Understanding Religious Militancy and Terrorism in Bangladesh

Research Report
(Submitted to the Social Science Research Council, Planning Division, Ministry of Planning,
Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh)















Submitted by:
DHAKA INSTITUTE OF CULTURAL AFFAIRS
(ICA BANGLADESH)
Mailing Address: GPO Box 972, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh
Dhaka Office: Mouchak Tower, Suit #1513 (14
th
Floor)
83/B New Circular Road, Malibag Moor, Dhaka - 1217, Bangladesh
Tel: (+88) 06668242930/01817182610/084165719
Fax: (+88) 02-8322799, E-mail admin@ica-bangladesh.org
Website: www.ica-bangladesh.org, www.ica-international.org



Author Note

Mohammad Azizur Rahman, Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology and Police
Science, Mawlana Bhashani Science and Technology University &
Chairperson, ICA Bangladesh
and
Mohammed Bin Kashem, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, National University, &
Director, Centre for Criminological Research, Bangladesh (CCRB)







This research was supported by Social Science Research Council, Planning Commission,
Government of Bangladesh Institutional Research Grant awarded to the Dhaka Institute of
Cultural Affairs (ICA Bangladesh)


















December 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS


TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... v
LIST OF APPENDICES ................................................................................................................. v
LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................. vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................... viii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ x

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY .......................................................... 1
1.1. Study problem ........................................................................................................................ 13
1.2. Objectives of the study........................................................................................................... 16
1.3. Rationale of the study ............................................................................................................ 17
1.4. Methods and data ................................................................................................................... 17
1.4.1. Data collection techniques .................................................................................................. 17
1.4.2. Sampling ............................................................................................................................. 18
1.5. Scope and limitations ............................................................................................................. 20
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................... 22
2.1. The concept of terrorism and militancy ................................................................................. 22
2.1.1. Terrorism............................................................................................................................. 22
2.1.2. Militancy ............................................................................................................................. 22
2.1.3. Explanations of terrorism .................................................................................................... 28
2.2. History of Religious militancy and terrorism ........................................................................ 31
2.3. Organized crime and terrorism .............................................................................................. 33
2.4. Islamist Terrorist groups, networks, tactics, and activities .................................................... 35
2.5. Global action against terrorism, and War on terror ............................................................... 39
2.6. The Current Study .................................................................................................................. 45
CHAPTER III: MILITANT OUTFITS AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ................................. 48
3.1. Number of Terrorist Groups .................................................................................................. 48
3.2. Nature of Terrorist Activities ................................................................................................. 51
3.3. Ideologies and Strengths of Islamist Militant Groups ........................................................... 57
3.4 Militant Networks, Tactics, and Strategies ............................................................................. 65
3.5. Terrorist Financing ................................................................................................................. 70
3.6. Factors and Causes of Islamist Militancy and Terrorism ...................................................... 72
CHAPTER IV: ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES ..................................................................... 75
4.1. Laws, statues and conventions related to terrorism ............................................................... 75
4.2. Law enforcement measures against religious militancy and terrorism .................................. 77
4.3. Other Measures against militancy and terrorism ................................................................... 83
CHAPTER V: CASE STUDIES ON SELECTED ISLAMIST MILITANTS ............................. 87
5.1. Shaikh Abdur Rahman ........................................................................................................... 87
5.2. Mufti Abdul Hannan .............................................................................................................. 89
5.3. Siddiqul Islam ........................................................................................................................ 90
5.4. Asadullah Al Galib ................................................................................................................ 92
5.5. Zahidul Islam Sumon alias Boma Mizan ............................................................................... 93



CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS OF KEY INFOMANT INTERVIEWS ........................................... 96
6.1. Public Perception ................................................................................................................... 96
6.2. Rise of Islamist Militancy ...................................................................................................... 97
6.3. Organization of Terrorist Groups ........................................................................................... 98
6.4. Terror Financing .................................................................................................................. 100
6.5. Preventing Religious Militancy ........................................................................................... 100
6.6. Impact of Terrorism ............................................................................................................. 103
CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .............................................................. 104
7.1. Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 104
7.2. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 111
7.2.1. Enforcement ...................................................................................................................... 112
7.2.2. Intervention ....................................................................................................................... 114
7.2.3. Prevention ......................................................................................................................... 115
7.2.4. Other Recommendations ................................................................................................... 116
References ................................................................................................................................... 119
Appendices .................................................................................................................................. 125



LIST OF TABLES
Table: 3.1 Religious Militant Organizations in Bangladesh 37
Table: 3.2 Year wise Number of Terrorist Incidents and Persons Killed/Injured 39
Table: 3.2 Major Terrorist Activities in Bangladesh (1999-2010) 40
Table: 3.4 Strengths of the Major Terrorist Groups in Bangladesh 47
Table: 4.1 Year wise Number of Arrests by Militant Groups/Outfits (2003 2010) 66
Table: 4.2 No. of Convicts by Type of Sentences (2006-2010) 68
Table: 4.3 Year wise No. of Convicts and Type of Sentences (2006 2010) 70

LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Research Instruments 112
Appendix 2. Analysis Coding Framework 116
Appendix 3 Year wise Number of Arrests (2003 2010) 118

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACHR Asian Centre for Human Rights
AHAB Ahle Hadith Andolan (People of Hadith Movement)
AL Awami League (Mass Peoples League)
AMLO Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance
APG Asia Pacific Group
ATO Anti-Terrorism Ordinance
ASK Ain o Salish Kendra
BB Bangladesh Bank
BCL Bangladesh Chatra (student) League
BDR Bangladesh Rifles
BGB Border Guard of Bangladesh
BIPS Bangladesh Institute for Peace and Security Studies
BIISS Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies
BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party
CHT Chittagong Hill Tracts
CHRI Commonwealth Human Rights Initiatives
CID Criminal Investigation Department
CPB Communist Party of Bangladesh
CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CTG Care Taker Government
DGFI Directorate General of Forces Intelligence
DB Detective Branch
DU Dhaka University
GoB Government of Bangladesh
EU European Union
HUJ I-B Harkat-ul-J ihad al-Islami (Movement for an Islamic Holy War)
Bangladesh
HT Hizbut Towhid (Party of Oneness of God)
HuT Hizbut Tahrir
IBP Islami Biplob Parishad
IBA Institute of Business Administration
ICA Institute of Cultural Affairs
ICM Institute of Conflict Management
ICS Islami Chhatra Shibir (Islamic Student Camp)
IED Improved Explosive Device
IGP Inspector General of Police
IIF Islamic International Front
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
INTERPOL International Police Organization
IOJ Islami Okiya J ote (United Islamic Front)
ISI Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan intelligence agency)
J CD J atiyabadia Chatra Dal
J MB J amaat-ul Mujahidin Bangladesh (Party of Mujahidin Bangladesh)

J MJ B J agrata Muslim J anata Bangladesh (Awakened Muslim Masses of
Bangladesh)
J IB J amaat-e-Islam (Party of Islam) Bangladesh
J S Tatiya Sangsad (National Parliament)
KII Key Informant Interviews
KMO Kamtapuri Liberation Organization
KNAB Khatme Nabuyat Andolon Bangladesh
LeT Lasker e - Tayeba
NDF National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NGOAB Non-Governmental Organizations Affairs Bureau
NLFT National Liberation Front of Tripura
NSI National Security Intelligence
MP Member of Parliament
PM Prime Minister
RAB Rapid Action Battalion
RAW Research and Analysis Wing (Indian intelligence agency)
RIHS Revival of Islamic Heritage Society
RPF Rohingya Patriotic Front
RSO Rohingya Solidarity Organization
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SATF South Asian Task Force
SATP South Asia Terrorism Portal
SB Special Branch
SF Security Force
SSHI Servants of Suffering Humanity International
SSRC Social Science Research Council
TIB Transparency International Bangladesh
TRI Terrorism Risk Index
UAB Ulema Anjuman al-Baiyinaat (Clerics' Circle of Clear Understanding)
ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
USDoS United States Department of State
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VDP Village Defence Police
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA) Bangladesh is thankful to the Social Science Research
Council (SSRC) of the Planning Division of the Government of Bangladesh for awarding the
Institutional Research Grant to carry out the timely and relevant study ``Understanding religious
militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh``.
ICA Bangladesh is very grateful to the authors of the report Mohammad Azizur
Rahman and Mohammed Bin Kashem for their brilliant work on complex and sensitive issues
like militancy and terrorism with limited access to the reliable data and appropriate subjects.
Deep appreciation should go to two research assistants (RAs) Muhammad Kamruzzaman and
Md. J ahangir Alam for their extraordinary pulling over the media reports, content analysis of the
secondary sources, and conducting expert interviews.
We must acknowledge with high appreciation the key informant and experts from
different organizations including DU, TIB, BIISS, and ASK for their time given for the interview
despite their busy schedule. We express our high gratitude to three Bangladeshi repatriate
academic scholars in the USA and Canada whose research works are related to this study.
Md. Zakiul Islam deserves our special thanks for his important management role from
signing the contract and maintaining accounts through organizing meetings, interviews and
submitting necessary documents of the project to team members and respective authorities. We
also mention SSRC officers and staff for their administrative support and cooperation. ICA
Bangladesh also would like to name ICA staffs and silent supporters Md. Nurunnabi Milton,
Mujib Ahmed Patwari, and Masudur Rahman. We must acknowledge Mr. Md. Mafizul Islam for
guardian role in the project agreement process.

We also would like to thank the Board and members of ICA Bangladesh for supporting
the team and staffs when needed to carry out the study project from time to time. Mr. Md.
Mohsin Ali is highly appreciated for his editorial assistance. Last but not the least, we
acknowledge the sacrifices of the spouses and children of the authors for giving time to
accomplish the project.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The main purpose of this study is to document and highlight the problem of Islamist
militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. It examined the nature of various Islamist militant groups
and the extent of their terrorist activities in Bangladesh. This study also investigated the
underlying causes of militancy, the funding sources of militant groups, and the strategies and
techniques used by terrorist groups. Recommendations are made on how best to address the
menace of militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. The study mainly used content analysis of
secondary sources and expert interviews. ICA Bangladesh conducted Understanding religious
militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh with a financial grant of the Social Science Research
Council, Planning Ministry of the Government of Bangladesh.
While religious militancy and terrorism have become a serious socio-political concern of
Bangladesh for a long time, it is still one of the most debatable and underresearched issues. The
study revealed that Islamist extremism and militant activities rose from 1999 to 2005. However,
homegrown and internationally linked Islamist terrorist outfits and groups have continued to
emerge in Bangladesh since 1992. International pressures from some western countries, donors
and neighboring countries and the international media heavily influenced the Bangladesh
government to fight Islamist militancy and terrorism especially aftermath the 9/11 US attacks
and the subsequent global war on terror campaign. By this time, Bangladesh has signed most of
the UN anti-terrorism conventions and enacted a number of laws to address the menace of
terrorism. Since 2006, Bangladesh has not faced any devastating terrorist attacks with bombing
or grenade attacks due to different measures by different governments such as the BNP
government`s banning of some outlawed Islamist militant groups and prosecution of militants;
the caretaker governments enactment and implementation of anti-terrorism and anti-terrorist

financing laws; and the present Awami Leage government`s serious counter-terrorism measures
ranging from banning outfits, arresting and prosecuting militants, updating laws, and initiating
other local terrorism prevention steps and regional policies.
While various reports and studies pointed out that political gaming with the Islamist
elements by two major political parties since the liberation war provided avenues for the rise of
Islamic political groups and Islamic extremism and militancy in the structure which subsequently
facilitated the uncontrolled growth of Islamist terrorist outfits and militant groups. The study
revealed that J MB, J MJ B, HUJ I-B and HT are the major terrorist groups which generated
thousands of members, and who have continued their activities under different names in different
times. Each of these groups has several thousand activists in the country. Though the exact
number of groups or outfits cannot be explored the number ranges from 12 to more than 50.
Data show that the top leaders and founders of these militant groups were educated in madrasha
(Islamic seminary institution), and later some of them joined teaching in madarsha at point of
their career. Some of them were also Afghan War veteran, and travelled to India, Pakistan,
Afghanistan and some other Gulf countries. Most of these Islamist militant groups have
symbiotic relationships among themselves and with foreign outfits based in Pakistan, India and
some other countries. These groups also have mutual support and cooperation from non-religious
insurgent groups within and outside the country such as ethnic militant groups in CHTs, Rohinga
refugee in Cox`s Bazar, and the Indian North East ethnic insurgent groups including ULFA.
The study found both positive and negative role of madrassa in facilitating the rise of
militancy. However, it is found that poor, unemployed and disadvantaged youth educated in both
general and madrassa lines and low educated and illiterate people from economically
disadvantaged districts are more likely to be brainwashed to join these militant groups.

