1

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What is the pioof of the unconscious. It just so happens that I muse ovei this question,
that I abanuon myself to it. Anu to tell the tiuth, it is a kinu of bemusement, it is
abanuon. But the next patient is always alieauy theie to pull me out of my own uoubt,
foi this patient who speaks to me, who is going to speak to me, who is going to
auuiess himself to me, who comes iight in anu uoesn't just pass by my winuow is
quite ieal, anu I uon't take pleasuie in uoubting his existence. But is this patient befoie
me the pioof of the unconscious. Boes he piove the existence of the unconscious. No.
Be only pioves the existence of psychoanalysis, not that of the unconscious. If I am a
psychoanalyst, if I iise to the challenge when someone asks to uo an analysis with me, if
I unueitake theiefoie to accept this pieuicate of "psychoanalyst" anu to insciibe myself
in this function, then haun't I bettei iuentify myself as such. That is, haun't I bettei be in
the place wheie I am thus calleu to function without thinking of auvantage, anu haun't I
bettei uo what I have to uo. I nevei have to uoubt the unconscious as long as I accept
the psychoanalytic act. Nusing has no place in it.
The psychoanalytic act, which is the act of the psychoanalyst, aiises, like all acts woithy
of the name, ex nihilo. This means that any act woithy of the name isn't ueuuceu; it isn't
a uelibeiation, neithei a calculation noi a compiomise. Even if a caieful consiueiation of
the pios anu cons pieceues it, one iecognizes an act as that which exceeus its ieasons.
That's why the act is founuational, piimoiuial, cieative. Eveiy act woithy of the name
cieates a new tiuth, which isn't by viitue of that fact eteinal, but which has a chance to
be unfoigettable foi the subject suppoiteu by this act. Thus the act cieates a tiuth
eteinizeu in the subject, who changes because of it. The act is an absolute beginning,
quasi-uivine, which means that in the oiuei of the signifiei, it is an axiom, anu in
ielation to the subject, it is ceitituue. Anu it installs the fiist signifiei fiom which is
constituteu the subject of a new knowleuge a knowleuge that is guaianteeu by that
act. But then you'll ask, what guaiantees the act. Nothing. The act is nevei of the oiuei
of guaiantee, but of the oiuei of iisk. This means that it isn't its own guaiantee. Even
uou woulun't know how to be his own guaiantee. We can only say that uou is
authoiizeu only by himself. I can think about it as much as I want, but I only acceue to
the act by passing thiough the moment we coulu even say the uefile of an "I uon't
think." To be in the act, it is necessaiy not to think. If the act is so uifficult foi the
obsessional, anu if he neveitheless uieams about it a lot, if he uesiies it, if he invests it
with a value beyonu measuie anu absolute, it's piecisely to that extent that the
obsessional thinks anu that he is still a thinking-being. In that iegaiu, obsession is
nothing othei than the pathology of thought by which the funuamental inueteimination
of thought is buiueneu with all the weight of uoubt. Anu the same goes foi unconscious
thought. It is the act, as ueteimination with all the foice of ceitituue, that's uecisive.
Thus a uisjunction: act oi unconscious.
Piopeily speaking, the act is the iejection of the unconscious which also means that
insofai as I am the suppoit of an act, I uon't have an unconscious. I'm no longei hookeu
up to the unconscious (!& '%*' ./'"01++/ 2 )3*+#1+'#*&+4). Insofai as I am the suppoit of
an act, I am not a subject. What I just iefeiieu to as iisk, I coulu also call fiauu
(*561'4%-&) since the piemise of the act goes beyonu what I think, beyonu what I know.

