The Fragility of Arctic Strategies

The Fragility of Arctic Strategies
Sensitivity of Arctic States for Harm from Volatility

Halldor Berg Hardarson
1101214537

MIR

2013 05
I | P a g e

Abstract

Climate change is melting the sea-ice that covers the northernmost regions of the planet
opening up for various economic and political changes. Scientific models project a complete
opening up of the area in coming decades. This trend will disturb the environment and lead to
increased human activity which threatens the balance in the region. It will also lead to
opportunities in regards to resource exploitation and shipping. Arctic and non-Arctic actors,
including some of the most powerful states on the planet such as Russia and the US, have been
developing strategies to react to these projections. These projections are based on scientific
predictions that are inherently fragile and affects the strategies. The focus of this paper is on the
fragility of the strategies using a definition put forward by Nassim N. Taleb. All of these actors
are preparing themselves for something that hasnt happened yet but they assume will happen.
If the assumption break, the strategies can either gain or lose from different outcome. By taking
the fickle nature of the Arctic development into account its possible for states to guard
themselves against the volatility to create more resilient strategies or even gain from the
volatility and become antifragile. The key findings of the paper is that the US and Icelands
strategies can be considered fragile as they dont take into account the possibility of huge
downsides; Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norways strategies are robust; Denmark/Greenland,
Canada and Chinas strategies are considered antifragile as they all gain from volatility.

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Foreword

This paper is written as a final thesis in my Masters of International Relations Program at Peking
University. These two years studying in China has opened up a world for me. Ive gotten to
witness and experience the extent and meaning of International Relations in a way that is
sometimes lost when you focus on theory and rarely leave home. Its through international
relations where the smallest of countries, like Iceland where Im from, and the largest, like China,
can communicate and learn from each other.
When choosing a topic for the paper I wanted something that would show how these
two very different countries, far away from each other, affect each other and share common
interests. The issue of the Arctic is interesting as it in one way or another affects the whole
world. The reality of climate change is generally accepted and the biggest stakeholders have
already started devising strategies. The sad truth is that none of these strategies has an answer
to how to undo the mess that is climate change, maybe its too late. Instead they focus on how
to adapt and benefit from something that is considered already a fact.
Writing this thesis Ive gotten help from a lot of good people. I want to give a special
thanks to my advisor, Fan Shiming, for good recommendations that helped me to find the limits
of the research. I also want to thank Ragnar Baldursson, minister counsellor for Iceland in China,
for sharing with me his extensive knowledge on Arctic affairs. I want to thank H.E. Kristn A.
rnadttir Ambassador and the Embassy of Iceland in Beijing for good help and facilitating me
while writing the thesis. Many were very helpful in answering my questions when I contacted
them: Alyson Bailes, professor at the University of Iceland, Michael Corgan, professor at Boston
University, Julien Bo, climate researcher, and Kristinn Schram, the director of Center for Arctic
Policy Studies in Iceland. Finally I want to thank Jessie Jing for her translations from English to
Chinese.

Beijing, April 23 2013
Halldr Berg Hararson
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Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1
2. Background ................................................................................................................................................. 2
2.1 Climate Change and the Arctic ............................................................................................................. 2
2.2 Political and Economic Impact ............................................................................................................. 3
2.3 Literature Review ................................................................................................................................. 5
2.4 Theories of International Relations ...................................................................................................... 6
2.5 Predictions and the Social Sciences ..................................................................................................... 9
2.6 Fragility as a Method .......................................................................................................................... 11
3. Methodology ............................................................................................................................................ 15
3.1 Defining Fragility ................................................................................................................................ 15
3.2 Fragility in Arctic Climate Models ...................................................................................................... 17
3.3 Using Fragility in the Context of Strategy ........................................................................................... 20
4. Strategy Assessments ............................................................................................................................... 23
4.1 The United States ............................................................................................................................... 23
4.1.1 Strategy Overview ....................................................................................................................... 23
4.1.2 Fragility of the Strategy............................................................................................................... 25
4.2 Canada................................................................................................................................................ 25
4.3 Russia ................................................................................................................................................. 29
4.4 Nordic Countries ................................................................................................................................ 33
4.4.1 Denmark (Greenland) ................................................................................................................. 33
4.4.2 Norway ........................................................................................................................................ 34
4.4.3 Iceland......................................................................................................................................... 36
4.4.4 Finland and Sweden .................................................................................................................... 37
4.4.5 Fragility of the Strategies ............................................................................................................ 38
4.5 Non-Arctic Actors ............................................................................................................................... 39
4.5.1 European Union .......................................................................................................................... 39
4.5.2 China ........................................................................................................................................... 40
4.6.2 Fragility of the Strategies ............................................................................................................ 42
5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................... 44
6. Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................. 46
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Table of Figures
Figure 1 Number of Google Scholar Results for the key words "Arctic" and politics .................. 5
Figure 2 Example of probability distribution ................................................................................ 15
Figure 3 Example of the probability distribution of different types of fragility ............................ 16
Figure 4 Definition of Fragility - the shaded area represents the fragility of the function ........... 17
Figure 5 Bo, Hall, & Qu, 2009 ...................................................................................................... 18
Figure 6 Probability Density for Surface Warming ........................................................................ 20
Figure 7 Overview over the fragility of different strategies .......................................................... 45

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1. Introduction
Climate change is melting the sea-ice that covers the northernmost regions of the planet,
opening up room for various economic and political changes. This trend is interesting as the area
involves some of the greatest powers in the international community; in Northern America we
have Canada and the United States and in Eurasia we have Russia and Northern European
countries. The implications of this change also means that many other non-Arctic actors, such as
China and the European Union, have started to consider themselves as having strategic interest
in the high north. Besides the many different natural resources that can be found in the region,
there is a great potential for new shipping routes across the north to connect the Eastern and
Western hemisphere in a new and more efficient way, powerfully altering global political and
economic realities.
This has made policy makers in these countries both excited and worried and in recent
years, all of them have gone into the work of building or renewing their Arctic strategies. Many
facades of this work can be observed in the focus of these states and in their published strategy
reports, which will be examined in this paper. Specifically, the countries that the paper will
examine are Russia, Canada, USA and the Nordic countries and their territories. Moreover two
non-Arctic actors will also be studied, the Arctic policy of the European Union and China. For the
most part, these new policies assume that climate change will lead to warmer climates in the
Arctic and tries to use that prediction to rearrange their priorities to take advantage of the many
opportunities that the great melt might lead to or at least protect the established power balance
that such a change might threaten.
What is interesting about the situation in the greater context of the field of International
Relations, is that this is all based on a certain prediction. All of these great powers are preparing
themselves for something that hasnt happened but that they assume will happen. Predictions
are perfectly all right in the context of science where one can use the tools of statistics to make
reasonable theories about the future within the limits of the assumption put forth. The Social
Sciences and within the realm of politics on the other hand have a much worse track record of
making prediction. The innumerable variables that human society consists of means that any
prediction beyond the very short term usually becomes prey of the effect of many unlikely
scenarios that are impossible to expect but will necessarily accumulate over time. This makes
social and political policies based on predictions inherently fragile. Not all policy is fragile in the
same way. By taking the fickle nature of the Arctic development into account, it is possible for
states to guard themselves against the volatility to create strategies that are more resilient or to
gain from the volatility. The focus of this paper will be on the fragility of the Arctic policies of the
states and actors mentioned above.
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2. Background
2.1 Climate Change and the Arctic
Fossil evidences from the northwestern part of Iceland show that several million years ago, the
environment on this now barren cold island used to be completely different. Its hard to wrap
your mind around the fact that tropical plants and jungles were thriving at such northerly
latitude but that was nonetheless the case
1
. The scientific community has known for a long time
that the climate on this planet is not always the same and that it changes regularly on the grand
timescale of the geology. The planet has had phases of cold and hot eras; from long ice ages,
where a big part of the global land surface was covered with ice, to warmer ages between when
almost all ice had disappeared, even from the Polar Regions. Its known that the environment is
relatively sensitive to any non-temporary change in its conditions. Even small changes in the
planetary position seem to be able to trigger a lasting change in the climate through feedback
processes that reinforces the change. This can even happen on a much smaller timescale;
scientists have been able to study considerable fluctuation within the smaller timespan of
written weather remarks in human history. This can also happen very regionally; but scientists
have seen that a drastic regional climate change can happen as quickly as in ten years
2
.
As early as the 19
th
century physicists, started to realize that the atmosphere and what it
consists of must have a great effect on the climate. The atmosphere moderates and distributes
the energy received from the sun in correlation with the amount and ratios of atmospheric
gases. This can be seen by observing the inhospitable, blazing hot and thick atmosphere on the
planet Venus. Early on, many scientists theorized that human activity could cause climate
change. Industrialization was measurably affecting the atmosphere with an increasing rate and
it made sense that this might affect the climate. In the last decades, this effect has been
confirmed in general weather trends. In the 1980s, results from studies on ice-cores from
Greenland show that global warming seemed to be correlated with the amount of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere like methane and carbon dioxide (CO2). The impact of the CO2 was
especially important as the ever-increasing usage of fossil fuels had significantly raised the CO2
levels in the atmosphere and there were no signs that this trend was going to stop
3
.
In the late 80s, the United Nations in co-operation with governments all over the world
and the scientific community established the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that
has since then released four assessment reports, the latest in 2007. These reports are not
independent researches but an overview and analysis of new knowledge in the field of climate
science taken together as an attempt to assess the current and future state of the climate
4
. The
main findings of the IPCC included that since the industrial revolution, the global climate had
indeed warmed up considerably, with more than 2/3 of the warming happening in the last three
decades. The world was getting hotter and global warming was happening faster. An
overwhelming majority of climate models, using what we know about which factors affect

1
Gsli rn Bragason 2007
2
Weart 2003
3
Weart 2003
4
IPCC n.d.
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climate change, past trends and a wide measurement network, also showed that global
warming would further increase in the coming decades
5
.
The real world implication of this fact is probably nowhere as apparent as in the Arctic
region. Unlike the Antarctic, the North Pole is not located in the middle of a landmass but rather
in the middle of the ocean. This fact means that the ice formation is very different from the
South Pole. The nearest landmass is Greenland, which is covered with an enormous glacier that
rises high into the air and is not as easily melted when the temperature rises. The Arctic itself is
covered in sea-ice. The ice is broken into many different plates that float and drift around. They
clash and make chunks ice ridges and break up again. The seasonal weather patterns have a
huge impact on the ice. Half the year, the sun cant be seen and half the year there is nothing
but sun. In the frosts of the long winter nights, the sea freezes at the surface and creates new
ice that can be everything from a few centimeters up to a meter. In the summertime, the sun
easily melts the thinner layers but if the conditions are right, some of the ice survives and gets
another chance to become thicker. Multi-year ice can get extremely thick
6
.
In recent years, with increased temperatures, the summer ice coverage has been
shrinking rapidly. The ice still covers most of the Arctic vastness in the wintertime but its getting
thinner and thinner. An increased percentage of the winter ice is less than one year old and
melts away in the summer. The thinner ice has made it easier to cross the Arctic on ice breakers
but in recent years, there has also been the opening up of regions on the edge of the Arctic that
have turn completely ice-free in the summertime
7
. Ice free routes, both east and west of the
North Pole has, in recent years, been sustainable enough to allow for sail boats to circumvent
the North Pole but until very recently that thought would have been impossible
8
. Scientists
predict that this development will keep going and that the North Pole itself will be ice-free over
the summertime sometime in this century
9
.
2.2 Political and Economic Impact
This change will completely alter every possible political and economic condition in the region.
The countries that have territorial claims in the Arctic are some of the most powerful states in
the world, which means that the melt might affect the global power balance. From a geopolitical
point of view, the ice-locked north has always been a very firm limitation in the topology of the
whole world. Living in the shadow of that fact, a sleuth of smaller states and groups of native
people also exist in the region protected by the inflexibility of the ice filled Arctic-ocean that
kept them insignificant. Now changing climate threatens to change everything.
It is known that the area has many resources, everything from precious metals to fossil
fuels reserves that until this day have been inaccessible. The changes now might cause a boom
in economic activity in the high north that could lead to migration pressure in areas that havent
been considered very habitable before climate change. Potentially more important than the

5
IPCC 2007
6
National Snow and Ice Data Center 2013
7
National Snow and Ice Data Center 2013
8
First Circumnavigation of Arctic Completed 2010
9
Bo, Hall and Qu 2009
4 | P a g e

resources for economic activities is the opening up of new shipping routes across the Arctic. The
effect of this on the global economy is unimaginable. If ships could cross the Arctic directly and
unhindered it would shorten the distance between the markets in East Asia and the markets in
Europe and the East Coast of the United States about 40%
10
. This would be a complete game
changer.
The main drive for the economic globalization in the last few decades has been
inexpensive and secure shipping on a global scale. The connection between the eastern and
western hemisphere has a allowed for international division of labor and resources that has
been incredibly beneficial for all parties involved and brought on a surge of growth in developing
parts of the world. There are nonetheless serious limitations to the global value chain as it
stands today. Shipping routes that connect the west and east are limited by severe geographical
bottlenecks
11
. In the old days, ships had to go around the southernmost points of South America
and Africa, which made these ways of moving products incredibly costly. Transportation on land
is an order of magnitude less efficient, even when trains are filled with goods to be hauled; the
payload is only a fraction of that which could be transported with a cargo ship.
The opening of the Suez and Panama channel changed a lot and made the global
economic environment of last few decades possible. They are nonetheless limited in many ways.
They are already being used at full capacity and even with recent and planned renovations, they
put a serious limit on the number and size of the cargo ships that go through. They are also
politically dangerous as they create choking points that could prove the Achilles heals of
everybody that are too dependent on them
12
. In the monopolar moment of todays global
politics, one country, the United States, is responsible to protect most of these precious
shipping lanes and to keep the bottle necks open; not only the channels but also other natural
bottlenecks on the way such as the Strait of Malaga. This situation makes the US vulnerable but
could also create a very uncomfortable situation for any potential rising power that has to rely
on these same lanes and the established rule that keeps them in order
13
.
Opening up of shipping over the Arctic is therefore very likely to strongly influence the
global order. Shortening of the shipping routes and the lack of channels that limits the size of
cargo ships could lead to shipping capacities reaching unknown levels. Even only partial opening
in the summer time would be extremely meaningful. The winter-ice is projected to persist but in
most areas, it will be ice that is less than a year old and therefore thin. New icebreaker
technologies, such as the double-acting hull ships, are likely to make shipping economically
viable all year round
14
. In a bigger context, this could give the slowing down economies in the
West a much-needed economic spur and prevent the foreseeable economic slowdown in East
Asia. This could also open up new political dimensions in how the global distribution network is
kept secure.

