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Article III - Bill of Rights Digests Part 1
Article III - Bill of Rights Digests Part 1
equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It is Not a violation of due process
there was no proof or even an allegation that the Joint Committee itself made biased
statements that would convey to the public that the members were favoring a
particular party.
Comelec is a collegial body. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be
considered as that of the entire body itself
therefore, inaccurate to say that there is only one body which acted as evidence-
gatherer, prosecutor and judge(Fact-finding and joint committee have different
mandates)
It does not violate the Independence of the Comelec.
Petitioner: The chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly
surrendered its independence to the DOJ.
As pointed out by the Court in BANAT Party-List v. Comelec, the grant of exclusive
power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses was not by virtue of the
Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by
Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts preliminary investigation of
election offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies.
the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of
the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the
prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate
of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
II. (Comelec has Jurisdiction.) Publication Requirement
The assailed Joint Committees Rules of Procedure regulate not only the prosecutors
of the DOJ and the Comelec but also the conduct and rights of persons, or the public
in general. The publication requirement should, therefore, not be ignored.
Nevertheless, even if the Joint Committees Rules of Procedure is ineffective for lack
of publication, the proceedings undertaken by the Joint Committee are not rendered
null and void for that reason, because the preliminary investigation was conducted by
the Joint Committee pursuant to the procedures laid down in Rule 112 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure and the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Validity of the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation
GMA claims her right to due process was violated when her request to require Pimentel
to furnish her the documents used as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage.
o Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads: The respondent shall
have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense
o Section 6 (a), Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure:
Conduct of preliminary investigation: The respondent shall have the right to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
However, Senator Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to
the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report.130 Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the
documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right to examine as
guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Anyway, the failure of the complainant to submit documents supporting his allegations in
the complaint may only weaken his claims and eventually works for the benefit of the
respondent as these merely are allegations unsupported by independent evidence.
It is well settled that the absence [or irregularity] of preliminary investigation does not
affect the courts jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the criminal
information or render it defective.
DISSENTING; J. BRION
Concurrent jurisdiction has been defined as equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter The Comelec and DOJ can have equal jurisdiction while maintaining the INDEPENDENCE of
the Comelec. In order not to trample the mandate of the Constitution, the DOJ should be a mere deputy ot
delegate of the Comelec and not a co-equal partner in the investigation and prosecution of election
offense.
Article III, Section 1
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION v OLALIA JR
GR No. 153675 April 19, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
Quick Digest: This is a petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify two Orders of RTC Manila Judge
Felixberto Olalia Jr (respondent)
1) Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz (private respondent) to post
bail
2) Order dated April 10 2002 denying the motion to vacate said Order (1) filed by the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKAR) represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner
The petition alleges both Orders were issued by Olalia with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Petition was dismissed.
Facts
Muoz was charged before the HK court with 3 counts of offense of accepting an advantage as
agent (bribery). He also faces 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued
against him.
DOJ then received from the Hong Kong a request for the provisional arrest of Muoz. The
National Bureau of Investigation then filed in with the RTC an application of provisional arrest of
Muoz. RTC issued an order of arrest. NBI agents then arrested and detained him
In the same case that the HKAR filed a petition for extradition of Muoz, he files a petition for
bail. Judge Ricardo Bernardo Jr. denied the petition for bail holding that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that Muoz is a high flight risk. Thereafter, Judge
Bernardo inhibited himself from the case and Judge Olalia (respondent judge) presided.
Muoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. It was
granted by Judge Olalia (Order dated December 2001).
HKAR filed urgent motion to vacate such decision. It was denied by respondent judge Olalia
(Order dated April 2002). Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that Judge Olalia acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction granting the said Orders as there is no provision in the Constitution granting
bail to a potential extraditee
Issue
Whether or not a prospective extraditee may be granted bail (Topic on Extradition Proceedings under
Procedural Due Process)
Held/Ratio
A prospective extraditee can be granted bail.
In USA vs Purganan, the Court held that the exercise of right to bail is limited to criminal
proceedings and not to extradition. However in light of the various international treaties and also
the modern trend in public international lawgiving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and libertya reexamination of the Courts ruling in Purganan was
made.
! The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed, is recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community.
! The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed
and ratified also upholds the rights of every person to life, liberty and due process.
! The Philippines as member of the family of nations has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedingsto make available such remedies
which include the right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases (Mejoff v Director of Prisons considered the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights), it should also be allowed in extradition cases. Both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence and guilt of the person detained is not an issue.
Although there is no law providing bail to the extraditee, there is also no prohibition from
exercising his constitutional right to post bail.
! The right of the extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the Philippine
treaties concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.
! According to Justice Puno is Purganan case, only clear and convincing evidence will
be considered. Private respondent did not yet show evidence to show that he was not a
flight risk.
WHEREFORE,we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. If not, the trial
court should order the cancellation of his bail and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch. .
Article III Section 1 Arbitration
RCBC v. Banco de Oro
G.R. No. 196171 and G.R. No. 199238, December 12, 2010
Quick DigestRCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision dated December 2010 one
of which is that the CA acted contrary to law and prior rulings in vacating the second partial award on the
basis of Chairman Barkers alleged partiality
Facts:
1. RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB),
George L. Go and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) (2000)
2. There was dispute between the parties when RCBC informed EPCIB and the other selling
shareholders of an overpayment of the subject shares, claiming there was an overstatement of
valuation of accounts amounting to P478 million and that the sellers violated their warranty under
the SPA (2003)
3. As no settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings with the ICC-ICA in
accordance with Section 10 of the SPA (2004)
i. Section 10. Arbitration: Should there be any dispute arising between the parties
relating to this Agreement which cannot be resolved by agreement of the parties
within 15 days after written notice by a party to another, such matter shall then be
finally settled by arbitration under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce by three arbitrators appointed in
accordance with such rules. The decision of the arbitrators shall be final and
binding upon the parties hereto and the expenses of arbitration shall be paid as
the arbitrators shall determine.
ii. In its Request for Arbitration, Claimant RCBC charged Bankard with deviating
from and contravening generally accepted accounting principles and practices
and resulted in the overpayment of P556 million. For this violation of sellers
representations and warranties under the SPA, RCBC sought its rescission, as
well as payment of actual damages
4. In their answer, EPCIB, Go and the other selling individual shareholders denied RCBCs
allegations contending that RCBCs claim is one for overpayment or price reduction under the
SPA which is already time-barred. A counterclaim for litigation expenses and costs of arbitration
as well as moral and exemplary damages, was likewise raised by the Respondents (2004)
a. Subsequently, the Arbitration Tribunal was constituted where Sir Ian Barker was
appointed by the ICC-ICA as Chairman.
5. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that they are required to pay US$350,000 as advance on costs
pursuant to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (ICC Rules) (2004)
a. RCBC paid its share while Respondents share of the advance on costs was thus fixed at
US$175,000
b. Respondent filed an Application for Separate Advances on Costs stating that it is
improper for them to share equally on the advance cost of Claimants (RCBC) claim
since the total amount of RCBCs claim is substantially higher more than 40 times the
total amount of their counterclaims
c. Respondents refused to pay their share in the advance cost fixed by the ICC-ICA
d. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that if Respondents still failed to pay its share in the
advance cost, it would apply the ICC Rules and request the Arbitration Tribunal to
suspend its work and set a new time limit, and if such requested deposit remains unpaid
at the expiry thereof, the counterclaims would be considered withdrawn
6. The ICC-ICA notified the parties of its decision to increase the advances on costs from
US$350,000 to US$450,000 subject to later readjustments (2005)
a. The ICC-ICA again invited the Respondents to pay the US$100,000 increment.
Respondents, however, refused to pay the increment, insisting that RCBC should bear the
cost of prosecuting its own claim and that compelling the Respondents to fund such
prosecution is inequitable. Respondents reiterated that it was willing to pay the advance
on costs for their counterclaim
b. In view of Respondents continuing refusal to pay its equal share in the advance on costs
and increment, RCBC wrote the ICC-ICA stating that the latter should compel the
Respondents to pay as otherwise RCBC will be prejudiced and the inaction of the ICC-
ICA and the Arbitration Tribunal will detract from the effectiveness of arbitration as a
means of settling disputes
c. Chairman Ian Barker, in a letter stated in part (2006):
i. The Tribunal has no power under the ICC Rules to order the Respondents to pay
the advance on costs sought by the ICC or to give the Claimant any relief against
the Respondents refusal to pay.
d. RCBC paid the additional US$100,000 under the second assessment to avert suspension
of the Arbitration Tribunals proceedings
e. Meanwhile, EPCIBs corporate name was officially changed to Banco De Oro
(BDO)-EPCIB after its merger with BDO was duly approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. As such, BDO assumed all the obligations and liabilities of
EPCIB under the SPA.
7. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered a Partial Award and makes the following declarations (First
Partial Award) (September 2007)
a. The Claimants claim is not time-barred under the provisions of this SPA
b. The Claimant has established the following breaches by the Respondents of the SPA
i. The assets, revenue and net worth of Bankard were overstated
c. Subject to proof of loss the Claimant is entitled to damages for the foregoing breaches
8. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm the First Partial Award, while
Respondents filed a motion to vacate the same (October 2007)
a. The Makati City RTC issued an order confirming the First Partial Award and denying
Respondents separate motions to vacate. Respondents motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied
9. ICC-ICA by letter increased again the advance on costs. Respondents declined to pay its
adjudged total share and the ICC-ICA then invited RCBC to substitute for Respondents in paying
the balance. RCBC complied with the request (October 2007)
10. RCBC filed an Application for Reimbursement of Advance on Costs Paid, praying for the
issuance of a partial award directing the Respondents to reimburse its payment representing
Respondents share in the Advance on Costs (2008)
a. Respondents filed their opposition arguing that in issuing the award for advance cost, the
Arbitration Tribunal will be deciding an issue beyond the terms of the Terms of
Reference (TOR)
11. In his letter, Chairman Barker advised the parties, as follows (2008):
a. The Tribunal notes that neither party has referred to an article by Matthew Secomb on the
very subject of the case at bar. To assist both sides (later the court will decide that the
Secomb article was evident partiality of the Tribunal for RCBC) and to ensure that the
Tribunal does not consider material on which the parties have not been given an
opportunity to address, Chairman Barker attached a copy of the article
i. Secomb is the ICC Secretariat
12. RCBC contended that based on Mr. Secombs article, the Arbitration Tribunal is vested with
jurisdiction and authority to render an award with respect to said reimbursement of advance cost
paid by the non-defaulting party.
a. Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that RCBCs application for reimbursement
of advance cost has no basis under the ICC Rules
13. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered the Second Partial Award as follows (2008):
a. Respondents are forthwith to pay to the Claimant the sum of US$290,000
14. EPCIB filed a Motion to Vacate Second Partial Award in the Makati City RTC while RCBC filed
in the same court a Motion to Confirm Second Partial Award (2008)
15. The Makati City RTC issued the Order confirming the Second Partial Award and denying
EPCIBs motion to vacate the same (2009)
a. Said court held that since the parties agreed to submit any dispute under the SPA to
arbitration and to be bound by the ICC Rules, they are also bound to pay in equal shares
the advance on costs
b. It noted that RCBC was forced to pay the share of EPCIB in substitution of the latter to
prevent a suspension of the arbitration proceedings, while EPCIBs non-payment seems
more like a scheme to delay such proceedings
16. EPCIB filed in the CA a petition for review with application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 113525) in accordance with the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules) (2010)
a. EPCIB assailed the Makati City RTC in denying its motion to vacate the Second Partial
Award despite the fact that it was issued with evident partiality
17. The Arbitration Tribunal issued the Final Award (2010)
a. BDO filed in the Makati City RTC a petition to vacate final award
b. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm final award
18. The CA rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 113525 (found in no. 14), the dispositive
portion of which reverses (December 2010):
a. The Second Partial Award dated May 28, 2008 issued in International Chamber of
Commerce Court of Arbitration
19. RCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision dated December 2010 one of
which is that the CA acted contrary to law and prior rulings in vacating the second partial award
on the basis of Chairman Barkers alleged partiality
Issue:
W/N there was evident partiality which is a legal ground to vacate the Second Partial Award
Held:
There was evident partiality and therefore constitutes as a legal ground for vacating the Second Partial
Award
1. Special ADR Rules sets forth that evident partiality or corruption in the arbitral tribunal or any of
its members is a ground for vacating an arbitral award
a. The failure of the CA to apply the applicable standard or test for judicial review
prescribed in the Special ADR Rules may warrant the exercise of the Supreme Courts
discretionary powers of judicial review
b. Rule 19.10. Rule on judicial review on arbitration in the PhilippinesAs a general rule,
the court can only vacate or set aside the decision of an arbitral tribunal upon a clear
showing that the award suffers from any of the infirmities or grounds for vacating an
arbitral award
2. Evident partiality is not defined in our arbitration laws. As one of the grounds for vacating an
arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in the United States (US), the term
"encompasses both an arbitrators explicit bias toward one party and an arbitrators inferred bias
when an arbitrator fails to disclose relevant information to the parties."
a. In the Court of Appeals of Oregon, evident partiality in its common definition implies
"the existence of signs and indications that must lead to an identification or inference" of
partiality
b. In Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
they stated that evident partiality will be found where a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration
3. The Court adopts the reasonable impression of partiality standard, which requires a showing that
a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the
arbitration.
a. Such interest or bias must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than
remote, uncertain, or speculative
b. When a claim of arbitrators evident partiality is made, the court must ascertain from
such record as is available whether the arbitrators conduct was so biased and prejudiced
as to destroy fundamental fairness
4. CA found factual support in BDOs charge of partiality
a. Chairman Barkers furnishing the parties with a copy of the Secomb article. This article
ultimately favored RCBC by advancing its cause. Chairman Barker makes it appear that
he intended good to be done in doing so but due process dictates the cold neutrality of
impartiality
i. By furnishing the parties with a copy of this article, Chairman Barker practically
armed RCBC with supporting legal arguments to deal with the situation when
one of the parties to international commercial arbitration refuses to pay its share
on the advance on costs
b. Applying the foregoing standard, we agree with the CA in finding that Chairman
Barkers act of furnishing the parties with copies of Matthew Secombs article,
considering the attendant circumstances, is indicative of partiality such that a reasonable
man would have to conclude that he was favoring RCBC
Article III Section 1 - Academic Discipline
Guzman v. National University
G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, Narvasa, J.
This is a petition to seek relief from what the petitioners (students Guzman, Urbiztondo, and Ramacula) describe
as the respondents (NU and its officers) "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enroll without valid
grounds. Petition was granted.
Facts
1. Students (Guzman, Urbiztondo and Ramacula) were denied re-enrollment allegedly for their participation in
mass action protests against the school and other related activities.
petitioners allege that they were subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or if there
be any, without being informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to defend
themselves.
2. Respondents countered:
Petitioners failure to enroll was due to their own fault, enrollment period was over when they tried to
enroll
The students were not of good scholastic standing
Protest activities were without permission and led to the disruption of classes and destruction of property
Guzman has a pending case lodged by the school at the Manila MTC for malicious mischief (destruction
of University property)
Issue: W/N respondent University can deny the students re-enrollment based on the reasons given and the pro-
cesses observed.
Held: No. Apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never
conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated
"in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that dis-
turbed or disrupted classes therein or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise
barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority. The pendency of a civil case
for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish
sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respon-
dents to cite to the Court any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-en-
rollment for poor scholastic standing.
There are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these
are, that
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
Fermin.
Art. 3, Sec. 1
ADMU v. Capulong
This is a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer of issuance of a temporary restraining
order questioning the order of respondent judge (Capulong) reinstating respondent students and to reverse
the decision.
Facts:
Abas and Mendoza, law students of ADMU were prevented by the petitioner from taking their
examinations after having participated in the hazing incident conducted by the Aquila Legis Fraternity
which resulted to the death of Leonardo Lennie Villa and the hospitalization of Bienvenido Marquez.
Lennie Villa died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital.
Abas and Mendoza, filed with the RTC of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for restraining order and preliminary injunction alleging that they were currently enrolled as
students of second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary order is issued, they would be
prevented from taking examinations. The petition principally centered on lack of due process in their
dismissal.
Respondent judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students and the court ordered petitioners to
conduct special examinations which they were not allowed to take. Thus, this is a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer of issuance of a temporary restraining order questioning the order of
respondent judge (Capulong) reinstating respondent students and to reverse the decision. SC granted the
petition and reversed the order of the respondent judge as he committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: W/N the petitioner violated due process when they expelled the students.
Held/Ratio: No. The school was within its rights when it expelled the students after conducting an
investigation. ADMU did not violate due process. It complied in the requisites enunciated in Guzman v.
NU wherein the court enumerated the minimum standards to be observed by schools before imposing
disciplinary actions. Students do not necessarily have the right to cross-examine the evidence and
testimony against them.
ARTICLE III SECTION 1
SPOUSES EUGENE GO AND ANGELITA GO, MINOR EMERSON KIM GO V COLEGIO
DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN
G.R. No. 169391; OCTOBER 10, 2012
Facts:
1. October: Letran recieved information that fraternities were recruiting members among
Letran's high school students.
2. Letran started an investigation--4 students admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau
Gamma Fraternity.
3. These 4 neophytes identified Emerson Kim Go, a 4th year highschool student, as one of the
fraternity seniors present during their hazing.