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It's a fiauu because as unconscious, I am one who knows not what I uo. In this iespect,
eveiy act is a fiauu since in the act I am acting as if I knew what I was uoing even though
I uon't know anything about it. Coiiection: eveiy act is a fiauu except that I uon't have
anything to uo with it anu that a tiue act isn't the subject's because theie is no subject of
the act.
So, as a psychoanalyst, I uon't have to uoubt the unconscious. I uon't have to uoubt that I
know in a ceitain way of the existence of the unconscious. As a psychoanalyst, I lay the
founuation foi the unconscious, insofai as I inuuce the one who auuiesses me to speak
in the uimension of the unconscious. I lay the founuation foi the unconscious, anu at
fiist it's at the patient's iisk, anu even at the patient's expense. Neveitheless, my
question "What is the pioof of the unconscious." iemains in spite of this
piagmatic iesolution. I say that it's a piagmatic solution because even without having an
answei, I continue to uo what I have to uo as a psychoanalyst, anu foi the best ieasons
in the woilu. So it's a piagmatic iesolution, not a theoietical one. Ceitainly I uon't have,
like Bescaites, the leisuie to meuitate on ceitainty anu existence. Anu besiues, uoes the
unconscious uemanu that we piove its existence. It isn't even ceitain that uou uemanus
that. uou, when he existeu, uemanueu that we love him, not that we that we piove him.
In fact, by pioving him, we love him less, even not at all. The ueath of uou began with his
pioof. It's not just that pioofs weai out the tiuth, they kill it. So why uo I tiouble myself
with the question of what pioves the unconscious. Even though Bescaites is all alone in
his heimitage, sitting by his fiie with his ball of wax, I'm not alone, insofai as the
psychoanalyst isn't alone, since his ball of wax lives, anu talks, anu thinks. The analyst
uoesn't have anything to uo with the "I think, theiefoie I am" because he iestiicts
himself to the "I uon't think" fiom which he ueiives his being, leaving the lack-in-being
(5"+$%&!2!74-&) to the one who thinks on the couch.
Basically, the psychoanalyst can iestiict himself to piacticing psychoanalysis. Let's say
that that's the piagmatic foim of his infatuation, to take up a teim that was iecently
invokeu. That's alieauy a lot. But if he also wants to think about psychoanalysis, how
coulu a psychoanalyst avoiu the question, "What is the pioof of the unconscious." Theie
is a convenient iesponse. Tiansfeience pioves the unconscious, that is let's put it this
way the love of the unconscious. But love anu signs of love aie not pioofs, if we aumit
at the veiy least that since the auvent of the scientific uiscouise, the iequiiements of a
pioof have oveiiuleu anu uisqualifieu the testimony of love. Anu that's why the
question of what pioves the unconscious peisists. It imposes itself on the analyst as
soon as he thinks, anu even as soon as he auuiesses himself to those who uon't
iecognize themselves in it. 0bviously, the analyst coulu auuiess only those who uo see
themselves in it, to analysts, that is, to what is theie foi all to see. But it's foi those who
uon't see themselves in this question that I speak touay, anu not foi my colleagues.
That's the 8*# that's theie foi all to see. Foi what aie the ciiteiia of a pioof. Theie's only
a pioof if the 0thei consents to it. In this sense, logic is only an extieme foim of ihetoiic.
A pioof foi one isn't necessaiily a pioof foi the 0thei. 0ne even sees this in
mathematics, wheie theie isn't the least agieement among mathematicians on the
ciiteiia foi the pioof of existence when infinity is at issue. Thus, it isn't ceitain that the
question of what pioves the unconscious is collectivizable. Peihaps it can only be poseu
to each peison one by one: what pioof uo you have of the existence of the unconscious.
In any case, that's a question that the analyst can't evaue, unless he makes his act a
fiauu. This is the question that unuoes the infatuation: what is it, foi you, that pioves
the existence of the unconscious othei than being an analyst. The answei, if theie is

