Aristotles Rhetoric

Chapter 1
1354 a. 1

Rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialect; for both are concerned with such things that
are, to a certain extent, within knowledge of all people and belong to no separately
defined science

Antistrophos - translated as counterpart correlative and coordinate

1355 a 12

but rhetoric is useful first because the true and the just are by nature stronger than
their opposites, so that if judgments are not made in the right way {the true and the
just] are necessarily defeated by their opposites [the false and the unjust]


speech based on knowledge is teaching but teaching is impossible with some
audiences; rather it is necessary for pisteis and speeches as a whole to be formed on
the basis of common beliefs

none of the other arts do this, for both [rhetoric and dialect]are equally concerned
with opposites.

Note: in addition it is strange if an ability to defend oneself by means of the body is
shameful, while there is no shame in an inability to use speech; for the latter is more
characteristic of humans than is the use of the body

Note for why rhetoric is not intrinsically bad: and if it is argued that great harm can
be done by unjustly using such powers of words, this objection applies to all good
things except virtue, and most of all to the most useful things, like strength, health
and wealth, and military strategy; for by using these justly one would do the
greatest good and unjustly the greatest harm

Rhetoric, therefore, does not belong to a single defined genus of subject but is like
dialect and that it is useful is clear-and that its function is not to persuade but to see
the available means of persuasion in each case, as is true also in all the other arts

It is a function of rhetoric to see the persuasive and to see the apparently persuasive

Chapter 2
1355 b 1

Let Rhetoric be defined as an ability in each particular case to see the available
means of persuasion.
2. Of the pisteis, some are non-artistic some are artistic. Those that are not artistic
are not provided by us, but are preexisting, e.g. witness testimony of slaves under
torture. And artistic whatever can be prepared by us. One must use the former and
invent the later

3 species of pisteis provided through speech, by showing or seeming to show
something:
a. for some are in the character of the speaker [ethos]
b. and some in disposing the listener in some way[pathos]
c. and some in the argument [logos] itself

4. for we believe fair minded people to a greater extent and more quickly that we do
others on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact
knowledge[ character is almost so to speak the controlling factor in persuasion]

5. There is persuasion in the hearers when they are led to feel emotion[pathos] by
the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or
when being friendly or hostile

6. Persuasion occurs through the arguments [logoi] when we show the truth or the
apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case

8. in the case of persuasion through proving something or seeming to prove
something, just as in dialectic there is on the one hand induction and on the other
hand the syllogism or the apparent syllogism. [logos]

Paradeigma induction paradigm to show on the basis of many similar instances
that something is so is in dialectic induction

Enthymeme syllogism enthymeme- to show that if some premises are true, a
conclusion beyond them results from these because they are true, either universally
or for the most part

1356b

10. speeches using paradigms are not less persuasive, but those with enthymemes
excite more favorable audience reaction.

Rhetoric theorizes about people of a certain sort not individuals.

1357a

13. It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions either from previous
syllogisms or from statements that are not reasoned out but require a syllogism[if
they are to be accepted] because they are not commonly believed
the former of these e.i. the chain of syllogisms is necessarily not easy to
follow because of its length
the latter is not persuasive because the premises are not agreed to or
commonly believed

Thus it is necessary for an enthymeme and a paradigm to be concerned with things
that are for the most part capable of being other than they are and draw from few
premises, if one of the premises is known, it does not have to be stated, since the
hearer supplies it.

14. Since few of the premises from which rhetorical syllogisms are formed are
necessarily true (most of the matters with which judgment and examination are
concerned can be other than they are
?

Moreover, enthymemes are derived from probabilities and signs, so it is necessary
that each of these be the same as each of the truth values mentioned
?

15. for a probability is what happens for the most part, but whatever among things
that can be other than they are, is so related to that in regard to which it is probable
as a universal is to a particular.

16. In the case of signs some are related as the particular to the universal, some as
the universal to the particular. Of these there are ones that are necessary and not.

