Large Retail Malls To Prevent and Respond To Terririst Attack

The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S.
Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: An Assessment of the Preparedness of Large
Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terrorist
Attack
Author(s): Robert C. Davis ; Christopher Ortiz ; Robert
Rowe ; Joseph Broz ; George Rigakos ; Pam
Collins
Document No.: 216641
Date Received: December 2006
Award Number: 2003-IJ-CX-1017
This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice.
To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-
funded grant final report available electronically in addition to
traditional paper copies.
Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
AnAssessmentofthePreparednessof
LargeRetailMallsto
PreventandRespondto
TerroristAttack
RobertC.Davis
PoliceFoundation
ChristopherOrtiz
VeraInstituteofJustice
RobertRowe
AmericanSocietyforIndustrial
Security
JosephBroz
MidwestInstituteforResearch
GeorgeRigakos
CarltonUniversity
PamCollins
UniversityofEasternKentucky
January20,2006
final%20report%2dedited[1]
ii
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
TableofContents
Figures................................................................................................................................iv
Tables.................................................................................................................................iv
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................1
Background...........................................................................................................2
PrivateSecurityinaPost-9/11World..................................................................3
NewStandardsforIndustryResponsibility..........................................................4
PurposesofThisReport.......................................................................................5
2. SurveyofStateHomelandSecurityAdvisors............................................................7
PerceptionsofPreparedness.................................................................................8
LinksBetweenPrivateSecurityinMallsandPublic-SectorResponders..........11
PrivateSecurityRegulation................................................................................12
3. SurveyofMallSecurityDirectors............................................................................14
HiringStandards.................................................................................................14
Training..............................................................................................................15
ChangesinHiringStandards,Training,andSpendingon
SecuritySince9/11......................................................................................16
PreventionStrategies..........................................................................................17
EmergencyPreparedness....................................................................................20
CoordinationWiththePublicSector..................................................................20
OpinionsAboutTerroristThreat........................................................................22
4. ResultsofSiteVisitstoMalls...................................................................................25
SpendingonSecurity..........................................................................................25
RiskAssessment.................................................................................................26
PreventionStrategies..........................................................................................26
TrainingPrograms..............................................................................................27
EmergencyResponsePlans................................................................................28
RelationshipWithLocalLawEnforcement.......................................................29
Assessment.........................................................................................................29
TheSpecialCaseofIsraeliMalls.......................................................................30
5. AnalysisofStateStatutesRegulatingPrivateSecurity............................................33
SummaryResults................................................................................................34
ChangesSince9/11............................................................................................35
6. ConclusionsandRecommendations.........................................................................37
StepstoTake......................................................................................................38
iii
Appendices
AppendixADetailsofMallSecurityDirectorSurveyResults
AppendixBCatalogofRegulationsbyState
Figures
Figure1. Mapofstatesurveyrespondents......................................................................7
Figure2. Numberofadvisorscharacterizingrelationsbetween mallsecurityandfirst
respondersasgoodorverygood...................................................................11
Figure3. Adequacyofstatelawsgoverningprivatesecurity(N=29)..........................12
Figure4. SecurityDirectorratingofsecuritythreats....................................................22
Figure5. Mostlikelyformofattack.............................................................................23
Tables
Table1. Mostcommonreasonsforpositiveratings onpreparedness..........................8
Table2. Qualitiesofbest-preparedmalls......................................................................9
Table3. Measuresretailmallscouldtaketobecomebetterprepared.........................10
Table4. Whatisthebiggestobstacletofullerpreparedness?.....................................10
Table5. Suggestionsforadditionalstateregulation....................................................13
Table6. Hiringstandardsformallsecuritystaff.........................................................14
Table7. Backgroundchecksformallsecuritystaff....................................................15
Table8. Antiterrorismtraining....................................................................................16
Table9. Changesinhiringstandards,training,andsecurity
spendingsince9/11........................................................................................17
Table10. Typesofactions,characteristicsprofiledbysecuritystaff............................18
Table11. Policyonhandlingsuspiciousbehavior/persons...........................................18
Table12. Changesinpatrolandsurveillancestrategiessince9/11...............................19
Table13. Technologicalsecuritymeasures...................................................................19
Table14. Partnersinpreparednessexercises.................................................................20
Table15. StateDHSinvolvementinsecurityplanning.................................................21
Table16. Lawenforcementinvolvementinsecurityplanning.....................................21
Table17. AssistancesoughtfromDHS.........................................................................22
Table18. Additionalsecuritymeasuresconsideredcritical..........................................23
Table19. Statestatutesregulatingprivatesecurity.......................................................34
Table20. Post-9/11changesinstateprivatesecuritystatutes.......................................35
iv
1. Introduction
SincetheeventsofSeptember11,2001,securityconcernshavefigured
prominentlyinthenationalagenda.Governmentofficialsandthepublicnowrecognizea
widerarrayofpotentialterroristtargetsextendingbeyondmilitaryinstallations. These
softtargets,orareaswithpublicaccess,includetransithubs,schools,andmassprivate
spaceslikeamusementparksandsportsarenas.
Onetypeofsofttargetthathasreceivedtoolittleattentionistheretailmall.With
alltheothersofttargetsthatexist(e.g.,transitsystems,schools,hospitals,etc.),why
shouldcitizensbeconcernedaboutattacksagainstshoppingmalls? Onereasonisthat
thenatureofmallsmakesthemveryvulnerable:therearemultipleentrancesandexits,
andtheyareopentothepublic.Largenumbersofpeoplecomeandgo,makingiteasyfor
potentialterroriststoblendinunnoticed.Manyofthevisitorscarrylargeparcelsthat
couldhideabomborotherweapon.Therearemultiplewaystoattackamall,ranging
fromautomaticweaponstocarbombstobombsplacedinsidethemall,eventoanattack
usingabiologicalorchemicalagent.
Moreover,theconsequencesofanattackcouldbequiteserious.Inthecaseofan
attackusingabiologicalorchemicalagent,orabombblastresultinginstructural
collapse,thecasualtiescouldbeveryhigh.Anattackcouldalsoproduceinsuranceand
joblosses.Acoordinatedseriesofattacksagainstmallswouldalmostcertainlyresultin
long-termlostbusinessandseriousregionalornationaleconomicconsequences,aswe
sawintheairlineindustryfollowing9/11.
Infact,mallsandtheretailsectoringeneralhavebeenattackedinvariouspartsof
theworldforthepastseveraldecades.Israelhasexperiencedorthwartedattacksagainst
mallsontenoccasionssincethestartoftheIntifadaintheWestBankinthemid-1990s.
CountriesasdisparateasTurkeyandFinlandhavehadattacksagainstmallsinrecent
years.EnglandsufferedattacksagainstretailstoresbytheIrishRepublicanArmyasfar
backasthe1970s.
1
IntheUnitedStates,mallshavebeentargetedaswell.Justafewweekspriorto
thedraftingofthisreport,amanwalkedintoamallinTacoma,Washington,andopened
firewithapairofassaultrifles.Aftershootingsixpeople,oneofthemcritically,the
gunmanduckedintoamusicstoreandtookfourhostages.Afterhissurrenderto
authorities,thepolicesearchedhiscarandapartmentandfoundarecipeformakingthe
deadlypoisonricinaswellasbomb-makingplansandmaterials.Thegunmantold
authoritiesthathehadbeenhumiliatedduringatroubledchildhoodandthatrecent
problemsmadehimwanttobeheard.
2
1
DanBilefskyandAnnZimmerman,etal,CanShoppersBeKeptSafe?BombThreatAgainstIkeaIn
EuropeSpursStores,MallsToReassessSecurityMeasures,TheWallStreetJournal,5December2002.
2
SuspectinTacomamallshootingsentangrytextmessagesbeforerampage. MinneapolisStarTribune,
November21,2005.
1
Lastyear,theFBIarrestedamanonchargesthatheintendedtoblowupa
Columbus,Ohio,shoppingcenter.Theman,aSomaliimmigrantwhoallegedlytraveled
toEthiopiatoobtainterroristtraining,wasafriendofamanconvictedofconspiringto
blowuptheBrooklynBridge.TheColumbussuspectisawaitingtrialinfederalcourt.
ThisreporttakesacloselookatthestateofsecurityinlargeU.S.shoppingmalls.
Howhavethingschangedsince9/11,andisthestateofsecuritytodaymeetingthe
standardsthattheindustry,government,andcourtshavedefined?
Background
Expertsagreethatprivatizationofpolicingisagrowingtrendworldwide.This
trendwasfirstwidelynotedasaresultofa1971RandCorporationstudycommissioned
bytheNationalInstituteofJusticeintheUnitedStates.
3
Severalyearslater,Stenning
andShearing
4
notedthataquietrevolutiontowardsprivatesecurityhadoccurredin
Canada.South
5
documentedasimilarphenomenoninbothwesternandeasternEuropean
countries.AnupdateoftheRandassessmentin1985concludedthatprivatesecurityout-
spentpubliclawenforcementby73%andemployedtwoandone-halftimesasmany
6
persons. ExpertsseemtoagreethatprivatesecurityismoreextensiveintheUnited
Statesamongstwesternnationsthanvirtuallyanywhereelse,
7
butitseemsclearthat
privatizationofpoliceservicesisaglobalphenomenonthatneedstoberecognizedand
considered.
Asthestatestraditionalmonopolyonpolicingdissipates,manyfunctionsthatwere
oncetheexclusivedomainofpublicpoliceforcesarenowbeingperformedbyprivate
agencies.Inaddition,wholenewareasofactivitiesservicesthatdidnotexistorwerenot
widelyavailablecannowbepurchased.Whilethestateremainsasignificantplayerin
thedeliveryandregulationofpolicing,itisnolongertheonlyinstitutionthataimsto
safeguardthesecurityofcitizens.Therearenowarangeofprivatesecurityorganizations
thatinclude,forexample,privatesecurityfirms,insurancecompanies,forensic
accountants,andin-housecorporatesecurity.
Theseprivatesecurityagencieshavemovedbeyondsimplyprotectingprivate
property.Theyareactivelyengagedinmaintainingorder,investigatingcrimes,andmaking
arrestsinpublicspaces.Inotherwords,theyareperformingmanyactivitiesthatwereonce
exclusivelyperformedbypublicpoliceforces.
3
JamesS.KakalikandSorrelWildhorn,PrivatesecurityintheUnitedStates(SantaMonica,CA:Rand
Corporation,1971).
4
PhilipStenningandCliffordShearing,TheQuietRevolution:TheNature,Development,GeneralLegal
ImplicationsofPrivateSecurityinCanada,CriminalLawQuarterly22(1980):220-48.
5
NigelSouth,PrivatizingPolicingintheEuropeanMarket:SomeIssuesforTheory,Policy,and
Research,EuropeanSociologicalReview10,no.3(1994):219-233.
6
WilliamC.CunninghamandToddH.Taylor,TheHallcrestReport:PrivateSecurityandPolicein
America(Portland,OR:ChancellorPress1985).
7
SouthAfricaandRussiahavehigherlevels. SeeJaapdeWard(1999). Theprivatesecurityindustryin
internationalperspective EuropeanJournalofCriminologyPolicyandResearch,7:2,168.
2
Thelinebetweenwhatispublicandprivatepropertyandwhoisresponsiblefor
policingpublicandprivatespaceisbecomingblurred.Therehasbeenanincreasein
whatStenningandShearinghavetermedmassprivatepropertyshoppingmalls,gated
communities,andthelike.
8
Thesearelargetractsofpublic-access,privately-owned
spacewhichhavetraditionallyfallenoutsideofthedomainofpublicpolice.
Inpolicingmassprivatepropertyandinothersituationsaswell,publicpoliceand
privatesecurityagenciesoftendevelopcooperativerelationshipswithoneanother.This
cooperationcontributestotheblurringoftherelationshipbetweenpublicandprivate
sectors.Themovementofretiringpoliceofficerstotheprivatesecuritysectoroften
facilitatescooperation.Manyexecutivesthatheadupprivatesecuritycompanies,forensic
accountingteams,orsecurityconsultingfirmswereformerpublicpoliceofficers.
Insomeplaces,publicandprivatesecurityofficersexchangeinformationabout
peopleandeventsinagivenjurisdiction.Informally,policeofficersandprivatesecurity
guardsoftenshareinformationabouteventsinaparticularareaoraboutwantedpersons.