10
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland 2009
11
Castonguay n.d.
12
Zumerchik and Danver 2010
13
Blair and Lieberthale 2007
14
National Research Council 2007
5 | P a g e

2.3 Literature Review
With the potential economic and political impact of this magnitude,
the issues of the Arctic have gotten surprisingly little attention in the
mainstream IR circles. None of the most influential IR scholars has
discussed the issue specifically beyond anything but vaguely
mentioning the interest that the matter seems to raise in China. Even
though there is not a lot of debate in the several most important
journals, there are nonetheless hundreds of articles published in more
specialized publications every year.
By using Googles search machine for academic articles
15
the
general trend can be observed. In the last decade or so, the number of
articles that discuss the Arctic in a political context has tripled.
Moreover the number of policy papers, think tank reports and other
publications that are evidence of governmental interest has increased
rapidly and many of the academic articles are a reaction to that.
There have quite a few general analyzes on the political situation in the Arctic and Arctic
strategies, for an instance New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for
National Security and International Collaboration written by The Institute of Foreign Policy
Analysis
16
and A New Security Architecture for the Arctic published by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies
17
. Two of the central sources used in this paper are an example of how
the Academic analyses are reactive to the governments initiative. The Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been known as expert analysts when it comes to Chinas
Arctic policy and aspirations. They have published such reports as China Prepares for an Ice-Free
Arctic
18
and the more recent Chinas Arctic Aspirations
19
. These papers and others like it are not
based on scholars speculations about the geopolitical meaning of the area but rather reactive
to something that is happening in the realm of policymaking and diplomacy. In the case of
SIPRIs analysis on Chinas policy, it doesnt give any deep insights in to the academic discussion
in China (which doesnt seem to be that significant in the case of Arctic policy anyway) but
focuses on the activities of the governmental institutions, the activities of the Chinese foreign
service with Arctic countries and within Arctic cooperation and analyzing governmental policy
papers and so on. The state of Arctic research within the field of International Relations is
maybe an example of how sometimes, the academia follows the real world policy rather than
the other way around.

15
http://scholar.google.com
16
2012
17
Conley 2012
18
Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic 2010/2
19
Jakobson and Peng 2012
Year Results
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1700
1900
2120
2390
2770
2970
3230
3800
4500
5400
5410
5580
5730
Figure 1Number of Google
Scholar Results for the key
words "Arctic" and
politics
6 | P a g e

In this paper, that fact is actually beneficial. By looking into the analysis on the state
Arctic Policy, there are many sources to base a study on the fragility of Arctic strategies. The
analytical state of research and lack of theoretical discussion gives a lot of space for new
approaches. One of most important report for the research in this paper is similar in this regard;
Bailes and Heininens Strategy Papers on the Arctic or High North: A comparative study and
analysis
20
compares the different strategies papers published by governments of each of the
actors and states in the Arctic.
That is not to say that there doesnt exist papers that try to approach the politics of the
Arctic in more of a theoretical way but these papers or more peripheral in the field; student
papers, not published or in either very small or specialized publications. The main question that
people seem to be interested in is the question of if the change in the balance around the Arctic
might lead to some kind of conflict or if it will lead to new types of international cooperation.
The different theories of International Relations have a different answer to that question.
2.4 Theories of International Relations
One of the most fundamental questions of international relations is how states can cooperate
with each other and what prompts them to be confrontational and most of the theoretical
frameworks that underpin the field revolve around answering that question. A long history of
aggressiveness, mutual hostility, attacks without much provocation, colonialism, world wars and
the creation of weapons of mass destruction seem to indicate that the international community
isnt so much a community at all but rather a jungle were actors are driven by pure self-interest
and nothing else. Nevertheless, many others have pointed out that this picture is perhaps quite
a bit of a simplification and does not portray the intricacies of the real situation. There are many
examples of cooperation in history that can be easily pointed out and one could argue that the
force of cooperation was actually much more powerful in shaping the world and course of
events compared to the force of aggressiveness and self-interest. How else would you explain
the incredible economic ties between countries and the wide span sharing of culture and
distribution of new technologies and ideas? On a state-to-state level, we also see many
examples of direct cooperation that seem to debunk the bleak portrayal first depicted. These
two opposite points of view are at the heart of main debates in International Relations and
many of the most influential theories today can be broadly found in either of these two
categories.
These points of view are best crystalized in their respective theories: Realism and
Liberalism. Realism is the theory that assumes that the international system is anarchic, the
states are the only significant actors, andand all states behave in a unitary rational way with
their self-interest and survival as their main goal
21
. The central idea of Liberalism in international
relations is that the state only exists in the context of a domestic and international civil society
22
.
The state is therefore not a unitary single actor with one main goal but reacts to a multitude of
different interests and cultural values in its environment. Economic ties, political co-operation

20
2012
21
Donnelly 2000
22
Moravcsik 1992
7 | P a g e

and many other behaviors can easily exist in the international space that does not necessarily
reflect the best interest of the state but influences it nonetheless
23
. These very broad looks on
state behavior have, in recent years, been mostly replaced by more specific models based on
either Realism or Liberalism and some independent theories that try to approach the subject
from a completely different angle
24
.
The main paradigm of realism in the last 20 to 30 years is the so-called neo-realism. It
bases its theoretical framework on the anarchic nature of the international structure. Because
international relations happen in a space that by definition, is without governing of any sort it
defines any other behavior of states. Without international government to make sure contracts
are honored, the opportunity for international cooperation is very limited
25
. Only cooperation
that allows the state to gain in a relative sense (in terms of security or power) is worth it to go
into and only has any meaning as long as the benefits are being reaped. No state neither would
nor has to honor contracts they lose from
26
. This means that all cooperation is extremely hard to
establish and even harder to maintain and is mainly shaped by the power of the participating
states.
Neoliberalism is the other popular paradigm that, as opposed to neorealism, emphasis
that international cooperation is very possible and quite common. Even if liberal scholars would
accept all of the other assumptions of the neorealist, such as the influence of the anarchic
nature of the international arena and so on, there is always at least one assumption that they
assess differently. This is the way states value their self-interest. While the neo realists claim
that states are only concerned with relative gains in power and security, the neo liberalists
argue that in reality, states are more interested in absolute gains
27
. That leaves a lot of space for
mutually beneficial cooperation because even though an arrangement of cooperation might
benefit some states more than it does others, some benefits are always preferable to no
benefits
28
. This theory is related to more specific theories of how international cooperation
happens, such as institutionalism, that conceives international cooperation mainly as building of
multilateral institution, and neo-functionalism, that stresses the importance of the process,
which catches the state in an escalation of ever-increasing commitment that is not easy to
abandon
29
.
Besides these two general points of view within the field of International Relations,
there are at least several other very influential theories that mostly fall outside of this
dichotomy. Most noteworthy of them is the set of idealistic and revolutionary theories that
approaches quite differently, for them international relations are characterized by ideas, joint
values, culture and social identities. The main actors are not necessarily the state but all kinds of

23
Moravcsik 1992
24
Mingst 2003
25
Powell 1994
26
Mingst 2003
27
Powell 1994
28
Mingst 2003
29
Mingst 2003
8 | P a g e

groups and individuals that help shape our culture, values and paradigms
30
. An example of this
kind of theory is constructivism
31
. These three main categories of paradigms, the realist, the
liberal and the idealistic, all have different views on how international cooperation happens and
what it is that prompts security dilemmas. It is therefore to be expected that they have
something interesting to say about how the political circumstances in the Arctic will play out.
Throughout the Cold War, the relations in the Arctic were shaped by the balance of
power between the USSR, the US and their allies (NATO). Their relations were very much in
accordance with neo-realist theories. Both powers had a big military presence in the region and
all interaction happened based on mutual mistrust as countries in the middle ensured their
security by allying themselves with either of the superpowers, occasionally using opportunities
to gain by playing them against each other. Every development in the Arctic and how it
influenced international relations was analyzed under this paradigm until the 1980s
32
.
The meetings between the leaders of the States and the Soviet Union, such as the
meeting by Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik 1986, showed some new approaches in the
question of cooperation but everything changed when the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of
the decade
33
. With the old model out the window, what were we supposed to expect in the
relations between the Arctic states? Right after the big change, there was immediately some
efforts to establish cooperation between states and ever since then those efforts have been
escalated and institutionalized. In 1991, eight Arctic countries signed the Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy and in 1996, the Arctic Council was established in the Ottawa Declaration,
including all states that have territories in the regions and even including some non-state actors
such as representatives for ethnic groups that are native to the area
34
. The cooperation has
grown ever since and is today central to any issues regarding the Arctic
35
.
This development is of course exactly in the spirit of neo-liberalist theories and
therefore tempting to conclude that any possible future friction in the region will be resolved
through these channels of cooperation. Thats far from reality though; as it is the Arctic Council
is a completely powerless institution. The Arctic states have been eager to keep the Arctic
council as a platform free from politics that is instead effective as a channel of communication
and research, with the environment as a special focus
36
. There have been some signs of the
Council moving more into the direction of a political regime, such as a by establishing a standing
secretariat in Troms, Norway, and the recent Search and Rescue Agreement which is the
Councils first law-bound international agreement
37
.

30
Mingst 2003
31
Mingst 2003
32
Arup 2012
33
Axworthy 2013
34
Axworthy 2013
35
Gordon Foundation 2013
36
Arctic Portal 2010
37
Molenaar 2012
9 | P a g e

Even so there also seems to be determination amongst the five littoral state to keep
such issues as territorial claims and security separate and leave them to the more traditional
approach of sovereignty and self-determination as well as to different degrees international law
of the sea or bilateral or multilateral communications
38
. In recent years as it has become more
apparent that the Arctic environment is changing, some have said that the each country is now
raising to unilaterally secure as well they can own interested and power as Arctic neighbors
draw up battle lines
39
. An example of that is the Russian submarine mission in 2007 that put a
Russian flag on the sea bottom right at the North Pole
40
.
From a theoretical point of view, three scenarios that can happen now regarding the
question of whether the changing environment in the Arctic will bring out confrontation in the
Arctic. From the point of view of Neo-Liberalism, we might expect the cooperation that has been
growing in the last two decades to keep on growing and eventually be the channel through
which any friction will be settled. From the point of view of Neo-realism, we can expect every
country to rise to protect their claims and ambitions and in the case of uncertainty, resort to
confrontation. From the point of view of Idealism, some other entirely different scenario might
develop where new ideas and solutions will prevail. Thats the problem with theories in Social
Studies, they always seem to leave out the possibility that unexpected things can happen.
2.5 Predictions and the Social Sciences
There is nothing wrong with the theories of International Relations if we remember to accept
them in the context of their assumptions. As a basis of policy, on the other hand they have been
proven terrible. What is the purpose of a theory? In general, a theory, be it a scientific theory,
mathematical theory, psychological theory or a social science theory, are all meant to do at least
one or more of the following four things: describe, explain, predict and change. A theory creates
a mental model that allows us to understand natural or philosophical concepts better. However,
not all theories are as good as others are in fulfilling all four goals.
The scientific theory applied in the natural science is the ultimate role model for any
budding theorist. Ever since our forefathers realized the reliability of the seasonal change and
the first astronomers predicted solar eclipses with awe-inspiring accuracy, mankind has been
obsessed with the idea that we can foresee the future through our insights and calculations. In
many aspects, we have been tremendously successful, such as in the field of physics, chemistry
and possibly fields such as biology and medicine. We have also realized that sometimes when
theories and science fall short in their predictability it is. Its often because we simply havent
enough data, time or the right tools and approaches to correctly deduct results. This has led to
believe that perhaps all fields of reality are possible to predict about assuming enough data; that
its only the complexity that prevents from seeing the future, not the nature of phenomena.
In many ways, the Social Sciences were based on this belief. The origin of the Social
Sciences in the 19
th
century can be traced to Positivism that attempted to use the methods and

