Honeymoon with Modi?

Thursday 29th May 2014

President Mahinda Rajapaksa may have metaphorically leapt into new Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modis arms this week, but in the beginning there was Sonia Gandhi
and Manmohan Singh.
The Congress Party won Parliamentary elections in 2004, returning the
Gandhi family dynasty to the helm of Indian politics after a hiatus of eight
years and heralding a new dawn for Sri Lankas battle against terrorism.
The change had come only three years after America had faced its own
demons in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon, forever altering how the world would approach and combat
terrorism. Already, appetite for the LTTEs brutal politics of terror had
waned completely in the Western world. By assassinating Indian Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the LTTE had made one of several historic mistakes.
When Rajiv Gandhis widow Sonia led the Indian National Congress to election victory
13 years later, the stars began to align for the eventual defeat of the Tamil Tigers.
Mahinda Rajapaksas hairs breadth victory in the 2005 presidential election a direct
result of the LTTE enforced boycott of the poll in the territories under their control in
the north and east would create the perfect confluence of factors to defeat the Tigers
in the jungles of Mullaitivu only four years later.


Rock
solid
Within
months of assuming office, President Rajapaksas administration was in the process of
cultivating a rock solid relationship with New Delhi. The relationship was deemed so
crucial to Sri Lanka, especially with the new regime in Colombo mulling a return to
war, that the Rajapaksa administration bypassed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
altogether in its dealings with Delhi and the ruling Congress Party.
Handling India was a task entrusted to Presidential sibling and Economic
Development Minister Basil Rajapaksa, the Governments chief emissary to New
Delhi, whose efforts were supported by key officials such as Presidential Secretary
Lalith Weeratunga and current Monitoring MP for the Ministry of External Affairs, Sajin
Vaas Gunewardane. There was a tacit understanding between political circles in New
Delhi and Colombo, even though such claims could not be made outright, that the
Indian Government would not stand in the way of a Rajapaksa administration push to
end the brutal reign of the LTTE.
Eight months after President Rajapaksa took office, Sri Lanka was back at war.
Together with Washington, the Indian Government strongly backed the Sri Lankan
Government push against the LTTE, sharing intelligence about the Tigers weapons
networks and providing naval vessels with blue water capability to hunt and destroy
rebel ships carrying ammunition on the high seas.
Facing crucial elections in 2009, the Congress Party stood by its commitment to
Colombo. It held its Tamil Nadu political ally at bay even in the months of April and
May 2009, that coincided with the staggered month long vote in India. So airtight was
this relationship between the ruling regime in Colombo and the Congress Party, that
Weeratunga asserted a few months after the Indian polls, that Sri Lanka had stopped
using heavy weapons against the LTTE at New Delhis request, to ensure the Tamil
Nadu vote would not be affected and dampen the chances of the Congress re-
election.
Weeratunga told a local website that Indias Congress Government had to be seen to
do something to stop what the rest of the world wrongly saw as the massacre of
Tamils in Sri Lanka.
Quid pro quo between Colombo and Delhi was a given, even though Weeratungas
assertion caused ripples in the BJP camp at the time.
Uneasy relations
Flash-forward five years and much water has flowed under that bridge. By the time the
Indian parliamentary elections rolled around in April, once seemingly unshakable ties
between the Rajapaksa administration in Colombo and the Congress were at a historic
low.
Three more resolutions have been passed on Sri Lanka
at the Human Rights Council. India voted in favour of
two and abstained from voting on the third in March this
year, on the grounds that the probe on Sri Lankas war
was intrusive.
The Indian Government decision to abstain from the
controversial UNHRC vote that was won by countries
moving the resolution by what the US has called a wide
margin, only slightly repaired increasingly uneasy
relations between Colombo and New Delhi. Too many
promises had been made and broken by Colombo on
delivering on political devolution for the Tamil people of
the north and east since 2009 the basis on which the
Indian Government unconditionally backed the final war
against the LTTE. Many of these commitments had
been made personally by President Rajapaksa to
former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, former
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and finally in April
2012 to then Opposition Leader Sushma Swaraj, who
was sworn in on Monday as Indias new Foreign
Minister. To each of these Indian officials, President
Rajapaksa promised full implementation of the 13th
Amendment that devolves power to the provinces and
insisted that a final political devolution package for the
Tamil people would go beyond the provisions of the
13A.
Delhis angst
In the cases of Krishna and Swaraj, the President flatly
denied providing these assurances only hours after the
officials had left Colombo. Every retraction in Colombo
stirred a hornets nest in Tamil Nadu, causing untold
headaches for the ruling Congress party, which was accused of protecting a regime in
Colombo that was discriminating against Sri Lankan Tamils. The volte faces caused
outrage within the Congress and angst even for its usually mild-mannered Prime
Minister who was said to be shocked by how lightly the Sri Lankan President would
dismiss assurances provided to other heads of Government and their top officials.
