recognize that the logical paacib-
lent h. not eneclive are: 1dwari...1 Madden and Peter Ilare, Jail a . m./ /tic ( nil.-
G. ' d, 111. :(I I !1m, 9OS '1Ind Wtiliani Rowe.
kncino and 1;chnont. ("aid.: Dickenson, 197S:,.
2. For the induct"' e argument, see Bruce Reichenbach, "I mu Inductive
Art2,ument Crum
cluicricail phihisophiimi
1.7 i. 19S0h
221 227; for the .1 posteriori see Akin Plantin,1.1. Goo' and ()n'a-' i
.11iiids:0.1Ratimal 18.+1111, - Friva,Jr i I(.7():Ttell
c:Nitv, 1967 p. 128.
3.1:Imes W. Cornman and Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Pioll.driucomi....1;:ou
.11; /afro/in:viol: .NeNN1970). pp. 340:1-1.1
mine
4. I lure we follow Planting.Cs \Nay of outlining the arginnenr. See Planringa i,
God. .1::Crioni,11. 17 Grand Rapids,Eerdinans, 1977'1, pp. '59---64.
Paninai],a rirq intriOuLC(.1 the Ootion oaTl 011 bon:
!
2, broadly
dedfing v
i the trim. aunt rhat rhe existence of Guel i
s inconsistent v,
the existence of naturalI hi s notion is then .1% 111,, i ble
to b
e i mport ed i n t o
his discussion
( )Cut,:
problem.
O.,p 64.
(.)course., classieal tricism as \\ ell as 111C 111.110r Mt 1 1 -',0111C1M1+.:
C ,,p0UNe3,:k

CCIi!..t.'
that (Pod's lrtiittul nih e-..hati,e power cut creak 1 . 1 . 1Mly
I'ati0;1;11, free h,aings other than humannal k repugnant
both to scnse and 1 , a sophisticated theo!ov.cal undershInding is the
no:atilt that rack:lice to noliftrman Creatures '0 to ,1110: live plays a
malor part in the explanation of thc evil k\ cOne can add to this
the assessment that it is extreincl': unlikek that imHat ne uP nalur,h oil in our
woild1.11.03d1V PIOQ1 itiiat.ur I,- RS themes can be dr,.1\% a
Iro.tn
soirees as s\cli is Maio!'ar the (.11ristiltii fail h. Stidl theme,:
C.;1\ isagC 11112 11,1111r,1 1.. kV0:"Idby impersonal objects operating and
62P;..o:',,,i(5 11/(ic..P;.,'.,:lilriti or T.
imeractm52, ao...ording to their u\'. ti inherent natures. Second, ticnial Olor at
leasi, de eniphasis on the role 01 demons Or de \ ik in oti! Nvorid can be adduced
from such sources by fair and intelligent i:itcrorciation.
8, Alvin Plantinga, "The Probabilistic .;r1: tumerit from Evil," Philmoi
iihio.il
Situtl ii:. 35 1979): I 53. For those w!shing iifollow the subsequent discus
stow; ul Plantingals work in this area. sec Keith " 'Planting: Ion A tI1 C-
ititiCNOphit2' 27 (1)8810. and IiiiinLpistemic Probabil-
ity and i) ; 1988). reprinted in Daniel
11 (m
aid- Sin der. ed., /7.h- kvicfrritialrow/ /,11( tomington: In-
diana Universit:,. I'vess., 10%), ss .
69 96,
9. Planti*.a, "Probabilistic r\t.tiiinent," pp. 15-18.
10. Ibid., p. 15.
11, Ibid., p. 18.
12. Planting thoroughly discusses this and other difficulties in ibid.,
pi). 21-30.
13. Of course, the classical or LaPlacean theory of probability also as-
rP a ratio but one established a priori based on equiprobable out--
conies.
14. Wesley Salmon, "Religion and Scien,:e: A New Look at 11o:tic's Dia-
hwur.v," Phibisophica/1978 ;: 1.13 176. 1ci ually, Salmon pro-
pose, th,11the design arguincni claim that 'I IS highly probable
that this world 15.15 crcatcd by a beno. ()lent, intelhgk.nt Supreme Being. In
C1 . 01 . 1 : 1 61 1 g the argument ilrom th
e perspeci i vefi-equencv I heore, he eon _
eludes that it is improbable that this skorld seas designed b\ all Lnov.ing,
all .poserfulmd all good beinl.t, particularly given the evil than it contains.
15.
Plarninga, - Probabilistic Ar: .cument., - p. 33. In the same article
32-39), Plantinga also considers the possibility hat the frequency claini here
involves the trequencY 551t11 o hid] ne clay. (II propositions arc line relative
to another class
o
r pr..posit ions.
16. Pl.uninga ako calls these belief sets "noetic structures .- and males im-
portant ohs(5. ations on il(po, theY function in human krum ledge. See his
"Probabilistic .kri2annern," pp. 1-1, .18, and 51,
17. See mi ehae l re ! erson
, \Villiain I lasker, Bruce Reicnenbach, and David
Basinl.ter, itraymRflifilous 1k/Fit: A i 1/11r01ior111n1 hi the
Rclipiva, 2nd c(i. (Nisw York: Oxio:ci University Pren. 199;-; ) . pp. 87-91
and 91-100.
18. For more criticism iii the 11k:qui:mist ar:.ument advan,:ed in Salmon, see
Nancy Cartwright,( - .,:onunents on Wesley Salmons 'Science and Religion:. A
New 1.ouil, atIii esPhib)sophical Ntudicy 33 ! 1978 177-183.
Although Creque:n.kt n hods may not be frasible for arriving at crucial
initial assessments 0 e
, t ,
Inates thal con. ill turn, hic...1L,sed in calculating the
prt &ability of (G), Druce Reichenbach, a theist, still thinks it \\ orthwhile to
cemsider Salmon's proposal that Bayes' , Theorem lac used for calculation
14/ %Si nT f
63
purpr,:es. Where P(B/A) means the probability of B on A, Reichenbach for-
mula:es Ilaves's Theorem in this fashion:
[P(B/A)I I':P(r,'"A&134
The parts of the theorem have thc H
ow i ng ine,uungs:
P(B/A) =the iiiioi . pr,.;1):, l/i/at , tthe original hypothesis is true,
giver the ba,,..ground evidence
P(/A)Ie t.-2,,.pro5abilify that the (>1. 4.:,:nal lit oothesis is Kilse,
given the background evidence
P(C/A& Bt Ii.: pn>baftilit \ that t he eCi ill be ol),er, ed. i.iteit
:hat 01;2 hvpodtesis1111e
P(C/A&B) =
the probability that the elteel will be observed, given
that thelake
P(B/A&(:) = the probability 111,11 thc ti r,) ,.1-tesis is true, Olen the back-
ground evidence and ihe 1.1ct let ihe effect isobserved.
Now the was is prepared e. r cnta p oha1listic arl?rtivient 1: - >in evil
along B.:\ c,iart lines.
Reichenbacli sets up the Irame \\ ork. for the Bavesi.ni type argument from evil:
I 01.
Then, caming the critic's argument in terms of the amount of natural evil in
rum \\ odd, Reichenbach interprets the parts of the titeoreit ts 14.)11o\\
N))
Pr(G)/(N))
the rob.6ilit:\ that a personal, lo' et,otnnipotent.,
ti uniscient, perfectly w oil (iod eists, gi\ en the
furniture and SII'lli.7111C ,f;hewinkl'.en
tient creatures, inentient creatures. pits sical objects,
,Lid la \As ()C11,11.11C but r.vil'a,?/;,:iy any moralk stui i
reask.in, dere nscth,,, ,licv for evil,:m.
e\ idence in (,od's \ : st.ence , or eel)
he rrt )1'1 ,11.31.111 V 0111 a 00k.i ..11)0,e does
not c\kt, given the furniturestuctitic of the
wood
the probabililv of there being the amount 1 , 1evil
tha t cN i st ..., i n our world, gk.er, tha t die ,,, vor(lc
Alk s: obtains, and th.c Cod described.
abo\ e
64

The P; . ,),',, ./!, 11/../(7.Ti,ii

Pt(E)
P(((_;)/(N
the probabiliiv of there being ihe amount of evil
that exists III ()lir world, given that the world de-
scribed al), c obtains and the God dc:scribed
above does
exist
the probability that (i)d
desc- lbcd above
iis cn that the .0. orld Lk:scribed ai
, ovc obt a i n:, an d
there exists the ammun ilnat in evil that our
world contains.
Of course, the critic advancing this kind of Bayesian argument claims, in the
end, that P(((.i/i NE) < .5.
R.eichenbach rightly
17;)scrvc, that POiCi)/(N)&i EP) cannot be emulsified
by the atheistic critic ithout determining tile
prior
N,n ,t1 P t;
conic \ I. see Bruce Reichenbach, Lvil and a Good God New
University Press, 1982 pp.
2027.
19. W.".Phe Ethics of Belief." in his f.ccimi.c/7111:1 Hnlvct I . it
don: .\ Len Lan, 1979, ) pp. 3451:, Brand Blanchard, Rcasoli /N/!Eon-
de.m: Allen
L'nwin, 1974), pp. 400Ct Bertrand Russell, "Ali' I Am Not a
Christian," in his Why
I Ain .Voi. a tiny's:la)) Nk-.v York: Simi in Schuster,
1957), pp. 311:,Scriven,Philosophy !. New York: N1cGrax -
nal, 19 06 , , pp ;';71); Ani(my
PcmHer),,, I97(,,, pp. 2201
W. Is.. ( iilbrd insists that "It is \\ ro
)Ig always, everyiA hcre, aanyone
to believe anvzhing upon insufficient evideific." See his - Ethics," p. 186.
20. Flew, l'..c.maiptifin, pp. 14 15.
21. Sce, lor example, their respe:.tive essays in Alvin Plantinga and
-Nicholas \Volt erstorft, eds., jairbReam an1l 14- 11V711 God
(Notre
Dame, Ind.: Universitv oCNopc 1)ame Press, 1983 . i. Sec also Alvin
Plant inga. "f ic Ii. united Objection :o Natural 'theology," (.7
, istian
(xis B.crirw 11 (10 82i: 187-198.
22, 'ice the fuller discussion o(cvidentialism and foundationalisin in Peter-
son et al., Reason, pp. 146-165.
Suggested Readings
Adams, Robert M. "Plaininga oil the Problem ()FE\ it," In
ArL;ii
edited by James Tomberlin and Peter van lnwagen. Dordrecht: Rcldel.,
1985, pp. 225-255.
,Basinl\er, David. "Evil as Evidence Ag.i!nq L he Existence 01 Cod: A Re-
sponse."
Philosophy Rescanl, ilril.fivt.v 4 (1978): article no. 1275.
7 .br65
Cartiril.ilit, Nancy. - Comments on 1.Vcsiev Salmon's 'Science and Reli-
gion,'" Phiiiiiophicii/33 (Fall 1978 177-183.
Chrzan,-Piantinta oil Atheistic Induction," jihia (Atisirliti;) 27
(Jul:, 1988): 10-14.
Di . aper, Paul. "livi: and the Proper BasicalityBelief in God." Faibli am/
Philo.iophy1991 135-147.
"Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem orL.ous 23
(19$9iE-350.
"Pobabilisiii- Arguments from,Refiiiiwis
(1993):
303-317.
Howard Sm:dcr.1)ailicl. the Erideui:1;:rtuin:71? j'7p;4-4 Lea. Bloomington:
LiMersity Let, 199(i.
Kalitman, clordon 1). "Flidentialisin: A Theolk,gian's Response." hiiih
J'bilfu:opl. 1989: 35-46.
Mari1;1,:1 l'hilosophiral /;:3:i1. /icalion. Philadelphia: Temple
Lilitverst, Press, 1990.
. "Ood. Satan and Nam::: 1Sophio22 (October
1 9 831: 43 45.
Is bvil Fvidenee Ae,anist tbe I-.xistk:nce of God?" lititri 87 (1978):
429-432.
"A Theistic Indatetive Argument tTom Fail?" / nr er mtr io,i:) !
0/ Zeifr ion
22 (1987): 81- 67.
()Ake , . Kober!.(..onc1tisive 1 1 4
1 -4 lull 1973): 10 2.0.
Pc:et- son N"Rcee;1:!;: on the Problem of Bal." ANhTican Philo
()parte:11..201983 ;: 321-339.
Peterson, Nlichaei I.., ed. iheoi'Lrik Selected R,.Tdiiirfs. Notre
171 ,1111e, 1111.: I:11i Vrtij PC Or NOIR' 1),1111C Press, 1992.
Peterson, Michael, William Hasker, Bruce ReichenbachInd 1 - .),1\ 1 Bsint,,er.
R r aso. 11 Ui IMioll)ifs 11all/JIM:1/1M tO P bilucophy
f
Kr kaim.
2nd cd. Ne;,i York.: Oxford L.Iniversitv Press. 19 9 8, chap. O.
- 1ThiSICMIC Probability and 1-.N.11," :17Thirio di li!osolia
(LA': S011988
Goa,('nil Rapids, lieh.: rerdmans, 1977.
P h: .\- aiswePress, 1974:
lie ProlAibIlistic Argument from FA it: P hilosophical ,Srudic.(3:-..
(1979: 1;;;;;53.
Reiehenbach, Bruce. ILvital/if a Good God. New York: l'or(tHnli I:Myers:1. v
Pc.'.,, 1982.
.he nitiense Argumeni from Evil,"
t2/rarre.-;:i5; 17 (1980 !: 221-227.
66'Theof' T.
Salina )11, Wesley. 1cIi.0 md Scieno.: 1k Nev Look
tudie.v 33 1 ,1 78): 113 176
Wanikx right, Milian I ic Presencelvi and the Falsification of Theistic
Assertions." Relom;. ,Stinlifv 4 (10 69): 213-216
5
The Problem of
Gratuitous Evil
III the pre\ ions chapter, \v,e sa1\ thatOr probabilfor
theism depended not simply on hclict',, Ghoul e\ ii but also on a larger
collection of background beliefs and, iiitimatch, on one's total C\
deuce set. Since the atheist's total sct of beliefs \\ ill surely differ from
the theist's in important ways, their assignments of probabilities to
G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good Cod e\ists
will differ greatly. l or the theist, the probability of ((i) is high,
whereas for the atheist, it is low. But then it is difficult to see how evil
constitute~ a probabilistic problem for the Additionally, Re-
formed epistemolt )1,2,1 's crit ique of e\ identialism, coupled with its per-
spective on \\ het her evidence iN even necessary t r one to be ratio-
nally entitled to belie\I.-wee, a reconsideration of the role of
atheistic as \\ ell as theistic arguments mt.. God'sistence.I 'lei many
philosophers---,itheists ilnti theists alike still think that evil provides
a has kn. some kind of nondeduciive or broadly inductive argument
agaill`q llicisiu. "[he trick is tt) arlis.... at a fOr11111.110011 of an e\ idential
arg1.1111CIlt trout evil that significantly ad\ ances the discussion.
Can There Be an Evidential Argument from Evil?
In seeking to determine \vhether there is some kind of \ idential argu-
ment that avoids the detects of the logical and probabilistic arguments
67
from evil and still gives some rat( )nal basis fir not believing in God, we
must first remember vhat defendc- s ha\ c and lia e nor shown. Planti-
riga has shown that theism is Ho,'
//probable given
evil; he has not
proved that evil cannot be et , itioicciiiwipst theistic belief. For e\ample.
the testimony of the defendant's husband that she was at home at the
time of the murder is evidence against the hypothesis that she is guilty.
But the testimony may not show. that the hypothesis is improbable iL
there is enough other evidence or her guilt. Likewise, evils may gen
uinely be evidence against theism and still not show dial lite probability
of theism is low, iftheism is sufficiently probable on other grounds.
Furthermore. R.li)rtned epistemologists point out that the theist
may be entirely rational in taking belief in God as basic, that he need
not justify it by arguments construct ed from other beli ef's. Fl owecer,
Reformed epistemology does not entail that evil cannot count as c\
deuce against belief in God. It does undermine unfair cflOrts to eval-
uate belief in (...;()d probabilistically accorkling to the atheist's own evi-
dent-LII set. More generally, RelOrtned epistemology calls into
question the idea that one is rational] \ entitled to believe in God only
if one has adequate evidence for this belief. None cif this, however,
siu ns that evil cannot: count against belief in God even 'When that
heliet is construed as basic. The probabilistic problem of eN il reflects
one (albeit flawed) strategy fir showing how evil can he conceived as
evidence. It is, then, a potential deleater for theistic belief that itself
can be defeated by appropriate delensi\ c maneuvers. Rut this leaves
open the possibility that a more formidable deleater can be fashioned
in terms of another type of evidential argument.
Plantinga has clearly shown that the at critic is misguided
if
he thinks he can produce an argument or coercive force that will
compel all reasonable people to agree ! hat theism is improbable with
respect to evil and thus that one would not b
e
rational in
emi,wi ng
it. 'Lowe\ er, it does not 1(010 'rum ths either that atheists have no
argument at their .1 SpoSal ieuar ding the evidential impact. of evil on
theistic belief or that theists should show no concern tOr any such -Jr
g1.1111ellt. The atheistic critic, fOr instance, may not intend to coerce'
but rather to "persuade- the winds ortheists and agnostics. The the-
ist and atheist can reason together about Tlicbearing of evil on the ex-
istence of God - as well as the bearijia of a great many other things,
for that matter- \\ ithout accusing each other of being irrational or
being in violation of some intellectual duties.
69
I ucla reJsoning in philosophy generally has this
erci c character. Even if it cannot be shown that one position on
some controversial issue is more probable than another, it is still legit-
imate tbr the position's proponent to make a case for why it is prefer
able to the other. .krid it is likewise legitimate tOr his interlocutor to
make a case for his own position, point out Nveaknesses on the other
side, answer objections, and so forth I his all takes on the character
of 10S Ophie la a t giN ing reasons for and against a
controNersial position. Since such rea,,oning doe, sometimes lead to
chanL,,es of opinion, \\ e may engage in it \VIII sincciv hope of per-
suading others or or coming to a more ad
_xquatch justified position
oursel cs. in the process, we rn,:v rely on assessments o plausibility or
credibility that are not obvious and not unix ersallx accepted. Neither
Plantin$4.1's detc. -nse against the prob.lbilistie problem nor his presen-
tation vt R.cliwined cpktclimiogt has shown that it is useless to offer
an e+ identi,i1 problem of c\ it in this vein. The he\ is to [t- rive at some
understanding of the kind of nomicrnonstrati\ e argument that sup-
plies rational grounds fir the rejection of theism.
Versions of the Evidential Argument
This kind of nondemonstrsnix c c,r broadly inductive argument essen-
tially asks the theist to make sense of evil in light ol his belief in God.
The critic cites some alleged tact about evil as the LT/de/ice that sup-
ports the conclusion that it is more rational, : 41 1 01 the es idence, to
belie e that God does not exist. Three ft mnulations of Ihis kind of ar-
gument may be detected in the growing literature on the evidential
argument. As with the I()gie.II and probabilistic arguments, we may
classify these COIMmulmons according to which of the t011o\,, ing
propositions about. evil they use:
exists
L.arge amounts, extreme kinds, and )erple\in distribu-
tions of evil exist
(E3 ) Gratuitous esil exists
Thus, we get the taxonomy of arguments shown
70i17r PioN:- 11/ y rGramitolts
FIGURE 5.1. Versions of the Evidential Argument rroln Evil
IV V I
is e\ idenceis evidenceis evidence
ap,ains:againstap.ainst
(G i
For each version of the argument, then, a specific (E)-proposition is
said to count as evidence againsi (G).
The first formulation of tilt.' Cevidential argumentVersion 1Vis
not no\ ideh discussed. George Schlesinger, a theist, recogni/ed
this ersion iii ' erv cm-i\ stiscusstiuis a the e\ idential argument:
-While the question olthe amount of ei1 the world contains must \
affects our hes, in the context Cour problem this is an entirely
irreio ant questionf' 2 According to this version of thc arguincnt, ci i v
instance of evil at all tends to dist nafirm God's evistenee. Tim\ (..\
the critic's hope of making Version IV successful depends on his
showing that there is no morally sufficient reason for an omnipotent.
omniscient, 1 11
woo.,v !I-4
)0d God to allow any evil whatsoever. ellyis is a
claim that secnis we!! beyond the critic's reach, since a number of
thoughtful nontheists admit that some evil serves good ends that
could not otherwise be achieved. .fheretOre, the theist can respond
that God, if he ev.ists, could have a morally sufficient reason for allo\\
ing
come evil. 'I 11c theist might even suggest some general kinds of
evils that arc connected to some goods (e.g., hardship is connected to
character de\ elupment, danger to heroism, and so liwth).
Man) critics, home cr, see ersion V as a more promising argu- ,
ment. In Me Faith Or a IWalter Kauintann states:
'the problem arises \\ hen monotheism is enrichedimpmerished
bytv,o assumptions: that (.od is omImIlipoicIlt and that God is just. In
fact, popular theismbeyond inercit assertinLi. that God is just and
claims that (nod is "good, that heli:orally perfect. that he hates suffer-
ing, that lie loves inanmd that he is infinitely merciful, far transceilding
all human mercv, love, and pertection. Once these ssumpt.0 ns lid
granted, the problem arises: why, then, is there all the sufferinp., we know?
And as liinr is these assumptions are granted, this quesiiol duOt he an-
Nis CI"Cd . FOP' if these assumr..ions ere tritC, it would follow that, there
could not he all this suffering. ( . onversclv: .since it is a fact that there is tell
" r ( ; ;
T nitoef.c Evil