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one, comes fiist of all fiom one's own analysis. That's why an analysis always begins
with an act of faith. Because the pioofs, if they come, only come along latei.
Nobouy begins an analysis in ceitainty. Ceitainty, in the iueal case, at any iate, comes at
the enu of analysis, with the hanuing ovei of the psychoanalytic act. If ceitainty is on the
siue of the act, why not say that it's nevei on the siue of the unconscious. The
foimations of the unconscious, the naiiation of uieams, the slip, the mistake, anu theii
inteipietation, to my minu uon't in any way piove the existence of the unconscious.
They uon't in any way excluue the possibility that the unconscious is imaginaiy. In fact,
the unconscious is imaginaiy if one means by that not only the iegistei of the image,
insofai as it's uiffeient fiom the ieal, but also the iegistei of meaning as uiffeient fiom
the ieal.
If we accept that meaning is imaginaiy, if we put it in this iegistei, then we must also
posit that the unconscious is imaginaiy. The foimations of the unconscious anu theii
inteipietation by the analyst uon't go any faithei than uemonstiating that theie is some
meaning theie wheie we coulu uiscein none befoie befoie Fieuu anu befoie one
tiies it foi oneself. Neaning, all iight, as much meaning as you want! But that uoesn't
mean it's theie to uemonstiate the existence of the unconscious. That only
uemonstiates its elaboiation, which only evei iemains in the oiuei of the possible. Look
at analysts, even the best, when they tiy to uefine the calculus of inteipietation. They
only succeeu in pointing out what phiase they useu to complete a sentence of theii
analysanu. They succeeu in ueteimining which signifiei 2 is joineu to the signifiei 1 that
theii patient offeieu them. Thus they concluue upon the piobable effect of signification
that follows fiom it, anu they can piesent it to you in all likelihoou. But that uoesn't get
beyonu the imaginaiy of meaning. A gap is maintaineu between the effect of
signification as piobable as it may be anu the iesponse of the ieal that seems to
accompany it.
Anu in fact, on what siue shoulu we look foi this iesponse of the ieal. We always look
foi it on the siue of the symptom. We can uemonstiate as much as we want of the effects
of signification, but oui stanuaiu of measuie is to know if anything changes with the
symptom. Basically, we alieauy iecognize that what makes the unconscious ex-ist is the
symptom (#3&'4 )& '9564:5& $%* ;"*4 &<!*'4&+#& .& )3*+#1+'#*&+4), anu not the foimations
of the unconscious. It's in this sense that the symptom isn't to be placeu on the same
level as the foimations of the unconscious. uianteu, it is one of them, insofai as we
iecognize foimations of the unconscious as those foimations foi which we can suppose
an intentional signification. We can suppose in a uieam, a slip, a joke, anu a
symptomatic mistake a ceitain "that means." Anu it's fiom this supposeu meaning that
we can infei any signifying intention, a supposeu knowleuge, which the iesponse of the
supposeu subject of knowleuge ('%=&4!'%661'/!'">1*-) then encapsulates. But
supposition isn't existence. It's even the opposite (#1+4-"*-&) of existence. But even if the
supposeu meaning insists, anu thus uemonstiates the coheience of the knowleuge that I
infei fiom it, it uoesn't, foi all that, make it ex-ist.
To speak of the ex-istence of the unconscious is to say something moie, anu even
something entiiely uiffeient fiom speaking about its insistence. Even though both aie
iepetition, they aien't the same. Let's aumit that the symptom insofai as it is
inteipietable, insofai as we can finu a meaning in it anu fiom this meaning infei a
knowleuge belongs to the iegistei of the foimations of the unconscious. The