Forexample,Rigakos
9
reportedthatpoliceofficersinTorontomadelocalmallor
housingsecurityofficersawareofwantedpersons,therebyturningsecurityofficersinto
anextrapairofeyesandears.Similarly,Davis
10
reportedextensivecooperationbetween
publicandprivatesecurityinoneofNewYorkCitysbusinessimprovementdistricts.
Inseveralcities,policeandsecurityfirmshaveformedformalcooperative
associationstomeetanddiscusstopicssuchasbombthreats,executiveprotection,and
burglaryinvestigation.AccordingtoPancake,inAmarillo,Texas,thepoliceandaprivate
securitycompanyworkedoutanagreementunderwhichtheprivatecompany assumed
responsibilityforrespondingtoalarmcalls.
11
Withinthesameperiod,Amarillopolice
alsohiredprivatesecurityofficerstopatrolthedowntowncoreduringpeakhoursin
tandemwiththepolice. InNewYork,thepolicebriefkeyprivatesecuritychiefs
monthlyonterrorismissues.
PrivateSecurityinaPost-9/11World
Forthemostpart,mallsandothersofttargetsthatarepartofourhomeland
securityconcernsareprotected,notbypublicpolice,butbyprivatesecurity.Thus,the
eventsof9/11thrustprivatesecurityofficersintoanewandimportantrole.Recognizing
thisreality,severalstatesincludingCalifornia,Illinois,andMichigantookstepsto
morecloselyregulatetheindustryintheyearfollowing9/11/2001.
12
8
PhilipStenningandCliffordShearing,TheQuietRevolution:TheNature,Development,GeneralLegal
ImplicationsofPrivateSecurityinCanada,CriminalLawQuarterly22(1980):220-48.
9
GeorgeRigakos(2002). Thenewparapolice:Riskmarketsandcommodifiedsocialcontrol. Toronto:
UniversityofTorontoPress.
10
RobertC.Davis,SarahDadush,JennyIrish,Dr.ArturoAlvaradoandDianeDavis,ThePublic
AccountabilityofPrivatesecurity:LessonsfromNewYork,Johannesburg,andMexicoCity(NewYork,
NY:VeraInstituteofJustice,2000).
11
Pancake,D.(1983). Thenewprofessionals:Cooperationbetweenpolicedepartmentsandprovate
security. ThePoliceChief,50,34-36.
12
RobertSalladay,DavisSignsBillstoGiveSecurityaBoost;PrivateGuardsmustCompleteCriminal
Checks,TheSanFranciscoChronicle,16September2002,p.A.16.
3
Howhastheindustryitselfrespondedtotheincreasedresponsibility? Media
reportsafter9/11suggestedthatlittlehadchanged. Anearly2003USATodaystory
characterizedprivatesecurityashomelanddefensesweaklink.
13
Althoughafew
stateshadintroducedorraisedhiringortrainingstandards,theUSATodaystoryshowed
thatmoststatesstilldonotimposeminimumtrainingstandardsorevenrequire
backgroundchecks.Moreover,eveninstatesthatdidrequiretrainingprograms,there
waslittleefforttomonitorthecontentorqualityoftheprograms.
Severalnewspaperarticlesandlimitedsurveyshavereinforcedthenotionthat
securityintheretailsectordidnotundergosignificantchangeafter9/11. A2003survey
bytheCouncilonCompetitivenessof230corporateexecutivesfromcompanieswith
grossrevenuesof$50millionormorefoundthatonlyhalfoftheexecutiveshadmade
changestosecurityinresponsetoterrorismconcerns.
14
Asurveyconductedinthreelarge
statesfortheServiceEmployeesInternationalUnionsimilarlyfoundthatfourinten
officersreportednonewsecuritymeasuresattheirworkplaces.Sevenintenofthe
officersreportedthatbombthreatdrillsornaturaldisasterdrillswereneverconductedat
theirbuildings.
15
NewStandardsforIndustryResponsibility
Recognizingtheimportanceofsecurityintheretailsector,the9/11Commission
determinedthatbusinesseshaveadutytocareaboutthesecurityoftheircustomers.
TheCommissionendorsedtheNationalFirePreventionAssociationstandard(NFPA
1600)fordisasterandemergencymanagementpreparednessintheprivatesector.
AccordingtotheCommission,Webelievethatcompliancewiththestandardshould
definethestandardofcareowedbyacompanytoitsemployeesandthepublicforlegal
purposes.
16
TheNFPA1600standardspecifiesthatemergencymanagementprogramsshould
addressthefourphasesofemergencymanagementandrecovery,whichinclude:(a)
mitigation,oreffortstoeliminateorreducetheriskofadisasteroremergency,(b)
preparedness,oractivitiesandprogramsintendedtosupportrecoveryfromdisaster,(c)
response,oractivitiestoaddressimmediateandshort-termeffectsofadisaster,and(d)
recovery,oractivitiesandprogramsdesignedtoreturnconditionstonormal
TheNFPAstandardlistsanumberofelementsthatcompaniesoughttoadoptinorder
toeffectivelyimplementthefourphasesofemergencymanagementandrecovery.
Includedamongthoseelementsare:
13
MimiHall,PrivateSecurityGuards:HomelandDefense'sWeakLink,USAToday,23January2003,p.
A.01.
14
SherryL.Harowitz,TheNewCenturions,SecurityManagementOnline,January2003.
15
PeterD.HartResearchAssociates,APost-September11ReportonSurveysofSecurityOfficersin
California,Texas,andFlorida(Washington,D.C.:PreparedfortheServiceEmployeesInternationalUnion
(SEIU),2002).
16
The9/11commissionreport. www.gpoaccess.gov/911/
4
RiskassessmentIdentificationofpotentialhazardsandthelikelihoodoftheir
occurrence
HazardmitigationBasedontheresultsoftheriskassessment,effortsto
minimizelikelyhazards
EmergencyresponseplanAssignmentofresponsibilitiestoorganizationsand
individualsforcarryingoutspecificactionsduringanemergencyordisaster
EmergencycommunicationprotocolsDeterminingcommunicationneedsand
capabilitiesofvariousorganizationsandpersonnelandensuringinteroperability
TrainingofstaffinemergencyproceduresEducationofstaffontheelementsof
theemergencymanagementprogramandperiodictestingandexercises
MutualaidAgreementswithotherentitiesfortheirparticipationinemergency
responseplans
Courtdecisionshavereinforcedtheresponsibilityoftheprivatesectortotake
reasonablestepstoguardagainstterroristattack.ANewYorkdistrictcourtrulingin
2003deniedamotiontodismissasuitagainsttheairlinesbyfamiliesofthe9/11victims.
Thejudgesrulingwasbasedontheconceptthatitwasforeseeablethataplanewhose
passengershavebeennegligentlyscreenedatcheck-incouldbesubjecttoterroristattack.
Inanotherrecentruling,aNewYorkStatejuryfoundthattheagencythatownedthe
WorldTradeCenterwasnegligentfornotdoingenoughtothwartthedeadly1993
terroristbombingbeneaththetwintowers,arulingthatmayopenthedoortomore
litigation.Infact,thejurorsfoundthatthePortAuthoritywasactuallytwiceasliablefor
thebombingastheactualterrorists! Jurorssaidtheywereswayedbya1985report
writtenbythePortAuthoritysownsecurityofficials,whowarnedthattheunderground
parkinggaragewasalikelyattacksite.
PurposesofThisReport
ThePoliceFoundation,incooperationwiththeVeraInstituteofJustice,theASIS
InternationalFoundation,andtheMidwestResearchInstitute,incooperationwith
researchersattheUniversityofEasternKentuckyandCarltonUniversityundertookan
assessmentofthelevelofsecurityinlargeindoorshoppingmallsaswellasthe
associatedissuesoftrainingandlegislationofprivatesecurityforces.Thecoreissuewe
addressinthisreportisthedegreetowhichmallshavebecomebetterpreparedto
respondtoterroristattacksintheaftermathof9/11.
Theinvestigationweconductedwentwellbeyondearliersurveysconductedafter
9/11.Itincludedsurveyswithstatehomelandsecurityadvisorstogettheirviewsonmall
preparednessaswellassurveyswiththesecuritydirectorsofthenationslargestindoor
retailmalls.Weconductedsitevisitstotenmallstogaingreaterinsightintohowtheyare
dealingwithsecuritypreparednessandresponsetodisasters.Weconductedastate-by-
stateanalysisoflegislationregulatingthehiringandtrainingofprivatesecurity.
Thedetailedassessmentthatresultedfromourworkindicateswhatmallsare
doingintheareasofriskassessments,preventivemeasures,emergencypreparedness
plans,training,andcoordinationwithstateandlocalgovernment.Thecomprehensive
picturethatemergesofthestateofsecurityinlargeretailmallssuggeststhatthereare
5
gapsinpreparednessandthatstatehomelandsecurityofficialsandlocalpoliceaswellas
mallownersandsecuritystaffhavearoletoplayinfillingthosegaps.
Thepresentationofdatafromourworkbeginswithresultsofthesurveythatwe
conductedwithstatehomelandsecuritydirectors.Wethenpresentresultsofthesurveyof
mallsecuritydirectorsandinsightswegainedinsitevisitstomallsbothinthiscountry
andinIsrael.Finally,wediscussstatelegislationintheareaofprivatesecurityand
changesinstateandfederalstatutessince9/11.Weconcludewithadiscussionofwhat
welearnedfromourworkandourthoughtsaboutwhatstepsmightbetakentoincrease
thesafetyofmallcustomers.
6
2. SurveyofStateHomelandSecurityAdvisors
Weundertookasurveyofstatehomelandsecurityadvisorstofindout(a)how
closelytheywereinvolvedwithsecurityinshoppingmalls,(b)howcloselymallsworked
withlocalfirstresponders,and(c)howpreparedtheythoughtmallsweretorespondto
terroristattack.Thesurveyconsistedofbothforced-choiceandopen-endedquestions.
WewereaidedindistributingthesurveybytheDepartmentofHomeland
Security.DHSagreedtodistributethesurveytohomelandadvisorsinall50statesand
PuertoRico,andtotaskthemwithcompletingit.Theinitiale-mailfromDHSwas
followedbytwoadditionale-mails,andthenphonecallsbyprojectstafftostateadvisors
whohadnotresponded.Atotalof33responseswereobtained.Figure1depictsthestates
thatcompletedsurveysandshowsgooddispersionacrossallregionsofthecountry.
Figure1.Mapofstatesurveyrespondents
7
PerceptionsofPreparedness
Thefirstsectionofthesurveyaskedrespondentstogivetheiropiniononissues
surroundingtheabilityoflargeretailmallstopreparefor,andrespondto,terroristattack.
Includedinthissectionwerequestionsabouttheperceivedlevelofpreparednessofretail
malls,theindustrysabilitytoprepare,impedimentstopreparation,andtheavailabilityof
fundingandtraining.
Overall,therespondentswerefairlyoptimisticabouttheabilityoflargeretail
mallsintheirstatetorespondtoterroristattack.Eighteenpercentofrespondentsreported
thattheabilityoftheretailmallsintheirstatetorespondtothethreatofterrorismwas
verygood,27%thoughtitwasgood,andanadditional24%believedthatitwasatleast
fair.Table1presentsthereasonsbehindtheirassessments.Mostrespondentswho
reportedapositiveassessment(verygood,good,orfair)believedeitherthatmalls
cooperatedwellwithlocallawenforcementorthattheyhaddevelopedemergencyplans.
Othersfeltpositivebecausesomemallsintheirstateshadreceivedfundingtoupgrade
securitythroughthefederalBufferZoneProtectionProgram,avehiclethatprovidesup
to$50,000forimprovingsecurityatcriticalinfrastructuresites.
Table1.Mostcommonreasonsforpositiveratings
onpreparedness
Respondentsansweringvery
good,good,orfair
Reason (n=24)
Cooperationbetweenmalls
andfirstresponders 9
Developmentofemergency
preparednessplans 9
ParticipateinBufferZone
ProtectionProgram 4
Otherreasonscited 2
Oneinthreestateadvisorsratedpreparednessaspoor.Themostcommonreasons
givenfortheseassessmentswereinadequatetraining,inadequateequipment,oran
opinionthatmallsecuritywouldbeirrelevantintheeventofanattack,sincethe
responsibilityforresponsewouldbeuptolawenforcement.Onestateadvisor
complained:
Theabilityoflargeretailmallstorespondtoaterroristattackdependsin
largepartonthequalityoftrainingprovidedtheprivatesecurityguards
whowouldbethefirstrespondersintheeventofanattack.