4. In an incident report prepared by Letran, it stated a list of fraternity members including Kim.
5. November 23, 2001: a PTA conference was held, informing Kim's mother, petitioner Go, that
neophytes identified Kim as a frat member.
6. Thereafter, Letran asked Kim to explain his side.
7. December 19, 2001: Kim, in a written statement, denied that he was a frat member and that he
did not attend said hazing.
8. On the same day, Letran sent a written notice to inform spouses Go to attend a conference on
January 8 to address the issue of Kim's frat membership. spouses Go did not attend said
conference.
9. january 15: Letran subsequently conveyed to Mrs Go and Kim the decision of Letran to
SUSPEND Kim from Jan 16 to Feb18.
10. Spouses Go filed a case in RTC of Caloocan claiming that Letran unlawfully DISMISSED
Kim, not observing due process.
11. Petitioners claim that due process was not observed under the guidelines set by Ang Tibay v.
CIR. they claim that respondents violated due process by:
a) not conducting a formal inquiry into the charge of Kim
b) not giving them any written notice of the charge
c) not providing them with opportunity to cross examine the neophytes.
12. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses GO.
13. CA rendered judgment in favor of Letran, stating that Letran observed due process.
Issue:
Whether or not due process was observed in suspending Kim.
Held:
Yes. Due process was observed in suspending Kim.
The case of Guzman v. NU should be observed in academic due process rather than the case of Ang
Tibay. Due process in disciplinary cases of students does not entail proceedings similar to judicial or
administrative proceedings.
Minimum standards to be observed:
a) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of the accusation
b) right to answer the charges against them
c) right to be informed of the evidence
d) right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
e) The evidence must be duly considered by the school authorities deciding.
Requirement a - The spouses and Kim were informed of the nature and charge of the
accusation through the written notices given to them for attending the conferences on Jan
8 and 15.
Requirement b and d - They also gave an opportunity to be heard by lettinh Kim answer
the charges against them as proved by the written statement of Kim dated December 19.
Thus, he was also given a chance to adduce evidence on his behalf.
Even though at that time, they havent received the written notice yet, they were
nevertheless given notice through the PTA meeting of the charge against Kim. What is
important is the notice given, not the form of the notice.
Requirement c - In the same PTA meeting, petitioners were informed that the case was
evidenced by the statement of the neopythes, thus they were given the right to be
informed of the evidence.
Cross examination is not needed, as again, this should not be likened to administrative
due process.
Note: Letran merely SUSPENDED Kim and not dismissed, contrary to what spouses
Go allege in their claim.
Article 3 Section 1
LAO GI v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR# 81798 December 29, 1989
Quick Digest Portion: This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners wherein they seek to set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask that a new one be rendered setting aside the order of the CID
(Comnmission on Immigration and Deportation) dated September 28, 1982 and directing it to proceed
with the reception of the evidence in support of the charges against the petitioners.
Facts:
September 3, 1958: Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191: finding Filomeno Chia, Jr., alias Sia
Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino citizen born
on November 28, 1899 being the legitimate son of Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug of Guagua,
Pampanga.
October 3, 1980: Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147: cancelling Opinion No. 191: setting aside
the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A
motion for reconsideration of said Opinion was denied by the Minister of Justice on February 13, 1981.
March 9, 1981: a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children.
March 19, 1981: an amended charge was filed with the CID alleging that said respondents refused to
register as aliens having been required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such. On August 31,
1981 another amended charge was filed alleging that Manuel Chia committed acts of undesirability.
September 4, 1981: said respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended charges on the ground that the
CID has no authority to reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No. 191. The motion to dismiss was
opposed by the private prosecutor. The CID special prosecutor also filed an opposition on the ground that
the citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion may demand and that due process was accorded to
respondents. The respondents filed a reply thereto. The motion to dismiss was denied by the CID and a
motion for reconsideration of said denial was also denied in a resolution dated December 10, 1981.
February 11, 1982: said respondents then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order. After requiring a
comment thereon, on April 28, 1982 this court en banc resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
Earlier, Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public documents in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila in Criminal Case No. 60172 for alleging that he was a Filipino citizen in the execution of
a Deed of Absolute Sale of certain real property. He was acquitted by the trial court in an order dated May
5, 1982 on the ground that Opinion No. 191 of the Secretary of Justice may be equated as res judicata and
that revocation thereof by Opinion No. 147 cannot be considered just, fair and reasonable.
Issue:
WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if they are aliens.
Held:
The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner Nituda that they register as aliens as required
by the Immigration Act. While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and authority of the
Commissioner to require an alien to so register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive
finding that the person who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship of the
petitioners is in issue there should be a previous determination by the CID that they are aliens before the
petitioners may be directed and required to register as aliens.
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the
provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings.
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:
c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated
in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground
he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.
Petition is hereby granted and the questioned order of the respondent CID is hereby set aside.
Article III, Section 1
PHILCOMSAT (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation) v ALCUAZ
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
This petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz
of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which
directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified
lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for
being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial
of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.
Facts:
1. PHILCOMSAT was granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain, and operate in the
Philippines to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and
ground terminal or terminals through RA 5514.
2. PHILCOMSAT is also designated as the sole signatory for Philippines in the Agreemnent and
Operating Agreement relating to International Telecommunications Satellite Organization.
3. Since 1968, petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to (1) Phil. Long Distance
Telephone Company, (2) Phil. Global Communications, Inc., (3) Eastern Telecommunications
Phils., Inc., (4) Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT and (5) Capitol Wireless, Inc.
This enable said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable
communication services
4. Under Section 5 of RA 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission (now NTC) but pursuant to EO 196, they were place under the jurisdiction,
control and regulation of respondent NTC including the fixing of rates.
Petitioner filed with NTC an application to continue operating and maintaining their
operation it has been doing and to charge the current rates.
Sep 16, 1987: This application was granted for 6 months and it was extended to another 6
months.