Compounding the tension was Colombos growing intimacy with Beijing, its pushback
against Indian investment projects like Sampur and threats to unilaterally abrogate the
terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord by repealing provisions of the 13th Amendment.
Minister Basil Rajapaksa was no longer being used as Colombos chief envoy to New
Delhi, in a development that coincided with the Ministers waning influence within the
ruling regime. After years of Basil Rajapaksas engagement with New Delhi, he had
been recognised by the Indian Government and bureaucracy as one of the regimes
more rational voices. His absence in dealings with Colombo and the increasing
influence of the more militaristic elements within the Rajapaksa administration had
also made New Delhi acutely uncomfortable.
Ecstatic relief
For the Rajapaksa administration, the betrayal that began with Indias vote for the
2012 resolution led by the US was a point of no return. Stung by what it perceived as
betrayal and alliance with the neo-imperialist Western conspirators, but unable to
ignore India completely in dealing with the legacy of 30 years of war, the Government
has been in a state of flux for the better part of two years. But the slight relieving of
tension by the Indian abstention at the UNHRC this year was reinforced by the
Congress routing in the April-May poll, with Government officials seeming to breathe
ecstatic sighs of relief publicly, about the new administration in New Delhi.
So it was that President Rajapaksa flew into the arms of Indias new Prime Minister,
Narendra Modi this week. His office has repeatedly reinforced that the Sri Lankan
President had been one of the first world leaders to congratulate the former Gujarati
Chief Minister on his election victory. The two leaders are exchanging pleasantries on
the social media network, Twitter. State media claims that with the election of
Narendra Modi, India has dawned its own Rajapaksa moment. Presidential aides are
fawning over Mondays oath-taking ceremony at Rashtrapathi Bhawan in New Delhi,
comparing it to the inauguration of Barack Obama Americas first Black President
seemingly unaware of the profound irony of that particular comparison, given the
Indian Prime Ministers somewhat checkered history on minority issues.
For a Government that has made no attempt to hide its contempt for India, especially
with regard to its role in the ethnic conflict in the island, the ingratiating lengths to
which the regime appeared to be going to pay homage to the new BJP administration
raised several questions. It was either that the Sri Lankan Government was ecstatic
about the potential to reset relations with Delhi under the new administration. The
more sinister explanation was that the regime was sensing kindred in the new
leadership across the Palk Strait, an Indian administration that would understand and
even embrace governance based on ethno-centric nationalism in a smaller neighbour.
Jubilation in the presidential camp about Modis ascension even resulted in the
extension of an olive branch to Northern Province Chief Minister C.V. Wigneswaran,
who was invited to join the delegation travelling to New Delhi for the swearing-in.
Wigneswarans presence in the delegation would send a strong message to the new
Indian Government, that all was well between Colombo and the Northern Provincial
Council, nipping in the bud any residual negativity about the Rajapaksa
administrations intransigence about the implementation of the 13th Amendment.
Wigneswaran says no
Justice Wigneswaran, the TNAs choice to be the voice of Northern Tamil aspirations in
this profoundly-complex post-war phase, spurned the invitation in a well-crafted letter
and refused to facilitate what he called tokenism on the part of Colombo to
demonstrate that all was well with the Northern Provincial Council. It was the master-
stroke of a living, breathing opposition, not unlike JVP Leader Anura Kumara
Dissanayakes refusal to take President Rajapaksas phone call on his birthday this
year, knowing that it would be publicised far and wide to reflect amity between the
ruling powers and the Marxist party. To have a public relations gesture thus rejected is
a rare thing for the regime, and to have it done in so public and incisive a fashion
caused palpable anger within the administration.
Yet not even the snub could temper enthusiasm. Bright and early on Monday morning,
the presidential delegation which included Minister Arumugam Thondaman who stood
in for the Tamils of recent Indian origin and the Jaffna Mayor hailing from the EPDP as
token Northern Tamil representation, boarded the special SriLankan Airlines flight for
New Delhi. A beaming President Rajapaksa was photographed among other SAARC
leaders at the colourful open-air oath-taking ceremony.
But the biggest buzz was about Tuesdays first bilateral discussion between the two
leaders that would take place at Hyderabad House in New Delhi at 10:30 a.m. It may
have proved a bitter disappointment to the Rajapaksa Government that the new Prime
Minister echoed the call of the previous Congress led Government for the extension of
the 13th Amendment as part of a final political devolution package for the Tamils and
insisted that reconciliation in Sri Lanka had to meet the aspirations of the Tamil people
within an united country.
The official communiqu from the Presidents office about the bilateral talks omitted all
references to the 13A, devolution or even the Tamil people, including instead what
President Rajapaksa had told Prime Minister Modi about reconstruction, rebuilding
and rehabilitation efforts post war and discussions about the Palk Bay fishing crisis.