71
th' , ,ICIcring. it is plalJI that at least one of these assumptions iliust be
false. Popular ificism i relined by the existence of so
theism pi e,iched from thousands of pulpits and credited lw inillions of
cliev ets Is ilisprmcd by Auschwlesser oik. 1
Many theists ako acknowledge that this argument is quite tOrmida
ble. Harvard theologian G(,rdim I:anfman discusses its force:
A major st umblin,y, Nock for contempt ware faith i. (iud remains: If
there is a God, and he is loville, why is there such horrendous evil in
the odd? Do not the facts of terror, pain, and unjustifiable sinleiing
demonstrate either that Cod is nut prod- and therefore n ot oorthv
our adoration and worship or that there is no God at alit... Explo-
ration of the mr/ctics, and of
e vil i n htnnIn
lIe
has
become perhaps the principal theme of literature, art, and drama since
World War 11, 4
Thus Kaufman admits that
(E2) Large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distribu-
tions of evil exist
can be construed to count against
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists.
Again, it is not the sheer existence of evil per se that counts against
the existence of God but the fact that there are so many evils that are
Yen severe and present in patterns &king comprehension. 5
Formulating a reply to this ersion of the problem is difficult but
not impo,,sible for theists. Some theists ha\ e pointed out that i Ii a:-
gm-rent rests on an asstiniplion that the theistic deity Nonld .111o\\
only certain :mounts, kinds, and distributions ole\ if. Yet it is hard to
know how to establish how much evil is for' In/WI.)
tor God t4,
1.1o\\ , in principle, Cc mid we establish this? The logic ot theism itsell .
does not seem to generate am clear limit on the amount, t\ pc, and
proportions of e\ il in the \N orld. It also does not appear that the
teachings of Christian theology, which expandn i restricted the-
ism, contain some limit. We cc mid obviously appb; one theistic re-
sponse to Version V here, saving- that God could allow quite a lot of
evil, even very extreme evil, as long as it serves good purposes that
72 yrGramit,ws Epit
God could not otherwise achieve. A second question that theists of-
ten raise regards how any finite person could ascertain that the pres-
ent amount of evil in the world far exceeds the divinely set limit.
These and other perplexing questions make it difficult to imagine
how the atheist could ever establish such claims.'
What are We to say, then, about formulation V? In spite of its diffi-
culties, we should not dismiss V too quickly. After all, it is an attempt
to articulate one of the deepest and most protound objections to reli
gious disbelief. Expressions of this argument that describe concrete
instances of suftering, for example, strike a responske choFd in many
thoughtful people, believers and unbelik..:\ ers alike. The critic can eel--
tainlv argue strongly that theism fails to explain the large amounts,
extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil in the world and
that this is a prima Lteie good reason to reject theism. Further, critics
can argue that \\ Hue er divine purposcs 2
)e I I , H- ribte oils 01 ou r
world allegedly serx e lutist be shown to be morally worthwhile if God
is to be exonerated for permitting them.
The debate o er Version V is vigorous and important. Theists typi-
cally argue that even quite considerable evil can be allowed by a
morally perfect deity as long as it is necessary to either bringing about
a greater good or pre\ curing a greater evil. They employ either de-
fenses or theodicies that involve suggestions for what morally suffi-
cient reasons God has or might have along- these lines. 7 Atheistic crit-
ics find faith in attempts to argue. that all evils have a point. nut this
really brings us to the consideration of the next version of the eviden-
tial problem.
Version VI has become a major Chem or h it Ii atheists and theists
alike. We may refer to this version here as the eziyirmera
'Poiii/traiLlitori., (14/. Many critics 'a ho ad\ ance Version VI of the ex i-
dential argument are willing to admit that the theistic deity might al-
ix\ ast amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions (devil
to exist. But they insist that God is justified in allowing the magni-
tude and profusion of ex il onl it i se' Cs some purpose. Cornman
and Lehrer speak or "tiank.cessary c' Madden and I hare speak of
"gratuitous evil," and Daniel 1 Toward ilvtler speaks of -pointless
evil." So, it is gratuitous or pointless oil, if it exists, that provides
crucial evidence against the existence of a supremely po'a erful, wise,
and good God. We must now take a look at how the philosophical
community has handled this argument from evil.
The 1Yob7c;" of Grain itous Evil
73
Analyzing the Evidential Argument
from Gratuitous Evil
William Rowe has provided the most widely discussed version of the
evidential argument from gratuitous evil. In 1979, Rowe wrote:
(RI) There exist instances of intense suffering which an om-
nipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally bad or worse.
(R2)
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the oc-
currence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could
not do so without thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(R3)
There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly
good being. 9
Rowe actually offers a concrete version of this argument by citing a
specific instance of intense suffering that could have been prevented
without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally bad or worse. Largely to avoid the Free Will Defense, he de-
scribes an instance of natural evil: A helpless fawn is trapped in a for-
est fire and suffers horribly for days before dying. Now, assuming that
premise (R2) is held in common by most theists and atheists, the bulk
of the controversy revolves around the first. premise.
In providing rational support for premise (RI), Rowe states that
the fawn's suffering is "apparently pointless" for "there does not ap-
pear to be any outweighing good such that the prevention of the
fawn's suffering would require either the loss of t hat good or the oc-
currence of an evil equally bad or worse." In
biter revisions of the ar-
gument, Rowe also borrows a case of suffering from Bruce Russell as
an instance of moral evil! A five- ycat- old girl is raped, severely beaten,
and strangled to death by her mother's drunken boyfriend. Rowe's
two examples are now referred to as "the cases of Ilambi and Sue"
and employed as two reasons to believe that gratuitous evil exists.
Rowe argues, moreover, that even if we could discover that God
could not have eliminated these specific cases of seemingly pointless
evil without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some
evil equally bad or worse,
it would still be unreasonable to believe
74

ibt-PioN:-/1/ yrGraIllitolts End

cesof'seeinin his human and animal suffer- pointl
cccur have such a point Thus, Rowe believes he has pro-
inductive support tOr premise.
Rowe's argument has virtually been the paradigmthe evidential
argument from evil since the late 1970s. For present purposes, let us
trim it down as fllows:
(RI') Gratuitous evil exists
(R2') If God exists, then !!,ratititous e

exist
(R3') Theretbre, God does not exist.
The argument structure here is ob ioush deductive. The support for
prentise (RI') is inductive, making this version of the argnmcnt iron)
eyi "- e\
We must understandcpil (in ROWC'S WordS)an evil
that an omniscient being could have prevented witliout
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equal bad
or worse. A gratuitous evil, in this sense, is a state of affairs that is not
necessary neither logically or causally) to the attainment of a greater
good or to the prevention of an evil equally had or worse. According
to this line of thinking, the oniv jfiCit'ill ciod can
have fbr permitting any evil is that it must be necessary either to the
attainment of a greater good or to the prevention of an evil equally
bad or worse.
The Appearance of Evil
Many theists have joined the fray to rebut or mitigate the force of
Rowe's lira premise and thus stop the argument from working. Some
of them argue that the instances of- apparently pointless evil that
Rowe cites are not generated by t011ow ing
proper inductive tech-
niques, that is, that they are not part
or a represe n tative
sample.
These theists argue that we arc rationally justiiied in believing that
there arc no goods that itistilv an evil only if we think the goods we
kno , of arc part of a rcpresentative sample. Obviously, in making
many ordinary inductive judgments, the range of ale\ ant items in
the sample falls within our range (4- knowledge looking all
around the world and seeing many storks with red legs and ',hen c o n
eluding that it is reasonable to believe that all storks have red legs).
75
But Ste phen \Vykstra argues that the atheistic critic has no reason to
believe that finite human beings can have a presentati\ e sample of
goods for the sake of which 311 omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good
being would allow evil.
To begin to understand the exact point of this objection to Rowe, \\e
must underctand Wykstra's analysis of appears locutions. lc assumcs
Rowe 1 1 SC: ., the term "appears" in what Roderick Lhisho:m cars the
"epistemic" sense of the term. I hat k. it pertains to what we arc in
dined to belie\ e when we contemplate a situation. Then, Wykstra
makes a careful distinction in the different \N A l's that the word "not"
functions in such locutions. He argues that Rm c's statement that
-re dot's not appear to be
any Ouly,ej: - 1
ggood" should not be in-
terpreted as the Illll.lal premise in an .1112,11111Ctli rriffil ignorance, \\ hich is
a blatant ftliao.. Ro\\ e's statement, as NV\ kstra correctI\ points nut. is
better interpreted as meaning iliat appears that there is no outweigh-
ing good." 12
RM.\ Cti inference, then, nlav be understood as mo\ Mg from a
proposition such as
(42) It appears thatevils are connected to no outweighing
1.2,ochis
to the proposition
(43) It is reasonable to believe that some evils are not connected
to ow:weighinu goods.
This reasoning has this general: (A) it appearsp; therelOre,
(B) it is reasonable to believe that p.
Such an inference seems \,arranted by tlic Principle of Credulity e -
pounded by Richard S\111burrita: appcars to be the case
(in the epistemic sense in - appears"), then this ptnna iaeic justifies
one in believing it iS the case." This principle is rooted in a wide-
spread philosophical opinion that \Ne ha\ e generally reliable
forminpt powers (e.g., perception, mentor', 1 that incline us nwvard
certain belick in certain situations. Ick.- ording 0) NV\ kstra. however,
the Principle (1-: Credulity does not quite provide the criterion we
need. He argues that the epistemic relation that the principle posits
between (A) and (I ) must meet the Condition of Reasonable Epi-
stemic Access (CORNI-..\):
76

yrGramitolts
CORNEA: On the basis of (-ognitect situation s, hunhw II is cmilled
claim - It appears that p" only ti it is i...sonabie tor H tO bcrieve iNair,
;7:ken hernitive faculties am? the use she liainade of theni, tip were
not the case, s vould likely he ditferent titan it is in sonic N a\
cernible by her. IS
In making an appears-claim, one assumes there is an evidential con-
nection between w hat she is inclined to believe (i.e., that p) and the
cognized situation that inclines her to belie c it 1"lov% ever, if it is not
reasonable (or her to belies L.: that tlin c idential connection obtains,
then she is not entitled to say, It appears that p."
\V\ lo,tra argues that applying, ( ( )RN]'. ...is IMal to Rowe's ise, for
by CORNone is entitled to claim - this suffering does not appear
al'Pears
run
to serve am\ Di` inch. irp scd "otweighing good"
ol d
s it
it i s reasona
ble to belte e that if such a L)is illek purposed
eood eVist',, it would be within our ken. Bur it is
not reasonable to
beli es e this, ...h.- cording to Wastra, since an inlinitel ss Re deityss (mid
certainly kin is of outvveighing goods that escape our finite under-
standing. We humans could not expect to know all the goods in
virtue of which God permits suffering. They are beyond our ken.
Thus, Rowe's claim that there appear to be no outweighing goods for
much suffering does not meet the Condition of Reasonable Lpis-
temic Access. It such goods did exist. Wykstra claim', that we have no
reason to think we would have cognitive access to then
V:\ kstra contends that Rowe would have to show that if theism is
true, then there is reason to think that see would have accessto the all
thc goods that enter into God's reasons for permitting suffering. Wyk-
stra belies es th.lt the prospects for doing this are very i)leak. Since he
maintains that belief in Cod's infinite kmiss ledge that c\cecds our oss it
is logically implied lw theism, the theist should r.Vpri'l that \e seould
to see outv% eighing goods for many CsAccordini4 to Wykstra, We
theist li,is reason indeed to belicix that in many cases ol suffering,
CORNEA is not met. but then he \much:1-s lio\\ Ro\xens claim that
there appear to be no justik'ing ;.,;(iods connected to mans- es ils is sup-
posed to be rational support bir the kes, premise than
(RI) There e \ist instances of intense sul Cc:ring that an
, omniscient being co
uld iii'
e pre\ ented without
thereby josing Nome greater . 1. 7. :(xid
or permitting some evil
equally bad or 55orse.
77,,,
"r (
nitoef.c Evil77
If this premise dues not have adequate rational support, that is, if one
is not within her epistemic rights to belies e it, then it is difficult to see
how it can serve as evidence
ajrithisr t Ncism.
in replying to Wykstra, Row
e re i n forces
his position that the fact that
c arious evils - appear" not to have outweighing goods is acceptable ra
tional justification fOr his premise ( ). le clarifies that his original in-
tention was to discuss SlandiriT1 thCiS111, which is the view that there is
an omnipot cilt, omniscient, wholly good being who created the world.
Within standard theism, Rowe distinguishes theism and ex-
ihdsm. Res tricted
theism is S'11 . 1CtIV 1.11C s tew that the being de-
s,:yihed by standard theism exists. Expanded theism, how ex er, is the
that this being exists, o )11 wined with certain other significant reli-
gious claims i.about sin, redemption, afterlife, and so nth 1. The
essence of . Rowe's response to NV\ kstra, then, is that kstr,i in
t stak-
enh defends his own preferred \ crsion of expanded theism, w hk:rcas
Raw c's original attack \\ niounted against restricted theism. Wyk-
Stra ' S dctcnse. then, misses the point. It might work lir his particular
xersion of expanded theism, but it does not help restricted theism at all.
Rowe describes Wykstra's general strategy as an attempt to block
his ability to affirm a proposition such as
(44) It appears that the fawn's suffering is pointless that is, it
appears that the tawn's sub tering does not serve an out-
weighing good otherwise unobtainable by an omnipo-
tent. omniscient being.
Rowe, of course, cites as justification for (44) the fact that we are unable
to think (fins good that exists or might come into existence that both
outweighs the liwn's suffering, and could not be 'brained bx God with-
out permitting that suffering. lithis is acceptable support or (44), then
the es idential argument from gratuitous e5 il works.
11(1\1eler, \V\ kstra counters that %Me is not lo affirm (44)
unless the follow ing prop, )sition is true:
\Ve have no reason to think that were God to exist things
would strikL: us in pretty much the same way concerning
the fawn's suffering.
Wykstra's objection tocuscs, then, on showing (45) to be false by
supplying a reason to think that were the taw n's suffering actually to
78

End
serve an outweighing good, otherwise unobtainableGod, things
would still strike us in pretty much the same waythat is, we would
he unable to think ()lam, outweighing rood or it.
Rowe characterizes Wvksrra's reasoning in this way. Wykstra starts
with the claim
(46) God's mind grasps goods beyond our ken,
and moves to
(47) It is likely that the goods for the sake of which God per-
mits stole!are, to a large extent, beyond our ken,
and eoneItides \\ iih
(48) It is likely that many of the sufferings in our world do not
appear to have a pointwe cannot see \ hat goods justify
God in permitting them.
For Wykstra, then, proposition (48) is a "logical extension of the-
ism," "implicit" in theism, and not simply an "additional postu-
late." )7 Armed with a version of theism that includes (48). \Vvksrra
claims that the appearance that many instances of suffering do not
have a point is exactly what we would expect if God exists. In other
words, (45) is not true.
Rowe agrees that standard theism implies (46) and that it also im-
plies a proposition something like
(49) God, allows the stii Ferings that occur in this world in order
to achieve goods he could other ise not achie\e.
BLit RiMs. '1 igovously disagrees that restricted standard theism Implies
that these goods, once they occur, remain beyond our ken.'' That is
an implication of some versions 01 expanded theism, such as Wvk
stra's, but not of restricted theism itself.
Rowe maintains, then, that \Vvkstra's move from (46) to (47) is the
heart of the difficulty. This move presupposes that the goods in ques-
tion have not occurred or, if they ha N e occurred, remain unknown to
us (in themselves
or in their connections to actual sufferings). But re
stricted standard theism, says Rowe, supplies 110 reason to think that
7brFP.i179
eitherc alternatiN es is true. Perhaps, prior to their being real-
ized, God's mind grays goods that we cannot imagine. This much
seem deducible from standard theism. But this is no reason to think
either that the greater goods in virtue of which God permits most suf-
ferings come into existence in the distant future oi that once they do
come into existence, we remain ignorant of them and their relation to
the sufferings.'"
Although restricted standard theism implies that God can appre-
hend nonactual goods prior to their occurring that lie beyond our
ken, this is insufficient to lust Wykstra's claim that, if God were to
exist, the surierings ir 1.n. Orld ,Aould appear to us as the do. Rowe
concludes,
thereiOre, that Wxkstra has not supplied a con % incing rea-
son to reject his e% idential claim:
(M) There exist instances o intense suffering that an omnipo-
tent, omniscient being could ha c pre, clued without
thereby losing some g,reater good or permitting sotne evil
equally bad or \Norse.
Thus, for Rowe, a crucial premise in the evidential argument can be
shown reasonable to believe, and the argument from gratuitous evil
stands.
Notes
1. See Alvin"11te Reformed Ohlection to Natural Theology."
5cho1a: 1,- l'111982): 187-198. See also Niellolas Wolter
sin ft, - The ligratiou ,d the 'Iheisrie .\rguments: From Natural Theolo
12, ,, ,
In Evident -1.1.BI Apologetics, - in Intiomility, Rchilious Brlicf, am/
Coillwriiiic;ii, eds. I:Aker: .\u& arR1 William I. Wain'\r11.tly. (Ithaca: ( (
ersu Pres. 1))86. , pp. 38
1 GeorgeRchlifio;/.1.h.vhod (Hingham, Mass.:
Kcidcl, 1977), p. 13.
3. Walter Kaufmann, MeUm-tic ,(..iarden City, N.Y.: Double-
day, 1961), p. 139 (italics mine:.
I.
(_ , ordon 11"))God.: 17, e(Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard
1972
pp. 171. 172 ita!ies mina).
5 Paul Draper ka, offered ':he iii ni sophisticated recent rendition of ar-
gument V in "Pain and Pleasure: \r Li idential Problem ii ii Thei ,as," iii .17.1e
ArouiaciaDanici Ho.aard Snyder
Pre,s. 199 6), pp. 12-29.19 the early 1980s,1 introduced
8017ir Pif07:-/o yrGrairi ii.ol t s1:1 , 17
the language of "amount," "kind," ,ind "ltiNtribUCRIII
" int() ,i112 diSCUSSi(111
the eviiiebtial
arIpmcnt in ply Epil
nail ti'