Unfortunately,[this]isoneofthefewstatesinthenationthathasno
regulatoryboardprovidingoversightoftheprivatesecurityguards.
Respondentswereaskediftheywereawareofanylargemallsintheirstatethat
havedoneagoodjobofpreparingforthethreatofaterroristattack,andwhatmadethem
8
successful.Amongthe19stateadvisorswhowereabletoidentifyanexceptionalmall,
themostfrequentelementidentifiedwiththemallssuccesswassuperiorsecuritystaff
(seeTable2).Otherreasonswhymallswerethoughttobebetterpreparedincludedan
emphasisonpreparednessplanningandtraining,agoodworkingrelationshipbetween
locallawenforcementandmallmanagement/security,participationintheBufferZone
ProtectionProgram,andadvancedclosedcircuittelevisionsystems(CCTV).Onestate
advisornoted:
WehavethreemallsinthestatethatarecurrentlyparticipatingintheDHS
BufferZoneProtectionPlaninitiative.Byactuallysittingdownatthe
tableandworkingwiththeotherkeystakeholdersfromthelocallaw
enforcement,fire,EMS,andEMAcommunities,thesemallsaremuch
furtherdowntheroadinidentifying,understanding,andacquiringthe
physicalsecurityresourcesandtrainingthatbetterpreparethemto
interdictand/orrespondtoaterroristevent
Table2.Qualitiesofbest-preparedmalls
Responses
Reason (n=19)
Superiorsecuritystaff 7
Emphasison 6
planning/training
Goodworkingrelationship
withlocallawenforcement 4
ParticipationinDHSBuffer
ZoneProtectionProgram 1
AdvancedCCTVsystem 1
Whenaskedwhattheybelievedtobethemostimportantmeasuresretailmalls
couldtakeinordertobetterprepareagainstterroristattacks,mostrespondentsendorsed
improvedtrainingforsecuritystaffandemergencyresponders(seeTable3).Other
responsesincludeddevelopmentofemergencypreparednessplans,morevisiblesecurity,
bettercoordinationwithlocallawenforcement,enhancedtechnology,andhigher
standardsforsecurityofficers.Somestateadvisorsincorporatedmultipleideasintotheir
answers:
Outsidebudgetandpersonneladditions,formaltraininginareassuchas
terrorismawarenessandhazardmitigationwouldbehelpful.Additionally,
weencourageincreasedcommunicationandpartnershipswiththelocal
firstresponders(police,fire,EMS)toestablishmechanismsfor
informationsharingandcollaborationtopreventaterroristattack,andto
prepareafullycoordinatedresponsetooneshouldtheneedarise.
9
Table3. Measuresretailmallscouldtaketo
becomebetterprepared
Responses
Typeofaction (n=34)
Training 15
Additionalplanning 6
Increasevisibilityofsecuritystaff 5
Partnerwithlocallawenforcement 4
Increasetechnology 3
Increasesecurityofficerstandards 1
Respondentswerethenaskedwhattheybelievedwasthebiggestimpedimentto
fullerpreparedness.Amajorityofrespondentsidentifiedcostorlackoffundingasthe
mostsignificantissue(seeTable4),andrespondentsindicatedthatstateswereoflittle
helpwiththisproblem.Onlyfiverespondentssaidthatfundingforimprovedsecurity
wasavailablethroughtheirstate.
17
Thenextmostcommonimpedimenttobetterpreparednessnamedbythestate
advisorswasfearofdisruptingmallbusinessandfrighteningcustomers.Onerespondent
stated,Hardeningopenenvironmentsimpliesrestrictionsandlimitationsthatimpede
trafficflowandimposeunaccustomedcontrolsonmallvisitors. Otherstateadvisorsfelt
thatmallownerslackedawarenessorconcernaboutthethreatposedbyterrorism,that
trainingprogramswereinadequate,thatmallsecurityandfirstrespondershadfailedto
coordinateeffectively,orthatstateregulationoftheindustrywasdeficient.
Table4.Whatisthebiggestobstacletofullerpreparedness?
Responses
Obstacle (n=29)
Cost/funding 18
Disruptmallbusiness 4
Lackofthreatawareness 3
Trainingsub-par 2
Lackofcoordinationwithfirstresponders 1
Inadequateregulation 1
Thisquestionwasfollowedbyaquestionaskingwhetherornotrespondents
believedthattheretailmallindustrywaspreparedtotakeadditionalsecuritymeasures.
Twooutof threestateadvisorsdidnotbelievethattheindustrywaspreparedtotake
Infact,itisverylikelythatthesefiverespondentswerereferringtotheBufferZoneProtectionprogram,
whichprovidedfederalfundingforsecurityenhancementsforcriticalinfrastructuresitesrecommendedby
thestates.
10
17
thesesteps,primarilybecauseofreluctancetospendmoneyonadditionalsecuritystaffor
othermeasuresthatcouldimprovepreparationandresponsetoterroristacts.
LinksBetweenPrivateSecurityinMallsandPublic-SectorResponders
Respondentswereaskedtheiropinionsaboutthelevelofcooperation
betweenmallsecurityandlocalfirstresponders.Thestatehomelandsecurity
advisorswereverypositiveabouttheserelationships.Twenty-six,orroughly
threeoutoffour,respondentscharacterizedrelationsbetweenmallsecurityand
publicpoliceasgoodorverygood,whiletheremaindercharacterizedrelationsas
fair(seeFigure2).Asimilarnumber(23)ofthestateadvisorscharacterized
relationsbetweenmallsecurityandemergencyservices(fireandEMT)asgood
orverygood.
Figure2.Numberofadvisorscharacterizingrelationsbetween
mallsecurityandfirstrespondersasgoodorverygood
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
Police Fire
Follow-upquestionsaskedrespondentswhethermallsecuritystaffconducted
jointtrainingexerciseswithfirstresponders.Fifteen,orslightlylessthanhalf,ofthestate
homelandsecurityadvisorsaffirmedthattheywereawareofjointexercisesbetween
securitystaffinsomemallsandlocalpolice.Thirteenaffirmedjointexerciseswithfire
and/orEMTstaff.
Cooperationwithpublicofficialsprovedtobeanimportantstimulusforthe
developmentofemergencypreparednessplans.Respondentswereaskedwhetherthey
knewifmallshaddevelopedemergencyresponseplansthatspecifiedwhattodointhe
eventofterroristattackorothercatastrophicsituation.Sixteen,orslightlyunderhalf,of
thestateadvisorsrespondedintheaffirmative.Nearlyalltheadvisorswhowereawareof
emergencyresponseplansstatedthatthepublicsectorwasinvolvedintheirdevelopment
throughtheBufferZoneProtectionProgramorthroughstateorlocalemergencyplanning
efforts.Accordingtoonerespondent:
11
Localpoliceandemergencyserviceshavedevelopedresponseplans
specifictoaterroristattackatthemall.Thereiscoordinationtodevelop
similarmatrixesforelevatedthreatlevelsecurityandprevention
measures.Bothmallofficialsandlocalfirstrespondersareactivein
developingtheseplansduetotheclearincentivesoftheBufferZone
ProtectionPlan.
PrivateSecurityRegulation
Stateadvisorswereaskedtheiropinionsregardingtheadequacyofstate
regulationconcerningprivatesecurity.Threeinfiverespondentsthatgaveananswerto
thisquestionbelievedthatthelegislationwaspoor,whilelessthanoneinfour
characterizedtheirstateslegislationasgoodorverygood(seeFigure3).
Figure3.Adequacyofstatelawsgoverningprivatesecurity(N=29)
20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Poor Fair Good VeryGood
Of29advisorsanswering,19ortwooutofthreefeltthatadditionalstate
regulationwouldhelptheindustry.Themostfrequentsuggestionswereforcreationof
minimumtrainingstandardsandhiringstandards(seeTable5).Accordingtoonestate
advisor:
Somespecificmeasureswouldbetoupdatelawsasnecessaryforthe
screeningofsecuritypersonnelandthemandateofappropriatetraining
pertainingtoprecursorincidentrecognitionandbasicresponsestoterror
attacks.Thislegislationshouldbedevelopedwithrecognizedsecurity
professionalorganizationstoimprovesecuritystandardswithinthe
industry.
12
Table5.Suggestionsforadditionalstateregulation
Responses
Suggestedmeasure (n=21)
Minimumtrainingstandards 16
Hiringstandards 4
Othermeasurescited 1
Respondentswerethenaskediftheythoughtthereshouldbeuniformnational
standardsregulatingtheprivatesecurityindustryintheUnitedStates.Twenty,ornearly
twooutof three,stateadvisorsrespondedaffirmatively.
13
3. SurveyofMallSecurityDirectors
Wesentletterswithsurveysattachedto1,372securitydirectorsofenclosedretail
mallsacrossthecountryhavingatleast250,000squarefeet.Theletterswerewrittenon
ASISletterhead.Theresponserateforthefirstwavewasdisappointing:wereceivedjust
32completedsurveys.Severalsecuritydirectorscalledandtoldusthattheyhadbeen
instructedbytheirparentorganizationsnottocooperatewiththesurvey.Theselargemall
ownersweremembersoftheSecurityCommitteeoftheInternationalCouncilof
ShoppingCenters.Severalweekslater,afollow-upletterwassentout,thistimeon
NationalInstituteofJusticeletterhead.Thesecondlettergotasomewhatbetterresponse,
foratotalof120completedsurveys.Thisiscertainlylowerthantheratewehadhoped
for,butbetterthanwemighthaveexpected,giventhecircumstances.Wedidnotobserve
significantdifferencesinresponserateseitherbysizeofmallorregionofthecountry
(EastCoast,South,Midwest,West,orWestCoast).
Themediannumberofsecurityemployeesatthemallsrespondingtothesurvey
was5full-timeand5part-timestaff.Themedianstartinghourlyrateforofficerswas
$8.50,andtheaverageforallsecuritystaffwas$9.50.
HiringStandards
Webeganthesurveybyaskingmallsecuritydirectorsaboutqualificationsfor
hiringnewemployees.Nearlyhalfofrespondentssaidtheyhadeducationstandards,
mostoftenahighschooldiplomaorGED;veryfewmallsrequiredadvancededucation
ofnewhires(seeTable6).Aboutoneinthreerespondentssaidthattheyhadexperience
requirementsincludingpriorlawenforcement,military,orsecurityexperienceand/or
statecertification.Lessthanoneintenindicatedthattheyhadagerequirements,and
aboutthesameproportionsaidtheyhadotherrequirements,includingavaliddrivers
licenseorcleandrivingrecord.
Table6.Hiringstandardsformallsecuritystaff
Minimumqualificationsintermsofeducationand
experienceforsecuritystaff
Responses
(n=276) Percent
Education/skills 133 48.2
Highschool 86 31.1
GED 35 12.7
Somecollege 7 2.5
Verbal/writtenskills(English) 3 1.1
A.A.orB.A.incriminaljustice 2 0.8
Experience/Training 88 31.8
Securityexperience 24 8.7
Statecertification/license/training 16 5.8
Generalexperience 10 3.6
Noexperience/qualifications 10 3.6
Lawenforcementexperience 6 2.2
In-housetraining 6 2.2
14
Minimumqualificationsintermsofeducationand
experienceforsecuritystaff
Responses
(n=276) Percent
Militaryexperience 5 1.8
Off-dutypoliceofficer/deputy/somepolice
officertraining
3 1.0
Peaceofficer 2 0.7
Correctionsexperience 2 0.7
Other 4 1.6
Agerequirements 22 7.9
Atleast18yearsofage 12 4.3
Atleast21yearsofage 10 3.6
Otheremploymentrequirements 33 12.0
Cleanrecord 13 4.7
Validdriverslicense 7 2.5
Drugtest 4 1.4
Other 9 3.4
Wealsoaskedrespondentswhethertheyrequiredbackgroundchecksonnew
employees.Nearlyallrespondentssaidtheyrequiredcriminalbackgroundchecks,while
slightlymorethanhalfrequireddrugtestsaswell(seeTable7).
Table7.Backgroundchecksformallsecuritystaff
Typeofbackgroundcheckconductedon
newemployees
Responses
(n=118) Percent
Criminalbackgroundchecksonly 48 40.7
Drugtestsonly 1 0.8
Bothbackgroundchecksanddrugtests 65 55.1
Neitherbackgroundchecksnordrugtests 4 3.4
Training
Participantswereaskedhowmanyhoursoftrainingnewemployeesreceive.