5. NTC further extended the authority granted to petitioner to operate for another six (6) months,
however, NTC directed them to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen
percent (15%) on the current rates.
6. PHILCOMSAT assailed that allowing NTC to fix rates for public service communication does
not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation
of legislative power.
7. PHILCOMSAT also assailed that there is a violation of due process because there was no
hearing and prior notice and the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and
confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.
Issue:
WON there is a violation of due process when NTC directed the price reduction.
Held:
Yes, there was a violation of due process.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates
are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a
legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of.
In The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al.
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice
of hearing is not required by due process of law.
No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume
that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-
faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are,
therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the
maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved.
In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which
provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have
power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to
the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first
giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the
same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the
present case.
Petitioner is assailing the constitutionality of the EO's because they do not fix a standard.
Held: The NTC is empowered to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operations of public service and communication.
Petitioner = No notice and hearing
Held:
The order is quasi judicial, thus there is a need for due process., PCS was not given the opportunity to cross examine the witness that gave the report
with the NTC based its order on.
Even if the order is temporary in nature, it does not mean that due process is foregone.
With regard to rate fixing, the NTC has no authority to to fix and alter the rate without giving PCS a hearing.
Article 3, Section 1
RADIOCOM v NTC
G.R. No. L-66683 April 23, 1990
Petitioners: Radio Communications of the Phils Inc. (RCPI), Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
(PTTC), Clavecilla Radio System (CRS)
Respondents: National Telecommunication Commission (NTC), PLDT
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
seeking to annul and set aside the January 25, 1984 order of the NTC and to prohibit respondent
Commission from taking cognizance of, and assuming jurisdiction over the "Application for Approval of
Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities" of PLDT for lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:
1. PLDT applied to NTC for an Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities on
Jan. 4, 1984. On January 25, 1984, the respondent Commission provisionally approved and set
the case for hearing within the prescribed 30-day period allowed by law.
a. On Feb. 2, 1984, NTC issued a notice of hearing scheduled on Feb. 22, 1984 at 9:30am.
All the petitioners were given notice except for PT&T. All the petitioners appeared at the
hearing and moved for some time within which to file an opposition or reply to said
application. Petitioners alleged that neither respondent Commission nor private
respondent PLDT informed them of the existence of this provisional authority.
b. In a resolution dated March 24, 1984, the Second Division of the SC required
respondents to comment, issued a temporary restraining order and transferred the case to
the Court En Banc which was accepted in a resolution dated April 5, 1984.
2. In their petition, petitioners alleged that the application filed by respondent PLDT is not for
approval of rates as its caption misleadingly indicates but for authority to engage in new services
not covered by private respondent's franchise and certificate of public convenience and necessity.
a. Petitioners further claimed that PLDT is limited by its legislative franchise to render only
"radiotelephonic services," exclusive of "radiotelegraphic or record services." Therefore,
the issuance of the provisional authority by the respondent Commission without notice
and hearing constitutes grave abuse of discretion inasmuch as such power or prerogative
exists only for rate cases under Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act.
b. PLDT refuted the facts alleged in the petition as grossly false and misrepresented. PLDT
contends that the provisional approval dated Jan 25 1984 is a valid exercise of NTCs
jurisdiction. PLDT added that its franchise authorizes it to operate not only telephone
system, domestic and international, but also transmission service facilities. In fact, PLDT
pointed out that petitioners themselves with the exception of CLAVECILLA had been
actual users of PLDT lines or channels for data transmission.
Issue:
The main issue is W/N the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in (1)issuing a provisional authority in favor of PLDT,(2) without prior notice to the
petitioners.
Held:
No. The petition is denied because it is devoid of merit. The Public Service Commission found that the
application involved in the present petition is actually an application for approval of rates for digital
transmission service facilities which it may approve provisionally and without the necessity of any notice
and hearing as provided in the above-quoted provision of law. Under the Public Service Act, as amended
(CA No. 146), the Board of Communications then, now the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the
subscriber's investment to be effective immediately, without hearing.
Moreover, the Commission can hear and approve revised rates without published notices or hearing. The
reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to
adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing. The Commission has the
authority to issue ex parte a provisional permit to operate proposed public service based on the needs and
interest of the public.
Also, as a rule, the court does not interfere with administrative action prior to its completion on finality.
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to
determine particular questions or matters upon the facts presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall
prevail over the courts. Hence, findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect
but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
As to the notice not given to all of the petitioners, NTC is not required because not all of them are known
to NTC. There is already substantial compliance since most of the petitioners got the notice.
Article III Sec. 1
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board
GR 96266 July 18, 1991/GR 96349 July 18, 1991/GR 96284, July 18, 1991
Quick Digest: Petition Maceda seeks to declare the nullification of the ERB (Energy Regulatory Board)
Orders dated Dec 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that hearings conducted on the increase in oil prices did not
allow him substantial cross-examination, a denial of due process
Facts:
1. On August 2, 1990, Upon the outbreak of Persian Gulf war, oil companies filed with the ERP for
an oil price increase
! On September 21, 1990, ERB issues an order granting a 1.42 increase/liter
! Maceda files petition to nullify; SC dismisses and reaffirms ERBs authority even without a
hearing pursuant to section 8 of E.O. 172
! although a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte,
a provisional increase subject to its final disposition
2. ERB sets the application for hearing with due notice to all interested parties
! 3 oil companies filed their motions for leave to file or admit amended/supplemental
applications to further increase the prices of petroleum
! ERB outlines procedure to be observed for the reception of evidence: all the evidence-in-
chief to be placed on record first and then the examination will come later, the cross
examination will come later
! Maceda claims he is denied the right to cross-examine Petron, Caltex, and Shell witnesses
and points out the denial of due process
3. In response to the presidents appeal, the subsequent increase in premium and regular gasoline
was rolled back on Dec. 10, 1990 to the levels mandated in Dec. 5, 1990
Issues:
! W/N the ERB is bound by the same rules governing court proceedings
! W/N there is substantial evidence to support the provisional relief
! W/N the price increase to augment the OPSF will constitute illegal taxation
Held:
1. W/N the ERB is bound by the same rules governing court proceedings
No. The Solicitor General points out that the order and general course of the trial is left to the discretion
of the court. Such procedure is true in administrative bodies such as the ERB which in matters of price
fixing is considered a quasi-legislative body. It is not bound by strict and technical rules of evidence.
