1

Crisis Budgeting in Mid-Sized Cities:

Government Structure and Municipal Finance


Max Walker
Econ 6255: Economics of Technological Change and Innovation
November 28, 2013












2
Table of Contents




(Section starts at page number)


Introduction 3
Section I: Research Methods and Operationalization 5
Section II: Analysis and Context for the Independent and Dependent Variables 11
Section III: Analysis of Case Studies: Budget and Historical Data 16
Section IV: Results and Cross-System Analysis 42
Appendix: City Financial Data and Statistical Calculations 45
Bibliography 54




























3

Introduction


Since the onset of the Great Recession, budgets and the budgeting process have become highly salient and
contentious issues at all three levels of government. While the federal budget has come under the spotlight of public and media
scrutiny in recent months due to congressionally mandated sequestration and state budgeting crises have been of considerable
public and academic focus, city budgeting in a time of crisis is a territory left largely unstudied, especially from a comparative
standpoint. While the federal government has the authority to pass omnibus spending legislation, continuing resolutions and
borrow significant sums of money, 49 states (all except Vermont), the District of Columbia and all cities must pass balanced
budgets. In times of fiscal crisis such as these, the buck tends to be passed from the federal government down to states and
localities
1
. When the economy is strong, revenue sharing is a natural and accepted part of coercive federalism
2
. States get
used to revenues the federal government shares with them, and localities become accustomed to state assistance as well. When
the economy is performing poorly however, these valuable forms of fiscal assistance are reduced or removed, placing lower
levels of government in precarious situations. Without the ability to borrow large sums of money to fill budget gaps, and
without revenues provided from higher levels of government, cities and states must fill fiscal and policy vacuums created by
the removal of federal activity, fiscal or otherwise. These vacuums are more prominent at the local level, especially for city
governments already suffering from a 20
th
century legacy of urban decline and a legal history that treats them as creatures of
state governments
3
.

As Gamkhar and Pickerill note, lower levels of government often take the lead in key policy areas during times of
fiscal crisis, especially those that involve the removal of revenues from higher levels of government. This Bottom-Up or
Fend-for-Yourself federalism is a natural and necessary response by



1
Reducing Federal Deficits 2012

2
Walker 2000

3
Merill v. Monticello, 138 U.S. 673 (1891); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907)

4

local governments in an era of reduced support from higher levels of government
4
. There are three stages of this form of what
will here be called crisis federalism. First, a locality must recognize and account for the continued absence of revenue
sharing in its budget. Second, it must decide to take matters into its own hands cutting local programs and jobs, raising
taxes, etc. to balance budgets without outside revenues. Third, local government policies designed and implemented during
crisis, especially those that improve cost-effectiveness, properly tax a previously un- or under-taxed revenue source or
otherwise improve government efficiency can be co-opted by higher levels of government. In a way, policies enacted by
lower levels of government during times of crisis can be copied up the ladder of federalism, hence the moniker of Bottom-
Up federalism
5
. The focus of this study is on the first two steps of crisis federalism, and the policies enacted by mid-sized
cities during the Great Recession from 2008-2012. These policies, such as increasing taxes, cutting government services,
reducing public employment, instituting hiring and wage freezes, contentious negotiations with public sector unions and one-
time revenue policies like land sales will be called crisis budgeting.

The goal of this study is to discuss how mid-sized cities react when they are forced to fix deep budget gaps, what
policies they enact, how they are able to provide ample amounts of key services like public safety, and what institutional
advantages some cities might have over others. Mainly, were City Manager-Council or Strong Mayor systems of
government better able to deal with the realities of the crisis budgeting? Which institutional arrangement allowed for the
kind of acute fiscal maneuvering required at a time when tax revenues, intergovernmental monies and property values were
extremely volatile? What governmental design was better prepared for large budget gaps?

This study will be broken into several sections. Section I will be an introduction to the quantitative and qualitative
methods that will be used to explore the impact of each system of government on a citys ability to engage in crisis budgeting.
This will include statistical operationalization of

4
Gamkhar and Pickerill 2012

5
ibid.

5

successful fiscal management as well as detailing the methods used to explore the political history behind each citys budget
maneuvering from the 2008-2012 fiscal years. In short, it answers the questions How and Why. Section II will provide
background information for each system of government. Here the history as well as the advantages and disadvantages
especially those pertaining to fiscal and budgetary policy of each system will be discussed. This will include a review of
scholarship concerning each systems qualities from a theoretical standpoint as well. Section III will analyze the numerical and
anecdotal data for each city case study. Section IV will provide results as well as cross-institutional and cross-regional analyses
of the data. A complete list of budget data and statistics can be found in the Appendix.


Section I: Research Methods and Operationalization



This study, as all social science research should, uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative data. Numbers and
statistics are largely useless without an understanding of the politicking and value judgments that went into the creation of each
number
6
. Both the qualitative and quantitative data will come from eight mid-sized cities, four each with a City Manager and
Strong Mayor system of government (see Table 1). The cities are broken up into regions, following models set forth in other
studies
7
. This is a crude but effective means of controlling for regional disparities in the impact of the Great Recession as well
as the advantageous flexibility granted to Southern and Western cities when it comes to a wide variety of important urban
issues
8
. These cities were chosen for several reasons including online availability of budget data, status as true cities (i.e.
cities that are not technically smaller parts of a larger metropolitan area, like Joliet, IL, Overland Park, KS or Glendale, CA),
sizable amount of local control over public safety departments, access to the archives of local press and a lack of major state-
level policies that impact local finance like Tax and Expenditure Limitations (TELs)
9
.

6
Stone 2002

7
Metropolitan Policy Program 2010; Rusk 1999

8
Rusk 1999

9
While officials in Worcester, MA must work around Californias Proposition 2(1980), it is not as handicapping as
Californias incredibly influential Proposition 13 (1978), which eliminated many California cities as potential case studies

6

Table 1: Overview of Case Study Cities
City State Region Government Budget Interval 2010 Pop.
Allentown Pennsylvania Northeast Strong Mayor Annual 118,032
Charleston South Carolina South Strong Mayor Annual 199,110
Akron Ohio Midwest Strong Mayor Annual 120,083
Spokane Washington West Strong Mayor Annual 208,916
Worcester Massachusetts Northeast City Manager Annual 181,045
Savannah Georgia South City Manager Annual 136,286
Grand Rapids Michigan Midwest City Manager Annual 197,800
Tacoma Washington West City Manager Biennial 204,200


The quantitative data will come from each citys annual budgets (except for Tacoma). The key budget areas explored
will be annual spending on the Police and Fire departments, property tax revenues, inter-governmental revenues (often directly
related to local public service allocation responsibilities such as public safety and social welfare implementation) and total
annual revenues. It is important to note that property tax revenues vary dramatically between cities and states. While there has
been a general trend away from property tax reliance for both localities and states although states have been capturing a
larger percentage of property tax revenues since the 1920s the property tax revenues captured by states can find its way
back to localities when inter-governmental revenues are shared, which is less likely during times of crisis
10
. Furthermore,
property taxes, unlike income or sales taxes, are a lagging indicator of the housing crisis because properties are not appraised
annually. For cities with substantial revenues from sales taxes and user fees Spokane, Tacoma and Savannah those revenue
sources will also be explored. Only one city in this study, Grand Rapids, uses a local income tax, but income tax revenues are
directly related to the declining economy, so it is important to discuss that stream of revenue when it comes to Grand Rapids.
The data is provided and broken down in the Appendix, which contains tabular

10
Sokolow 1998
7

data for each city. The quantitative data will be statistically manipulated. To normalize for differences in city population, each
revenue and spending category will be converted to per-capita spending levels. Since cities provide neither accurate nor
precise populations for non-census years, populations will be estimated using data from the 2000 and 2010 censuses. The
anchor value will be the 2010 Census population (P
2010
), and trends will be calculated from this value using data from the 2000
Census. The 2000 Census population was subtracted 2010 Census population, forming a 10-year difference in
population (P
10
). That value was then divided by 10, forming an estimated annual change in population (P). From there
using the 2010 Census population (P
2010
) the 2011 population was calculated as (P+P
2010
), the 2012 population was
2(P)+P
2010
. The populations for 2009 and 2008 were estimated by subtracting P and 2(P) respectively. For Akron which
decreased in size from 2000 to 2010 , P and 2(P) will be subtracted or added from the anchor value in the opposite manner
so as to reflect declining populations over that ten-year interval.
While crude, this method is simple and useful, with this estimate coming very close to each citys 2011 population
estimate from the U.S. Census Bureaus Quick Facts website (as previously stated reliable estimates were not found for
previous inter-census years)
11
. This method allows for each city to have a population estimate for each year in the study,
which is important since the budget values will be converted to per-capita figures. Since changing city populations have a
tremendous effect on revenues and expenditures, it is important to use some method for estimating annual population.

The need for per-capita figures is obvious enough as it allows for a statistical control for city population, larger cities
typically spend more and have greater revenues regardless of the economic climate. Unfortunately, this does not solve issues
related to particular local and state tax laws or particular city public safety requirements. As a result, in addition to using per-
capita spending figures and showing changes in per-capita spending levels, another statistical manipulation will be used. By


11
U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts 2013
8

converting the per-capita figures to percent changes in per-capita spending, tax laws and spending cultures can be normalized.
This figure is calculated by subtracting the second years per-capita value from the first, and then dividing that quantity from
the per-capita amount from the first year. Net percent annual change in public safety funding (NACP) will also be calculated,
and the mean values for City Manager and Strong Mayor cities using this statistic can be used to draw conclusions across
institutional arrangements. NACP can be also used to compare one city with another or with a group of cities, as it shows a
citys ability to preserve and/or increase public safety funding during the crisis budgeting process. This statistic will ultimately
be used as a metric for successful crisis budgeting because public safety is a largely mandatory spending category. Cities must
spend money on public safety even in recessions, so judging a city governments fiscal management success on how well they
maintain public safety spending is appropriate. Ultimately, these data manipulations allow for city population and tax and
spending requirements to be controlled for, hopefully removing them as potential confounding variables.