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models of the natural sciences to create theories about societies and human behavior in the
hope that it could be used to get to the same kind of predictability as we have gotten used to in
the natural sciences
41
. In his lecture, Predictions and Prophecies in the Social Sciences
42
, the
political philosopher Karl Popper named this tendency historicism. Historicism is in his view not a
scientific but a pseudoscientific symptom in many ideologies and theories, made to look
progressive and scientific while in reality it stems from the superstition and ancient dream that
human progress could be understood as some kind of narrative.
This obsession with seeing the future is the Achilles heel of many theorists but the
reasons why it rarely is fruitful are simple. In the words of Popper: *L+ong term prophecies can
be derived from scientific conditional predictions only if they apply to systems which can be
described as well isolated, stationary, and recurrent
43
. While many natural systems (like the
solar system) are indeed isolated, stationary, and recurrent, modern society most certainly is
not such a system. Nassim Taleb has a more detailed description on why this is indeed the
characteristics of human societies (and especially modern societies) in his Black Swan Theory
44
.
Black swans are an event that are extremely rare, so rare that nothing in history and our
current understanding could have convincingly made us expect them, and they have great
impact that changes all other assumptions and situations. These kinds of events are statistical
outliers but have an out of proportion effect on society and development of affairs. After the
fact, they also have a tendency to be very obviously explained, giving the illusion that they could
have been predicted. The name comes from a Latin expression that something is so rare that its
like finding a black swan but at the time the phrase was coined, it was assumed that black swans
didnt actually exist but when the continent of Australia was discovered by Europeans the
original meaning of the saying became obsolete when actual black swans were found to exist
there
45
.
These kinds of events make it next to impossible to make theories that can predict the
future with any long-term accuracy. People have a psychological tendency to be blind to the
massive influence of black swan events on history and especially in taking into account the
statistical improbability of many of the turning points in history. Nevertheless, how can
something that is unlikely be so likely to have extreme effects? It stems from the fact that many
of the systems that rule human society are characterized by unstructured randomness. Given
enough time, there is almost infinite ways for something unexpected to happen so such
occurrences will therefore happen very frequently but its impossible to say in which way they
are going to manifest or how much impact they will have
46
. We cant even predict them in the
same way that we can statistically predict rare events in systems characterized with structured
randomness (like in games or gambling) because they arent structured and we cant map the
possibilities.

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Keat and Urry 2010
42
1948
43
1948
44
2010
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Taleb, The Black Swan 2010
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Taleb, The Black Swan 2010
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Does this mean that the traditional theoretical approaches of International Relations
described in the last chapter are useless? Of course not. These theories are possibly powerful
enough to predict the outcomes of many very isolated and short-term circumstances but
beyond that, theories also have other uses besides predictability. They can help people
understand by explaining and describing past and sometimes current events. For instance, the
theories of neoliberalism and neorealism can be useful in explaining the changing spirit of
international cooperation in the Arctic from the Cold War and from the 90s onward. This
understanding can also help us change the future. Its perfectly reasonable to use the lessons of
the past to base a policy of hopeful goals as long as we dont confuse it with predictability.
The goal of this paper is to describe and change, less so explain and not at all predict.
The nature of the subject at hand makes it very easy to fall into prophetic mode. The paper
analyses policies that are directly linked to scientific predictions. If we try to use the theories of
neoliberalism, neorealism or any other such theory to try to answer the question of if the future
of the Arctic beholds conflict or cooperation, the Author has failed the task and has become a
victim of historicism. The complexity and black swan nature of international relations could
mean incredibly unpredictable outcomes from any variation in the prediction of the climate
models with the accumulated effects so strong that it would render any conclusions made
meaningless. Instead, the paper utilizes a different tactic: ignoring any predictions, the paper
wants to describe the fragility of the strategies, a characteristic that can be observed right now
and tell us how sensitive different countries are to volatility in their general environment (but
here more specifically; the volatility in the outcomes linked to the assumptions in their
strategies).
2.6 Fragility as a Method
The viewpoint Taleb brings with his Black Swan Theory opens up the possibility for a completely
new approach in many fields of Social Science. Instead of using the IRs framework of analysis to
predict the future (which is futile anyway because of the black swan nature of modern societies),
we can use it to analyze the ability to be less sensitive to unpredictable outcomes and volatility.
The goal is not to predict black swan events but rather to measure the robustness against
negative ones and ability to gain from positive ones. These two qualities are called by Taleb
Fragility and Anti-fragility respectively. The usefulness of these concepts is that *f+ragility can be
measured; risk is not measurable
47
.
But what is fragility? When a thing, a system or any phenomena is fragile we know that
we should handle it with care. A fragile thing is only tolerant of normal and expected situations
but sensitive to volatility and randomness. If I decide to drop a porcelain teacup from a 1 cm
height, its unlikely that it would harm it a lot. Even if I did once a day for 100 days, its unlikely
to suffer any harm. This is the kind of wear and tear that the cup is built and expected to bear. If
I on the other hand decide to drop the cup from 100 cm height (1 meter) we would all expect it
to break into hundreds of pieces. The harm that the cup suffers is non-linear; the harm of
dropping it from 100 cm is obviously a lot more than 100 times the harm of dropping it from 1

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cm. When the damage is done, there is no going back. Increasing randomness in the
environment of a fragile thing increases the probabilities of ruining the thing permanently
48
.
Not only are things fragile but also any kind of systems; in the economic collapse of
2008 many big companies, banks and even countries got completely ruined because they
couldnt stand an unexpected shock. The usual response to fragility is to try to think of any
possible scenarios that could come up and try to prepare for them somehow in advance. This
often has the exact opposite effect. Because of the black swan occurrences, its never possible
to completely foresee any possible scenarios. This makes the system or thing even more fragile
when something truly unexpected happens because the system has been allowed to grow
beyond its capability to correct its fundamental errors before the error can be discovered. The
system becomes too big to fail and then it fails. N.N. Taleb believes that modern society and
technological processes are often more effective in fragilizing than the making things more
resilient
49
.
An interesting question in regards to fragility is: what is the prober antonym for the
word fragile, the perfect opposite of being fragile? Most English speakers would probably
come up with words resilience, robustness or possibly just simply strength. In Talebs opinion,
this is not a very precise description of the opposite of fragility in accordance with how we
usually talk about the concept. He proposes that we imagine a box marked Fragile and Handle
with care. Everybody understands the meaning of the word fragile in the context of such a box;
we dont need to know whats in the box, we just know that the more we mishandle the box,
shake it, throw it around or stomp on it, the more likely it is that whatever is in the box will be
broken. If somebody told us that whatever is in the box is resilient or robust, it would seem to
imply that we dont have to worry too much about how we handle it. Throw it around or shake
it; it shouldnt matter, the package is robust and therefore okay
50
.
But thats not the perfect opposite of the fragile box. A box that would be perfectly
opposite to fragile could be handled in way that we desired, thrown around and shaken and
whats inside wouldnt be broken nor would it be merely okay. It would be better than okay. It
would be better the more the box is shaken, the more randomness is applied to the box.
Because of a lack of a better word, Taleb named this characteristic simply anti-fragile. Such a
box would be marked anti-fragile and please handle carelessly. Even though thinking about anti-
fragility is something that doesnt come very natural to people (hence the lack of a proper term)
its quite obvious that nature is full of anti-fragile systems, there are a lot of systems that
evidently gain from more randomness and volatility. Evolution is one example and the process
of innovation through trial and error is another
51
.
How does the concept of fragility, robustness and anti-fragility link to strategies and
International Relations? Strategies in this context are systems and plans that prescribe how a
state should react to different circumstances and use a certain set of assumptions to try to do

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Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012
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2012
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this as intelligently as possible. As these assumptions are fragile, the strategy as a whole can also
be fragile. Lets imagine three different stakeholders in the Arctic with three different Arctic
strategies. All of them look at climate models and assume a certain environmental situation in
some certain date. In light of their own situation and circumstances, they then make strategies
that try to maximize the potential benefits (for instance in terms of security, power or economic
gains) they can get if that forecast will indeed come true or at the very least minimizing the
potential harm the predicted environmental situation could bring them.
One of them is a state that assumes that a certain climate change might open their
waters for new shipping traffic, which could bring considerable economic gains. The strategy
therefore recommends building an infrastructure that prepares for such an eventuality. The plan
on the other hand doesnt prepare for any variation in the original assumption. If the climate
change turns out to be much stronger and faster than the average in the climate model seems
to indicate (although is still possibility) it might completely destroy the environment in the seas
next of the country, devastate the sea life and at the same time catastrophically damage the
economy that is very dependent on fish resources. This would therefore be a very fragile
strategy as it only prepares for one eventuality and doesnt react positively to any variation in
assumptions or volatility.
Another of them is a state that also assumes that a certain climate change might bring
certain opportunities to the state, such as through the benefits of new shipping lanes, and starts
to prepare for it by building connections and infrastructure much in the same way as the
country with the fragile strategy. This country on the other hand is not very depended on the
climate assumptions of its strategy. If the outcomes turn out to be something less probable the
results arent devastating for the country. Its location or type economy doesnt make it sensitive
to changes in Arctic environment. They also make sure that all of their build up will also have
secondary uses in the case of improbable outcome. This could for instance be in the form of
research facilities, new economic ties and so on. Even if the most unlikely situation would arise
the strategy would always bring some benefits to the country. The only thing that doesnt profit
the country is a status quo; all volatility and any type of variations bring the country some gains.
This countrys strategy is anti-fragile.
The third countrys strategy is somewhere between the first and the second country. Its
not greatly depended on its assumptions like the first country and volatility wouldnt greatly
harm it. At the same time, it would not gain in any considerable way either if there is a lot of
volatility as is the case with the second country and therefore cant be called anti-fragile. This
countrys strategy is relatively robust.
By using this method, it is possible to do something interesting. We can compare the
countries strategies without making predictions about which eventualities are most likely. We
get around answering the question of conflict, cooperation, or anything else that requires us to
be able to calculate the future. Instead, we can assess which countrys strategy is the least
fragile. It doesnt necessarily mean that this country will be the most successful or most
powerful, it simply tells how particular countries are relatively fragile which can be taken as an
indication of whose strategy is least likely to break apart if something unexpected happens. This
paper limits itself to the strategies of Arctic stakeholders as they are today in regards to the
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situation in the Arctic. A country with very fragile or anti-fragile Arctic strategy doesnt inevitably
translate to a very fragile or anti-fragile state overall. Without further examination, it is
acknowledged that fragilities in other strategies or systems of these countries could affect their
status in the Arctic greatly. Even so, looking at the fragility of Arctic strategies specifically is still
an interesting inquiry as no matter of anti-fragility elsewhere in a countrys systems and
strategies can de-fragilize something that is already fragile. No chain is stronger than its weakest
link.
15 | P a g e

3. Methodology
3.1 Defining Fragility
The basic approach of estimating the fragility of different Arctic policies will be based on the
heuristics outlined in Taleb and Douadys Mathematical Definition, Mapping and Detection of
(Anti) Fragility
52
. In the paper, fragility is defined mathematically as the sensitivity of a given
risk measure to an error in the estimation of (the possibly one-sided) deviation parameter of a
distribution
53
. Essentially, what this means is that a fragile phenomenon is one in which a
change in condition can drastically alter the outcome to the worse, exponentially so the bigger
the change. A robust phenomenon is one that is insensitive to changes; any change to the
condition will not alter the outcome a lot. Anti-fragile phenomenon are those that the bigger
the change to the condition, the more beneficial it is to the outcome.
All this is explained in detail mathematically in Taleb and Douadys paper but the nature
of the subject at hand and the nature of social sciences in general does not allow for too much
accuracy or reliance on mathematical models. Nonetheless, some simple heuristics hold true
even in the case of wrong probability distribution. Without changing the probability distribution
and simply by looking at the general shape of it, we can assess the fragility of a system or a
phenomenon. This is done by examining the curve of the probability distribution
54
. We are
therefore going to look into the particularities of the model and see how it can theoretically
apply to the Arctic policies of different states. Then we are going to reveal the real world
limitation of such an approach and use that as the basis of our analysis.
Probability distribution is a mathematical concept that plots the different outcomes
against the probability of that said outcome. An example is the figure below that plots the
probability of every possible outcome of throwing two dices. This allows us to get a feeling for
the probability density of this event; it is obvious from the graph that in case of two dices, the
majority of the results are going to be between 5-9 by simply looking at the area it spans
55
.