Id juri d ,
Mich.: Baker Book I lone, 1982), p. 07. l'ek.r van Ilmagcn has inure ri-
centiV Used tilesc..1 concepts as the basis 101 ail article or the problem )1. cvii,
Sec1)urnHri, mid 1)kirillulii();A Thcodicv,"
P hihisophic,; / yr.,: 5199 I
I 15-16F, . iruceRI.L, Ncl .,tcknowicii ,:s
thisof problem in "I'klenseless,"1/./c Eridenrial
EN/. ed. 1).miel Howard Snyder (Bloomilwon: Indiana L.'I
n.vers,tv
1990), pp. 194, 19911
6. Peter van. InN\ ;igen discussci the difficulties surnau:iding the argument
over the amount and kinds o!vil in his "The Prohieii olEvil, the Problem
or and the ft- obleni ol Silence," Pbilosvhical Fe electives (1991):
135. 1(6, especially pp. 140 152.
7, Such ,u arpralsal the situation seeins more i;Itellek - tually honest and
more philosophicallY)illisil h than deming that there really is as witch evil
oi that multitudes of people are i:;aly as unhappy asmil:ally supposed. It
i s be tt er f
or the thel
st stInniv to aiinut',here arc a I.:9'CM [11.1ny severe evilc
in the \mild and Ihen to .,trgi.te th.li he emsti.mec of God i it h
ey
nreeluded
nor macic unlikely thereby. The argument can be constructed either tiom
lora,: of essential theistic concepts (1 rrom the additional
co! l eept s i ncl uded
in some expanoc.1 Corn'. of theism thatrepresented in a h\lilg tiiIl1Eradi-
tiOn, such as Christianity.
Although such theistic rrialletiNei's seem reasonable, perhaps there i at
least one ScilscNilii.211 the cv!tienlial fictni Illeamoimp;, kmds.
and ditillibilli()11CVIIdestILICIRC 1()belic_ C. The ar-
Fitment clearly discredits belie( in a deity who place, a f
e licitous iirnitation
On the evils that human behms cut e\perience and about whom simplistic
answersma\ IlL iaben. 1101$, (Ile god. tit popularb,..4,ion ()flea
peddled in thet' e u l liSiOriCai, orthodoN-,ca;lv is dead. 'I he
burden, then, 111;:s upon the shoulders ol t hough,. Cul Chrii, ti'an theists to ar-
ticulate a o incept &God that is more sophisticated and prolOal RI ien pop-
ular theism envision,.
8. I. \'. Cornman and Keith Lehrer, Mihisophical/27:ei
1 /;',%r: (Id ;Oil (No), York: Maondlan. 1970) p. 347: L.1,\ aid
Nladden ate Pelee Flare, Fri/ find(.one,'/It fit (ion! ,,Springiield,
harles C. Ihoinas, 1968 p.1)anicl lloward-Snyder, "The Argument
iron!Evil," in his 1.:ridciiti,11.:-.1;:grimenifli)ni &A/ Kimington:
Indiana l'niversitv Press, 1996i., pp. 291 292.
9. 'William Rowe, "'I e Problem or Evil and S, )nic Varieties oi..Vheisin,"
A Philosophic:11 Piraricil) 16 (1979): :,`36. I Jul c ehanl.t,ed nunibers
and added paremilieses to Rowe's argument in keeping with the convention
for numbering used throughout tins hook.
10. Ibid., p.
7,
81
11. Ill
(E3) Gratuitous evil esisis
counts as negati\ c eyiuence against
(G) All 01116ipulc it. omniscient, \\holly g,, oct Ciod exists.
But what is tilenegati\ u cviucntial vuFtivnsliip in (G) in which
(1-....; ) stands? Bruce R,Issell (-Thins 111.11 there are realk: I \Yei ways o(conceiv-
inct of this evulentiat relationship, oneand the other a/1i il/ft-11v. Al-
though1.1tirst.: this)11 acre, the reac:Ft\ encouragcd to
read 'Russell's - 1)efeitseles, - pn. 1.93 21:s.
12. Stephen \1:stra, "Ii:e Humean obstacle to h.%.\rgi::nents
)rt A\ (tiding theils 01 'Appcanme(, hirri,i,iiio,vrt! /ou7-
111///.(s- opin.,)//:111/11.011 I o k1981!: 81) 81,
13. Richard Sto.infitirtic, Pic /:\-1.(r,-, ,
iir ,),/ Gin/ (Oxford: Clarendon Prey...
197 9. . pp. 245, 254,
TI. or example, s
x,411-,.;Hor'a hel ler- 1 01 " mcd. on I he ba-
sis of sensor\ e\perience: H I ,W 'the ship appears to be t n osing' 1 am sat, -
1nt..1 that 1 am inclined that thc snip is that it s my
precent sensor,. experienci"xhich leads me tit have this mclinaTion to belief"
Sc: his (,'o/, p. 246. hor discussion of these otgnirivc
powers and ihJunction, sec .A.1 , in Plan:111ga.
him Nesv N,an Oxford. 1...n1yersits
Press, 1993).
15. \V\ kstni, "Ilumean Ohtstacle," p. 85.
16. Ibid..
I 7. Ibid., pp. 89, 91.
18. Villiam Ross c, "1-1\11 and thi..! Theistic I lypothcsis: A
Res ponse to
ksira, Rciiiiion 16 (198-1): 99.
19. R o(c
tb,:
could_ 0,
a version of ex-
panded theism :11,11 contiY.Ps a proposition snub as
The goods for Hie NA C: Or nil: () IA must permit suffering will be real-
ized only at the end. 01 the cold
with standard theism, This ,, an , n &expanded theism is no rendered un-
likely by thc items that render , cstricted theism unlikely. See ibid.
Suggested Readings
Aj.st(11."Thc In1(4,!\ c Argument from 1'..\ ii and the Human Cog
flii ue ort1 i ion . Philosophirni,:1991".: 29-67,
Beaty, Michael D. "The ProblemThe L'ilast)ertid Questions Argu-
ment. - Sominlyst P.T.;itos(ptiv.16:rien. 4 (1 9 88):
57-64.
8217h-PioN:-/o yrGramitolt s Ind
Chtzan, Keith. "Necessary (ratui)as Evil: An Oxyrno, on RL visited." En ill)
and Ph/Ion/thy ii (199.1!:: 13.1- 1$7.
"AVilen,Iliratiiitoiu, li\ :! Really Grmitilous?" lil lelli Inn/J/ Jon r
nal fin Pidio.wpin of Rclifinni 24 1988
Dore, C. :einem. Does Suffering Serve Valuable Ends?" In 77, ,1,- /Ii.
drecht:Reidel. 1984.
Feiliberu,, John S. 71),-.1/aii. v LircsZ it...dom./cal ,.1.strzi/s and th
1.1 Evil.(..;rand RTids. Mich.: tondervan, 1994.
Cie. -m. 1h Peter. Piorlit! - T/c6 - (1;7/iC:ambridge: C.unkridge L'inversit \ Press.
1977,
Hasker, William, "( hrzan on Necessary Gratuitous Evil." Faith arid Philoc6-
phy
12 (1995): 423-425.

"The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil," Fah' ii Ph (1992):

23-44,
. "Prov ide nce and Evil: Three l'heories ," Rahlioits ,!,,tudics 28
(1992): 91-105.
John,Gi)d of I o Pe. 2nded.! New.-rper & Row,
1978,
Howard-Snvdcr,nie
Indiana 1. 'nivel - sky Prcss, 1996,
. "Seeing"! hrough CORN [A."
jour.qa/f):- Philofophy
nfRcloluii 32 r,1992 25-49.
Madden, Edward, and Peter Hare. "Evil and Inconcluskeness." .(ophio
ii.tralia.1 II !. January-June 1972): 8-12.
OConnor, Da'. id. "1Iasker on Necessary Gratuitous Evil," Faihr. ,Phihis-
ophr I 2( 1995): 35(1
Pelersinl. Michael. Jail und 1/li'Tian God. Gr,ni,? Rapids, Mich.: Baker
Book I louse, 1982.
-( iod and Evil in Process TheoloL
,
" Ii Pro:y ilicoh,oy, edited by
Ronald Nash. (.;rand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book 1 lousk.., 1987, pp.
117-139,
'God and Evil: Problems of Consistency and (.;atuiry,"janitiri/ of
l'aincl.vipiiiy 13 11979): 305-313.
. "Recent WOils. on the l'Ioblem of Evil," Aincii ca Pinh,sophi (di
Ono ririk 2(1 1,1983 321 339,
Pcierson, Michael, ed. /1.),- P!!iihrhitini
itIiioi. Sdreteit R:!affiiia.. Noire Rune,
Ind.: IThiverNil \! of Noire .1),une Prey,. 1091
PcierNon, .\1:e hod,RruceBasiiwr.
lichannts I(eief. All bliTill///Ciff'%! to the PhillisoplaR:Adion.
2nd cd. Nei). York: C.)xiOrd 1.'imersitY Press, 1995, dup. 0, pp. 110 145,
RoI.. "The 1- ;.mirici-ilfrc.un Evil," In Rniinitriily. Ro-
C;Incur, edited by Rube:': Audi and William
IVainv.right. Itha, a: Cornell U) 1.CPress, 1980, pp. 227- 247.
77(cEvil83
Thcodic."Phillbophical liTirs 16 (Fall 198) k: 119-132.
"Evil arid the . 1 heistic Eivpozhcsis: A Response to S.
J.
Wyksira," In-
tt7Thrtiomil los'i?. mil I'''' Pifilo.soplit . of' R16 (1)84): 95--100.
The 1'H Nent 611:0. 7 In .Plilloyophy
Evcino ,tr,sit'schtiorst, (:. ,,Ii! ....1)ickcns611,1978,1.1). 79 95.
. "The Prohlum 6i. - Evil"',611e VarienesAtheism, - .-11,71c,q72
Phihk(ophical (..)/1,17- tvviv 16 (1979):5.341.
-Rtimi nat ins
per.,-pydres 5
:1991't; 6O-NS.
RuNsell. Po . nce. "The Pcp-,Hent Prol)lc:nEvii. 7triid6
(1989i: 121
139,
rtrucc ,m(1
Stephen Wastra. "The `111lti5'live. Ao.:urnent from
A Dialogac. -1:9pi:sl11 (Fall 19881A.=,-160.
Scnnett., J.ln1c 1 - TheDulense.7 ./., 7ithPhi7((s()pli's. 10
22(1 22).
NicktIlt:. 1hr (,/Cris';-(ioadIssay on itic117, of
Nett York.. Si. Aistutiti .
s .1693,
Trail, lane NI:a. v. - 1;a11.1cies 1 t\b.;,liment from Gratuitonc Sulteri
/he en,
19801: 585-5V_
van I1m.4...cn, Peter. "Tile Magnitude. Duration, and Diqribution oft. \ -1 A
l'heodicv." Pbilucophiral Iupie 161.Fail 1988.,: 161 187,
"The Place ()if Clance in a NVOrld tins:ained(..loct" In
cd1:Illomac V. Motris, Ithaca: Cornell University
ft1988, pp. 211
-P! . (1 1 1 cniU. rol. ) 1 ;. m or Air, and the Problem oi -
1k..nce." Philn.cqpitical.Pcrspcct/Pcs 5 (1991): 135-165.
This page intentionally left blank
6
The Task of Theodicy
The evidential argument from :.tratuitous evil is 110\\idelV
erect the most formidable objection to theistic belief. Clearly, arifi.rof
against this as well as other objections front (bit is an important t pc
of' theistic response. Yet many classical and ointemporary theists ha,c
responded in an altogetht:r different mode, These theists engage iii
what has traditionally been called throdicv. The tern dens c' front the
Greek tucH(god! and dike justice i and k, as John Milum says, an at-
tempt 0) "Instil\ the ways of God to man." Rather than propose
niciiivpossibh. reasons (4)d night have tbr permitting evil, a theodicy
seeks to articulate phinsible or credibir (Aph:/ivarloiis
that rest on theis-
tic truths and insights. Just its contemporary anah tic philosophers of
religion have sharply distinguished the logical and evidential prob-
lems of evil, they also have carefully defined the strategic !Unctions of
defense and theodiev. Although debate about the viability of theodiev
continues, man\ interesting and ;Tint:cm:Jai theodicies ha\ c been ad-
Naneed in the discussion of God and e\ il. I rcview henr discussions of
the leasibilib of theodicy Then, 1take a close 1(10k at Cour fa-
mous theodicies. from Augustine, (lott friedJohn I lick, and
Allred North Whitehead,.
The Prospects for Theodicy
Alost theistic responses to the argument from gratuitous el il re\e
around its factual premise, which is the claim that there is (or proba
blv is gratuitous c\ il. William Rowe writes: "If \\c are to fault t his ar
gument.... we must find some fault with its factual] premise."'
Madden and Hare state that "the really interest ing problem of evil is
85
86

iht. Task ofThrodicv

whether the apparent gratuity can be explained away . or whether
the gratuity [of evil ] is real and hence detrimental to religious be-
lief. -2 Keith Yandell, a theist, insists that "the crucial question is
whether it is certain, r at least more probable than not, that there is
unjustified evil, vhethe - natural or moral." 3 Almost all defenses as
well as thcodicies based on standard theism react to the factual
premise of the argument.
Theistic defenses against the factual claim that there is gratuitous
oilsuch Wykst ma's. Alston's, and an Inwagen's1 --typically cite
the se\ ere cognitke limitations of human beings in relation to divine
wisdom. According io these theists, stIch limitations bar the critic
from claiming that it is reasonable to belie e that there are no offset-
ting goods connected to many e\ ils in the orld. The e
a
that
tuft Cod
God in allowing
e\ ii a
re
, they contend, beyond our ken, kno\\ ii
to
the divine mind but not to our imilils. Because 0! these same cog,niti\ e
limitati(ms, man). theists \ ho oiler a defense declare thcodicv to be
impossible or unnecessary or inappropriate. Some see the( )ducv as im-
possible because requires knowing the reasons ti)r evil that only the
divine \\ iski ()in can know. Even it 11. Were not stnetiv impossible to
1(11011 Cods reas(ms tom c\ il, others would argue that theodicv would
still be unnecessary becausc it usceeds k\ hat pure defense coupled with
Reformed epistemology requires of the theist in the debate with the
critic. Some even say that theodiev is inappropriate because it displays
the presumption and arrogance of mere humans trying to probe into
divine mysteries. Let us look at each (if these obiections in turn.
A great many (:hristian theists, past and present, have not consid-
ered theodicv impossible. Most of them have not thought that for-
mulating a theodicy requires knowing God's reasons for evil as
though finite human beings could completely Cat hom the infinite di-
Ile wisdom. Rat her, they conceive or the project of theodic\ as
drawin!...t out the implications of one's theological position tor e\
ter all, religious believers commonly accept that the doctrines and
teachings of their faith base implications lot. all sorts ol important
matters moral and spiritual irtues, the meaning of redemption, the
purpose of human life, and so forth. So, it would be odd indeed to
think that religious belie Ls have no implications whatsoever for under-
standing something so important as e' it in the 'a orld. In a sense,
then, Christian theism already contains implicit theodical insights that
may be made explicit and systematic. In fact, some Christian tradi-
tions forthrightly claim that it is (cid's good pleasure to give us at
7.5coriatiodicy87
least dim and partial glimpses of his general purposes, including his
purposes for evil. (Here we simply ha\ e to recognite diff.frences
among Christian traditions oi what we are calling ersions of
panded theism, and some are MOIC positive toward theodicv.)1Vhat
ever degree of understanding of evil that believers achieve, then, pro-
vides a measure of theodicv. Thus, theodicv is not impo
ssible.
Not aft theists ag,ree with what we might ca he Reformed o
bjec
-tion to theodicv, which designates defense as the theist's only respon
sibility in the debate NN ith the critic and offers a theory of how belief
in God can he epistemically basic. Yet developing a theodicv seems
completely justified to theists who construe the dialectical context of
rational debate in a certain fashion. The theist might see himself not
as asserting the isolated claim that - God exists" but rather as assert
Mu a ,o hole set, of logically interrelated claims regarding the divine
nature and purposes. He might e\ en 11Micr ,, Land the single claim
"God exists" to be i nvested larger interpren\
e scheme .11),!,
there re entailing all sorts of . c.ither claims al ( ml God's ways
with the
world. He could maintain that the whole system of belief's that ,:onsti-
trite his understanding of theism offers an interpretation or human
life and the world at large. I ke dialectic develops, then.when rime
critic alleges that this theological interpretation has difficult\ c,fount
ing for evil ate theist. responds by trying to elucidate and explain
how his theological beliefs' make sense of evil. Here the critic is not
being eccentr ic or unfair to request that the theist make sense of his
own belief in (iod, particularlv by tracing out its ramifications tiir the
issue of evil. So, when the et mtext of. dialogue is conceived differently,
theodicv is not unnecessary.
Even if we grant that the believer may be entitled to accept be!ief in
God as basic under certain conditions, it is naive to think that life's ex-
periences will never ins he deeper reflection upon that belief, reflection
that includes questioning as \ ell as reaffirming one's faith. When en-
gaging
i n t hi s ki nd of honest reflection, thoughtful believers explore the
implications of their unique particular (...hristian and theistic perspecti\
for a large number of irnp01'1,1111: issues moral crises, the worth of cer-
tain humanitarian projects, the hope of life after death, and tire presence
of evil. Thus, it is quite legitimate for theists to try to formulate some
reasonable fmderstanding of evil for themselves, and whatever under-
standing rho- obtain moves them in the direction of theodicv. This ac-
tivity need not be characrerited as exhibiting the haughty presumption
that a finite human hewn can know the divine mind. Instead, to may be
88T17
Task
ophrodicy
seen as the process of "faith seeking understanding" jiiics g1if-1,7177.c in-
tclirctuni). Hence, theodicy is not inappropriate.
If tho)dicy is not impossible or unnecessary or inappropriate, then
the WaV is open to discuss a variety of issues at the level
of
nietatbcod-
icy. example, how much conceptual work can or ought theodicv
accomplish? 'filar is, can theodicy specify God's reason for allowing
particular evils? Or should it aim at explaining why God allows the
broad kinds of evils that exist? Must a theodicv rest on just one theme
(e.g., punishment or character building)? Or can it weae together
cral themes and insights into an overall picture of the sort of world
Go
d created and sustains? .And what role does our particular moral
theory play in the creation ot theodicY? What difference does iimake,
say, whether we adopt a consequentialist or a deontological moral
theory: Vhere arc appropriate building blocks for theodicv to he
found in restricted theism or in .,ouIc Nersion of expanded theism?
1-.1)\ these a id mom more related crocstions are settled1uetermiries
the direction theodicv \' ill take.
Without attempting to discuss these questions in detail, ler us say
that all of the theodicies considered here tr) . to ive some highly gen-
eral explanations for the c\ ils we find in our world. Furthermore,
since restricted theism provides very little material tOr theodicv, each
of the tbllowing theodicies relies on some form of expanded theism
adopted by the theodicist. In developing thHr theodicies, Christian
theists extract themes from the Bit* and historical church teachings
as well as insi,::)In pre\ alent in the c(nrimunity of believers, thus tap-
ping into a rich \ Cirl of ideas. Of course, various Christian traditions
will yield different ihrms of expanded theism. The theodicist then re-
flects upon the various ideas axailable
bin
his tradition and con-
strues them in a kl a\k r evil in the world.
The moo\ Jtion for
:ho)dicv, of course, is that we do not readily sec
the purpose of IliliCh (.!\if. at least a genera! account of if
from a theistic perspecti\ c, then, oil appears pointless. Hence, we
have the tOrCe of Rowe's first premise:
(RI) There exist instances of intense suffering that an omni-
potent, omniscient being, could Nave prey ented without
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally had or worse.
Most theodicies therefore follow the strategy of specifying either
greater goods that are gained or worse evils that are averted by God's
7i5c L.ykorThod1t.1,89
permitting, o
il.
We may call this general approtk h "Greater-Good
Theodicy." Greater-Good Thoidicv is, so to speak, the "parent," and
in particular theodicies arc its "offspring "" The N,1110us
offspring
theodicies may specify different offsetting goods tbr the evils of the
world, but they all agree in assuming, that the justification of God
consists in specifying sonic greater good. The difference between a
Greater -Good Defense and a Greater t.iood Theodicv, of course, is
that the former claims it is possibfr that some proposed greater good
justifies evil whereas the latter claims that the proposed good in filet
ju,iifles eyil.
Augustine's Free Will Theodicy
The first 16111 formed thcodiev in the\A.,:estern world \\ as offered by
St. Augustine, an earl \ Christian philosopher and theologian. In part,
Augustine was rebutting \lanichaean Dualism, w, Inch holds that two
equal cosmic powers, one Good and the other id ii, are at \var in the
universe. hor Manichaeism, the Good power, which people worship,
is therefore not absolute. For Augustine, hoe et - , the Christian
worldview entails that God is absolutely sovereign o\er ill things and
that no oil comes from him. St , Augustine undertook the task of
showing how the disturbing and undeniable presence of evil in no
\\ al* detracts from ood's total so\ ereignty.
Augustine offers a comprehensive vision of reality that brings to-
gether several strands ( d thought. One of Augustine's central ideas is
that God is supreme in reality and goodness. lie also believes that the
unh ersethat is, the vt1'.ole (tr God's creation is good. Only God
has the power to bestow being upon finite creatures, and God only
creates good things. All oi the creatures in Goci's creation, then,
are
wid in their essence. \ugustine embraces a recurring theme in West
ern philosopin : the Iin.,age of being and goodness. I le re lu tist un-
derstand "being" not as bare - existence" ii.vhich does not admit of
degrees but as haxing more or less - intensitx" On the sense, say, that
a poetic genius fixes more intensely than a simpletitn). Intensity ad
wits a degrees. in A ugustine's terminology, everything Is sonic de
glee of "measure, form, and order,' \ inch is its proportionm of being.
Just as God's being is infinite and absolute, so his goodness is infinite
and unsurpassable. God's creation is rich and variegated, tilled with
all lc\ els of being, and the goodness of all things is correlated to the
degree of measure, tOrm, and order he has given them. On the scale
of created things, an artichoke is more valuable than a rock, a gorilla
90