As for qualitative data, this study will use the letters and reports that accompany each budget (written either by the
Mayor or the City Manager) as well as articles from local city press that focus on the citys budgetary policies. The letters in
particular are particularly useful, as they discuss specific local and state policies and projects that impact that fiscal years
budget, but they must be taken with a grain of salt. The backroom political infighting that may or may not be behind a budget
and its policies is unlikely to be discussed in the budget letter, which is a public document typically addressed to the City
Council. Turning to the Fourth Estate can be of use in this regard, as it can provide some of the hidden details that would not be
present in the budget. In this way, the press provides valuable insight into the value judgments that produce the numerical
figures in each budget
12
.

This local history process also presents an extra research question of its own. The decline of print media nationwide
has resulted in staff reductions at local newspapers, many of which have been

12
Stone 2002
9

purchased by larger national newspaper conglomerates like the Tribune Company or the Gannett Company. This has sadly
resulted in a quality decline for local-level reporting, a decline featured most prominently in Season V of David Simons
timeless television treatise on the American city, The Wire. Simons critique is especially damning given his 30-plus years of
experience at the Baltimore Sun, which was purchased by the Los Angeles-based Times-Mirror Company (itself later
purchased by the Tribune Company in 2000) in 1986
13
. An interesting side question posed by this study, but largely left
unanswered, is what the impact of declining local press has on the ability to accurately delve into the world of mid-sized city
politics without using interviews or a deep personal knowledge of each citys political environment. In particular, the decline
in local press quality could have major repercussions on future comparative research of mid-sized cities or other smaller local
governments.

This study focuses on mid-sized cities for several reasons. For one, the City Manager-Council form of government
is not very common among large cities. The very concept of a City Manager was a Progressive-Era reform designed to
remove control of urban areas from the kind of corrupt political machines the Progressives blamed for a whole host of urban
woes. It was, naturally, difficult to implement such an anti-machine political reform in large cities, especially older cities
with stable machines and governmental path dependency in the Northeast. As a result, cities with City Manager-Council
systems (hereafter referred to as a City Manager system) tended to have weaker political machines and a strong Progressive
contingent. Most of these cities in the Northeast or Midwest were small; the largest city in either region to shift to a City
Manager system was Dayton, OH in 1913 (hardly New York or Chicago when it comes to size)
14
. In the South and West
however, machines were weaker, and new Progressive forms of government such as Direct Democracy reforms and the City
Manager system were more readily accepted. In fact, the largest city in the United States with a City Manager system today
is Phoenix, AZ, a Western city. Still, smaller cities tended to be those that were willing to

13
Simon 2008

14
Judd and Swanstrom 2010

10

relinquish some democratic control of their local government to the hands of an expert. Focusing on mid-sized cities
(roughly in the 100,000 to 225,000 persons range) also allows this study to touch on an important field within urban politics
that is not often explored. The reality is that most cities in the United States are not New York, Chicago or Los Angeles; most
of them resemble cities like Allentown, PA or Grand Rapids, MI. The fact that mid-sized cities often go understudied should
be changed, and exploring the fiscal processes of smaller cities would allow for a more wholesome picture of how local
governments budget in a time of crisis and how they respond to the problems associated with crisis federalism. Furthermore,
most of the contemporary research on crisis budgeting comes from the state level
15
. Overall, the institutional focus of this study
necessitates an exploration of mid-sized cities, but it brings with it the added benefit of exploring a rich but largely unexplored
area in both urban studies and American federalism.

In summation, this studys Independent Variable is each citys system of government, and the Dependent variable is
fiscal management success as determined by the public safety NACP metric. This IV is a dichotomous categorical variable or
dummy variable because there are only two potential options. The dependent variable, success of fiscal management, is
much more abstract. The operationalizations and normalizations provided here with per-capita spending and net annual percent
change (NACP) will make for a more successful Difference of Means Test to see whether Strong Mayors or City Managers
were more successful in engaging in crisis budgeting. While the number of subjects, or n-value, for this study would be quite
low, since only eight cases are presented over a five-year period, a Difference of Means test (even if it falls short of a 90% or
95% level of significance) can show whether the evidence points in a particular direction. In this manner, it can show some
evidence towards a trend favoring one system of government, and it can also direct future research, perhaps with more case
studies and/or an improved metric. Ultimately, it is too short of a time span for a true time-series analysis and too


15
Gamkhar and Pickerill 2012; Klarner and Phillips 2012; Oliff, Mai and Palacios 2012
11

small for a true cross-sectional study. Consequently, the qualitative data, the political history behind the numbers, is all the
more important. In effect, it will help fill the holes left by this studys lack of raw statistical data.
Ultimately, these eight cities are each a unique species. In addition, each of these species is the creature of one of
seven vastly dissimilar states in four disparate regions. To rely purely on statistical data would be improper because the
innumerable inconsistencies in city political structure, fiscal responsibilities (e.g. cities in Massachusetts are responsible for
their school systems, but in Pennsylvania, school districts are separate government entities responsible for public education)
and the unique culture of each citys social, political and economic framework. In the end, the combination of qualitative and
quantitative data will hopefully lend a greater sense of gravity to the results. To paraphrase from Deborah Stone in Policy
Paradox, numbers are just another symbol, and it is just as important to explore what goes into the production of a number, as
it is to properly use that number
16
.


Section II: Analysis and Context for the Independent and Dependent Variables



City governments, like state governments, do not come with any specific set of requirements or rules. While the
federal government has the constitutional obligation to guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government the composition and design of the fifty state governments are each unique
17
. The states have an implied
obligation to likewise guarantee a republican form of government among local governments within that state, but local
governments have, like the states, produced numerous designs and constructions of government within those parameters.
From the New England-style Town Hall Meeting to City Managers, Mayors, Council members, and a plethora of sub-state
governments like counties each with their own structures, it is obvious that local governments

16
Stone 2002

17
U.S. Const. art. IV, 4

12

are very much like snowflakes or fingerprints. There are, however, some general categories which city governments can be
placed into. Two useful categories, especially for 20
th
and 21
st
century cities, are the City Manager and Strong Mayor systems
of government. These two systems are not entirely different from one another. Both systems feature a City Council with a
varying amount of responsibility, although City Manager systems tend to vest more power in City Councils than Strong
Mayor systems. In addition, both systems typically involve a Mayor, although the title of Mayor is usually ceremonial in City
Manager-Council governments. Lastly, both were products of the Progressive Era and its reforms.
The Strong Mayor institutional arrangement is the most common of city government structures. To generalize, the
Mayor, elected by the entirety of the city electorate, runs the city, and he/she governs along with a City Council, whose
members can be elected either by at-large or by city district elections.

The Mayor coordinates, staffs and runs executive departments under the citys control, oftentimes making key appointments
with Council approval. Policies are voted on by Council members and signed by the Mayor, who typically has veto power like
other American political executives. The power of each Mayor depends on the citys charter which is shaped by the state,
another reflection of the historical weakness of local government autonomy and these are, again, generalizations
18
.

The Strong Mayor system, like the City Manager system, is a product of the Progressive movement. The
reformers, who tried to get good men into office, foundthat, even if they elected a Mayor or Council, they were intolerably
handicapped by the existing systems of municipal government. [Due to] the principles of powers and of checks and
balancesthere was no single elective official or governing body that could be held responsible for effecting reform
19
. It
succeeded the older Weak Mayor system, which the reformers saw as being slow and inefficient for the provision of city
services and the effective running of city government. Progressive reformers envisioned the city as a giant business, and
sought to create an executive with powers resembling that of, say, a CEO. In this scheme,

18
Richardson Jr. 2011

19
Judd and Swanstrom 2010

13

the Mayor presides at the top of a hierarchical chain of command with clear lines of authority and accountability.
20


The advantages and disadvantages of centralized control in a Strong Mayor system are like that of any business with a
strong executive, or that of a ship with a skilled captain at the helm. If that ship is captained by James T. Kirk or that business
is run by Steve Jobs, then things will run smoothly. The thing about centralized power is that whoever is at the controls has to
really be qualified for the job, something that voters are trusted with keeping an eye on throughout the electoral process.
Furthermore, centralized executives tend to gain power with popularity, so an effective executive tends to, through a system of
positive feedback, gain more and more centralized control over city functions from an informal standpoint. The converse is
also obviously true, so is the nature of democratic politics. As it pertains to fiscal management, Strong Mayors bring this
centralized control to crisis budgeting. As one figure that the public and the city charter delegates its power to, he/she is the
point man for a variety of fiscally related functions. As a public figure, he/she dictates the citys negotiating strategy with
public service unions, and these negotiations are extremely important to resolving budget gaps in times of economic crisis.
Furthermore, they bring with them the political and institutional clout to push for, and often pass, fiscal policies they deem
most appropriate for the city. The Strong Mayor also plays an important role in courting businesses and other mobile resources
to their city, an important job in an era of interjurisdictional competition and increased mobility for firms and valuable white-
collar workers. He/she also serves as an advocate for the city at the statehouse and with departments at the federal level, and
there is often the need for this role in times of economic crisis when inter-governmental revenue sharing is extremely volatile.
Ultimately, all of these roles are contingent on past performance and behavior, both in public and with the City Council.
Council members can block a Mayors proposals and




20
Judd and Swanstrom 2010
14
projects, whether for legitimate disagreement on their merits or for political reasons
21
. Like a ship, the shape that it is in
depends on the quality of her captain, and Strong Mayors in times of fiscal crisis must be able to navigate extremely dangerous
waters with deftness and aplomb. Strong Mayors have the capacity (with high popularity, past success, etc.) to define their
citys financial policy stances much more unilaterally than City Managers.

