239

Zeno's
A rrow,
Divisible
Infinitesimals,
and
Chrysippus
MICHAEL J. WHITE
In a recent
interesting
discussion of Zeno's
paradox
of the
arrow,
Jon-
athan Lear
produces
a reconstruction of the
paradox
which,
he
argues,
the
differential 'calculus is
impotent
to solve.'2 In
opposition
to the received
wisdom
(and
a
good
deal of
contemporary analysis),
Lear maintains that
Aristotle's
response
to the
paradox
is to the
point.
I find Lear's
arguments
for both theses
compelling, given
the
assumptions
he makes
concerning
what the 'modern
concepts
of the calculus' are.
However,
in the
present
paper
I
suggest
that the
'conceptual equipment' supplied by
a recent
grounding
of the differential and
integral
calculi in non-standard
analysis
is relevant to
resolving
the
paradox
as formulated
by
Lear.
My
second
thesis is
really
more a 'tentative
suggestion': perhaps
some of the
concep-
tual
equipment
of the nonstandard foundation of
calculus,
in
particular,
the
concept
of 'nontrivial divisible
infinitesimals,'
can be extracted from
several difficult and much controverted
passages pertaining
to
Chrysippean (or `Stoic')
doctrines of
time,
space,
and motion.
PART I
The arrow
paradox, according
to Lear's
formulation,
is the
following:
(1)
Anything
that is
occupying
a
space just
its own size is at rest.
(2)
A
moving
arrow,
while it is
moving,
is
moving
in the
present.
(3)
But in the
present,
the arrow is
occupying
a
space just
its own size.
(4) Therefore,
in the
present
the arrow is at rest.
(5)
Therefore,
a
moving
arrow,
while it is
moving,
is at rest.
It
might
seem that the differential calculus
suggests
that the
paradox
can
straightaway
be resolved
by denying premise
(1);
for the calculus
supplies
us with a
conception
of 'instantaneous
velocity'
or
'velocity
at an instant.'
The thrust of Lear's
response
to this line of
argument,
as I understand
it,
is
as follows. The notion of instantaneous
velocity supplied by
calculus is
-
I
hope
Lear will
forgive
the
pun -
a 'derivative' one: 'the limit of velocities at
which an
object
is
moving during successively
shorter
periods
of time
which
converge
on a
given
instant.'3 This account of instantaneous
velocity,
then,
must assume the existence of motion
during
a series of
240
periods
of time of which the
given
instant is a limit.
But,
to
quote
Lear in
persona
Zenonis contra
Owen,
Zeno would not. be at all
happy
about our
simply helping
ourselves to the
assumption
that there exists a
period
in which the arrow is
moving.
'For
surely,'
he
would
say,
'if the arrow is
moving
at
all,
there is no time it could be
moving
other
than the
present.
And
yet you
have admitted that the arrow is not
moving
in the
present,
in the sense that it is not
actually traversing any
distance in the
present.
You
want to
say
that the arrow
really
is
moving
at the
present,
in the sense that the
present
is
part
of a
period
of time
[read:
is the limit of a series of
periods
of
time]
in
which the arrow does traverse some distance.
However,
you
should have admitted
that there is no time the arrow could be
moving
other than the
present.
So it is
absurd for
you
to
say
that the arrow is
moving
at the
present
in virtue of its
moving
in some other time!''
One
might,
I
suppose, regard
both the 'standard calculus' ' and Owen's
resolution of the
paradox,
to which 'Zeno' is here
responding,
as a denial of
premise
(2),
which
seems,
as Lear
points
out,
to be an
expression
of a
common ancient doctrine that accorded
'ontological priority'
of some sort
to the
present.5
But a number of ancients -
Chrysippus
for
example -
would not have been at all
eager
to
dispute
the truth of
(2).
If one does not wish to
relinquish
(2),
Lear
suggests
that the 'first line of
attack should be
premiss
(3).' (3)
can be
attacked,
he further
suggests, 'by
developing
a
theory
of time in which the
present
can be conceived as a
period
of time...one can then
proceed,
as Aristotle did
not,
to
give
a sense
to the notion of an
object moving
at an instant or at the
present
instants It
is,
I
think,
arguable
that the
conceptual grounding
of the calculus in
non-standard
analysis
motivates this sort of resolution of the
paradox.
The
key
is to
identify
the
present
with a
period
of time rather than some
'temporal point';
but the
period
of time will be of 'infinitesimal' duration.
Then,
depending
on the
interpretation
of the
phrase 'occupying
a
space
just
its own
size,'
either
premise
(1)
or
(3)
will
prove
false. One
might,
according
to
the interpretation
I shall
develop, regard
the
paradox
as a
fallacy
of
equivocation
on this
phrase:
there is a
precise
sense that
may
be
given
to the
phrase
which
makes ( I )
true and a
precise
sense
which makes
(3)
true,
but these are
different
senses.
It is well known that
applications
of the calculus
developed
much more
quickly
than its
conceptual
foundation.7
Indeed,
the
'8,
e-method' was first
rigorously developed
in a
way
which maintains the 'limit
concept
in its
central
place' by
Weierstrass in the mid-nineteenth
century.8
It is also
known
that,
during
the first several centuries of the
development
of the
calculus,
there was considerable talk of 'infinitesimals' - as well as
criticism of this talk. The criticism was inevitable: within the context of
241
standard real
analysis,
if a
non-negative
infinitesimal is conceived of as a
non-negative
real number smaller than
any positive
real
number,
there can
be
only
one
non-negative
infinitesimal,
zero.
Then, however,
a formula for
the derivative of the
function flx)
at
xo (assuming
that it has
one),
namely
the formula one obtains from
(f(xo
+
Ax) -
f(x))/Ax
when an in-
finitesimal is substituted for the
Lx,
will be
meaningless: dividing by
zero is
not defined.
