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Aristotle'S Theory of Practical Wisdom: Ricardo Parellada
Aristotle'S Theory of Practical Wisdom: Ricardo Parellada
deliberation is properly phronetical or wise for Aristotle-not the work of mere
astuteness-if it presupposes an address of the appetitive dispositions toward the
ends of vaIue, that is, if there is a previous inclination or intention of moral virtue
toward its proper end. Next, practical wisdom has to pass a judgment about the
course of action that must be followed and, since in Aristotle's moral psychology
the principie of movement always comes from the appetitive dispositions, moral
virtue must choose-that is, undertake-the proposed action.
Now, says Aristotle, "it is even more diflicult [than deciding] to abide by our
judgment, since the results we expect [when we endure] are usually painful, and
the actions we are compelled [to endure, when we choose] are usually shame-
fuI. "44 For this reason, within the context of traditional ethical thought, it has fre-
quently been held that the task of practical wisdom does not end with judgment,
but rather it culminates in a lingering rational command that encourages the will
to follow through with the hosen behavior. Thus, Aquinas assigns a great impor-
tance in his psychology to this cornmand on the part of practical wisdom, which is
known as ;mper;um. With his habitual analytic perspicacity, he discusses, for
instance, whether this action of cornmanding is characteristic of the reason or tbe
will, and he concludes that it is an act ofreason that presupposes the motion of tbe
Will.
45
Nevertheless, later philosophical tradition discussed vividly whetber or not
an accurate description ofour practical reason should ascribe to practical wisdom
this third psychological act, following cleliberation and judgment
Be this as it may, the Thomist conception of imperium or which is
more elaborated on this point, is perfectly compatible with Aristotle's treatment.
Indeed, in chapter 10 of book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics we can find the
thought that motivated the distinction between the judgment and command of
'That is why comprehension goodjudgment, sagacity] is
about the same things as pllldence, but not the same as pllldence. For prudence is
.prescriptive (m1.'taK't1.K1, cornmanding), since its end is what action we must or
must not do, whereas comprehension only judges (lcpt'tucft J.1VOV)."<46
With this stlllcture of actioil, Aristotle tries to acknowledge the different
tasks carried out by intelligence and character, discovered in the course of his
detailed anthropological reflections, and to explain sorne psychological phenom-
ena-such as the weakness of the will-which are difficult to understand with the
conceptual tools of earlier moral psychology. Thus, moral action in the face of a
complex real situation entails the following psychological acts: (1) the intention
of moral virtue toward its proper end, such as justice; (2) the phronetical delibera-
tion abaut the real factors and circumstances that are relevant in that situation; (3)
the phronetical judgment about what appears, in that particular moment and situ-
Aristotle sTheory 01Practical Wisdom
Ricardo PareHada
13
..
ation, as the mostjust course of action; (4) the choice of moral virtue, which
undertakes the necessary movements to carry it out; and (5) the command of
practica! wisdom, which reaffinns and ensures the detennination of the will to
follow the indications of judgment and choice:
47
l. The intention of moral virtue.
2. The deliberation of practical wisdom.
3. Thejudgment of practical wisdom.
4. The choice of moral virtue.
5. The cornmand of practical wisdom.
Starting from this strueture, there is a natural interpretation of the apparent circle
found in the passage quoted in the first paragraph of this article. Firstly, the obser-
vation that practical reasoning is true if it agrees with correct desire can be taken
as meaning that the judgment of must agree with theprevious correct
intention of moral vrtue. Secondly, the indication that desire has to pursue what
reason says can be interpreted as that moral virtue must follow, in the
next momento the judgment of According to this understanding of the
structure of moral action, choice is correct if practical reasoning is true and desire
is good. In otber words, it is correct if is in agreement witb the previ-
ous desire of a good end and if action follows the judgment of CarIo
Natali, for example, offers a reasonable explanation of what Aristotle understands
by the correctness of desire:
In order to define practical truth, thevirtue of A.oy1.0't1.1CV, i. e. of the
deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle is obliged to establish what is
meant by "truth" or, better, "correctness" in speaking of desire. This
may seem a strange question to us now, but Aristotle, aIso in the case of
desire, regards a fonn of correspondence with its object as being trutb.