City Manager arrangements also appeared as a result of similar Progressive reforms that sought to envision the city as
a large business enterprise. The crusaders for governmental reform responded to these criticisms [that past reforms had
created patronage-heavy systems resembling machines] with a new idea: place administrative authority into the hands of a
professional manager (emphasis added) specifically trained for the jobthe City Manager would be responsible for the day-
to-day operation of governmentIn this way, the reformers hoped, the City Manager would bring to local government
administrative expertise and accountability.
22
In many ways, the City Manager movement was created because reformers saw
the Strong Mayor system being abused for political and/or personal gain. The early results for City Managers were quite
positive, and 87 cities adopted the system from 1913-1918 and another 153 followed suit between 1918 and 1923
23
. This non-
political solution seemed to be a way to disarm political machines and other patronage-heavy systems. The advantages of
having a City Manager are also somewhat obvious. By having a qualified expert hired by the Council, the electorate need not
be trusted with electing a truly qualified candidate to run the city. City Managers are also granted a great deal of flexibility
because the public does not elect them. They can propose the kind of touch fiscal policies like tax increases or spending cuts
that might seriously impact the electoral chances and popularity of a Mayor. Overall, the power each City Manager wields is
related to his/her desire for policy activism, which can vary tremendously. Some managers are very involved with city policy,
while others confine themselves to their officially described responsibilities and do not venture into or purposefully

21
See Moore 2003, for a great discussion of Strong Mayor-Council battles during the mayoralty of Carl Stokes in Cleveland.

22
Judd and Swanstrom 2010

23
ibid.

15

influence the political structure
24
. Furthermore, their expert qualifications made them particularly adept at fiscal management,
usually to the benefit of city elites through low taxes. Coincidentally, many of those elites were also the Progressive reformers
that had empowered the manager in the first place!
25


The disadvantages are also quite apparent. By lacking a point man to organize city policy agendas, the city is at a
disadvantage when it comes to union negotiations (some other official would direct negotiations on behalf of the Council),
courting businesses and other resources, and personally lobbying for resources at other levels of government. Simply put, the
weight of citywide elected office lends Strong Mayors a tremendous deal of concentrated political clout and agency which
City Manager systems lack. In addition, the very nature of City Manager Systems is inherently undemocratic. After all a
city is more than a business corporation[and] good health is more important than a low tax rate.
26


Ultimately, each system has its advantages and disadvantages when it comes to fiscal management and the general
operation of cities. While managers are experts, so too are many contemporary Mayors
27
. Furthermore, Strong Mayor
governments could always hire or create an office with an official whose qualifications resemble that of a manager. In effect,
Strong Mayor systems are not precluded from attaining the same level of financial and management expertise that City
Manager systems have, but the relative weight of that individuals opinion would be significantly less than of a manager whos
power is specifically defined in the city charter. From a theory standpoint, the expert nature of managers can be countered with
Mayoral staffs and/or the Mayors own expertise. A Mayor has the advantage of being elected by the entire city while a
manager is insulated from electoral politics and can make the tough decisions that can save a city from sliding into fiscal
insolvency. One important area to consider however is the Mayors ability to act as a point man for successful negotiations
with public service unions, whose

24
Morgan and Watson 1992

25
Judd and Swanstrom 2010

26
Judd and Swanstrom 2010

27
Wiekart 2003

16

wages are key to a citys fiscal policy, like the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) or the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF). Like most Mayoral advantages
however, this cuts both ways, as Mayors can quickly become central figures of blame when negotiations turn sour.
It is therefore quite hard to say which system appears better on paper, but this study is not designed to answer that
question. By examining the theory behind each system however, it will allow for a better understanding of how each system
acts in practice. Does theory accurately match practice? If not, how and why did theory fail to explain the real-world impact
of each system? These questions are important in any theory-practice study and will hopefully be answered in the remaining
sections.


Section III: Analysis of Case Studies: Budget and Historical Data



This section will be broken into eight separate sections, each focusing on one case study. The four City Manager
cities will be discussed first, followed by the four Strong Mayor cities. There will be an order to the regions that will also be
followed within each institutional arrangement, with the progression being Northeast, Midwest, South and West. A brief
description of each city will also be provided. At the end of each section, graph data for year-to-year changes in per-capita
spending from total and percentage perspectives will be provided.

City Manager Cases

Worcester, Massachusetts:

Worcester is a city of roughly 200,000 people in Central Massachusetts. While a sizable city in its own right, the
tremendous reach of the Boston metropolitan area has begun to cross with that of Worcester. Worcester is a deindustrialized
Northeastern city with a strong union culture. It is the home of several medical institutions related to the University of
Massachusetts as well as Holy Cross and Clark Universities. The city is the third-largest employer in the region behind two
University of Massachusetts
17

hospitals
28
. Of fiscal note, Worcester is constricted by a Tax and Expenditure Limitation (TEL) passed by ballot initiative in
1980 during nation wide tax Tax Revolts. Proposition 2 cap annual property tax increases, usually to a level that is far
below the annual rate of appreciation due to inflation
29
. As a result, Worcester is limited in the percent of property values it can
tax, hindering a major revenue source. To compound this limitation, the city chooses not to maximize its millagethe rate
allowed under Prop 2 so the

city has forgone millions in potential revenues since the laws implementation
30
. It has had a City Manager system since
1947
31
. From 2007-2010, Konstantina Lukes served as City Manager, and she was succeeded by Joseph OBrien, who served
until early 2012, when Joseph Petty replaced him
32
.

The budget years discussed in the Worcester case study differ than those of other cities. The budgets was not
available online for 2008, but it was for 2013. As a result, the fiscal years here discussed are 2009-2013. Most other cities are
2008-2012. One key trend exhibited in the budget data, the budget letter from the manager and local press was the tremendous
and consistent decline in state-aid for the city from 2009-2012. In that time interval, state (non-educational) aid dropped
49.81% from $73 million to $37 million
33
. In per-capita terms, state aid fell from $405 to $218 in just two years. While the city
was able to cope with that revenue loss by increasing its property tax by a small, Proposition 2 approved increment; it still
did not come close to maximizing its property tax millage rate allowed under the initiative, which could have prevented key
cutbacks. As area journalist Gary Rosen puts it, the city is under its Proposition 2 1/2 tax-levy capacity
34
. While the City
Manager might be able to propose such a solution, the Council and its members are elected, and it is possible the idea was
panned by Council

28
City of Worcester 2008

29
Sokolow 1998

30
Rosen 2010

31
City of Worcester 2008

32
City of Worcester 2013

33
Rosen 2010

34
ibid.

18

members because it shifted the onus of the crisis to homeowners, which is politically unattractive. Then again, so too is cutting
nearly 600 non-union jobs from the city payroll, especially difficult since the city is the 3
rd
largest employer in the area. Some
of those job cuts were provided through hiring freezes as well, where vacated positions were left unfilled until the citys fiscal
situation improved. The city was able to turn to some unique revenue solutions however, options that might not have been
realized without a City Manager, although that is just speculation. For example, the city ceded control of the regional airport to
Worcester County thereby saving 1.2 million for the 2011 fiscal year
35
. Otherwise, the city accomplished most of its spending
cutbacks through job cuts, since it was unable to negotiate successfully with key public service unions. This resulted in a 15%
reduction in total city workforce by 2011
36
. While union wages were held steady, union jobs were cut, and services declined
more than 14% as a result
37
. In addition, the city was forced to reduce vice and prostitution stings, disband its Gang Violence
Unit, delay a Fire Department recruit class and end extra summer and fall foot patrols, all of which greatly impacted the citys
public safety. Worcester also cut over 200 police and firemen from the payroll between 2008 and 2012
38
. Even after the citys
budget woes had slightly abated in 2013, there was tremendous trepidation regarding the citys ability to restore job losses, fill
vacated positions and adequately fund worker pension plans. To the City Managers credit, OBrien was able to accomplish a
shift of some city workers healthcare plans through the Massachusetts insurance plan, which saved the city a significant
amount of both short and long term funds
39
. From a statistical standpoint, there are a few major swings in per-capita public
safety spending on a percent-per-year basis. The political history says that while police and fire funding remained somewhat
static from a numerical standpoint, both departments suffered from job losses. In effect, the city was paying more money for
fewer public safety services because of the decreased manpower.

35
Rosen 2010; City of Worcester 2011

36
City of Worcester 2011; Note: Total employment figures for all cities were hard to come by in budgets and local journalism

37
City of Worcester 2011

38
City of Worcester 2009-2013

39
City of Worcester 2013

19

Overall, it is hard to fault Worcester for deciding not to increase its property tax millage closer to the maximum
allowable amount under Prop. 2 (which would still be a low still be a low property tax compared to other cities and states)
like other cities in Massachusetts, since it would have passed the bill for drastically decreased revenues especially from
declining state assistance to homeowners. While the city used some creative maneuvering to keep public safety funding
relatively static, it was unable to stop job losses because it did not negotiate successfully with its public sector unions.
Ultimately, the city appeared to be funding public safety in roughly static amounts, but with the decline in manpower, the
city was getting an inefficient level of production from its police and fire departments. This is not to place blame on either
the city or unions specifically, but their inability to reach a meaningful compromise resulted in both job losses and inefficient
provision of public safety. From a purely statistical standpoint, Worcesters NACP values ranked sixth of the eight cities in
this study with a value of -1.84%, indicating that on a percentage basis, per-capita public safety spending levels fell from
2009-2013. It also ranked second-last in NACP for the four city-manager case studies. It appears that local history and
budget data show Worcester and its City Managers did not successfully engage in crisis federalism, although the
circumstances and volatility of state aid play a role in those results.







A
n
n
u
a
l

S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g


Worcester, MA: Annual Per-Capita Public Safety Spending
$250.00


$200.00

$150.00

$100.00

$50.00

$0.00
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013








Police


Fire
20









P
e
r
c
e
n
t

C
h
a
n
g
e


Worcester, MA: Year-to-Year Percent Change in Public Safety Funding
20.00%

15.00%

10.00%

5.00%


Police


0.00%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Fire

-5.00%

-10.00%



-15.00%





Grand Rapids, Michigan:

Grand Rapids has had a City Manager system of government since the early 20
th
century, and the shift to the City
Manager system is credited with ending an era of machine politics in the city
40
. It is a city of roughly 200,000 people situated
in western Michigan, and is the second-largest city in the state after Detroit. Its main employers are in the health sciences and
medicine sectors
41
. Michigan was hit disproportionately hard by the housing crisis and the continued decline of the American
automobile industry, and as a result, the state has instituted strict policies regarding revenue. Note that there was no budget
available online for the 2012 fiscal year, so the budget data are from 2008-2011.