2. W/N there is substantial evidence to support the provisional relief
Yes. The Solicitor general commented that the evidence considered by the ERB included (1)certified
copies of bills issued by crude oil suppliers, (2) reports of bankers association of the Philippines on
the peso-dollar exchange rate and (3) the OPSF status reports
3. W/N the price increase to augment the OPSF constitutes illegal taxation
No. The board order authorizing the proceeds generated to be deposited in the OPSF is not an act of
taxation because it is authorized by P.D. 1956
Dissenting Opinions:
1. Paras, J.
! The ERB has no power to tax which is solely the prerogative of Congress.
2. Padilla, J
! Any increase, provisional or otherwise, should be allowed only after the ERB has fully
determine through full hearings that it is necessary
MISSING DIGEST
GLOBE TELECOM VS NTC
435 SCRA 110
Facts:
- The law that was proposed by John Osmena wanted to remove the telecom industry from the grasps of the GOV't and place it at the hands of the market forces.
- At the center of the petition ins the SMS service and its interconnection between Smart and Globe.
- Smart filed a complaint with the NTC which requested for interconnection, this came from a failure of the 2 to implement an intercon.
- NTC reprimanded both smart and globe for this problem, and it further added that SMS is part of the value added service
o it further added that smart and globe were providing SMS services without its authorization.
- The RTC and CA ruled SMS as a VAS, it was after this that the petition of smart changed to one that brought the 2 together, BOTH ALLEDGE THAT SMS IS
NOT VAS.
Issues;
1. W/N NTC can compell globe and smart to secure NTC approval to operate an SMS system
2. W/N SMS is a VAS
Held:
- Globe alledges that the NTC order is violative of due process because it exempted islacom from acuiring the same.
- The court usually accords great respect to the findings of admin agencies, but in this case it can be seen that what was done here was a mere assertion.
- In the NTC resolution, it can not be seen how SMS fits into the VAS
- Globe and smart were also not able to present evidence on their own behalf relating to the nature of SMS as VAS
- There lies a discrepancy in the holding of the NTC that SMS is not a vas for islacom, but it is for G&S
- Globe compelled the NTC to submit the evidence of the hearings, but there was none that was given by the ntc.
o this is violative of the requirement of due process that a party must be able to adduce evidence on its own behalf.
- In the Public Serivce Act it is given that the NTC can investigate without hearing, but the powers that are enumerated here do not include the imposing fines.
o to impose fines, there is a need for notice and hearing pursuant to S21 of the PSA
-
Art 3, Sec. 1
CORONA VS. UHPAP
G.R. No. G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997
Quick Digest: Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issues Administrative Order No. 04-92 which limits the
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to a yearly renewal or cancellation of license which is
assailed to be violative of the due process clause.
FACTS:
1. Prior to A.O. 04-92, the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services governed the
requirements before becoming a pilot.
The rules mandated that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses, and must train as
probationary pilots. After satisfactory performance, they are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach 70 years of age,
unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General
Manager.
2. On July 15, 1992, PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan issued A.O. 04-92 in order to instill
effective discipline through the improvement of pilotage services. The order was an exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under PD 857. The Administrative Order
contains:
All existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of
Customs (preceded PPA) and PPA shall remain valid up to December 31 1992 only.
All appointments to harbor pilot positions shall be only for a term of one (1) year from the
date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation after rigid evaluation of
performance.
3. On December 23, 1992, the Office of the President (OP) issued an order directing the PPA to
suspend the implementation of A.O. 04-92.
4. On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato
C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. He states:
The exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited
context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let
alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession in PPAs jurisdictional area.
5. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and damages.
The court struck down the administrative issuance and pointed out that the Bureau of Customs,
the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore. Thus, abbreviating
the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property
rights of the harbor pilots.
Consequently, any withdrawal or alteration of such property right must be strictly made in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not
followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No.
04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From
this decision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.
6. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process clause of the
Constitution:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, x x x.
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there
is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.
Therefore, there is procedural and substantive due process.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby relevant government agencies and the
pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural
aspect of the enactment.
The main issue, however, deals with substantive due process where the property of the
respondents are unduly abbreviated.
ISSUE:
W/N In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents right to exercise their profession and their right to due
process of law?
RATIO
Yes. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing
that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or
physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their
license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation.
Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at
the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance
which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term
renewal. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable
and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
On the aspect of procedural due process, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four
times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail
to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which issues the licenses of
pilots after administering the pilots examinations, was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA,
which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board
of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense
involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.
Nevertheless, substantive due process was not observed, therefore A.O. 04-92 cannot be implemented for
being against Art 3 sec. 1 of the constitution.
Article III and Section 1
CORONA v UHPAP
G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997
Quick Digest Portion This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC regarding
their ruling on the unconstitutionality of PPA Administrative Order 04-92.
Facts:
1. Philippine Ports Authority promulgated PPA Administrative Order 03-85 on March 21,
1985 and PPA Administrative Order 04-92 on July 15, 1992.
PPA AO 04-92 states all existing regular appointments would only be valid
until December 31, 1992 only. All the subsequent appointments would only
have a term of one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the PPA.
2. United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association through Capt.
Compas questioned PPA AO No. 04-92 before the DOTC.
The secretary of DOTC insisted that the matter review and recall of the
administrative order lies with the PPAs Board of Directors.