Evidences suggest that politicians, teachers, community leaders, and peers are the mentors or
patrons of militancy in Bangladesh. Despite having various anti-militancy and counter-terrorism
measures by the governments, recent media and intelligence sources indicate that several militant
outfits and their members are being reorganized to publicly continue to do their activities.
The study identified a number of funding sources, mostly from local areas generated
through collecting zakat/sadka/fitra (donation on different religious occasions), donation in the
name of Islamic dawaat (invitation) for speech or lecture, educational or orphanage institutions,
and from local businesses. External funding came through Islamic charitable NGOs from Gulf
countries, USA, UK and other countries and through hundi (illegal money exchange) from
individuals living abroad. The militants are also found engaged in money laundering and
organized crime such as illegal underground business. The study also found that members of
these militant groups are trained in military tactics to use automatic weapons, guns and grenades,
IED (improved explosive device) and in making explosives such as powerful bombs, etc. They
also use high-tech information technology (IT) communication tools such as computer,
telephone, internet, compact disks (CDs) to propagate, disseminate or for terrorist attacks.
Bangladesh has been facing leftwing, ethnic and religious militancy since its
independence in 1971. However, the Islamist Militancy and terrorism has vandalized the lives of
the people and endangered law and order, and national, regional and international security, and
handicapped economic development. Therefore, we must eliminate the root causes of militancy
and terrorism in Bangladesh. In addressing these risk factors, a comprehensive and integrated
terrorism prevention strategy needs to be imparted, which is essential for a sustainable
democracy and socio-economic wellbeing in Bangladesh. Therefore, political parties and civil
society should work together to combat terrorism. The study concludes that the confrontational

political culture, the culture of immunity and lack of appropriate policies are the major obstacles
to control the Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. Otherwise, the problem of militancy will go
beyond control threatening the national sovereignty.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
1.1. Study problem
Terrorism is one of the extreme forms of crime, since it involves serious violence against
civilians. The terrorist activities by the religious militant groups became a security challenge
across the globe especially in the post 9/11 era. Since the mid-1990, terrorism has become a hot
topic for research because of national and transnational security concerns and the international
war on terrorism. Research on terrorism focused on the issues of religious militancy, organized
crime, and financial crime. In modern times, militants and terrorists are synonymously used. As
terrorism is a complicated multifaceted form of crime, this discipline or sub-discipline is based
on the paucity of well-researched data and scientific literature.
Militancy and terrorism are not new to either Bangladesh or other South Asian countries such
as Pakistan, India, Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Various religious, ethno-national and
political rebel outfits, militant groups or insurgent groups have been operating in these countries
and many of these groups are interlinked as well (Riaz, 2008; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Datta,
2007; BIPSS, 2010). Despite terrorism being a subject of considerable public debate for a long
time, counterterrorism strategies has become the major governmental priority in these countries
to combat terrorism for national, regional and international interests. Since 1999, Bangladesh
has witnessed the rise of militant groups and terrorist outfits both homegrown and internationally
linked including al-Qaeda. Evidences suggest that terrorist attacks have increased from 1999 to
2006. Despite the fact that Bangladesh has not faced any major attacks since 2007 due to
governmental bold steps against militancy and terrorism, research and experts suggest that to
eliminate the roots of the menace of terrorism and militancy from Bangladesh society, integrated
and comprehensive terrorism prevention strategies must be formulated based on various

socioeconomic, political and cultural factors. Some experts argued that despite some significant
steps by the government, since independence ethnic and leftwing insurgency and militancy
continued in Bangladesh.
Islamist radicalization, extremism and militancy have gained accelerated currency in
Bangladesh politics in recent years (BIPSS, 2010; Riaz, 2008; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Datta,
2007). The mass-media, academics, researchers, politicians and the government have not
seriously brought the menace of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh before 2000s,
but aftermath the country-wide showdown of force and strength by two Islamist militant
organizations the J amaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (J MB) and the J agrata Muslim J anata
Bangladesh (J MJ B) in 2005 (Riaz, 2008). International media, intelligence agencies, donors and
foreign governments have pointed to the rise of Islamist terrorist in the country since the US
attacks in 2001 (Quamruzzaman, 2011). Some researchers and experts do not think Bangladesh
is a safe haven for international terrorism, while other scholars ague that religious militancy is
homegrown due to various socioeconomic and historical factors and cannot be generalized the
menace in terms of international context and forms of terrorism.
Bangladesh is the 7
th
populous country and 3
rd
largest Muslim country located in South Asia.
It has a reputation for being a moderate Muslim country. In general people of this country are
peace loving and God believers. International concerns over Bangladesh as a hub of terrorists
have began since the US declared global war on terrorism after the 9/11 event. Various reports
by local and international media and intelligence sources claimed that Bangladesh has been
facing the rise of Islamist militancy, Talibanization by Islamist militants, becoming another
Afghanistan, becoming a regional terrorist hub linked with al-Qaeda or pro-bin Laden J ihadi
terrorism (Harrison, 2006; Vaughn, 2007; Rahman, 2004; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Institute for

Defence Studies and Analysis 2009; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2003. It is found
that the rise of religious militancy and terrorism are linked to various factors, such as domestic,
regional and international (Riaz, 2008); historical-political (Quamruzzaman, 2011); madrassa,
political patronage (Datta, 2007); and political, economic and cultural factors (Momen, &
Begum, 2005).
The growing number of Islamist militants, networks and their activities along with the
incidents of terrorist attacks since 1999 indicate that Bangladesh is very vulnerable to terrorism
in the name of Islam. The Bangladeshi governments have already shifted their position from
denying the presence of Islamist militant groups and their international links to the war against
terror to accepting the menace of militancy. The current Bangladesh Awami League (AL)
government in their earlier regime (1996-2000) failed to take action against Islamist militancy
and terrorism, but the present AL government (2009 onwards) has adopted the zero-tolerance
strategy. During the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led alliance government, religious
extremism and militant activities have risen as they initially denied its existence. But in the midst
of several terrorist incidents by a number of terrorist outfits and militants like Bangla Bhai across
the country finally they took measures to fight Islamist militancy. There has been allegation that
some of the then ruling party (four party alliance government) lawmakers and ministers used to
maintain relationship with the terrorist group leaders. At the same time, the party and the
government and state administration patronized some form of militant activities. In fact, the
international pressure from donors was a crucial factor in changing their position. A study by
Riaz (2008) pointed out that Islamist militancy is the result of both errors of omission (the state,
politicians and the civil society failed to do things that could have stemmed the rise of militancy)

and errors of commission (the state, politicians, and the civil society did things that worsened the
situation).
Terrorism is a complex term; it has a long history and different meanings, depending on the
context and the users. Terrorism literature has been growing tremendously. But this field is too
complex, multi-faceted and multi-dimensional in terms of forms, causes, patterns, consequences,
organization, and networks. Therefore, no single study can adequately explain religious
militancy in Bangladesh. Necessary data and appropriate subjects for studying such topic is
always an issue. As a result, there is hardly any rigorous scientific study on terrorism in
Bangladesh. Most of the studies on terrorism were descriptive in nature. Given these limitations,
the present study made efforts to explore the linkages between Islamist militancy and terrorism
in Bangladesh by looking at the growth of numbers and outfits, the links with regional and
international groups, the sources of funding, the patterns, trends and causes of Islamist militancy
and terrorism as well as the government responses to address the problem of terrorism.
In response to the current terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations
(UN) have introduced a global strategy by promoting democracy, dialogue and good governance
to tackle the root causes of radicalization.
1.2. Objectives of the study
The main objective of this study was to assess the extent and nature of religious militancy
and terrorism in Bangladesh. The specific objectives of the study were:
To identify the different Islamist militant and terrorist groups in Bangladesh
To understand the patterns of Islamist militant and their terrorist activities in Bangladesh
To investigate the strategies and techniques of committing militant and terrorist activities
in Bangladesh

To determine the underlying causes of Islamist militant and terrorist activities in
Bangladesh
To examine the anti-militant and counter terrorism measures in Bangladesh
1.3. Rationale of the study
The issue of Islamist militancy and terrorism is not just a law and order issue for
Bangladesh; it involves overriding concern over other issues including political stability, human
security, socio-economic development, and international relations. Available public perception
as articulated through various media, local and international reports and research evidences
supporting such claims is plentiful. This study identified various Islamist militant groups and
their terrorist activities in Bangladesh. It analyzed the trends, patterns, causes and consequences
of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. The study also looked at the funding sources,
strategies and techniques used by various terrorist groups. These findings can have policy
implications for undertaking future action plan in combating Islamic militancy and other terrorist
activities in Bangladesh.
1.4. Methods and data
1.4.1. Data collection techniques
Multiple methods were used to collect the data for this study. Secondary analysis was the
primary source of data. Despite the drawbacks of studying militancy and terrorism based on
secondary, official and biased journalistic sources, to ensure the maximum reliability and
validity, the same data were verified against different sources.
Content analysis: In the absence of primary data , a content analysis of secondary
sources such as newspapers reports, internet publications, books, magazines, journal articles, and
intelligence documents was the main method of data collection. This study also verified the content
of available and accessible books, booklets, leaflets, press briefings, press releases, reports, letters,

articles, magazines, and newsletters and internet publications or interviews or statements published in any
newspaper to to understand the actual agenda of the groups and the reasons of their militant activities.
Data on militant groups, their types, numbers, ideologies, activities, strategies, funding sources,
and locations were gathered from the newspapers. It is important to mention here that terrorism
and religious militancy as subject matter of study being very sensitive for investigation and very
hard to get access to all required information.
Key informant interview (KII): In-depth interview of key informants was conducted to
understand the underlying causes of terrorism and militancy, factors influencing involvement
with terrorist and militant groups, international linkages, trends and history of terrorism.
Case study: Case studies on five selected extremists/convicted terrorist/militants
belonging to five different militant outfits were conducted based on secondary analysis to find
information about their reasons for joining, involvement of activities. It is important to mention
that we have originally planned to conduct case studies on convicted terrorists who are serving
time in Dhaka Central J ail. We have not been able to conduct the interviews with the convicts
because the Home Ministry did not approve our request for obtaining permission to visit the
central jail and conduct the interviews. Under these circumstances we had to rely on
newspaper/magazine reports on the terrorists to present the case studies for this study.
1.4.2. Sampling
Sample selection for content analysis
Two leading national dailies the Daily Ittefaq and the Daily Star have been purposively
selected for data collection. Considering the volume of circulation and the neutrality of these
dailies we have selected them. We covered ten (10) years of newspaper from 2001 to 2010. In
addition to that, the Daily Prothom and the New Age were consulted to supplement the news
reports and the recent government strategies and actions.

Sample selection for KIIs
Purposive sampling technique was used to select respondents for key informant interviews.
In this case respondents depth of knowledge on the subject matters was the primary
consideration. The sample is consisting of key officials of the law enforcing agencies, research
organizations, NGOs, and civil society members representing the following agencies who were
considered to be able to provide deeper understanding of their views on terrorism in Bangladesh:
1. Advocate Sultana Kamal, Executive Director, Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK), Ex. Advisor
to the Caretaker Government of Bangladesh, Chairperson of the Trustee Board,
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB)
2. Mr. Md. Nurul Huda, Ex. Inspector General of Police (IGP), Bangladesh Police, Ex.
Secretary, Government of Bangladesh
3. Dr. Ifthekharuzzaman, Executive Director, Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB),
Ex. Director, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)
4. Professor Delwar Hossain, Chairman, Department of International Relations, University
of Dhaka
5. Professor Rafiqul Islam, Chairman, Dept. of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of
Dhaka
6. Professor Ali Riaz, Chair, Department of Politics & Government, Illinois State
University, Normal, USA & Author, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh (2008)
7. Dr. Shaheen Afroze, Research Director, Bangladesh Institute of International and
Strategic Studies (BIISS)
8. AM M Quamruzzaman, Author, Militia Movement in Bangladesh (2011) and PhD
Researcher, McGill University, Canada

An interview guideline was used to gather information from the respondents (Appendix 1).
We have not been able to conduct interviews with the IGP and DG, RAB because they were not
willing to give us interviews without prior permission from the Home Ministry in this regard.
Also, on some issues respondents were unwilling to answer any question.
Sample selection for case study
Five convicted militants were purposively selected given their involvement, leadership,
justice response and media coverage. The selected individuals are :
1. Sheikh Abdur Rahman
2. Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai
3. Dr. Asadulla Al Galib Mufti Hannan
4. Zahidul Islam Sumon alias Boma Mizan
1.5. Scope and limitations
The study confined its scope to Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. The
complexity of the phenomena of Islamist militancy and terrorism is a major limitation. The study
is based on the available and accessible secondary information derived from the content analysis
of two newspapers and views of experts gathered through Key Informant Interview (KII). Based
on secondary analysis supplemented with KIIs, it addressed the objectives. Limited scope, time
and resources as well as inaccessibility to appropriate subjects and experts affected the quality of
data and analysis of the study. Despite our repeated efforts, we could not interview some of the
respondents especially the chief executives of the law enforcing agencies such as police and
RAB. They were not willing to give the interview without permission from the Home Ministry.
The reliability and validity of data gathered from news media sources, which often count
on official sources, pose a significant question. Neither official data nor the news media are from

biasness. Many authors pointed out the drawbacks of terrorism and militancy studies
(Quamruzzaman, 2010). Government sources do not release actual information under the excuse
of security concerns and the government`s image issue. Despite non-implementation of the
recently enacted the Right to Information Ordinance (No. 50 of 2008), 2008 and act in 2009
along with the inaccessibility of such sensitive information, this study used various news media
as the main source of information. International and regional news media are used as well. In
Bangladesh, news media do not enjoy much freedom from government control and in most cases
media are not neutral in reporting as they represent specific view points and the same is also true
for international and regional media as well (Quamruzzaman, 2010).