Grand Rapids did not enter the housing crisis with its fiscal house in order. The 2008 budget letter from the City
Manager cites a long standing, structural budget imbalance.
42
That same letter however also places blame on the state of
Michigan and its dramatic, precipitous drops in state support of our city
43
In fact, from 2007 to 2008, state aid fell
nearly $30 million to Grand Rapids alone
44
. The

40
Judd and Swanstrom 2010

41
City of Grand Rapids 2008

42
City of Grand Rapids 2008

43
ibid.

44
ibid.

21

city was forced to swiftly and with a sharp knife, cut services and jobs where it could to secure a balanced budget. In the first
year of the crisis, the city cut 52 police, 28 firefighter and 134 other city jobs in addition to a hiring freeze, reduction of
overtime pay, wage freezes and a reduction in employee benefits
45
. Furthermore, the city implemented a host of temporary
measures designed to increase revenues such as keeping old cars in their vehicle fleet and selling city property. By 2009, there
was still no talk however of negotiating with unions regarding changes in pay, despite the fact that six more police positions
were cut
46
. The City Manager again laid the blame at the statehouse, writing Self reliance must become our driving force.
47

The city continued to cut jobs in both 2010 and 2011, slashing an entire canine unit and 40 more jobs. Finally, in 2011
however, the city opened itself to the idea of public sector union negotiations. The problem Grand Rapids faces with union
negotiations is two-fold. First off, it lacks a point man for negotiations with the weight of elected office behind him, and
second the city is handicapped by Public Act 312, which forces cities and public sector unions into binding arbitration when
they reach a negotiating impasse
48
. The city finds fault with the law because they claim the review process does not adequately
consider city finances as a mitigating factor in determining the outcome of arbitration. To mitigate its increasingly perilous
fiscal situation, the city passed, by ballot proposal, an income tax increase for the 2012 fiscal year that would be dedicated
specifically for public safety spending
49
. Clearly the community places a high value on public safety regardless of the citys
fiscal situation. Despite drastic cuts in revenues, the city was able to maintain relatively constant levels of funding for its police
and fire departments (other than a 10% decline in fire department spending in the 2008 fiscal year), although both suffered
from job losses and hiring freezes. Again, cutting jobs before cutting wages producing an inefficient provision of services
becomes an issue with a City Manager locality. What is interesting in this case study is that the City Manager took such strong
public stances

45
ibid.

46
City of Grand Rapids 2009

47
ibid.

48
Czurak 2010

49
City of Grand Rapids 2011

22

against state policies in his budget letters. It appears Manager Greg Sundstrom is an active manager, playing a highly
involved and visible role in a city lacking a singular strong elected official
50
. He is certainly the most active City Manager
reviewed in this study, and his language use is particularly powerful as he discusses the states abandonment of local
government. Ultimately, Grand Rapids was able to achieve a NACP value of 3.11%, which ranked it fifth of the eight cities
in this study and second among City Manager cases. This indicates a moderate level of fiscal success as it pertains to the
preservation of per-capita public safety spending.

Grand Rapids, MI: Annual Per-Capita Public Safety Spending


A
n
n
u
a
l

C
h
a
n
g
e

i
n

S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g

$300.00

$250.00

$200.00

$150.00

$100.00

$50.00

$0.00
2008 2009 2010 2011



Grand Rapids, MI: Year-to-Year Percent Change in Public Safety
Funding





P
e
r
c
e
n
t

C
h
a
n
g
e


8.00%



6.00%



4.00%



2.00%



0.00%

Police 2008 2009 2010 2011

-2.00%

-4.00%

Fire


-6.00%



-8.00%




-10.00%
-12.00%

50
Morgan and Watson 1992
23

Savannah, Georgia:

Savannah is a city of roughly 130,000 people in the Low Country region of Southeast Georgia. The city is situated
where the Savannah River and the Atlantic Ocean meet, and the city has always been tied to its port and the riverfront.
Today, the city runs pleasure cruises, other major tourist ships and draws plenty of non-seafaring tourists to its famed River
Walk, featuring plenty of bars and restaurants. The old section of the city is also one of the earliest instances of city planning
in the British Colonies, a system composed of many small square parks each surrounded by homes. A different Savannah
exists outside of this touristy historic quarter, and it has relatively high crime and vacancy rates
51
. Public safety is high
priority for Savannah and its City Managers, Rochelle Small-Toney (2008-2012) and Stephanie Cutter (2012-present)
52
. On
an odd note, Small-Toneys budget letters each ended with an inspirational or provocative passage from a poem. The city has
had a City Manager system since 1954
53
.

One thing that must be understood about Savannahs budget policies is how it manages its property tax rates.
Savannah has relatively low property tax rates for a Georgia city, and, unlike Worcester, it consistently manipulates the
property tax rate as it needs to so that it can cover small budget gaps, increase reserves, or maintain spending levels
54
. With
the rate so flexible though, it can also be the subject of pro-homeowner political manipulation forcing the rate down. As the
data in the Appendix shows, property tax revenues changed by an average of 4.39% each year despite the comparatively small
impact of the housing crisis had on Savannah
55
. In addition, there was no readily available inter-governmental revenue
sharing data for Savannah, but there is data for User Fee revenue, which is important for a city with a large tourism sector.
Early on in the financial crisis, Savannahs government recognized the importance to continue funding the police department
so as to stem any increases in crime



51
U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts 2013

52
Savannah 2012

53
Savannah 2008

54
Savannah 2010

55
Using absolute values to show total change regardless of direction
24
in a down economy, although it did institute a broad hiring freeze that impacted nearly 330 positions
56
. The city was also
greatly affected by the economys impact on tourism
57
. Fortunately for the city, it was not impacted as harshly as the rest of the
state of Georgia by the crisis. Unfortunately, by 2010, the city was facing across-the-board cutbacks, drawing down some of its
reserve funds and delaying maintenance, although it did not consider cutting jobs for the 2010 fiscal year as a budget solution.
By 2011, the city was actually able to give city workers a 2% wage increase, which was much needed for city workers, who
had not seen increased wages since 2008
58
. Unfortunately, these raises came at a time when the city was pushing for early
retirement for some workers, and planned to leave 75 positions vacant for the next fiscal year
59
. In an interesting fiscal move, it
gave a sign of faith to current workers while maintaining a hiring freeze. The statistics show that police and fire funding did
not see very large shifts in funding, despite larger changes in property tax rates and user fee revenues. Savannahs NACP value
was 5.80%, which ranked it fourth highest in this study and first among all City Manager cases. Clearly, the City Manager and
Council members made public safety a priority, and were able to keep funding levels relatively stable. This must be taken with
a grain of salt however, since the housing crisis impact on Savannah was admittedly light by the citys own research. In
addition, the culture of unionization and state laws supporting unions are weaker in Southern states
60
.
















56
Savannah 2009

57
City Budget Cuts 2009

58
Savannah 2011

59
ibid.

60
Savannah 2012

25


Savannah, GA: Annual Per-Capita Public Safety Spending



A
n
n
u
a
l

S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g

$600.00

$500.00

$400.00

$300.00

$200.00

$100.00

$0.00
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012




Police


Fire


Savannah, GA: Year-to-Year Percent Change in Public Safety Funding






P
e
r
c
e
n
t

C
h
a
n
g
e

10.00%

8.00%

6.00%

4.00%

2.00%

0.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

-2.00%

-4.00%



-6.00%










Police


Fire

Tacoma, Washington:

Tacoma is a city in the Seattle metropolitan area, but with a sizable enough population and a defined urban center of
its own, is the final City Manager case in this study. It provides an interesting look into several variables related to municipal
finance. First, it obviously allows for a discussion of the impact of City Managers, but it also allows for a discussion on the
merits of biennial budgeting. Tacoma is the only city in this study with a biennial budget, but reviewing it provides another
interesting avenue for future research regarding municipal finance. Biennial budgets are, naturally, passed every two years,
and fund city departments for that amount of time. One advantage of biennial budgets are that the city
26

needs to only pass a budget every two years, saving taxpayers money by limiting the work that city government officials are
required to do regarding the budget process. Furthermore, it allows for more consistent funding of services over that two-year
span in a good economy, since departmental budgets are for 24 months as opposed to twelve. The problems with biennial
budgets in a time of crisis are numerous however. To limit reviewing the official budget to every two years is to seriously
handicap a citys financial flexibility. While the city can propose spending and tax changes between budgets, limiting
budgetary review to every two years is problematic. For instance, in the 2007-2008 budget, which is not reviewed in this
study, officials anticipated higher revenues than were received, because they did not know in 2006 that a financial crisis was
rapidly approaching
61
. The two-year budget had the effect of anticipating higher revenues and promising higher levels of
spending for city services, promises that had to be revoked when the harsh realities of the financial crisis set in. Simply put,
restricting financial flexibility through biennial budgets is not a particularly good idea in a time of crisis budgeting. That
having been said, the City Manager and Council of Tacoma were able to maintain their public safety spending levels over the
four-year period, despite nearly a 15% decline in total revenues from the 2009-2010 to the 2011-2012 budgets. In the 2009-
2010 budget, the city was able to avoid cutting jobs from the police and fire departments, but was handicapped by a citizen
initiative that limited property tax increases to 1% for the following year
62
. By the 2011-2012 budget however, the city had to
cut 40 police and two firemen from the citys payroll, and the city also incentivized early retirement for public sector
employees
63
. In total, 79 city jobs were cut under the second budget although the city had reduced its business tax rate
64
. After
the police job cuts went through, the city actually had to quite embarrassingly hire four officers back because they were in
violation of the citys own staffing laws
65
. Ultimately, it is difficult to judge the impact of the City Manager with just two
biennial budgets, but the fact that the city

61
City of Tacoma 2009

62
ibid.

63
City of Tacoma 2011

64
City of Tacoma 2011

65
Glenn 2012

27

had to undergo job cuts under the second budget along with the embarrassing incident regarding police staffing show a lack of
acute fiscal maneuverability that can be expected when budgetary decisions are charted out two years at a time. It is an obtuse
way of operating with regard to budget policy in a time of crisis budgeting that necessitates financial flexibility. In the end,
exploring Tacomas budget situation shows the problems inherent in biennial budgets, as well as the fact that even expert
City Managers can make very public mistakes regarding city finances and staffing. The problems associated with Tacomas
government and its biennial budget rules are clearly shown by the NACP statistic, which ranked the city last of all cities with
a -8.25% value.