Ta OrtiV i
is more valuable than an artichoke, and a human being is more \ alu
able than a gorillaall because of their relative degreesbeing. 9
Evil, then, trom Augustine's perspective, is not a thing, not a being.
Although evil in human experience can be very powerful and pro-
found, evil does not, at least metaphysically speaking, represent the
positive existence of anything. Evil simply does not exist in its own
right; it is not one of the constituents ot - the universe. Rather, it is the
lack of reality and thus the lack of goodness. Pat another way, evil en
ters creation when created beings ce.t.,,c to function as they were cre-
ated to function by nature. I vil is Nils met aphvsical dcprivation, pri-
ation, or degradation. Augustine's term (,r e\ii is
pi .ipnii,/,fl i
(pri\ ation of good ).
1 or Augustine, c\ it enters creation throuuli the misuse ot finite tree
`04Fle attributes all oils,
both natural and moral, to the \\ ning
choices ()Circe rational beings. [his oil choice is "sin - in theological
language. Augustine's interpretation of ( Ihristian teachings leads him
to assert that, first, a company of ati!.,;(.ls Inonembodied rational lire
beings ) rebelled against God and that this rebellion was then repli-
cated in humankind (embodied rational free beings). In order to ex-
plain how free rational creatures\\ 'licit represent a very valuable
kind .)lbeilig can fall away from God, Augustine appeals to the clas-
sic Christian doctrine of "creation out of nothing" (ucatio cv
Since creatures are brought into being "out of nothing," they arc
"mutable" 1)1. changeable. Only God, the Creator, is "immutable" or
unchangeable.although the finite rational creature is originally
good, it has the capability for sin.
This line of thought clearly gi \ es rise to the una \oidable dilemma
ofaccounting kgr how an unqualifiedly good creature can commit sin.
On the one hand. ir the creature is perfect according to its place in
the scale living, then It s dii'Lull to em ision moo It \\ oold
commit
sin. On the other hand, c" the creature is mitialk flawed and thus
commits sin, it is ditticult to see how to
oncl ai e God This
dilemma arises with rt.garki to human creatures; it arises \\ fill respect
to angtHic creatures as s ell. FriedriCII Schleiermacher pressed the
point: "The more perfect these good angels arc supposed to have
been, the less possible it is to find any motive but those presupposing
a fall already, e.g., arrogance and envy." 10 Unable to find a satisfac-
tory logical solution to this difficulty, Augustine e\ entually retreats
into the "mystery of finite freedom." Somehow, the free, originally
good creature originated an evil act. That is a great ":11yst-cry."
Plcornoidicy91
Of course, the classic Christian belief in God's omniscience entails
that God knew betore the act of creation that the creature would sin.
So, God bears the ultimate responsibility for the creation of beings
that he knew would, if created, frecb fall into sin. Augustine ad
dresses divine responsibility ill creation by developing a conception of
sovereign predestination. In Adam, the wholc
human race Ninned.
since the race was - seminallY present" in his N uus thus, all of hu-
mankind is guilty of sin and subject to condemnati(-1n. Yet in God's
soveycign grace. w llich is to us a lilt sten, some .ire predestined to sal-
ation tt hue the rest of humanity is allowed 1 recci c its just punish-
ment: - God leads some in mercy and repentance, and others in just
judgment does not lead,"' The co\ creicn election of some to salva-
tion is due to God's mercy, not to their ow n merits. Thus. Atu2,ustine
subsumes the mystery of tree 'ill tinder the mystery of predestina-
tion. Or Course, many important queslions deserve more thorough
discussion than I can provide here or exainple, whether the con-
cept of free will needed to it \\ ith concepts of divine Jim:knowledge
and predestination is adequate to the reality of significant human
freedom, whether a moral critique of God's apparent arbitrariness in
predestination is de\ astatiug, and so on. .,Nt this point, howc.'\ er, I
must be content with laving out a few more important themes in Au-
gustinian theodicy and then evaluating it in light of the concerns of
this book.
The larger perspective of Augustinian theodicy is not complete
without including what Arthur Lovejoy calk "the principle of plenti-
tude.' - ' , ' This theme, which held sway in Western intellectual history
from Plato to I :eibniz, ens isions the \\ Me Inlit. CI'SC as a complex and
Nariegated oreer of different kinds of created beings, from least to
greatest, each kind exhibiting its own unique qualities as Well as 11111-
1..111011S. In the hands of :\ il , 2,ustine, this metaphysical inteTretation
asstiines that God 1;110
.
0s thu ii is
good to
fill
every
level otere,it i oi i .
Hp and down the scale, with finite beings, making creation rich and
full. The principle of plentitude helps to account 1(.)r what we call
"evil" due to creatureiv finitude.
Perhaps the final key that makes Augustinian theodicv fall into
place is what John Hick calls the "aesthetic theme.-
I
This is the as-
sumption that the \\hole of creation, even including- those aspects we
call evil, is good w hen seen from God's perspecti% e. Related, of
course, to the idea of the universe as a graded diversitv, the aesthetic
theme is used by Augustine to stress the "beauty" and "fitness" of the
92lt,f 7ri7A '7iiridiC. 1 ,
universe seen as a whole, So, the uniquenessof each grade or kind of
finite creature is somel-u.ow comIplementary in an overall scheme that is
harmonious, beautiful, and balanced in the sight of Co,i. The deter
minate characteristics of each kind of creature, then, betoken its place
in the great chain of being (e.g., the swiftness of the cheetah, the
beauty Ca giant sequ4)ia), as do its limitations (e.g., the pig is not as
beautifill as the peacock, the dog does not live as h ng as the ele-
phant!.
It may seem that the aesthetic emphasis here explains natural evil
better than it does moral e, il. Yet Augustine oh\ iously extends it to
cover moral evil reference !o Justly desen, ed., properly propor-
tioned punishment that settles accounts for wrongs that were done.
Atigir,tine sees even the fall of the human race and the damnation of
sinners as subsumed under the "perlecti(m" and "beauty - of the uni-
verse .t.. st a t es:
"F,),.- as the beau ora pi, t ure is iiicreased by \Veil-
mana12.-cd shadows, so, to the eve that has skill to dis,:ern 11, the uni-
verse is beautilied even by sinners, thouli, considered by themselves,
their detOrmity is a sad blemish."'" rhe result of pressing the aes-
thetic theme to the fullest is that everything ill God's creation con-
,.
tributes n the beauty and appropriateness of the whole even natural
and mural evil. 17 "If
it were not good that evil things exist, they
would certainly not be allowed to exist h the Omnipotent Good. 18
Clearly, the upshot of Augustinian theodicy is the denial of the fac-
tual premise of the argument from gratuitous evil. Everything in the
universe sen es the higher harmony of God's sovereign desi. ,,n. There
is no state of affairs without which the universe would have been bet-
ter: "Cod judged it better to bring good out of e\ it than nut to per-
t any evil to exist ."19 All evil serves a greater good.
Leibniz s Best Possible World Theodicy
6.11.fried on Leibnii, (1(46-1716) is the onlv thinker in-
eluded in the present study \\ ho has written a book explicitly entitled
Throdicy. 2 " Leibnizian theodiev seeks u> demonstrate that God can-
not be blamed lor the existence of e\ in the world, since this world is
the best of al p)-,siHe worlds. Leibniz's argument utilizes the con-
cept of a "possible world- that was introditCed in Chapter 3. Techni-
cal] \ speaking., a possible woild is a total possible state of affairs, a com-
plete universe with past, present, and future. Possibility here, as
defined in C:hapter 2, is broadly logical possibility. lnr I eibniz, God's
Plcornoidicy93
omnipotence ensures that God has die power to actualize any possi-
ble world he chooses From among, an infinite number of eternally
fixed possibilities. God"s perfect goodness, \\ itch wssays and unerr-
ingly acts for the best, ensures that he will choose to create the most
saluable possible world. And God's omniscience ensures that he un-
derstands all possible worlds that he could create, accurately calcu-
lates their worth, and identities the \ cry best uric. So, the theistic
concept of God entails the conclusion that whatever world exists is
indeed the best of all possible ones.
Of course, no creaturely reality can be tot alls perfect, and at least in
that sense, reality will contain some o ii i.e.. "metaphisical
According to Leibnit, God's goodness and pow er guarantee that he
will select that possible world from among ai. other alternatis es that
..-irritains the optimum balance of gin id and es il. Some interpreters of
Leibni/ mistakenly think in. maintains that God brought about that
world containing the least amount ol evil commensurate with there
beitv.; A. world at all. How ei er, a more correct interpretation. of L
cib
nit is dint he envisions God actualizing that possible world that con-
tains the amount of evil necessary to make the world the best one on
the whole. And Frankly, this may not mean actualizing the world that
has the least amou,Fit cut evil. It may mean bringing about a world that
has a great mane evils in it but evils of such kinds and arranged in
such ways that they contribute to the world being the very best one
possible. As Leibniz says, the actual world contains those possible
states of affairs - which, being united, produce most reality, most per-
fection, most significance." -' Sometimes he employs an aesthetic mo-
tif, reminiscent of Augustine, indicating that mere quantitative maxi-
malizat ion is dull and uninteresting_ that God seeks to produce
richness and quality in the world.
In the process of comparing and es alto: rig all possible worlds, God
tOresees the natural and moral evil the contain. iie chooses to actu-
alize that world whose various constititentsesen Is evil con-
stituents make it the best on the hole: "Not mils does [God de-
ris e troni [oils I g ICO I Cr 1 400iik: , IC d S them connected with the
greatest goods 431 1 those that, are possible: so that it would be a fault
not to permit thein."2 :' Simply put, all the oils of the world con-
tribute to its character as the best of all possible worlds: "If the small-
est evil that comes to pass in die world e ere missing in it, it would no
longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all allowance
made, was found the best by the ( :realm who chose it."24
94
77)1. Tast,,
ol'ihrodicy
There are many points of serious philosophical interest in Lcibniz's
thcodicy for example, its conception of the relation between divine
omnipotence and human free will, 25 the standard of value according
to which this possible world is the "best," and the prospect that it im-
pugns God's power that he cannot make a better world than this one.
Yet the point of central interest for us is this theodicv's bearing On the
factual premise of the argument from gratuitous evil. Leibnizian
thcodicv is tantamount to a denial of the factual premise. The evil
that exists is indispensable to the \attic of the universe considered as a
whole. Leibnit's Ai - pm-lent is not an empirical one that starts with the
evils that act tially c ist in the world and argues that they contribute to
the best attic ()Idle whole. Instead, the argument starts with Several
crucial assumptions about God's attributes and purposes, xvIiik:h are
taken as axiomatic and 55 hich yield a demonstration that this world
must be the best one possible. It is a \\ orld that contains no grato
itous evil.
Hick's Soul-Making Theodicy
Although St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, and other tradi-
tional thinkers may be seen as following in the broad Augustinian tra-
dition in theodicy, there is another major approach to theodicy that
also has roots in Christian antiquity. This type of thcodicy can be
traced to Bishop Irenaeus (c. 130c. 202). The most articulate con-
temporary proponent of Irc,laean theodicy is John Flick, and it is his
presentation that we will examine. The main difference between the
two traditions may be plainly put: Augustinian theodicy looks back to
the fall of a good creati,in through the misuse of human freedom;
1retaaean theodicy looks to the future in terms of God's pla n ui fir the
development of humanity. I low(' \ (-, the ostensible aim of trenacan
theodicy is the same as that of Augustinian theodicy: to relieve God
of responsibility tOr es il.
Ico..)rdingni Hick, Adam, the iirst human, and the test ul the orig-
inal creation were innocent and numature, possessing, the privilege of
beotiming good by kr, lug God and fellow creatures, 1:',iAt it would be
an em )r to hold, as Augustinian tlicodicv does, that original inno-
cence can be equated with original perfection. Indeed, it is not at all
clear that God can instantaneously create morally mature persons,
since moral maturity almost certainly requires struggling, grappling
with temptation over time, and prohably participating in evil. But
(:\ en if God c(iuld create by fiat a morally mature human person, Hick
says, "one who has attained to goodness b meeting and es entually
mastering temptations, and thus by rightli, making responsible
choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable
sense than \v(mld be one il'k. ',1 tCd ill /ill) in a state either of inno-
cence or olvirtue. - -'-' lenee, evil as 'ac know it is explained not as a
decline from a state of pristine purity and goodness but rather as an
inevitable stage in the gradual growth and struggle of the human
race. I lick also states: "I suggest- . . that it is an ethically reasonable
judgement, eNcil though in the nature of the case not one that is ca-
pable or demonstratke proof, that human goociness slowly Htilt up
through personal histories H' moral efforl has a \ alue in the eves of
the Creator \\ Inch justifies ei,en the long tra\ ail of the soul -making
process.2 Thus. Iminamt io as not created perfect but is in the
pI , (. Cess( being perfected.
Hick labels his In:wean-type approach son/ he-
(iise it paints a picture of God's grand scheme of helping relati\ ely
immature hinnan being- s become morally and spiritually mature. The
\\ odd we inhabit is an en\ ironment designed to promote God's plan
of soul making. .11a ironment condi:Li\ c to personal MThmust
be (me in \\ hich there are rcal challenges, real iipportilnities foi the
display of icoral virtue, and real possibilitles for expressing faith in
God. A major component of this environment is community of
moral agents who interact in a variety of special ways deciding on
the kinds of relationships they will have, hat projects they will put-
sue-ind how they will live together. Another component is a physical
ord
er of
impersoll . 1
1 objects that operate independent oi our vi
atoms and molecules, fields ocean currents, biological cells,
and innumerable other physical things. 011\ iously, in this kind ( )1 en-
vir)nment, there ,11-
e opportunities t develop ni nil character as \\ ell
as distincti\ eh spiritual qualities. li.quath ob\ iouslv, in such condi-
tions there is the gonuine risk of (nil (il' railure and ruin, guttering
and injustice.
Interestingly. ITick even ( eems inj..)4}rtant the: the \\ u 'ld appear as
if there is no God, and evil certainly plays an miportant role in Iiirming
this appearance. For Hick, the pinentialk atheistic appearance of the
\\ odd create "epistemie distance - bet een creature and Creator.'s He
thinks th,vs, if the presence of God were
impressed
too forcefully upon
human consciousness, people \\ ould readily acknowledge that God ex
ists and authentic faith would
nor he possible. So,
God has to conceal
96

TIE. Task of-77wodiv

his presence from us, having in important dual effect. On the one
hand, epistemic distance has the effect of making it virtually inevitable
that human beings will organize their lives apart from God and in self-
centered competition vith their fellow human beings. Thus, our state
of Niel-mess represents the way we huntans were made, not a descent
from a prior state of holiness. On thc other hand, epistemic distance
has the result of making room for sincer e, uncompelled acceptance of
God's gracious invitatkm to a lite of faith and trust. 29
Within the general frame:\ urk of an I renaean vision of soul-
making, Hick laces the realities of evil and sullering in human lite. In
regard to inoral evil, I lick says that the possibility olIvrong choice
and action is necessary to the kind of world that is conducke to per-
sonal grow
th. I Ic i
s \oili ng to agree with NIackie. Hew, and others
that it k ioilicallv possilde that God could have created tree finite be-
ings who always dc.> w hat is morally right. But then he einphasiies
that the spiritual diniension requires the treedom either to reject God
or to come to " Accordi n g to Christianity, the divine purpose For
men is not 'ii] chit that they shall freely act rightly towards one another
but at they shall also freely enter into a filial personal relationship
with God Himself. There is, in other words, a religious as well as an
ethical dimension to this putp()SC." It is re it ton.ship with God,
then, that uLikes it /qtfically impossilde for God to have so constituted
humans that they freely respond to him, manifesting love and trust
and faith. So, Hick's argument is that God cr eated the world with the
possibility of moral evil (or sin, from a theological perspective) as the
kind of environment in which humans could exercise authentic faith
in him as 'a ell as manifest love and virtue toward their Cello:vs.
In regard to pain and sullering, Hick argues that it is rational to
recognise the value of a tN odd ii physical obiects operating by stable
natural laws. In such a world, bt)th pleasure and pain arc possible for
the sentient creatures inhabiting it. But he turns this feature of the
world into fodder lhr his soul-building thesis, e \plaining that a paw-
:free, soli, unchallenging 'a odd would be inhabited by a soft, unk.- hal-
lenged race of free being,s. Hick then distinguishes "suffering" (as a
qualitatively unique psychic state) tr( m - pain" as a physical state).
Though pain may sometimes be the source (..)f suffering, it is not al-
ways or even usually so. Suffering is a distinct and very profound hu-
man phenomenon.
Hick defines suffering as "that state of mind in which we wish vio-
lently or obsessively that our situation were otherwise." This state of
mind can be as o.riplex and high-level as the human mind itself re-
lated to regret and remorse, to anxiety and despair, to guilt and
shame, or to tile loss of a loved one. Even what makes, sav, a terminal
illness produce suffering is 11( )1- 011ft the physical pain involved but the
anticipation ()floss. \o'4\
,
:uftering or anguish is usually self regarding
in focus but is sometimes other regarding. flick anributes sufferinL.,, to
sin and its consequences for our improper attitudes toward our own
finitude, weakness, and mortality. Sin keeps us frolu being fully con-
scious of God .And lilunbly and jox hilly accepting his Link ersal pur-
poses ibr good. Again, just as ph\ sical pain is an ingredient ()fa \\
in .,hich thc soul-building purposes of God can Ne carried oJi., so suf-
fering is also a feature nr such .1 world. It prompts human beim,gs to
search for the deeper meanings ot their eNistenee, helping prepare
them for mutual scr, tie to each other amid suffering and for turning
to God.
Niuch of Hick's argument re' ok es around the instrumental (teleo-
loLT.ical) value of the of this odd: Bith natural and moral ex ils
contribute to the sotil making process. Hick assumes that he has w on
the point that a hedonistic paradise or at least a world without sig,
niticant challenge and opportunity does not c(mtribute to solid
moral character or authentic religious Faith. It seems that a consider
able amount of rnailv kinds of evils would be noiLssary to any world
that (4 ,u.ld be
an
environment for soul-making. Whatever amounts
and kids arc neeessarv, then, arc not gratuitous but just Hied in the
sense we nave been discussing. At this point. it appears that Hick is
ready to deny the tactual premise of We argument from gratuitous
evil, since he h bxiously identified ninth evil that serves a good
purpose.
Pni then F lick asks the haunting question regarding v, h (dud al-
Itm s -k.11 steleological that is, those e\ ifs thai. ,tre excessixe and
go beyond anything rationally regniied ola soul-making process:
Need e world contain the more exireillc and crushing cl \Ain't:11 it in
fact e(ifilains? Are not liFels challeres often so se\ CO. as to be sell
clefealing w hen considered as soul making influences? Man rmist let
suppose', cultivale the soil Si) as to V, in his bread by the .sv cal ut his
brow: but need :herene he vuantc lamines, lift example in China,
from whicHIlave so miserably perished?..l'i
Hick states that it would nave been better it . such events had never
happened, 32
an admission that seems to embrace the fact of gratu.
98Tk 0f1hrodicy
itous evil. Then he moves on to ask how, from the standpoint of
Christian theodicv, we can address the utterly destructive evils in our
world. Why does this world seem less like an environment for soul-
building and more like a cold and indifferent, if not outright hostile
and malevolent, place:.
1
Hick ultimately says that the excess and random character of much
evil is mysterious to us. \Vc sec no constructive purpose ft fr It. But
then he begins to bring even dysteleological or excessive evil within
the ambit- ot si,n1-making theodicy, saying that ex en the mystery of
dysteleological exI has soul making value. He argues that the human
misery in this `a ()rid calls il- th deep personal sx mpathy and energetic
elibrts to l le contends that unless the sulIk ring is really wide-
serk ed and actually had tor the sufferer, kwe k ould not ha\ e such de-
sirable and k aluable passionate reactions. l le also argues that, in a
kk mild where suffering and prosperity kk ere exactlk roporti( wed to
desert, we would lose the moral 4..11 lronnIcnt in which persons do
\k hat is right simply IOr the sake of what is right. Instead. persons
would act prudentially so as to bring about the most fax ()rabic conse-
quenck.7s for themselves. So, by the end of his treatment of dvsteleo-
logical evil, it is not clear that the evil remains dysteleological. In the
end, there is no gratuitous evil fbr Hick because all evil serves a pur
pose. He says that God permits evil to "bring ()III of it an even greater
good than would have been possible evil had never existed.'" ' 5
A study of Hick's Irenacan version of theodicy would not be com-
plete without analvzin , g his vk'W Of lit after death as the continuation
of (rod's plan of soul iwaking. Flick argues that God's plan is the Uni-
s ersal salvation of all persons, a pnwess that extends beyond earthly
existence and into the afterlife. For those people who, for whates er
reasons, depart mortal lire ilhout having achieved the proper degree
of in and spiritual maturity or soul hood, one might say), God
pursues hi
s same
objectik e for them in the lire to come. %Fier all,
s(iinc
o : these persons voul t f ha ve
been
am ong thos e who s u lt e red
terribly and v, hose lix CS t k:rc snuffed out kk ithout a lair chance to ma-
ture along moral and spiritual lines. So. God continues his eftbrts in
the afterlife, pro\ iding u is or exercising lose and till* until all
persons are brought into the ilea\ enly kingdom. He notes that the
1 1 1 1 h ers al salvation ot humanit\ is not a 14 T,ical necessity within Ire-
tiCall theology but is a "practical ccrtaintv. -7'D This affirmation of di-
vine persistence completes the pt ogressive, developmental, and escha-
tological orientation of Irenaean theodicy.
-.1.711 ' Th .,* of