3. Capt. Compas appealed the ruling of the DOTC to the Office of the President.
The Office of the President later dismissed the appeal maintaining that it
applied to all harbor pilots in general and it comes within the power of the PPA
to control and regulate pilotage.
4. Capt. Compas filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with a prayer for
TRO. The Manila RTC ruled in favor of Compas declaring that PPA AO 04-92 is null and
void.
Issue:
W/N the license of harbor pilots can be cancelled without due process of law.
Held:
No. Section 1 of Article III states that No person shall be deprived of their life, liberty or
property without due process of law. Their license, which allows them to practice their
profession, comes within the definition of a property. PPA-AO No. 04-92 restricts the pilots from
practicing their profession to only one year. In light of this, due process of law in the form of a
hearing must occur in order to protect the rights of the pilots.
Article 3, Section 1
SALAW v. NLRC
G.R. No. 90786 September 27, 1991
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the NLRC decision affirming the dismissal of Espero
Salaw by his employer, Associated Bank which reversed the decision of the labor arbiter, Benigno
Villarente Jr. declaring the petitioners dismissal as illegal.
Facts:
1. Espero Salaw was dismissed by his employer, Associated Bank
The Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary was able to
extract from him, without the assistance of a counsel a sworn affidavit admitting that he
and a co-employee sold twenty sewing machines and electric generators foreclosed by the
bank from Worldwide Garment and LP Garment and divided the proceeds of Php
60,000.000 among them in equal shares.
He was invited by Rollie Tuazon, the bank manager to appear before the banks Personal
Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC) without the assistance of a counsel.
Court awards 10,000 in moral damages to the respondents pursuant to A2217 of the Civil Code.
Exemplary damages of 5,000. This is to serve as an example to other public officials to be more
circumspect in the performance of their duties.
Nuisance per Se = The Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality.
ABAKADA vs Ermita
Sept. 1, 2005
Quick Digest: This petition consists of 5 consolidated petitions to declare RA 9337 or more
popularly known as the E-VAT Law which amends the National Internal Revenue Code, or
certain parts of it, as unconstitutional.
Facts
1. RA 9337 An act amending sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997, popularly known as the E-VAT law was passed by Congress and approved
by Pres. Arroyo
RA 9337 is a consolidation of 3 legislative bills, 2 House Bills and a Senate Bill.
All of which were certified as urgent by the President in order to hasten its
passing.
The bill was signed into law by the President on May 24, 2005.
2. Before the effectivity of RA 9337, several parties filed petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of certain parts of the law
After the laws enactment but before its effectivity, 4 parties each filed petitions
before the SC questioning the constitutionality of certain parts of the law
1. ABAKADA GURO party- list questions the constitutionality of
sections 4, 5 and 6. These sections pertain to the imposition of 10%
value added tax (VAT) on the sale of goods and properties, the
importation of goods, and the sale of services and use or lease of
properties. They also question a provision authorizing the President to
increase the VAT rate to 12% contingent upon certain events. They
argue that such provisions constitute abandonment by Congress of its
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Art. 6, Sec. 28(2) of
the Constitution.
2. Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, et al., also assail sections 4, 5, and 6 of the
law. They also assail the stand-by authority of the President to increase
the VAT rate. They also argue this stand-by authority violates the due
process clause embodied in Art. 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution because:
a. 12% increase is ambiguous because it does not state whether it
will be returned to the original 10% if the conditions are no
long satisfied
b. Rate is unfair and unreasonable as the people are unsure of the
applicable VAT rate year after year
c. Increase in VAT rate should only be based on fiscal adequacy
3. Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers Inc., et al., assail Sec. 8 and 12
of RA 9337 which involves input taxes on depreciable goods, limit on
the amount of input tax to be credited to output tax and the deduction
of final withholding taxes. They argue that these provisions are
unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and
confiscatory. They base their argument on the constitutional right
on non-deprivation of life, liberty and property without due
process of law under Art. 3, Sec. 1. They argue that input tax partakes
the nature of a property and may not be confiscated, limited, or
appropriated without due process of law.
4. Members of the HR led by Rep. Francis Escudero likewise question
the constitutionality of Sec. 4,5, and 6 of RA 9337 based on the same
argument as ABAKADA GURO party-list
Respondents mainly argue that the law has sufficiently met the standards set by
jurisprudence regarding the issue of undue delegation of legislative power. They
also aruge the every law is presumed to be constitutional and in this case, the
petitioners have not sufficiently proven is invalidity. They manifest that RA
9337 is the anchor of the governments fiscal reform agenda. A reform I the
value-added syste, of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt the
balance toward a sustainable macroeconomic environment necessary for
economic growth
3. On the date RA 9337 was supposed to take effect, the Supreme Court issued a TRO
against the enforcement and implementation of the law
Supreme Court issued a TRO on July 1, 2005, the effectivity date of RA 9337,
which took effect immediately
In the oral arguments regarding the TRO, the SC, through Justice Panganiban,
manifested the primary reason behind the issuance of the TRO.
The SC had concerns about confusion in implementing the law. This is mainly
because the people were at the mercy of confusion regarding the price increase in
products and services due to the effect of implementing value-added taxes.
The SC wanted the government to clarify the different issues regarding the laws
implementation
After the issuance of the TRO, Governor Enrique Garcia also filed a petition for
certiorari alleging the unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the
limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered
establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, thus violating the
principle that tax collection and revenue should be solely allocated for public
purposes and expenditures. Allowing these establishments to pass on the tax to
consumer is inequitable, in violation of Art. 6, Sec. 28(1) of the Constitution.
Issue
1. Whether Sec. 8 and Sec. 12 of RA 9337 are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and
confiscatory in that it violates Art. 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution
Held: No, it did not
Doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for
proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such
showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.
Input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due
process clause. A VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a
mere statutory privilege. The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights
must be born in mind for persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges.
Article III Section 1
British American Tobacco v. Camacho
As Sec. of Finance and Parayno, Jr. as Commissioner of BIR
[G.R. No. 163583, August 20, 2008]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City Br. 61.