The late mathematician Abraham Robinson used the methods of model
theory,
a branch of mathematics that deals with the
properties
of 'semantic
structures' used to
interpret
formal
languages,
in order to restore in-
finitesimals to
grace.9 Intuitively,
we think of the
propositions
of real
analysis
as
being 'about'
the real numbers. In
logistic jargon,
this amounts
to
interpreting
these
propositions
in an 'intended model' which has as its
basic or 'urelements' the real numbers.
Then, (first-order)
properties
of the
reals can be
thought
of
('extensionally')
as sets of these
elements,
two-place
relations
among
the reals as sets of ordered
pairs
of these
elements,
etc.
What Robinson did was to effect an
'embedding"
of the reals
(the
urele-
ments of the intended model for real
analysis)
into
another,
non-standard
model,
a model which is
'larger'
in the sense that it contains elements other
than the 'embedded reals.' Such a non-standard model defines what has
come to be called a field
of 'hyperreal'
numbers.l The field
of hyperreal
numbers is constructed in such a
way
that it
is,
in
many ways,
similar to the
field of standard real numbers. More
specifically, any property
of the reals
that is 'first-order'
(i.e.,
that can be defined without
quantification
over sets
of real
numbers)
is matched
by
an
'exactly analogous' property
in the field
of
hyperreals.
However,
properties
of the reals that must be defined in
terms of
quantification
over sets or ordered sets of reals
(or
sets of sets of
these,
etc.)
will be 'matched'
by properties
of the
hyperreals
which are
'weaker' in a sense I shall not here
try
to
explain. (Actually,
even the 'sense'
of some first-order
properties
of reals is
not,
intuitively, preserved
in its
hyperreal 'analogue';
see,
for
example,
the discussion of the Archimedean
property
in note
25.)
I shall
give
a relevant
example.
The set of real numbers is ordered
by
the
less-than-or-equal-to
relation <. It is true of the reals that
they
are 'conti-
nous' in the
following
sense: for
any
set X of reals that has an
upper
bound
(i.e.,
for which there is a real number x such that for
eachy
E
X, y S x),
there
is a least
upper
bound. This
property
of
reals,
which involves
quantification
over sets of
reals,
does not have an exact
counterpart
in the set of
hyperreals:
there are sets
of hyperreals
which have an
upper
bound but not
a least
upper
bound. One such set
of hyperreals
is the set of 'infinitesimals'.
242
The set
of hyperreals
contains infinitesimals or numbers that are
'infinitely
small' in the sense that these numbers are not
equal
to
zero;
yet
each of
them is less than
any
of the 'standard' real numbers all of which are
'embedded' in the field of
hyperreals.
In order to continue with the
discussion,
we must introduce the relation
on the
hyperreals.
When a and b are
hyperreal
numbers, a -- b
is read 'a
is
infinitely
close to b' or `the difference between a and b is infinitesimal.' A
theorem
proved by
Robinson establishes that when a is
any
finite
hyperreal
number,
there exists an
unique
standard 'embedded' real number
r,
called
the 'standard
part'
of
a,
to which a is
infinitely
close.ll When the standard
part
of a
hyperreal
a is
zero, then,
that a is an infinitesimal. It should be
pointed
out that none of the infinitesimals are 'indivisibles.' The fact there
is no smallest
positive
real number
straightforwardly
'transfers' to the
hyperreals:
there is no smallest
positive hyperreal
number either.
The non-standard
grounding
of calculus in the field of
hyperreals
provides
an alternative for those who are inclined to the view that the
8,
E-method's limit
interpretation
of some derivatives
is,
at
best,
a useful
fiction;
for
example,
'instantaneous
velocity' implies, according
to the
non-standard
conception,
neither movement
during
a
temporal point
(which
is
incoherent)
nor
'movement,'
in a 'derivative'
sense,
at a
temporal
point (which
might plausibly
be viewed as a sort of fiction
possessing
pragmatic value);
rather,
instantaneous
velocity pertains
to movement in
the 'fullblooded'
sense,
distance traversed in a
period
of time
(the
distance
and time
being, of
course,
infinitesimal).
To re turn to Lear's formulation of the
arrow,
let us
give
Zeno his
premise
(2)
and..4'lt us
identify
the
present
with an
(any)
infinitesimal interval of
time.
Additionally,
let us
suppose
that the size of the arrow is some
quantity
that
can,
given
an
appropriate
measure
function,
be associated with the
positive
finite
hyperreal
number r.
Now,
in
premises
(1)
and
(3)
the
phrase
'occupying
a
space just
its own size' can be taken to mean either
'occupying
a
space r'
such that r' =
r',
or
'occupying
a
space
r' such that Y
r,'
which I
shall refer to
(for
reasons that will later become
evident)
as the
'is-equal-to'
and the
'is-not-unequal-to' interpretations
of the
phrase.
Let us do what Aristotle was
unwilling
to do and
grant
the truth of
premise (I)
for the
'is-equal-to' interpretation.
It
does,
I belive -
pace
Aristotle - have some intuitive
plausibility
on this
reading.
However,
given
the
'is-not-unequal-to' interpretation,
it must be
false; for,
ex
hypothesi,
the
arrow
moving
in To vv is
moving;
but if T6 Vi5V is of infinitesimal
duration,
then the distance r' traversed in the interval
by
the arrow must be r
(not-unequal-to
the
length
of the
arrow).
For
premise
(3),
if we assume that
243
the
present
is of
(nontrivial)12
infinitesimal
duration,
then
(3)
is false
according
to the
'is-equal-to' interpretation.
But for the
'is-not-unequal-to'
interpretation,
it must be
regarded
as true: in
any
infinitesimal time in-
terval the arrow will traverse some r' such that Y r.