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. The concept of terrorism and militancy
2.1.1. Terrorism
Terrorism is a sociological concept. It is a global phenomenon now. Following Durkheim
(1973), terrorism is a social fact. It is a socially constructed concept. Following Becker, terrorism
a crime as it is labeled. ``Terrorism is more extreme than most common crimes since it often
involves the commission of serious violence against civilians who have done nothing to directly
provoke their victimization`` (Agnew, 2010). It has been used in various ways such as tactic and
strategy, as crime and a holy duty, as a justified reaction to oppression and inexcusable
abomination or war on terror. It has been used by different actors ranging from militant groups,
pressure group, state, a group of individuals, ethnic group, religious group, and so on. The term
`terrorism` has no common or universally accepted definition. It is also one of the most debatable
terms in the literature. Its meaning is continuously changing and especially aftermath the 9/11
incidence, the term get more complicated and multifaceted. The definition of terrorism varies
from international bodies like the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and North
Atlantic Organization (NATO) to governments. One government varies from another in defining
terrorism. Even within the same state, different agencies responsible for different functions in the
ongoing fight against terrorism use different definitions.
The most commonly accepted academic definition starts with the U.N. definition
produced in 1992; "An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)
clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons,
whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets."
According to the framework decision of the European Union (EU), terrorism combines two

elements: an objective element, as it refers to a list of instances of serious criminal conduct
(murder, bodily injuries, hostage taking, extortion, fabrication of weapons, committing attacks,
threatening to commit any of the above, etc.); and a subjective element, as these acts are deemed
to be terrorist offences when committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population,
unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from
performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization (EU
Website, http://europa.eu/ legislation summaries/justice freedom_ security/fight against_
terrorism/l33168_en.htm).
Among government definitions, some are always broad (the USA) and some are narrow.
According to the US Department of Defense, terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful
violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological. This definition include three key elementsviolence, fear, and intimidation. The
U.S. Department of State defines "terrorism" to be "premeditated politically-motivated violence
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses this:
"Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political
or social objectives."
The British Government`s definition seem to be less specific and considerably less
verbose. According to their definition of 1974, terrorism is"the use of violence for political
ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the

public, in fear." Canada`s definition of terrorism has been regarded as broad as an act or
unlawful acts for purposes of influencing or intimidating governments and the civilian
population for 'motivated for political and ideological purposes'."
According to the US Immigration Act of 1990, terrorists can be anyone who used a
"firearm, explosive, or dangerous device" to "endanger the safety of one or more individuals or
to cause substantial damage to property. According to the EU framework decision, a terrorist
group is defined as a structured organization consisting of more than two persons, established
over a period of time and acting in concert, and refers to directing a terrorist group and
participating in its activities as offences relating to a terrorist group. This framework also
includes certain intentional acts as punishable offences linked to terrorist activities even if no
terrorist offence is committed: public provocation to commit a terrorist offence; recruitment and
training for terrorism; and aggravated theft, extortion and falsification of administrative
documents with the aim of committing a terrorist offence.
Since 1930s, international bodies such as the League of Nations and the United Nations,
has put terrorism in their agenda. Domestic agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) have defined terrorism in the late 1930s. Both domestic and international groups flourished
and had began to use techniques such as hijacking, bombing, diplomatic kidnapping and
assassination to assert their demands. Politicians, lawmakers, law enforcement and researchers
have viewed these groups and as real threats to Western democracies. Lawmakers, security
professionals and scholars started efforts to classify terrorism based on what kind of attack
agents an attacker uses (biological, for example) or by what they are trying to defend (as in
ecoterrorism). The US researchers have begun to distinguish different types of terrorism in the
1970s to understand how to counter and deter terrorism.

There has been no internationally agreed UN definition yet or there cannot be a universal
definition of such complex and debatable term overnight. However, given criminal law violation,
terrorism is a criminal act, one of the cruelest forms of crime that influence the audience beyond
the immediate victim.
2.1.2. Militancy
The term militancy has not clear definition like the term terrorism. The word militancy
can be understood as the acts of individuals, groups or parties displaying engaging in violence
usually for a cause whether religious, political, ideological, economic, or social. Nowadays, the
term militant is synonymously used with the term terrorist. This complexity is reflected in the
use of the term in both academic and non-academic literature such as security studies and
intelligence reports (Firdous, 2009; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Firdous, 2009). There some words
that often seem to be confusing to understand militancy.
The word militant comes from the 15th Century Latin militare meaning to serve as a
solider. Militia is the related modern concept described as a defensive organization grew out of
the Anglo-Saxon Fyrd (Firdous, 2009). According to the Oxford English Dictionary (London:
Oxford University Press 2009), militia is an organized group of people comparable to a military
force. Etymologically, the term 'militia' derives from Latin miles or milit- meaning 'soldier;'
adding the suffix -ia, the word militia literally means 'military service (An Elementary Latin
Dictionary edited by Charlton T. Lewis (London: Oxford University Press, 1997) . The
contemporary sense of the term militia as paramilitary force motivated by religious or political
ideology, especially one that engages in rebel or terrorist activities in opposition to a regular
army" is associated with the US usage in the early 1990s as applied to a number of rightwing
groups opposed to gun control and distrustful of the federal government (Quamruzzaman, 2010).

In modern times, various movements seek to apply militancy as a solution, or use
militancy to rationalize their solutions for issues. But these movements do not share common
tactics. Usually, a militant uses violence as part of a claimed struggle against oppression. To Hall
(1995), a militia movement as a social movement has three common elements goals, collective
actors and collective action. According to Freilich et al. (2001), a militia movement has five
dimensions ideology, motivation, mobilization, organization and ritual. These elements are
also common to Islamist militancy or terrorism. This word is sometimes used to describe anyone
with strongly held views (e.g., militant Christian, militant Atheist). A militant sometimes hold an
extremist position. A militant person or group expresses a physically aggressive posture while in
support of an ideology or a cause. A militant person is a confrontational person regardless of
physical violence or pacifistic methods (http:/ http:/encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/
Miltancy). Two common traits shared by many militants are: use of force or violence directly,
either in offence or in defense, and justification of the use of force using the ideological rhetoric
of their particular group (http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/47081/4/Critical_Analysis_of_
the_Rise _of_Islamic_Militancy.pdf).
Abuza (2003) did not define militancy, but used the words radical, extremist, militant and
terrorist interchangeably (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). There are several other terms such as
insurgency, extremism and militia, which often have similar meanings or usages. However, they
have different connotations in different contexts. Some view these movements as social
movements or resistance movements while others view as criminal acts like terrorism. Following
Becker, these are socially constructed, and depend on who is labeled and who labels. Usually the
powerful or authorities define militias as terrorists or insurants and terrorists as in this present
world, the US or hegemonic powers determine what movements are terrorism (Quamruzzaman,

2010). From the late nineteenth century, militant is sensed as ``aggressively active in pursuing a
political or social cause``. In earlier times, it has been referred to a person engaged in warfare.
Wright-Neville (2004) theorized that there is a continuum linking activists to militants
and militants to terrorists. Based on publicly available information on the attitudinal dispositions
of Southeast Asian Islamist groups (J I members), he argued that movement between these
behavioral categories is a function of relative degrees of existential anger and alienation. Many
reports also inform that the existential motives of Southeast Asian terrorists and their
counterparts in other corners of the world are similar in many respects (ICG 2002, 2003;
Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2003). He writes `` J I members differ from activists and
militants at many levels, but one of the most obvious is their transcendence of parochialism and
commitment to a supra-national Islamist agenda. This is especially evident in their tendency to
paint the US and the West more generally as the main source of what they see as the
marginalization and oppression of Muslims around the world. In other words, as Southeast Asian
Muslims they see the causes of their plight as indivisible from those that deprive Muslims in
South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere`` (Wright-Neville, 2004:39). In
Southeast Asia, the majority of Islamic political organizations are activist groups; they infuse
national politics with a more Islamic flavor, and prefer to work within existing political or
democratic frameworks. As activists, they have moderate degree of political alienation. Activists
become militants due to their accumulated frustration generated by a sustained period of political
impotence. Their degree of alienation becomes high. Terrorists are characterized by extreme
degree of political alienation. The activist groups of Southeast Asia are Nahdatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah (Indonesia), Sisters in Islam and Muslim and ABIM (Youth of Malaysia)
(Malaysia) and Philippine Association of Islamic Ulamas and Islamic Movement for Electoral

Reform and Good Government (Philippines). At militant level, Islamist groups are KISDI
(Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World), Hizbut Tahrir, Front Pembela Islam and
Laskar J ihad (Indonesia), Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS), Al Arqam and Al Ma`unah (Indonesia);
and MNLF, Bangsamoro People`s Consultative Assembly, MILF and Abu Sayaf group
(Philippines). J I appears as terrorist groups in all three countries.
2.1.3. Explanations of terrorism
There are various causes and forms of terrorism. Religious militancy is as old as
terrorism. From the definitions of terrorism, it is evident that the purposes of terrorism are
manifold; it could be for politically motivated, state sponsored, ideological and so on. Over the
last two decades, terrorists have committed extremely violent acts for alleged political or
religious reasons. It has been observed that the actors who use terror tactics belong to different
groups of our society, local, regional, international. The actors can be individuals, group or even
state.
There are various explanations of terrorism in academic literature. While much terrorism
research showed that strains or grievances are a major cause of terrorism (Rosenfeld, 2004;
National Research Council, 2002 as cited in Agnew, 2010). These strains may include material
deprivation, the problems associated with globalization/modernization; resentment over the
cultural, economic, and military domination of the West particularly the USA; territorial, ethnic,
and religious disputes resulting from postcolonial efforts at nation building; economic, political
and other discrimination based on race/ethnicity or religion; the problems (unemployment/
discrimination or the clash between western and Islamic values) encountered by certain
immigrant groups; the denial of basic human rights; harsh state repressions over certain groups;

displacement or the loss of one`s land/home; military occupation of certain types; and threats to
the status of working class, white, male heterosexuals (Agnew, 2010).
Agnew (2010) linked collective strains to terrorism. According to him, the core
characteristics of collective strains are high in magnitude, with civilian victims; unjust; and
caused by more powerful others, including complicit civilians, with whom members of the
strained collectivity have weak ties. The likelihood of terrorism increases due to a number of
reasons - negative emotional states and traits caused by strains, reduced ability to effectively
cope through legal channels, common crime, and military means; reduced social control; beliefs
favorable to terrorism; and a collective orientation and response to the strain. A number of
factors that condition the effect of strains on terrorism include a range of coping resources, skills,
and opportunities; various types of social support; level of social control; selected individual
traits; association with others who support terrorism; beliefs related to terrorism, and the
anticipated costs and benefits of terrorism. Terrorists explain their actions in terms of strains they
experience and these are reflected in the publicity materials (video, website etc), in the names of
their organizations (such as the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the
Organization for the Oppressed on Earth).
However, many scholars argue that various historical and politico-religious factors
contributed to the rise of militancy and terrorism in the region over the years (Millard, 2004;
Abuza, 2003; Gunaratna, 2003). The direct and indirect presences of al-Qaeda and homegrown
militant groups are associated with major terrorist violence in Southeast Asia (Hamilton-Hart,
2005; Wright-Neville, 2004). The 1990s witnessed the rapid expansion of Islamic political
organizations and activists like PAS to establish Islamic state and rule and there is a continuum
linking activists to militants and militants to terrorists (Wright-Neville, 2004). Various factors

can be considered motivators of terrorism, such as ideologies, slogan and rumors (Gur, 1970);
poverty, deprivation and westernization (Hafez, 2000), technological factors (Castells, 1997).
Islamist militants are individuals, groups, organizations and parties that see Islam a guiding
political doctrine that justifies and motivates collective action on behalf of that doctrine (Hafez,
2003).
While the causes of terrorism in Southeast Asia involve two separate types of
explanations religion-driven and politics driven, it was argued that both processes are working
to produce Islamic radicalization and Islamic fundamentalism leading to terrorism (Hamilton-
Hart, 2005). Religion-driven explanations call for ideological responses to terrorism (Hamilton-
Hart, 2005). Radical or extremist version of Islam mobilizes violence by using Islam as an
emotive force and by distorting proper religious teachings (Abuza, 2003; Millard, 2004;
Gunaratna, 2003) as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). These studies also argued that the absence of
counterpropaganda through disseminating good Islamic teachings, placing curbs on religious
schools, preachers, enlisting the support of moderate Islamic figures, and related failures of
Muslim governments in this region lead to the rise of terrorism. Political grievances, repression,
conflict as well as social injustice and economic marginalization are emphasized in politics
driven explanations of terrorism and counterterrorism strategies addressing these underlying
political causes are paid attention (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). The US extended war on terrorism and
has been supporting governments in the Southeast, South Asia, Middle East and Africa for
counterterrorism operations. Research also suggests that all Islamist groups are violent, anti-US
and anti-democratic vehement in Southeast Asia, and unless the US takes account of the
important differences that divide Islamist groups, there is a risk of more activists to become
militants and more militants to become terrorist (Wright-Neville, 2004).