Just as in scientific knowledge truth is affinning or denying in confonni-
ty with the state of tbings, so too in desire truth is a movement tending
toward the true good and away from the apparent good.
4I
Once we clearly understand what Aristotle means by the correctness (sometimes
even called truth) o desire, it is not difficult to understand also what he means by
practical truth: that is, the concurrence of practical deliberation and judgment
with the desire directed toward the ends of value. This is in full agreement with
the Thomist interpretation of practical truth: verum per conformitatem ad apeti-
tum rectum.4
9
This structure o moral action renders clear alsb Aristotle's conception of tbe
practical syllogism, sometimes called the syIlogism o The first
premise of this syllogism o action is the intellectually comprehended direction of
appetite toward the good or tbe just, or its expression in a general nonn of behav-
ior, for instance: un is not fair to get paid for tbe work done by another person." .
Tbe second premise is the defining one, and it is detennined by tbe judgment of
after due consideration of the situation and its circumstances:
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"Although it seems that I have done this work myself, and sorne extra money
would not hurt me, it is crystal c1ear to me that someone did it for me and that it
would not be fair that I get paid instead of that person." The conc1usion of tbe syl- .
logism of action is not a proposition, but the action that corresponds lo the previ-
ous reasoning and the rightness of character: "1 choose tbat the work be charged
by the person who did it." Now, as Arislotle says, we sometimes find it difficult lo
be consequent with our own judgments--the fiesh is weak-and for tbis reason
practical wisdom must get involved again. IfI find it difficu1t lo aet in accordance
with what I have decided or even started lo undertake, practical wisdom plOtests
and orders the will to end what it has already begun: "Just let the money go to the
legitimate hands."
This Aristotelian notion of <pp<)V'JlOlC; or practica1 wisdom disappeared from
the currents of modern philosophy which do not generally take account of the
Aristotelian and scholastic traditions. As we have seen, Aristotle conceives of
practical wisdom as interdependent with the moral virtues and as acquainted
tbrough them witb ends of value. By contrast, in Kant's etbics, for instance, the
virtue of prudence is reduced to instlUmental ability, entlUsted exclusively with
finding the most appropriate means to a given ende There is also little room for the
psychological subtleties of practical wisdom in contemporary philosophical or
economic tbeories of rational choice and action that understand them as unana-
lyzed outeomes of tbe interaction of the beliefs and desires of agents. The c1assi-
cal virtue of practical wisdom is intended mainly at understanding individual
action, but it can be significant also when we want lo highlight the importance, in
collective action, of appropriate deliberation and judgment, while at the same
time retaining certain general ends of value.
51
FlOm individual and collective
points o view, this conception o practical wisdom and moral action points out
tbat there can be no lucid deliberation or balanced judgment in the absence of
refiection upon the ends that are tnJIy worthwhile.
52
IIn the last decades, there have been impar- ICV. ed. 2001), l.ove's Knowkdge (Oxford:
tant developments in moral philosophy devoted Oxford University Presa, 1990). See also John
lo tbe difficulties of moral perception and moral McDowell, Mind, Wzlue. and Re4lity (Cambridge,
judgemenL Sorne contributions have anti-theo- MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Lawrence
retical implications; for example, Bemard Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (New
Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
University Press, 1981), Ethics and the Limits of Another line o thought argues foc tbe context-
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard dependence of mmd reasons and questions ethi-
University Press, 1985). Other POSitiODS have cal principies from a viewpoint of "moral
forcefully taekIed tbe problem of moral percep- particularism," mainly inspired by me writings o
lion and the priority of the singular in Jonathan Dancy; foc example, Moral Reasons
Aristotelian or literary manners; for example, (Oxford: Blackwen, 1993), Ethks Mthout
Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility Di Goodness Principks (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Presa, 1986, 20(4). A good survey of me positions prompted
Aristotle's Theory ofPractical Wzsdom
. Ricardo PareUada
15
by particularism is the collection OOitOO by Brad
Hooker and Margaret Little, Moral Particularisnr
(Oxford: Oxford Universjty Press, 2000). Since the
main objective of the present essay is to provide a
self-contained picture ofAristotle's conception of
pr.tetical wisdom, with its anthropological aOO eth-
ical implications, Ido nOl refer here to these con-
temporary complex positions.
2Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 2, J139 a 36 - b 6.
Trans. T. Irwin, 2
nd
oo. (lndianapolisICambridge:
Hacken Publishing Company, 1999). Greek text
ed. Bywater in Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, reprinted 1962).
31n c1assical Greek, onou&xi'oc;; means
'respectable,' 'worthy,' and is contrasted to
yeAoi'oc;;, 'ridiculous,' 'unworthy of respect:
Plato uses the term frequently as a contrast to
cpauA.oc;;. 'of little worth' (Plat. Phaedr. 261 b 2,
Resp. 424 e 7, Leg. 816 d 9). I owe mese indica-
tions to 1. Rodriguez Alfageme (Complutense
University ofMadrid).
WE, n. 6,1106 b 35.
'NE, VI, 2, 1139 a 23-31.
fiNE, VI, 1, 1138 b 21 and 11, 6, 1107 a 1-3.
English translations usually render phronesis by
practica! wisdom, in arder to distinguish it from
the usual meaning of prudence as instrumental
ability. In his recent translation, T. Irwin has
revivOO the old term prudence, which is c10ser to
Latin's prudenlia and to the terms used in Roman
languages. In my text I use both practical wis-
dom aOO prodence fOl' Aristotle's phronesis..
WE, VI, S, 1140 a 26-28.
WE,VI, S, !140bS-7.
'NE, VI, S, l140b 8.
IUNE, VI,5, 114Oa2931.
"NE, 11, 9, 1109 b 24 and VI, 8, 1142 a 29.
UNE, VI, 12, 1144 a 23.
IlNE, VI, 12, 1144 a 8-10 and 3S-37. CarIo
Natali expresses this dependence in conceptual
terms: "(possession of phronesis) analytically
contajns (possessjon of ethical virtue)," in The
Wisdom 01Aristotle, G. Parks, transo (Albany,
New York: SUNYPress, 200 1), 5l.
'WE, VI, 13, l144b31- 114Sa2.
"Martha Nussbaum has wjdely argued for a
reappraisal of AristOlle's virtues and main good
ends. Sec, fOl' example, "Non-Relative Virtues:
An Aristotelian Approach," in M. Nussbaum and
A. Sen, OOs., The QuaJit)' 01Lije (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993),242-269. On the other
hand, Aristotle js an important source of inspira-
tion for her capabiJities approach, restated and
reassessed in WOlnen and Human Development:
The CapabiJiti!s Approach (CambridgeINew
York: Cambridge Uoiversity Press. 2(00) (lill of
capabilities on pages 78-80). It is wOl1h menlion
iog also the contributions to a Symposium dedi
catOO to. Nussbaum's political philosophy.
published in Ethics 111 (2000). with her response
on pages 102-140. As I have already said. in the
context of this article I cannOl deal with these
important contemporary developments.
I6NE,III. 12. 1119 b 17-20. After reviewing
carefully different ways of understanding this
point, Cario Natali affinns tbat fOl' Aristotle the
means are the object of reason (pp. 45-49), that
hands them down to desire. whereas the ends are
the object of desire, but must be acknowledged
by reason (pp. 49-S4).
'1NE, n. 3,1104 b31.
11Cf. S. Broadie. "Aristotle's Elusive Summum
Bonum." Social PhiJosophy and PoJicy, 16
(1999): 233-251, al p. 236, n. 14: "Aristotle com-
monly uses 'spout1aios' (literally: serious) to
mean 'moraIly good'."