So,
according
to this
reconstruction,
the non-standard
conceptual apparatus
for the differential
calculus does
suggest
a resolution of the
paradox:
the
paradox
involves the
fallacy
of
equivocation,
with the
phrase 'occupying
a
space just
its own size'
cast as the
culprit
PART II
In the remainder of this
paper,
I wish to entertain the
hypothesis
that
Chrysippus toyed
with the
concept
of 'divisible
infinitesimals';
I shall
examine several rather
puzzling passages concerning Chrysippean
or
'Stoic' doctrine found in Sextus
Empiricus
and Plutarch in the
light
of this
hypothesis. My
aim is to determine if the
hypothesis
is of
any
use in
making
some sense of these
passages.
A. The
cone,
'that which is
greater
without
exceeding,' and
the distinction
between
things
that are 'not
equal' and things
that are
'unequal'(Plu-
tarch,
comm not
1079e-1080d).
This
passage pertains
to
Chrysippus' response
to a
paradox
due to Demo-
critus
concerning
the cone. If a
(right
circular)
cone should be cut
parallel
to the
base,
'what
ought
one think about the surfaces of the orifices
(Tv
61volalli
Tas Twv
Tpr?p,&Twv
do
they
turn
equal
or
inequal
&VLOOU?
yiyvowlvs)?'13
Democritus
may
well be
thinking
of the cone
as 'hollow':
hence,
when it is sliced
parallel
to the
base,
the
cutting yields
two 'holes' bounded
by
circles.14
According
to
Democritus,
if the
circles are
unequal they
will make the 'cone
uneven,
giving
it
many step-
like notches and
asperities.'
But if
they
are
equal,
'the orifices will be
equal
and the
cone,
being
constituted of circles that are
equal
and not
unequal,
will have the
appearance
of a
cylinder,
which is absurd.'15
This looks like an illustration of the
Epicurean complaint
that
geometers
do not deal with the world 'as it
really
is.' One of the standard illustrations
used to introduce the
concept
of
integration
in
elementary
calculus texts is
the calculation of the volume of a
right
circular cone
by ascertaining
the
limit of the summed volumes of 'circumscribed' stacks of n
cylinders
of
equal height
h as h
approaches
0 and n is
'indefinitely
increased.'
Suppose
that one were to assume a 'realistic' view of this
procedure
and were
actually
to conceive of the cone as constituted of an infinite number of such
cylinders.
Question:
is the circumference of one of these
cylinders
(the
244
circle that is the 'surface of the orifice' at the
top
of the bottom
segment
obtained when a
plane
is
passed through
the
cone)
equal
or
unequal
to the
circumference of a
cylinder
'on
top
of it in the stack'
(the
circle that is the
surface of the orifice at the bottom of the
top segment
of the
cone)? 16
If the
answer is
'unequal,'
one does obtain a
'stairsteps'
of
cylinders
that cannot
be
identified
with the
cone;
if the answer is
'equal,'
then one obtains one
big
cylinder,
which also
obviously
cannot be identified with the cone.l7
Chrysippus' response
is to declare that the surfaces
(the
circles
which,
on
this
interpretation
are
equivalent
to the circumferences of the
cylinders)
are neither
equal
nor
unequal. Despite great controversy concerning
this
whole
passage,
I am confident that this answer is
intimately
connected with
(i)
the
doctrine,
attributed
by
Plutarch to
Chrysippus,
that
something
can
'be
greater
without
exceeding'
(TV vziiov
xav
J.1T1 uiTEpE\ov)
and
(ii)
the
doctrine Plutarch
appears
to ascribe to
Chrysippus concerning
the non-
equivalence
of 'not
being equal'
zlvi
roov)
and
'being unequal'
More controversial is the
interpretation
I should like to
give
to
these various distinctions: 'to be
greater
and exceed' = 'to be
unequal' =
'to differ
by a finite
amount and
*)';
'to be
greater
without
exceeding'
=
'to not be
equal
and to not be
unequal' =
'to differ
by
a
(non-zero)
infinitesimal amount but
Although
I shall not defend this inter-
pretation
in detail
against
its
competitors,
it does seem to me somewhat
more
plausible
than the rather similar
interpretation
of
Sambursky,
who
reads 'to be
greater
and to exceed' as I do but is forced to
interpret
'to be
greater
without
exceeding'
not as
specifying
a relation between two
quantities
but as
characterizing
an infinite series of relations b=a +
E,
where e
is,
in
effect,
a variable
having
as values an infinite series
converging
to zero
(which
entails that either a or b must
vary,
as
well).19
B. The 'Stoic ' account
of
motion xaT
6povv J.1EpLO'TOV 6iGaTqw (Sextus,
PH 3.76-80 and M
10.123-142).
The latter
passage
discusses a doctrine
concerning
motion,
attributed at the
end of the
passage
(M 10.142)
to 'those of the Stoa'
and,
at the
beginning
of
the
passage,
to those of the
opinion
that 'all
things
are divided "to
infinity"
The doctrine is that
a
moving body 'effects
the
crossing' of a
continuous,
divisible interval in one and the
same time and does not
occupy
the first
part
of the interval with its first
part,
and
secondly,
in
order,
the second
part;
but it
passes through
the whole divisible interval
at one time
completely
The discussion in PH is more
succinct,
and
perhaps
clearer. Sextus asserts
that those who hold
bodies,
places,
and times to be divisible to
infinity
245
cannot
accept
the
possibility
of the
progressive
sort of motion because it
will be
impossible
'to discover
anything
that is first whence the
thing
said to
move will move.'21 One is
reminded,
of
course,
of the version of Zeno's
Stadium
paradox
in which the runner can never
begin.
To those who hold a doctrine of motion
&8pows
through
a divisible
interval,
Sextus
gives
three choices. The
spatial
interval over which such
motion is
possible
can be
(I)
limitless,
(II)
'precisely
bounded'
(qrp6s
&xp?(3wav ?repvwpvo?EVOV),
or
(III) 'small,
but not
precisely
bounded'
([LLxp6v
ov
ITP63 &xpv(3wav
8i
T7EpL<JpLop.Evov).?