Figure 2 Example of probability distribution

52
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Taleb and Douady, Mathematical Definition, Mapping and Detection of (Anti) Fragility 2012
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Johnson and Kuby 2012
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In real life, probability distributions are not going to be symmetrical in the way the dice
example is and the most likely the results are not always going to be in the middle. More often
than not, the most probable outcome is asymmetrically closer to either extreme of good and
bad outcomes. This can be observed but can give a wrong picture of the risk involved. In
probability space, no outcome is certain and the tails, the accumulation of less likely outcomes,
have to be taken into consideration
56
. Lets for instance imagine the probabilities of increased
average temperature in the Arctic. If for instance the most likely average temperature rise is 5,
with 25% likelihood its very tempting to just consider that number. If however the accumulated
of probabilities of the temperature rise to be 1-5 is 50% and from 5-10 is 25%, its obvious
that the average rise of temperature is more likely to be somewhat less than 5 rather than 5
exactly or higher.
How much does that matter? That depends on the convexity (or how deeply or steeply
the curve bends). If the convexity is extreme (creating fat tails), it means that the bigger the
change the more out of proportion the effect is on the outcome
57
. The main question then is on
which tail the fat tail is on. If the fat tail is on the left side it means that the main probability
density is on outcomes worse than the mean and the change is not linear, i.e. a little change for
the worse is a little less probable but twice as big of a change will be more than half as likely.
This means that a twice as bad outcome is not twice as unlikely as intuition might imply but
rather less, so any events lying to the left side of the mean might actually result in a much worse
result than people would generally expect. Any event to the right of the mean (more beneficial
outcomes) are much rarer and do not have the same impact. An example of an anti-fragile
situation is where the fat tail is to the right. As opposed to the fragile situation, the downside (to
the left) are rare and the convexity of the tail to the direction of good outcomes is so that the
bigger the change is from the mean, the better the outcomes will be. All this can be
demonstrated in the figure below and can be explained in detail in N.N. Talebs book Anti-
fragile
58
.

Figure 3 Example of the probability distribution of different types of fragility. The Type 1 Fragile is very rare in its
symmetry
59

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57
58
2012
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The probability density function is the derivative of the probability distribution; we get the
density function by integrating the probability distribution over some range. It shows the
relative likelihood for some random variable to occur
60
. By simply looking at the probability
density function, we can detect fragility or anti-fragility. Because fragility is characterized by the
thickness and location of the tails of the probability distribution curve (the shape of the area
beneath the curve), the probability density function can be used to define fragility. The increase
in tail thickness on the left side is the same as the shift the of probability density function to the
right, as is shown on the figure below.

Figure 4 Definition of Fragility - the shaded area represents the fragility of the function
61

3.2 Fragility in Arctic Climate Models
As was described in the climate background chapter, climate change is quickly changing the
climate of the Arctic, melting the ice and creating new ice-free environment that changes the
strategic meaning of the region. The warmer climate could open up sea routes at least part of
the year with serious economic and political consequences. Scientists have data that reaches
back decades to reveal this development but use simulations and models to make projections
for future trends in the regions climate.
These models get increasingly sophisticated. They take into account more and more
variables: components of the atmosphere, ocean, land and the cryosphere
62
. At the same time,
they also get more and more complicated and sensitive. The overwhelming majority of these
models shows us is that the sea ice in Arctic waters are going to decrease in the future.
Many different things matter to policy makers. They might be interested in knowing
when either the east or west route opens up (however narrow it is), when any route that would
be totally in international waters would open up or even when the North Pole itself might open
up in a completely unfrozen Arctic. The extent of the ice is usually the biggest in Mars and April
(after winter) and smallest in the end of September (after summer) so they might want to know
when the Arctic is ice-free all year round or simply if there is a window of opening in
September
63
. The regularity of such an event would also be very important. It seems to be a very
long wait until we can see an all year round ice-free Arctic but we are already starting to see the

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Johnson and Kuby 2012
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62
Kattsov and Klln 2004
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National Snow & Ice Data Center 2013
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opening up of the eastern sea route at the end of summer almost annually. Now, a lot of focus is
on when we can expect the North Pole itself to open up in September. This is important because
this would mean that the shortest possible route between the eastern and western hemisphere
would be viable for shipping at least part of the year.
The projections of an ice-free North Pole regularly make the news. Different scientists
make different estimations based on different simulations. Some news make it look like the ice
might be disappearing in the next three or four years
64
, others talk about the Arctic becoming
ice-free in the next decade or two
65
while others say that climate change will leave the Arctic
ice-free by 2050
66
. The reason for the discrepancy is that scientists can of course not say when it
will happen with 100% certainty; instead, they can only estimate the probability distribution of
an ice-free Arctic by using a model built on certain assumptions. Other models, using other
assumptions, will give different probability distributions. Each of them will only be able to
estimate with some likelihood but there is also the probability that the event could happen
some other time.
The method of making a best-guess projection is called the deterministic approach.
Every different model gives one result and assuming they are all as likely it is possible to take an
arithmetic mean to get one result that is deemed the most likely impact
67
. This does not give
the best picture of what these models are saying. Instead, it is better to use the probabilistic
approach, where every different model is used separately for impact analysis, the probability
distributions estimated and then evaluated together. If there is a need for a one result, it
happens in the last phase, where the calculated impacts are averaged instead of the average
climate change projection
68
.

Figure 5
69

64
Vidal 2012
65
Planetsave 2013
66
Drajem 2013
67
Kattsov and Klln 2004, 122
68
Kattsov and Klln 2004, 122
69
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By using the probabilistic approach on several of the most imported models, we get a
graph like the one above. By examining it, we can predict with considerable certainty that by the
year 2100 the September sea-ice cover will be completely gone
70
. In the paper that the graph
was published in, the authors uses the approach to say that there is a 16% probability that 20%
of the base line ice cover in September will left by the end of the 21st century. But at the same
time, there is the same probability that the ice will have disappeared completely by the year
2046-2065
71
.
This kind of projection is what policymakers try to base their strategies on. They tend to
use the results of the scientists to get to some number they can strategize around but do not
take into account the probabilistic nature of these projections. As explained in the earlier
chapter, projections in probability space can be considered either fragile or not by looking at
some of their characteristics.
In the year 2007 a survey of the summer sea ice coverage revealed a record low. What
was most shocking about the situation was that the most recent UN climate models at the time
hadnt predicted this extremely low coverage until 40 years later, in 2040 or even 2050
72
. What
had happened was a freak weather incident that only happens every twenty years or so and the
model had not taken into account. A combination of certain weather conditions had brought
much warmer winds into the Arctic compared to normal years, increasing the rate of the
melting
73
. Because the incident happened in an era of general melting, the effects were
irreversible and moved the projected probabilities ahead by many years. The model had not
been designed to consider this kind of event, which made the model more fragile.
As a reaction to that event, all new models try to take into account historical frequency
of outlying weather incidents. What is extremely hard for model builders to know is if the
general trend of climate change might be exacerbating the volatility of the weather pattern in
the Arctic. If that is the case, it means that the frequency of freak weather events becomes
unpredictable and that all models are inherently fragile. Every strategy that does not consider
those must therefore become as fragile or more.
It is possible to show this mathematically. We know how we can define fragility if we
know the probability density function of a certain phenomenon. Moreover, we do not need
accuracy or perfect description of the probability distribution thanks to Talebs heuristic. All we
need to know is the general shape of the density function. Because of the probabilistic approach
that most of the models use and the fact that they are strongly linked to the variables of global
climate change, we can examine the probability density of projected warming, which the sea ice
cover projections are built on.

70
71
Bo, Hall and Qu 2009, 2
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Silverman 2011
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Silverman 2011
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Figure 6 Probability Density for Surface Warming between the year 1990 and (A) year 2100 / (B) Year 2200
74

The graph above shows the probability distribution for projected global warming from the year
1990 to the year 2100 (right side) and 2200 (left side). We can assume that the lag for Arctic
temperatures will not be considerably different from the lag for global temperatures
75
. The
authors used similar methodologies as IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change) and
others
76
. The shape of the probability distributions is therefore fairly representative for models
like this. We also see very similar shapes of probability distributions when we examine projected
temperature sensitivity
77
. Temperature sensitivity is the projected temperature rise that results
from doubling the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. The shape tells us that the reaction is
nonlinear.
The shape of the probability distribution looks familiar. While the mean temperature
increase is around 3C, we can see that the right tail is a lot thicker than the left tail, which
means that freak incidents are much more likely to trend toward a temperature rise higher than
the mean rather than the opposite. This is exactly the same kind of situation as we saw on the
examples of fragile and anti-fragile phenomena earlier.
3.3 Using Fragility in the Context of Strategy
The phenomena in Figure 5 is neither fragile nor anti-fragile, its simply a natural development
that has no subjective meaning, good or bad, except for in the context of human made
strategies. We can assume (and we will see later) that the different outcomes of Arctic
strategies are strongly correlated with how much global warming will lead to decreased sea-ice
in the Arctic-ocean. The outcomes of the strategies can be good or bad, depending on the
probabilities, and are therefore either fragile or anti-fragile. Their fragility is determined by if

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Titus and Narayanan 1998, 38
75
76
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Rogelj, Meinshausen and Knutti 2012, 3
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they are positively or negatively correlated with the x-axis on Figure 5. Generally, you can expect
a strategy that benefits from more and quicker melting of sea-ice and therefore from more
warming to be anti-fragile. If a strategy benefits more from more status quo, less opening up of
the northern routes and therefore less warming up will have a distribution that is mirrored to
the one above and therefore fragile.
We cannot expect to be able to create a model that explains that correlation
mathematically. The different values of how good and bad the outcomes will be are necessarily
very subjective; such is the nature of social studies. Thats not a problem though, as we dont
need to be able to specify the probability distribution with any precision
78
. Instead, we use the
transfer theorem that outlines certain detection heuristics that have been proven to reveal
fragility without precise probability distribution. The heuristic allows us to simply analyze the
shape of the distribution but according it to there are four types of distributions that creates an
exhaustive map of possible outcomes with mutually exclusive categories of payoffs
79
. These
types are the robust type, fragile (type 1), fragile (type 2) and anti-fragile and how they look and
how their tails are shaped can be seen in Figure 2.
Having these heuristics in mind, we can use it to analyze different strategies. This is an
inaccurate task but thanks to the general characteristics of the fragility heuristics, we can make
estimates under certain assumptions of how we measure strategies ability to react to volatility.
The first thing that we have to research is the volatility in question, which is the probability
distribution of climate change. This we have already done in the chapter above. Applying
probabilities on models in natural science is easy enough but how do we apply it to strategies?
The general idea in this paper is that in theory, you could use the newest sources on the
Arctic policy of the involved powers to estimate the countries preparedness to deal with
different scenarios of temperature rise. For the sake of comparison, certain variables will be
evaluated using a numerical scale. The numbers are not extremely meaningful on their own; the
evaluation is always going to be extremely subjective. Paired with the assumptions and
arguments, these observations should nonetheless be somewhat useful in giving a picture of the
scope of different countries strategies.
With the strategy evaluation in hand and the probability distribution of different climate
models, we can get a very general picture of the probability distribution of good and bad
outcomes for different strategies. For example, if a certain country is well prepared for a certain
rise in temperature we can see the probability of that outcome by comparing to the probability
of that temperature rise. By looking at different temperature rises compared to different levels
of preparedness, we can plot the probability distribution of good outcomes for the strategies.
Different countries will benefit in different ways from different climate scenarios so the
distribution is not going to be the same for every country. By looking at the distribution and
having the fragility heuristic in mind, we can easily see if the strategy is fragile, robust or anti-
fragile.

