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MEXIDATA . INFO
Column 062005 Brewer

Monday, June 20, 2005

Intelligence sharing — Mexico’s dilemma

By Jerry Brewer

Although the “intelligence” apparatus throughout the

world appears to be in serious disarray, and
necessitates serious attention to repair this historical
strategy that has been used for hundreds of years,
Mexico is by far in critical need of this most important
proactive strategy. The issue that prevents the use and
deployment of sound intelligence initiatives in Mexico is
simply “trust.”

It is not a total issue of other nations not trusting

intelligence dissemination to and from Mexico, but
rather it is an internal Mexican dilemma of
disseminating tactical and strategic intelligence to its
states that include military and police.

Intelligence must be produced in a manner that

balances the need for maximum utility of the
information to the intended recipient, with the adequate
protection of intelligence sources and methods.
Intelligence is seen primarily in military or national
security terms, as part of the “silent warfare” between
and among nations, and consisting of four basic
elements: collection, analysis, covert action, and
counterintelligence. The usual emphasis is on
espionage, covert action, counterintelligence and
deception.

The seemingly out of control violent crime in many

parts of Mexico, especially with significant rates in
Sinaloa and states along the U.S.-Mexico border,
humanely demands action and a coordinated team
effort against this violence from every corner of Mexico.
It is simply wrong to point an accusatorial finger at
President Vicente Fox as a scapegoat, saying that he is
not doing enough to interdict these senseless atrocities.
However, nor is it enough of an effort for President Fox
to simply plan visits to these areas and just send troops
into volatile regions.

The murders of police officials in Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad

Juarez, Nogales, Chihuahua and other cities is not “an
exaggeration” of an ungovernable situation along the
border as President Fox has said. Soldiers carrying out
patrols and manning roadblocks in cities affected by
recent violence is a reactive strategy. “Operation
Mexico Secure” in its written form is indeed a proactive
strategy, but words alone will not settle what is
essentially lawlessness.

While not widely reported there have been present day

incidents of “military-looking” youths, in camouflage
utility uniforms and carrying automatic weapons, who
apparently are escorting narcotics across the border
into the U.S. near the city of Laredo, in Webb County,
Texas. Freight forwarding agents in Nuevo Laredo have
recently expressed concern to this writer of threats,
intimidation, and the spotting of individuals attempting
to sabotage or otherwise place contraband on freight
carriers. Their question was an aggressive plea of “who
do we call to report this?” Their frustration was real
and desperate.

With but a “tip” that troops are moving into the Nuevo
Laredo area to “restore order,” organized criminals
would most likely flee back into interior cities and areas
until the “Band-Aid” was removed. They would
certainly be unable to effectively face this kind of
manpower or weaponry, nor face the politics of
confronting them. Without “tips” the organized groups
would be fighting and running for their lives as they
were surreptitiously confronted. In addition, panicked
and armed bandits crossing the border committing
carjacking, home invasions, and possibly taking
hostages as a knee-jerk reaction would besiege the city
of Laredo.

The nexus formed by the intersection of U.S. national

and broader international security concerns is
manifested by three facets of national security policy:
diplomatic, military and intelligence capabilities.
Intelligence is simply the capacity to acquire and apply
knowledge gained through sources as a prelude to
decision and action. “Private sector” intelligence, a rare
but very viable commodity, should play a critical role in
this proactive strategy process, as it comes from a
myriad of sources and contributors of less political
significance since it quite often comes from
businesspersons, financiers, local officials and related
entities.

Intelligence collection and dissemination entities

(intelligence producers) should prepare their reports
and products at the classification level commensurate
with expected damage that could be caused by
unauthorized disclosure. With intelligence coming from
both open and clandestine sources, this is the caveat
that supersedes trust.

U.S. intelligence policy dictates that “intelligence may

be shared with foreign governments, and international
organizations or coalition partners consisting of
sovereign states, to the extent such sharing promotes
the interests of the United States, is consistent with
U.S. law, does not pose unreasonable risk to U.S.
foreign policy or national defense, and is limited to a
specific purpose and normally of limited duration.”

Enough said. You do the math.

——————————
Jerry Brewer is Vice President of Criminal Justice International
Associates, a global risk mitigation firm headquartered in Miami,
Florida. He can be reached via e-mail at Cjiaincusa@aol.com
and jbrewer@cjiausa.org.