99
In the final analysis, then, Hick is not able to admit the existence of
gratuitous evil. On this point, ironically, Irenaean theodicy falls back
into agreement with Augustinian theodi;, \ Hick s.1\ s that "the King-
dom of God will be an infinite, because eternal, good, outweighing
all temporal and therefore finite evils." .' 7 Interestingly, whereas Au-
gustinian tneodice argues for the possibility of evil in a theistic uni-
verse, I lick uses Irenaean theodicv to
argue tOr its actuality being
necessary to the kind of theistic universe he describes. so, Irenaean
Iheodic places the responsibility for evil OF ( ;Od 111 least as strong
a sense as .kugustinian theodicv does. Yet in relation to the fulfillment
of God's purpose, "nothing will finalk ha\ e been sheerly and irre-
deemabl\ evil. For everything w iil receive a fleW Wei fling in [he light
oldie end to which it
I lick's contribution to the ongoim& discussion of God and oil is an
important one. I ic inust be commended for not denyin-, the reality
of the oil in the world by saving that it oni 11 from our finite
perspectike. Although he tries t,) face e\ en the in hcirrible and ex-
cessiN c e\ ils, his theodicv cannot ultimatehy recognize really gratu-
itous evils. 1-:\en though, tbr Hick, it \\'kt ithin God's pi ,wet to make
a
world signiticanth like this one but without (.1\ steleologieal
such a world would not have been as conducive to soul making ,As is
this \\ orld. Thus , contrary to other remarks he makes along the
wav,..'" in the end Hick comes very close
to arguing that our
\\ arid,
even with its most extreme evils, is the best possible one for achieving
God's purpose of soul making. For those whose intuitions run
counter to this conclusion, perhaps w c must say that it comes down
to differing conceptions of goodness and what goodno5 would do
regarding things that arc within its power.
Whitehead' Process Theodicv
Each of the theodicies I have surveyed so Li has ended up rejecting
the factual premise of the argument from gratuitous oil. Yet sonic
thinkers do not believe that denying gratuitous evil is a satisCactory
response to the problem, although they see such a denial as a logical
consequence of classical theistic, commitments. lhey seek to de\ clop
a viable theodicy based on an alteritati ,,c ,-
)ncepti,in of deity. One im-
portant alternative to classical theism is found in the process philoso-
phy of Alfred North Whitehead. Process philosopkv
assumes a differ-
ent metaphysical picture of reality than does much traditional
1 0 0
T he T ask
of 7 hrod
philosophical thought upon Nyhich classical theism rests. Process
thinkers such as Charles Hartshorne, John Cobb, and David Ray
Griffin --have employed process concepts to articulate what is com-
monly known as
processtheismand its implications for theodicy. They
claim that process theism retains the strengths of classical theism
while avoiding its weaknesses and that there arc clear hem:fits to
theodicv.
Process thought is based on a view of reality as becoming rather
than being, which is a direct reversal of the traditional approach. It is
nut surprising, then, that he central theme in process theodicy is the
concept of change, de\ elopment, e\ olutionboth in the creaturely
wodd and in Go
d (
; vat ure,
, cCOnNdOliN, e\ er-changint2., centers of
acti itv and eyerience rather than relati\ de enduring substances:4 o
God. tOr process thought_ has two natures: Primordial Nature an d
Consequent Nature. God's Primordial Nature contains all c_ernal
possibilities for how the creaturcly \\ or1 ,1 (an advance; Cod's .onsc-
quent Naturecontains the experiences and responses of creatures as
the choose to actualize some of these possibilities in their lives. As
Gods (:onsequent Nature changes in response to events in the crea-
turely \\ odd, God also ma\ be said to change or to be in process
not something that classical theists would say of God. Although
process thinkers deny that they hold a pantheistic \Norld\ iew, the inti-
mate and reciprocal ontological relationship benw cen God and the
world is obvious. Process thinkers have labeled their position "panen-
theism," which affirms that the eTcriences of the world arc included
in God.-
11
One key point in process thcodicv is the rejection of the classical
concept of divine omnipotence, which process thinkers lind Made-
quatc and laden \\ it:h fallacies. Pr cc' theists den y that God has a
monopoly on )o\ver or is "infinite in power," as tradition1 theology
at firms. Since finite CrC,11111'C'S are also centers of power (or -treedom"
or "sell-determination"), they can bring about new state, of albirs
that God cannot c(mtrol. Although traditional theisms typically en\ i
sion God choosing to bestow some deg,ree of significant freedom oil
creatures, the process version of freedom is rooted
in We 1. cry struc-
ture of reality, with each creature haying the inherent power of self-
determination. This power enables creatures to choose good or evil
possibilities for their lives. God's power, then, can meet real resistance
from creatures. Thus, we may say that God has all of the power that it
is possible for a being to have but not all of the power that there is.
Plcornoidicy101
This marks a clear parting (if the \\ ays with the classical concept of
omnipotence, \\ Inch process theists criticize as monopolistic and to-
talitarian.42
According to process thinkers. God's chief goal for the universe is
the realiyation and maximi/anon of value in the experience of crea
timely realities. Important values here inelude nox city, ercati\ itv, ad
venture, intensity, complexity, and so forth. But God's power must he
vie ed as pcisitirszie rather than coricire. God tries to "persuade" tir
"lure- creatures toward the good and awayfrom ex il, but he cannot
fork.- c them to choose the good. Process thinker David Ray Griffin
states that (. ;od carioca eliminate evil because "Cod cannot unilater-
ally effect any state )faffairs." 1 .2 Instead, God oliers persons possibili-
ties for the realization of good in their experience. When negati e
t"c....\ experiences occur, threatening to dm art the kik.ine aim. God
simply ofILH-, new ideal possibilities that are adjusted to 11hat has al-
read' happened. Again, creatures ti - eel respoildind again. God of=
krs new possibilities. SO goes the e oltitic cii of
the uorld as (;(),1,-on-
tinually creates increased order and :.igniticance out or aboriginal
chaos and trixiality.
Since finite creatures are always perishing, process theodicy affirms
that God is continually storing up their experiences in his Conse-
quent Nature. All positive and negative (...periences arc ultimately
conser\ ed and harmonited in God's own conscious life. Thus, all
things can he said to work out all right insofar as God "include[s] in
himself a synthesis of the total universe." In his function as "the
Kingdom of Heaven," God brings about a kind of synthesis of all
carthlx experiences but does not
unilaterally rectift all cils. Tx pically,
process thinkers have not conceived of "personal immortality" or
"lilts alter death" as central to the defense of GI Kr, goodness against
the problem ot. evii, as traditional Christian thinkers sometimes do.
There is also no final, definitive, eschatological culmination of all
things. Thus. for pro1/4 ess thinkers, the continual, ongoing synthesis of
all exper iences in God's own conscious life is the basic hone tbr the
triumph (if good and the redemption of the world.
Process theism has ti.irced classical theists to relhink and reline their
fundamental concepts:1-6 but classical theists as well as tivrue nonthe-
ists have also raised a number of serious objections to process
thought. For example, the process attack on the classical 0 incept, of
divine power has been said to rest on pure caricature that sets up an
oversimplified "either/or" distinction between coercive and persua-
102

1 he Task of Thr odicv

sive power. It is probably wiser to admit that there may be a range of
modes of divine p(twer, such as "productive power" or "sustaining
power" or "enabling power," many of which are compatible with
moral persuasion. 47 Another topic :.bout which there is vigorous dis
cussion is divine goodness. Some classical theistic thinkers declare
that the process concept of God's g(todness is fundamcntallY aesthetic
rather than moral. If the aims of the process deity arc to make crea
turely experience richer and more complex, even at the cost of pain
and discord, then there is the risk of violating many ordin.tr\ moral
principles. Most classical theists understand that their own position
denies that God could he inorallv perfect if he caused or allowed suf-
terin, 2t in order to attain merely aesthetic awls. Process theists have
replied that their conception of aesthetic %attic is a largi."1", more indtl-
ske category than moral \ attic. Hanging on the out:oine (4! this dis-
pute, of cotiv ,.;e, is die question ot v,liether God is worthy tf worship.
Putting these and ()titer questions aside tin- the moment, let us fo-
cus on how process thought. relates to the e' idenual argument trom
gratuitous evil. It would be difficult to think of another tradition in
theodicy that tries to come R) grips more squarely with what appear
to be gratuitous evils in the world. In its analysis of the concept Of
power, process metaphysics makes room for really gratuitous evils.
TItese are es ;Is that Cod does n u )rdain, cannot control, and cannot
necessarily make right. Now, in order to admit the existence of such
evils, at t he \ en least, process theists have radically overhauled the
r.ona. te.st.c concept of divine pf over. Theyaintain that the
classi cal
tradinm
concept of omnipotence leads logically to the denial ofgratu-
itous e\ ii and that their alternative concept of divineovel' allows us
to acknowledge its e\istence.
In our brief sun CV 0; tho ,d ides, it may seem that process thought
has pushed us to a dilemma: Fidler we can retaln classical cate:.,I,ories
and C 1 k. the. existence of gratuitous evil or we can adopt rwocess cat-
eg,ories and accept gratuitous e\ il. In a sense. process Ine(tdicv de-
fent.ls theism ar-tinst the al. glillient win gr,anil01.1`.; 0\1! by modifying
theism--by opting "quasi theism," as it has been called. Thus, in
terms if the historical disussion, the critic asks how classical theism
deals with what appears to be gratuitous evil in the world. The
process theist responds by conceding that classical theism cannot han-
dle gratuitous evil and thus must be rn(tdified along process lines, Of
course, for those theists who agree that there is something to the
claim about gratuitous evil but who want to retain classical theistic
7.75corrlicodicy103
commitments, the only visible option is to try to break the dilemma
to \Ankh ha e c{)nic. It may be that an interpretation of dhine
goodness and other divine a:tributes can be developed that allows fiir
the possibilit\ of genuinely gratuitous evil. But that is a project that
lies beyond the scope of the present volume.'"
Theodicy and the Assessment of Theism
The complete list of comprehensive theodicies as well as the various
themes that they incorporate is too long to treat in this chapter.
However, this sampling of approaches begins to acquaint us with the
'a dc scope of moves available to theists and a number of counteo
mok es open to critics.
We can detect one own-non thread running thnnigh kirinally all
theistic solin ms, Nether global theodicies w more specific themes:
God (who and i' 011111 dC37:1711 the
a.Fth, ci.se sad] /hal crit aeressa ;",! to a iweah.-iaood. Theists haletYPi-
cally taken a !N. -cart:I - y(4n? approach as integral to their search For a
morally sufficient reason tdr God aih '.v cvii. 1.or many \\ ho
think about the problem, it seems to lv a deeply held intuition that
for an evil to be justified and H God to be justified in permitting
it the evil must be necessary to a greater good. It it were not strictly
'necessary.: then a Cod who is all powerful, all-knowingmd all-
good could achieve the specified good through other means, With
this strategy in the background, theisti,-. thinkers have proposed a va-
riety of types of goods and a range ot suggestions for how they are
connected with c'. us. The various responses to evil in the immediately
preceding pages only hint at the wide spectrum of possibilities.
Act ually, the greater-good schema is also the common root of many
delenscs to the prohlcm oi greater-pmd approach de-
lensively, many theists liae long endorsed a greater-go(id `,1 1 '. 1 1 q,N . to
undermine all \ ersions of the logical problem (devil. fOr example. In
constructing a defense around the theme of tree will, theists have
stated that the greater good of tree will is a P OS . 41 , fr reason lot why a
de it y wh o i s
,,upreniely powerild and perfect IV good allows es it How-
ever, the greater good strateg,v stands behind many attempts to de-
s do') a posithe theodicv as well The He will theme is one that the
ists have used in the context of theodicy, not as a merely
possildc
reason for God's permission 01' evil but as a purportedly tine and
plausible reason. Whether it is tree will or sonic other proposed
1 0 1

Task01-11.wodicv
greater good, let us tOcus here on the general strategy of sp,.:eifying, a
greater good as the basis fOr theodicy.
\ luitv theists and their critics believe that a morally sufficient reason
for w
hv God allows evil must relate evil to a good that outweighs it.
These theists usually take for granted that no explanation of evil can
be acceptable unless it credibly argues that the evil in question is nec-
essarily connected to a greater giiod. A large number of theodicies,
then, simply offer different ways of construing what that good is. In
effect, they conclude that no existing evils are pointless or gratuitous
and thus that they d,, not count as c idenee against the existence of
God. Here !watt/ I/ ow vi/ is inhierstood as ui c1ii that is not neces-
sary u the eyistenee of a greater good. The mom potent atheistic re-
buttals to theistic specificatitms of greater goods revoke around the
claim that at least sonic evils or some broad kinds of (nil do flit seem
necessary to WPC .rk..ater good. It makes more sense to belie e either
that the \ serve no good purpose w halm wver or that the purpose they
supposedly serve is not worth the price.
In the history of the debate over theodik.- Y, several important points
havee been made by both sides. In future debates, perhaps critics could
probe more deeply into the question of whether a greater-good justi-
ficatory scheme is \lable After all, attempting to justif\ evil by refer
Cr1 CC to sonic good essentially makes the moral weight of the evil de-
pend on an extrinsic factor. It may well he, however, that a more
promising line tbrthe critic is to say that some actual evils arc intrinsi-
cally so negati\ c and destructive that no external good could out-
weigh them. This certainly is the tone of Ivan Karamazov's remarks
to his brother Al \ osha w it N wh L i I opened this book. And the writ-
ings of Madden and I .are make a forcei III case along these lines.
"lheists, by contrast, cotild more itJh explore a distinction between
o sorts of greater-good theodicy: One type clailns th,11 the at - Ina/77j
ole\ il
is necessary to a greater 12.00d, and another type dimp.., that the
pos.kibiliry of oil is necessary to a greater good. ( :learly, of the
unacceptable greater g(iod theodicies are of the first type. Following
this first type of approach, theodicists embracing classical theism have
to justify carp actual evil or kind of evil by linking it to sonic actual
good or class of goods an effOrt that is extremely difficult and prob-
ably doomed. Some classical theists avoid many cre difficulties by
denying that God is morally obligated to make each specific instance
of evil turn out or the best, arguing instead that God is morally obli
gated to create or pursue a certain kind of world in which we have the
Li Tr;..,*Thoidic 105
potential for certain g()ods. A good kind of world would be struc-
tured accordinn to certain overall policies, Such policies would in-
clude the granting of significant ft L%.dom to human beings, the estab
lishment of a stable natural order, and so forth_ Fhese structural
features of God's created order would then make many particular
evils possible, evils that may or mac nut ays he ciinnected to par -
ticular goods within the world system, either now or in the future.
According to this approach, the greater good would be the overall
struct we of the world order and the values that ,11. 0 able 1 (
emerge from it. Thus, as IO1 1 : : as the theist describes a
\ ere \ aluahle
kind of world (strucf tired so that five creatures can make significant
choices, hate the opportunity deCiOp moral character, and so on),
the existence of such .1 world might ,
e n be seen a, v, orth
it.
ltintatelv., the dispute ner CV11 is one ofseveral considerations rel-
e\ ant to the rational acceptance or rejection of ihcistic belief. A rea-
soned iudgment ,Thout the acccptahnu\ of theism, theretl)rd, must be
made in light of ot the ale\ ant arguments tOr and against the exis
tence of God, Vhar is more, a final judgment would ha\ ,2 to consider
how well the overall theistic position fares in comparison to other
\vorldviews, both religious and secular.
Notes
1 , \Vdtimn it v c, P5ii0. 01 ) 1 1 1 i: .1 (1 -0 1 1 : Alt bitiOdFiCi /0 4 (Encino and Bei
mom.: 1)ickenson, 1978). p. 88.
2. kik\ aid ladden and Peter I lure.i) ( God (Spring-
field, III. Charles C. ..rhomas, I 968 t
, p.
3. Keith Yandell, Basic issnes :u ;heiv or Religion (Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, I 9:7162-4)3.
1. In tile previt ius chapter. ccidcrcd Stephen liVlotras. delense, 1:10
tar'n ,; on the cognitive lirnitati,n. !Inman beings. Similar defenses are used
by WtHiam Alston, "The Induct; e Argument li . om l. il .1rd the Human
nitiAeondit..ii.)n,"V7.),'ed. Daniel I Inward
Snyder ; kloomington: Ii cilaili nivc7 ,-)iv Press, 199w.. pp,. 97-125, and by
Pete: . van !imager, "The Problem ut 1.). Ft, the Problem of Air, and the Pi 011-
lent of.Sileoce," in] Ins ad `..;nvi.ier, pp. 151 I 7-i. Plaint lw also alludes .t. die
cognitive limitation theme: - Perhap:, (..;nd has a gond reason, but that reason
is :no k.sotitplicated us to underncdhticc Akin God. Frecdom.
mid Evil Gr3ild Rapids.. Mich.: Eerdithins,1977), p. 10.
InI c.c ci i,se theOdiCit'S 1)ihr a morally sufficient reason for
Ond permitting
106
The Tr sk
6. This int;Igt.TV is I 0.1VV Cd frOM MCI.% ire Si ikVart, The (;:werre,, -Cood De-
Jens( Nevn
:Martins, 1993
p
7.
And s het her fOr purposes of deCense or theod:=ev, b(ith agi . ee that a
(cater Good Theme v, needed. Since the rheme is assumed to be necessary
to theism. authors developing both delenses and theodieies employ it.
114- N'atun.Coml. ed. and trow,. I.H.S. Burleigh, in
Am/Ls- relic:Writhigs (London: S.( ,.\1. Press, 1953), p. 'Vt.
9. Ii CriSINeOpiatOniSM I lea \ CV illiiienCed AL1. 1 4liNtine *S ViC\\ 01 C\
For a discussion ()1' Plot Hian Neoplatonisrn. see W. R.liii Pliilosophy or
Morin n.s.
3rd ed. t London: Lorti,mans, Green, 1929). Pk ainns's vies.v of eYil
as lack occurs i Aust.ine, as explai:;cL: inchapter.
10. Fricdrich Schleteralacher, The Cliiish. ;;;t).:...iinburgh: T. &
Cark, 1928). ' 161.
11.
A t;2.:ustinc, (74y n! God. trans. Marcn:, Dods, George Wilson, and J. J.
Smith :New York: Random I louse, 1950 pp. 13, 14.
12. Augustine, ( .1111(1? julir mIrm. Iciezp.aiimit, bk. 57 chap. 14.
13. Ti ,..ce ho\\ this prInciple is Yo',.en through inudi ti tWestern intellec-
tual history, see Art Ili!! 1.meiov,',Tatof it
(C.r ,Thridge.
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936J
14. John Hick, Ertl and the God or Tote, 2nd ed. San Francisco: I Earner
& Row. 1928 pp. 8201
1:', ..ugustine, On .1:ee ii717, trans. J.H.S. Burleigh, in .11/pititili,C: 17171IiIT
Writ/nay, 3
. 9. 26.
10. Augustine, Ciry11. 23.
17. Augustine.trans.
J.
F. Shaw, in Basic irritims ()Of.. .1itj:Tu5
(2 vols.), ed.: Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random T louse, 1948 .27
18. Ibid., 24. 96.
19. Ibid., 8, 27.
20.
Gottfried Wilhelm you Lcihnit, 7/on/to. IISSaySG11011.111..
God, the .1-ieedwir of Mail,thf01 Fril, trans. II. I higp.ard Irom
C. J. Gerhardt's editionthe Collremiit tilts i; 1873-1890)
(New I laven: Yale Lniversity Press, 1952).
21.
Gott tried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Vicodicy, trans. E. M. I luggard t,Lon-
don: Routledge & Kega:t Paul, 1952), paras. 30-33.
22.
Ibid., para. 201,
23. Ibid., p., ra. 127.
24. Ibid., para. 9.
25.
"llie reader \Nil! remember Plaminga's remarks on Leibnii's Lapse that
was discussed in Chapter 3.
26. Hick, Evil, p. 255.
27. Ibid., p. 256.
28. Ibid., p. 281.
29. Ibid., p. 287.
77...eIitykorTilicodicy107
30. Ibid,, p, 272,
31, Ibid., pp. 329 330,
32. Hick speaks 01 - es il Which is utterly gra:no (ibid., p. 324); of
"es it in so Car as it is purely and unambiguously evil - ibid.. p. 325); and
- horrors which will dis!;gure the 11111VC!.0 t Cie end ()fume - bid.. p. 361
33. 1 lick ibd.. p. $301es en quotes Shike , peare in' iu Leau) :",. V , r iir s to
a:11011s. are we to the gods, The\ kill us lot their sport."
3-1. 1 bid., p331.
35. Ibid., p. 176.
36. Ibid., p. 344.
37,350.
38. Ibid., p. 363.
39. Mans of Hick's statements about the nature oicsil indicate that sin
and stitlernn are to be regariled as "genuinely t'ivl and ruterly inimical to
God's Nt 01 and purpose" ibid., pp. 15-16i; he also sass: "1-or it is an in-
ctataple deliverance of our moral consciousness, of which1 lnn must be
, -
,loved
to rob us, that evil i n all us iorms i
be abhorred and resisted and
fe.ired - ibid. , p. 363).
-10. Allred North 'Whitehead, P r ocess ,vi?' R r ality Ness York; Macmillan,
1929 p. 3
41. Nhch.tei Peterson, "1..litki and IPtt h:l.", 1
ntiodics," in Pim:its,- third
ed. Ronald Nash (C..7, 1aild Rapids, Nlieh.: Bake IL ok Ilouse, 1987 p. 123.
12. See, tor e\iimplc, t.'harles lianshornc,
) i nnip oi cno., -
oiip'eitr n! ii:41.r.17i071, Cd.Fenn Newirk:1.111r;in, 1945
pp. 545t Secalso (diaries Ilartshorne.17. . icohiaic,!!
th. clakes \H-,, u p, , : s la t e 11 1 -l i vcr . . . m u! ' N cw
IL1954 ;, pp.
4i1. RI\ id Rat tint'iln. God, 1 2721/ Wesnninster,
1970 p. 280.
1.1.ti-ed Nor I h Vhitchcak i,Mr/Li:2/7
Ness
, r k :
Ian, 1920 p. 98: also see hisNca/itt., pp. 524-52Fi.
Some poiccy, ;Milos, 'pliers have attempted
to poi,. kiciscoecss
count ol'persoilal immortality, that is, lit' Mier death. See\CW,si011 ul
this i David Ras
b. . 111\1:11:ver.SitvYork Pte;s, 19)01 r . pp. 34 40,
16, See thedli scac discussion of process theodicy in Peterson, "God and
Evil in Ptocess Thcodicy," TT. 121-139.
47. Nancy Frankciibel- rv, "Some Problems in Process Theodicv,"
ialies 17 ,. 1981 1: 181 18.1.
48.1 suggested that Christian ilieists could take this kind of approach in
my tt irk Lid tim/ a ii (-. ; ,) d (Gr auld R . upid , Mid. : Baker Boo];
House, 1982 particulark . ch.y. 5_ pp. 101-.133. 1 also recommended it in
the book 1 wrote with_ \\ iH .....I asker, Bruce Reichenbach, and Dip, id
Basinger, Ren.,- 0/1 cif,1 Aa In ib? Hr t
108or Thr odicy
R :ligloa, 2nd ed. (No\ York: Oird University Press, 1995 L. pp. 123 - 127.
lasker r,-, 1 1;es a evse tor the possibiii:y or gratuitous evil from the
p.srspecti\ c of Christian theism in his -rh, .1Gra:Mums Evil,"
Fa Xi IIIII Phiioyo ph) , 9 (1992 ); 23 44,
.19. See HaS kOf "Ni. siCS !siti";
ReiChCl] NICh, Lpil am?' 0Gwor (. 7. 011
(NcAN York: Fordhamcrsit \ Press, 1982): David Basinger, /1.h-
Tr i' z Mil 77.14.15 1,7 (DOWACCS Cr :0\ C,InterVarsit Press, 19961,4,
PP.
,
83- 104; and Peterson, Fr it and he Chr istian God,
Suggested Readings
Adam,,, Marilyn NI, "Thcodicy Without Blaint.'," P ldlosophical1Opir s 16 (Fall
1985: 215-245.
Adams, Marilyn NI., advisory Co. theological Contributions to Thcodicv,
special issue of I Ohl) and P hilosophy 13:1996)
Basinger, David. "Di% ine Omni;)otence: P1a1ting.1 vs. Griffin." Proci.7sc.Vnii.
icy 11 (1981: ) 11....24.
Davis, Stephen '1., ed. F. ncon?2, -/ InLT I.P11:Options ii, Theodicy.
Kno\ Press. 1981.
Files, 1:van. - Al t cdil vian Theodiey: Stump on the Fall." l' ir ir b tind P hiloso-
phy (i 1:19893 1 0- 329.
. "Should ( did Not Have Crelted Adam? Faith and P hilosophy 6
(1992): 192 208.
Ferre, Nets, Fpi./ anziChr i. ,r ian Fnith. New York: Harper, 1947,
Reprinted by Books tOr I krarics Press. New York, 1971.
Griain, Da\ ici Ray. E r ii kr r isited: ilr.vionse.., rid R cci. , ; / _ , / titm. c. Albany:
State 11!niversity of New York Press, 1991.
. God, P ower , emit r'11.- .1 P r occss Theodicy, Phikdelpha: Westminster
Press, 1976.
Flare, Peter. - Review of 1)-avid RavG001, . 1 401Ti% tin,!1) ,"uir S S
7 f 1977i! 44-51.
Ilarshorne,harl::!-,. "A Nev,. Look at. ilk Pi . ohiciii or Evil." Inis :rent
P hibb . ophi,771 tv.vnes: .v.,.../.7y.cH oimr of Cirri John Olicr:P, edited by I. C.
foil Springlicid.(:harlesThomas, 1966, pp. 201-212.
\V:ithun. "Suffering, Soul Makingind Salvatior.."
P :Illosophi,77/ 0/w.rh1'iy 28 1 985 ): 3 19.
flick . , John. h. / 7 anti the ( do! Or b:P C. 2nd ed. New York: Ilarper
"God, E\ i .i d Myst e ry."
R tlitiio,r r . V n!it. 3
1968 539 54.6.
The Pribblem of Exil in he First and I .ast fouiwal of7hr -
o4iicai1965 5)1-602.
Kane., G. Stanley. - The (..once pt of Divine Goodness and ic Problem (A'
Evil," Rcligions Snedirs 11 (1975 ): 49-71.
Li' Iayk ('1