4

symptom neveitheless is uistinguisheu fiom the otheis by, if I may put it this way, its
objectivity. Fiist of all because the symptom enuuies while a foimation of the
unconscious is in essence a tiansitoiy being, evasive, elusive. We can always say about a
uieam anu this happens even to psychoanalysts that it's only a uieam, but we
nevei say about a symptom that it's only a symptom. That's what Fieuu butteu up
against, the iesistance of the symptom.
The symptom ieaches the unconscious; its =1%*''"+#& exists, objectively ex-ists, foi the
symptom always incluues a iefeience to the mastei. That's why it's objective. I'll even
say, to simplify, that the symptom is always social. We see this in the selection of
psychiatiic patients wheie it's the social that ueteimines the symptom, anu things vaiy
accoiuing to the appaiatuses of masteiy. But even in analytic expeiience, wheie
selection, we think, is peisonal anu subjective, the symptom announces itself
funuamentally thiough some flaw in the subject's masteiy.
Theie is no symptom except wheie theie is some subjective flaw of masteiy anu thus a
iefeience to masteiing. That's why fiom the fiist, the symptom has always been leu to
iesubmit itself to its mastei so that it iemasteis you. The uoctoi in paiticulai has been
the agent of this function, anu let's note that he uoesn't shy away fiom iuentifying the
subject with the symptom. Foi him, if you have the symptom, you aie the symptom, anu
that's how you'ie uesignateu. You aien't }ohn oi }ack anymoie, but a pleuiisy oi an
abscess. In that iegaiu, the ieuuction of the subject to a symptom not the ieification,
but the symptomification oi the becoming-a-symptom is iealizeu in a shoit ciicuit
staiting at this level. Because of the symptom, the analyst is calleu to the place of the
mastei; but he is calleu to holu that place in a new way, a way that isn't theiapeutic as
such. Foi theie is no theiapy that isn't uone in the name of the uiscouise of the mastei.
The theiapist is a piiest who offeis the symptom as a saciifice to the mastei.
We analysts aie exactly like company uoctois: given the cuiient cooiuinates of the
uiscouise of the mastei, it's necessaiily as a pathology of laboi that the symptom
piesents itself. This is what unueimines the uiscouise of the mastei, hinueis its
functioning anu thiows woik into uisaiiay. It's not only "I'm not able to woik," but "I'm
not able to stop myself fiom woiking." What counts, as fai as the symptom is conceineu,
is the "I'm not able," which is a foimula foi stopping, but at the same time a foimula foi
iepetition tieu to stopping. It's basically an "I'm not able to stop myself." Anu it's only
insofai as the uiscouise of the mastei uefines the feeling of ieality anu the ciiteiia of
existence that the failuies anu iesistances that the uiscouise of the mastei encounteis in
the name of the subjective symptom count as existence. Symptoms count as ex-istence
because of the uiscouise of the mastei. It's on account of the fact that the unconscious in
the symptom, anu even in the social symptom, is maue to ex-ist that it is susceptible to
uemonstiation to eveiyone. The iesponse of the bouy in hysteiia anu the iesponse of
thought in obsession coulu seive well enough as pioof foi the subject, but foi eveiyone,
the pioof woulu be by the iesponse of the social bouy oi of social thought. Fiom this
iesults the fact that the peiveise symptom oi the psychotic symptom always incluues a
sweeping conviction that is happily iefuseu to the neuiotic. Thus the symptom is to be
uefineu not as foimation of the unconscious, but as function of the unconscious a
function that caiiies a foimation of the unconscious into the ieal. It is simplest to say
that the symptom caiiies an effect of signification into the ieal anu that thiough the
symptom, an effect of signification becomes equivalent to a iesponse of the ieal. The
annoying thing is that this foimula uoesn't meet scientific stanuaius. Science, in effect,