Another dominating causal explanation of terrorism in Southeast Asia is pathological
approach (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Deviant religious teachings and religious brainwashing by
certain individuals drive to terrorism (Farish, 2002 as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Anti-US
anger, anger at local governments and religious justification of state terrorism killing innocent
civilians in the name of war on terrorism are associated with the problem of militancy and
terrorist violence (Hamilton-Hart, 2005).
2.2. History of Religious militancy and terrorism
The history of terrorism and militancy indicates that terrorism has been used since the
beginning of the recorded history and the meaning of terrorism depends on the context and on
the perspective of the perpetrators. Terrorist and religious groups can be traced back to ancient
times. Terrorist groups, like the Zealots of J udea (J ewish group against Roman occupation
forces), the assassins, and Nizari Ismails Shia faction in Northern Iran) existed in the fourteenth
century and modern terrorist groups are similar in many aspects like motivation, organization,
targeting, and goals, but key ingredients for terrorism were not before 1700s. These groups used
underground campaign, assassination, killing of enemies (the killers waited next to their victims
to be killed or captured). The term terrorism appeared in 1795 in the Reign of Terror initiated by
the Revolutionary government. Maximillian Robespierre, the radical leader in the post-
revolutionary period, famously said that virtue is powerless without terror. Royalists and other
opponents of the Revolution State against states oppressing their populations employed terrorist
tactics such as assassination and intimidation in resistance to the Revolutionary agents. The
Parisian mobs used such extra-legal activities as killing prominent officials and aristocrats in
gruesome spectacles starting long before the guillotine was first used.

The 19
th
century witnessed political terrorism and small group of revolutionaries started
to attack nation states employing weapons technology. Nationalist conflicts (Irish nationalism)
also brought decolonization. Such nationalism ideological force continued throughout the 2oth
century terrorism. After the World Wars, members of ethnic groups, such as both the Irish and
Macedonians in Europe chose terror as a method to conduct their struggle for independence and
bring their states back from the absorbers. They used terrorism to bring international attention
and sympathy.
During the 20
th
century, leaders of nationalist insurgencies and revolutions used terrorism
as a tactic for independence from colonial rule within the framework of larger movements, and
coordinated with political, social, and military action. The Palestinian campaign against Israel
combined with other activities. The Soviet Union provided direct and indirect assistance to
revolutionary movements and many anti-colonial movements with free weapons and training
during the Cold War era. Extremists learned to employ violence and terror as the means to
realize their ambitions. Afghanistan`s Taliban are also blessed by this. Outside the Middle East,
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force in Northern Ireland, Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, the Shinrikyo cult in J apan, and the Shining Path
guerrillas in Peru are its luminous example.
The age of modern terrorism can be attributed to the activity of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which hijacked an El Al airliner en route from Tel Aviv to Rome
in 1968. Palestinian groups got cooperation from European radicals in the early 1970 and with
the J apanese Red Army (J RA) in 1974. Since then the internationalization of terror has been
growing by cooperating terrorist groups through training, operations, and support.

The 21
st
century witnessed the new age of Islamic terrorism with 9/11. This is the largest
act of international terrorism held in a set of coordinated attacks on the USA where terrorists
hijacked civilian airliners and used them to attack the World Trade Center towers in New York
City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Since then various terrorist attacks have been going
on across the world. Among them, major terrorist attacks include New Delhi (Indian Parliament
attacked); Bali car bomb attack; London subway bombings; Madrid train bombings and two
recent attacks in Mumbai (hotels, train station and a J ewish outreach center, opera house).
The history of terrorism shows that political ideology divides between left extremists and
rights extremists; religious ideology divides between Islamist extremists, Christian extremists,
J ewish extremists, Hindu extremists and so on. In many countries, terrorism has been used by
political ideology based groups such as left extremists (Bangladesh), Maoists (Nepal and India).
Nationalists sharing a common ethnic background also use terrorism (Tamils in Sri Lanka,
separatists in Northeastern India). Special interest groups also use terrorism for legitimate causes
justifying their use of violence to achieve their goals. Members of these groups are people who
use terrorism to uphold anti-abortion views, animal rights, and radical environmentalism.
2.3. Organized crime and terrorism
Since 1920s, organized crime has emerged as another field of study despite the paucity of
data and literature. Organized crime has no uniform definition and its definition has always
been problematic (Levi, 2008). Organized crime is often invisible, insidious in its network, and
dangerous as it involves violence and resilience. Organized crime is sometimes shaped by
political, economic and legal factors. Power elites alliance with criminal elements is more
threatening than the criminal groups (von Lampe, 2008). Legal political structures (by the police,
judiciary and government) also facilitate criminal organizations, and illegal enterprises continue

and flourish. Organized crime is not just crime (specific type of criminal activity) but it involves
a systematic condition (the concentration of power whether in the form of an underworld
government and/or in the form of alliance between criminals and political and economic elites
(Von Lampe, 2008). Organized crime includes four levels of complexity the individual
characteristics of organized criminals, the structures (networks and groups linking to
individuals), the overarching power structures (hierarchical superior to individuals and
structures) and the nexus between these illegal structures and the legal structures of society (Von
Lampe, 2001).
The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime included three elements of
organized crime - organized criminal group, structured group and serious crime (Retrieved
J une 14, 2010 from UNTOC, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/ Publications/
TOC%20Convention/ TOCebook-e.pdf). Van der Heijden (1998) looked at organized crime
quantitatively and argues that a group of people, commission of serious criminal offences and
profit seeking interest are must for any crime or group to be called organized crime (c.f.
Gilmour, 2008).
Both terrorism and organized crime have conceptual, definitional and policing
challenges. The linkage between organized crime and terrorism has been growing. Ridley (2008)
argued the increased linkage based on his analysis of money laundering and financial crime
associated with terrorist financing in the post 9/11 era. In the UK, two-thirds of the organized
crime groups were involved with some form of terrorism in 2005 (Ridley, 2008). According to
Russian sources, Chechen terrorist groups received about 8 million US Dollars annually by 2003
from overseas donations and foreign groups engaged in various forms of criminal activity
(Ridley, 2008). They used various channels to receive these monies, such as via offshore

entities, and used Georgia as the transit country (from overseas to Russia), cash couriers (Russia
to Chechnya), transferred to a second bank account, opening bank accounts on false
documentation and stolen or forged travel or identification documents. Ridley`s (2008) case
study also showed that thefts items are counterfeited and sold in illicit markets under through
front and subsidiary companies. In this Russian case, resistance groups used Moscow based
accounts to receive from or transfer money to accounts in the UK, USA, Poland, France and EU
countries. In another case, a small group of individuals active in London was associated with
credit card forgery and false sale of false credit card, across the UK, Belgium, France, Spain, and
other EU countries. Perpetrators were linked to Algerian Islamic extremist group (the GIA)
which had affiliation to Al Qaeda since the mid-1990s.
Organized crime and terrorism together maintain status quo of partial breakdown of
government and law enforcement and disrupt democratization and economic development to
continue their activities (Ridley, 2008). In developing transition or failing states, domestic
terrorist groups make common cause with organized groups. Research evidence indicates that
Bangladeshi Islamist militants have political and administrative patronization during the BNP-
led alliance government. They are organized, engaged in money laundering for financing their
activities, and run underworld businesses to raise funds.
2.4. Islamist Terrorist groups, networks, tactics, and activities
Religion has appeared as a potential weapon to mobilize and unite people. It has been
used and misused for terrorism throughout the human history. Religious militancy results from
historical circumstances and again depends a lot on the perspectives of the perpetrators whether
the challenge or threats to a portion of the community is cultural, political or economic.
Religious extremism leads to militancy resulting in extremist movements and terrorist attacks

across the globe. This relationship can be evident in the international or transnational conflicts
such as Arab-Israel (Muslims and J ews), India-Pakistan (Hindus and Muslims), the 9/11 plots.
Within the national boundary such relationship are also prevailing in various countries such as
India (between Hindus and Muslims, Ireland (between two Christian sects), Bangladesh
(Islamist), Pakistan (Islamist), and so on. Religious extremists want to establish legal system
based on their religious beliefs and often reject secular governments. In Bangladesh, Islamists
militant outfits and terrorist groups are mostly organized to achieve their main goal.
Islam has meanwhile occupied a prominent place in the critical study of terrorism and
militancy. Several studies also portrayed the rise of Islamist groups and al-Qaeda networks in
Southeast Asia (Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Wright-Neville, 2004). According to the US State
Department (2003), a number of indigenous terrorist groups connected in some way with al-
Qaeda are not only existing in Southeast Asia but also in North and East Africa as well as in
Central and South Asia, and even Central and South Asia contain many more of these groups
than Southeast Asia (as cited in Wright-Neville, 2004)
In the case of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia), a series
of studies have shown that Islamic extremism has been associated with terrorism (Abuza 2003;
Millard 2004; Barton, 2005; Rabasa, 2003). In these countries, some political parties are alleged
to have links to terrorism and Islamic extremism (Millard, 2004; Stewart, 2003 as cited in
Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Al-Qaeda and indigenous groups like J I posed a potent threat to regional
security of this region (Wright-Neville, 2004). For example, in Malaysia, some members of PAS
(Prosperous J ustice Party) had alleged links to terrorist groups (Stewart, 2003 as cited in
Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Various studies revealed that the genesis of militant groups can be linked
to the US funding and CIA support, US cooperation with Pakistan intelligence service, and arms

transfer for the anti-Soviet militants in the 1980s and 1990s (Kepel, 2002; Gunaratna, 2003,
Abuza, 2003 as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Many scholars argued that the US connection to
and patronization of these groups got no proper attention (Gunaratna, 2003; Kepel, 2002 as cited
in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Religious fundamentalism and the groups like J I (J amaah Islamiyah) in
Indonesia have grown with Saudi Arabia`s funded mission of Wahhabism (Abuza, 2003;
Millard, 2004; Gunaratna, 2003) as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). There is also an argument for
the inclusion of groups like PKS in the mainstream politics to count on their voice to address
radical Islamism (Fox, 2004, Bubalo & Fealy, 2005 as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005).
The age of modern terrorism beginning in the 20
th
century can be attributed a lot to
Islamist militancy and terrorism. The operational and strategic epicenter of Islamic terrorism can
be attributed to Pakistan and Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, the new age of Islamic
terrorism was identified with 9/11 experiencing coordinated attacks characterized by hijacks of
airliners used to demolish the World Trade Center and the Pentagon preceded by the attacks in
New Delhi, in Bali, in London subway, in Madrid train, and in Mumbai. These groups use
violence and militancy to either establish Islamic state, implement Islamic laws or political
issues. Israel Palestine conflict, Taliban regime in Afghanistan, India Pakistan Kashmir,
Issues with al-Aqsa mosque in Israel, Babri mosque in India, led to the rise of a number of
Islamist militant groups who used terrorism as tactic to revenge in the name of Islam. During the
cold war era, many of these groups were trained, sponsored or assisted by two super powers,
USA and Soviet Union. European radicals and the J apanese Red Army (J RA) cooperated
Palestinian groups in the 1980s. There are linkages between Islamist militant groups with non-
Islamist groups in the areas of training, operations, and support. In South Asia, such nexus is