[Note: graph data for Tacoma because there were only two budgets]

Strong Mayor Cities

Allentown, Pennsylvania:

Allentown is a city of roughly 120,000 people situated in the Lehigh Valley region of Eastern Pennsylvania. The
former home of Mack Trucks and neighbor to Bethlehem, site of the Bethlehem Steel Works, Allentown has suffered greatly
from the impact of deindustrialization. Furthermore, its once vibrant downtown shopping district was crippled in the early 90s
with the growth of shopping malls in the area. In many ways, Allentown has suffered at least somewhat from every urban
malady of the 20
th
century, but it entered the 21
st
century with a rising population and a bright eye towards the future, with
several projects in line including two minor league sports stadiums and deals in place with teams to fill said stadiums. The city
runs off of a charter approved in 1997 that granted increased powers to an already Strong Mayoral position
66
. The current
Mayor is Democrat Ed Pawlowski, formerly the head of the citys planning office, who is in his second term as Mayor.

Allentowns Mayor commands the spotlight in the city for several reasons. He notably was a member of a
contingent of Mayors that visited the White House to discuss infrastructure repairs and

66
Allentown 2008
28

federal grants with President Obama when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was under debate in Congress, and
later had the privilege of hosting the President in Allentown a few months later for a speech
67
. To discuss Allentown, or any
city with a Strong Mayor system is to discuss its Mayor in many ways, since they command the media spotlight and direct
public policy. Allentown went into the financial crisis with money left in its reserve funds but had to cut services and raise
taxes to achieve a balanced budget. The citys crime rate is about 1.7x the national average, and crime prevention and public
safety are major priorities for the city
68
. This is clearly reflected in the budget data, which shows very consistent spending
levels for both the police and fire departments. In fact, the most either departments budget was cut from one year to the next
on a percentage basis was only a 5.02% reduction for the fire department in 2012, but that came on the heels of an
unprecedented 18% increase in funds for the previous year. During the financial crisis, Mayor Pawlowski was not only able to
keep public safety spending levels quite stable, but he also secured a major healthcare grant from the federal government for
community health outreach, completed the citys AAA baseball park and set up the Neighborhood Improvement District
(Pennsylvanias version of a Tax Increment Funding district, or TIF) that will produce the citys second sports venue - an ice
rink for the AHL affiliate of the Philadelphia Flyers and will be used to fund his riverfront redevelopment project
69
. In
securing the funding mechanism for the rink, Pawlowski was also able to win an interjurisdictional competition with
neighboring Bethlehem and Mayor John Callahan
70
.

These anecdotes show the unique role that Strong Mayors can play as their citys spokesman and go-to-figure for
funding at higher levels of government. His relationship with the City Council started off less than amicably in 2008 when the
Council attempted to force the city controller to audit several city departments against the Mayors wishes, but in his second
term, he has enjoyed tremendous Council

67
Weiner 2009

68
Allentown 2008

69
Assad and Baxter 2011; Blumgart 2012

70
Allentown 2008

29

support
71
. The Mayor also successfully used his political capital to campaign for a 0.4% increase in the earned income tax
in 2011, which was passed by ballot initiative and brought in an extra $4 million in revenues
72
.

The city has faced its share of difficulties related to the housing crisis however. In the first year of the crisis it was
able to stay any major spending cuts, but the city was forced to use 17% of its reserve funds to cover the gap in the budget
without proposing new taxes
73
. In 2010 however, the city began engaging in crisis budgeting, beginning with employee layoffs
that left the city with its smallest workforce in over 20 years, and included the consolidation of many city departments
74
. The
citys commitment to spending on public safety paid off however, as crime fell over 10% that year according to the Police
Departments estimates
75
. The city also began negotiating with its public sector unions so that it could include a mix of wage
and job cuts, which would allow for more workers on the city payroll and a more efficient provision of city services when
compared to just cutting jobs. The Mayor was also able to successfully pass fee increases for water and sewage utilities, which
would start for the 2012 fiscal year
76
. The elephant in the room for the city however was public sector pension plans.
Allentown had no solvent mechanism by which it could continue making payments to pension plans, and that issue was not
resolved until 2013 with a contentious 50-year water and sewer lease that drew public protests at Council meetings. The lease
did however provide funds necessary to make a substantial one-time payment to the citys pension funds
77
.

The 2011 and 2012 fiscal years were pivotal for the city and its crisis budgeting policies. In 2011, the Mayors EIT
increase passed, which impacted the following fiscal year. Furthermore, the city was



71
Councilors, Voters Should Push for Audits 2008

72
Allentown 2011

73
Allentown 2008

74
Allentown 2010

75
ibid.

76
ibid.

77
Opilo 2013

30

able to reach a 5-year deal with the SEIU, avoiding potential layoffs for public sector service employees
78
. The Mayor also
successfully negotiated a $9 million commitment from local corporations to help offset increases in health costs for the citys
fire department
79
. In 2012, the Mayors ability to negotiate as a point man with unions paid dividends as the city reached
agreements with the Fraternal Order of Police to limit wage increases and save several departmental jobs
80
. For Allentown and
Mayor Pawlowski, the statistics and the anecdotal evidence show a strong positive involvement in crisis budgeting on the part
of the Mayor, but the increased inter-governmental revenues in 2011 and 2012 likely helped to offset or delay further spending
cuts as well. Ultimately, Mayor Pawlowski took an active role with unions, with taxation policy, in protecting public safety
expenditures and with securing funding from the federal and state governments (ARRA funds and the NIZ approval,
respectively). It remains to be seen however what his legacy will be on city pensions however, as the 2013 payment is likely to
be a stopgap measure in what is still a persistent problem for the city. Overall, Allentowns fiscal management was very
successful when it comes to crisis budgeting, especially from a statistical standpoint. The citys NACP value was 22.83%,
which ranked it first among all cities in this study. It is important to note however that Allentowns city government does not
control the local school system (Pennsylvania uses separate school districts) and that state aid has remained relatively stable
throughout the crisis. This could be the product of statehouse politics however. From 2008-2012, Pennsylvanias Governor was
Democrat Ed Rendell, former Mayor of Philadelphia. His partisan identity and political past may have made the statehouse
more sympathetic to the plight of local governments during crisis budgeting. Whenever one singular official takes so prominent
a role in public policy however, there is a danger that it can backfire, a situation that will be at least partially explored with the
next city, Akron, OH.





78
Allentown 2011

79
ibid.

80
Allentown, 2012

31

Allentown, PA: Annual Per-Capita Public Safety Spending





A
n
n
u
a
l

S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g

$300.00


$250.00

$200.00

$150.00

$100.00

$50.00

$0.00
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012






Police


Fire



Allentown, PA: Year-to-Year Percent Change in Public Safety Funding




P
e
r
c
e
n
t

A
n
n
u
a
l

C
h
a
n
g
e

20.00%


15.00%

10.00%
Police
5.00%
Fire

0.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-5.00%

-10.00%




Akron, Ohio:

Akron is a city of roughly 220,000 people situated in northeast Ohio. The city is home to several tire manufacturers,
such as B.F. Goodrich, Goodyear and Bridgestone
81
. As complementary goods for automobiles however, these industries fell
into decline with the onset of the recession and the decline of American auto manufacturers. The auto industry has
rebounded considerably since the federal bailouts, and Akron saw its situation improve as well. The city has the unique
distinction, along with Charleston,

81
City of Akron 2008
32

of not only having a Strong Mayor system, but having what will here be called a legacy Mayor as well. Mayor Donald
Plusquellic, a Democrat, has served Akron as Mayor since 1987, the second-longest serving Mayor in this study behind
Charlestons Joseph Riley, who was first elected in 1979
82
. Plusquellic is, in many ways, an institution in and of himself,
especially as it pertains to Akron and Ohio politics. He wields tremendous sway at the statehouse because of his longevity,
giving him the freedom to criticize state policies that harm his city while simultaneously lobbying for increased state funding
and directing special projects towards Akron. He was also instrumental in developing Ohios unique Joint Economic
Development Districting laws (JEDD), which allows Ohio cities to wield quasi-annexation powers
83
.

As previously stated, to discuss a Strong Mayor city is to discuss its Mayor, and this is most certainly true for Akron.
Plusquellics influence permeates every policy decision. He takes on the responsibility of policy leadership, and voters have
found his policies to their liking for more than 25 years. Plusquellics power as a legacy Mayor is particularly strong when it
comes to pulling in state and federal funding, and he details each of his lobbying accomplishments in his annual budget letter.
He is also particularly adept at courting new businesses to Akron as well as getting concessions from existing businesses,
especially those in the tire industry. From 2008-2012, Plusquellic reigned in a $200 million Headquarters for Goodyear, a
strong influx of ARRA funds (which he personally lobbied for), a Homeland Security grant that saved 38 firefighters from
potential job cutbacks, worked to convince Bridgestone to build another factory in Akron and obtained $10 million in
mortgage relief funds for the city. Needless to say, his record when it comes to diverting projects, grants and industry towards
Akron is quite substantial, and that is only for a five-year period
84
.

Sadly, Plusquellic was far less adept when it came to managing the city budget, and was especially flummoxed when
it came to union negotiations. Just as his leading role as a city spokesman and
82
City of Akron 2008; City of Charleston 2008

83
City of Akron 2008

84
City of Akron 2008-2012

33

rainmaker paid huge dividends, his leading role in the budget and union negotiation processes proved disastrous for the city.
His crisis budgeting policies were, in part, the product of fluctuations reductions in intergovernmental assistance from the state
of Ohio as well as an immediate 24% drop in per-capita property tax revenue from 2008-2009. In 2012, in particular, state
assistance dropped nearly 30%, and the states capturing of a larger share of property tax revenues resulted in a near-30%
decline in that revenue source as well. Regardless of mitigating factors in 2012 however, the results were quite negative from
2008-2010 as well. The city was forced to layoff so many workers in that period that the city was employing as many people in
2011 as it had been in the 1950s when Akron had over 270,000 people but provided fewer services (before social service and
welfare expanses of the Great Society Era)
85
. In addition, these job layoffs were the first motivated by economic reasons in 27
years for Akron
86
. He also drastically cut overtime pay for all non-unionized city departments.