I'NE, m. 4, 1113 a 28.
'J.ONE, VI, 9, 1142 b 23 and 33-35.
21p' Aubenque. Lo. prudence chez Aristote
(paris: PUF, 1963),46-49.
22/bid., 58. Cf. NE, VI, 8. 1141 b 15.
2JAubenque, SO.
24Cf. the trenchant arguments against these
views in Nussbaum, "Non-Relative Virtues: An
Aristotelian Approach."
25Cf. lile discussion of the role of the intuition
of principies and particular cases within theoreti-
cal and practical knowledgc: NE, VI, 11.
26Aristote, L'thique d Niconulque, R. A.
Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, eds. (2.... ed.
LouvainIParis: Publications Universitairesl
Nauwelaerts, 1970),11,2.469. Although 1 dis-
agree on this point, 1regard this commentary of
Aristotle's ethics to be one of the most precise
and usefuI.
27
00 lile same line. see S. Broadie, Elhics with
Aristotle (New Yor:kIOxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991),257, aOO O. Guariglia, La Itica en
Aristteles o la moral de la virtud (Buenos Aires:
Eudeba. 1997). "La voluntad de lo bueno," 210 fr.
apoJitics, 1268 a 39 ff. Cf. Nussbaum. "Non-
Relative Virtues: An AristOleJian Approach,"
242.
:l9Aubenque, 38.
lON. Hartmann. "Die Wertdimensionen der
Nikomachischen Ethik" (1948), in Kleinere
Schriften, Bd. I (Berlin: De Groyter, 19.55). 200.
31M. Heidegger, Plato: Sophistes (1925), 9A
19 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992), SS. Cf.
Natali 2001. 184, 187.
16
32Aubenque, 103.
331 lcarot this, as many other things, from Juan
Miguel Palacios' rich lectures on Ethics at the
Complutense University of Madrid. See also C.
Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the
Noble," jn S. Engstrom and J. Whiting, eds.,
Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 203-236;
andK. Rogers, "Aristode on Loving Anotber for
His Own Sate." Phronesis 39 (1994), 291-302.
"J4NE, VI, 12, 1144 a 15-21.
;"Eudemian Ethics, EE, n, 1228 a 2-4: lCal
Stlt 'tOMO tx 'tfic; npoalfl1e.coc; Kpvq.aev
noieS<; 'tte;, 'totYto S' :J'tl 'ta 'tlvoc; lWlCa
JtPC't'tEl dU' oi> 't 1tPC't'tE1.. flOmc; lit! lCal
1' lCalCUx 'tWv tvaVt1CDV lWlCa nolEi 'tfcv
npoaipEalV. Trans. H. Rackham. LoebClassical
Library (LondonlCambridge, Mass.: Heinemannl
Harvard University Press, reprinted 1992).
36C. Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake
of the Noble" and "Self-Constitution l. The
MetaphysicaJ Foundations of Normativity,"
Lecture I of the Locke Lectures 2002 at Oxford
University (2002, unpublished).
37'fhisethical criterion did not remain unno-
ticed by Anselm of Canterbury: "Disc. Nec
minus apertum mihi videtur quia sicut volendum
est unicuique quod debet; ita volendum est ideo,
quia debet, ut justa sit ejus voluntas. Mag. Bene
intelligis haec duo necessaria esse voluntati ad
justitiam: velle sciJicet quod debet; ac ideo, quia
debet [...) Mag. Bene ergo diximus justitiam esse
rectitudinem voluntatis servatam propter se, id
est quae servatur propter se." "S. And it seems no
less clear to me thal in arder for a man's will to be
just, be must will for the reason be ought, even as
he must will what he ought. T. You understand
well that these two thinls are necessary for a will
to be just: willing what it ought [to will) and will-
ing for tbe reason it ought [to will] [oo.) T.
Therefore, justice is uprightness-of-will kept far
its own sake." In De veritate, cap. XII. J.