discovered among Nepalese Maoists, Indian Maoists, Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) such as
ULFA, Sri Lankan LTTE, Islamist groups in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El Al airliner en
route from Tel Aviv to Rome in 1968. Palestinian groups got cooperation from European
radicals in the early 1970 and with the J apanese Red Army (J RA) in 1974. Since then the
internationalization of terror has been growing by cooperating terrorist groups through training,
operations, and support. Osama Bin Laden sponsored the World Islamic Front for J ihad against
J ews and Crusaders (WIFJ AJ C). Various attacks, for example, bombing of Los Angeles
International Airport, the USS Cole bombing in October 2000 and September 11 attacks. In
1996, al-Qaeda was formed by Bin laden having large base of operations in Afghanistan, when
the Islamist extremist regime of the Taliban had seized power.
The major terrorist attacks in Bangladesh from 1991 reveal that linkage between various
Islamist militant and terrorist groups and outfits go beyond national boundaries. Al Qaeda is one
of them. For bomb blasts in India, Pakistan-based LeT has been accused. HUJ I is a Pakistan-
based international militant group. HUJ I Bangladesh is the Bangladeshi chapter founded by the
Afghanistan holy jihadist from Bangladesh. There is also allegation that Bangladeshi militants
have supported Pakistan based militant groups in terrorist attack and expanding their networks in
India. HUJ I-B is also connected to homegrown Islamist militant groups like J MJ B, AHAB. In
the Middle East today, various terrorist groups are operative, such as Hamas (Islamic groups),
Kach or Kahene Chai (J ewish groups).
The perpetrators of terrorist attacks from 1991 in Bangadesh claimed responsibility for
the attacks, identifying themselves to be various Islamist militant groups and terrorist outfits. The
agenda and the links between these groups vary from one location to another. Some attacks are

for political reasons such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MLIF) in the Philippines,
J ammu and Kashmir Liberation Front in India, Pakistan, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, and the Islamic J ihad Movement in Palestine. Others are for religious ideologies, such
as J MB, J MJ B in Bangladesh, Islamic J ihad and Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. But these days,
terrorism in Asia becomes regionally coordinated. Hizbul Mujahedin and Harakat ul Mujahedin
claimed responsibility for various attacks in India. They mostly used bombs for attacks. Hamas,
Hizballah, and al-Qaueda are attacking on Israel. Al-Qaeda is a global militant group of Osama
bin Laden founded before 19990. It claimed responsibility for various attacks including 9/11,
1998 US embassy bombings, and 2002 Bali bombings.
2.5. Global action against terrorism, and War on terror
In 2005, the UN says, whatever may be the purpose, the international community will
not tolerate any form of terrorism. The international community put terrorism on the UN agenda
since 1934. They looked for a convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorism.
Despite its adoption 1937, it never came into force (UN website http://www.un.org/terrorism/
instruments.shtml). Since 1963, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has
collated the 13 universal conventions (international agreements) and 3 protocols against
terrorism signed to create consensus that certain acts count as terrorism (for example, hijacking a
plane), in order to create the means to prosecute them in signatory countries.
These sixteen universal instruments dealing with terrorism were elaborated to prevent
terrorist acts.
1. 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
2. 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil

Aviation
1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons
3. 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
4. 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
5. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
6. 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation
2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation
7. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
10. 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection
11. 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(Terrorist Bombing Convention)
o Creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of
explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various defined public

places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with intent to cause
extensive destruction of the public place.
12. 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(Terrorist Financing Convention)
o Requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists,
whether direct or indirect, through groups claiming to have charitable, social or
cultural goals or which also engage in illicit activities such as drug trafficking or
gun running;
o Commits States to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or
administratively liable for such acts; and
o Provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist
activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other States on a
case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy is no longer adequate justification for refusing to
cooperate.
13. 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
In response to the current terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) and the The United
Nations (UN) has introduced a global strategy by promoting democracy, dialogue and good
governance to tackle the root causes of radicalization. At the World Summit 2005 of the
United Nations member states condemned all forms and manifestations of terrorism, and
agreed to reach a common definition and a comprehensive combating strategy to address
international terrorism (retrieved March 5, 2011 from http://www.un.org/terrorism
/background.shtml).

On 8 September 2006, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNCTS) was
adopted as a unique global instrument to enhance national, regional and international efforts to
counter terrorism. It underscores the importance of existing international counter-terrorism
instruments. The Strategys four pillars include: tackling the conditions conducive to the spread
of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; building States capacity to prevent and
combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and
ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight
against terrorism. In 2005, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was
established with 31 international entities o provide member states with the necessary policy
support and spread in-depth knowledge of the Strategy, and wherever necessary, expedite
delivery of technical assistance. The biennial review of the UNCTS in 2010 also reaffirmed the
support for the Strategys four pillars.
Following the terrorist attacks in the USA (in 2001) and Europe (Madrid and London in 2004
and 2005), the European Union`s (EU) action against terrorism undertook four pillar approach
(prevent, protect, pursue and respond) based on the Amsterdam Treaty. To address this
transnational phenomena, the EU focuses on preventing and cracking down terrorist acts,
protecting infrastructures and citizens and tackling the causes, resources and capacities of
terrorism provided that coordination between law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities
within the EU and international cooperation are essential. The EU strategy includes the following
objectives:
increase cooperation with third countries (especially in North Africa, the
Middle East and South-East Asia) and provide them with assistance;
respect human rights;

prevent new recruits to terrorism;
better protect potential targets;
investigate and pursue members of existing networks;
improve capability to respond to and manage the consequences of terrorist
attacks.
Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) expressed the vulnerability of Alliance members to large-scale
terrorist attacks. NATOs Article 5 declaration and subsequent operations demonstrated the
Alliances resolve to deal with this threat (NATO Website http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_69482.htm.).
The UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) has been contributing critically for many
years to counter- terrorism capacity building among member states. To fight international
terrorism, the UNODC supported for different (inter) regional action against terrorism in Africa,
Asia, Europe, and other organizations.
G8 also vows joint action against terrorism. Leaders of the G8 promised to work together to
combat terrorism threat and to support weak governments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Sahel,
Somalia and Yemen to fight terrorism.
The USA is leading the War on Terror also termed as the Global War on Terror or the War
on Terrorism. Its policy, politics, and pursuit of a global war on terrorism influenced the rest of
the world. War on terror is an international military campaign with the support of other North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as non-NATO countries mainly to fight against
militant Islamists and al-Queda. President George W. Bush first used the phrase War on
Terror. President Barack Obama used the term Overseas Contingency Operation. Even before
Bush, the Reagan Administration used the term "war against terrorism" in 1984 as part of an

effort to pass legislation designed to freeze assets of terrorist groups and marshal the forces of
government against them. Following the 9/11 attack, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 was passed in
order to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world to enhance law
enforcement, investigative tools, and other purposes. To protect the US from terrorist attacks,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is working closely with a range of partners and are
using growing suite of investigative and intelligence capabilities to neutralize terrorist cells and
operatives here in the U.S., to help dismantle extremist networks worldwide, and to cut off
financing and other forms of support provided by terrorist sympathizers (FBI website,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism). The US military action against terrorism
predates 2001. The USA enhanced military action and attracted support from many countries
including Russia following the 9/11 attacks. In Aaugust 1998, the US ground troops undertook
airstrikes against terrorist training camps in Khost, Afghanistan. Following the bombings of US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, US President Bill Clinton launched Operation Infinite Reach,
a bombing campaign in Sudan and Afghanistan against targets.
Canada is a strong ally of the USA in fighting against terrorism. It has been leading that front
since 1963, and it has signed 12 conventions related to terrorism (CSIS Website,
http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/prspctvs/200004-eng.asp). The Anti-terrorism Act (ATA)
represents Canada's overall anti-terrorism strategy like the USA Patriot Act passed in the same
time frame. The ATA focuses on terrorists and terrorist groups, and aims to protect the safety,
security and fundamental rights of Canadians.
Since the 9/11 event, various western governments have undertaken various programs to
support developing countries facing the problem of terrorism outside the war on terror in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The US is on the lead to support countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and

India in South Asia. Bangladesh received training and technical assistance, for example, security
forces including Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) was trained in the USA. Scotland Yard helped to
investigate some terrorist attacks outside the Interpol. The US government also provided
capacity building assistance to Bangladesh Bank in addressing the money-laundering problem to
check and monitor terrorist financing.
2.6. The Current Study
In Bangladesh, militancy and terrorism have become a socio-economic and political issue.
Over the last two decades, a number of Islamist groups and terrorist oufits both homegrown and
internationally-linked have emerged in the country. Though the number of terrorist attacks by
Islamist militants has increased since 1999, various militant groups continued to exist in the
country since 1992. Various militant groups have grown over the years enhancing strengths in
terms of manpower and skills, and widespread networks to conduct terror campaigns (Datta,
2007; The Daily Star 2005; The New Age xtra, 2009; BIPSS, 2010, 2011; ICM, 2011; Munir,
2011). On J anuary 27, 2005, J anes Intelligence Review, the leading defence magazine of the
world, reported:
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth, on the brink of being a failed state,
and that makes it a perfect target for al- Qaeda and its-ever expanding network of Islamist
extremist organizations. Virtually unnoticed by the world at large, Bangladesh is being
dragged into the global war on terrorists by becoming sanctuary for them.

Another report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in December 2003, said
that the Bangladesh government is not doing enough to prevent the country from becoming a
haven for Islamic terrorists in South Asia and pointed out that religious extremists are connected
to Al Qaeda. Blaming the BNP government for not taking appropriate action against the terrorist
organizations the report said rather than finding out the real perpetrators of violence the
government has been routinely blaming the opposition political party for such criminal activities.

Various factors can be associated with the rise of Islamist militancy and terrorism in
Bangladesh (Riaz, 2008; Datta, 2007; BIPSS, 2011; Quamruzzaman, 2011). Most of the reports
indicate four major groups J MB, J MJ B, HT and HUJ IB (Riaz, 2008; BIPSS, 2011; ICM 2011;
Munir, 2011). The origins of these groups indicate the existence of such militant groups and
networks following the Afghan war (Munir, 2011). Quamruzzaman (2010) examined the militia
movement covering Islamist, leftwing and ethnic in terms of 5 dimensions - ideology,
motivation, mobilization, organization and ritual of different militant groups from a holistic point
of view following an integrated analytical model of Freilich et al. (2001). He used the term
militia instead of militancy. He does not accept the the claims of many national and international
media and intelligence reports and even some academic studies that an Islamist movement is on
rise in Bangladesh after the 9/11 event. To him the Islamist movement leftwing and ethnic
militia movements are all equally important. He argued that that the Islamist movement has a
long history and it has been periodically revitalized in the country due to some internal and
external socio-political factors.
Immediate after the 9/11 US attack, Bangladesh has been presented as a new host of
extremism and Talbanization in a number of international media reports of 2002 (the Far Eastern
Review, the Hindu, J ane`s Intelligence Review, Time Magazine, and Frontline) and 2005 (New
York Times, Asia Times). These articles (Linter, 2002 a, 2002b; 2002 b; Perry, 2002; Habib,
2002 Griswold, 2005; Shahin, 2005) pointed out the links of Bangladeshi militants with
international terrorist groups and the use of madrasas (religious schools and colleges). The
Canadian Intelligence Service (CSIS) report 2003 also raises the same concern, and later the US,
Australia and other western governments have issued advisory stating Bangladeshs terrorism
threats. These studies and reports, based mostly on journalistic and intelligence sources, has

portrayed that religious militancy is a deeply rooted problem of Bangladeshi society (BIPSS,
2010; Datta, 2007; ICM, 2011; Riaz, 2008; the Daily Star Web Edition, Vol. 5, num. 447).
Before 2008, Bangladesh did not have any law to address the contemporary most pressing
issue of militancy and terrorism. The government has not taken any action against this Islamist
militancy until 2005 despite local and international media reports and even political and civil
society concerns (Datta, 2007). Banning Islamist groups, campaigning program to make people
aware about extremism and militancy, and continual drive against militants are the key measures
taken by the past and present government against terrorism. Religious militancy and terrorism is
one of the most debatable and under- research topic for Bangladesh. The present study explored
the nature and extent of Islamist militant groups and their terrorist activities. The study also
examined the underlying causes and factors of Islamist terrorism, the sources of funding, the
tactics and strategies used by the militant groups. The study also looked at the government
response to the menace of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. Given the rise, extent
and costs of militancy and relevant for policy recommendations to address terrorism, this study is
very timely.