In 2009, at the onset of the crisis, Plusquellic actually faced a recall election a strong referendum on his crisis
budgeting failures and while he defeated his challenger, only one the Council members on his ticket survived the next
election, a testament to his declining political influence in Akron
87
. In addition to his failures in negotiating with the IAFF and
FOP, Plusquellic drew the ire of citizens and fire fighters alike when he accused the fire department of setting a trap for him
amidst a labor dispute. A firefighter pulled over the Mayor, who was driving a city vehicle while mildly intoxicated. He did
not face any discipline at the scene, but the public scorn that resulted from the incident is most certainly impacted the recall
election that year
88
. Furthermore, the thought that he blamed the incident on the poor union negotiations drew the ire of the
IAFF, which, along with the FOP, continued to play hardball in the negotiating process until 2011, resulting in job losses for
the city and the unions, and a protracted




85
Williamson 2009; U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts 2013

86
ibid.

87
ibid.

88
McCormick 2009

34

negotiation and arbitration process that drew considerable public attention and decreased the efficiency of city services,
including public safety.
As previously mentioned, Akron also dealt with a significant amount of problems coming from the statehouse, likely
a product of partisan fighting between Ohios mostly Democratic Mayors and Republican Governor John Kasich
89
. A 2011
article by local journalist Stephanie Warsmith noted The best word to describe Akron's budget for this year: uncertain. Akron
is assuming it will get its usual $12 million in local government funds from Ohio. Or maybe not. The city is counting on the
$4.5 million it averages in estate taxes from the state. Or maybe not. Also unclear is whether the Ohio House will approve
legislation already passed by the Senate that would revamp collective bargaining. All of these unknowns make the budgeting
process challenging for Akron and other cities, causing angst among city and union leaders.
90
Clearly budget problems at the
state level were causing tremendous problems with crisis budgeting in Ohios local governments as well. When state assistance
levels are volatile, it is difficult to plan out local budgets. Some localities might hope that the assistance will come, and will
anticipate its presence in the budget; others might assume that help is not on its way, and will plan as if the state were not
discussing potential revenue sharing. The problem with the 2011 Akron budget, and for the 2011 budgets of cities across Ohio,
was that the program the state was considering cutting dated back to the Great Depression, and had been a consistent and
reliable source of revenue for over 75 years
91
. Statehouse politics played a strong role here, especially for Akron. Ohio had a
Republican Governor, John Kasich, and the state likely balanced its own budget at the expense of local governments.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to know more about the dialogue between Republican Kasich and Democratic lion
Plusquellic when it came to the decline in inter-governmental revenues. Quite simply, it was a classic case of the state fixing
its own budget by passing the onus of crisis budgeting onto local

89
Major Ohio Mayors (2008-2012): Columbus- Michael Coleman (D); Cleveland- Frank Jackson (D); Akron- Plusquellic
(D); Youngstown- Jay Williams (D: 2006-2011) and Charles Sammarone (D:2011-Present)

90
Warsmith 2011

91
City of Akron 2011

35

governments, but with the familiar signs of partisan bickering left behind. Even more damning was the fact that those funds
went directly to public safety expenditures in Akron.
Ultimately, the example of Akron and Mayor Plusquellic is informative for several reasons. For one, it shows the
importance of having a city spokesman who can represent the citys interest at other levels of government and with businesses,
to secure funding for the city. However, it also shows the downside of vesting a considerable amount of control in one public
figure. As captain of Akrons damaged ship, Plusquellic was (literally) drunkenly sailing through dangerous waters. For over
25 years he guided the city to prosperity and safety (2008 budget letter), but his influence began to wane. One of the problems
with legacy Mayors is that even as their influence within the city wanes, their tremendous incumbency advantage makes them
difficult to defeat come Election Day. In the end, Mayor Plusquellic shows the very highs and the very lows of centralized
control of mid-sized cities. From 2008-2012, he was a savant of sorts when it came to directing governmental and business
funding to Akron, but he could not keep his fiscal house in order, nor could he successfully negotiate with public sector
unions, two key battlefronts that are extremely important when it comes to crisis budgeting. From a quantitative perspective,
the city ranked third of all cities with an 11.32% NACP value, placing it third among Strong Mayor cities as well. This figure
is quite high in spite of Ohios reductions in state aid (including a 30% decline in per-capita aid from 2011-2012) and
Plusquellics poor performance negotiating public sector unions, which might show the great importance of his ability to
lobby for funds with federal and state governments as well as corporations. It also shows the advantages and disadvantages of
long-serving legacy Mayors as well, which would make an excellent topic for future research.
36








A
n
n
u
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l

S
p
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d
i
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g


Akron, OH: Annual Per-Capita Public Safety Spending
$300.00

$250.00

$200.00

$150.00

$100.00

$50.00

$0.00
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012









Police


Fire



Akron, OH: Year-to-Year Percent Change in Public Safety Funding








P
e
r
c
e
n
t

C
h
a
n
g
e


25.00%


20.00%

15.00%

10.00%
Police
5.00%
Fire

0.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-5.00%

-10.00%

-15.00%




Charleston, South Carolina:

The second legacy Mayor, Republican James Riley of Charleston, has served his city since 1979. He has overseen
the citys meteoric rise as a cultural hot spot, rapidly growing tourist destination, cruise liner port and place for white-collar
employment. Charleston is a city of roughly 120,000 people situated at the mouth of the Ashley and Cooper Rivers. The large
Charleston Bay is guarded by the famed Fort
37

Sumpter, and the bay today takes in naval vessels for the Charleston Naval Shipyard as well as large cruise liners. While
Charleston has many military installations and a Boeing facility in its immediate grasp, the city does get a sizable amount of
its revenues from user fees related to tourism. The Charleston area is known for its food, beaches and climate, and the citys
tourism industry, and city budgets, reap the benefits of large amounts of domestic and international tourism drawn to its
historic buildings and southern charm.
Mayor Riley, like Mayor Plusquellic, is very good at securing funds from other levels of government and courting
business interests. Of note, he secured federal funding for a major harbor-deepening project through the Obama
Administration
92
. His success as a fiscal manager, especially his use of TIFs, both before and during the financial crisis
however, sets him apart from Mayor Plusquellic. At the beginning of the housing crisis, Charleston had just received a bond
rating upgrade to AAA, the highest rating for a municipal bond
93
. In the 2008 budget, the city actually increased employment
in the fire and police departments, and when the crisis fully impacted the budget in 2009, the Mayor secured a federal SAFER
grant from the Department of Homeland Security that saved both departments from potential job losses
94
. In 2010 however,
the city was faced with the reality of looming pay cuts for some public sector jobs, but the citys total revenues did not fall, in
part because of the sale of two properties in Concord Park each valued at over $9 million
95
. In 2011 and 2012, the city was
able to grant its employees a Cost of Living Adjustment, which in part made up for some of the wages that were cut or frozen
the previous year
96
. As seen earlier with Savannah, the impact of the recession did not hit Charleston as hard as the rest of
South Carolina, and certainly the rest of the country
97
. Overall, he was able to keep public safety spending at consistent and
high levels, and only had to cut jobs through a

92
Obama Administration Announces 2012

93
City of Charleston 2008

94
City of Charleston 2009

95
City of Charleston 2010

96
City of Charleston 2012

97
ibid.

38

temporary and "flexible hiring freeze that's expected to save $2.1 million, the elimination of raises and the employee
furloughs worth $1.1 million and the increase in the franchise fee."
98
In effect, the only program he truly cut from either public
safety department during the crisis was the Mounted Police Unit, which the city disbanded in 2011
99
. The story for Charleston
and Mayor Riley is short and simple, in part because the city did not suffer greatly from the housing crisis, and in part because
the city used a combination of carefully placed spending cuts and one-time land sales to make up for what were ultimately
temporarily depressed revenues for the Queen City. While local history shows a story of success, the NACP statistic shows
that per-capita public safety spending actually fell from 2008-2012 in Charleston, as its NACP value is second-last in this
study at -3.21%. While spending and NAPC dipped from 2011 to 2012, this was the result of state and county-level changes in
property tax assessment rather than Mayor Rileys policies
100
. This property tax policy resulted in a decline in per-capita
property tax values from $558.35 to $450.99 over the 2011-2012 fiscal years (a -19.23% change), which seriously
compromised public safety spending for the 2012 fiscal year. Excluding 2012, Charlestons NAPC value would have remained
positive. Furthermore, while crime data is not explored in this study, perhaps this is due to the fact that the poorest areas in
Charleston County are in North Charleston, which is a separate municipality. This would give Charleston a low crime rate and
therefore a low level of necessary public safety spending. With his deft and experienced leadership, Charleston has certainly
benefited greatly from centralized political control in Rileys 30-plus years in office.













98
Slade 2009

99
Knich 2011

100
Slade 2012

39

Charleston, SC: Annual Per-Capita Public Safety Spending

$580.00

A
n
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S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g

$560.00

$540.00

$520.00

$500.00
2009 2010 2011 2012

2008


6.00%
Charleston, SC: Year-to-Year Percent Change in Public Safety Funding



4.00%

2.00%

0.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

-2.00%

-4.00%

-6.00%

[Note: Police and Fire spending were combined as Public Safety in the Charleston Budgets]




Spokane, Washington:

Spokane, the final Strong Mayor city and the last case study, is a city of 200,000 situated on the Spokane River in
eastern Washington, and is the home of Gonzaga University. The city has a history of strong environmental consciousness,
having hosted Expo 74, a green version of a Worlds Fair, and its legacy is felt in the citys continued environmental
friendliness, especially in the cleanup of old railways and industrial sites after the decline of the citys aluminum industry
101
.
Spokane provides an interesting look into an aspect of the Strong Mayor system that has yet to be explored by past cases.
Allentown,

101
Youngs 2010
40

Charleston and Akron all had the same Mayor from 2008-2012, but Tacomas city hall shifted hands in 2011 when Joseph
Condon defeated Mary Verner, who had served since 2007. It is important to note that Spokane does not have a history of
reelecting their Mayors to a second term, regardless of performance, and has not had a multi-term Mayor since the early
1970s
102
.