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A weaker version of this will be applied as the numbers wouldnt be meaningful anyway.
Simply assessing certain parts of the strategy can be as affective in portraying the fragility of the
strategy. Thanks to the fact that the heuristic doesnt need the distribution to be accurate, only
generally shaped right, we can use this indicator to get some meaningful results about the
fragility of the strategies. The results will be subjective because the original evaluation was
subjective and has to be understood with the original assumptions in mind. After processing the
strategy of every country in this way, we can backtrack and check if the whole framework leads
us to a sensible result by discussing the real world implications of the strategies of the country.
In the first part of the assessment of each country, we will get an overview of the
strategy. Special attention is paid to the environmental assumption that underpins the strategy.
Two dimensions will be considered particularly; economic and security and in the second part
there will be an assessment on how the outcomes in this two fields are affected if the
environmental assumptions break. All the strategies are designed to deliver good outcomes
under certain assumptions about the climate trend. The paper attempts to analyze the
consequences on the strategy outcomes if the environmental changes will happen slower or
faster than assumed. Using this method, we get a different perspective on what makes
strategies good, which doesnt necessarily negate other methods but possibly compliments
them and results in an interesting study.
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4. Strategy Assessments
4.1 The United States
4.1.1 Strategy Overview
According to Bailes & Heininen
80
, the main strategy document of the United States government
at the moment is the National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive labeled NSPD-66 / HSPD-25 under the subject title Arctic Region Policy
81
.
The priorities are listed early in the document:
It is the policy of the United States to
82
:

1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region
are environmentally sustainable;
4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United
States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and
Sweden);
5. Involve the Arctic's indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and
6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global
environmental issues.
When this paper was being finalized in mid of May 2013, a new version of the strategy
was published, National Strategy for the Arctic Region
83
. The new strategy document puts
further emphasis on innovative arrangements
84
but in every main way it has the same
priorities as the 2009 document. In the background of their policy, they take into account the
effect of climate change and increased human activity in the Arctic region
85
. They also take into
account the growing awareness that the Arctic region is fragile. The focus in the strategy is on
how to protect US national security interests in the Arctic. The strategy recommends that the US
government increases their military presence in the high north and invest more in Arctic capable
equipment. The document names possible hard threats like terrorists, criminal action, piracy
and possible state activities
86
.
This goes against the de facto situation in the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean but
the U.S. has, in the last decade, decreased their presence significantly, closing their base in
Iceland in 2006 and leaving most of the region/s security to their NATO allies
87
. This is
understandable as the focus of the US military defense after the Cold War moved to the Middle

80
2012
81
The White House 2009
82
83
84
85
86
Bailes and Heininen 2012, 54
87
Bailes and Heininen 2012
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East. With a possible pivot to Asia in coming years
88
, its hard to see how the US is going to
realistically project power in the Arctic without spreading its forces too thin.
The focus is also on making sure that the territorial claims of the US are respected and
to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf coming from Alaska towards the North Pole.
These claims rely heavily on the idea that international treaties and traditions will be honored.
Such an agreement is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Even
though its in many ways flawed and open to individual states interpretation and without an
international body that has a power to evaluate and rule when there is doubt there is a lot of
use in it in a situation like this as a platform for rightful claims. The problem for the US is that
even though almost every other state on the planet has ratified the UNCLOS, except for the U.S.
itself. The last three presidents, Clinton, Bush and Obama, were all strongly for the ratification.
such a commitment has always been stopped in Americas law making bodies as there is still a
majority opinion that backing this kind of international convention would go against Americas
sovereignty to act freely outside of own waters
89
.
An interesting aspect of the States Arctic strategy is its emphasis on working through
international cooperation. It wants to strengthen the Arctic council and therefore probably
move it away from being a simple platform for discussion to a more of a ruling actor in the area.
This is not very ordinary approach from a superpower. A superpower would only endorse
international governance if they believe they have enough influence to keep it in direct control.
Perhaps thats the United States idea, after all the majority of the Arctic council are very firm
allies, like Canada and the NATO members within the Nordic states. Thats nonetheless hardly
going to be the case when you have a state like Russia on board. Not even Canada seems to be
going to allow the US to lead the way Arctic issues.
There is a lot of economic interest in the Arctic that the States could benefit from,
especially in the case of the state of Alaska. There is nonetheless not a very enthusiastic tone in
their strategy towards the economic opportunities. Alaska is, after all, a very small and sparsely
populated state and not very economically significant for the whole economy of the United
States which is leading on a global scale. The strategy emphases that resource management in
the region will happen in a sustainable way and with cooperation. Research and development is
to be strengthened through cooperation but if we look at efforts to build something like Arctic
research ships (there are currently none), they have been postponed until after the term of the
sitting government and have a therefore uncertain future. When it comes to the prospects of
shipping, the strategy commends that there additional measures will be developed to address
issues like infrastructure and rescue and safety operations, but it will happen in cooperation
with other countries. There is nothing about how the US government could facilitate such
activities in a way that would directly help with American economic interests.

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Blackwill 2013
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4.1.2 Fragility of the Strategy
The overview of the current Arctic strategy of the United States shows us that the US
government indeed assumes that climate change will lead to some increased human activities in
the Arctic region and arranges measures with that in mind. However, what if that assumption
fails? It seems obvious that if climate change would not affect the Arctic a lot or lead to
increased human activity then there would not be a lot of harm done to the US strategic interest,
it could even be better for them. If on the other hand the process of a changed Arctic
environment would escalate and happen even faster and more intensely than is currently being
forecasted then what would happen?
If the process of opening up would happen really quickly it seems that the current Arctic
strategy would not make certain that the U.S. would take the lead economically, neither in
shipping nor resource exploitation. This has very drastic consequences for the status of the US
as the world main and only superpower. Unlike the smaller states, such a power has to concern
itself with more matters that score high in the worldview of the Theory of Realism, such as
relative power balances and the matter of global hegemony. The shipping networks that
connect a state to the rest of the world could be described as the breathing room of the state.
To be able to protect these lanes should always been a top priority of the leading power as is
the case with the US today. The current economic recession in western countries can be solved
with growth fueled through globalization but with the world distribution networks working at
full capacity this is not a likely option. A fast climate change in the Arctic would greatly update
the worlds capacity for globalization. There is nothing in the strategy that prepares America for
such a situation leaving that space upon for any other rising power to grow into, most likely
Russia or the states of East Asia.
This would also critically affect the security environment of the US. With an increasingly
globalized world that relies deeply on human activity in the high north that is mostly ruled by
other powers than America, this would undoubtedly lead to a lot of stress on the American
military that would have to move under-equipped and unprepared forces from very different
corners of the world to be able to show any sort of power projection as is dictated in the
strategy. This would be a very uncomfortable and costly for the military, more so the faster it
happens.
Its therefore the conclusion of this paper that in any other case than a slow and stress-
free climate change in the Arctic it seems that this strategy would not be very useful in keeping
the US in the lead economically nor in terms of power. The strategy is therefore considered
relatively fragile.
4.2 Canada
90
, the main Arctic strategy document of the government of
Canada at the moment is Canadas Northern Strategy Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future
91

90
2012
91
Government of Canada 2009
26 | P a g e

which remains the core strategy. Since then, there also has been added another document,
Statement on Canadas Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canadas
Northern Strategy Abroad
92
, which goes in more detail into implementation and meaning of the
strategy.
Canada is in many ways in a special situation. They are a true Arctic country and a great
power in the Arctic. In the Arctic, it controls vast lands, seas and resources and within their
population, they have many of the indigenous people of the Arctic. They are the second biggest
country in the world and their sheer size puts them up with Russia as the main Arctic players. At
the same time, they are nonetheless a small country. The population of Canada is less than of
the State of California in the U.S. and Canadas military and economic power cannot compare
with that of the US and Russia. In the Arctic context, this could actually be considered as a kind
of advantage. In the Arctic, they can be just as influential as Russia and the US but because they
are not a significant global power, they can also really focus on being an Arctic power. The
strategic documents really show effort from the Canadian government to establish the identity
of Canada as a pure Arctic state.
The main priorities of the Canadian Northern Strategy are according to the
Arctic Foreign Policy Statement
93
:

1. Exercising sovereignty
2. Promoting economic and social development
3. Protecting the Arctic environment
4. Improving and devolving governance
The strategys assumption about the coming impact of climate change is pretty well
demarcated. It assumes that the impact is going to be great as it will change the environment
and the livelihood of the people living in the north and bring international interest, especially
through resource development and opening of new transportation routes
94
. On the other hand,
even though the North Western Passage, the sea route that goes through the waters of Canada,
has become fully navigable in the end of summer in some recent years, they dont expect it to
become safe or reliable transportation route in the near future
95
. The climate projection they
are building their strategy on is therefore one that will bring a lot of change in coming years but
not so fast that we would see the full effects in the near future.
The top priority of Canadas Arctic Strategy is to exercise its sovereignty, and in the
same way as the US and Russia to get their territory claim recognized and to establish the outer
limits of its continental shelf in accordance with their right according to the UNCLOS. This is of
primary importance to Canada; everything else in their strategy depends on them being
unchallenged caretakers and on these territories and waters being an inalienable part of Canada.
The capability of Canada is very limited in terms of power projection but in the strategy, it is

92
93
94
Government of Canada 2009, 5
95
27 | P a g e

underlined that this is a process that the government of Canada will pursue through the
channels of international cooperation and negotiation. Canada has shown that they can lead the
way in cooperation but at the same time, they dont rely too heavily on it and are flexible for
new beneficial channels of cooperation and generally do not like to involve stakeholders that
are not directly linked to the Arctic. In the case of overlapping claims, they use the Arctic Council
but also lead the way of establishing an even narrower platform for cooperation: the newly
established informal cooperation of the five Arctic littoral states
96
.
This does not mean that there arent any problems of contested sovereignty. Canada
has, for many years, been in disputes with the kingdom of Denmark because of unpopulated
Hans Island, which is in between Canada and Greenland
97
. Canada has stood firm in their claim
and its military regularly goes to the island to put up the Canadian flag between the Danish
military doing the same. The dispute is not allowed to strain the diplomatic relations between
the countries. This is the main rule of how Canada approaches its sovereignty disputes, with
firmness, but not allowing it to affect relations.
This is can be a hard line to stay on when a lot is at stake. Canada has, for several years,
been in disputes with the US, its neighbor and closest ally, about the waters of the North
Western Passage. The US contests Canadas claims to these waterways and states that they are
in international waters. They are known to send their submarines through there without
notifying the Canadian government. This angers the Canadians that have reason to say that
these waters are not international
98
. The North Western Passage goes through the Canadian
Arctic archipelago. These consist of a myriad of islands that are all Canadian territory, which
under the provisions of the UNCLOS could be interpreted to mean that the entirety of the
waters between them should be considered Canadas territorial waters. To underline their
position the Canadian navy has established an armed naval presence at strategic choking
points in the Canadian Arctic
99
.
The status of these waters could become very important to Canada in case of the
opening up of transportation routes in the future. Canadas sovereignty in the Arctic (including
the maritime sovereignty
100
) is defined as the number one Arctic foreign policy priority
101
. The
strategy dictates that Canada reacts by strengthening their presence in the Arctic considerably.
This is done by sending more military staff to the north, more ships in the waters and more air
surveillance. They are building army bases and training centers, naval facilities and producing a
new and bigger polar research vessel for the Canadian coast guard
102
. This also reflects Canadas
commitment to Arctic research, but alongside these military installments, they also being build

96
The Ilulilssat Declaration 2008
97
98
Teeple 2010
99
Webster 2007/3
100
101
102
Government of Canada 2009, 9-10
28 | P a g e

research facilities and research networks
103
. Canada has become the world leader in Arctic
science and is determined to establish its position as such
104
.
Neither the human dimension nor the indigenous people are a high on the list of
priorities. Next on the list of priorities, after the sovereignty issue, is definitely economic
development, but given the security of Canadas sovereignty in the North this is definitely the
field that has most opportunities for Canadas future. According to the Governments 2009
strategy document they havent even started to scratch the surface of the Norths immense
store of mineral, petroleum, hydro and ocean resources
105
. This could really define the future
of the Canadian economy and the government is determined to maximize its utility. Huge
infrastructure and investment projects are underway to make sure this will happen. Everything
that has to do with the human dimension in the north is being put into this economic context.
Although this could be considered as mainly positive development for Canada as a
whole, its quite apparent that climate change and increased human activity could be incredibly
disruptive of the situation and the way of life of the many groups of indigenous people of these
northern territories. This is a problem Canada shares with Russia (and on a smaller scale some of
the Nordic countries) and this disruption could lead to more widespread social problems and
feelings of injustice. Canada has an interesting political way to tackle this, which consist of
involving these groups of people as much as possible, in terms of political power and ownership.
The political devolution in the northern territories in recent years and decades are interesting.
Of the fourteen indigenous nations living in the regions of Yukon, North Western Territories,
Nunavut and Northern Quebec, the central government has sign agreements of self-governing
with eleven of them.
More and more the decisions and policymaking regarding resource management has
been moved to the local governments of the native people. This devolution is happening on
more than one level. In the 2000s, the Canadians introduced the new province of Nunavut, with
its own parliament and government. The disruption is deemed inevitable but the strategy reacts
by bringing these people as close to the decision-making and the development as possible. This
is also seen in terms of ownership. New models for aboriginal participation are being developed
which includes aboriginal ownership positions in resource management projects
106
.
The overview of the current Arctic strategy of Canada shows us that the Canadian government
assumes that climate change will lead to greatly increased human activities in the Arctic region
and arranges measures with that in mind. The speed of the change is also indicated, as
something that will have implications immediately but the full impact will not be felt in the near
future. However, what if that assumption fails? Lets check the meaning of the strategy if the
climate will not warm up as projected and if the climate change will actually happen much faster
than they assume.