Trainingaveragedaboutaweek(mean=45.1hours;median=40hours).Thevast
majorityofnewemployeetrainingwaseitherdonein-house(50%)orbytheparent
securitycompanyorganization(31%).Localgovernmententities(police,fire,or
state/countyofficials)togetherconductedtrainingat17%ofthesites(seeTable1in
AppendixAforfurtherdetail).
Whenaskedifemployeesreceivespecialtrainingonpreventingandresponding
toterrorism,justoverhalf(52%)ofthesecuritydirectorsrespondedaffirmatively.When
askedtoindicatewhichareasareincorporatedintotheirantiterrorismtraining,the
directorsmostcommonlycitedworkingwithfirstresponders(46%).Another43%
mentionedsecuringthesceneafteranattack,41%identifiedaccesscontrol,40%said
respondingtochangesinnationalalertlevels,and34%indicatedidentifyingterrorists
15
(seeTable8).Otherareasidentifiedbysmallernumbersofsecuritydirectorsincluded
traininginweaponsofmassdestruction(WMDs)andevacuationprocedures.
Table8.Antiterrorismtraining
Areasincludedinthemalls
antiterrorismtraining
Workingwithfirstresponders
Securingthesceneafteranattack
Accesscontrol
Respondingtochangesinnationalalert
level
Identifyingterrorists
WMD
Other
Responses
(n=120)
55
52
49
48
41
4
14
Percent
45.8
43.3
40.8
40.0
34.2
3.3
11.7
Antiterrorismtrainingwasprovidedin-houseaccordingto28%ofsecurity
directors.Theremaindersaidthatthetrainingwasconductedbyavarietyofsources,
mostcommonly lawenforcementorfirepersonnel,trainersfromparentsecurity
organizations,consultants,orhomelandsecurity(forabreakdown,seeTable2in
AppendixA).Justoveroneinthreerespondents(38%)believedthattheirmalls
antiterrorismtrainingwasadequate.Exactlyhalfbelieveditwasinadequate,andtherest
werenotsure.
Figure4:Is your antiterrorism training program adequate?
Adequate
Inadequate
Unsure
ChangesinHiringStandards,Training,andSpendingonSecuritySince9/11
Weaskedthesecuritydirectorshowmuchhadchangedsince9/11/2001.Itturned
outthatremarkablylittlehadchanged(seeTable9).Only6%ofrespondentssaidthat
hiringstandardsweremorestringentsince9/11andjustoneintensaidthatadditional
backgroundverificationwasbeingrequiredsince9/11.Thosewhodidhaveadditional
16
requirementsindicatedthattheynowconductedmorethoroughchecksorrandrugchecks
(seeTable3inAppendixA).
Table9.Changesinhiringstandards,training,andsecurity
spendingsince9/11
Change
Responses
(n=120) Percent
Hiringstandards
Yes 7 5.8
No 113 94.2
Backgroundchecks
Yes 13 10.8
No 107 89.2
Training
Yes 38 32.2
No 71 60.2
Dontknow 9 7.6
Securityspending
Yes 19 15.8
No 101 84.2
Similarly,just16%ofthesecuritydirectorssaidthattheirbudgetshadincreased
beyondtherateofinflationsince2001.Thosewhoindicatedanincreaseinexpenditures
saidthattheincreasedfundshadbeenspentonnewtechnology(bettercommunicationor
CCTVsystems),increasedmanpower,developingemergencyresponseplans,or
performingriskassessments(seeTables4through4dinAppendixA).
PreventionStrategies
Thenextsectionofthesurveyaskedrespondentsaboutprotectivemeasuresthey
mayhavetakentoreducethelikelihoodofaterroristattack.Theseincludedthe
developmentofsecuritygoalsandobjectives,humansurveillancestrategies,access
control,andtechnology.Slightlyoveroneinthree(37%)ofthesecuritydirectorssaid
thattheyhaddevelopedasetofgoalsandobjectiveswithrespecttoprotectionfrom
terroristattack.Oneinfoursaidthattheyhadspecificperformancemeasurestodefine
whethertheyweremeetingthosegoals.
Patrol strategies. Fewmalls(34%)everusedundercoverstaffaspartoftheir
surveillancestrategy,andmostofthesedidsoonlyoccasionally.Butabouthalf(49%)of
therespondentssaidthattheirstaffwereinstructedtobeonthelookoutforunusual
behaviorordressofmallclients.Thekindsofthingssecuritystaffwereinstructedtolook
forincludedgenerallysuspiciousbehavior,takingphotosornotesofthefacilities,
17
suspiciousclothing(extrabulky),andlargeorotherwiseunusualpackages(see
Table10).
Table10.Typesofactions,characteristicsprofiledbysecuritystaff
Characteristic
Responses
(n=94) Percentage
Suspiciousbehavior(ingeneral) 18 19.5
Takingphotographs/videos/notes 16 17.0
Unusual/suspiciousclothing 16 17.0
Carryinglarge/suspiciouspackages 11 11.7
Loitering 7 7.5
Unusualinterest/curiosity 5 5.3
Suspiciousappearance(ingeneral) 4 4.2
Suspiciousvehicles 3 3.2
Foreignersactingsuspicious 3 3.2
Largegroups/gangs 2 2.1
Youngeradults 2 2.1
Abandonedpackages 2 2.1
Other 5 5.5
Almostallrespondentssaidthattheirmallshadwell-definedpoliciesonwhatto
dowhensecurityguardsencounteredasuspiciousperson.Inmostcases,theencouraged
responsewastocontinuesurveillanceand/orreporttoasupervisororlawenforcement,if
required(seeTable11).Aboutoneintenrespondentssaidthattheirpolicywastohave
staffapproachandtalktothesuspiciousindividualtogainbetterinformationonwhat
theyweredoing.
Table11.Policyonhandlingsuspiciousbehavior/persons
Whattheofficershoulddo
Responses
(n=89) Percentage
Reportbehavior(tosupervisor/dispatch/other
officers)
30 33.7
Continuesurveillance 27 30.3
Informpolice(ifrequired) 16 18.0
Approach(non-threatening) 10 11.2
Other 6 6.6
Nearlytwointhree(63%)securitydirectorssaidthattheirpatrolandsurveillance
strategieshadchangedsince9/11.Themostfrequentchangesweretoincreasethe
visibilityofsecurityofficers,instructofficerstobealertforsuspiciousindividuals,and
paymoreattentiontocarsanddeliverytruckscomingintothemall(seeTable12).
18
Table12.Changesinpatrolandsurveillancestrategiessince9/11
Patrolandsurveillancestrategies
Responses
(n=32) Percentage
Morepatrols/strategies/visibility 12 37.5
Heightenedawareness/alertness 8 25.0
Moreattentiontovehicles/parking/firelanes 4 12.5
Moreattentiontodeliveries/truckdrivers 2 6.3
Other 6 18.6
Access control. Weaskedrespondentswhethertheyhadplanstorestrictaccessto
sensitiveareasofthemallincaseofachangeinthenationalthreatadvisorysystemora
specificthreat.Sixintenansweredaffirmatively.Nearlythesameproportion(56%)said
thattheyhaddevelopedorreviewedplanstokeeppotentialwrong-doersfrombreaching
sensitiveareassince9/11.
Technology. Weaskedthesecuritydirectorsaboutwhethertheyemployed
technologytomaketheirmallsmoresecure.Halfofthesecuritydirectorssaidthattheir
mallhadaCCTVsystem(seeTable13).Thevastmajorityofthesesystems(81%)were
usedtomonitoreventsinrealtime.Threeintenmallshadinstalledbollards,orpassive
barriers,topreventvehiclesfrombreachingtheentrance.Fifteenpercentofmalls
reportedemployingexplosivedetectiontechnologyorbomb-sniffingdogs,whileonein
tenhadinstalledtechnologytocleantheairinsidethemallofsmokeorother
contaminants.Verysmallpercentagesofmallshadinstalledwindowfilmorexplosive-
resistanttrashcans(4%)orequipmenttodetectbiologicalorchemicalagents(1%).
Table13.Technologicalsecuritymeasures
Securitymeasure
Responses
(n=120) Percentage
Surveillancecameras
Yes 60 50.0
No 60 50.0
Passivebarriers
Yes 36 30.0
No 84 70.0
Explosivedetectiondevices/canines
Yes 18 15.0
No 102 85.0
Airdecontaminationtechnology
Yes 12 10.0
No 108 90.0
Windowfilm/explosive-resistanttrashcans
Yes 5 4.2
No 115 95.8
Detectionofbiologicalorchemicalagents
Yes 1 0.8
No 119 99.2
19
EmergencyPreparedness
Threeoutoffour(73%)securitydirectorsreportedthattheyhaddeveloped
writtenprotocolsforsecuritystafftofollowintheeventofadisaster.Thesame
proportionreportedthattheseplansincludedcoordinationandcommunicationwithlocal
lawenforcement,fire,andmedicalfirstresponders.Amuchsmallernumber(3in10)had
heldexercisestorehearseemergencyprotocolswithfirstresponders.Mostcommonly,
theexerciseswereheldwithlocalpoliceorfiredepartments.Othermallsconducted
exerciseswithEMTs,RedCross,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA),
orFBIstaff(seeTable14).
CoordinationWiththePublicSector
Mallsecuritydirectorsindicatedalowlevelofsupportfromtheirstatehomeland
securityadvisors.Just3%saidthattheirstateadvisorswereveryinvolvedwithsecurity
planning,whilefully78%saidthattheiradvisorswerenotatallinvolved(seeTable15).
Themajorimpetusforinvolvementofthestateadvisorsinmallsecurityhasbeenthe
BufferZoneProtectionProgram(BZPP).Ninepercentofsurveyrespondentssaidthat
theirmallhadbeendesignatedasacriticalassetunderthatprogram,andanother7%
believedthattheywouldreceivesuchdesignation.Securitydirectorsindicatedthatfunds
receivedthroughtheBZPPwouldbeusedtoinstallorupgradeCCTVsystems,install
bollards,orimprove
trainingofsecurityofficers(foracompletebreakdown,seeTable5inAppendixA).
Table14.Partnersinpreparednessexercises
Agenciesparticipatinginmalls
rehearsalofemergencyprotocols
Responses
(n=90) Percentage
Policedepartment 28 31.1
Firedepartment 27 30.0
EMS 10 11.1
County/cityagencies 5 5.6
RedCross 2 2.2
FBI 2 2.2
FEMA 2 2.2
Other 14 15.4
20
Table15.StateDHSinvolvementinsecurityplanning
Involvementofstatehomelandsecurity
advisorinplanning,reviewing,or
approvingmallsecuritymeasures
Responses
(n=117) Percentage
Veryinvolved 3 2.6
Somewhatinvolved 23 19.7
Notatallinvolved 91 77.8
Surveyrespondentsreportedthattheirlocalpoliceweremoreinvolvedwith
securityintheirmallsthanwerethestatehomelandsecurityadvisors.AsTable16shows,
twointhreemallsecuritydirectorscharacterizedtheirlocalpoliceasbeingatleast
somewhatinvolvedintheirsecurityplanning.Nearlyhalf(44%)ofmallsecurity
directorsstatedthatlawenforcementofficialsregularlysharedkeyintelligencewith
them,andanother34%saidthatinformationwassometimesshared.Aboutoneinthree
(36%)securitydirectorssaidthattheirrelationswithlocallawenforcementhadbecome
closersince9/11.
Table16.Lawenforcementinvolvementinsecurityplanning
Involvementoflocalandstatelaw
enforcementinplanning,reviewing,or
approvingmallsecuritymeasures
Responses
(n=117) Percentage
Veryinvolved 21 17.6
Somewhatinvolved 57 47.9
Notatallinvolved 41 34.5
Byalargemajority(63%),mallsecurityofficialswouldwelcomegreater
involvementoftheirstateDHSandlawenforcementofficialsinsecurityplanning.(In
fact,80%hadinvitedlocalpolicetopatrolorsetupaministationinthemall.) Survey
respondentsfeltthatpublicofficialscouldassistthemsharingmorekeyintelligence
(40%),byconductingriskassessmentsordevelopingemergencymanagementplans
(33%),orhelpingtotrainsecurityofficers(27%).