109 109
"Evil i.ind Privai ion."Plii/osep/.7 at RIl-
2:Ti.vie 11 ( 19S0 1 :-13 5 8 .
"1
n.
Rid en e tt Soul-Making Theodic." intc;.7urtio1eort Phiumr/ jihi -
Philikk. ripb.i. of1973 ;: 12 2.
"Soul Making H icodio.lAuslialia)
19731: 24-$1.
(f/Pain. Ne\ Yi qt.: Macmillan. 1962.
Madden. Edward, and p
e l e r Harc..;d.
1:1.: Charies C. .1110111:. 1968.
Mari:ain, Jacques Gui ibl.,/"::;,//,,i3;) of Evil.. Milwaukee: Briicc Pub--
lik,hing, 1960,
Peterson. lichael. "God and Evil in P! ocess 1 heolop. " in Pif1CCSS
edited ON. Ronald Nash. Grand Rapids, Mich,: Baker Book Ilouse, 1987,
pp, 117 139.
. "Recent Work on the Problem
o f Evil,"
1hdoS 0/ 0/ 17/ 1
13!1:r; tz. 71r 20 1983:: 321-339.
Peterson, Michael, ed IP:whh-in orRrodinos. N+o , c Dame,
l'ni\Notre Dame Press, 1992.
Peterson, Nliehael, ltrilliiI1asker, Bruce Reichenbach. and. 1.).1%id Basin :;(T.
17M1
Brihf: hilioduciilm
1/if' rbilm-ophy at R
2nd e d. New York,: ( hi -c ) rd
in ersilic Prey,. 1998, chap. 0, pp. I I -- 143 .
Reichenbach, l',1 'nce. Evil owi a COW?' GOzi. Nt.'AUniversitv
Pi - css, 1982.
"Natural itch and >.a: rd 1.a .\ :- 1 . 1icodion Natural
16 :1970i: 179-196,
swinhurne, Richard. "Does Theism Nced. Ilicod .k.- s?" Cinvadia,i; jonimil.
a/ Philos:14)y 18 i1988.: 287-311.
-Krim\ let.11,:c (him 1"; \pcncii...- e, ai1 Incfat Ra-
i/m:2:71y Rckabills
1ays ill H an
coitc,..1 by
Abraham and Steven 1 loltzer.

C aivn.don l're , s, 1987,

PP
. 41 167.
Oui:fiti..i11 15 (1978):
295-301.
.Problem or Evil." hi lb'G Ulf Oxtord: Clarendon
l'rcss, 1979, pp.
200 221.
.Illeodicv ()Clic:A\ en and111 Hi(N11711I
Cad,ediced .1) !. Aided Freddoso. Notre I)aine, Ind.:T:nivcr
Pres,, 1983, pp. 37
." -S1.
Vilitnev, i k irr L. kriL: 72,/Piocc.,-., ( ;oil. New York: Mellen Press, 1985.
This page intentionally left blank
7
The Ems e Problem of Evil
As noted earlier, the problem of evil may he divided into theoretical
and existential dimensions, We are familiar with We triotis ticrsions
of the theoretical problem: the loizieal, pi - 4 liabilistic, and ex idential
irmulations. Yet writers on the theoreticai problem trequently allude
to another kind of problem lying beyond the so )t , L.: of the logi:- al,
probabilistic, and epistemic concerns that gie shape 0) the ariotTs
theoretical expressions. This other dimension ofthe problem t): -. k.:\ it is
more difficult to characterize. At the very least, it is rooted in the ac
teal experience of evil and how that experience sapports disbelief in
God. It has been called a practical problem, a psychological p
roblem,
and a moral problem) Alvin Plantinga has called it the "religious
problem of evil , and Marilyn Adams has called it the "pastoral
problem of \\hal is clear is that, for a some people, the existen-
tial feel lot evil somehow leads t
o the rejecti o
n of religious belief.' Al-
though there is no delinithe stud\ oldie existential problcin ofevil,
shall explore major aspects of it hcrc and tic together sex era! impor-
tant ideas about it from the current literature.
The Experience of Gratuitous Evil
What one might call the "phenomenology of ecil"that is, the stud
of the all Of evil in human consciousness and how we assign
mk.saning to itis a rich field of imesti14ation. Jeffrey Burton Russell
insists that evil is "perceived inimediateh, directly and existentially.";
Many other authors also bclicve that there is something, forceful and
primal about the way evil is experienced." John liowker writes that
11271k' Lvistenti,q7P;o:57em or Tvii
"the sheer bloody agonies of existence" arc something of which all
men are aware and have direct experience." 7 Actually, it is not the ex-
perience of evil per se that has such intensity but the experience of evil
a meaningless, pointless, gratuitous. It is this aspect of experience
that is expressed in the bitter lament- of the ordinary pers(,n as \yell as
in the sophisticated reasoning of the antitheistic philosophert' Great
literature also provides extremely effective representations of this ex-
perience: Consider the writ iligs of Dostoeyskv,`) Albert Camus," and
Nliguel de Unamuno. 11
There is something about the experience of evil as gratuitous that
can and often does render faith in God untenable. M. ,:ny persons say
that the find themselves gripped at the core of their being by the
horror of evil and that this awareness is prolOundlv transtbrmin!,2,.
Those who have this kind of perception of evil often report that they
cannot experience the universe as theisticthat they could never
manifest attitudes of praise, adoratioit, gratitude, and worship toward
God. After reflecting, on the horrible and absurd evils in the world
that the di\ Me being is supposed to allow.i( . ii Stuart Mill says,
"When I am told that . . I must . . call this being lw the names
which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain
terms that I will not. Whatever power such a 1, eing may have over me,
there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to
yorship him."2
As long as theism is understood to entail that there arc no gratu-
itous evils and as long as human beings experience much evil as gratu-
itous, then there will be a continuing tension between theistic belief
and common experience.
Some defensive 'milieu ers by theists such
as Planting,: seek to show that the facts of evil do not render theism
improbable. Other theists, such as s',I.ephen Wykstra, argue defensively
that we are in 110 1)0%141011 C012,1111.11CIV 10 affirm the existence for likely
existence; of gratuitous evil. In a sense, Flantinga sums up the net re-
sult Hail such
defensive strategies when he writes
I he thekt nit\ find a rrIQll)ms prohlem H the presence of his
0,0,11 Milk:ring or that Of S0131C011C Hear 10 111111 he m.w find P difficult to
maintain ia hat he takes to he the proper attitude towards God, laced
with great personal sofferin, or rro,fOrtunc, ic nay be tempted to rebel
to shake his fist in God's fac, :', or c% en to gi% C Up I , CFCI "
God Atogedler. But this is a problem of a different J tension. Such a
prohlern calls not for philosophical enlightenment, but for pastoral
dare."
113
So, prestitnably, at the strictly philosophical level the level of I(
cally reconciling \ arious claims, confirming and discontinuing
themthe critic's arguments can be staved off, and the intellectual
doubts of believers can be assuaged.. If there is any remaining objec-
tion to rcFgious faith, then it must be emotional or attitudinal or
practical in nature.
Plantinga correctly intimates that there is more to the problem of
evil than abstract exercises in juggling propositions. Rut how we con-
ceive of this other dimension in relation to the theoretical dimension
is of major importance. To suggest that further philosophical enlight-
enment is not reit:\ ant to the attitudinal or experiential dimension bi-
tiircates reason and experience. When defense against the problem of
e\ it is coupled w it h Retbrined episteir4ilog, \\ hich al lirms the theist's
intellectual right to believe in G
od bas i ca ll y, many theist s beli eve tha i
\ irtuallv e\ en thing related to the issue of God and evil that is phik)
sophicall\ important has Neen addressed.
Front another perspecti\ e, larilvn Adams indicates that the pas
toral or religious problem of c\ it "has a philosophical dimension in
that it might be partially alto iated by some sort of explanations of
how God is being good to created persons, even when he permits
and/or causes evils such as hCSC. -14 101' . \dams. to den\ the bifurca-
tion between theoretical consideratii , n ,: and the actual ex peri ence of
evil is to move in a more appropriate direction. After all, there are
many convincin,,,,, philosophical and psychological studies, quite 11111- C
lated tO thC ktiLIC 01 God and evil, that argue tor the intimate li d. be-
tween "lope and emotion" (w - belief and experience. - 1 hese studies
show that what a person helloes conditions the range and quality of
his experience.'
It is not surprising that, in disct.1 ,,,ing the problem (devil, critic Sid-
ney I ty ) 1.; obser, cd tha t -no mono the i sti c reli gi on w hi ch omcei N es
olGod as both omnipotent and benevolent, no metaph
ys ic Na Inch as-
serts that the \\ odd is rational. 11CCCSSanind good has an room for
genuine tr,P,2,1.24.11'. -1(' Ihere \VC may 0,0.41111C that flook's term - genuine
tragedC !viers lo gratuitous oil. I he point, then, is that what one
believes ;lb( , ut theism and its implications afiects his experience of the
world. We can see why theistft belie\ crs who understand the exis-
tence of God to exclude gratuitous e\ ii \\ ould encounter significant
dissonance in the face of intense experiences of evil as being gratu-
itous. John Hick captures something of this dissonance when he ar-
gues that a theology cannot be repugnant to the moral sense on
11471,c Lyistenti,q7P;.o:57em or Tvii
which it is based) 7 In this
same vein, we can comprehend why non-
theists who ponder the credibility of theistic belietS have great diffi-
culty seeing how they fit with the experience of real life.
Adams is correct in suggesting that the religious problem can be
somewhat alleviated by relevant explanations. in Other vords, a per-
son's beliets about (lod and their logical implications may need to be
clarified, amplified, or modified. Or she ruay need n cc encouraged,
in an emotionally supportive context, to sec that the beliek she holds
about God ecik call for attitudinal change or for a dilIerent personal
response. Recogniving the seriousness of I lie religious problem. the-
ologian Thomas Oden has articulated a "theodicv f(,r pastoral prac-
tice. - The pastoral approach Oden outlines clearly discounts lake and
harmful answers for e\ NOMC general explanations ik.ir why evil
exists, suggests how some good may still he brought out of unneces-
sary evil, and presents some ;i.,... neral themes ihotit (id' s lose and
care for persons in spite H the contingeheiek, 'h
uman evi stence.is
One does not has c to foll)w, this sort of pastoral process cry long
to see that it cannot ; 1 far s.inp.\- on the onceptual resources of re-
stricted theism. Standard theistic beliefs about the divine attributes of
omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness imply only the
broadest outlines of ho\\ to thinL about the relation of ( h id and evil.
Although sheer defense may be effectively based on restricted theism,
any sufficient explanation of evil, 'vhieh ObVit.
uslc
rakes us into the
area of theodicy, requires additional resources, drawn tram various
doctrines and teachings ()fa faith tradition.
Evil and Personal Identity
We are now in a position to see how the experience of gratuitous evil
supports the factual premise of the argument. For the person ofiering
the argument from gratuitous e\ il, the factual :Lim such as Rowe's
(R1 )--has stioitg experiential weight. Though the argument itself
its c(mstituent propositions and their logical and epistemic relations-
fOriw, the theoretical dimension 0! the problem, it is intimately re-
lated to \\ hat we are callin:; L he existential dimension, After all, the
argument must be advanced by someone who thinks it is sound, that
is, a person who believes the premises to be true and that they lead to
the stated conclusion. We generally assume that the critic who be-
lieves there is gratuitous evil is expressing moral protest, indignation,
and outrage. We typically see him as wishing violently that things
Pic Lvstnli;7of Evil115
were not the w ay they are and insisting that God, if he exists, is
blameworthy for allowing them to be the way they are. That is a large
part of the existential dimension of the problem.
but once a person
experiences the world as containing gratuitous
evils and is morally repulsed by their horrors, an interesting and sub-
tle consideration arises. It is a deeply existential consideration pertain-
ing to the person's value preferences toward himself and toward the
word in general. Accordin,, to a certain way of thinking ab01 1 t such
thingsi person can be 4x/sh/thrilv diutticutie r vitcuimllv honc.ci
raising a theoretical statement of the problem oi evil oni if lie gen-
uinch regrets his n existence. vl his consideration
pro\ Ides the basi s
for an intriguing theistic response to the problem of gratuitous evil, a.
response that does not advance an explanatory theory of \\ he God
jti sti fi ahlv allo\\ s the e\ ils ot the \\ orld. Although it \\ ould be interest
t1 splore other ivances of the attitude of regret in relation to
()flier statements of the problem of e\ii , I \\ ill focus here on the most
formidable of ill statements: the argumcit from gratuitous e'.il,
The particular theistic strateg\ here rests tin certain value prefer-
cnees or attitudes. Plc first step in developing this response is to call
upon each indi \ idual a no thinks about it in this case, the atheist ad-
ati ci m i g
t he
problem ofgratuizous evil to declare his attitude toward
his own existence. Ili ffil31 1 1 Hasker straightfbrwardly poses a question
to each person who
might
advance the problem of evil as a reason for
rejecting theism: Am I glad that I cvi.q? He explains the exact mean-
ing ( d- the question as follows:
The question is iv whether m\ ht .(' all that it ()light to be or all that it
conceivably onild be, It is not wheiHe;- pleasure pain balance ih my
life to d, he has been, on the w hole, a 01 % 1 He () ) . 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 \ tff. lb1 : . it is not
whether in, life is, in general. a benefit to those w Ito nc affected
It is not even the question whether MN'
consideNd, con
tains ot these
ltmestoll' ale
deepik interesting,
and the ,mswers to elp,m, 1: known, 'night affect in ;.insw er to the kiLICs-
thinw HCII I am askhut the! On s`. . irliPIVIm I clad that I ,un
aliie? 01 isp. ,i. c;cc, on Ike \,\
hole, something Nk hiCh I regret? Is
me EL. sonething which I 0,(ti;:ii, or do I wish, like Job, that I had
never b
e,.,, ,19
Ob\ ionsle, this casts the matter in a person relati%e way. Each person
must answer fig- himself whether he is glad for his ow n existence or
w ould rather it be replaced by nonexistence. And the question
can
116.istenti,q7P;.0:5;tem or
obviously be extended to ask whether one is glad for the eNistenee of
loved ones: Alll 1 . 11/1701 of their existent - I'?
The second step in laying out the theistic exists ntial response
clarify 1 hat is necessary for human beings to exist as the unique indi
viduals that they are. Haskcr proposes a thesis that is not uncontro-
versial but is widely accepted by thinkers who hold a variety of philo-
sophical perspectives. The thesis is
(50) A necessary e(mdition of natit w in into existence
coming into-existence of my body.n
In one way or another, then, my unique personal identity depends
somehow on ha\ ing this particular bokh. Materialists, identitk theo-
rist, epiphent:imenalists, beliaiorists, and eke!) Fh(miisp; accept this
( :artesian dualists and the like, w ho do not hold that the body
is a nk.cessorY condition of personal existence, will not feel the force of
the follow reasoning.
The third step in progressively folding this existential response is
to show that, I( whatkner Is necessary for my body's existence i ,
necessary ii)r is V existence. That is, if my body is necessary titr me to
have individua p,:rs(,nal existence, then whatever is necessary for my
body's existence is also necessary for my personal existence. '1 his prin-
ciple, of course. holds for any person. When one honestl, and thor-
oughly examines all +)1 thenecessary conditions for one's bodily exis-
tence, the results are impressive. In order for my body to come into
existence, my parents would have had to have had a child. Had my
mother married someone else, none oltheir children ntdd have been
wt., since none of their bodies could hake been Ibis hods,. Moreover,
not just any child of my parents would have been me, with mu identi-
cal genetic heritage donated by a specific pair of male and temale re-
productik e cells at a specific time.
111 of this means that the comint.::, r into L.. \istenee of any partii.:tilar
indi\ :dual is, antecedently, an extremely improbable cent. iii fact,
alitifccidtintk. it is quite improbahle that any given individual \\mild
Collie In k
) cistunce iii vie\\ (It Ills I It- her dependence on a multitude
of other highly improbable events, such as the tOrtuitous ircum-
stances surrounding how one's parents met and got married, which
could include events as routine as a school prom or as dramatic as a
world \var. And behind one's parents stand a whole series of their
progenitors, persons whose coming into-being must have depended
me Lvist ,71!1'., .:111c1)1.Eva
on yet other c:ontingent events. All of this leads Hasker to conclude
that
(51 Had Mu() : ' or significant events in the world's past history
been different than they Were, than in all probability neither
I nor the persons whom I love would even have existed.
This secures the connecii)n between one's attitude toward one's ex-
istence and the World -,, total hiNtory.
The meeting and mating of our ancestors w as influenced by the
ey ems of their timesmany of w hid) 15 ere undoubtedly calainii()us,
such as wars, epidemics, crimes., accidents, and so tbrih. Nlid yy e al-
ready know that no person has any reason yyllateN'er lc) suppose that
he y (mid hay(' existed had the course ()nt' Yy orld's history been he- sub-
stantially different. We arc no's in a position to grasp the i.l
eLkii one's indiYidual existence and 111c existence ()Call the evils of
the w orld leading up to his coming into being. As Robert Adams oh-
serves, "The farther back we go into history', the larger the propor-
tion of evils to which Wt. ' OWC our being., for the causal nexus Ric\ ant
to our individual genesis widens as we go back in time. We alinost
certainly xx rid never have existed had there not been just about the
same evils as at occurred in a large part Fhuman histor,." 21 Let
us now explore the bearing of this link on the original question, Am I
dial I cvi. ,1?
The Logic of Regret
At this point, we need to specify some principles goy erning the logi-
cal relationships between certain attitudes. The relevant attitudes arc
expressed by the plu- ases -being glad that" and - being ,,orry I hat. -
Such attitudes nnot be true
or fake, as belicis are. I lasker contends
that they share with ()click, moral judgment, and imperatly es the
property of being rivionnlii coils/stew or ihconsisfrnt. Ihe sense of
"glad" and "sorry." with lhi. - 1 1 \NC are concerned is not essentially a
matter offeclika gladness or sorrow, although it might inyolve these
feelings. Hies,: attitudes atv largely dkHined by pij'crence. Thus, my
being glad that P entails my pit:ft/Thyr that be the case rather than
'wt.
P. (on' erselv if I am sorry or nyriet that P. this means that I
irimidpri::k;- that not. Pbe the case rather than P. (Here P stands for
the sentence that expresses the proposition that P, and Pis the name
11871/c Lyistenti,q7P;.0:5 7em or Tvil
of the state of affairs such that .1),) By virtue of these prcicRliccs, the
attitudes in question are rationally consistent or inconsistent.
At this point, we can begin to discern important logical principles
that apply to the attitudes in question. Surely, we can say that
52) If I am glad that P, I rationally cannot be sorry that P.
Of course, a person may feel both gladness and sorrow about some-
thing. This is what we mean when we say that an event in life is "bit-
tersweet" (e.g., a parent whose child is getting married may be de-
scribed as "being sad" that a family menlI)cr is leaving home but
"being glad" that she is finding committed companionship). But "be-
ing glad" in the relevant sense here involves an attitude of preference
w hid) principle (52) applies.
Let us !tow spek.- il'Y sonic key definitions that will enable us to sec
the significance or some other important principles. Hasker first sug-
gests this:
clicum.tiaika/iiii that I" - di 'A is glad that l', rt,f. there is
some state uLaftairs 0 such that A knows that if Qdid nco: ohtain nei-
ther I', and A regrets that Q.'
One may, tUr c \ ample, be circumstantially glad that the University of
Kentucky defeated the L'niversity of Ctan to N, in the 199S Nt:.-VA.
baskciNall championship but not prefer Kent -dekv's victory wide/. all
puccu/1Jc cuic111115 11 lir CS on the whole). ha example, one may have
placed a large her on Utah (a believe that the NCAA's existence is a
had thing because its championships, tele\ ision contracts, and the like
foster corruption and an undue emphasis on athletics in our society.
So, '.u,/ eircumstance., one may he glad for Kentucky's vic;ory.
But this dues not mean that one is glad on the whole. We are ni:.iv
ready for Ilie second definition we need:
'A the wholc I tat V df is glad that P, and for any statc-or-
aibirs Qsuch that A knovs.7-. that if 0 did not obtain neither would 1),A
is glad that Q.'
Modifying our example, e may say that one may be glad on the
whole when, rccognitin, that
the NCAA involves some undesirable
consequences, he still definitely prefers Kentucky's championship vic-
tory. Finally, we may say that a person reglits on the ir lioh that P
yhenever he is clearly riot glad on the whole that P or is only circum
stantially glad that P.
me Lvstfm,,,Iwf7r a119
In light of. these definitions, we can now see the significance of the
foliowing principle:
(53) If I am glad on the \\ hole that P, and I know that Pentails
Q, then I rationally muse be glad on the whole that Q.
And
(54), If I am Jad on the whole that P, and I know that if 0 did
not obtain neither would P. then I rationally must be glad
that Q.
These principles seem quite clearly correct. lint'a hen principle k 54) is
combined with tSi from the prek ions section regarding sell-identity,
we get an .mtotinding conclusion:
(55) If I am glad on the whole about my own existence and that
of those whom I love, then I must be glad that the history
of the w 4) rld, in its major aspects, has bcen as it has.
Of course, this conclusion does not follow deductively from (54) and
(51) as they have been stated. Principle (54) speaks of my knoiriag
that if 0 did not obtain neither would P. whereas (51) says only that
in 11,11 p,-0//ability there is such a connection. This should make little
difference in our attitude toward ; 55 Perhaps, then, the reason
why (55) has been largely ignored is the fact that (50) and (51) are
not obvious. The ideas expressed in 5-1) and (55) have been dis-
cussed in philosophical literature. Benedict de Spinoza, for example,
says that our ordinary judgments of goodand evil are irrational pre-
cisely because in making them, we overlook the necessary connec-
tions hei.veen events. 2 '
Existential A uthenticity and Evil
If what we have said so far is sound and if the truth of (55) has been
established, w hat bearing does all this ha\ e for the problem of evil?
Put inure precisely, w hat eftect can it Have on one who advances or
considers ad\ ancing the argument from gratuitous evil? For a person
who is glad on the whole that he exists or even that someone he loxes
exists, then it gallows due to alli,ve that he must be glad also
120the rxistentifdr57em ri
about the world's existence and about the general course its history
has taken. But then it is very difficult for him to be existentially 1711 -
thiVI lit' or existentially honest in advancing the argument: from gratu-
itous e% I,Ct us see div this is so.
The argument from gratuitous evil involves affirming a factual
premise about there being evil in the world that serves no good pur-
pose. To have the experiential grounds for affirming this crucial
premise is to have certain moral convictions, to consult one's experi-
ence of thc. goods and e' ils oL life, and to be morally repulsed by what
one finds. To assert the fict ii premise is, in effect, to issue a com-
plaint that there is something drastically wrong with the world as a
whole. And we now arc 1:CChil' ..1W are of lie intricate causal intercon-
nc,li ons be t ween a ll the e ven/ s
Ri
the wor ld (including evil events)
and our own existence. Thus, the critic \\ !to is glad On the whole for
111owii existence or that or those xx hom he loxes cannot be existen-
tially authentic in advancing the tactual prcinise. Robert Adams
\ rites: "The het that we owe our cx sleilce to evils wis. es rise to a
problem of evil, not only for theists but tOr anyone ' h ha es an ac-
tual human individual himself or anyone else. How is our l
ove for
actual human sel\ es to be reconciled with moral repudiation of the
evils that crowd the pages of history? Arc we to wish that neither we
nor the evils had existed?" 2. I
Based on this line of reasoning, the following existential stance sim-
ply becomes ludicrous:
(56) The world as we know it is morally so objectionable that a
God who tolerated it could in no meaningful sense be
called goodnevertheless. / 111,fin" Ufl 01111 existence
and then:lipy I ow it /so alad that tin ' lvo;-ld exists and that
the WO CPCJITS ail!! 11a11/ITS of its histo7 ha pc been as they
have.
We ma\ say that such a posture is c.visiciiiially sc/r-snibifyins or exis-
lensell=d073/Ing.
It shotdd now be intuitively e\ ident that
(57) If I am glad on the whole .1hout my own existence and that
of persons close to me, then I cannot reproachw the
general character or the major e\ Cuts Ot ' t he world's past
history.
Pic vs:;:;. ;of E vil121
Since reproach is attitudinal, preferential, and existential in nature,
the critic is hereby blocked from reproaching God by citing the gen-
eral character and major events of the past, nunv of which Nere tragic
for the persons invoked. It ill1a,so nor do tiir the critic to base his
argument from giatuitous evil just on events in his own lifetime,
events, therefore, on which his own existence does not depend in the
way in which it depends on those tragic CVCIUS of the past. After all,
the tragedies of our lifetime .ire simply the same kimis of events as
those that ha\ e occurred countless times in the past. For a critic to
mount his moral complaint solely on the basis of evil events that oc-
cur only in his lifetime is (or mu to express a position too egocentric
deserx cseriouc at tention.
Tims, the critic \\ ho is posinx el\ glad .ibout i.e.. does not positively
regret 1 his own existence cannot ad\ dnie the general problemgrat ti-
itous Oil in an existentially authentic wOne interesting aspciat oi this
approach t() the existential problem is tIrtt, without ming
us crap ln God allows ex il, it strikes on .1 \ el'1. deep lex el at
one's sense 4, 4:: existence. Furthermore, it logically connects one's exis-
tence with the overall state of the \\ mid . this restlonse capitalises on an
often neglected fact: that we do not come to our judgments about the
goodness Or pathless of existence tioni he standpoint of - a cosmic ideal
obser\ cr." 1 his is a standpoint we can never attain. Instead, each of us
comes to these judgments from a personal standpoint as an e\isting hu-
man being one who prospers and struggles, reiiiices and sorrows,
laughs and xx ceps. and is glad for the opportunity to live out his life
upon the earth. It IS the critic who adopts Lilly standpoint who cannot
raise the problem or gratuitous esci in an existentiall\ authentic
1 Here ace, H course, other types or critics w ho are glad that they
exist and \ et are not deterred by the 1 u ecediitg line ,)i - reasonmg. One
t\ pc 0 mId he the antitheistic critic \ 11( ) is indeed glad on the whole
that she exists or that her loved ones eidst and who collet:hes and pre-
sents the problem of cxii merely as a Hatter of internal inconsistency
t"()I- theistic belief taS explored in (:hapter 2). .1nother t\ pc of critic
may take the probein or evil
to be a probabilistic difficulty for theistic
belief i light of ecil ill the world t as explored in Chapter 4). In either
case, the critics in question need not support any substantive
premises, commit to any moral principle, , or form any value judg-
ments about the actual state (.4' Cite world. So, the theistic response
here does not directly address them. Of course. "C have already seen
that the logical and probabilistic arguments from evil are
122
to rebuttal in other ways. As shown in Chapter 5, the argument from
gratuitous evil is the most difficult for the theist to rebut anyway.
Chapter 6 reviewed several theodicies that could be interpreted as at-
tempts to answer the argument from gratuity by offering theoretical
explanations. But now we see a different way for the theist to respond
to the antiLheistic critic who advances the aquunent.
This still leaves us with the one very tbrmidable type of critic the
person who is willing to say that he positively ic. grits his own existence
on the whole. This is the person presumably a cry rare indkidtial in-
deedwho is able honestly to sa\ that he would truly wisn and would
prefer that some other world, in which no one now li\ lug hat, i share,
or perhaps no w odd
at all should exist in place of this present (\ ii world
of which he is unhappily a part. Out of the depths of his own pointless
sintering, the ancient patriarch Job cursed the ti\lV of Ins birth:
"Let the day perish in k\ Inch I was born, and the nigh: that said, 'A
man child is cum- med.'
et that day he darkness! May God above not seek it, or light shine
01 1
" I A ': 1 1 c. 1 deep darkness claim it Let clouds settle upon it; let
the blackness of the day territi it.
"Thai night let thick darkness seize it! let it not icloice among the
days of the year; let It mil come into the number of' the months.
-Yes,let I ha nirin I b.lrren; let no jo,, cr he heard in it,
"Lct illose curse it \\ Ito curse the Sea, those ho are skilled to rouse
up Leviathan,
"Let the stars of its ita\ n he dark; let it hope !",w light, but have none;
may it not see ilie evelds it the morning
"because it did not shut the doors of Inv mother's womb, and hide
trouble front in, ekes.
-N\!1\ did I not die at birth, come forth from the V\ omb and evirc?
"Why \\ CrC there knees to l'Cv- Ci e IIIC, or breasts for me to suck?
- No\AI :\ ould be lying dow n and quiet; I would be asleep: then I
wouki be at rest
-with kings and counselors of the earth 51111 icikt ruins for them-
Sell es,
01. 1\ itli princes who line gold, k\to till thin. houses
\\ jilt
sl iver,
"Or why was I not buried like a stiliborn ch d ,
Ift,e an infant that
never sees the light?" 25
This is the deep existential regret that is required for one meaning
fully to raise the argument from gratuitous evil. To be able to assert
P ic vistenof E vil123
the factual prcmise that there is gratuitous evil, the critic must posi-
tively rc firct on the whole that he, his family, his friends, all his Ion
onesind the rest of us have ever lived.
Perhaps Ivan Karamazov is the paradigmatic figure here. Ivan re-
sists his brother's declaration that all events in the world contribute to
a divinely designed "higher harmony- that will be revealed at. the end
of time
You see, Alvosha, per!laps it really may harper, :iv ,: fl live to that mo-
ment, or rise again to NCC t (1 1 . ) , perhaps 1 1 1 . 1 . L: IV .,iload with the rest,
looking at lIte ntother em6racing INC childs tot hater, "Thou art just, 0
1,ord 1. - hut I don't want to cry aloud then, \nil,: there is still rime, I
hasten to plotCCI 1 1 1 1 ri. : 1 1 C',1 1 1 CC the highe . harmont alto-
gether. Its n
o t v0 , l':11 the tcars olthat onc ii , mur,..t.1 child Y.,
on the breast with its little fist and prayed in its stinkintY outhouse, with,
its uneArated Fears to -dear, kind (;od": It's not north it, because
those tears tie unatoned for.'"
Summarizing his existential posture. Ivan declares, "In the final re-
sult, I don't accept this world of God's, and, although I know it ex-
ists, I don't accept it at all." 27
Here we have a person who is willing to say that the existence and
history of the world has not been worth it. for Ivan, many of the
world's evils arc gratuitous because whatever purpose they serve is
not worth the price. A rebellious existential hero, Ivan , - learly seems
ready to embrace the implication that he must be willing NY !lis own
existence ti be replaced by nonexistence. What Ivan does, then, is to
answer the penetrating question with w hich V. e ha \ e been working-
1 /.17/mi ahri 1 cvi..4 ,..= and to answer it negati\ el\ . This answer
nvs : 1 1 1 1 1 I lie e Lilly honest or authentic in rejecting the evils
o the world.?.$ It is these kinds (- If persons the Ivan K. 1 1 ,1 1 1 1 ,1 /01 s of
this w odd who are unaffected by the theistic response to the prob-
lem 01 e\ that has been sketched here. is in is the person who can
honestly sa% that he regrets his own existence and the existence of all
w how he Imes, since too great a price in terms 01 nlisery and suffer
ing has been paid for their existence. 2 ')
In tact, for such a person, framing- his objection in terms of the gen-
problem of gratuitous evil is somewhat unnecessary because he
can consider the evils occurring in his own life as the only factual in-
stance of gratuity he needs to cite. On that basis alone, he might oh
jeer that the God of theism does not exist. )r he might cite as a case
124