Spokane did not start the crisis budgeting process on a good note. In the citys first recession budget, it laid off six
policemen and one firefighter
103
. Furthermore, the Mayor lost an important political battle regarding budget policy. First, she
saw her proposed tax increase to fund the 911-call center defeated at the ballot box, and she later saw the City Council defeat a
utility rate increase
104
. Also in 2008, budget woes resulted in hiring delays for 12 new police recruits, which lead to Council
disapproval. "City Councilman Richard Rush said there's been a growing understanding that new hiring might have to be
delayed. I don't see that the Mayor has been given a lot of choices, he said."
105
To which the Mayor responded "It's going to
be a really tough year for me and the Council to make it through without cutting services,
106
In 2009 however, Mayor Verner
had greater fiscal success, finally pushing through a utility rate increase, and then a separate 15% rate increase on water and
sewer utilities to cover needed maintenance
107
. While her first crisis budget included job cuts, her 2009 and 2010 budgets
managed to avoid any job losses, but in 2011, the city was forced to enter into contract negotiations with public sector
unions
108
. As a result of these largely failed negotiations, over 100 city jobs were cut, and the losses contributed directly to
Mayor Verners election loss to David Condon, a former Congressional staffer who campaigned on taking a tougher stance
with public sector unions
109
.

While the impact of the transition of power is difficult to judge because Condon has only




102
There are no formal term limits, just an incredibly fascinating part of Spokanes political history

103
City of Spokane 2008

104
ibid.

105
Brunt 2008

106
Brunt 2008

107
City of Spokane 2009

108
Brunt 2009

109
Brunt 2011

41

submitted one budget so far, it is important to consider the immediate political impact of poor crisis budgeting. While
Spokane does rarely reelect its Mayors, Mayor Verners failed union negotiations created a crucial campaign issue for her
challenger and cost the city a significant sum of public service jobs. In terms of the statistics, the transition of power is
perhaps best exhibited by a 7% and 6% increase in funding for the police and fire departments respectively, but this statistic
can be misleading. Mayor Condons tough stance on union bargaining resulted in a significant number of layoffs as well,
including 19 police and nine firefighters. Council President Ben Stuckhart responded by stating "I can't see how you can cut
those positions and say you are not affecting services to citizens."
110
He said he is particularly worried about the effect on
police and fire. Stuckart said Condon has enjoyed a prolonged honeymoon as the new Mayor, but that may be coming to an
end."
111
Again, centralized control of city policy is a double-edged sword, and again one can see the importance of a Mayors
successes or failures when it comes to negotiating with public sector unions like the FOP or the IAFF. Regardless of the citys
failures when it came to union negotiations or its Mayoral shift in 2012, Spokane actually ranked second in this study in
NACP values at 20.28%. It is difficult to reconcile the differences between the local history and the quantitative data for
Spokane however, especially since inter-governmental aid was not a recognizable category in the Spokane budget.




















110
Prager 2012

111
ibid.

42








A
n
n
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S
p
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Spokane, WA: Annual Per-Capita Public Safety Spending
$300.00

$250.00

$200.00

$150.00

$100.00

$50.00

$0.00
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012









Police


Fire



Spokane, WA: Year-to-Year Percent Change in Public Safety
Funding






P
e
r
c
e
n
t

C
h
a
n
g
e


10.00%


8.00%

6.00%

4.00%

2.00%

0.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-2.00%






Police


Fire




Section IV: Results and Cross-System Analysis



After examining the qualitative and quantitative data from the eight case studies, several important trends become
clear. One truly dominant theme is the importance of public sector unions and the
43

collective bargaining process. This is consistent with past research regarding municipal finance
112
. It seemed that a Mayor or
managers success often hinged on his/her ability to successfully negotiate with public sector unions to avoid drastic job
losses and public disapproval over failed negotiations. A second and very clearly exhibited theme is the role that state funding
and other inter-governmental revenues play in whether a citys crisis budgeting efforts succeed or fail. In many ways, it seems
Dillons Rule the legal rule behind the history of weak local autonomy in the United States, famously codified by Judge
John Forrest Dillon in his treatise Municipal Corporations is alive and well, acting through the crisis budgeting process and
fend-for-yourself federalism.
113
In addition, the two Southern region cities seemed to have faced the smallest impacts from
the financial crisis of the eight case study cities.

In terms of themes and trends that pertain to the institutional question, whether City Manager or Strong Mayor
systems better preserved public safety funding in mid-sized cities during the financial crisis by successfully engaging in crisis
budgeting, the results were slightly less clear. From a numerical standpoint, the Strong Mayor cities performed better, based on
average net percent change in public safety funding, than the City Manager cases, but it is difficult to draw any causality from
those results because they only pass an 80% standard, far below the 90% or 95% standards typically used in the Social
Sciences. This is likely due to the low number of test cases, but that is, naturally, just speculation. One of the key determining
factors however was the Mayor or managers ability to successfully negotiate with public sector unions, and Strong Mayors
won as much as they lost. On the other hand, when they lost, Mayors, and their cities, suffered greater losses than did City
Managers. All four City Managers lost their negotiations with public sector unions. While their losses were not as spectacular
as those of Mayors Plusquellic, Verner or Condon, they did lose more consistently than did Strong Mayors as a group.

In terms of actual policies, Strong Mayors appeared to do a lot more to help their failing cities. Perhaps it was a
case of poor case study selection, but only one of the four City Managers in this study

112
Inman 2009

113
Gamkhar and Pickerill 2012; Richardson Jr. 2011

44

seemed particularly active from a political standpoint. As arguably the worst city leader for the five years of this study, Mayor
Plusquellic did bring a tremendous amount of state and federal programs, not to mention private businesses, to the Akron area
throughout the crisis, even as he was bungling union negotiations at the same time. It appears that in times of crisis budgeting,
Strong Mayors have the institutional power, clout and influence to enact the kind of meaningful, but tough policies that are
needed to grow and develop a city during a recession. Furthermore, their ability to court funds at other levels of government
and (for better or for worse) serve as a key political figure in union bargaining allow them the formal and informal agency to
better manage city policy in times of fiscal crisis. Simply put, crisis budgeting requires action, and Strong Mayors are in a
better position from an institutional standpoint to act than are City Managers, especially those who do not expand the impact
of their office through informal means such as the power of information, expertise or influence
114
. This is consistent with the
political theory scholarship concerning City Managers and Strong Mayors
115
. To continue using an earlier analogy, in seems
that in dangerous seas, it is better to have one captain with centralized power than a captain-by-committee.


45


Appendix: City Financial Data and Statistical Calculations



Worcester, MA Northeast City Manager
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Population* 180,206 181,045 181,884 182,723 183,562
Police $41,382,085 $38,947,554 $39,902,032 $36,266,289 $42,134,713
Fire $34,856,180 $32,230,466 $30,584,879 $30,971,290 $33,940,872

Property $195,675,552 $203,861,862 $214,891,243 $223,669,013 $235,184,029
Inter-Governmental $73,046,019 $57,468,544 $39,671,768 $36,658,469 $39,337,125
Total Revenues $505,379,217 $491,165,675 $506,076,587 $518,590,112 $541,809,392

Per-Capita Values 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Population* 180,206 181,045 181,884 182,723 183,562

Police $229.64 $215.13 $219.38 $198.48 $229.54
Fire $193.42 $178.02 $168.16 $169.50 $184.90
Property $1,085.84 $1,126.03 $1,181.47 $1,224.09 $1,281.22

Inter-Governmental $405.35 $317.43 $218.12 $200.62 $214.30
Total Revenues $2,804.45 $2,712.95 $2,782.41 $2,838.12 $2,951.64

Percent Change 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Population* 180,206 181,045 181,884 182,723 183,562
Police 0.00% -6.32% 1.98% -9.53% 15.65%

Fire 0.00% -7.96% -5.54% 0.80% 9.09%
Property 0.00% 3.70% 4.92% 3.61% 4.67%
Inter-Governmental 0.00% -21.69% -31.29% -8.02% 6.82%

Total Revenues 0.00% -3.26% 2.56% 2.00% 4.00%


2010 Census Population: 181,045
2000 Census Population: 172,648

P
10
= 8,397
P= 839
46
Grand Rapids, MI Midwest City Manager

Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 195,848 196,824 197,800 198,776 199,752

Police $47,300,000 $46,800,000 $48,600,000 $50,056,595
Fire $26,800,000 $24,200,000 $24,900,000 $26,673,538
Property $12,511,764 $14,402,094 $12,413,383 $13,987,719

Inter-Governmental $21,394,640 $22,811,532 $21,128,673 $18,151,695
Total Revenues $117,300,000 $123,000,000 $115,085,827 $110,699,436
Income Tax
$57,801,530 $57,829,659 $47,991,972 $54,392,259
Per-Capita Values 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 195,848 196,824 197,800 198,776 199,752

Police $241.51 $237.78 $245.70 $251.82
Fire $136.84 $122.95 $125.88 $134.19
Property $63.89 $73.17 $62.76 $70.37

Inter-Governmental $109.24 $115.90 $106.82 $91.32
Total Revenues $598.93 $624.92 $581.83 $556.91
Income Tax
$295.13 $293.81 $242.63 $273.64
Percent Change 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Population* 195,848 196,824 197,800 198,776 199,752
Police 0.00% -1.55% 3.33% 2.49%
Fire 0.00% -10.15% 2.38% 6.60%

Property 0.00% 14.54% -14.23% 12.13%
Inter-Governmental 0.00% 6.09% -7.83% -14.51%
Total Revenues 0.00% 4.34% -6.90% -4.28%

Income Tax 0.00% -0.45% -17.42% 12.78%


2010 Census Population: 197,800
2000 Census Population: 188,040

P
10
= 9,760
P= 976
47
Savannah, GA South City Manager

Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 130,556 131,033 131,510 131,987 132,464