Tekmerion is a necessary sign, and there is not name for a not necessary
17. now I call necessary those from which a [logically valid] syllogism can be
formed; thus, I call this kind of sign a tekmerion; for when people think it is not
possible to refute a statement

18. an example of signs related as the particular to the universal is if someone were
to state that since Socrates was wise and just, it is a sign that the wise are just. This
is indeed a sign, but refutable, even if true in this case; for it is not syllogistically
valid. But if someone were to state that there is a sign that someone is sick, for he
has a fever, that is a necessary sign. It is as example of the relation of the universal to
the particular if someone said that it is a sign of a fever that someone breathes
rapidly. This too is refutable, even if true; for it is possible to breathe rapidly and not
be feverish


signs Necessary sign (tekmerion) Not Necessary
Universal to particular Sickness -fever Fever breathes rapidly
Particular to Universal n/a Socrates wise -just

19. It has been explained that a paradigm is an induction and with what kinds of
things it is concerned. It is reasoning neither form part to whole not from whole to
part, but from part to part, like to like, when two things fall under the same genus
but one is better known than the other.

For when someone claims that Dionysius is plotting tyranny because he is
seeking a body guard; for Peistratis also when plotting earlier, sought a guard and
after receiving it made himself tyrant, and many others did the same all become
examples of Dionysius, of whom they do not yet know whether he makes his
demand for this reason. All these actions fall under the same genus: that one
plotting tyranny seeks a guard.

1358a
The sources of pisteis that seem demonstrative have now been explained. But in the
case of Enthymemes, a very big difference is one that is also found in the case of
syllogisms in dialectical method

21. I am saying that dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are those in which we state
topoi ???

Chapter 3

1. The species of rhetoric are three in number; for this is the number of classes to
which the hearers of speeches belong.

A speech consists of 3 things:
a. speaker
b. a subject on which he speaks
c. someone else addressed ; hearer

2. The hearer can either be a judge or a spectator
a judge judges about future happening like sentence
a spectator (jury man) judges from the past

3. There are three genera of rhetorics
a. Deliberative is either exhortation or dissuasion
b. Judicial is either accusation or defense
c. Demonstrative( epideictic ) there is either praise or blame

4. each of these has its own time the deliberative speaker the future,
for the judicial the past, and for the demonstrative (epideictic) the present is the
most important for all speakers praise or blame in regard to existing qualities, but
they also make use of the past and future both reminding the audience of the past
and projecting the course to the future

The end for each of these is different

For the deliberative speaker the end is the advantageous and the harmful( for
someone urging something advises it as the better course and one dissuading
dissuades on the ground that it is worse) and he includes other factors as incidental:
whether it is just or unjust or honorable or disgraceful

For those speaking in law courts the end is the just and the unjust, and they make
other considerations other than these incidental

For those praising and blaming the end is the honorable or the shameful, and these
speakers bring up other considerations in reference to these qualities.

6. Here is a sign that the end of each species of Rhetoric is what has been said:
sometimes one would not dispute other factors; for example, a judicial speaker
might not deny that he has done something or done harm, but he would never agree
that he has intentionally done wrong

Deliberative speakers often grant other factors, but they would never admit that
they are advising things that are not advantageous or that they are dissuading from
what is beneficial; and often they do not insist that it is not unjust to enslave
neighbors or those who have done no wrong

Those who praise or blame do not consider whether someone has done actions that
are advantageous or harmful, but often include it even as a source of praise that he
did what was honorable without regard to the cost of himself, e.g. they praise
Achilles because he want to the aid of his companion Patroclus knowing that he
himself would die, though he could have lived. To him such a death was more
honorable; but life was advantageous.

Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been
done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not
occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the
political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their
command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a
thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur. Further, all men, in giving praise
or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or
defending themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to
show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is
great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must
also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the
greater or the lesser-propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be
able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or
injustice; and so on. ( another translation )

The subject of propostions common to all species of Rhtoric are thus the
possible and the impossible, has occurred or has not occurred, will occur or will not
occur, greatness or smallness, greater or lesser both universal and particular

Chapter 4

The important subjects on which the people deliberate about are 5 in number:
a. finances
b. war and peace
c. national defense
d. imports and exports
e. framing of laws


Wednesday
Exercise