71/c r . istenti,q1".1); . o:',i/em

s not seem to be good on the \\ hole ,
not athe person living it. An implicit assumption here
wolc that a morally good deity would not allow even one individ.
ual to have a life that is not a great good to him on the whole, re-
gardless of what broad reasims there are fOr thinking that our world is
good on balance. This of thought, of course, pursues thc attack
in an Ivan-like directi(m. And it certainly makes the attempt to apply
gencral explanations tiir evils to individual cases irnpertinent, at least,
and dama;:in;:, ar most."
The Defeat of Horrendous Evil
it is not clear w !tether restricted theism oilers enough rich ideas to
fashion an (M.o.- like response t.o the person who says that he regrets
his oy% n existence or that of the whole world. The critic's charge here
CSSe1111111V\\ mild have been better if Godif he exists at
1 had not created this world. For one thing, the theist might
erv, "Better f% ) ,, ' whom?" si; ice
if God had not created this world and
Titie had not come into existence, it could hardly be better fOr
itic. For another thing, the theist who accepts the tact of gram-
'1 in a theistic universe may stress the overall value of the
moral enterprise even if there are no guarantees that all evils will al-
ways be compensated with greater goods. But all such tactics may still
be met with the Ivan-like response, "Ah, but what about all the hor-
rendous suffering? It is just not worth it. Nothing can make it worth
it," Ivan even admits that all people may indeed be resurrected at the
end of time and that victims may their torturers. But that will
all be too unjust, he insists, since somethe sullerings are too aA
to be compensated..' 1 l'or ,u), there are too marn people w ),(2
\ es
are not a great good to rhem and may, on balw ice, not have positive
alue. Thus, no just and lovin;: deity could ha\ e created a korld that
contains them. Pill another way, the magnitude of the horrific e\ ils
that some tragic human lk es include cannot be e\en approximately
estimated w idiomthat they arc inconnnensurate vtith
any c(>1Ick- Lion of goods.
Althoug,h we are entering a tem - y of tinidamental disagreement
betw cell the theist and critic, a territon that is hu- gely uncharted,
n Adams has offered a response that is distinctively Christian as
Well as theistic, She observes that- most responses to the problem ot
evil arc generic specifying a general reason for evil) and global (fo-
The Ls:;:;. ;J l':-171:?;/. of Evil125
casing on some feature of the world that makes evil possible). Yet she
points at the insufficiency of generic and global solutions for the
problem raised by horrendous evils. "Horrendous evils" are evils the
doing 01 suffering of which gives one prima facie reason to doubt
whether one's life could (given the inclusion of such evils in it) be a
great good to oiic on the whole. Adams argues that the attribute of
divine .,.00dness must be analvtcd to show not only that God would
create a world that is good on the whole but also that he would not
allow any individual lives to be lived that are enguhed and overeome
by evil. The difficulty that the Christian t heist faces here is not only
that do we not know God's acrmt/ reason forp,...rm]ttin,.,, horrendous
evils but also that we cannot even coneciiw of ;t111 plaiisil. 1e reasons. 32
Hui -dosing sy hat she calls the "resources of religious value theory.,"
Adams des clops an ar...uament that horrendous evils can he defeated in
the contest of the lives or inkt \ :duals who cs periencc them. Let us
simpl, say that c'.f is "defc,itc(1" when it is part ila life dot is good
on the m mole. when it is related appropriately to rekv ant and great
goods. Adams agrees with rebel':, like Ivan Karamazos and John Stu-
art Mill in insisting that there is no set of temporal and unitegoods
that can guarantee that a persc.m whose life includes horrendous es us
will be a great good to him or Iler on the \\ hole.
Accordiml to Adams, it is the intimate relationship with God that
has value incommensurable with anything else:
From 1. Christian nt iFsiew, God is a hentg rcmh. r thin which can-
not be o.occivcd; incotlinicnsurme with Foth created goods and
temporalIs likewise, the ;:.stoodheoli;ic, face 10 face intimac% With
Cod k dmph ncommensurate. \N ith any merely non transcendent
goods or ills aperson might c \perientx. Thus, the good ()Cheat:1 .1c
t intimaoil.h God would eveo the honvildimis
humans experience in tIns prcscm life here below, and iv comic any
prima-t(cie rcomm he Hdiidual had to donFt whether his/her life
would 0i . cotild hi.",,vorth
The central lo;T,ic at vs ork here is that the \viwst evilsdemand to
be de--
featcd bv the hest goods. (Ihristian theists such as Ni,tril it Adams
argue, then, that horrendous evils
can he 0\
t..Tonnc only bv the infi
nitc goodness f God.
Adams claims that it is not necessary to rind reasons (even merely
logically possible reasons) God might permit horrendous evils.
Thus, theoretical theodicy is not essential. it is enough lor the Chris
12671'r Lxistenti,q . 1) ; . o:57eni or Tvii
tian theist to show how God can be good enough to created persuls
despite their participation in such horrors. For Christian theists to
show this, according to Adams, they must work out the implications
of divine goodness conceived not just as aiming at the excellent pro-
duction of global goods but also as not allow' anv individual life TO
SUSlain evils that would ultimately engulf ii 11cr conclusion, then, is
that, tOr a person who experiences horrendous evil, God can ensure
that his life is a great good to him only by integrating participation in
those evils milt() a personal relationship with God himself. This is, in
effect, to oriel- a practical or existent
I low shall \ve think about \\ in
it means or Gud
tO integrate hor-
rendous 0 it into relationship \\ ith hini.eliNdains argues that
God's l uidentification with the sufferer, k i\ ilk disph\ ed in his
own
sell-sacrifice in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, Is a helpfu l
Christian model ill this cunte\t. 3,
:Site asserts that Christian theism
teaches that God thrintgli .hrist participated in horrendous evil, ex-
periencing, human horrors. Thus, the sufferer can identify (either
svmpathetically or mystically) with :hrist and thereby have a(ceY, to
the inner life of God. According to Adams, this experience of (iod
preempts the need to knov, w, b
y
horrendous r\ ils exist.'" At the end
of his ling ordeal wit anguish and loss, the biblical character Job Was
not privileged to know the reasons why he suffered so terribly. But he
was given an intimate vision of (..;od that seemed to satisfy him and let
him sec that his lifc was indeed a great good. Job answered the Lord:
"I know that you can do all thingsmd that no purpose of yours can
he thwarted I have uttered what I did not undcrst and, things too
wonderful for me, which I did not know. I had heard of von bv the
hearing of the ear, but now thy eve sees you." 37
In the final analysis, the lssue comes down to \\ Nether Adams's case
o acceptable to the one to whom it is addressed. Adams can maintain
:ht her owi distinctikel\ Christian ,ipproach is internally consistent,
although the Christian theist and the critic \\ihl predictabl\ Mier on
the truth and plausibilit or its claims. The antithcistic critic, by con-
trast, could agree that (lod, if he exists, is a good incommensurable
ili 111 other goods. But he might object that u ne means by \\ hich
people can be connected to God (e.g., horrendous suffi...ring) are so
intrinsically an t ul that they still violate other moral prinjples we
hold. The critic might also complain that Adams has shiticd ga iind
in answering the theoretical problem by giving a practical solution.
.11w critic might even press the point that it is extremely difficult to
71w LvistP..-171:?),,. or Evil127
tmderstand \\ hat it is for one person to experience another's pain or
for suffering to be an avenue of interpersonal identification and thus
that the 'acceptability of A dams's answer hangs, in part, on fuller
analysis of such concepts. A dams and other Christian theists may
eventually offer complete accounts of these concepts so that this
strand of existential I hcodicx may advance. It is hard to say exactly
where the future dist: ussion of the existential problem of evil will lead,
but it is sure to be both fascinating and important.
Notes
1, Kenneth Surintheoretical Irum practical probleniN
in his ibt-olqin.- andProblz-,,ii al l i'llBlackwell.p. 112..
Roller', Adams calls it a pm chtilogical prohle:;t inUS liii 1 Yroic of Faith / 1 /id
Other Phil,nophicar Theo1617. v. iNC' Y(>11,:: 0116rd L rtn,,,T ,itv
Pr
1987l, p. 75. William 1 lasker alludes in the problem being a iO! in of moral
protest in "On Kepi - citing the lrIs orthis World," Soutbeiv,,
lo.fopip: 1.9 (1981 'n 4 )5.
2. Alvin rantinga, God, Fi.Tito,vi, aud Evil ((hrandhch.: herd
tnms, 1 0 77 , ,
3 N1-1Hk
i
"RcticIllirj's Suricrirc:
S oiutiun to the
PriIblem u I\ IP - in lilt: Problanyd.-cd. Michael 1.. Pe-
terson Notre 1),tme.1...'itiversiity of Notre Dame P: - ess, 19921, p. IT..
.1. 1:clwarii Nladden and Pil.C1 I Inc.//IC(,ail
field.(Ii des C. Tlionns. 196S). p. 25.
5. lenfes . Rurion Russel!. ``.. rExpel-le:1,x of F ii,"1974 72.
. l'aui P.:cutler, 'Mc(.)/ Et'!,
trans. lniiBliel),m311 Rt im un:
Beacon Pre,s;c, for n instance, pp.5.
7.h
it Ih
k er. ],);;,,,,.,no /71 R t:
,91 1 3. ,11:
Uni\ er,ity Press, 1970 ;, p. 2.
eontenThorary cask, is riten f(); the layperson, that expr esses grief
and bitterness in ,s NI:niggle to Inaintain religions faith is
.5. Les,,1
G,"1. c/ . 01) . ,-er volYork: Nlacmillan, An: :-er hook in the same
spirit is Nicholas \oirerstortt, In wc;ir fai(i...irand Rapids. Nlich.:
Lerdnian,.. 1987).
9. I'voc'.4., ri),itoe.;. sky,Kii1,inazotit trans. Constance Garnett
(Ness Vi i Norton, 1976). particularly pp. 217-227.
10. AI 11,
all I it Alber; anuh's writings can be seen as dealing with the
robiem ol grittunous CVi: and the senselesi., destruction i thiitn ul VaiLIC.
P, A. see"The NIVth Of Sisyphus, - in..1/yrbnod
Jason, :fans. jusrir O'Bvicn in Ness. York: Allred A. Knopf. 1055), pp.
128i/o' Lviste211i,q7.
1-138. Also sec C.amus, 7h -
trans. Sttlart Gilbert !, No\ York: Alited
1948).
Unamuno, Hi(Sriise tiftrans. J. Crawford
Flitch NC11. 'OH DIJsk.A. , 19;14 ?.
12. I'vom John Stuart Mill, ". 1Philosoph\ of the ConditionedAp
plied I'' Mr. Nlan , e1 to the Limits or Reit:rious Thought," in /11!
11(r)! 0t
iI Ii
/111, -Hii Philoophi,
rCpril)]i Pike, ccGod
a
IC.'!.'