103
104
105
2009, 16
106
29 | P a g e

In terms of security, the main actions of the strategy involves actively exercising their
sovereignty by being very firm in their claim without allowing it to affect their relations with
other states, by leading but being flexible in cooperation, and by greatly increasing their military,
research and economic presence in the Arctic. In the case of the climate remaining unchanged,
it is very hard to imagine how this strategy could backfire. The buildup of presence and claims
wouldnt be as significant as if the Arctic were to open up but in any case it would help with
securing Canadas security, giving it a clear voice in the international community and
establishing new links and knowledge that could be beneficial for Canada without considerable
costs. In the case of the climate change escalating much faster than is normally projected and
assumed in the strategy, its hard to see how that wouldnt simply magnify the planned benefits
of the strategy actions as they stand, either linearly or even exponentially.
Economically it is the same story. Without the projected warming, it is hard to say that
the planned infrastructure and resource projects wouldnt at least leave some benefits. They are
also very scalable and can be scaled back in accordance with the climate reality. In the case of
the climate change escalating and happening much faster than projected, there are certainly
some threats that have to be examined. This is especially the case when it comes to the
environmental dangers. Canada is a proper Arctic country. Any disruption in the Arctic
environment will affect all of Canada (unlike the US that is only in very small way connected to
the Arctic environment).
This paper argues that this will not become a significant problem. More than 90% of the
population lives within 200 km of the southern border
107
, an area that would become more
habitable. The disruption would be the biggest in the northern aboriginal communities whose
way of life would be greatly affected. They way Canada approaches this problem through
devolution and giving these groups self-governing powers really makes these groups more
adaptable in the case of such disruption. By creating local units and entities that are in charge of
their own affairs and participate in the development, it creates an atmosphere of creativity and
many different ideas and approaches and if there is some failures in adapting and governing its
much more likely to be isolated and be a lesson to other entities.
Its therefore the conclusion of this paper that independent of how the climate change
assumption of the Canadian Arctic strategy will hold, different scenarios are always more likely
to bring some benefits. Furthermore, the more future climate outcomes deviate from the
assumption of the strategy the more benefits can be expected from the strategy. The strategy is
therefore considered to be very close to be considered as anti-fragile.
4.3 Russia
108
Russia at the moment is Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in
the Period up to 2020 and Beyond *title translated, original title:

107
BBC 2012
108
2012
30 | P a g e

2020
+
109
.
Russia is a very special amongst the Arctic nations. When looking at a map of the Arctic,
around half of the circumpolar landmass seems to belong to Russia. With by far the longest
shore facing the North Pole, any activity in Arctic water necessarily has to take Russia into
account. Russia is an Arctic state with many of its states and regions belonging at least partially
to the Arctic. Like Canada, it does indeed identify itself as such but still being by far the biggest
country in the world, the Arctic is not always a very influential dimension in Russian politics.
With land that goes all the way down to the Caucasus and the Black Sea in the south, to Eastern
Europe in the west, and over deserts and mountains all the way to the Sea of Japan in the Far
East, there are many geopolitical dimensions the central government of the Russian federation
has to take into consideration. After participating in the establishment of some of the Arctic
cooperation channels that are prevalent today, right before the fall of the Soviet Union, there
wasnt a lot of focus on Arctic matters for a long time. In recent years, the attention has been
slowly moving back to the Arctic and some even say that Russia has been making a comeback
as an Arctic state. Today, the Arctic regions across the country all play an important role in the
countrys overall strategy, especially in regards to maintaining the ever-rising resource sector,
which the Russian economy heavily relies on. The strategy document that will be analyzed in this
paper was published in 2008 and has since then been important for the making of many other
military and economic strategies for Russia, especially in the way they want to treat the north as
a strategic resource base
110
. The main goals of the strategy are
111
:
1. The expansion of the resource base of the Arctic zone to meet the needs of hydrocarbon
resources, aquatic biological resources and other types of strategic raw materials
2. Military security and protection of the northern border, including the maintenance of
the required combat capabilities, troops and military units in the region.
3. The Preservation and protection of the Arctic environment, especially those
environmental consequences of increased economic activity and global climate change
4. The formation of a unified information space of the natural features of the Russian
Arctic
5. Ensure an adequate level of Arctic research and the creation of a framework for
scientific and geographic research that will include the development of tools to meet
the challenges of defense and security and production activities in the Arctic climate
conditions
6. Ensure the mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Russia
and other Arctic states.
The most basic objective that goes through all other parts of the strategy is the desire
and determination to give the Arctic a role in the social and economic development of the whole
state as a strategic resource base. To be able to do this, they need to properly defend and keep

109
Gazeta 2008
110
111
Gazeta 2008
31 | P a g e

up protection around their northern border and their claims in the north while at the same time
keep the region peaceful so economic development can happen uninterrupted. There is an
certain emphasis put on cooperation and good relations with other Arctic states, mostly with
the other four Arctic littoral states and less so through international organizations. This
cooperative spirit can be seen in the way Russia resolved its Spitsbergen dispute with Norway
through cooperation and negotiations. At the same time, there is also a lot in the strategy about
building up strong presence in the north with combat ready military forces. The strategy can be
quite contradictory in times when it at the same time proclaims the Arctic to be a zone of
peace and cooperation and a sphere of military security
112
.
Another aspect of the main objective stressed is the usage of methods to preserve the
very fragile ecological system of the Arctic. This is again quite contradictory within the strategy;
this is to happen at the same time as Russia is going to greatly increase their military presence
and go into huge infrastructure and resource exploitation projects. The way they are going to
resolve this paradox and preserve the environment is very vaguely described in the strategy.
Although there arent many laid out plans, how is this going to be achieved? The tone of it really
indicates that the Russian government is committed to doing everything in their power to keep
the stability in the area. This includes making sure that the environmental disruption will not
endanger the livability of these areas by getting scientists and academic from all fields involved
in any project undertaken. In the same way as in Canada, the fragility of the environment is
likely to be most disruptive when it comes to the livelihood and the way of life of the local and
aboriginal people in the North. The way the strategy dictates this should be dealt with is the
polar opposite of the Canadian method. There is nothing about involving these groups, neither
in decision-making nor ownership. Instead, the strategy seeks to bring them prosperity through
development and employment. These groups of people will be reeducated and helped to adapt
to a more developed way of life
113
. This kind of reeducation approach has been prevalent in the
history of western countries dealing with indigenous people within its borders. The results have
usually been disastrous, no matter if it is the case of Indians in Canada and the United States or
aboriginals in Australia
114
. There is no reason to assume that this approach would be any more
successful in the Russian Arctic Strategy.
The third aspect that is important for the strategys desire to make North Russias
resource base, is the buildup of the Arctic coast of Russia as a national transportation link
through the constructions of harbor facilities and other infrastructure along with a fleet that
could handle at least a one-year ice. This would truly be a revolution for Russia. Although Russia
is the biggest state on the planet and spans almost the whole of Eurasia, its always been a
traditional land power. Their naval connections are small and far apart, at the coast of the sea of
Japan; at the Black sea, throttled by the chocking point at the Bosporus strait into the
Mediterranean and again at the strait of Gibraltar into the Atlantic and the Access to the Baltic
Sea through the insular Kalingrad oblast in Europe that is not connected to the rest of Russia.
Other harbors, such as the whole of the extensive North coast, have been very limited by

112
113
Gazeta 2008
114
Jones 2008
32 | P a g e

yearlong sea ice although some of them have proved very useful at least part of the year and for
ice-capable fleet, such as the harbor in Murmansk and St. Petersburg
115
. This is a complete game
changer, both militarily and economically. The lack of sea access has often, in history, been
Russias Achilles heel. In the first great war of the 20
th
century, the Russo Japanese war, one of
Russias main goals was to retain access to a warm water port for its navy. The lack of good
naval access really lost the war for Russia. They deployed their naval fleet from their Baltic Base
in North Europe and it took half a year and a trip around the world, south by Africas Cape of
Good Hope to get to the Sea of Japan. When arriving, the fleet was so worn-out that they lost
the battle
116
. The opportunity to link the north coast to the rest of the worlds maritime
transportation network is therefore invaluable for Russia.
In Bailes and Heininens comparative study on Arctic strategies
117
, the strategy is reasoned to be
mostly a pragmatic instrument to achieve President Putins primary aim the stabilization of
the Federation and its economy
118
.The strategy seems to be considerably adequate in fulfilling
this mission. It is nonetheless hard to say that the strategy takes into account any other interests,
such as those of the people living in the north or the environment beyond measures that
reduces threats of destabilization. This approach could seriously weaken the strategy in case of
unexpected circumstances.
When taking a look at the underlying climate assumption in the strategy, its possible to
tell that the Russian strategy is all based around the notion that the Arctic will open up allowing
for resource exploitation and maritime transportation in Arctic waters. Most of the projects and
planned maneuvers, such as military presence and maritime infrastructure construction, will be
useless without the warming up. On the other hand, even though there are no special measures
for an unexpected increased climate change, it seems obvious that many of the plans could only
benefit from such a course of events. The faster the climate change happens the quicker and
more powerfully the impact of restructuring the north as a resource base could happen.
It should nonetheless be considered if the strategy can react to the incredible
environmental consequences such a development would bring and the way it could affect the
natural environment and groups of people living in the region. The environmental changes will
have great affects to vast parts of Russia. The way the strategy suggests how this should be dealt
with is not convincing, especially not if it happens very fast. Moreover, the increased human
activity in the Arctic will not affect any country as powerfully as Russia. If the opening up of the
northeastern route brings international shipping and resource exploitation in international
waters near to the coasts of Russia, it is bound to put some kind of pressure on the power
balance in the region. Russia has proven that they will want to have a lot to say about the
governance of this activity while other powers will want this to be mostly controlled either by
each state or under the auspices of international governance. The contradictory current

115
Sakwa 2008
116

Jukes 2002
117
2012
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33 | P a g e

approach, where Russia at the same times plans to militarize the region along with their wish for
the regional disputes to be resolved in cooperation, might make the situation fairly dynamic.
It is therefore the conclusion of this paper that the Russian strategy is neither fragile nor
particularly anti-fragile but relatively resilient. The strategy is unlikely to break up and be
rendered useless under stress but in lieu of dealing with the dangers of potential stress, it is not
possible to foresee that this strategy is good at bringing extra benefits that could come with
different unexpected climate dynamics.
4.4 Nordic Countries
4.4.1 Denmark (Greenland)
119
, the main Arctic strategy document of the Kingdom of
Denmark, which covers the joint Arctic strategy of governments of Denmark, Greenland and
Faroe Islands, is currently Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark
Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020
120
.
The small state of Denmark, bordering Northern Germany, lies far south of the icy
waters of the Arctic but for historical reasons plays the most pivotal role of all the Nordic
Countries through its links with the autonomous country of Greenland that used to be
Denmarks territory for centuries. Greenland is a prominent landmass within the Arctic Circle,
whose glaciers takes up the lions share of the ice mass of the North Pole with an extensive
coastline in the Arctic Ocean. As the climate is changing, Greenland has been slowly moving to
the center of the Arctic stage where its getting a lot of attention for its bountiful resources and
geopolitical importance. The Greenlandic people were granted home rule in 1979 under the
pretense that Greenland, along with the Faroe Islands and Denmark itself, was an equal partner
country in the Danish Kingdom
121
. The issues of foreign relations, judiciary and policing, largely
stayed in the hand of the Danish government as well as some of the fiscal power but the
government of Greenland has historically been very dependent on Danish financial support
122
.
Despite its small population density, (around 50 thousand people in a country the size of
2 million square kilometers
123
) the government of Greenland has enjoyed quite far-reaching self-
governing powers. For instance, deciding in a referendum to leave the EU as a member in 1983
after fishery disputes, these powers have grown to a borderline sovereignty in recent years. In a
treaty with Denmark and a national referendum in 2008, the self-governing got even more
substantial with Greenland getting more authority to lead an independent foreign policy
124
. The
current and expected resource development is making Greenland less financially dependent on
Denmark, which has allowed Denmark to change its relationship with Greenland. The Danish