Hopkins and H. Richardson, transo (Minneapolis:
Arthur Banning Press, 2000). 1owe this refer-
ence to Juan Miguel Palacios.
311Cf. Korsgaard's argumento 1996, 218: "It is
even possible to argue that nobility is a fontUJl
property... Now when Aristotle specifies the
orthos logos, be always gives us a Iist of what we
might aJso think of as the parts of the aetion. The
aetion that is in accordance with the orthos logos
is done in the right way aOO at the right time,
directed to tite rigllt object, and so oo. So we might
think thal its overall rightness consists in tbe way
its parts are combined, that is, in its formo The
parts are combined in a way that enables tbem lo
func:tion, taken tgether, as a reason for aetion."
39Although he does nOl identify its role as a
fundamental moral criterion, Cario Natali does
point out clearly the function of the end as tbe
motive of action: "The end that one intends by
means of an action is actuallythe cause of [ratber
the motive for) that aetion,and is the principie 01'
staning point of deliberative reasoning," in
Natali 2001, 177.
MINE, In. 1, tilO b 12-13.
4WE, m, 8. 1116 a 31-b 4.
41NE, X, 9, 1180 a 4-8.
43NE, VI. 7, 1141 b 8-9.
44NE, m, 1, 11 10 a 32-34.
45Sant Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologitu,
II-n, qq. 47-56, esp. 47. Cf. L.-E. Palacios, La
prudencia pol{tica, 2" ed. (Madrid: Gredos,
1978),9S .
46NE, VI, lO, 1143 a 7-11. TIte term ml'talC-
should nOl be translated as 'normative;
because this tenn conceals the commanding
ofcppvrptc;.lrwin's translation ren-
ders it well with "prescriptive," and so does
Rowe's in Nicomachean Ethics, C. Rowe, trans.,
S. Broadie, introd. and cornmentary (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2(02). Rackham makes
the point even more explicit: "issues com-
maods." This important meaning of the tenn is
manifest in the dictionaries of Liddcll-Scott
JoReS (cornmanding, authoritative) and Bailly
(qui conceme le commandement; epitaktilcos:
imHrotivemmt).
41Aquinas, ibid. Palacios 1978, ibid.
4INatali 2001, 12 f.
49Aquinas, Sunutu:l Theologiae, 1-11, q. 57, 5,
ad 3; Palacios 1978, 71. In my opinion, it is nOl
comet to ascribe 10Aristotle a notion of the prac-
tical truth of actions due to their contribution to
achieving happiness., as it is often done.
"'Paul Ricoeur explains this task of the second
premise in the following way: "trouver I'uni-
versel appropri6l une situation singuli= el con-
la en ccla consiste I
t
ap6'ation de
la pense qu' Aristote a tour l tour calcula-
trice, opinante, lgislative", in "A la de la
phronesis," 21 f., in J.-Y. ChAteau, ed., La vritl
pratique: Aristote, thique el Nicomoque. Livre
VI (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 12-22.
Aristotle Theory 01Practical Wisdom
Ricardo Parellada
17
"As 1 have already nOled, much work of
Martha Nussbaum goes decidedly in this direc-
ton. Arecenl application of meidea of phronesis
10capability lheory and human developmenl that
combines respecl fOl general norms and complex
particulars can be seen in S. Deneulin,
"Promoring Human Freedoms under ConditioDS
ofInequalities: a Procedural Frarnework." JouT7llJ1
ufHuman Development 6,1 (2005), 75-92.
52
1 aro graleful lo Salvador MI.. I,nlcio
Rodrguez Alfageme, Ignacio Snchez-CuencA
and William Charron, editor of lhis joumal. fOl'
comments and correctons. This essay WIlI wril-
ten dUring a visiting period al Harvard
University. 1aro very grateful lo its Philosophy
Department, tbe Real Colegio Complulense al
Harvard and tbe Madrid Regional Governmenl
fOl support.
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