Option
(I)
is,
on the face of
it,
absurd.
Option
(II)
evidently postulates
motion
&8p6us
over some finite
distance. It has a
consequence
that
everything
must move at the same
speed
since
everything
covers the same distance in the same amount of time.23
Other
arguments against
motion
9pows
over some
specified,
finite dis-
tance constitute the bulk of the other
passage
from M 10.
Option
(III)
remains: the
spatial
interval over which motion
&8p6us
is
possible
is
'wixp8v
ov
p8s axpyvav
Bi
'TTEPLWPLOf.lVOV
T6Tov'. Sextus'
response
here is
quite interesting.
It
is,
as he
says,
a form of sorites: a 'hair's
breadth'
(TO &xapLa7Lov)
of
space
is added to this
supposed
interval,
and
then
another,
etc.
If,
Sextus
argues,
the advocate of motion
&8p6us
'calls a
halt' somewhere
along
the
way,
he
has,
in
effect,
reverted to
Option
(II);
if
he calls no such
halt,
he has reverted to
Option
(1).24
I,
of
course,
should like to
interpret Option
(III)
as
postulating
motion
&8p6us
over
any
'divisible infinitesimal'
spatial
interval and 'motion
&8p6us'
as 'motion
during
a nontrivial infinitesimal time interval.' The
claim can then be made that motion over an infinitesimal
spatial
interval
takes
only
an infinitesimal time.
However,
due to the existence of different
infinitesimal
spatial
and
temporal
intervals,
different velocities can be
asserted for bodies
traveling
at different
speeds.
The sorites-like
response
of Sextus fails because of the 'non-
Archimedean' character of an ordered field
containing
infinitesimals. The
thrust of the
response
is to show that the
postulation
of some,
'[LLXp6V wEV,
ov
'TTP63
8e
'TTEpLWpLO?ivov'
interval as one which can be traversed
a9pows
is
arbitrary: by
some finite number of
repeated
additions of a 'hair's
breadth' of
space
one obtains a sum
greater
than a
given
finite
quantity
(which
reintroduces
Option
(II)),
but
by non-ceasing repeated
additions
one obtains a
quantity
of infinite extent
(Option
(I)).
The
argument
has a
point
when
applied
in the 'standard' ordered field of
reals,
which is cha-
racterized
by
what is
normally
called Archimedes' axiom:
For all
a, b, if 0 < a < b,
then there exists a natural number n such that
246
A finite number of
repeated
additions of a to
itself,
in other
words,
will
yield
a sum
greater
than
any given positive
real
number;
non-ceasing
repeated
addition will
eventually surpass any
finite
quantity.
For Robinson's non-standard ordered field of
'hyperreals',
this axiom
fails when a is
any
infinitesimal and b is
any
finite,
non-infinitesimal
number: for
any
natural number
n,
n
repeated
additions of
any
in-
finitesimal to itself
yields
an infinitesimal. So the force of the sorites is
avoided if the 'small but not
precisely
bounded' interval is an infinitesimal
one.
Repeated
additions of such an infinitesimal 'hair's breadth' to itself
will
always yield
an infinitesimal and never a
finite,
non-infinitesimal sum
that would
give
rise to the
paradox
derived from
Option
(II), namely
equivalent
velocities for all
moving objects.
Motion over the 'small but not
precisely
bounded'
interval,
identified with
any
infinitesimal interval will
occur
&Op6w-;,
in the sense of 'in a time interval t such that t 0.' But if we
consider
(an
imaginary point
in)
a
body traversing
an infinitesimal distance
E in an infinitesimal time 8 and a second
body traversing
the also in-
finitesimal distance 2E in the same time
8,
the
velocity
of the second will be
twice that of the first
(2 -
/6 is
equal
to
2e/8)
even
though
both motions
take
place
'all at once'
(i.e.,
6
0).
C. The divisible
present
alone
'obtains' (im&PXELv),
while
the past and future
'subsist'
but,
of
the
present, part is future and part
is
past
(Plutarch,
comm not
1081c-1982a)
The Stoics are characterized
by
Plutarch as 'not
admitting
a least time nor
wishing
the now to be without
parts'
(iX6tXLaTov xp6vov
&'TTO?d'TTOUOL
vq6k
To vv ETVat t
Aristotle,
in
fact,
distinguishes
a use
of 'now-locutions'
according
to which such
locutions
refer to a finite in-
terval of time.27 The extent of the 'now' or
'present'
referred to
by
such a
use of a now-locution is
heavily context-dependent.
But,
according
to the
characterization
by
Owen of such uses of
now-locutions,
it is in
principle
possible
to
find,
for
any given
use
characterizing
a
given
stretch of time as
'present,'
another use of a now-locution
characterizing
a smaller 'sub-
stretch' of time as
present,
i.e.,
a use that
implies
that
part
of the
original
time interval is
'past'
and
part
is 'future.' It is this model of 'now' or 'the
present,'
which Owen terms the 'retrenchable
present,'
that he finds in the
combination of
Chrysippus' interval-conception
of the
present
and
another doctrine attributed to
Chrysippus by
Plutarch:28 'but in the
third,
fourth,
and fifth books
pertaining
to
Parts,
he
[Chrysippus]
affirms that of
present
(lvzaTqx6Tos) time,
some is
going
to be while some has
already
been.'29
There is
yet
another doctrine ascribed
by
Plutarch to
Chrysippus
that
247
generates
difficulties,
however:
Chrysippus says
'in the work
concerning
the Void and in certain others that the
past
and future
parts
of time do not
obtain but subsist while
only
the
present
(To
vaTqxds)
obtains.'3 Plutarch is
quick
to
point
out that
Chrysippus'
doc-
trine that the 'divisible
present'
is
actually 'partly
future and
partly past'
seems to
nullify
this distinction between 'obtain' and 'subsist' with
respect
to time. It
appears
that the two doctrines are not consistent. Several
ways
of
attempting
to deal with the
apparent inconsistency
are available. The
simplest,
I
suppose,
is to admit that there is an
inconsistency, assuming
that
since the
passages giving
rise to it
apparently
come from different
parts
of
Chrysippus' corpus,
he either
changed
his mind
concerning
at least one of
the doctrines or did not
recognize
the
difficulty.