Facts:
1. Petitioner contends that Sec. 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) as recodified in
RA 8424 (Tax Reform Act) and further amended by RA 9334 is violative of the equal protection
and uniformity clauses of the Constitution such that through its legislative classification freeze,
new brands are at a disadvantage having higher tax rates compared to those older brands covered
by such freeze which may have the same current net retail price.
2. Petitioner is the owner of a new brand of cigarettes (Lucky Strike). It filed on September 1, 2003
before the aforementioned RTC a petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of said section of the
NIRC together with Revenue Regulations Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 issued by the BIR.
- Jan. 1, 1997: RA 8284 amendments; Sec. 145 of the NIRC provides for four tiers of tax rates
(low, medium, high, premium) based on the net retail price per pack of cigarettes which is
based on a survey done in October 1, 1996 for the duly registered and active brands as of that
time. Meanwhile, those brands not covered will be classified based on their current net retail
price.
- Rev. Reg. No. 1-97: Classified existing brands (brands registered on or before Jan. 1,
1997/RA 8424) from new brands which were registered thereafter providing that their (new
brands) tax category will be based on their suggested retail price (SRP) until a survey by the
Bureau has been conducted to determine its actual retail price after three months of its
introduction to the market.
- June 2001: Petitioner introduced their Lucky Strike brand of cigarettes which had an SRP of
P9.90/pack therefore belonging to the high tax rate of P8.96/pack.
- Rev. Reg. No. 9-2003: Empowered the BIR to make survey every two years on the current
retail price of the products for the reclassification of their tax rates or for new tax category.
- Rev. Mem. No. 6-2003: Issued guidelines for the net retail price of new brands of cigarettes
and alcohol products.
- Rev. Reg. 22-3003: Issued to implement the revised tax classification of the new brands (after
Jan. 1, 1997) based on the survey (RR No. 1-97), which revealed that Lucky Strike has a
current net retail price of P22 thus should be categorized in the premium rate of P13.44/pack.
3. On Sept. 4, 2003, the RTC denied the TRO, saying that it has no power to restrain tax collection.
Then it also denied the Motion to Dismiss on March 2004 but issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction for the Revenue Regulations and Memorandums. On a motion for reconsideration,
both the parties agreed that it was their (the law and rules/orders) constitutionality that is being
ultimately questioned.
4. On May 2004, RTC uplifted the writ and upheld their constitutionality, thus this petition for
review in the Supreme Court.
5. Jan. 2005: RA 9334 amendments; This provided for the legislative freeze on brands of cigarettes
introduced between Jan. 2, 1997- Dec. 31, 2003, saying that their current tax rate/category will be
that which the BIR has assigned to them together with those old brands (prior to said date)
contained in Annex D of the petition shall remain in their categories until revised by Congress.
Thus, it resulted for petitioner having higher tax for their products, prompting them to amend
their petition to assail the validity of RA 9334 and praying for a lower tax category, citing other
brands such as Philip Morris and Marlboro being unduly benefited because their category are still
based on the Oct. 1996 tax base (and all those listed in Annex D) and thus having lower taxes
than them despite the disparity in their prices. Said companies filed their respective motion for
intervention which the Court granted.
Issues:
Procedural-
1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2. W/N petitioner is estopped from complaining about the authority of the Bureau upon entering the
field/market, knowing and complying with its policies
Substantive-
3. W/N Section 145 of the NIRC as amended by RA 9334, by retaining the Annex D (with tax base
as of Oct. 1996) and the classification freeze violates the equal protection and uniformity of
taxation clause of the Constitution
4. W/N the Revenue Regulations and Revenue Memorandum Orders are valid
5. W/N petitioner should be categorized in a lower tax category
6. W/N RA 8240 as amended by RA 9334 violates the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT) of 1947
Held:
1. YES. Art. 8 Sec. 1 of the Constitution vests the courts with judicial power, thus having
jurisdiction in cases wherein the constitutionality of the law or rule is challenged. It is not the
Court of Tax Appeals who have the jurisdiction for the reason just mentioned.
2. NO. Petitioner did not do any misrepresentations or misleading acts as requirement for estoppel
upon complying with the Bureau regarding the NIRC and its rules and regulations, and it was also
mentioned that the unconstitutionality of the law may still be attacked though it was never done
before.
3. NO. To fulfil the rational basis test to stand the test of equal protection and uniformity, a
legislative classification must 1) rationally further a legitimate state interest, 2) have reasonable
classifications, and 3) rest upon some ground of difference having fair and substantial relation to
the object of legislation. The Court finds the classification freeze in the NIRC as having fulfilled
these standards and mentioned that it was adopted by Congress for practicality and expediency, to
have a uniform mechanism of taxation specially for fixing the tax rates of new brands, for
stability in short. As regards the correctness of these schemes adopted by Congress (including
retaining Annex D in the amendments), the Court refused to delve into that question declaring
that it is already inquiring into the wisdom of legislators which it cannot and should not do for
respect for a co-equal branch.
4. NO. The BIR clearly erred in issuing such orders since there is nowhere in Section 145 of the
NIRC a granting of the power and authority for it to conduct resurveys and reclassifications every
two years or earlier on said products for their new tax rates.
5. NO. It cannot avail of being into a lower tax category since it failed to compel or ask the BIR for
the mandatory survey of its actual net retail price after three months of introduction of its product,
thus the subsequent survey (long after the three-month mandatory period) was the first survey it
had, availing it of no re-classification because technically, it was its first, thus cannot be reversed
(perhaps only for those reclassified based on the Regulation and Memorandums which later were
invalidated).
6. NO. It doesnt violate the GATT since the classification freeze is both applicable equally to local
and imported products, and even assuming for the sake of discussion that it is prejudicial to the
other one, it cannot prevail over RA 8240 as amended by RA 9334 because the latter one must
prevail being a later enactment of Congress as statutes (since both have the force of it only) and
as a special law dealing with taxation.