Indian officials on the other hand, maintained that Modi had talked at length about the
13th Amendment and Colombos need to go beyond it to offer a final solution to the
Tamil people.
Strange parallels
Struck by Gujarat magic, the Government is drawing parallels between the
governance styles of Chief Minister Narendra Modi and President Rajapaksa. As Chief
Minister of Gujarat, Modi prized economic development, making economic growth
rates in the state soar. That may often have come at the cost of profound social
injustice and inequitable resource distribution; it may have encouraged a culture of
crony capitalism that Modi himself campaigned strongly against during the general
election campaign, but Gujarat has a booming industrial sector and gleaming new
highways lined with bougainvillea trees.
This is a strategy Government advisors would vouch resonates with the Rajapaksa
model of nation building. The new Indian Premiers strong Hindu nationalist
credentials and his partys well known antipathy for Muslims will no doubt also be
heartening for the ruling administration in Colombo, as it faces off against an
increasingly hostile Western world about its post-war minority policies.
In the euphoria about the Modi ascension, memory in the ranks of the ruling
administration has proved weak. To assume Indian policy towards Sri Lanka would be
framed on the persuasions economic and otherwise of one man, would be to ignore
the might of the Indian Government bureaucracy and the BJPs own historic positions
on the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. When the Indian Parliament was in uproar during
the UNHRC session in Geneva in 2012, a brief glance at the transcripts of those
heated debates would tell a revealing tale. Followed by Tamil Nadu MPs, BJP
strongmen, former ministers and top leaders proved the most vociferous advocates of
Sri Lankan Tamils. The Party has been deeply critical of what it perceived as Congress
Party tolerance of the Sri Lankan Governments intractability and double-speak.
While the BJP-led administration in New Delhi will not be encumbered by demanding
allies in Tamil Nadu that plagued the Congress Party (something Colombo is rejoicing
about), that free hand may only help the new Government to pursue its own
ideological path with regard to the Tamil question in Sri Lanka. Hindu nationalism is by
implication tied to Hinduism, the dominant religion of Tamils in Sri Lankas north.
Furthermore, attempts to overplay the Beijing factor in an attempt to mitigate Delhis
influence on the national question, may have proved an unpopular tactic under the
Singh administration but under Modi, with his strong positions on China and Pakistan,
it could prove a devastating miscalculation.
Posturing
The new Indian Prime Ministers inauguration, that analysts have quipped was like a
SAARC summit, may have been an attempt to reach out to Indias neighbours, but it
was also unmistakable posturing by Indias new leader, seeking to portray his country
as the undisputed leader of the South Asian region. The projection of power was as
much a signal to Beijing as it was to the immediate neighbourhood. Moves by Beijing,
to send an extremely high level Chinese defence delegation to Colombo the day Modi
was declared the winner in the Indian poll, was similar posturing and the Rajapaksa
administrations indulgence of such power-games may be viewed less benignly by
Modis India. Modi muscle is already showing results in Colombo, with President
Rajapaksa instructing his officials and the Attorney Generals Department to expedite
the implementation of the Sampur power project that his Government has been
delaying for years.
If pre-election positions are to be any indication of BJP policy towards Sri Lanka going
forward, the Rajapaksa Government may find clues in the positions articulated by BJP
member and former Indian diplomat Hardip Puri. Until weeks ago, Puri was strongest
contender for the powerful position of National Security Advisor in the new BJP-led
Government. While Puri may have lost out to former Intelligence expert Ajit Doval, the
former diplomat will remain a key player in Team Modi. Puri, was a diplomat in
Colombo in the crucial late 1980s, and more recently served as Indias Permanent
Representative to the UN in New York.
Deprived of the NSA title, Puri may still play a role as Foreign Policy Advisory to the
new BJP Government, sources in New Delhi claim. The retired diplomat has been a
strong supporter of Indias decision to vote for two UNHRC resolutions on Sri Lanka
and believes that New Delhi must push for accountability by Sri Lanka for alleged
crimes committed during the final phase of the war in 2009. It is Puris contention that
while India can renounce the LTTE and what the organisation stood for, it continues to
have an obligation towards Sri Lankas Tamil population.
If these ideas find resonance in the Modi policies towards Sri Lanka, the Rajapaksa
administration could find the euphoria about the change of guard across the Strait
waning swiftly. The potential to repair a faltering relationship with New Delhi may well
be on the cards with a new administration in charge, but Colombo will also find that it
has little maneuverability on the question of the 13th Amendment Plus if it wants to
keep the new Indian Government happy. On this front, there appears to be significant
continuity between Modi India and Singh-Gandhi India. What could be different are the
consequences of broken promises and intransigence under a more assertive Indian
regime. Something for the Sri Lankan Government to ponder if it does not want the
honeymoon with the New India to end too soon.