Another
approach
is to
conceive of the distinction between 'obtain' and
'subsist,'
applied
to
time,
as relative not
merely
to the time the assessment is made but also to the
particular 'scope'
one
attaches,
in that
context,
to the
retrenchable-present
locution one is
using.
However,
on the
assumption
that the distinction is intended as an
'ontological' (although, obviously,
'time-relative
ontological')
distinction,
there is
yet
another
approach
to the
problem
of
consistency posed by
Plutarch.
Although
there
may
be now-locutions that refer to a finite in-
terval of
time,
these
'retrench',
according
to this
interpretation
of
Chrysippus,
not to a 'real
point'
but to an 'indefinite' infinitesimal but
divisible interval of time. It is this 'indefinite' infinitesimal interval that
'actually
obtains'
surrounding
some
'incorporeal'
(i.e., `conceptual')31
temporal point
that
might
be
imagined
to divide the future and the
past.
Yet since this now is an interval and not a
point,
other
'imaginary points'
may
be selected within the interval
(at
various 'infinitesimal distances'
from the
initially
selected
point);
and each of these must be in either the
future-direction or the
past-direction
from the
initially
selected
point.
In
other
words,
according
to this
way
of
construing
the
dilemma,
the
apparent
inconsistency
results from an
ambiguity of 'past'
and 'future': the now is a
time interval of indefinite infinitesimal
length;
relative to an
imaginary
point
selected within this
interval,
any finite
interval 'to the front or to the
rear' involves the sort of future or
past
time that
'only
subsists and does not
obtain' while
any infinitesimal
interval 'to the front or rear'
really
'obtains.'
Of
course,
the selection of the initial
imaginary point
in the infinitesimal
interval is
purely arbitrary
since it is the indefinite interval and not
any
point
in it that is
'present.' Consequently
the distinction between
past
and
future within the interval
is,
in a
sense,
arbitrary;
what
Chrysippus
means
to
emphasize
in
saying
that 'TO-D
iVE(IT'qx6Tos yp6vov
T8
wkv
zlv1 To
248
Si is that the
present
is an interval rather than a
point.32
D. Counterevidence?
(Diogenes
Laertius,
7.150 and
Plutarch,
comm not
1070a-b)
The former
passage,
from the text as 'emended'
by
von
Amim,
reads as
follows:
Hence,
they
further claim that the
cutting [i.e., division]
proceeds
to
infinity.
Which
cutting, Chrysippus says,
is infinite but not 'to an
infinite';
for it is not the case that
there is some infinite to which the
cutting proceeds.
Rather,
it is inexhaustible.33
The latter
passage
constitutes an account
of Chrysippus'
view on the matter
of `our
parts.' He
advises
drawing
a distinction:
employing a `gross' sense
of
'part,'
we are
composed
of
head,
etc. as
'parts.'
But,
'if
they
advance their
questioning
to the ultimate
parts
(Ta 9CFXCtTOt
he
says,
'it is not
proper
to
respond
with
any
answer of this
sort;
but one must
say
neither from what
sort
[of
minimal
parts]
one is constituted
nor, likewise,
of how
many,
whether of a infinite or of a limited number'.34
Sambursky
cites the former
passage
as evidence of
Chrysippus'
care in
'avoiding any expression
which could be
interpreted
as reference to an
actual
infinitely
small
quantity-which
he
rejected
as did the
Peripatetics.'36
Todd also
interprets
the former
passage
as an
attempt
to
avoid a 'terminated infinite series':
That
is,
Chrysippus
would have reasoned that the sum of an infinite number of
magnitudes
(the
product
of a terminated infinite
division)
would be
infinitely large,
and in the
light
of this
principle
formulated his
concept
of an interminable infinite
series. 36
Todd also mentions the latter
passage
as
denying that 'body
is
composed
of
an infinite number of bodies.'37
I believe that both
passages
do indeed
deny
that infinite division 'ter-
minates' in a 'ultimate'
quantity
or in a
largest
number of these
quantities.
But such a denial does not entail denial of the existence of an
'actually infinitely
small'
quantity
or an
'actually infinitely large'
number
of these
quantities.
The
point
of the
passage
from De communibus notitiis is
evidently simply
that,
since
body
is
infinitely
divisible,
there can be no least
quantities
to serve as the 'ultimate constituents' of our
bodies; so,
a fortiori,
one cannot
say
how
many
'ultimate
parts'
there are or of what sort
they
are.
The
passage
from
Diogenes
Laertius can be read in the same
way.
If the
'iaTl Tt' of the
key,
unemended
clause,
'Ob
yap
EOTL w
a?revpov,
eis 6
-YCVFTOLL ?
&xotr6tX'qXT63 on,'
is
given
'wide
scope',
it
expresses
a
pro-
position
that the defender of divisible infinitesimals would
surely accept:
it
is not the case that there is some
aireLpor
(infinitely
small
quantity
or
249
infinitely large
number of those
quantities)
in which division
terminates;
division can
always proceed beyond any
such
quantity.