CHAPTER III: MILITANT OUTFITS AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
3.1. Number of Terrorist Groups
Our study explored 70 names of organizations that are either reported in different sources
as militant or terrorist outfits (Table 3.1). The number varies across sources official, political
party, research studies, and newspapers. Although some key informant interviewees mentioned
the political parties like J IB and IOJ and student wings like ICS as militant organization, this
study excluded those. It is very difficult to estimate the exact number of terrorist groups who are
active in Bangladesh. This is difficult because of numerous definition of terrorism as we
discussed earlier. According to key informant interviews, it is very difficult to estimate the exact
number of terrorist groups in Bangladesh and they argued that there must be an agreement
regarding the definition of terrorism. During his interview, one respondent mentioned one list
included 112 and another list included 125. There cannot be any reliable or accurate list as the
groups are operating in different names, for example, J MB is changed to J MJ B, HUJ I to Chital
(form of jihad) which later merged to J MB and another new group named Islam o Muslim has
emerged. Many of these organizations are connected to each other like J MB and J MJ B. He also
regards that this nature of changing ghost is not only in militant groups in Bangladesh but in
Pakistan, e.g., Laskar e Taiyeba (LeT), and Sipahi Sahara in Pakistan.
A report published in English newspaper the Daily Star revealed that there are 30 terrorist
groups who are active in Bangladesh. But, the report did not provide the name of all the
organizations. Studies suggest that the number of active militant groups range from dozens
(Ahsan, 2005), 30 (Khan, 2007) to 50 (Barakat, 2005). Quamruzzaman (2011) identified 18 such
Islamist militia groups which included 2 political parties (J IB, IOJ ) and one student organization
of J IB (ICS). In 2005, the then opposition party Awami Leage identified 33 Islamic militant

Table: 3.1
Religious Militant Organizations in Bangladesh
Sl. Name of the Organization Sl. Name of the Organization
1 Harkatul J ihad (HUJ I-B) (Movement for an
Islamic Holy War in Bangladesh)
36 Amra Dhakabashi
2 J amaatul Mujahideen Banglades (J MB)
(Party of Mujahidin Bangladesh)
37 J oisea Mohammed (J eM)
3 J agrata Muslim J anata, Bangladesh (J MJ B)
(Awakened Muslim Masses of Bangladesh)
38 al-Khidmat
4 Islami Biplobi Parishad (IBP) 39 Harakat-e-Islam-al-J ihad
5 Shahadat Al Hiqma (Testimony of Wisdom) 40 al-Qaida
6 Hizbut Towhid (HT) (Party of Oneness of
God)
41 Muslim Millat Sharia Council
7 Hizb-ut- Tahrir (Party of Liberation) 42 Hizbullah Islami Shomaj
8 Ahle Hadith Andolon (AHAB) (Movement of
the Hadith)
43 Hizbul Mahadi
9 Towhidi J anata 44 Basbid
10 Bishwa Islami Front 45 al-Islam Martyrs Brigade
11 J umaatul Sadat 46 the International Khatme Nabuwat Movement
12 Al J omiatul Islamia 47 Islamic Constitutional Movement
13 Iqra Islami J ote 48 Khatme Nabuat Andolon Samannay Committeee
(KNASC)
14 Allahr Dal (Party of God) 49 Majlishe Tahaffuze Khatme Nabuwat
Bangladesh
15 Al Khidmat Bahini 50 Amra Dhakabashi
16 Al Mujahid 51 Nashik Murtad Resistence Committee
17 J amaati Yahia Al Turag 52 Hikmat-ul J ihad
18 J ihadi Party 53 Al Hikma
19 Al Harkat al Islamia 54 Hifajate Khatme Nabuwat Andolon (HKNA)
20 Al Mahfuz Al Islamia 55 Ulema Anjuman al- Baiyinaat (Clerics of Clerics
for Clear Understanding)
21 J amaatul Faladia 56 Bangladesh Khilafat Andolon (Caliphate
Movement)
22 Shahadat-e-Nabuwat 57 Hijbe Abu Omar (HAO)
23 J oish-e-Mostafa 58 J adid al Qaeda
24 Tahfize Haramaine Parishad 59 Harkat-ul Ansar
25 Hizbul Mojahedeen 60 Islam o Muslim (IOM)
26 Duranta Kafela 61 Dawat-e-Islam (DeI)
27 Muslim Guerrilla 62 World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
28 Tamir al Din (Tree of Religion) 63 Hizb-ul Mujahahideen (HM) J K based
29 J amaat-e-Yeaheya-al-Turat 64 Lasker e Taiba (LeT)
30 Al-Markajul-al-Islami 65 Muslim Ummah Millati MaZahabul Qurran
(MUMMQ)
31 the International Islamic Front 66 Quran Education Foundation (QEF)
32 al-J ihad Bangladesh 67 Hizb-ul Mahadi
33 hahadat-e-Naboyed 68 J ammat-e-Muslimeen
34 the World Islamic Front for J ihad 69 Al Harmain
35 Warot Islamic Front 70 Global Relief Foundation (RF)


groups. On March 16, 2009, the Government identified 12 militant outfits the MB, HUI-B, HT,
Ulema Anjuman al Bainat, Hizb-ut Tahrir (HuT), Islami Democratic Party (IDP), Islami Samaj,
Touhid Trust, J MJ B, Shahadat-e al Hikma Party Bangladesh, Tamira Ar-Din Bangladesh (Hizb e
Abu Omar), and Allahr Dal. The security agencies identified 33 militant groups. The security
agencies identified 33 militant groups (Bangladesh Timeline Year 2009, from
www.satp.org/satporgtp/bangladesh/timeline/2009.htm). The list of major Islamist militant
groups is presented in Table 3.1 and the strengths, goals and other characteristics are presented in
Table 3.4. HUJ I, J MJ B, J MB and HT are described as the the most prominent militant groups in
Bangladesh (South Asia Terrroism Portal, 2011; BIPS, 2011; Datta, 2007; The Daily Star Investigation,
2005). J MB and J MJ B are often considered twin and many others change name when the
government banned the mother organization. Many reports also demonstrate that LeT, and many
other Pakistan and Indian operatives are active in Bangladesh (BIPSS, 2010; ICM 2011).
Thirty three (33) Islamic militant groups identified by the then opposition party Awami
League include J MB, Shahdat-e-al Hikma, J amaat-e-Yeaheya-al-Turat, Hizbut Touhid, Al-
Harat-al-Islamia, Al-Markajul-al-Islami, J amaatul Faliaya, Touhidi J anata, the International
Islamic Front, J ummatul-al-Sadat, hahadat-e-Naboyed; Harakat-ul-J ihad-al-Islami (HUJ I),
Allahar Dal, J oisea Mustafa Bangladesh, al-J ihad Bangladesh, the World Islamic Front for J ihad,
J oisea Mohammed, J amaat-ul-Muzahidul Bangladesh, Warot Islamic Front, J amaat-us-Sadat,
al-Khidmat, J MJ B, Harakat-e-Islam-al-J ihad, Hizbullah Islami Shomaj, Muslim Millat Sharia
Council, Ahl-e-Hadith, Hizbul Mahadi, Basbid, Hizbut Tahrir, al-Qaida, al-Islam Martyrs
Brigade, the International Khatme Nabuwat Movement and Amra Dhakabashi (Datta, 2007).
Our content analysis found that different Islamist militant groups have emerged over
time. The arrest of activists of different groups also indicates the presence of many militant
outfits. Islamic Constitutional Movement, J aise Mostafa, Khatme Nabuat Andolon Samannay

Committeee (KNASC) emerged in 2003 while 2004, HKNA, Majlishe Tahaffuze Khatme
Nabuwat Bangladesh, Nashik Murtad Resistence Committee, Muslim Millat Shariah Council,
Mujaheedeedn al Islam, Hikmat-ul J ihad emerged in 2004 are also appeared in media reports.
IKNMB is seen in 2005. On September 21, 2003, police arrested Tamir-ul Din Chief Maulana
Abdur Rauf and on March 20, 2003, an Al Hikma activist was arrested.
Table: 3.2
Year wise Number of Terrorist Incidents and Persons Killed/Injured (1999 2010)
Year Number of incidents Number of People Killed Number of People Injured
1999 3 18 147
2000 1 2 18
2001 5 24 202
2002 10 27 461
2003 2 9 18
2004 9 37 765
2005 32 36 952
2006 18 03 68
2007 7 0 6
2008 6 0 16
2009 8 0 0
2010 5 3 5
Total 92 136 2488

3.2. Nature of Terrorist Activities
We have analyzed the newspaper reports on major terrorist activities occurred between
1999 and 2010. Table 3.2 shows that between 1999 and 20109, 136 people were killed and 2488
were injured. Table 3.2 also shows that most of the incidents took place in 2004 and 2005. The
highest number of terrorist incidents (32) occurred in the year 2005 in which 36 people were
killed and 952 were injured. In 2004, 37 people were killed and 765 sustained injury.
Table 3.2 reveals that in a decade about 100 Islamist incidents took place in Bangladesh.
The highest number of attacks (32) was reported in 2005 followed by 18 incidents in 2006, 9
incidents in 2002, 8 incidents in 2004 and 2009, 7 incidents in 2007, 6 incidents in 2008, 5
incidents in 2001 and 2010 and 2 incidents in 199, 2003 (Table 3.3). Table- 3.3 shows the list of

Table: 3.3
Major Terrorist Activities in Bangladesh (1999-2010)
1

SL.
No.
Date Place of occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 J anuary 18, 1999 Dhaka secular poet Shamsur Rahman who is
critical of growing communal intolerance
was attacked by religious extremists at his
house
0 1
2 March 7, 1999 J essore bomb blast attacked a cultural group called
Udichi celebrating Bengali New Year Day
10 106
3 October 8, 1999 Khulna Ahmadiya mosque 8 40
Total 2 18

SL.
No.
Date Place of occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 December 24,
2000
Dhaka 2 18
Total 2 18

SL.
No.
Date & Year Place of Occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 April 14, 2001 Ramna Park, Dhaka Bomb explosion at a Bengali New Year
cultural function
10 100+
2 October 14,
2001
Sirajganj District 0 2
3 September 26,
2001
Sylhet Town 2 0
4 September 25,
2001
Shullah, Sunamganj
District
Bomb explosion near the venue of an AL
election meeting
4 0
5 September 24,
2001
Mollarhat, Bagerhat
District
Bomb blast at an Awami League election rally, 8 100
Total 24 202+
SL.
No.
Date Place of occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 J anuary, 2002 Barisal District 0 2
2 February 27, 2002 Dhandoba , Barisal
District
1 1
3 February 04, 2002 Chittagong District 1 3
4 April 25, 2002 Dhaka 0 2
5 May 1, 2002 Gurdaspur, Natore 1 25

1
Based on secondary sources including newsreprots and SATP


6 September 28,
2002
Satkhira Town Two bomb explosion 3 125
7 October 13 , 2002 Khulna District 0 1
8 October 11, 2002 Rangmati Town 3 2
9 December 7, 2002 Mymensingh town Serial bomb blasts at four cinema halls 18 300
Total 27 461

SL.No Date Place of Occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 J anuary 17, 2003 Dariapur village,
Tangail district
Bomb blast at a carnival 8 8
2 March 1, 2003 Khulna Bomb blast at a International Trade Fair 1 10
Total 9 18

Sl. No. Date Place of Occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 J anuary 12, 2004 Sylhet Bomb explosion at the shrine of Hazrat Shah
J alal (Rh:)
10 137
2 J anuary 28, 2004 Golakandail, Rupgonj,
Narayangonj
Bomb explosion at the Poush Mela (winter
fair)
02 20
3 May 21, 2004 Hazrat Shah J alal (Rh:)
Mazaar, Syllhet
Bomb attack on the British High
Commissioner to Bangladesh
02
2
100
4 August 05, 2004 Near J alalabad
Senanibas, Sylhet
Bomb explosion 02 07
5 August 21, 2004 Bangabandhu Avenue,
Dhaka
A series of grenade attack on AL leader Sheikh
Hasina at a meeting
23 500
6 September 9, 2004 Faridpur Bomb blast at Faridpur 00 13
7 October 4, 2004 Barabihanali, Rajshahi Attack carried out by cadres of J MJ B on a AL
leader
00 07
8 November 14, 2004 Rani Nagar, Naogaon A leader of the Bangladesh Chatra League was
killed by cadres of J MJ B
01 00
Total 40 784


2
Accordingto South Asia Terrorism Portal, the number is reported 3
(www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/database/majorbombbla...)