119
2012
120
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2011
121
Graugaard 2009
122
Graugaard 2009
123
CIA World Factbook 2013
124
Graugaard 2009
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government still visions the future status of the bond between countries where Denmark will
have a constructive role in the Greenlandic part of the Arctic
125
.
In many ways, the way Denmark has already been devolving power and transforming its
relationship with the local people in Greenland and the Faroe Islands is what is being envisioned
in Canadas strategy and goes even further. A strategy for the Arctic region is first and foremost
a strategy for a development that benefits the inhabitants of the Arctic,
126
. When assessing the
usefulness and fragility of the Danish strategy, it should therefore always been done with how
well it serves this purpose in mind.
The strategys climate assumption is fairly well delimited; it looks at the period 2011-
2020 and it bases the strategy on the increased international interest the warmer climate is
going to bring Greenland. It doesnt assume that this climate change will be limitless and takes
into account ice, low temperature, extreme weathers, and the risk of grounding
127
. The main
implication the strategy foresees is to greatly increase resource utilization, especially in the field
of fossil fuels and mining of precious stones and rare metals.
This will bring a lot of international attention that might threaten the country and the
strategy reacts by planning for increased military presence of the Danish Defense forces in
Greenlandic waters, trying to involve the Greenlandic people as much as possible in their own
defense, and through their membership in NATO and defense agreements with the US
128
. The
exploitation of resources through international cooperation is central to the strategy and the
future of the Greenlandic economy. The strategy acknowledges the great threat that the
environmental changes poses to the local people in Greenland. It will disturb the traditional way
of life and the way people in the area currently make a living. Over 80% of Greenlands export
value comes today from fishery
129
. The dangers these bio-resources face are being counted. The
strategy also emphasizes the diversifying of Greenlands economy. The Greenlandic energy
sector is moving rapidly into the direction of more renewable energy sources and alongside a
warmer climate a new source of foreign currency has been introduced; tourism, especially
through the arrival of cruise ships, which has already become the second largest economic
sector in Greenland and will only grow bigger if handled in the right way
130
.
4.4.2 Norway
131
Norway are two documents: The Norwegian Governments High North Strategy,
132
that lies out
the main priorities in the Norwegian Arctic Strategy and New Building Blocks in the North The

125
126
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2011, 10
127
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2011, 16
128
129
130
131
2012
132
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway 2006
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next step in the Governments High North Strategy
133
that comes with more intricate plans
about how these priorities can be realized.
Norway is a proper Arctic littoral country whose geopolitical location makes the Arctic
dimension a very essential part of its foreign policy. The country is long and narrow, going from
south far into the north along with offshore territories such as the island of Svalbard in the high
north that extends their claim far into the Arctic Ocean. Their economy is very much based on
the extraction of fossil fuels from the seas around Norway alongside other environmentally
sensitive sectors such as fisheries and renewable energy production and is one of the strongest
economies in the world
134
. The ability to keep up their territorial claims against neighbors like
Russia is therefore a vital interest to them. Norway was one of the first countries in the Arctic to
develop and publish a comprehensive strategy in their Arctic approach
135
. The 2009 strategy is
clearly based on the assumption that climate change will offer new challenges and opportunities.
The scenario they are looking at is the next 10-15 years and is assumed to be characterized by
needs for infrastructure development, transport and business development, both onshore and
offshore
136
.
The priorities are listed in their strategy as such
137
:
1. Exercising their authority in the high north
2. Be in the forefront of developing knowledge about the Arctic
3. Take responsible care for their environment
4. Extract oil and gas from the Barent Sea
5. Safeguarding the lives of indigenous people
6. Develop people-to-people cooperation
7. Strengthening the cooperation with Russia
The Next Step strategy explains how this is going to be done by building research
facilities in the north, building a new ice breaking vessel, developing safety systems, building up
maritime, petroleum based and transportation industries and business activities in the north,
increasing and developing the activities of Norways Coast Guard and Border Control and so
on
138
.
According to Bailes and Heininen
139
, the main feature of the strategy is its narrow focus
and emphasis on Norway-Russia relations. The strategy talks much less about the Arctic and
prefers to use the word high north. The high north can easily refer to the whole Arctic much in
this context is seems more often than not mostly referring to the regions in north and north of
Norway, the waters around Svalbard and the Barents Sea. This region has played an important
role in the history of Norwegian foreign relations and is to become a (new) petroleum

133
134
The Economist 2013
135
136
137
138
139
2012
36 | P a g e

province
140
. The whole strategy revolves around this area. A lot of energy is spent on region
building and creating new links in this region instead of focusing on Arctic cooperation in general.
This is supposed to be done by people-to-people cooperation (such as encouraging cross border
communications of the indigenous Samis), opening up border and developing border control
and creating new treaties with neighboring countries.
The neighboring country in the Barent region is only one, Russia, and the focus is
therefore quite aggressively on raising cooperation between them and this former enemy of
Norway
141
. They seem to assume that the current atmosphere of peace and cooperation will be
ongoing and there is no reason to anticipate a race for energy resources
142
. They have reason
to believe that Russia is willing to cooperate in this manner in the spirit of the success story of
the Treaty of offshore de-limitation in the Barents Sea where all territory disputes in the Barents
Sea between Russia and Norway was resolved through very amiable and mutually beneficial
negotiations.
4.4.3 Iceland
143
Iceland is the report Iceland in the High North [translated, original title: sland
Norurslum]
144
and A Parliamentary Resolution on Icelands Arctic Policy
145
.
Iceland is a small island country that lies in the Atlantic Ocean, midway between
Greenland and Scandinavia. The countrys small population (300,000 people) is a relatively
special case in Arctic politics as the country lies in the mid north Atlantic with its northernmost
part lying on the Arctic Circle (through the island of Grmseyjar)
146
. The entire population the
country can be extremely affected by the economic and environmental situation in the Arctic
(there are no aboriginal people, only Icelanders). The economy of the country is very dependent
on natural resources as a majority of its GDP is based on fisheries, renewable energy industries
and tourism, with fisheries being the biggest. The cold Arctic stream and the warm Gulf Stream
meet at Iceland making it a very habitable environment for many different cold-water fish
stocks
147
. Much of Icelands most important catch is therefore particularly sensitive to changes
in the environment.
The economic aspects of Icelands strategies are nonetheless vague, compared to other
parts. The strategies acknowledges climate change and assumes a rather big change in Arctic
climate in the coming year, vanquishing the summer ice in northern routes in the very close
future, and discusses openly the possibility of this trend happening much faster than current
models project. The country is on its own powerless against that development but the strategies

140
141
142
143
2012
144
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland 2009
145
Alingi - The Icelandic Parliament 2011
146
147
European Environment Agency 2010
37 | P a g e

do not lay out a very well prepared plan of how to react to it. There is nothing in the strategies
about the possibility of the main livelihood of the nation, the fishing stocks, to move northward
into colder waters outside of the Icelands Economic Zone as the climate warms up. Historically,
the countrys main sovereignty disputes have been regarding the fishing rights. It has been the
unofficial policy of the Icelandic government to not share any rights to fishing within its own
zone and unilaterally take authority over moving stocks that go through the Icelandic zone (an
example of this is the case of the Mackerel dispute with the countries of the European Union in
2012
148
).
This doesnt bode well for how neighboring countries would treat Iceland in case of the
Icelandic fishing stock moving around. Although Iceland has territory and waters that reach into
the Arctic, it is noteworthy that as the littoral states of the Arctic have been initiating
cooperation in recent years, Iceland is not amongst them
149
. This is worrying for Iceland and one
of the biggest priorities of the Parliamentary Resolution of 2011 is to be recognized as an Arctic
coastal state. Another of the strategys aspiration is for the Arctic Council to be the most
important and relevant platform for cooperation in the Arctic rather than other narrower
platforms. This is understandable as within the Arctic Council, Iceland is an equal partner and
enjoys considerable influence.
Although these threats are being underreacted to in the Icelandic strategies, there are a
lot of opportunities that are well recognized. One of the earliest notion that lead to the strategy
being created, was the possibility of Trans Arctic Shipping and the opportunities linked to the
strategically important location at the Atlantic side of the Arctic right between Europe and
America. Iceland is actively preparing to have built up infrastructure to service this kind of
transportation, especially emphasizing the option of an Icelandic transshipment hub. This is
disproportionally costly for such a small country to build and the Icelandic government has been
trying to attract international interest. As Iceland has very different interest than most other
Arctic countries and no outstanding direct sovereignty claims in its territory, the country has not
been hesitant to create links with Non Arctic actors such as China.
The lack of contested territory claims unique characteristics of the Icelandic Arctic
Strategy. The countrys security is entrusted with its membership in NATO and the only resource
exploitation the country has shown interest in is in the so called Dragon Area, a splice in the
furthest north eastern waters. This area is not contested. Iceland is very reliant on peace,
stability and cooperation in the region and this need and desire shines through in the
strategies
150
.
4.4.4 Finland and Sweden
Both Finland and Sweden are special countries in the context of the Arctic in the way that they
have some territories in the Arctic but do not have any access to the Arctic sea and are
therefore affected by climate change in a different way from the rest of stakeholders in the

148
Ministry of Industries and Innovation in Iceland 2013
149
150
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Arctic. According to Bailes & Heininen
151
, the main Arctic strategy document of the governments
of Finland and Sweden are Finlands Strategy for the Arctic Region
152
and Swedens Strategy for
the Arctic Region
153
respectively.
Because of the special status of Finland and Sweden within the Arctic, the strategies can
be considered more general and less prioritized than the strategies of other countries. The
strategies concern more internal matters of those two countries and in the way they concern
the international situation in the Arctic, they are less specific and goal oriented as it has much
less to do with direct national interest then in the case of other Arctic players. The countries
nonetheless identify themselves as Arctic countries, are active in the Arctic council and have
comprehensive Arctic strategies
154
.
Finlands strategy assumes that climate change will change the landscape in the Arctic in
coming years and focuses on economic activities, such as infrastructure, transport and
technology. Even though Finland doesnt have territories in Arctic waters, they want to be an
active member in the development in the technologies and industries that will be built. An
example of this is the new double hull ice-breaker technology that could revolutionize Arctic
shipping and is being researched and developed in Finland. Internationally, Finland has played a
certain role as the main proponents for the EU Arctic policy. In Finlands EU presidency in the
late 90s, Finland stimulated EUs first comprehensive policy regarding the high north, the
Northern Dimension
155
.
Sweden hasnt be as willing to speak for the EU in Arctic matters as there is always a
great tendency in Swedish foreign policy to not mix up the Swedish and European foreign policy.
Sweden came late to the game in regards with Arctic strategy. Its been an active member in the
Arctic Council since the beginning but when it came to their round of taking care of the Arctic
Council in 2011 they simultaneously published a Swedish Arctic Strategy, the last of the member
states to do so. Bailes and Heininen consider it a mostly responsive policy
156
. Its comprehensive
and goes into most of the main Arctic issues but mostly as a way to react and clarify position on
many of the development that have been happening internationally and in the Arctic in recent
years.
4.4.5 Fragility of the Strategies
From this we can say that the Arctic strategies of Sweden and Finland are fairly low impact but
at the same time resilient. The strategies are a response to the strategies in other countries but
the variation in the effect of climate change is not likely to affect the outcome of these
strategies in the same way as with the other countries examined.
Norways strategy is also robust, but for different reasons than Sweden and Finland.
Unlike the Swedish and Finnish strategies, the impact of the strategy is high, it has a lot of

151
2012
152
Prime Minister's Office, Finland 2010
153
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden 2011
154
155
156
2012
39 | P a g e

details and implementation plans and if the climate trends will go the way they assume, there
will be many benefits in store for Norways already strong economy. If on the other hand things
go beyond their expectations, it seems like there will be many opportunities lost. This is because
of the narrowness of strategy. It focuses very intensely on the relationship with Russia but more
or less ignores other more farfetched possibilities. In the case of a very strong climate shift, the
mixture of human activities up in the north will go far beyond the traditional neighboring
cooperation and there is a chance that Norway wouldnt be prepared for such. Norways dispute
with China is an example of such shortsightedness. This is not to say that Norways strategy is
fragile, on the contrary it looks very robust and will bring benefits in case of unexpected
developments. There is however lost change of anti-fragility that Norway would be in very good
situation to go for.
The Icelandic strategy assumes a climate change that will open up shipping traffic across
the North Pole but not so much that it will disturb the ecological balance that the country
currently relies on. This is a very fine line and any amount of volatility in the climate models
could impair the outcome of the strategy. If on the one hand everything goes according to how
the strategies envision it climatically, the plan is sure to bring many benefits and the potential of
Iceland as a transportation hub is good and has been noticed. There is on the other no other
immediate benefits of climate change, there are no territories claimed that could open up for
economic development and no resources which accessibility is depended on more favorable
climate. There is however a large potential downside, the environmental change that goes along
with climate change could do away with the Icelandic fish industry and the increased economic
activity would bring traffic into Icelandic waters that have no benefits but increases greatly the
probability of environmental catastrophes (such as oil spillage) that is not very prominent today.
The strategy of Iceland is therefore fragile.
The strategy of the Kingdom of Denmark concerning Greenland is however very anti-
fragile. All the downsides described for Iceland still exist in the case of Greenland but they are
downplayed by the scalability of the upsides, which are highly correlated to how favorable the
climate is. The way the strategy incorporates devolution and political self-governing along with
Greenlands place at the table with the littoral states, is likely to be effective in counteracting
the bad effects of climate change by providing the local people with the tools to adapt and deal
with it on their own terms. That is exactly the goal of the strategy. Even in the case of
explosively rapid climate change, the Greenlanders would be able to cope and even benefit
more, as there are many resources and wealth that gets more accessible. The destabilizing
effect of how small the population is mitigated through the relationship with Denmark. Within
the Kingdom of Denmark the other two realms, Faroe Islands and Denmark, are more robust
and less anti-fragile than Greenland. Greenlands anti-fragility is nonetheless up to a point
transferred to them through their economic links.
4.5 Non-Arctic Actors
4.5.1 European Union
It is not completely accurate that the European Union is a non-Arctic actor. Within the EU
there are two Arctic States, Finland and Sweden, although neither are an Arctic costal state. It
also has a special relationship with Greenland through its connection with Denmark, which is an
40 | P a g e