Nearlythreeinfourmallsecuritydirectors(72%)alsofeltthattherewerespecific
thingsthatthefederalDHScoulddotomakemallssafer.Whatmostrespondentswanted
washelpwithtrainingandbettersharingofthreatintelligence.Otherssoughtmore
fundingforequipmentorhelpwithdevelopingemergencyplans(seeTable17).
21
l%20report%2dedited[1]
22
Figure 1: Rating of Security Threats
Table17.AssistancesoughtfromDHS
HowDHScouldhelpmake
largeretailmallssafer
Provideorassistwith
training/education/seminars/drills
Morecommunication/information/contact/updates
Morefundingfortraining/equipment
Helpwithdeveloping
procedures/policies/plans/strategies
Setminimumsecuritystandards/training
Responses
(n=78)
24
24
13
12
5
Percentage
30.8
30.8
16.7
15.4
6.4
OpinionsAboutTerroristThreat
Thefinalsectionofthequestionnaireaskedsecuritydirectorsabouttheirthoughts
onthedangerposedbyterrorismandanyadditionalstepstheybelievednecessaryto
adequatelyprotecttheirmalls.Theywereaskedtorateterrorismandfiveothersecurity
concerns(shoplifting,vandalism,burglary,kidsloitering,androbbery)intermsof
importanceindailysecuritywork.Theresults,presentedinFigure5,indicatethat
terrorismwasrankedfirstby27%ofrespondents,slightlylessthanthe30%whoranked
kidsloiteringasfirst.Interestingly,terrorismwasalsothesecurityconcernmostoften
ratedasleastimportant.Oneinthreerespondentsratedterrorismlastfarmorethan
ratedanyotherconcernlast.Thissuggestsabipolarreactiontotheterroristthreat:itwas
eitheraseriousconcernorwasviewedasaproblemconfinedtocertaincitiesandnotone
highontheprioritylistofmallsintheheartland.
Figure5.SecurityDirectorratingofsecuritythreats
(proportion who rated threat as most significant)
fina
Vandalism
Burglary
Robbery
Shoplifting
Terrorism
Kids loitering
0 10 20 30 40 50
Figure 2: Most Likely Form of Attack
Securitydirectorsbelievedthat,ifaterroristattackcame,itwouldmostlikely
taketheformofabombblastintheinteriorofamall(seeFigure6).Smallnumbersof
respondentsalsofearedacarbomb,attackwithsmallarms,orabiologicalorchemical
attack.
Figure6.Mostlikelyformofattack
0
Bio/chem
attack
Carbomb
Firearms
Bombinterior
20 40 60 80 100
Slightlymorethanoneinthreesecuritydirectors(38%)believedthat
implementingadditionalsecuritymeasureswascritical.Themostcommonmeasures
soughtinvolvednewequipmenttobettermonitorthemallortoprotectitfromcarbombs
(seeTable18).Somerespondentsalsothoughtmorefundsfortrainingwereimportant.
Just16%ofsecuritydirectorswhoarticulatedcriticalmeasuressaidthatthoseneeds
werebeingaddressed,andthree-quartersoftheserespondentssaidthiswasduetolackof
funds.
Table18.Additionalsecuritymeasuresconsideredcritical
Criticalmeasures
Responses
(n=43) Percentage
Securityequipment/surveillance/barriers/
detection
23 53.5
Moreandimprovedtraining 11 25.6
Funding 3 7.0
23
Communication 2 4.7
Morepersonnel 2 4.7
Domesticterrorism 1 2.3
Increasedpayandbenefits 1 2.3
24
4. ResultsofSiteVisitstoMalls
Inthissection,wediscusstheresultsofourvisitstoeightU.S.mallsandtwo
mallsinIsrael.TheeightU.S.mallsweredoublethenumbercalledforinourproject
workplan. Wefeltitwasimportanttoexpandthenumberofsitevisits,inpartbecause
wehadalowsurveyresponseratebutmoreimportantlybecausethesitevisitsprovided
anopportunitytogatherfarmorecomprehensiveinformationthanwecouldhopetogain
throughasurvey.Forexample,inthesurveywecouldonlyaskwhethermallshadan
emergencyresponseplan.Inthesitevisits,wecouldtrytoascertainhowspecificthe
planwasandwhetheritwasrehearsedbystaff.Wecannotclaimthattheeightmallswe
visitedwererepresentativeoftheindustrysincethenumberissmalland,aswiththe
survey,weranintooppositionfromsomeofthelargemallowners.However,themalls
wevisitedweregeographicallydiverse,spreadacrossCalifornia,Texas,Wisconsin,and
Utah.Theywerediverseaswellintermsofownershipandhowsecuritywasprovided
(locallyorthroughnationalcompanies).
Ateachsite,wespoketothemallsecuritydirector,localpolice,andlocalfire
officials.Wedonotdivulgetheidentitiesofthemallsherebothtoavertthepossibilityof
disclosingconfidentialsecurityinformationandalsotoprotecttheidentitiesofthe
securitydirectors,someofwhomspoketousinspiteofcontraindicationsfromtheir
parentcompanies.
SpendingonSecurity
Oneofthemostconsistentandstrikingfindingsduringthesitevisitswasthat
mallswevisitedhavenotmadeanysignificantinvestmentinincreasedsecurityfollowing
9/11.WiththeexceptionofsitesthatreceivedfederaldollarsthroughtheBufferZone
ProtectionProgram,wedidnotobserveanyincreasesinspendingbeyondinflationover
thepastfouryears.(Infact,onemallhaddramaticallycutitssecuritybudget.) The
privatesectorgenerallyhasnotinvestedinimprovingsecurityeithertoprotectagainst
emergencysituationssuchasaterroristattackortoprotectagainstpettycrimes
committedinmalls.
TheBufferZoneProtectionProgramwastheonlysignificantsourceoffunding
forupgradingsecuritythatweobservedduringsitevisits.Accesstoprogramfunds
appearedlargelytobeafunctionoftheprioritiesofeachstateshomelandsecurity
advisor.Weobservedthat,insitesthathadreceivedBZPPfunds,locallawenforcement,
workingwiththestatehomelandsecurityoffices,tooktheinitiativeandcontactedarea
mallstoconductariskassessment.Otherstatesappearednottoplacemallshighontheir
priorityliststoreceiveBZPPfunds.
18
OnemallownereagertoparticipateintheBZPP
hadbeenunabletoinitiateariskassessmentforhismallsintwostates,thefirststepin
gettingBZPPfunds.
BZPPgrantdecisionsweremadebyDHS,butinformedbyrecommendationsofstatehomelandsecurity
advisors.
25
18
BZPPfundswereusedtoenhancevideosurveillancesystemsintwoofthefour
mallsthathadreceivedgrants.Intwoofthesites,BZPPmoneywasusedtohelpimprove
regionalresponsetodisasters.Forexample,onejurisdictionusedBZPPmallfundsto
helpfundamobilecommandvehicleforthelocalpolicethatwouldassistinresponding
toterrorismorotherdisasteratthefacility.Thevehiclehastheabilitytoaccessthemall
videosurveillancesystemfromaremotelocationintheeventofadisaster.
RiskAssessment
Riskassessments,whenconducted,havelargelybeendrivenbytheBZPP
applicationprocess.Thisprocedure,codifiedbytheDHSandgenerallyimplementedby
stateorlocalhomelandsecurityofficials,isquasi-quantitativeandemploysstandardrisk
assessmenttechniquesdevelopedbythemilitary.Itdeterminesprobabilitiesandpotential
lossesfordifferenttypesofhazardsoccurringatvariouslocationswithinfacilities.Infive
oftheeightmalls,ariskassessmenthadbeenconductedattheinstigationofthestate
homelandsecurityadvisor.(Followingtheassessment,fourofthefivemallshadbeen
designatedasBZPPsites;onehadnot.) Forexample,theriskassessmentatonemall
determinedthatthemajorriskpotentiallyimpactinglivesandpropertywouldbeabomb
blastinthemallsfoodcourt.Suchablast,itwasdetermined,wouldproducethemost
casualtiesandpotentiallyharmthestructuralintegrityofthatpartofthemall.This
knowledgewasincorporatedintoexercisesforsecuritystaff.
ThethreemallsnotconsideredforBZPPstatushadnotundertakenrisk
assessmentsontheirown,evenonaninformalbasis. Insomecases,mallssimplywere
notatthetopofthelistoflocalcriticalsites.Butinonemallwevisited,thesecurity
directortoldusthatlocallawenforcementhadofferedtoconductariskassessment,but
thatmallownershaddeclined,worriedaboutpotentialliabilityiftheyfailedto
implementprecautionarymeasuresfollowingariskassessment.Withoutundergoing
someformofriskassessmentprocess,itisdifficultformallmanagerstoarriveatan
understandingaboutwhatelementsshouldbeprotectedandwhichstrategiesshouldbe
employedforpreventionofspecificassets.
PreventionTactics
Weobservedbothhumanandtechnologicaldeterrentstrategies.Onemallwe
visitedhadinstalledbollards,orbarriers,toprotectagainstthepossibilityofacarbomb
beingdetonatedinsidethemall.Severalothersecuritydirectorssaidthatbollardswould
beagoodidea,butthattheircompanydidnothaveplanstoimplementthem.Mostmalls
hadpoliciesdesignedtomonitorandrestrictdeliveriestostores.Deliverytruckswere
checkedcomingin,andnonroutinedeliverieswerecheckedoutbeforeallowingthe
driverstoproceed.Afewmallsrestricteddeliveriestooff-hourswhenstoreswereclosed
orthemallwaslesspopulated.Othersecuritydirectorssaidthattheywouldmovetosuch
aplanifthenationalalertlevelwentuporifaspecificthreatagainstthemallwas
uncovered.
Singlingoutandobserving mallvisitorswasanimportantpartofhuman
preventiontactics. But,accordingtopolicies,profilingwasbasednotonethnicitybuton
26
dressorpatternsofbehavior(referbacktoTable10).Commonactivitiesprohibitedwere
photographyandlargegroupgatherings.Inonemallthatwevisited,securitystaffhad,in
fact,observedagroupofmiddleeasternmenphotographingsensitivelocationsinsidethe
mall:Thegroupwasconfrontedbysecuritystaffandfledbeforepolicearrived.Other
typesofbehavioralprofilingwerelesswell-definedandcoveredcharacteristicssuchas
obviousbulgesunderclothing,carryinglargebackpacks,wearingheavycoats,
unwillingnesstomakeeyecontact,frequentingthesameareaofthemallrepeatedly,or
sittinginoneplacetoolong.Whensecuritystaffencounteredpersonsacting
suspiciously,accordingtothedefinitionsofaparticularmall,thestaffwereinstructedto
observeorengagethesuspectsin conversation.Ifthesecurityguardscuriositywasnot
satisfied,heorshewastheninstructedtocallthelocalpolice.Wealsoaskedsecurity
directorsaboutwhethertheyemployedundercoverofficersintheirpreventionstrategies.
Asingledirectorrespondedaffirmatively,andeventhen,onlyatcertaintimes,suchas
holidays.Thethinkingseemedtobethatofficersweremostvaluablewhenconducting
visiblepatrols.
DeterrencemostoftenreliedonCCTVsystems.Allbutonemallwevisitedhad
someformofCCTVsysteminplace.Thesystemsvariedintheirsophistication:some
weremonitoredconstantly,whileothersrecordedeventsforsecuritystafftorefertoafter
theeventhadoccurred.Visiblesecuritypatrolsalsoweredesignedtoactasadeterrent,
withpatrolsoftenincreasedatholidaysandotherpeakusagetimes.
TrainingPrograms
Allofthemallswevisitedhadimplementedsomeformofantiterrorismtraining
forsecuritystaff.Weencounteredmanyvarietiesoftrainingprograms.Somemallsthat
hadcontractedwithanationalsecurityfirmhadgenericcompanyprograms,somehad
trainingprogramsdevelopedbystategovernment,andsomeusedtheprogram
promulgatedbyDHS.Inthecaseofcontractedmallsecurity,trainingisoftenviewedas
akeycompetitiveadvantageofonecontractoroveranother,anditwasmarketedassuch.