There
is,
so far as I am
aware,
no
independent
evidence that
Chrysippus
would have
accepted
the doctrine which Todd believes to lie behind his
denial of the 'actual
infinite',
namely
that an infinite number of
mag-
nitudes of some
given
size would
yield
an
infinitely large
sum. As
Alexander
of Aphrodisias implies
in his De
mixtione,
the Stoic doctrine of
'total
blending'
(xpiais 6Xuv)
seems
ultimately
to be conflated with
'justaposition'
if 'infinite
divisibility'
if
given
the
'potential,
6-z
method'
interpretation. 38
Of
course,
Alexander
additionally argues
that the
alternative,
'actual infinite'
interpretation
also
yields
difficulties for the
Stoic doctrine.
Although
the
passage
is less than
pellucid,
his criticisms
seem to be two in number:
(i)
'what is constituted from an infinite number
of
parts
each
having
some
magnitude
and extent
(wlyz86s
TL xai 8L6tcrTaCFLV
i-X6VTWV)
is infinite
i.e.,
infinitely large
in
extent)'; (ii)
the idea of
infinitely
small but still divisible
magnitudes
would
yield
'still further
infinite bodies'
(Xzlu
av zlvi
awp,aTa (ii)
might
be in-
terpreted -
as Todd
apparently interprets
it4
-
as
implying
'different
sizes' of
infinitely
small and
infinitely large quantities.
The defender of
divisible infinitesimals need have no fear of this
consequence.
(i), however,
is another matter. Given a collection of
magnitudes
all of some fixed size
E,
we can conclude from Archimedes' axiom
that,
for
any
finite
magnitude
8
such that 8 >
E,
there is a natural number n such that e added to itself n
times exceeds 8. This
principle
holds true
regardless
of how small we make
e,
provided
that it is some finite
magnitude.
So we
might
conclude that
any
E,
'added to itself an infinite number of
times,'
would
yield
a sum
surpas-
sing any
finite 8.
So,
according
to this
interpretation,
the
cogency
of
criticism
(i),
generously interpreted,
relies on Archimedes' axiom.
E. Did
Chrysippus accept
Archimedes' axiom ?
I
very
much doubt whether this
question
can be
apodictically
answered one
way
or the other. The
point
of the
argumentation
in Part II of this
paper
has
been to
suggest
that the
hypothesis
that he did not
accept
the axiom for a
class of
'divisible infinitesimals' is not an absurd
conjecture.
In
fact,
the
hypothesis
does,
I
think,
enable us to make sense of a number of
reports
of
Chrysippean
doctrine,
reports
for which it is difficult to find a
different,
unified
explanation. Perhaps
some small additional
support
for the 'divis-
ible infinitesimal'
hypothesis
can be drived from the
similarity
of ter-
minology
between Plutarch's
reports
of
Chrysippus' strategem
for
dealing
with the 'constitution' of the
pyramid
and cone and the statement of his
'axiom'
by
Archimedes,
who was an almost exact
contemporary
of
Chrysippus.41
'
250
Plutarch,
comm not 1079d:
Archimedes,
De
Sphaera
et
Cylindro,
I. Post. V:
F. Conclusion
I believe that it
is, then,
a real
possibility
that
Chrysippus postulated
the
existence of divisible infinitesimals. If he
did, however,
the status of these
infinitesimals remains rather obscure. I have thus far
adopted
a rather
'ontological' conception
of these
quantities.
In
particular,
in order for
Chrysippus successfully
to avoid several criticisms of his doctrines of
time,
space,
and
motion,
it must be the case that Archimedes' axiom does not
hold for these
quantities.
It is
conceivable, however,
that the basis of
Chrysippus' apparent
dis-
tinction between
'being greater
but not
exceeding'
and
'being greater
and
exceeding'
was
epistemological.
One
quantity
is
greater
than and exceeds
another if there is a discriminable difference between them.
Suppose,
however,
that there is not a discriminable difference between two
quant-
ities. Given
Chrysippus'
doctrine of infinite
divisibility,
we
probably
should be
judging rashly
were we to decide that the two
quantities
are
precisely equal (assuming
that we can
give
some
legitimate
sense to
'precise
equality').
Hence,
the idea of an 'indiscriminable difference' between two
quantities.
It is far from
clear, however,
that it is
possible
to
'map'
such
indiscriminable differences onto divisible infinitesimals of the sort found
amongst
Robinson's
hyperreals. Perhaps
the
key question
is whether it is
sensible to
deny
Archimedes' axiom for 'in discriminable differences': is
it,
in other
words,
sensible to maintain that
any
finite sum of indiscriminable
differences is itself an indiscriminable difference?43 If
Chrysippus'
dis-
tinction between
being greater
but not
exceeding
and
being greater
and
exceeding,
his distinction between not
being
either
equal
or
unequal
and
being
both not
equal
and
unequal,
etc. is to be identified with d distinction
between
indiscriminable and discriminable differences and the answer to
251
the
preceding question
is
'no,'
then much of the criticism of
Chrysippean
doctrines
concerning
time,
space,
and motion
by
Plutarch, Sextus,
and
Alexander seems warranted.
Arizona State
University
NOTES
1 Jonathan
Lear,
'A Note on Zeno's
Arrow,'
Phronesis 26
( 1 98 1 ),
pp.
91-104.
2Ibid.,
p.
100.
3 Ibid.,
p.
99.
4Ibid.,
p.
95.
5 Ibid.,
p.
103,
note 4.
s Ibid.,
p.
98.
' See,
for
example,
Abraham
Robinson,
'The
Metaphysics
of the
Calculus,'
in The
Philosophy of Mathematics,
ed. Jaakko Hintikka
(Oxford, 1969),
pp.
153-163.
8 Ibid.,
p.
162.
9
Robinson's
principal comprehensive
work on non-standard
analysis
is Abraham
Robinson,
Non-Standard
Analysis,
2nd edition
(Amsterdam, 1974).
A number of his
papers
on the
topic
have been collected in the second volume of his 'selected
papers':
Selected
Papers of Abraham
Robinson: Volume 2 Nonstandard
Analysis
and
Philosophy,
ed. W. A. J.
