Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.

188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare
unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for
the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province
of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative
districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162
(later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986,
Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to
be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by
Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of
Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for
failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for
a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative
district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan is unconstitutional as
petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000
actual or projected.
Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591
isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the
1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population.
In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a
Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has
no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the
following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135
as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if
such are declared official by the Natl Statistics Coordination
Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have
been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or
his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional
Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year,
which in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda
was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth
rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as
of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court
ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the
population and voting power among districts.

Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., et al. vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010.
Condonation doctrine; applicability to appointive officials.
Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of
condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials who were
administratively charged along with the reelected
official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly
committed during their preceding term.
The Court rejects petitioners thesis.
More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija issued the landmark ruling that prohibits
the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act
committed during his immediately preceding term of office. The
Court explained that [t]he underlying theory is that each term is
separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the
people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be assumed that they
did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the people.
(underscoring supplied)
Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. replicated the doctrine. The Court
dismissed the petition in that case for being moot, the therein
petitioner having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable to
administrative sanctions.
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation doctrine
does not apply to a criminalcase. Luciano v. The Provincial
Governor, et al., Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz, and Aguinaldo v.
Santosechoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public
official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him
prior thereto.
Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of
recent jurisprudence including two cases involving a Senator and
a Member of the House of Representatives.
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon.
Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was
applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before
the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged
misconduct occurred four days before the elections,
respectively. Salalimadid not distinguish as to the date of filing
of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged
misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise
timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as
long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public officials
culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.
Petitioners theory is not novel.
A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v.
Sojor where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of
the doctrine of condonation.
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the
condonation doctrine to appointiveofficials does not violate the
right to equal protection of the law.
In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections, the
Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection challenge
against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it discussed the
material and substantive distinctions between elective and
appointive officials that could well apply to the doctrine of
condonation.
The electorates condonation of the previous administrative
infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of
the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of
the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed
through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of
the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to
speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who
happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an
administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive
positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The
people cannot be charged with the presumption of full
knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable
appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual
reelection.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine
would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents
posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government
employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability
that would spawn and breed abuse in the bureaucracy.

Dizon vs Comelec
Post under Local Government , Political Law Case Digests , Term
of Office , Three-term limit
FACTS: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of
Mabalacat,Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to
disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat
on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served
three previous consecutive terms in violationof Section 43 of the
Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was
municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales
should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and
same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible
and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not
elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred
that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of
Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not elected for
the said position in the 1998elections. His term should be
reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only
for his second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied
the petition. It took judicial notice of SCs ruling in the Rivera
case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that
Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and
2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest
case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC
ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-term limit
under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not
a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for
the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the
same position in 2007 elections.
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc. COMELEC En Banc: affirmed. The three-term limit is not
applicable here for: 1) Morales was not the duly-elected mayor
of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term
primordially because he was not even considered a candidate
thereat; and 2) Morales has failed to serve the entire duration of
the term of office because he has already relinquished the
disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a month
prior to the end of his supposed term.
ISSUES:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term
(although he was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16,
2007) should be considered his fourth term
2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term
HELD:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court
unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his
Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This
cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the
May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered
stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of
the Local Government Code state that the term of office of
elective local officials, exceptbarangay officials, shall be three
years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the
application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor
of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June
1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004,
and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from
his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-
term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that
Moralesproclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there
was no interruption of the continuity of Morales service with
respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial courts ruling
was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the
1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary
severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007
term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption
of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was
promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The
next day, Morales notified the vice mayors office of our
decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from
17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice
mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may
seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service. Thus,
Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30
June 2007. (4
th
term)
2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in
office. NO. Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat
for the following periods:
1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998
1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and
1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the
duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales
hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term.
Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-
2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term. Morales occupancy of the position of
mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term
limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007
served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus,
the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively
Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term
as mayor through lengthy litigations. In other words, he was
violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer
length of litigation and profit from it even more by raising the
technicalities arising therefrom." To this, we quote our ruling in
Lonzanida v. COMELEC: The respondents harp on the delay in
resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then
opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and
resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to
which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay
cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is neither specific
allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political
maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office.
Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse
to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it
was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for
the execution of the regional trial courts decision declaring
the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to
assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC.
Such delay which is not here shown to have been intentionally
sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve
as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen
local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.

Montebon vs Comelec
Post under Local Government , Political Law Case Digests , Term
of Office , Three-term limit
DOCTRINE: Succession in local government office is by operation
of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from office.
QUICK FACTS: Montebon had been elected for three consecutive
terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during
his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position
of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor
retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy
againas municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was
filed against him based on the three-term limit rule.
FACTS: Petitioners Montebon and Ondy
and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal
councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14,
2007 Elections.
On April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal
councilor filed apetition for disqualification
against respondent with the COMELEC alleging
thatrespondent had been elected and served three consecutive
terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same
position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth
consecutive term.
In his answer, respondent argues that he cannot be disqualified
on the ground of the 3 term limit rule because his second term
was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor
due to the retirement of elected vice-mayor Petronilo Mendoza.
Petitioners maintain that respondent's assumption of office as
vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an
interruption in the service of his second term since it was a
voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They
argued that, according to the law (constitution and LGC),
voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be consideredan interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the official concerned was elected.
On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied
the petition for disqualification ruling that respondent's
assumption of office as vice-mayor should be considered an
interruption in the continuity of his service. His second term
having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus
not be disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.
On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First
Division. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the
ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004
interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor.
ISSUE: WON the private respondents assumption of the vice--
mayor office, by virtue of succession, can be considered as an
effective disruption in his full service of his second term as
councilor.
HELD: YES. In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court
held that the two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and 2) that he has FULLY served three
consecutive terms.
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized
that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not
enough that the official has been elected three consecutive
times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the
same position.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the
concept of voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length
of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is
evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term providedby law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service.
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal
councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether
he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his
assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12,
2004.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the
vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice
Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the
highest rankingmunicipal councilor, succeeded him in
accordance with law. Thus, respondent's assumption of office as
vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severancefrom
his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in
the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by
operation of law.
We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that The
legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether
to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local
Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest--
ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post
does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no
circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned
beconsidered as permanent inability within the contemplation of
law.
Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is
characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance
of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance
of which exposes said official to possible administrative and
criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in
theperformance of public functions. It is therefore more
compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.

Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011.
Moot and Academic Principle; Exceptions. (J. Abad)
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
canautomatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an
exceptional character ofthe situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue
raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.