Theformatoftheterrorismpreparednesstrainingprogramsvaried.Most
consistedofaclassroomformatusuallyfourhoursinlength,sometaughtbyoutside
expertsandothersbymallsecuritydirectorstrainedbyexperts.Onemallhadatext-
basedapproach,wheresecuritystaffwererequiredtolearnfromprintedmaterialsand
thentakeatesttoindicatemastery.Contentappearedtovarybutmostlyfocusedon
identifyingpotentialterrorists;spottingsuspiciouspackages;andresponsetoanattack,
includingsecuringthesceneandworkingwithfirstresponders.Mallsgenerallydidnot
havewaystoevaluatewhetherinformationimpartedinterroristtrainingprogramswas
retainedforlongoraffectedthewaysecuritystaffapproachedtheirjobs.
Thehighrateofturnoveramongmallsecuritystafflessenedthelong-termutility
oftraining.Wagesintheindustryaregenerallylow($8to$11/hour)withlittleroomfor
advancement.Mostsecuritydirectorssaidthattheyexperienced100%turnoverwithina
year.Whensecuritypersonnelleaveamall,theinvestmentintrainingleaveswiththem;
theeffectofthehighturnoveristhat,atanygiventime,thesecuritystaffincludesagood
27
numberofnewrecruitswhoareinexperiencedandhavenotreceivedanythingbeyond
basictraining.
EmergencyResponsePlans
Allmallswevisitedhadwrittenprocedurestofollowintheeventofathreatto
themall,orinanactualemergency.Typicalprotocolsfollowingathreattothemall
includedlimitingaccesstocriticalareasofthemall,increasingsecuritystaffpresence,
andkeepingaclosereyeonparkinglotsandmallentrances.Anumberofmallshad
standardizedproceduresforsecuritypersonnelintheeventofachangeintheDHS
ThreatAdvisorySystem.Detailsweresimilartostepstakeninresponsetoaspecific
threatagainstthemall,includingstepped-uppatrolsandrestrictedtruckaccess.
Foremergencies,writtenprocedurescoveredevacuations(intheeventoffire,gas
leakorsuspectedbomb),emergencycommunications,small-armsattacks,basicfirst-aid
andtriage,aswellasthenormalproceduresforhandlinglostchildren,misplaced
property,andsoforth.Inemergencies,protocolformostmallscalledforcontacting
emergencyservices,contactingdesignatedemergencymanagementstaffinthemall(mall
owner,securitydirector),providingfirstaidforanyinjuries,evacuatingpeople,and/or
sealingoffanareaofthemall.Someplansweremorespecific,includinghavingsecurity
staffmeetatdesignatedlocations,settingupfirstaidandcommandareas,orevacuating
throughspecificroutes.
Noneofthemallswevisitedhaddevelopedwaystocoordinatewithfirst
respondersintheeventofanemergency.Theonlymeansofcommunicatingwithfirst
responderswasbyphone.Thegeneralplaninallcaseswasthat,oncefirstresponders
arrivedonthescene,theywouldtakechargeandmallstaffwouldfollowanyinstructions
theywereissuedbypoliceorfireofficials.Innoneofthemallswevisitedwasitclear
whowouldberesponsibleforbriefingfirstrespondersorhowmallsecurityevacuation
planswouldbecoordinatedgivenlawenforcementsneedtoretainandinterview
eyewitnesses.Onelawenforcementofficialwasbluntinhisassessment:Wedonttake
mallsecurityintoaccount.Theyarepoorlytrainedandnotprofessional.
Anemergencyresponseplanmustbewellunderstoodbystaffinordertobe
effective.Wedonotknowfromourvisitstheextenttowhichsecuritystaffhad
internalizedtheseplans.Itwasnotencouragingthat,inonemall,thesecuritydirector
saidthathewouldrefertohiscompanysmanualintheeventofanemergency.Twoof
themallsweobservedcarriedoutexercisestorehearseresponsetoemergencies.Inone,
therehearsalswerelimitedtofindingsimulatedbombsandtakingappropriateaction.In
theother,exercisesalsoincludedasimulatedresponsetoabombdetonationandwas
quitesophisticated,includingevacuatingpeople,settinguptriageandpressareas,and
designatingahelicopterlandingarea.
Themostsignificantgapinemergencypreparednesswasthelackofcoordination
betweenmallsecurityandthesecuritystaffofthelargemallanchorstores.Inonemall,
securitycouldcommunicatewithtenantsbyradio;butinallothermalls,thesolemeans
ofcommunicationbetweenmallsecurityandtenantswasbyphone.Inonlyonemall
28
weretenantsinvolvedinthemallsoverallemergencyresponseplans.Usually,the
decisiontoevacuateanchorstoresandtheresponsibilitytooverseetheevacuationwasup
tostoresecurityorstoremanagement.Inseveralmalls,securitydirectorsexplicitlytold
usthatrelationswithsecuritystaffinanchorstoreswereminimalor,inonecase,even
hostile.
RelationshipWithLocalLawEnforcement
Wefoundwidevariationinhowlocallawenforcementandregionalterrorism
taskforceshadbeeninvolvedinmallsecurity.Weobservedmallsthathadaclose
relationshipwithlocallawenforcement.Theserelationshipsweresometimesdrivenby
statehomelandsecurityplansthatincludedmallsinriskassessmentsofcritical
infrastructure. Inothercases,theyweredrivenbymallsecuritydirectorsdrawnfromthe
ranksofthelocalpolice,whostillhadpersonaltiestomembersofthepoliceforce. In
stillothercases,theyweredrivenbythepresenceofpoliceofficersstationedinthemall.
Suchmallsparticipatedinriskassessments,andtheirsecuritydirectorsfeltthatthepolice
weregenerousinsharinginformation.
Ontheotherhand,wealsoobservedmallsthathadlittlerelationshipwithlocal
lawenforcement.Thesemallsweregenerallynotprivytopoliceintelligencedataanddid
notparticipateinriskassessmentsoremergencyplans.Forexample,inadiscussionwith
localfirstrespondersatonelocation,bothpoliceandfireofficialsacknowledgedthat,
althoughtheyprobablyshouldhaveestablishedcontactpeopleinmajorstoresinthelocal
mall,mappedoutexitroutes,andcreatedanevacuationplan,theyhadnoplanstodoso.
Duringourdiscussion,theyalsodiscoveredthattheydidnotevenhavefloorplansforthe
malltorefertoincaseofanemergency.
Wedidnotfindanymallsamongtheeightwevisitedthatconductedjoint
exerciseswithlocalfirstrespondersandlawenforcement.Thereseemedtobetwo
reasonsforthis:sometimeslocallawenforcementdidnotconsidermallsahighpriority
targetandhaddecidedtoexpendtheireffortsonothertypesoffacilities.Butmoreoften,
itwasthemallsthatresistedbecausetheycouldnotfindaconvenienttimeordidnot
wanttoalarmthepublic.Thissituationrepresentsalargedisconnectinresponseto
emergencies.Mostmallsecurityforceshaveconceptualizedtheirroleinemergenciesas
aninitialtriageforcethatwillrapidlyhandoffactualsituationstofirstresponders,yet
theyhavenotpracticedthishand-offinajointexercise.
Assessment
Wedidnotencounteranyactiveprogramstoevaluatewhatguardsderivedfrom
terrorismtraining,orifterrorismpreventionandresponsewasactuallyincorporatedinto
dailyworkroutines.Similarly,wedidnotobserveinanymallsstandardsforevaluating
whethertheirpreparednessplansortheirresponsetoasimulatedemergencywere
adequate.(Ofcourse,thispointislargelymootsincefewmallsconductemergency
preparednessexercises.) Withnotabletoporliveexercisesandnoclearstandardsfor
evaluation,itisimpossibletosayhowwellstaffwouldrespondintheeventofadisaster.
29
TheSpecialCaseofIsraeliMalls
Israelistheworldleaderinexperience-basedexpertisewithantiterrorismefforts
inretailmalls.Intheyearssince9/11,manylawenforcementagenciesintheUnited
StateshaveattendedpresentationsgivenbyIsraelisecuritydirectorsaspartof
comprehensiveantiterrortraininginitiativessponsoredbytheJusticeDepartmentand
otherfederalagencies.TheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmenthasoftensentofficersto
Israeltobetraindinantiterrortactics.
TheterrorismthreatinIsraelisqualitativelydifferentthanthethreatthatU.S.
citizensfacetoday.Therefore,antiterrorismeffortsinIsraelimallsdonotrepresentafair
standardforU.S.malls.Still,itisusefultoobserveIsraelimallsasanexemplarofwhat
canbedonewhenmotivationandfundsareathighlevels.InNovemberof2005,
researchersconductedsitevisitstotwoofthelargestmallsinIsrael,theAzrieliCenter
andtheJerusalemMall.Ateachsite,wemetwiththemallsecurityrepresentatives.As
expected,wefoundvastdifferencesbetweenU.S.andIsraelimalls.Someofthemost
notabledifferencesarediscussedbelow.
Security strategy. MallsecurityplansinIsraelplacethemallatthecenterofthree
concentriccircles.Intheoutermostcirclearerovingpatrolsofoneortwosecurity
officersandvehicleinspectionpoints.Bollardsandretractablebarriersareusedtokeep
vehiclesfrombeingdriventhroughthecheckpoints.Allvehiclesenteringmallparking
areasaresubjectedtoasearchofthepassengerandtrunkcompartments.Inaddition,
driversareassertivelyquestionedbysecurityofficersinanefforttodeterminewhether
theyposeapossiblesecuritythreat.UnlikeU.S.malls,ethnicprofilingisanintegralpart
ofthescreeningprocess.Onceinsidetheoutermostperimeter,allpedestriansattempting
toenterthemallhavetheirbagssearchedandmustbescannedbyametaldetector.
Screeningsareconductedbyrelativelylow-paid,unarmedsecuritystaff,buttheyare
monitoredbyahighlytrainedguardarmedwithasubmachinegun.Insidethemall(the
innermostcircle),oneortwoarmedsecurityofficerspatrolandobservevisitors.
Theintentoftheconcentriccircleapproachistointerceptterroristsbeforethey
actuallygetinsidethemall.Thisapproachhasworkedextremelywell.Israelhashadten
attacksagainstmallsinrecentyears,severalofwhichinvolvedsuicidebomberswho
inflictedfatalities.However,noneoftheattackerspenetratedtotheinteriorofthemall
wheretheycouldhavedonefarmoreseriousdamage.
Securitychiefsofbothmallsacknowledgedthatevenstringentsecuritymeasures
mightnotbeenoughtostopadeterminedattack.Therefore,theysay,deterrenceand
displacementisabigpartoftheirstrategy.Onesecuritydirectorbelievedthatvisible
securitymeasureswereresponsibleforthetherehavingbeenrelativelyfewattacks
againstmalls,butmanyagainstbuses.
Spending on security. Israelimallsspendmillionsofdollarseachyearon
security.Accordingtooneofthesecuritydirectors,approximately40%oftheoperational
budgetofIsraelimallsisdevotedtosecurity.(Hecontrastedthiswith3%to5%inthe
U.S.) Severalfactorsdrivethiscost.Whenstringentgovernmentalregulationand
30
licensingrequirementswereadopted,mallswereforcedtoprovidecomprehensive
securityservices.Initially,governmentaloversightandinspectionsforcedtheimmediate
closingofsomemallsnotincompliance,therebycreatingafinancialincentiveto
comply.Moreover,weweretoldthat,inIsrael,securityexpendituresarelookeduponas
aninvestment.DuringtheIntifada,forexample,Israelimallsprovidedasanctuaryfor
peoplefrightenedofsuicidebombers.Thiswasgoodforthecountry,butalsogoodfor
mallbusinesses.
Government involvement in mall security.TheIsraeliGovernmentheavily
regulatesprivatesecuritysystemsinretailmalls.Theregulationprocessconsistsof
stringentlicensingprocedurescarriedoutatthelocallevelandoverseenbylocalpolice
commanders.Theregulationstructuremandatesminimumnumbersofsecurityguards,
vehiclecheckpoints,andbarricades.Thedistrictpolicealsolicenseandapproveall
armedsecuritycandidatesandlicenseallunarmedsecurityofficers.Compliancewith
theseregulationsisensuredbyfrequenton-siteinspections.Typically,thedistrictpolice
willinspecteachmallonceortwiceamonth.Inaddition,theywillobservemanyofthe
drillsbeingconductedbythemallsecuritystaff.Eachmallisrequiredtore-applyfor
licensingeveryyear.