Sl. No. Date Place of Occurance Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 J anuary 01, 2005 (Sahajanpur, Majhira
Upozela)Vogra and Nator
03 70
2 J anuary 25, 2005 Putia, Rajshahi Unknown Unknown
3 J anuary 27, 2005 Baiddar Bazaar, Hobigonj Awamileague meeting 05 150
4 August 17, 2005 Whole Bangladesh 459 explosions in 63 out of 64 districts
(barring Munshiganj)
03 500+
5 October 02, 02005 Brahambaria, Shatkhira

Pabna, Daulatpur in Kustia
(SATP)
According to SATP, there is no fatalities or
injuries on October 2, 2005 in Pabna, and
Daulatpur in Khulna
02 Unknown
6 October 03, 2005 Chandpur, Laxmipur,
Chittagong
Five separate bomb explosions near court
roomand court premises
02 38
7 October 11, 2005

Comilla Nil Nil
8 October 18, 2005 Sylhet District Bomb attack carried out by a J MB cadre in
front of the judges residence
0 1
9 October 27, 2005 Syllhat Nil Nil
10 November 7, 2005 Khulna Nil Nil
11 November 12 , 2005 Naruamala, Gabtoli, Bogra 0 0
12 November 14, 2005 J halokathi J MB suicide squad exploded a bomb killing
two Senior Assistant judge
02 04
13 November 18, 2005 Rajshahi Unknown Unknown
14 November 20, 2005

Daulakhan, Vhola Nil Nil
15 November 22 Taragunia, Daulatpur, Kushtia
District
0 5
16 November 23 Choulerborder and
Harishankarpur, Kushtia District
0 0
17 November 27 Alamdanga, Chuadanga District 01 05
18 November 29, 2005 Chittagonj, Gazipur, Tangail Two suicide bomb attacks by the J MB cadre
in Chittagong and Gazipur court premises
09 78
19 November 30, 2005 Kaligonj, J halokathi, Madaripur
KD Ghose Road, Khulna
According to SATP, anotehr incident on KD
Ghos Road in Khulna, but no death or injuries.
Nil Nil
20 December 01, 2005 Gazipur, Tangail 01 50+
21 December 02, 2005 Sylhet District 0 0
22 December 03, 2005 Dhaka Nil Nil
23 December 03, 2005 Hobigonj Nil Nil
24 December 03, 2005 Rajbari Nil Nil
25 December 03, 2005 Kustia Nil Nil
26 December 03, 2005 Hobigonj Nil Nil
27 December 03, 2005 Rajbari Nil Nil
28 December 08, 2005 Netrokona bomb explosion by J MB in front of the office
of the Udichi
8
(SATP)
46
(SATP)
29 December 08, 2005 Dhaka Nil Nil
30 December 08, 2005


Vogra, Sylahet, Panchagar,
Munsigonj, Kishorgonj, Pabna,
J amalpur, Thacurgaonj
Nil Nil
31 December 25, 2005 Mirpur Road, Dhaka 0 04
Total 36 952+


SL.No Date Place of Occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 J anuary 02,
2006
Kishorgonj 0 0
2 J anuary 02,
2006
Hobigonj 0 0
3 J anuary 03,
2006
Khulna 0 0
4 J anuary 05,
2006
Savar, Dhaka 0 0
5 J anuary 06,
2006
Kachua, Kathalia, J halakathi 0 0
6 J anuary 25,
2006
Gangni, Meherpur 1 20
7 J anuary 24,
2006
Shamaspur, Munshiganj 0 3
8 February
25, 2006
Komorpur, Meherpur 0 2
9 March 3,
2006
Sher-e-Bangla Road, Jhenidah 0 5
10 March 13,
2006
Bhomordah village, Meherpur 0 3
11 March 27,
2006
Maricha, Kushtia 0 3
12 April 7,
2006
Daulatdia village, Chuadanga 0 0
13 April 12,
2006
Paka village, Chuadanga 2 4
14 April 21,
2006
Sonadanga Bus Terminal,
Khulna
0 3
15 May 5,
2006
Gobra Bazaar, Sadar sub-
district, Narail
0 4
16 J une 23,
2006
Omar Shahpara, Bander police
station, Chittagong
0 3
17 J une 26,
2006
Shiromoni, Khan J ahan Ali
police station, Khulna city
0 3
18 August 1,
2006
Mirzapur town, Atrai sub-
district, Naogaon
0 15
Total 03 68







Sl.No Date Place of Occurance Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 March 14, 2007 Meghna village, Bheramara sub-district,
Kushtia
0 2
2 March 22, 2007 Sarishbari, J amalpur 0 0
3 May 1, 2007 Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet. Three explosions at the main
railway stations in Dhaka, the
southern port of Chittagong and the
northeastern city of Sylhet.
0 1
4 May 2, 2007 Dhaka, Chittagonj, Syllahet 0 1
5 May 4, 2007 Chawk Ramakantapur village, Manda
sub-district, Naogaon
0 1
6 May 15, 2007 J oypur Mastarpara village, Sapahar sub-
district, Naogaon
0 1
7 May 31, 2007 Kamalapur Railway Station , Dhaka 0 0
Total 0 6

Sl.No. Date Place of Occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 May 14, 2008 Kanchon Nagar in the J henidah town 0 2
2 March 15, 2008 Naopara rail station, Abhoynagar sub-
district, J essore
0 7
3 May 14 Kanchan Nagar, J henidah 0 1
4 J une 26, 2008 Krishna Nagar under Tala sub-district in
Satkhira
0 4
5 J uly 5, 2008 Hajapur graveyard in the Awaliapur
union of Dinajpur sub-district
0 2
6 September 17,
2008
Faridpur Medical College Hospital 0 0
Total 0 16

Sl. No. Date Place of Occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1 March 3, 2009
(SATP)
Chapainawabganj 1 2
2 March 25, 2009
(SATP)
Barisal 0 1
3 April 21, 2009 Barisal 0 0
4 May 15, 2009 Mirpur, Dhaka 0 0
5 J uly 08, 2009 Hobigonj 0 0
6 J uly 20, 2009
(SATP)
Dhaka 0 2
7 J uly 30, 2009
(SATP)
Purabonogram 2 0
8 October 6, 2009
(SATP)
Moheshpur, J henaidah 0 5
Total 3 10


Sl. No. Date Place of Occurrence Summary of incidents Killed Injured
1
J anuary 15, 2010
(SATP)
Faridpur 2 0
2
February 10, 2010
(SATP)
Goyashbari, Pabna 1 0
3
February 12, 2010
(SATP)
Brahamanbaria 0 0
4
J une 26, 2010
(SATP)
Chuadanga 0 1
5
November 4,
2010 (SATP)
Meherpur 0 4
Total 3 5
terrorist activities from 1999 to 2010. Our analysis of newspaper reports from 1999 to 2010
reveals that these terrorist attacks targeted cultural groups, cultural celebration and activists,
Christian churches, movie theatres, fairs, Urs (the anniversary of the saints death) celebration,
university professors, Ahmadiyya mosques diplomats, Awami Leage leaders including the ex
prime minister Sheikh Hasina, journalists, political party meetings, NGO offices, book fair,
circus, international trade fair (Table 3.3). However, the exact number is very difficult to
determine. According to the Daily Star Investigation, the J MB activists carried out over 100
operations including murders and attacks on people they believe to be criminals in different
regions.

3.3. Ideologies and Strengths of Islamist Militant Groups
The aims and goals of these groups vary widely. It appears that the ideological basis of
most of the groups is religion. Table 3.4 provides a snapshot of major Islamist militant groups
strengths based on available media reports and other secondary sources such as academic studies,
intelligence reports. The Daily Star investigation found that over 30 religious militant
organizations have set up their network in Bangladesh since 1989 with the main objective of
establishing Bangladesh as an Islamic state. The Daily Star investigation (The Daily Star Web

Edition Vol. 5, No. 447, 2005) profiled seven militant organizations (J MB, J MJ B, HUJ I,
Shahadat al Hiqma, HT, Hizb-ut Tahrir, and IBP). Munir (2011) considered three the most lethal
and threat groups (J MB, HUJ I-B, and Hizbut Tahrir). Though the Intelligence Agencies of the
country advised the government to ban the outfits - J MB, HUJ I, Hizb-ut Tahrir IBP in 2003, but
the government has not implemented before 2005 following the lethal terrorist attacks in 2005.
The militant groups have some ten lakh members across the country. According to an
intelligence report, about 80,000 of them took training in arms and explosives. Only J MB has the
strengths of militants are substantial 57 districts. Huji has timers more than 25,000 activists. The
report further revealed that even some university teachers are involved with these militant
groups. The exact number of members or activists of these militant groups cannot be estimated.
According to former chief of Bangladesh Police, Chief A S M Shahajahan, the strengths of
militants are substantial for which attempting a countrywide blast is possible (New Age Extra,
August 21-27, 2009). He argued that the number of people brainwashed by militant ideologies,
their financial sources, training areas and the trainers of these militant outfits are yet to be
explored. The strengths of major groups (HUJ I, J MB, and J MJ B) ranges from 10,000 to 300,000
( Table 3.4).
The profile of major militant groups are discussed below.
HUJI-B
The rise of militancy in the country can be traced back to the year 1992, with the
Bangladesh chapter of Harkat-ul-J ihad-al Islami (HUJ I). HUJ I aided by Osama Bin Laden was
established under the leadership of Shawkat Osman alias Sheikh Farid in 1992 to establish
Islamic rule in the country (www.satp.org). HUJ I-B has estimated cadre strength of more than
several thousand members. They operates and trains their members in Bangladesh, where it

Table: 3.4
Strengths of the Major Terrorist Groups in Bangladesh
3


Sl Outfit/
Organization
Date
Established
Strength Status Aims Remarks
1 HUJ I-B 1992 15,000

Banned
in
October,
2005
Establish Islamic rule
through jihad, Fight in
Kashmir, freed from
the aggression and
influence of the west
and east
Transnational, reported to have links with al-Qaeda
and some militia groups in Pakistan, Publish and
distribute books, 6 camps in Cox`s Bazar hilly areas,
reported to have links with piracy, smuggling and
gunrunning. Rohinga refugees are also members,
recruit frommadrassa financed by Arab charities
2 J MB 1998 10,000


Banned
on
February
23, 2005
Establish Islamic rule,
end anti-Islamic forces
and practices
Local, transnational connections, Received BNP-
J IB patronization (2001-2006), founder Sheikh
Abdur Rahman, AHAB Chief Dr. Asadulla Al Galib
as one policy maker, Most front liners trained in
Afghanistan
3 Hizbut
Towhid (HT)
1994 Banned

Establish Islamic state
through jihad, Anti-
traditional government
Mohammad Bayezid Khan Ponni founded placed
just behind the prophets, authored a book banned in
1998, activists use iron hammer and tobacco dust to
attack
4 J MJ B

1998

300,000,


Banned
on
February
23, 2005
End activities of
leftwing extremist in
north west east,
Establish Islamic rule,
Taliban ideology,
oppose democracy
came into lime light on April 1, 2004 to unlawfully
free the country fromMaoist, 9 organizational
divisions, supported and patronized by a section of
BNP leaders, funding fromSaudi charities to build
mosques and seminaries, carried out 100+operations
5 Islami Biplob
Parisad (IBP)
2001 Establish Islamic state Former J I leader Moulana Abdul jabber formed IBP,
splitting fromJ IB preceded with Islami Samaj.
Threat the prime minister to declare Islamic state
otherwise oust the government
6 Shahadat al
Hiqma
1996 36,000 Banned
on
February
9, 2003
Liberation struggle An armed group arose fromICS, Founder Syed
Kawsar Hossain Siddiqui; publishes leaflets; have
extremist ; connections with 5 Islamist groups;
Contacts with Kashmir based LeT, get arms training
fromNepal based Maoist organizations, Dubai based
Daud Ibrahimgave funds
7 Khatm-e
Nabuyat
Andolon
Late 1980s Establish that
Mohammad the last
prophet and declare
Ahmadiyyas non-
Muslim
Transnational, Bangladesh branch cultivated by
Pakistani parent organization
8 Amra
Dhakabasi
Late 1980s Anti-Ahmadiyya Local limited in some parts of the capital Dhaka,
received support fromKhatm-e Nabuat and other
anti-Ahmadiyya groups
9 Hizbut Tahrir
(HuT)
2000 20,000
according
to Chief
Mohiuddin
Banned
on
October
22, 2009


Establish caliphate
state under a Caliph
through invitation and
jihad, Oppose the
traditional way of
politics
1953 in J erusalem, Recruitments target university
students, distribute inflammatory leaflets, raise funds
in the UK and within Bangladesh; founded by Dr.
Nasimul Gani and Shahnewaj and Dhaka University
professor GolamMowla, another DU IBA professor
Mohiuddin Ahmed coordinator
10 AHAB 1994 700
madrassas
in 42
districts
Transnational strong links with the movements
network in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, funding from
Hayatul Igaccha, Saudi Arabia and Society for the
Renaissance of Islamic Legacy, Kuwait, Asadullah
al Galib is the leader in police custody since 2005,
received training fromJ MB training centers and
Pakistani madrassas
11 Tamir ud
Deen
1999 Black-
listed
Establish Islamic
Shariah law
Founder is a HUJ I leader Mufti Abdur Rouf,
Alleged to have transnational Islamist networks
12 IDP 2008 Black-
listed
Establish Islamic
Sharihah law
transnational Islamist networks, founded by Afghan
war veterans
13 Allar Dal Black-
listed
Establish Islamic rule
through jihad
Linked to AHAB and J MB, Use coercion to recruit
with CDs, booklets and leaflets etc. Founded by 2
former ICS activists Matinul Islamand Babul
Ansar, Sentended to death.