Luxemburg
and S. Komer
(New
Haven and
London, 1979).
10
H. Jerome
Keisler,
Elementary
Calculus
(Boston, 1976).
This text demonstrates the
pedagogical feasibility
of Robinson's non-standard
grounding
of calculus.
"
Robinson,
'The
Metaphysics
of the
Calculus,'
p.
155.
12
Zero
is,
in Robinson's
usage,
a 'trivial' infinitesimal.
13
Plutarch,
comm not 1070e.
The term
'Tpfip'
seems to
eventually acquire
the technical sense of
'segment'
of a
figure,
in
particular, segment
of a circle. But in connection with the
circle,
it
apparently
was first
applied
to lunes and sectors of the
circle; hence,
I
suppose,
the connection with
its
etymological
sense,
which I use in the translation of the term in this
passage.
See
Thomas
Heath, A
History of Greek
Mathematics,
Vol. I
(Oxford, 1921),
pp.
184,
187-189.
Plutarch,
comm not 1079e. The translation here is
dependent
on the Loeb translation
of H.
Cherniss,
Plutarch's
Moralia,
Vol.
13,
Part 2
(Cambridge
and
London, 1976),
p.
821.
Cherniss' Loeb edition
possesses many
valuable
notes,
although,
as will become
apparent,
I cannot
accept
all his conclusions
concerning
the
argumentation
in this
very
complex
work.
ls
The
picture
of a stack of an infinite number of
cylinders,
each with an infinitesimal
height
is,
in one
respect,
inaccurate:
apparently,
not
every cylinder
in such a 'stack' can
have a
unique cylinder 'sitting
on
top
of it.'
The
assumption
here is that each
cylinder
would
possess
a
height
h such that but
h = 0. If h = 0,
then the 'cone' would turn out to be the circle that is its base.
Furthermore,
it seems
arbitrary
to
identify
the cone with one infinite 'stack' of
cylinders
each of which is
of some infinitesimal
height
h rather than another 'stack'
containing
a different infinite
number of
cylinders
each of a different infinitesimal
height
h'.
Perhaps
the cone could be
252
identified,
indifferently,
with
any
such infinite stack of
cylinders
the 'summation' s of
whose volumes is such that s
r,
where r is taken to be the 'real number' value of the
volume of the cone. See
Kreisel,
Elementary
Calculus,
p.
235,
Theorem 3: 'Given a
function f continuous
on
[a,b]
and two
positive
infinitesimals dx and
du,
then the definite
integrals
with
respect
to dx and du are the same.'
(The
definite
integral
of a
function f
continuous from a to b with
respect
to
b
dx is defined
a
as the standard
part
of the infinite
Reimann sum with
respect
to
dx, i.e.,
ffix)dx
=
st
a b
18
See comm not 1080c. There are
problems
with the
interpretation
of the last
part
of this
passage,
discussed
by
Cherniss. He claims that Plutarch
'misinterprets
the first
example
to
mean that
they [i.e.,
Chrysippus
and
disciples]
denied the
equivalence
of OX vaa and
offboa and the second to mean that
they
denied the
equivalence
of'L<Ja and OX awaa'
(op.cit., pp.
826-827,
note
b).
I am inclined to think that it would be
very
difficult to
interpret
the first
example,
i.e.,
the Stoics' denial of the truth of 'el TLVa
pfi
eaTLV va
E7iELVa QLVLQa EQTLV in
any way
other than Plutarch's
purported
'misinterpretation.'
In other
words,
I
suspect
that Plutarch's
reading
here is correct.
19
S.
Sambursky, Physics of the
Stoics
(New
York,
1959),
p.
94. Cherniss
(op.
cit.,
pp.
820-821,
note
b)
concludes that
Chrysippus
held that the 'surfaces' are neither
equal
nor
unequal
because
'they'
are,
in
fact,
simply
one surface. Such an
interpretation
would seem
to
suggest
that not
only
the distinction between 'not
being equal'
and
'being equal,'
but
also the
conception
of
'being larger
but not
exceeding'
are
misinterpretations
of
Chrysippus by
Plutarch.
Although
there has been extensive discussion of Democritus'
paradox
and
Chrysippus'
response
to
it,
there is no consensus as to the
import
of
Chrysippus' response.
A few
scholars have
interpreted Chrysippus -
as I do here - as
assuming
the existence of
infinitesimals.
See,
e.g.,
S.
Luria,
'Die Infinitesimallehre der antiken
Atomisten,' Quellen
und Studien zur Geschichte der
Mathematik, 1932-1933,
2
(Pt. B),
pp.
138-141.
An attractive recent account - one which does not make the infinitesimal
assumption
-
is found in David E.
Hahm,
'Chrysippus'
Solution to the Democritean Dilemma of the
Cone,' Isis
63
(1972),
pp.
205-220. Hahm
argues
that,
if the cone is cut
many
times
parallel
to its base in such a
way
that it is divided into
segments
each of which has a
height
of a
(Democritean)
'mathematically
indivisible'
unit,
then the cone is 'resolved' into a stack of
cylinders,
such that either
(a)
all of the
cylinders
must be of the same diameter or
(b)
all
must be of
different
diameters.
Consequently,
when
Chrysippus
claims that the 'surfaces'
are neither
equal
nor
unequal,
he is
talking
about all the circular surfaces of the Demo-
critean cone and
is,
in
effect,
refusing
to select one alternative of the exhaustive
disjunc-
tion of
(a)
and
(b)
because of his denial of the 'indivisible-unit'
assumption
from which
the
disjunction
is derived. Hahm
interprets Chrysippus' 'is-greater-without-exceeding'
phrase
as
signifying
(1)
that when we consider
any
two
parallel segments
of the cone
which are of
equal height,
the volume of one is
greater
than the other but
(2)
the lateral
sides of
any
such
segments
form the same
angle
with their
bases,
and the same
angle
as
the sides of the cone form with its
base,
yielding
a 'continuous'
edge
of the
cone,
no
part
of
which 'sticks out' or 'exceeds.'
zo
Sextus M 10.123.