Accordingtothesecuritydirectorsthatwespokewith,locallawenforcementand
emergencyservicerepresentativesoftenconductjointexerciseswithmallsecurity.The
exercisesincludecomprehensivedrillsattendedbythedistrictfirebrigade,ambulance
system,andtheentirepolicedistrict.Inaddition,thereisopenintelligencesharing
betweenmallsecurityandlocallawenforcement.Inonemall,policebriefedthemall
securitychiefweekly.Intheother,thelocalpolicedistrictheldmonthlymeetingsduring
whichantiterrorismintelligencewassharedanddiscussedwithkeyindividualsinthe
community,includingmallsecuritydirectors.Oneofthemallswevisitedprovidesthe
localpolicedistrictwithanon-sitesubstation.Thisallowsasubsetofofficerstobecome
knowledgeableaboutmalloperationsandphysicallayout.Italsoallowstheseofficersto
gettoknowthemallssecuritystaff.Finally,mallsecurityandlocallawenforcement
shareinteroperablecommunicationsystems.Intheeventofanemergency,eachunit
couldcommunicatewithoneanotheroverasharedradio-communicationsband.
Risk assessment.Israelimallsarerequiredundergovernmentalregulation
structurestoconductperiodicriskassessments.Accordingtomallrepresentativesthatwe
spokewith,theriskassessmentsareconductedbybothin-houseandoutsidesecurity
experts.Thein-houseassessmentsareconductedonacontinualbasisaspartofeveryday
securitypractices.Outsidesecurityassessmentsareconductedperiodicallyby
independentexpertscontractedbythemalls.Oncetheplaniscompletedandreviewedby
districtpolice,anoperatinglicenseisgranted.
Emergency response plans.BothoftheIsraelimallswevisitedhad
comprehensiveresponseplansforvariousemergencies,requiredbythegovernmentin
orderforthemalltoobtainalicensetoconductbusiness. Eachsecurityofficerisgivena
dutyundertheplan,andasubsetofofficersisassignedtoanemergencyresponseteam.
Plansincludepreventingoutsidersfromgainingaccesstothemallaswellaspossible
31
evacuationadecisionthat,unlikewhatweobservedinU.S.malls,isentirelyuptothe
securitydirector.Animmediatereactionsquadmeetsinaspecialcontrolroomtomonitor
anddirectsecurityactionsuntilthepolicearrive.
Emergencyplanstargetthefirst20minutesafteracriticalincident.Theplans
includedesignatedplacestomeetandhowtobriefpoliceofficersastheyarrive.Onceon
thescene,thepolicetakecommandoftheemergency.
Training programs. Mallsprovidemonthlytrainingforallofficersthatisalmost
entirelyfocusedonrecognizingandrespondingtoterrorthreats.Trainingishighly
repetitive,bothtoengraintheproceduresinthemindsoftheofficersandtocounteract
theeffectsofhighsecuritystaffturnover,aproblemasacuteinIsraelasitisintheU.S.
OneadvantagethatIsraelhasisthat,whileturnoverishigh,manysecurityofficerscome
tothejobwithrecentmilitarytrainingasaresultofthecountryspolicyofcompulsory
militaryservice.
Accordingtothesecurityofficerswetalkedwith,themallsusuallyconductabout
50drillspermonth.Theserangefromminorproceduraldrillstocovertdrillsduring
whichfalsebombsareplantedandattemptsaremadetobringthemintothemall.Major
exercisesarecarriedoutincooperationwiththepolice,whoevaluatetheadequacyofthe
responsebymallsecurity.Whensecurityofficersfailtodetectplantedthreats,theyare
retrained.Iftheyfailasecondtime,theyarefired.Inaddition,asystemofpositive
incentivesisalsoutilized.Ifasecurityofficerdetectsaproblemduringadrillandacts
accordingly,thatofficerwillreceiveamonetarybonus.Rollcallsoftenfocusonthe
assessmentofrecentdrills.Successesandfailuresarediscussedandalternativeresponses
areexplored.
32
5. AnalysisofStateStatutesRegulatingPrivate
Security
Arecentstudy,WatchingtheWatchmen:StateRegulationofPrivateSecurity,
19
concludedthattherehasbeenatrendtowardanincreaseinstatutoryregulationforthe
hiringofprivatesecurityofficersbutminimalchangestostateregulationsregarding
trainingforsuchstaffbetween1982and1998.Thestudyfoundthatthenumberofstates
requiringbackgroundcriminalchecksforprospectiveemployeesincreasedfrom13to20
overthe16yearsthatstatutesweretracked.Thestudyfoundlittlechange,however,in
stateregulationsregardingprivatesecurityofficertraining:justoneadditionalstateadded
sucharegulationbetween1982and1998.
Tradeorganizationshavepromotedtheadoptionofstandardsforhiringand
trainingofprivatesecurityofficers.Recently,ASISInternational
20
publishedguidelines
thatsetforthminimumcriteriathatregulatingbodiesandcompaniesintheUnitedStates
canusetoassistinrecommendinglegislationandpoliciesfortheselectionandtrainingof
privatesecurityofficers.Theguidelinescontaintemplatesforstatestouseindeveloping
orenhancingtheirlegislationregardingprivatesecurityofficers.
Still,priorto9/11,theprivatesecurityindustryintheU.S.wasnotsubjectto
extensiveregulationbythegovernment.Therewerenofederallawsgoverningthe
industry.Stateregulationwasspottyatbest,enforcementofregulationswasweak,and
moststateshadnorequirementsregardinghiringandtraining.
Theeventsof9/11/2001highlightedtheimportantroleofprivatesecurityin
detectinganddeterringdomesticterrorismatcriticalinfrastructuresites.Thissection
examineswhethergovernmentstandardsforprivatesecurityhaveincreasedinthe3
yearssince9/11.
StaffoftheJusticeandSafetyCenteratEasternKentuckyUniversityanalyzed
statutesinthe50statesplustheDistrictofColumbiaregardingregulationofprivate
securitytodeterminehowlegislationmayhavechangedsince9/11.Thiscontentanalysis
usedWestlawAcademicUniversetoreviewstatutesinsixareas:
Requirementsforbackgroundchecksofprospectivesecurityofficers
Educationorexperiencerequirements
Trainingrequirements
Oversightofthequalityorcontentoftrainingprograms
Statutesgrantingsecurityofficersthepowertodetainandsearchsuspects
19
Hemmens,C.,Maahs,J.,Scarborough,K.E.,Collins,P.A.,(2001)WatchingtheWatchmen:State
RegulationofPrivateSecurity1982-1998.SecurityJournal,Vol.14,No.4,pp17-28.
20
ASISInternational(2004).PrivateSecurityOfficerSelectionandTrainingGuideline,2004.http://
www.asisonline.org
33
Anystatutespertainingtotheuseofsurveillancetechnologyinmassprivate
spaces
Legislationwascataloguedastowhetheritwasenactedbeforeorafter9/11.A
codingschemewasdevelopedsuitableforcreationofacomputerdatabase.Summary
resultspresentedheredescribethenumberofstatesthathavestatutesonthebooksin
eachofthesixareasofpossibleregulation.State-by-stateresultsforeachareaare
presentedinAppendixB.TheASISwebsitecontainsthefulltextofthelegislationfor
eachstate(http://www.asisonline.org).
SummaryResults
Wefoundthattwo-thirdsofstatesrequiresomelevelofbackgroundinvestigation
forprospectivesecurityofficers,mostcommonlyinvolvingcriminalhistorychecks.
However,justthreestates(California,Hawaii,andMichigan)havesetminimumsfor
educationorworkexperienceforemploymentasaprivatesecurityofficer(seeTable19).
Table19.Statestatutesregulatingprivatesecurity
Frequency
Requirement (n=50)
Backgroundchecks 33
Educationalrequirements 3
Trainingrequirements 22
Standardsforqualityof 13
training
Standardsforcontentof 21
training
Powertodetain 3
Powertosearch 1
Regulationofsurveillancein 13
massprivatespaces
Twenty-twostatesmandatedminimumhoursoftrainingforprivatesecurity
officers.Ofthesestates,allbutMontanaalsoregulatedthecontentoftrainingprograms.
Thirteenofthestatesalsoattemptedtoensurethequalityofsecurityofficertraining.At
thispoint,nostatesmandatespecifictrainingonissuesrelatingtopreventingand
respondingtoterrorism.
Justthreestates(California,Hawaii,andSouthCarolina)grantedsecurityofficers
thestatutorypowertodetain;onlyCaliforniagrantsprivatesecurityofficersthepowerto
search.Thirteenstateshadstatutespertainingtotheregulationoftheuseofsurveillance
technologyinmassprivatespacessuchasmalls.
34
ChangesSince9/11
Itappearsthatnotmuchhaschangedinstatetrainingrequirementsforprivate
securityofficerssince9/11.Justsixstatesenactedoramendedstatutespertainingto
privatesecuritysincethatdate(seeTable20).
Table20.Post-9/11changesinstateprivatesecuritystatutes
Powe
Educa- Regulat Regulat r Power Regulate
Back- tion e e to to electronic
ground reqmen Require training training detai searc surveillanc
checks t training quality content n h e
CA amende
d
amende
d
new new
HI amende
d
NJ new new new new
N amended
M
OH new amende amende amende
d d d
VT amende amende
d d
W amende amende
A d d
NewJerseyandOhioaddedstatutesrequiringbackgroundchecksfornew
securityguards,whileHawaiiamendeditsstatutetorequirecriminalhistorychecksfor
allnewsecurityemployees.NewJerseyalsopassednewlegislationregardingtrainingof
privatesecurityguards,whileCalifornia,Ohio,Vermont,andWashingtonchangedtheir
trainingrequirements.Forexample,Ohioslegislationmandatesacertifiedtraining
curriculumforthoseseekingemploymentintheprivatesecurityfield.Thecontentand
curriculumoftheprivatesecurityacademictrainingcoursewastobeestablishedand
approvedbyagovernmentalcommission.Californiaenactednewlegislationthat
broadenedwhoisabletoadministeracourseinthepowertoarrestanddetain,andtotest
andcertifyprivatesecurityofficersintheexerciseofthosepowers.NewMexicopasseda
lawallowinglicenserevocationorrevocationofemployeeregistrationforpersonsusing
electronicsurveillanceinmasspublicspacesforunlawfulpurposes.Thus,althoughafew
stateshaveattemptedtoenhanceregulationofprivatesecurityinthewakeof9/11,there
hasbeennomajortrendtowardincreasedstateregulation.
After9/11,thefederalgovernmentforthefirsttimeattemptedtoensure
minimumhiringandtrainingstandards.Congressdebatedlegislationthatwouldrequire
employersofprivatesecurityofficerstosubmittotheirstatetheofficersfingerprintsor
othermeansofpositiveidentificationtoconductacriminalhistoryrecordinformation
search.ThePrivateSecurityOfficerEmploymentAuthorizationActof2003successfully
35
passedtheSenate,andaversionofitwasaddedtotheIntelligenceReformAct,which
hasbeensignedintolaw.TheActstressestheimportanceofcooperationbetweenpublic
andprivatesectorsandtheneedforprofessional,reliable,andresponsibleprivate
securityofficerswhoarethoroughlyscreenedandtrained.However,theoriginal
provisionswerewatereddown:inthefinalversionoftheAct,stateattorneysgeneral
couldrequestasearchofFBIfilesfornewprivatesecurityhires,butstatescouldelectto
optoutofthebackgroundchecksystem.Moreover,inordertosubmitfingerprints,the
employerisrequiredtoobtainwrittenpermissionfromtheapplicantandtoallowthem
confidentialaccesstotheircriminalhistoryinformation.Withtheseloopholes,itis
unclearwhetherthefederalattemptatregulationwillmakeasignificantdifference.
36
6. ConclusionsandRecommendations
Ourassessmentfoundthatmallshavetakensomestepstoimprovesecurity.Most
securitypersonnelnowgetseveralhoursofantiterrorismtraining. Althoughhalfofthe
mallsecuritydirectorsansweringthesurveynonethelessfeltthattheirstaffcoulduse
moretraining,itisastepintherightdirection.Similarly,alargemajorityofmallsecurity
directorssaytheyhaveemergencymanagementplanstodefineactionsthatsecuritystaff
shouldtakeintheeventofadisaster.