EU country. Greenland used to be a member of the European Community, the precursor of the
European Union, but exited the EC in 1983, the first and only member country to have done so.
Since then the EU has not had any presence in the Arctic Ocean
157
. There is still some connection
with Greenland though. Greenland is classified as an overseas territory of Denmark and as such,
it has a status of a non-member oversea territory of the EU
158
. The Arctic strategy of the EU is
therefore effectively a one of a non-Arctic actor and represents the aspirations and perspective
of a group of countries that are majorly non-Arctic.
The approach of the EU has mostly been in the field of environmental protection and
polar research
159
. Many countries of the EU have had a lot of impact in polar research since the
beginning, such as Britain, French and Italy, and the European countries considers themselves
historically to have a special link to the Arctic
160
. The EU has been interested in climate
protection for years and tries to make policies that slows down or reverses the process of
climate change. As far as the focus is on the special fragility of the Arctic in this context, EUs
focus there has been quite appreciated by the Arctic countries that cooperate with the EU in a
lot of research and programs
161
. Another aspect of environmental protection, EUs initiative
against certain fishing policies and against whaling and hunting of seal has not been as
appreciated. These policies are based on a powerful sentiment against animal cruelty in Europe
but have been criticized for endangering the livelihood and the traditional way of living of many
of the aboriginal and local people in the Arctic region
162
.
In terms of the economic potential of the Arctic region, the EU has remained rather
passive. This is questionably a lack in their strategy as the potential global impact of Arctic
transportation and economic activities could heavily affect the future status of the European
Union on the global stage. The main Arctic Strategy of the EU is the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council The European Union and the Arctic
Region
163
. Since its publishing, the EU has been trying to become more relevant in the Arctic
economic and political diplomat even though it is standing outside of the established Arctic
governance, by activating its member states in the Arctic, focusing more on Greenland and
influencing other relevant international governance tools such as the UNCLOS
164
.
4.5.2 China
Its perhaps a little peculiar to discuss the Arctic strategy of a country that is neither an Arctic
country nor has a formal Arctic strategy. It is nonetheless interesting to analyze China from the
same perspective of fragility as the Arctic players that have been examined in this paper. At the
very least, it gives an interesting insight into how non-Arctic superpowers can be considered
stakeholders in the changes that are happening in the Arctic and how their approach can be

157
158
European Commission 2013
159
160
Keating 2012
161
162
163
European Commission 2008
164
41 | P a g e

either fragile or anti-fragile in comparison to those that are more involved. As the changes in the
Arctic exacerbate, the more the potential influence it has on the entire international system.
China is also an interesting example as it really seems to have aspirations in the Arctic. A lot of
intergovernmental activity between China and Arctic countries, research voyages, infrastructure
investments and other investments seem to indicate that
165
.
China Daily reported in March that the first commercial shipping is expected to cross the
Arctic this summer and it will done by a state-owned Chinese shipping company
166
. Yang Huigen,
director-general of the Polar Research Institute of China, asserted that he expected up to 10% of
Chinas trade to be shipped through the northern route in 2020. That would be worth 700 billion
dollars for the Chinese economy
167
. There is a lot at stake for China as well as for the Arctic
countries. This is of great importance and it seems that China has been quicker than many of the
other great powers to realize this. In the lack of an official policy or strategy, the report Chinas
Arctic Aspirations
168
that was published last autumn by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute will be used as a guide.
Alongside with transportation, the other aspect of the Arctic climate change that is
meaningful to the Chinese is the amount of resources in the region. Vast majority of the
resources to be found are estimated to be within the largely uncontested exclusive economic
zone of other Arctic Countries as dictated by the UNCLOS. It is
169
. Its next to impossible for
China to go against this but that is not the whole story for China. As the second biggest and the
fastest growing economy in the world, the global access to resources is of utmost importance to
China
170
. China has shown interest in cooperation with Arctic States in resource extraction and
Chinese companies are for an example building facilities in Greenland. It is also important for
China that UNCLOS and international law will be respected in the Arctic so access through
international waters remain unrestricted
171
.
Arctic cooperation is far from being on the top of the agenda for the Chinese
government. Despites Norways importance and centrality in the Arctic, when the Norwegian
government announced that the Chinese poet and dissident Liu Xiaobo would receive the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2010 the Chinese government reacted by cutting any foreign relations with
Norway for two years and its only recently that there has been any evidence that there is some
thaw in the relations
172
. Less than 0.1% of the total research fund of the Chinese government is
spent on Arctic research and Arctic research still receives only 1/5 of that of Antarctic
research
173
.

165
166
Zhou Siyu 2013
167
Zhou Siyu 2013
168
169
International Boundaries Research unit 2013
170
Butts and Bankus 2009
171
Jakobson and Peng, China's Arctic Aspirations - SIPRI Policy paper 34 2012
172
173
42 | P a g e

However, there is a lot of evidence of China spending some effort in approaching the
region in a deliberate way. China has already one Arctic research vessel, the Snow Dragon [],
that crossed the Arctic last summer and another nuclear research vessel is being built. There is a
long-
174
. It was also a long standing desire of the Chinese government of getting a permanent
observer status at the Arctic Council so they will get automatic invitation for all meetings, which
they finally got in May 2013
175
. There is also a considerable relationship building going on
between China and the Nordic Countries. Hu Jintao, then president of China visited Denmark in
2010, and before the leadership transition last year Wen Jiabao visited Iceland and Sweden.
These leadership visits have been uncommon to this day butbut could be considered as a part of
a larger outreach of a growing power to diverse selection of highly technologically advanced
states. There are nevertheless signs that this relationship building might also be partly
anticipation for the growing importance of the Arctic
176
. Jackobson and Peng point out in their
report that the reason why the size of the Chinese diplomatic presence in Iceland has grown to
be the biggest in the country might have to with the expectation that Iceland might become a
major Arctic transportation hub
177
.
4.6.2 Fragility of the Strategies
To have unrestricted access to these regions and necessary facilities requires exceptionally good
relations but it is absolutely necessary for a power that wants to grow its presence abroad and
blue water capabilities as China has been proven to do. The Arctic could be the carte blanche
international dimension that China can actually have some opportunity to grow into, without
directly challenging already established power relations. To cultivate these kinds of options is
very inexpensive for China but very rapid changes could turn out as very substantial assets for
them. In the worst case scenario, if the climate development is far from expectations, then all
these options are at least not costly and have secondary benefits and in the case of the climate
change going faster than now is projected the gains will go up accordingly. Because China is
located far from the Arctic, there are few adversary consequences for China. The Chinese
approach to climate changein the Arctic at the moment is perhaps not very extensive nor as
impactful as the strategies of the states that have bigger stakes at the Arctic, but its very anti-
fragile. The most recent development goes to show this; when this paper was being finalized
there were news from an Arctic Council meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, that China had been
accepted as a permanent observing member of the Council
178
, a long standing ambition of the
country.
The same thing couldnt be said about The European Unions strategy. Unlike China, the
impact of EUs strategy is potentially much bigger. The joint power of the European Countries
can make a big difference in fields of the environment and international laws. There is on the
other hand nothing in the strategy that scales if the process of climate change develops in an
unexpected way. Even if climate change goes must faster or slower than projected, neither

174
Zhou Siyu 2013
175
Myers 2013
176
177
2012
178
Myers 2013
43 | P a g e

would affect the goals of the EU strategy. It is therefore a very robust strategy but it seems to be
missing the opportunity of anti-fragility. The development from the most recent Arctic Council
meeting also supports this. Because of the unresolved disputes over wild life products, such as
Canadian Seal hunting, the European Union was not accepted as permanent observer even
though it had applied for it
179
.

179
Myers 2013
44 | P a g e

5. Conclusions
Climate change with increasing temperature has caused the summer ice coverage in the Arctic
to shrink rapidly. Along with ice-free summer, an increasing percentage of the winter ice is less
than one-year-old and easy to cross any time of the year. Scientists predict that these processes
will continue, possibly exacerbate and that the North Pole itself will be ice-free over the
summertime sooner rather than later in this century. Increased accessibility brings increased
human activity, economic development and political complications.
The opportunities and threats that go with this have motivated countries around the
Arctic to readjust their Arctic strategies, taking the climate projections into account. Different
countries have different strategies and the whole situation can lead to different regional
dynamics. The main question that people seem to be interested in is the question of whether
this change in the Arctic will be destabilizing and lead to conflict or if it will lead to international
cooperation. From a theoretical point of view, several scenarios that can happen now
regarding the question of whether the climate change in the Arctic will trigger confrontations in
the Arctic. The cooperation that has been growing in the last two decades will keep on growing
and eventually be the channel through which any friction will be settled according to Neo-
Liberalist theory of International Relations. Neo-realism on the other hand dictates that every
country will raise to protect their claims and ambitions and in the case of uncertainty resort to
confrontation. In light of the chaotic nature of human society, the paper avoids to answer which
theoretical model best predicts the future.
Social and political policies based on predictions are inherently fragile. This fragility can
be studied. The less political strategies are able to stand the volatile nature of the Arctic climate
change, the more fragile they are. It is possible for states to guard themselves against the
volatility to create strategies that are more resilient or even gain from the volatility. By
examining these aspects of fragility in Arctic strategies, the author was able to compare
different countries.
By comparing the fragility of countries strategies, it is possible to make assessments
without making predictions about which eventualities are most likely. It doesnt necessarily
mean that this or that country will be the most successful or most powerful, it simply tells how
particular countries are relatively fragile which can be taken as an indication whose strategy is
least likely to break apart if something unexpected happens. The result of the assessment can be
Fragile Robust Anti-fragile
US X
Canada X
Russia X
Nordic Countries
Denmark/ Greenland X
Norway X
Iceland X
Finland/ Sweden X
Non-Arctic Actors
EU X
China X
45 | P a g e

seen in the table below:
Figure 7 Overview over the fragility of different strategies
The paper concludes that in any other case than a slow and stress-free climate change in
the Arctic, the United States Arctic strategy would not be very useful in keeping the US in the
lead economically nor in terms of power. It is a fragile strategy because while a relatively fast
climate change in the Arctic can greatly update the worlds capacity for globalization there is
nothing in the strategy that prepares America for such a situation. That can be consequential for
the worlds major superpower leaving the Arctic space for any other rising power to grow into.
The strategy is considered to be very close to being considered anti-fragile. Independent
of how the climate change assumptions of the Canadian Arctic strategy will hold, volatility is
likely to always bring some benefits. The more future climate outcomes will deviate from the
assumption of the strategy the more benefits can be expected from the strategy. The strategy
achieves this through a very clear plan for extracts of resources and how it handles the political
intricacies of it with emphasis on self-governing and devolution.
The Russian Arctic strategy is concluded by the paper to be neither fragile nor
particularly anti-fragile but relatively robust. The strategy is unlikely to break up and be
rendered useless under stress but in lieu of dealing with the dangers of potential stress, it is not
possible to foresee that this strategy is good at bringing extra benefits that could come with
different unexpected climate dynamics. The priorities of the strategy do not necessarily align
with the interests of the region itself, which could lead to intensifying any problem the quicker
the change happens.
The fragility of the strategies of the neighboring Nordic countries is very variable. The
strategy of the Kingdom of Denmark concerning Greenland is very anti-fragile. All the downsides
of ecological instability still exist in the case of Greenland but they are downplayed by the
scalability of the upsides (that are characterized by abundant resource extraction governed
based on the principle of devolution) which are highly correlated to how favorable the climate is.
Norways strategy is fairly robust but seems to have missed the opportunity of anti-fragility
through the narrowness of strategy. It focuses very intensely on the relationship with Russia but
more or less ignores other more farfetched possibilities. In the case of a very strong climate shift,
the mixture of human activities up in the north will go far beyond the traditional neighboring
cooperation and there is a chance that Norway wouldnt be prepared for such. Despite great
potential, the strategy of Iceland is fragile. A large potential downside isnt dealt with in the
strategy. The environmental change that goes along with climate change could do away with the
Icelandic fish industry and the increased economic activity would bring traffic into Iceland that
could be catastrophic. The strategies of Sweden and Finland were found to be robust but of low
impact.
When looking at non-Arctic actors we could see different dynamics than among
northern countries. The more south you go, the lesser you have to bear the consequences of the
ecological instability. The European Unions strategy was found to be robust with quite a big
impact. The joint power of the European Countries can make a big difference in fields of the
environment and international laws. The Chinese approach to climate change at the moment is
46 | P a g e

perhaps not very extensive or as impactful as the strategies of the states that are closer and
have bigger stakes at the Arctic but its very anti-fragile.
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Sensitivity of Arctic States for Harm from Volatility

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