ProlVeni oj'Evi1
NJ.: Prentice-1 Lill, PRO:, p. 43.
13. Plantinga, (;oo'./Id Le', pp. 03-64.
14, M. Adams, "Redemptive Sufferin.," p. 171.
13. Ed ard kValter, " i he Logic of Emotio:1 , ,."firihilf)s-
nplit 10 19721: 71-78,
10. Sidttcv Hook.. "Pragmatisnl and the Tragicense 0: Itre,"n
ti ll Li' di! it.V.VCS !if thr A illI,' 1 'hi/OS(1phi la I A SSOCi it IIIII (
t o k er 1960),
reprinted in RAbert otrigan,
c d j iwiricciy; Lsiol; ; H i
d Jhniii!.Sart rancisco:
ChmWer, I 90;;:, p. (58,
17 John I lick. Era fold the God of Love, 2nd ed. an Francisco: I-larper
&Row, 1978], n. 92.
18. ThomasTheodicy for Pastoral Practice," in his Pastoral
Theoloav !.San Franciso): ilarper
i n.
1983), pi'. 223-248.
19. lIasker, "Regretting, - pp. 425. 426.
20. !Kid_ p. _ 127. /. here 1.1,1 . ( ,. renum b ere d H ak er
'., prinopies lor the sake
of cominuitycontest oh is book. Ail remaining principle , cited here
may he tOunt_icontext of I Iasker's art,..les and ,
A id not carry Curtner
reteren,es.
21. Robert M. Adams, "Lxistence, S.:11- Interest, and the Problem of
at his loll/i.' 0f Faith,
p, 66,
22. Flasker, "Regretting, p. 431, Husker writs-',: "No: e first of all that,
given:he truth oti A, it is ..r;-tain, and not u.isi probable, Ella: subsequent to
anv major ca!amitv, ,tich as It war, matt v of the :)cHons who come into exis-
tence are ditferent individuals from those who would have existed had the
calamity not occurred. ;\ !any per s ons who would o th erwi se
lt .ne N
ee ,, me
parents (',:c e, thou! haying children. Those 'a hoco uld haVC lieu bee n their
mate , have children willt other partners, and so on, Within a lew- genect
tions, it is likely that hardiv aiwone Ibing in the affected ar
e a Ii identical \Nall
v% Ito ,Aould have existed, had the calamity lull occurn...d. Ntrhat
Is more difficult is to show that this is true in the case 0th .,..!,iyen individual.
Mitt even in the individual 1..1 , Ls, the probabilities mount :1
,,) vein See-
pose. ft )r exaqyle, that had the Firs. World War not occurred thcr,.. is one
chance in ten that my parents would have met each other. I eta sure that
this is too high. But at this point 1 can allOrd to be cmscrvane.) Suppose,
furthermore. that on just 1\ 0 previots (.,...ca.sions the rneetiro.,, and mating of
Lvistemi, -; 7. 1' n . , iitcwEPil
129
.50111ti.
arit:01(.11.,-; ii p.
ndittenccd in similar t,s by ...talarni-
touts events ( - tf.' Their own Times. 1ncOccling all other factors :all of
V1hich, it .
considered, v,ottld further strengthyb:nis argumertthe likelihood
01 In'. existing, II just these three :11,t'or calamities had not
'ACC:tried, is no
better than one in a thonsandl Thc iriot' is, that I have no reason: whatever
to suppose that I would have ems:'. had the t .
ourse worlds histot's
been sub.stainiall. . But hat Ie no tcason b , suppose I rcc MUM
1:rilChC.11 pillICVes he disrcp,:c'deel. Su) ,--; . z. ";/
must he accepted. -
23. Renediet de Spinoza. ifIncs, ed. I Icon 1-rowde, ttaiis. \I Idle White,
Reised by Arneli: ,, Hutchirison Sitting (London: Oxfold 1... - niersity Press,
191W, pp. 80 81,
24.
R. Adams, - 1Aistenee." p.
75.
25. Job
3:3-7 'New Re'. ised Standard Version,
26, Ivan 1<aramazov in Dostocvskv,
The 1 i.")7,74- l,i.an.tazot713. 225.
27. Ibid., p. 210.
28.
We note here Hit can,lot pursue the '.'.e!1
n case 01 Leo Thisibv
who
came to the coichisionk that lite had to meaning and was not w.
,
and thus came to the brink of suicide. It the critic raising me problem orgrattt
how, 0, 1 1
oil m
g to
toll he lertiels :us own existence, that his own
e.i.
tence is lul a positive c;
)()d to him then the theist mte,ht a s kvh.v
he does not conmut sweide. What we nught call the suicide anzument seem ,
espcciallv strong iii
the title 'Ma) is illin:2,ii cc he rq,rels Itis cm,y1clicc. See
Leo re.)Istov, 1.1v ' wifr . q. ions.
trans. co Wiener i ondon: 1. \ I. 1)cm, 1905),
29.
Although we cannot explore the matter here, the realip of suifering
and the search for
the proper
lies tt
the
heart tp.11:iddhiqn. Nil-
va n ; .1 (honeN i s i cnce;
iohn
flow ker,
R ehifio:o or TO' i. (:Ambr idge: (. ar n-
br idge
L'iiiveNii P r ess, 1970pp. 237- 2:71X.
persons is
30. TEIc iendencvit'll;t1t1 allsWiTS 10 di) ..H1 . 1,y,i.!
dISCLINSCki Ill I L'ir ,. . , 11t.- C. .I lle. Iii' Or .1 Was1thigton,
Oeorgetowt L'itiversit Press, 1991
3 I . bait Kaallla/CIVICVSky,/30).thrIS
pp. 22.1. 220,
$2. .\ ..\dams,
- 11orrendous Evils and the Ooodness ot tod. Pro(ccd
i;q,./?.1/4' /h,.. supplemen:,,Av 1>1. 63 1989 I: 297-310. The
present quote is fi - om the reprin:ek'. pic.:c in Robert Nlerri1lcw .\dams
and
\lard\ n :\lc(.ord Adams. eds.,
717.T of 1:v1/ (Nen., York: 0,;: -ord Um
versn, Press, 1991) p 215,.
33. XL ,\dams, I lorrendous
p. 218, Thc reader silo:did consult
the eompiktte article :t).o technical distinctions between
balalicui,g ort: dejear
i;, .bt, and riwilltino es II.
3-1. Tolstov mentioned in Note 2X) earn' to accept this k:nd t,I loi . t hat
orth the iniinite meaning to tie fatite. Thus. 1 ,verted .",ancicie and
claimed to find Incateing in his hie.
77./c Lvistent1q7P; . o:57e111
35. M. Adams, "Redemptive Suffering," pp. 169-187.
36, M. Aclaws, "Horrendotha. 220,
37. job 42:2, 3b, 5 New Revised Standard Version.
Suggested Readings
Nlarihn M. - Horrendous 1:..\ ils Ind the Goodness of God." The
7tt soci cty: .11pplethetu y l'()/niut 63 (1989): 297-310,
"ProbHus 0! II: \iore .ice to Christian Philosophers." kairh
and Phi fo3ophv S ( I 988 121 1.-1,';
"koiernplive Nitriering: , Chris? inn Solm ion It the Prohh:m of
EAR. - Iii itationaliry, .8clicj; am! Moral ( oinwitmolt, edited by
]titer: Audi and Mika:n .1. tVaiim right. Ithacd: Corncli1. 7 niyursity Press,
1986, pp. 21S 207.
Robert :\1..
-le..1.f.-Interest, and the Problem or Evil."
NOUS
13 (1979
53 6S,
Dupre, look.
Pcu' Mysicry." failh and Philosophy 7 (1990):
261-280.
"On Repelling tite J l fThis W,
Sondiri-n
,.rphi/
o.,-;
,pin, 19 (I 9S I.12S 137.
1 latterv.i.,., Stanio.thcG(o?, itcdicuic, anti the P.:.oblem
Suffcl - iqa. (irsmci Rapids, Niich.: Lerdinall,, 1990.
rh
It/ ) / , II
i 4 1 ) ,'
111.71diCaPpCii, alit?(71111Th, NOH C 1) unc,Notre
Dame Press,. 1985.
kohak, Fix/rim. "The Person in a PciNonal
AP Inquiry into the Nict , l -
ph- sicalof the I ragic Skinse of I 1!,,'11%-i) 71 tr/1111/
Pri iSoptiV1 I 1977): 51- OA,.
Lovi s ,
S.

/ ' P ub/ ,' n/ 01 P ain. New Yor k: 1962.

P e!cr sm, Michael. "R eccit Wor k (01 the Prol, len of 1:Ail." Anicricarl
top/;1,0I Olin7r:v . 1' 01983 ;1+21 330,
Peterson, Nlicho.cl, ed. rim Probh. ;;iii . pit: Selected Read ;hr .'s, Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame hiess, 1992.
Inde x
Abiluetne argument from evil,
81( n 1 1)
Adam biblical chavak:tc0. 91, 94
Adains, Marilyn, 111,113-114,
12.4 127
Adams, Robert, 117, 120
Aesthei e theme. 91-92,93
aestim is. aims (God's), 102
Sce atco plentitude
.Alier!iie, 9$. 101, 1.07(n45), 124
AIDS, 1
All good. God as. 7, 9, 18, 23,
36- 37. 48-49, 55, 70-71,
102 103
Alston, William, 58, 86
Animal inil, 5, 74. See also Evil,
nal:11%11
Anselm. Si., 94
Antecedent Nature (God's). 100 -101
Appears I( icut ions, 75.
SIT obv
gratuitous
Thomas, 94
Augustine, Sr, 4, 34, 85, 89-93
Aushwit.....
1
ANii ilog,i, , 9
Basinger, IT)as id, 107i. n48). 108(n49)
Bin es theorem,
67 - 64, n113).
Beliefs
bx,:k. , 59-61
incorrigibe. 59-60.
1 Ot. i ildaionaIi i,
Sdr L. \ Illeir,
5 Q0.
.
Foundationalism, i . r
theistic, 8-9, 18, 41, 57, 07
Berger, Peter, 6
:,is soue of ideas for theodie!, (,
8$
Blake, William, 12
Ilowk/..r, John, 111
Kt:3, 13
Buddhism, 6, 129(1129)
C1amits, Albc 1, 112, 127-128(nlO)
Character building theme, 88
Chisholm, Ri
, ticrick, 75
Clifford, W. IC, 58-59
Cobb, John, 101)
Cocks, H.1: Em
ur, 5
CogniliN lii imanons, 75-78, 86,
105! 111%, 112
Cognitive (episteinic) powers, 60, 75
Compatibilism, 35-36. Sec also
Leibniz's I apse
Condition of Reasonable Epistemic
Access (CORNEA), 75-76
Consequent Nature (God's),
100-101
Consisteilcv of theism, See Free Will
Dciense
Control. (di\ in Compatilisnu.
Incomnatibilism: Smereignts
Cornman. John, 47 FM, 72
argument, 9 -10, 56
Creation, 51), 89-91. .Sec do God, as
creator
Credence imit teti00, 75
Davis, Stephen T., 41
Death, 5 6
1 31
132
Deleater (01' 60-61, 68
Defense, a!, d 1l.ic strategy, 33, 69,
85, 89
Related to Reft,rmed epistetnol,
60 61
Sci
f/ ' :
i !'ccpricc
cc, R.01c,
.Necaiso
,ffp,timcra
I: \
odor, 3, 13, 112
'Eiot.. T. S., 6
Epicurus.. 18
Lpistonic distance, 95-96
Lpistonic tramcwot t b lieR 57
Fristemology, 9
Eschatalogical motif', 08, 101
FN idcmialism, 58-60, 64(n22), 67
FN
(dtiNitiCdlion of, 10-13
deltnition ol, 2, 10-11
dvsteleological, 98-99
as an eternal citic cmity, 6, 39
gtatuitous t pointless. meaningless),
30, 71 -79, 92, 91, 9 7 - 9 9 ,
102-103, 111-115, 119-126
in t:ic media.. 1-2, 6, 7
metaphysical. 93, Sec also Privation
(of good:,
moral. 11-12, 24, 35, 38-4.2, 50
natural, 4-5, 12-13, 50
Existential attitudes toward evil,
115-124
Faith, relation of to rational process,
10
Fallen angels, SO, 52, 61-62(n7), 90
Flew. Antony. 35-36, 38-39, 58-59,
96
Founkl.14hilisill, strong, 59-60,
6-1;112 2)
ill89 -90, 94-96, 103
as sell: determination, 100
S ei II. / III
FreeDen, 29, 33-43,
14(3), 73
applied to natural evil, 50-52
I ii
concep,ed by classical theism, 7-8
creator,18, 88, 91, 93, 95, 125
iLIP, with the ,triicrer,
125 127
a', ne,- cNsAt-11(111.)
aim l'nwes`, hci:ni
Great et t, iood strateg), 89, 103-104,
106m7)
Gritlin, Da, id Rav, 100-101
Hail, Thor. 8
Hare, Peter, IL, 72, 85-86, 104
Hartshorne, Charles, 100
111,107-10&
1(18.:n19), 115- 119
Flick, John, 11, 85, 91., 94-99,
113 111
Higher hat- nut:1y solution, 123. See
tyin) Aesthetic theme
Hinduism, (1
Hook, Sidney, 113
lloward-tinvdet, 1),niel, 9, 72
pride
1 fume, David, 11, 12, 18, 24, 58
Incompatiblit, 37-41, Sc.. iitco
Leibnit's Lapse
Inconsistency in tEeisni. 17-23, 33
Incorrigible beiiefs. .Se BelieR,
incorrigible
Inductive argument from evil, 47-52.
Nee ti/cu Prtibabilitv (as a method
incict:titnt
16:naeus, 94
Islam, 8, S2'
Jesus, S. 120
Job (biElical character), 115, 122,
126
Judaism, 8, 52
Karainazov, 1\ an. 13, 104, 123-125
Kauluuul, ttordon, 71
1aultnaun,1Vaher, 70, 71
Fans, 10
Pantheism, 100
pastoral thcodicy, 114, 126
Paetora! problem 4 . evil, 112
Paul Hie Apo...He
l'encHt in. It rcnec, 24
133
1 chief - , Keith, 4750, 72
1ihii. (.;.1h-ti kV , 11telin ion, 38,
Pcters(w,1

1071.0titie-1811.181149
kii,11(.\-lk.09.8
, 910 -1- ,A,;\ HI,Iis3 33
3ti ,11, 49, 94 3.', 39 42,H9,11
127: ;18 . n1,1. I. -49- F.,O, 7,ti
Itickt%in, 39 62eTw1.1.1.-.-;,16:. (X, 75,
Itit. (-joy,91 111 112
.11ackic, I. I ., 17 19, 22, 24. 27, 29,
33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 96
5iati(21k-1, F.J.\.11- (1, 11 , 72, 35-86, 104
lationna, tile. 3
lanichacankin (Ct tsmic Dualism), 39
;\ la\ rodue, t lei FUL 58
1.111t - ,7tu-Hitn . ) ,
.11c(40e)cy, FL J., 13, 24
Mt:ailing (Alit.' (in relation ice cell), 2,
4. o. 10, 123,125( n28
L'LlPhYsics, 9
NIci ii he 88. S ee also Thcodicy
5101, John St nail. 112, 125
.\111 -ron,lohn, $5
Man, 1)1, - 4., 4-5
.dorrira, iai..:. 1, 7
Natural i.c.c (1-tcrue. 29. 61-62(n7), 105
Neopiatoniern. 100019 i
MiIII, a, h. 129; n29)
tel ic,\\ ers cpistcmic), 60-61
Wen ; 1itouht-. 114
()Innipotcni_e ha\ in?..t .ell power), 7-9
in relation to human .ict-done.
"""15i' t1141.,, H to
ompatibilienet
proit..ss o itique 0 , 1, 1(10 101
, 1:d% !P.,!,,:1 1 knowledge) ,
LI
o
(lino
9, 56
P1,no, 91
Possible cc iii I i'
best 4 all poseiblc worlds, 48-49,
)
Togic (di 37 $S.
God\ relation to, 38-41, 56
['tract - , iod's
e, 11)1-102
persuasive, 101-102
the Onmipttence
Prctiesci
c.)
Prceinnotion itlaihcism, 58
Principle of plcm it tide, 91. Sec also
(heinc
Principle

t :roil:lint 75
Privation so[goot -11, 90. .cc - also
NIctaphysieal c\
Probability !as a :tu. -thod of induction
frequency theorI of 55-56.
62i n141, 02-64(n18 .,
tka! Wenn o-
5 - 4 -55
pct.- so:tails( thcon5A-54
Process theism, 99-10A
Punishment theme, 88, 91-92
(...)_oasd thelsn, , 2.
cc
ce ,tir e ) Process
Clii', Ii
,tr religious biller tilli110,
9-10
Fourulationalisilt, elrolut,
Rettu tiled epistcmidor,y
134

1. 11 t/eV
Ref orinetl
68 69, 86 87, i
l.\5L1 i II
iti). 11/411,
64(108(n-1.9)
Rust HW3L Ilan, . 2
Rt(t t William, 8, 17, 18, 47, 73-79,
83.
Russell, Bert rand, 58
Russell, Bruce, 73, 81(n11)
Russell, Jet :re\ Btu ton, 111
Salluiin, Wesley, 55-56
(cycle t,( birth-death-
rcbirt:,6
S.11,1(1..S't( Fallen angels.
Schlciermacher. Friedrich, 90
Schlesinger, George, 70
Scriven, Michael, 38
Seitle% ident beliefs, Sec Beliefs, sell
evident
Sell-refcrential incoherence, 59-60
Settle. T. W., 7
siti, 4, .34, 77, 90-91, 97. See also
\ il moral
Smith, Susan, 2
Sh\ ereigniv (Clods:, 89, 91. See also
Oinniputena.
Spino , Benedict de, 119
Ste\ ensim.ibert L.'ruis, 3
Suicide, i29tii28) and (113.4)
SiinL.titnc, RiChArd, 7o, 81(t114)
,A l'k016tal argument, 10, 62(ri14)
Theism ( standard 18
litishan, 7 8, -13, 86, 124
k:NPalltik'd, 8, ./1, 77 79, 80, b7),
8 I( (119), 87 88, 111, 1 -!-1
moilleisni, 52, 70, 113
restricted. 8, 18, 71, 77-79, 88,
II!.. 121
Tlitiodie, 13, 33, 39, 105(115)
as r,lat 2 IIIcredibility of reli0
-0,
Fel, 6 8, 11 -15(n18)
,,,ihil(1% (it, 8S-88
Sti Aletailicodict.
I co, 129,11281 .131-y
Tbial evIdence, 56 3$, (i2 ii
67 (i8. Sec 015!) idemialism
brid depr,b-10 -12
Unatiltinu, Sltgiici de,112
Value diet):relil.t.lbus, 125
van lin\l'crer, 79-800151, 86
Whitchea,i, Alt(- ed North, 85, 99-101
Wittgenstein, 1 mix\ ic. 3
WolterstbriI, Nicholas, 58
Wvkstra, Stephen, 8, 75-79, 112,
127: It8
Yandell, Keith, 41, 86
Liiroastrianism, 6