Yet,oursurveysandsitevisitsfoundthat,outsideofBufferZoneProtection
Programgrants,verylittlemoneyisbeingspenttoupgradesecurity.Onlyafewstates
havechangedtheirstatutestorequirebackgroundchecks,minimumhiringstandardsor
training,andfewmallshaveupgradedhiringstandardsoftheirownaccord. Risk
assessmentsarerareand,whentheyhavebeenperformed,areinstigatedbytheBuffer
ZoneProtectionProgramandstatehomelandsecurityofficials.Emergencymanagement
plansaretoooftendevelopedwithouttheparticipationoflocalfirstrespondersormall
storeownersandtheirsecuritystaff.Drillstotestthesecuritystaffsknowledgeofwhat
todoinemergencieswhendoneatallareseldomrigorous,seldomdonewithfirst
responders,andareusuallydonewithoutclearstandardstomeasuretheirsuccess.Many
mallsdonotevenhaveplanstolimitaccesstosensitiveareasintimesofheightened
alert. Manystatehomelandsecurityofficeshavenottakenanactiveinterestinworking
withlargemallstoenhancesecurity.
ThesituationintheU.S.standsinsharpcontrasttowhatweobservedinourvisits
toIsraelimalls,wheresecurityisthetoppriorityandthereisastrongpartnership
betweenthepublicandprivatesector. Noreasonablepersonwouldsuggestimportingthe
levelofsecurityusedinIsraelimallstotheU.S.giventhepresentsecurityenvironment.
Additionalterroristattacksfearedafter9/11sofarhavenotmaterialized.Peoplewould
notstandforqueuingtopassthroughmetaldetectorsatmalls,andthereisnoreasonto
askthemtodoso.Asasociety,wehaveastrongpredispositionagainstthekindofethnic
profilingthatisstandardpracticeinIsraelimalls.ThereisnojustificationforU.S.malls
tospendnearlyhalfoftheiroperatingbudgetsonsecurity.
Ontheotherhand,whilethereisnoreasontotaketheextremesecuritymeasures
thathavebeenadoptedinIsrael,thethreatofterroristattacksintheU.S.isreal,and
preparednessoughttobesubstantiallyhigherthanbeforethe9/11attacks. Thegeneral
beliefseemstobethat,ifsuchanattackcame,itwouldmostlikelyoccurinmallslocated
inthelargecitiesorstatesontheeasternseaboardorwestcoast. However,evenifthe
possibilityofanattackbyideologicallyinspiredterroristsisdiscountedinsomeareas,
manyofthesamesecuritymeasuresthatwouldsafeguardmallsagainstthatkindofthreat
alsowouldservealsotoprotectagainstotherdisastersaswell.Riskassessments,
emergencymanagementplans,anddrillswouldhelpmitigatetheeffectsofrandom
terroristactssuchastheonethatoccurredinTacoma,aswellastheeffectsoffires,
earthquakes,andothernaturaldisasters.
37
StepstoTake
Prudentstepscanbetakenbymallsandstatehomelandsecurityoffices,stepsthatare
notexpensiveandwouldnotaltertheexperienceofconsumers.Theseinclude:
1 Conductformalriskassessmentsandtakestepstomitigate
knownrisksonacost-benefitbasis
Inoursitevisits,wevisitedplaceswherelocalpolicewerenotinterestedin
conductingriskassessmentsinmalls.Wealsofoundamallthatwasnotinterestedin
havingariskassessmentdonebecauseownerswereworriedthat,intheeventofa
disaster,theycouldbeheldliableiftheyhadfailedtoactonthefindingsofthe
assessment.Somestatesaredoingagoodjobofworkingwithmallstoseethatrisk
assessmentsaredone,buthomelandsecurityadvisorsinallstatesshouldmakesure
thatlargemallshaveriskassessmentsconductedbytrainedexperts.
Riskassessmentswillhighlightareasinwhichmallsareparticularlyvulnerable.In
manycases,stepscanbetakentoreducetherisk;forexample,accesstoair
circulationsystemsandothersensitiveareascanbecurtailed,deliveriescanbetightly
monitored,andpassivebarrierscanpreventacarwithexplosivesfrompenetrating
heavilypopulatedareas. Whilesomemeasuresmayinvolveconsiderablecost,others
arerelativelyinexpensiveorevencost-free.
2 Developandrehearsedetailedandcoordinatedemergency
responseplansandinvolvestakeholders
Emergencyresponseplanscanonlyworkiftheycontainclearlydelineatedrolesfor
securitystaffintimeofcrisisandifsecuritystaffknowthemwellenoughtorespond
instinctively.Tobeeffective,theplansneedtobedevelopedandrehearsedin
coordinationwithfirstresponders,towhommallsecuritystaffwillhandoff
responsibility.Effectiveplansalsomustinvolvemalltenants,haveclearlydefined
responsibilityfororderingevacuations,andincorporatereliablemethodsof
communicatingwithfirstrespondersandtenants. Homelandsecurityadvisorsinall
statesshouldcoordinatethedevelopmentandrehearsalofemergencyresponseplans,
possiblyunderthedirectionofnationalguidelinesestablishedbyDHS.
3 Standardizeantiterrorismtrainingcourses.
Mostmallsecuritystaffcurrentlyreceivesomeformofantiterroristtraining.Butthe
methods,substance,andqualityofthesecoursesvary.Statesshouldsetminimum
standardsforthefrequencyofthesecourses,thematerialcovered,andthelearning
methodsused.Thecurriculashouldbeaccompaniedbyperformancemeasuresto
assesshoweffectivelythetrainingincreasesparticipantsknowledgeofterrorism
issuesandhelpsthemincorporatethisunderstandingintodailyroutines.
4 Enhancepartnershipswiththepublicsector.
Eventhoughmallsareprivatelyowned,partnershipwithgovernmentisessentialto
ensurethebestsecuritysystems. Statehomelandsecurityofficialsandfirst
38
respondershavetherequisiteexpertiseandthereforehavearoletoplayinhelping
mallsconductriskassessments,developemergencymanagementplans,andrehearse
protocolsinvariousdisasterscenarios. Firstrespondersalsoneedtodevelop
workableprotocolsforensuringthatintelligenceinformationthataffectsmallscanbe
andissharedwithresponsibleparties. Statehomelandsecurityofficialsshould
ensurethatfirstrespondersineachlocalityhaveformedthesepartnershipswithlarge
mallsandensurethatsecuritystaffateachmallreceivesufficienttraininginanti-
terrorismefforts. Stateofficialsshouldalsoensurethatthestandardsintheirstates
withregardtoqualificationsandtrainingofsecurityguardsmeetnationalguidelines.
Thesekindsofmeasuresriskassessment,mitigationofknownrisks,emergency
plansdevelopedandrehearsedwithfirstresponders,standardizedantiterrorismtraining
curriculum,andabetterpartnershipwithgovernmentofficialswouldbringmallsinto
compliancewiththeNationalFirePreventionAssociationstandardforemergency
managementprograms,whichwasendorsedbythe911Commission.Therecentcourt
decisionsbasedonthetwoWorldTradeCenterattacksindicatethatthiscommitment
wouldreducetheindustrysliabilityinfuturelawsuitsthatcouldresultfromanattackby
ideologicallydriventerrorists,lonegunmen,ornaturaldisasters.
39
APPENDIXA
DetailsofMallSecurityDirectorSurveyResults
Table1.Whatorganizationdoesthetrainingfornewemployees?
Organization
Responses
(n=136) Percent
In-house 68 50.0
Private/outsourcedsecuritycompany 42 30.9
Policedepartment 12 8.8
State/countytraining 8 5.9
RedCross 1 .7
Unknown 1 .7
Other 1 .7
Table2.Whatorganizationprovidesthetrainingonterrorism?
Organization
Responses
(n=86) Percent
In-house 24 27.9
State/localpolice 20 23.3
Privatesecurityfirm/consultant 14 16.3
HomelandSecurity 5 5.8
FEMA(self-study) 3 3.5
FBI/JTTFtraining 2 2.3
ATF 2 2.3
VHStape/PSTNvideo 2 2.3
U.S.BorderPatrol 1 1.2
Federalagency(notspecified) 1 1.2
DepartmentofSafety(County) 1 1.2
DepartmentofPublicSafety(State) 1 1.2
Emergencymanagement 1 1.2
Mallowner 1 1.2
FederalProsecutorsOffice 1 1.2
A-1
Table3.DetailsrelatingtoQuestion2:Changesinbackgroundchecksonnew
employeessince9/11
Changesinbackgroundcheckson
newemployees
Responses
(n=11) Percent
Drugtestadded 6 54.5
Morein-depthbackgroundchecks 3 27.2
Live/real-timebackgroundchecks 2 27.2
Table4.Wherehavetheadditionalfundsbeenspent?
Expenditureoffunds
Responses
(n=120) Percent
Increasedsecuritystaff
1
14 11.7
Overtime 11 9.2
Riskassessment 9 7.5
Developingemergencyresponseplans 13 10.8
Improvingcommunicationability 16 13.3
Newsecurityequipment/targethardening
2
16 13.3
Securingphysicalplant
3
7 5.8
Other
4
4 3.3
1
SeeTable4a
2
SeeTable4b
3
SeeTable4c
4
SeeTable4d
Table4a.Numberofadditionalfull-timeemployees
Mean
(n=10) Median*
Additionalfull-time
employees
3.7 4.0
A-2
Table4b.Newsecurityequipment/targethardening
Expenditureoffunds
Responses
(n=29) Percent
Surveillancecameras 7 24.1
Radios 6 20.7
Communication/radiotraining 2 6.9
Locks/rooftophatches 2 6.9
Additionalsecuritystaff 2 6.9
Firstaid/emergencyresponsekit 2 6.9
Defibrillator 1 3.5
AED 1 3.5
Vehicle 1 3.5
Patroltrackingdevices 1 3.5
Barricades 1 3.5
Mediastagingarea 1 3.5
Training 1 3.5
Policecoverage 1 3.5
Table4c.Securingphysicalplant
Expenditureoffunds
Responses
(n=9) Percentage
Physicalassessmentofproperty 1 11.1
Locksreplacedonalldoors 1 11.1
Hiredoff-dutypoliceofficer 1 11.1
Newdoorsinstalled 1 11.1
Limitedaccesstoroof 1 11.1
Identificationforservicevendors 1 11.1
Firealarmupgraded 1 11.1
Perimetersecurityenhanced 1 11.1
Staffingofentrances 1 11.1
Table4d.Otherareasofspending
Expenditureoffunds
Responses
(n=5) Percentage
Plantedareasatentrancetoreduceaccess 1 20.0
Accessalarminstalled 1 20.0
Nightpatrolmonitoring(increaseddiligence) 1 20.0
Mobilepatrolofparkinglotandsurrounding
areas
1 20.0
Hiredpoliceofficer(forpeakhours) 1 20.0
A-3
Table5.WhatwillBZPPfundsbeusedfor?
Expenditureoffunds
Responses
(n=16) Percentage
Upgradecamerasystem 5 31.3
Barriers 5 31.3
Training 2 12.5
Radios 1 6.3
Generalsafety 1 6.3
Police 1 6.3
Notsure 1 6.3
A-4
APPENDIXB
CatalogofRegulationsbyState
Table1.Hiringrequirements
Background Education
checks standards
Alaska California
Arizona Hawaii
Arkansas Michigan
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Iowa
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
NewJersey
NewYork
NorthCarolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
SouthCarolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
B-1
Table2.Trainingrequirements
Trainingrequired Monitorquality Monitorcontent
Alaska Arizona Alaska
Arizona Arkansas Arizona
Arkansas California Arkansas
California Florida California
Florida Georgia Florida
Georgia Illinois Georgia
Illinois Louisiana Illinois
Louisiana Minnesota Louisiana
Minnesota NewJersey Minnesota
Montana NewYork NewJersey
NewJersey Ohio NewYork
NewYork Oklahoma Ohio
NorthDakota Virginia Oklahoma
Ohio Oregon
Oklahoma SouthCarolina
Oregon Tennessee
SouthCarolina Texas
Tennessee Utah
Texas Vermont
Utah Virginia
Vermont Washington
Washington
B-2
Table3.Statutorypowertodetain,search,andinstallsurveillance
technologyinmassprivatespaces
Powertodetain Powertosearch
Installsurveillance
technology
California California
Hawaii Alabama
SouthCarolina California
Delaware
Hawaii
Kansas
Maine
Massachusetts
NewHampshire
NewMexico
NewYork
SouthCarolina
SouthDakota
Utah
B-3

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