Police $59,370,367 $62,602,297 $59,715,281 $58,883,579 $61,069,887
Fire $22,854,494 $24,665,106 $23,892,411 $24,485,106 $24,069,887
Property $132,456,580 $136,749,688 $127,377,882 $121,440,720 $124,943,225

User Fees $112,722,540 $112,341,693 $112,918,817 $113,465,657 $118,572,833
Total Revenues $331,602,572 $330,224,946 $323,525,498 $317,319,433 $325,084,403

Per-Capita Values 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 130,556 131,033 131,510 131,987 132,464
Police $454.75 $477.76 $454.07 $446.13 $461.03

Fire $175.06 $188.24 $181.68 $185.51 $181.71
Property $1,014.56 $1,043.63 $968.58 $920.10 $943.22
User Fees $863.40 $857.35 $858.63 $859.67 $895.13

Total Revenues $2,539.93 $2,520.17 $2,460.08 $2,404.17 $2,454.13

Percent Change 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Population* 130,556 131,033 131,510 131,987 132,464
Police 0.00% 5.06% -4.96% -1.75% 3.34%
Fire 0.00% 7.53% -3.48% 2.11% -2.05%

Property 0.00% 2.87% -7.19% -5.01% 2.51%
User Fees 0.00% -0.70% 0.15% 0.12% 4.12%
Total Revenues 0.00% -0.78% -2.38% -2.27% 2.08%


2010 Census Population: 136,510
2000 Census Population: 131,737

P
10
= 4,773
P= 477
48
Tacoma, WA West City Manager

BIENNIAL
BUDGETS
Year 2009-2010 2011-2012
Population* 189,397 200,678
Police $144,986,227 $142,664,891
Fire $96,845,400 $101,471,204

Property $96,768,512 $101,339,565
Inter-Governmental $21,921,378 $19,952,170
Total Revenues $440,793,100 $398,572,364

Sales/Use Tax $86,790,206 $83,658,226
Per-Capita Values
2008 2009
Population* 189,397 200,678
Police $765.51 $710.91

Fire $511.34 $505.64
Property $510.93 $504.99
Inter-Governmental $115.74 $99.42

Total Revenues $2,327.35 $1,986.13
Sales/Use Tax
$458.24 $416.88
Percent Change 2008 2009
Population* 189,397 200,678

Police 0.00% -7.13%
Fire 0.00% -1.11%
Property 0.00% -1.16%

Inter-Governmental 0.00% -14.10%
Total Revenues 0.00% -14.66%
Sales/Use Tax 0.00% -9.03%



No population statistics used, all data from U.S. Census and Census Quickfacts estimate for 2011
Since there are only two budgets, graph data would not be very useful.
49
Allentown, PA Northeast Strong Mayor
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population 115,752 116,892 118,032 119,172 120,312
Police $30,022,588 $32,164,356 $32,983,295 $32,718,293 $33,108,600
Fire $15,895,324 $17,278,982 $16,759,919 $19,970,084 $19,149,263

Property $29,100,000 $28,850,000 $28,375,000 $28,894,873 $28,891,911
Inter-Governmental $8,720,500 $10,163,024 $9,799,028 $13,688,347 $13,501,504
Total Revenues $86,626,735 $89,696,465 $81,649,818 $86,714,029 $90,350,392

Per-Capita Values 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 115,752 116,892 118,032 119,172 120,312

Police $259.37 $275.16 $279.44 $274.55 $275.19
Fire $137.32 $147.82 $141.99 $167.57 $159.16
Property $251.40 $246.81 $240.40 $242.46 $240.14

Inter-Governmental $75.34 $86.94 $83.02 $114.86 $112.22
Total Revenues $748.38 $767.34 $691.76 $727.64 $750.97

Percent Change 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 115,752 116,892 118,032 119,172 120,312
Police 0.00% 6.09% 1.56% -1.75% 0.23%

Fire 0.00% 7.64% -3.94% 18.01% -5.02%
Property 0.00% -1.83% -2.60% 0.86% -0.96%
Inter-Governmental 0.00% 15.41% -4.51% 38.35% -2.30%

Total Revenues 0.00% 2.53% -9.85% 5.19% 3.21%


2010 Census Population: 118032
2000 Census Population: 106632

P
10
= 11,400
P= 1 ,140
50
Akron, OH Midwest Strong Mayor

Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 202,702 200,906 199,110 197,314 195,518

Police $48,921,990 $47,580,240 $43,862,770 $45,924,800 $46,911,310
Fire $27,782,610 $27,649,890 $24,031,100 $24,507,760 $29,243,000
Property $65,465,950 $48,864,760 $48,592,100 $49,593,000 $34,820,000

Inter-Governmental $63,547,610 $74,724,330 $69,537,000 $76,190,500 $53,284,340
Total Revenues $480,868,530 $488,548,800 $462,703,500 $476,772,000 $440,980,040

Per-Capita Values 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 202,702 200,906 199,110 197,314 195,518
Police $241.35 $236.83 $220.29 $232.75 $239.93

Fire $137.06 $137.63 $120.69 $124.21 $149.57
Property $322.97 $243.22 $244.05 $251.34 $178.09
Inter-Governmental $313.50 $371.94 $349.24 $386.14 $272.53

Total Revenues $2,372.29 $2,431.73 $2,323.86 $2,416.31 $2,255.44

Percent Change 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Population* 202,702 200,906 199,110 197,314 195,518
Police 0.00% -1.87% -6.98% 5.65% 3.09%
Fire 0.00% 0.41% -12.30% 2.91% 20.42%

Property 0.00% -24.69% 0.34% 2.99% -29.14%
Inter-Governmental 0.00% 18.64% -6.10% 10.57% -29.42%
Total Revenues 0.00% 2.51% -4.44% 3.98% -6.66%


2010 Census Population: 199110
2000 Census Population: 217074

P
10
= -17,964
P= -1,796
51
Charleston, SC South Strong Mayor

Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 115,397 117,740 120,083 122,426 124,769

Public Safety $63,468,000 $62,917,000 $67,293,000 $68,390,000 $65,986,354
Property $65,483,320 $67,665,000 $66,768,000 $68,356,000 $56,269,993
Inter-Governmental $16,144,000 $15,809,000 $15,054,000 $16,650,000 $15,227,581

Total Revenues $198,939,000 $168,857,000 $191,344,000 $189,235,000 $160,323,308

Per-Capita Values 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Population* 115,397 117,740 120,083 122,426 124,769
Public Safety $550.00 $534.37 $560.39 $558.62 $528.87
Property $567.46 $574.70 $556.02 $558.35 $450.99

Inter-Governmental $139.90 $134.27 $125.36 $136.00 $122.05
Total Revenues $1,723.95 $1,434.15 $1,593.43 $1,545.71 $1,284.96

Percent Change 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 115,397 117,740 120,083 122,426 124,769
Public Safety 0.00% -2.84% 4.87% -0.31% -5.33%

Property 0.00% 1.28% -3.25% 0.42% -19.23%
Inter-Governmental 0.00% -4.02% -6.63% 8.49% -10.26%
Total Revenues 0.00% -16.81% 11.11% -2.99% -16.87%


2010 Census Population: 120,083
2000 Census Population: 96,650

P
10
= 23,433
P= 2 ,343
52
Spokane, WA West Strong Mayor

Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 206,258 207,587 208,916 210,245 211,574

Police $47,436,813 $49,580,951 $49,850,244 $49,450,746 $52,804,143
Fire $29,772,853 $31,487,678 $31,523,019 $31,547,920 $34,235,281
Property $31,620,000 $34,306,000 $34,730,000 $35,388,000 $36,931,600

Sales/Retail Taxes $33,982,617 $30,200,000 $30,070,000 $28,827,000 $30,680,000
Total Revenues $145,198,736 $155,538,805 $159,121,479 $156,173,751 $163,541,752

Per-Capita Values 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population* 206,258 207,587 208,916 210,245 211,574
Police $229.99 $238.84 $238.61 $235.21 $249.58

Fire $144.35 $151.68 $150.89 $150.05 $161.81
Property $153.30 $165.26 $166.24 $168.32 $174.56
Sales/Retail Taxes $164.76 $145.48 $143.93 $137.11 $145.01

Total Revenues $703.97 $749.27 $761.65 $742.82 $772.98

Percent Change 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Population* 206,258 207,587 208,916 210,245 211,574
Police 0.00% 3.85% -0.10% -1.43% 6.11%
Fire 0.00% 5.08% -0.52% -0.55% 7.84%

Property 0.00% 7.80% 0.59% 1.25% 3.71%
Sales/Retail Taxes 0.00% -11.70% -1.06% -4.74% 5.76%
Total Revenues 0.00% 6.44% 1.65% -2.47% 4.06%


2010 Census Population: 208,926
2000 Census Population: 195,629

P
10
= 13,287
P= 1,329
53

Net Annual Percent Change in Public Service Funding Statistics (NACP):

Sum of annual percent change (including positive and negative values) for both police and fire funding. Statistic is
the total net change in funding as a percentage. A high number indicates that a city was able to increase public safety
funding more than a city with a lower NACP value. A value close to zero indicates that public safety funding was
largely unchanged throughout the crisis budgeting process. A negative value indicates that public safety funding fell
throughout the financial crisis.

City Manager Systems
- Worcester, MA: -1.84%
- Grand Rapids, MI: 3.11%
- Savannah, GA: 5.80%
- Tacoma, WA: -8.25%
117


Average NACP for City Manager Systems = -0.295%
Standard Deviation = 6.17555

Strong Mayor Systems
- Allentown, PA: 22.83%
- Akron, OH: 11.32%
- Charleston, SC: -3.21%
- Spokane, WA: 20.28%

Average NACP for Strong Mayor Systems = 12.805%
Standard Deviation = 11.76239


Difference in NACP for each system = 12.51%




These values are not statistically significant at the 90% Level of Confidence. This is likely due to the low sample size,
as only eight total cases are presented. The difference is significant at the 80% level of confidence. While this is by no
means a statistically acceptable level of significance, it can direct future research towards an alternative hypothesis
that points in favor of Strong Mayor systems. Further study with a larger n might lead to similar results, but with a
higher and more acceptable level of significance.












117
NACP value for Tacoma impacted by financial inflexibility related to biennial budgeting
54

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