21
Id. PH 3.76-77.
22
Id. PH 3.80.
23
Sextus
apparently
holds that
Option
(II)
is similar
to,
or a
special
case
of,
the
postu-
lation of
indivisibly
minimal times and
spaces.
If all bodies traverse a minimal distance d
253
in a minimal
time t,
and all
spatial
intervals are
multiples
of
d,
all
temporal
intervals
multiples
of t,
it seems that if a
body
traverses a distance D
(= nm
'without
stopping',
it
will do so in a time interval T=nt. But
then,
the
speed
DlT = ndlnt
=
dlt. But dlt was
assumed to be constant for all
moving
bodies.
By analogous reasoning,
if all bodies
traverse some fixed finite distance d 'all at once'
(i.e.,
in some fixed time
t), evidently
all
bodies must move at the
speed
dlt,
if t is some finite interval of time not
equal
to zero. If
t=0,
then it
appears
that all bodies move at the
speed
d/0,
whatever that 'non-ratio' here
might signify
(the
'literally
instantaneous' traversal of
any
finite
distance?).

PH 3.80.
Abraham
Robinson,
'Function
Theory
on Some Nonarchimedean
Fields',
in Selected
Papers ofAbraham
Robinson: Volume 2 Nonstandard
Analysis
and
Philosophy, p.
87. Cf.
the distinction between the 'additive' and
'multiplicative'
versions in 'The
Metaphysics
of
the
Calculus,'
p.
158: a
'multiplicative'
version of the axiom holds for
'hyperreals':
for all
hyperreals
a, b,
if 0 < a <
b,
then there exists an n e *N such that n . a > b. *N is the
hyperreal 'analogue'
of the
property
of
being
a natural number in real
analysis.
However,
unlike
N,
*N
may
contain
infinitely large
numbers. It is for this reason that the multi-
plicative
version of the axiom holds for the
hyperreals.
Actually,
forms of 'Archimedes' axiom' seem to antedate Archimedes and are
sometimes referred to as 'Eudoxus'
postulate
or axiom'
(cf.
Euclid
V,
Def.
4).
The actual
statement of his axiom
by
Archimedes in De
sphaera
et
cylindro
I,
Postulatum V
(quoted
below in Part
II,
Section E of this
paper)
has the
following import:
for all
magnitudes
a, b,
if0 < a <
b,
then for
any magnitude c 'homogeneous
with
a and
b,'
there exists a natural number bn such that
(b-a)
+
(b-a)
+ ... +
(b-a)
> c.
n times
With
respect
to this
postulate,
see E. J.
Dijksterhuis,
Archimedes
(New
York,
1957),
pp.
146-149.
Dijksterhuis
concludes his discussion with the comment
that,
'to
express
it in
modern
terms,
he
[Archimedes]
excludes the existence of actual
infinitesimals;
the
mag-
nitudes he is
going
to discuss are to form Eudoxian
systems' (p.
149).
zs
comm not 1081c.
See
Physics
4.13.222a20ff.
G. E. L.
Owen,
'Aristotle on
Time,'
in Motion and
Time,
Space
and
Matter,
ed. P. K.
Machamer and R. G. Turnbull
(Columbus, Ohio, 1976),
pp.
18-19.
2
comm not 1081 f.
30
Ibid.
It seems that
closely
connected with the Stoic view that continuous
magnitudes
such as
time and
space
are not 'constituted' of 'limit
entities',
such as
points
or
planes
without
depth (cf.
Stoicorum Veterum
Fragmenta (SVF)
ed. J. von
Arnim,
Vol.
II,
Frag.
482
(2.482)),
is the idea that such 'entities' are
'incorporeals',
i.e.,
that
they
exist in intellectu
but not in rebus.
According
to the
report
of
Diogenes
Laertius,
Posidonius - here as
elsewhere a 'Stoic rebel' - dissented from this
view,
holding
such entities to exist not
only
xaT' iitilvotav but also xaO' {1'ITO'TaOW
(7.135).
3z
comm not 1081 f.
33
SVF2.482.
34
comm not 1079b-c.
35
Sambursky, p.
94.
31
R. B.
Todd,
'Chrysippus
on Infinite
Divisibility,' Apeiron
7
(1973), p.
22.
37
Ibid.,
p.
23.
254
38
Alexander,
mixt 222.6-14.
39
Ibid.,
222.15-22.
4o
R. B.
Todd,
Alexander
of Aphrodisias
on Stoic
Physics (Leiden, 1976),
pp.
208-209. If
there are
non-equal
(i.e., infinitesimals,
the inverses of these will be
non-equal
infinite
'hyperreals'.
And it is
necessary
that there be such inverses if the
hyperreals
are to
obey
the 'inverse law': r, 1 /r = 1.
41
The dates for
Chrysippus
are 281/77-208/4 B.C.
(cf.
Diogenes
Laertius,
7.184)
and for
Archimedes c.287-212 B.C.
(cf.
Dijksterhuis, pp.
9-10).
Plutarch,
comm not
1070d, 1080c; Archimedes,
De
sphaera
et
cylindro
I,
Postulatum V
(II 8.23-7
Heiberg).
43
Another
question
is whether there is a least discriminable difference. There
is,
of
course,
no least non-infinitesimal finite
hyperreal.
I am not certain what the correct
answer to either of these
questions
is;
but I am inclined to think that our initial intuitions
suggest
(a)
that
any
indiscriminable difference added to
itself `eventually' (i.e.,
with some
finite number of
additions)
does
yield
a discriminable
difference,
and
(b)
that there
is,
perhaps
relative to the 'discriminator' and the conditions of
observation,
a least or
'threshold' discriminable difference.