ONG v.

ALEGRE

DOCTRINE:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three
(3) consecutive terms.

FACTS:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre and petitioner Francis Ong were candidates who
filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. Ong was then the
incumbent mayor. Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify
Ong. The petition was predicated on the three-consecutive term-rule, Ong having, according to
Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed
office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for 3 consecutive full terms corresponding
to those elections. Ong alleged that he could not be considered as having served as mayor from
1998 to 2001 because he was not duly elected to the post; his proclamation as mayor-elect in
the May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified per the decision of the RTC of
Daet, Camarines Norte.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Ongs assumption of office as Mayor for the term 1998 to 2001 should be
considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

RULING:
YES. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three 3
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and; 2) that he has fully served 3
consecutive terms.

Such assumption of office constitutes, for Ong, service for the full term, and should be counted
as a full term served in contemplation of the 3-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more
than 3 consecutive term for the same position. Being a presumptive winner did not make him
less than a duly elected mayor. The RTC decision declaring that it was Alegre who won in the
election was promulgated after the term of office has expired. Ongs proclamation as the duly
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be
taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the 3-term rule.

VALLES v. COMELEC

DOCTRINE:
The filing of a certificate of candidacy is sufficient to renounce foreign citizenship.
The general rule is that res judicata does not apply to citizenship cases.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez on citizenship grounds, in May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.

Respondent was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother, who ran for governor of Davao Oriental. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate
of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an
Australian passport.

ISSUES:
1) W/N respondent is a Filipino national
2) W/N, if proven that she is a Filipino, she in anyway renounced her citizenship by applying
for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
3) W/N the principle of res judicata applies in citizenship cases

RULING:
1) YES. She was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late
father and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of
Jus Sanguinis.

In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all
inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein, including their children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondents father was
therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her.

2) NO. The mere fact that private respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and had
an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in
the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not
amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the
herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so
because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her
certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

3) NO. The general rule is that there is no res judicata in citizenship cases. However, an
exception can be made when the following requisites concur: 1) a persons citizenship be
raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor
General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the
finding on citizenship is affirmed by the SC. In addition, reliance may somehow be placed on
these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or
simpler.


ABELLA v. COMELEC

DOCTRINE:
Component cities, like Ormoc City, whose charters prohibit their voters from voting and being
voted for provincial elective offices are treated like highly urbanized cities, which are outside
the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached.
The candidate who got the second highest vote does not qualify as the winner in case the
candidate with the most votes dies or becomes disqualified.

FACTS:
Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the
COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Adelina Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on
the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga,
Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was
earlier disqualified from running for the same office.
The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision,
Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella,
who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of
Kananga, Leyte.
The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the
provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify
her to run for the position of governor of Leyte.
She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is
more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else."
In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City
thereafter, did not necessarily erase or remove her Kananga residence, for as long as she had
the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in
the course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City."

ISSUES:
1) W/N the Larrazabal is qualified to run as governor of Leyte (W/N she is a resident and
registered voter of Kananga, Leyte)
2) W/N the Abella, the candidate, who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as
governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified

RULING:
1) NO. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized
cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other
component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition.
Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from
voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities, which are
outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. This
independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their
registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. While Larrazabal
claims that she is a resident and voter of Kananga, Leyte and not of Ormoc City, she was
unable to prove such claim.

In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her
residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is
clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers
herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in
Kananga, Leyte therefor, is not present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte
through the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is
common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided specially so when
we have left friends and relatives therein although for intents and purposes we have already
transferred our residence to other places.

Anent the issue of whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the
petitioner insists that she is such a registered voter based on the following antecedents: 1) She
cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on November 25, 1987, and 2) she then transferred
her registration to Kananga, Leyte on November 25, 1987 by registering thereat and 3) she
later voted on election day (February 1, 1988) in Kananga, Leyte. However, these claims are
not supported by the records.

2) NO. The Supreme Court held that while it is true that the petition to deny due course to the
certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact
remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the
sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were
counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that Abella lost in the
election. He was repudiated by the electorate.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle
the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of
the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be
valid the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute
which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were
cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.

In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision
and resolution of the COMELEC (disqualifying Larrazabal and allowing Vice-Governor Petilla
to assume the post of the governor). The COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.