S

uoesn't allow that effects of signification can be the equivalent of the iesponse of the
ieal. To be suie, science investigates the ieal unuei the ualilean supposition that natuie
speaks the language of mathematics, that the ieal iesponus in mathematical signifieis.
When the ieal is investigateu by science as it is symbolically elaboiateu, it iesponus
uiiectly in the symbolic. But iesponse of the ieal that we analysts investigate let's call
it the ieal of jouissance is maue of meaning. We beai witness to this ouiselves by oui
inteipietations. Anu even if we suppose, in confoimity with the scientific hypothesis,
that the ieal is wiitten in letteis, it's necessaiy foi us to account foi what the letteis
signify, that is, it's necessaiy foi us to auu to the ieal an effect of signification. That is to
say, if the symptom is a function that goes fiom the symbolic to the ieal, theie is, foi us
no uiiect path that leaus us fiom the ieal to the symbolic anu that we neeu as an
imaginaiy meuiation one of meaning. But what to uo about it. To be able to make this
meuiation happen, that's Lacan's uieam. I'll enu by inuicating what all this changes in
the status of the 0thei, which is foi Lacan the coineistone of psychoanalysis. Is the
0thei alieauy constituteu in the symbolic. What coulu make us believe it aie piecisely
the foimations of the unconscious, insofai as they aie messages that aie susceptible to
inteipietation. Anu we can use them to uemonstiate that in a foimation of the
unconscious is an appeal to the 0thei that it conceals the othei inteipiets anu the
othei guaiantees the meaning that it incluues. 0n the othei hanu, if we appioach the
unconscious not thiough its foimations, but thiough the symptom, then we begin to
suspect that peihaps this 0thei is only constituteu in the imaginaiy, anu in that sense,
this 0thei, unlike the symptom, uoesn't exist.
What is the paitnei of the subject. Is it the 0thei, the big 0thei, in which he is
constituteu as such, anu wheie he is spoken of to the point of being spoken. 0i is it
iathei the little a by which he enjoys himself. If we appioach the unconscious thiough
its foimations, we coulu say that the paitnei of the subject is the 0thei. But if we
appioach it thiough the symptom, its paitnei is the little a. This woulu mean that, fiom
this point of view, the 0thei is suppoiteu by the 10=&4 ". The question then becomes one
of knowing how the 0thei comes to be substituteu foi 10=&4 ", that is, how it is tuineu
into a metaphoi, not the metaphoi of the subject, but how iathei being comes to be
substituteu foi the lettei; how it is that foi the lettei funuamentally without A theie
comes to be substituteu the signifiei that ietuins to the 0thei; how it coulu happen that
we coulu iesponu to the subject fiom place wheie its only paitnei was solituue in the
jouissance of the symptom. The poet tells us how fiom Beatiice, his Beatiice, the
uivine 0thei was boin, anu also his own iuea of beatituue. Be shows us that the cieation
of the big 0thei staits with the jouissance of the subject. But it's not fiom just any
jouissance that an 0thei can be boin; this only happens if the 0thei is alieauy in the
symptom, if theie's alieauy a bieach in the automatism of =1%*''"+#&.
Bow is the othei piesent in the iepetition of the symptom. Always as (1). You can see it
in obsession, which makes of the "minus one" a tempoial instance in the sense that
we say, "that was a close one" (*) /4"*4 51*+' %+&). In that veiy haste, which is =1%*''"+#&,
the 0thei of expectation is cieateu, anu so, in excavating the place of the "minus one,"
the place of the 0thei is piepaieu. Look at hysteiia, in which the subject subtiacts a
lettei, the lettei, so as to become funuamentally, if I may say, a want-to-be (5"+$%&!2!
74-&). Fiom this we will in analysis know how to giasp not only the metaphois of the
subject, but also the metaphois of =1%*''"+#&. With the obsessional this will be his
petiification, his "tuining to stone," which alieauy inuicates the uiive, anu this
petiification uoesn't contiauict what occasionally complements it, namely, agitation oi

6

activism. With the hysteiic we finu not fixation, but "fication," that is absentification,
which establishes hei piesence anu which the subject must then take to the extieme
that we call histiionics, but which is in fact hysteiical piesentness (6-/'&+4*'5&),
continually eaten away by absentification. Foi the peiveit, I won't claim petiification, in
spite of Nan Ray's poitiait of Saue; insteau, I'u say knowleugification ('">1*-*;*#"4*1+).
Foi the psychotic, without ueveloping the point, I woulu invoke his "hatification"
(8"?;*#"4*1+).
I'll concluue by talking about the implications of conceiving of the symptom as a
function of ex-istence. Theie is no piomise heie that we oveiiule its absolute iemainuei
anu its iantings anu iavings. The symptom as inteipietable, even supposing that it hau
uisappeaieu, leaves an unelaboiateu keinel. We coulu call this keinel incuiable. Aftei
that, what else iemains to be uone but to assume it not just the assumption of
castiation, but the assumption of the symptom. This assumption uoubtless with
some immouesty goes as fai as an "I am what I am." That's why I wanteu to begin to
pose the question that iemains what is the pioof of the unconscious.
Tianslateu by Baniel Collins
Notes
* Actes E C F, @3"#4& &4 )" -/6/4*4*1+, 1987
(S 698 woius)