836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Carmelo vs. Ramos

No. L-17778. November 30, 1962.
IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the
Mayor of Manila, petitioner-appellant, vs. ARMANDO
RAMOS, respondentappellee.
Administrative Law; Contempt Committed Against
Administrative Bodies; Contempt under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court.Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to
inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt
committed against administrative officials or bodies, unless said
contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of
court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (People vs. Mendoza; People vs. Dizon, 49 Off.
Gaz., No. 2, 541)
Same; Same; When Section 580 of the Revised Administrative
Code may be invoked.One who invokes Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code must first show that he has authority to take
testimony or evidence before he can apply to the courts for the
punishment of hostile witnesses. (Francia vs. Pecson, et al., 87 Phil.
100.)
Same; Same; Same; Delegation by Mayor of Manila of power to
investigate.The delegation by the Mayor of Manila of the power to
investigate city officials and employees appointed by him does not
imply a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of
witnesses whose appearance may be required by the compulsory
process of subpoena.
Same; Same; Same; To what offices Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code pertains.It is doubtful whether the
provisions of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code are
applicable to the City of Manila, as these pertain to national
bureaus or offices of the government.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Alvendia, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. for petitioner-
appellant.
Armando Ramos for and in his own behalf as
respondent-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an
executive order creating a committee to investigate the
anomalies involving the license inspectors and other
personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office
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VOL. 6, NOVEMBER 30, 1962 837
Carmelo vs. Ramos
of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits
Division of this Office (of the Mayor). He named Mr. Jesus
L. Carmelo as chairman of said committee.
It appears that the committee issued subpoenas to
Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a bookkeeper
in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it on
June 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 and August 4 and 11, 1960, in
connection with an administrative case against Crisanta
Estanislao but that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas were
duly served, refused to appear.
Claiming that Ramos refusal tended to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administrative proceedings,
petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. After
hearing, during which petitioner was required to show a
prima facie case, the trial court dismissed the petition. The
lower court held that there is no law empowering committees
created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and
demand that witnesses testify under oath. It also held that
to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right
against self-incrimination.
It appears that in a statement given to investigators of
the Office of the Mayor, Ramos admitted having
misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money given
to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the
latters taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not been
discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain
employees in the City Treasurers office at Casa de Alba
where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above. The trial
court held that to compel Ramos to confirm this statement
in the administrative case against certain employees in the
Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to give
testimony that could be used against him in a criminal case
for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the
offended party. From that decision, petitioner appealed to
this Court.
The main issue in this case is the power, if any, of a
committee, like the committee of which petitioner is the
chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to
ask for their punishment in case of refusal.
838
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carmelo vs. Ramos
The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)
1
of the Rules of Court
applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not
comprehend contempt committed against administrative
officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said
contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as
contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580
of the Revised Administrative Code. (People v. Mendoza;
People v. Dizon, 49 O.G. No. 2, 541.)
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides as follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony.When authority to take
testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or
upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such
authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer
oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require
the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this
Act, any one who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear
______________
1
Section 4 of this rule provides in part: Charge; where to be filed.x x x And
where a contempt punishable by law has been committed against an
administrative officer or any non-judicial person, committee, or other body, the
charge may be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city in
which the contempt has been committed. This provision of Rule 64 embodies
the historical notion that the contempt power is necessarily judicial. This
notion dates as far back as 1893, when the Supreme Court of the United
States, in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, remarked that such body as the
Interstate Commerce Commission could not, under our system of government,
and consistently with due process of law, be invested with authority to compel
obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or imprisonment. But the Court
went on to hold that a judicial proceeding to enforce a subpoena issued by the
Commission satisfies the case or controversy requirement of the
Constitution, and that judicial enforcement does not violate the principle of
separation of powers. Accordingly, since 1893, the Congress of the United
States has consistently refused to empower any agency to commit for contempt,
customarily providing instead that agencies may apply to appropriate district
court for an order enforceable by contempt proceedings. (Davis, The
Administrative Power of Investigation. 56 Yale L.J. No. 7, 1111 at 1139-40.)
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VOL. 6, NOVEMBER 30, 1962 839
Carmelo vs. Ramos
upon summons issued under the authority of the preceding
paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or body
exercising the power therein defined, refuses to make oath, give
testimony, or produce documents for inspection, when thereunto
lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in case of
contempt of court and upon application of the individual or body
exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the judge of
first instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided
by law.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show
that he has authority to take testimony or evidence before
he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile
witnesses. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., 87 Phil. 100.)
Now, what authority to take testimony does petitioners
committee have from which the power to cite witnesses may
be implied, pursuant to section 580?
To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of
the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of
power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to
investigate anomalies involving certain city employees.
Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the
implied power to investigate city officials and employees
appointed by him to the end that the power expressly vested
in him to suspend and remove such officials or employees
(Sec. 22, Republic Act No. 409) may be justly and fairly
exercised. We agree with this proposition and We held so in
the case of Pagkanlungan v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. No. 10, p.
4332. But We do not agree with the petitioner that a
delegation of such power to investigate implies also a
delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of
witnesses whose appearance may be required by the
compulsory process of subpoena. Thus, in denying this
power to an investigating body in the Office of the Mayor of
Manila, We said in Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra: We do
not think the mayor (of Manila) can delegate or confer the
powers to administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue
subpoenas.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of
section 580 of the Administrative Code are applicable to
840
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carmelo vs. Ramos
the City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or
offices of the government.
Citing 50 Am. Jur. 449, petitioner contends that the
power of the investigation committee to issue compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses undoubtedly
exists since only complimentary to the power of the mayor to
investigate, suspend and remove city officers and
employees, supra, is the recognized rule that where the
statute grants a right, it also confers by implication every
particular power necessary for the exercise thereof. There is
no merit in the argument. In the first place, the authority
cited speaks of statutory grant of power to a body. Here, We
have seen that whatever power may be claimed by
petitioners committee may only be traced to the power of
the Mayor to investigate as implied from his power to
suspend or remove certain city employees. There is no
statutory grant of power to investigate to petitioners
committee.
In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has
the implied power to require the appearance of witnesses
before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that the Mayor can
not delegate this power to a body like the committee of the
petitioner. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra.)
Lastly, 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an
exception to the rule invoked by the petitioner. Thus, it is
stated that where the liberty and property of persons are
sought to be brought within the operation of a power
claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because necessary
to its due execution, the case must be clearly seen to be
within those intended to be reached. Here, no less than the
liberty of Armando Ramos is involved in the claim of the
committee to the right to cite witnesses.
We hold, therefore, that petitioners committee has no
power to cite witnesses to appear before it and to ask for
their punishment in case of refusal. This conclusion makes
it unnecessary for Us to pass upon the other error assigned
by petitioner as having been allegedly committed by the
trial court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First In-
841
VOL. 6, NOVEMBER 30, 1962 841
Rizal Cement Workers Union (FFW) vs. Court of Industrial
Relations
stance of Manila is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement
as to costs.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
Decision affirmed.
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