3
Adapted fromQuamruzzaman (2011), BIPSS (2011), SATP (www.satp.org).

maintains at least six camps in Bangladesh (US Depaartment of State, 2003). In 1998, a group
called Bangladesh J ihad came into existence to notice when one of its members signed a fatwa
issued by bin Laden calling for a jihad against the US and Israel (The Daily Star, December 10,
2003). It initiated Islamist movement with a view to convert Bangladesh into an Islamic state
(The New Age Xtra and the Daily Star). HUJ IB brought out their first publication, J ago Mujahid,
which served as the outfits mouthpiece until 2005 when the HuJ I was officially proscribed by
the government. Afterwards they published under a new name of Rahmat.
Unlike J MB, HUJ I is an international organization established with the assistance from
Osama bin Laden to unite the Muslim world and free Muslim countries like Bangladesh from the
western aggressions and influence. The Bangladeshi chapter began in 1992 by Abdur Rahman
Faruqi and after his death, Shakat Osman alias Sheikh Farid became the chief while Imtiaz
Quddus was appointed as general secretary of the organization. HuJ I-B is originated from
Harkatul Ansar and received financial and ideological patronage from al Qaeda (Munir, 2011). It
is reported that HUJ I-B has connections with the Rohinga organizations operating in the country
as well as with South East Asian groups. The US DoS declared Bangladeshi-based HUJ I-B as
FTO (Foreign Terrorist Organization). Its funding network can be traced back to sources in the
Middle East. Despite arrests and operational pause of its activities, HUJ I-B remains a major
challenge due to its strong transnational connections, support network, and the operational
alliance with J MB and other groups.
HUJ I activities were concentrated in the southeastern coastel belts, Chittagong and Cox`s
Bazar. It has two types of memberships: i) activists who train and sawat sections. Its membership
include local residents and foreigners, such as the Rohinga Refigees from Myanmar. HUJ I also
recruits madrassa students. There are allegations that they have linkage with Pakistan and receive

funds from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghnaistan through Islamic NGOs working in
Bangladesh. Huji activists are involved in several cases the attack on eminent poet Shamsur
Rahman in 1999, the killing of J ournalist Shamsur Rahman in 2000, two attacks on Sheikh
Hasina in 2000. HUJ I-B carried the most lethal terrorist attacks on 21 August 2004 on a political
rally of Awami League. In a subsequent crackdown by the law enforcing agencies, a number of
HUJ I-B leaders and activists were arrested and they lost their operational capabilities.
JMB
The J MB is founded in 1998 and follows the Ahle Hadith school of thought (Munir,
2011). It believes the Hadith is the path to salvation and the Bangladeshi state and society
manifest the devil (Taghoot). The target of J MB attacks on people and institutions (movie
theaters, court houses, local governments and intellectuals indicate their ideology. This group
carried a number of terrorist attacks including the nationwide serial bomb blasts in an hour in
2005 which demonstrate their operational capabilities. J MB had a Special Suicide Squad, and
tried a number of suicide attacks. It has links with LeT and other south Asian Fraternity. In 2003,
some members were arrested with fissile materials (225 gram of Uranium oxide) which was later
traced to Kazakhastan (Munir, 2011). Despite the arrests of senior member and although the
group wekakened, the J MB remains a major threat group. Scholars argue that despite
unsophisticated nature of bombs, but such powerful explosives could have catalytic implications
given the density of population (Munir, 2011).
Maulana Saidur Rahman led the organization and after he and his nephew (Bhagin
Shahid) were arrested in 2010, the J MB leadership became critical. The 2005 nationwide bomb
blasts brought international attention that Bangladesh has become a hotbed for Islamist terrorism.
The Bangladeshi Government took serious steps to do crackdown on Islamist terrorist

organizations especially focusing on curbing J MB (The New Age, August 18, 2010). Various
reports including the study of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group showed that despite
the execution of the key figures of J MB in 2007 along with apprehension of many leaders, J MB
started to regroup and reconsolidate (Munir, 2011). J MB had a Special Suicide Squad, and tried a
number of suicide attacks. It has links with LeT and other south Asian fraternity. In 2003, some
members were arrested with fissile materials (225 gram of Uranium oxide) which were later
traced to Kazakhastan (Munir, 2011). Though the arrests of senior leaders has weakened J MB to
some extents however, they still remains a major threat group.
JMJB
The highest decision making body (Majlish-e-Shura (central council) was 7 members of
J MJ B. The J MJ B is a three-tier organization activists (full time) who act at the behest of the
higher echelons, part-time activists, and those who indirectly co-operate with the outfit (The
Daily Star Investigation Team, 2005). It has 9 organizational divisions in Khuklna, Barisal,
Sylhet, Chittagong and 2 divisions in Dhaka. It has network of madrassas and educational
institutions in 57 districts. It has 10 camps in Naogaon, Rajshahi and Natore Districts. It is based
mostly in northwestern districts Rajshahi, Rangpur, Bogra, and the southern districts of
Bagerhat, J essore, Sathkhira, Chittagong and Khulna. It`s headquarter is reported to be in Dhaka.
Its chief Moulana Rahman in an interview on May 13, 2004 denied any international links
including Taliban.
Hizb-ut Tahrir Bangladesh
Hizb-ut Tahrir is an international organization established by Islamic thinker Tokiuddin
Al Nakhani in 1953 in J erusalem five years after Israel occupied Palestine. It aims to restore the
Caliphate and establish a global Islamic state. Hizb-ut Tahrir began its activities in Bangladesh in

2000. It has no constitution or committee. They mainly want to unite Muslims to establish
Islamic state. They publish and distribute leaflets in hard copies and websites sharing their
ideology and organize seminars symposiums. Changing human thoughts first is perceived as the
right strategy to propagate Islamic lifestyles. The organization recruits their members from the
different public and private universities of Bangladesh. There is no report of exerting violence,
but their publications indicate that they are against various foreign and domestic policies and
military or political ties with the US, neighbor India and so on (Munir, 2011). Dhaka University
management lecturer Golam Mowla, IBA lecturer Mohiuddin Ahmad, Public administration
lecturer Sheikh Towfik, Kazi Morshedul Haque, and London returns Dr. Nasimul Gani, Kawser
Shahnewaj who launched Tahrir works with Golam Mowla whom they met in London in 1993.
The Bangladeshi chapter was launched in 2009. And the government was the main target of its
activities.
Hizbut Towhid (HT)
Hizbut Towhid (HT) founded by Mohammad Bayezid Khan Ponni from Tangail in 1994.
Ponni left the country after the independence and returned in the 80s. In 1996 he published a
book where he argued that this Islam is not at all Islam. The book was banned in 19998. HT
followers do not belive in traditional political system. HT activities were run across Barisal,
Feni, Madariour, Tangail, Meherpur, J henidah, Noakhali, Khulna, Chittagong and Narsingdi. HT
published ideologies and objectives in booklets and leaflets. HT followers do not like ajan
(prayer calls) and mosques and never greet salam (Islamic greetings).
IBP
The main objective of the Islami Biplobi Parisad (IBP) is to establish Islamic state. It was
formed by a former J IB leader Moulana Abdul J abber in 2001. J IB is made split in the 80s, he

formed a faction called J ammat-e-Islami (J abber), and he renamed it Islami Samaj Bangladesh
and later changed to IBP. Its head office was in Dhaka. J abber sent a letter to Prime Minister
Khaleda Zia to declare the country Islamic state within a 3-month ultimatum and in case of no
action, IBP would form a counter government claiming that they can run the government. They
also organized several meetings to pass their message.
Shahadat al Hiqma
Shahdat al Hiqma was formed in 1996, but it activities opened in 2001 as an NGO. It is
reported that Shadat al Hiqma is an armed group arose from ICS. ICS leader founded it. The
founder - Syed Kawsar Hossain Siddiqui was improsioned for sedition charge. He termed
liberation war as a terrorsit activity. Shahadat al Hiqma publishes leaflets; has extremist
connections with 5 Islamist groups J MB, Towhidi J anata, Iqra Islami J ote, J umaatul as Sadat,
and Biswa Islami Front. Shahadat al Hikma get training and fund from NGOs and voluntary
organizations. It has contacts with Kashmir based LeT, and even get arms training from Nepal
based Maosit organizations. It is reported that Dubai based Daud Ibrahim is one of the financiers.
It also received fund from J MB and Towhidi J anata under the banner of Biswa Islamic Front.
Self-declared Chairman Siddiqi claimed that some cabinet members of the government are with
him in a press conference on February 8, 2003.
AHAB
The Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB) was formed by a university professor Dr.
Asadullah Al Galib. He is also a leader of J MB and served as a policy maker of the
organization. Galib and J MB chief Rahman has close relationship. They have similar opinions
about the Islamic revolution. AHAM used J MB as operational wing and HUJ I as training unit. It
has transnational links with the movement network in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In the Rajshahi

AHAB Conference in the late 90s, his links with al-Qaeda militants from Middle East, Soth Asia
was revealed. West Bengal and Punjab Ahle Hadith leaders, Nepalese Ahle Hadith Leader
participated in the conference. It received funding from Hayatul Igaccha, Saudi Arabia and
Society for the Renaissance of Islamic Legacy, Kuwait, Asadullah al Galib is the leader in police
custody since 2005, received training from J MB training centers and Pakistani Madrassas. After
his arrest on February 23, 2005, Galib admitted that he spent huge money for building mosques
and seminaries, giving military-style training to Madrassa students and other organisational
works. Galib and Rahman used to meet in Chittagong in 1998 to discuss about their plans for
revolution and they worked among Muslim Rohingas and Arakan militants. It is reported that
Galib masterminded the militant actions in the country (Kumar, 2006).
3.4 Militant Networks, Tactics, and Strategies
Media and intelligence reports indicate the major Islamist militant outfits are interlinked
and leaders of these groups are supporting each other (the Daily Star Investigation, 2005; Munir,
2011). J MB has local intent and connections while HuJ I-B is a Bangladeshi chapter of a major
international terrorist group. It is found that AHAB chief Dr. Asadullah Al Galib was a policy
maker of J MB and his AHAB followers used to raise fund for running J MB activities. Some
media reports claim that J MJ B is an outgrowth of the J MB, others as a youth front of HUJ I. J MB
wants to run the country with Islamic rule. They want to remove anti-Islamic forces. The J MB
activists attacked cinema, cultural events, fairs, meetings and rallies. They used madrasa students
to collect tolls. They use motivational speeches, statements, leaflet and graffiti to energize their
followers. Evidence indicates that they received training in arms and bomb making in abroad.
Both HuJ I-B and J MB were founded by Afghan war veterans in 1992. Both of them brought
international attention. J MB follows the Ahle Hadith school of thought and HUJ I-B follows the

Deobandi school of thought akin to the Taliban and its other counterparts in Pakistan (Munir,
2011). They have similar target patterns such as the members of intelligentsia and cultural
celebrations.
The 2003 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Report expressed concern over
the rise of al-Quaeda linked Islamist militant networks and the negligence of the government to
prevent the country from becoming a haven for South Asian terrorists (CSIS, 2003). According
to some newsreports, the activities of HUJ I, J ihad Movement, the J amaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
(J IB), the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) - the J IB's students' wing, the Islami Olkyo J ote (IOJ ), and
two other organizations - the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) and the Rohingya
Solidarity Organization (RSO) - Rohingya Muslim refugees from the Arakan area of Myanmar
and the proliferation of madrassas were on the rise in the country (Linder, 2002). In J uly 1992,
about 150 armed men belonging to the Taliban and Al Qaeda had been transported to
Bangladesh from Afghanistan and Pakistan by a ship called "MV Mecca" and that 50 others had
similarly been transported during 2001 (Perry, 2002). The Counter-Terrorism Division`s report
presented to the Congress in May, 2003 did not refer to any pro-bin Laden jihadi terrorist
activities in Bangladesh territory on the lines of what has been appearing in the US media (US
Department of State, 2003). However, previous report mentioned the HUJ IB`s connection to
connections to the Pakistani militant groups Harakat ul-J ihad-i-Islami (HUJ I) and Harak ul-
Mujahidin (HUM), who advocate similar objectives in Pakistan and Kashmir. HUJ I-B was
accused of stabbing a senior Bangladeshi journalist in November 2000 for making a
documentary on the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh. HUJ I-B was the primary suspect suspected
in J uly 2000 assassination attempt of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

Many of these militant groups are linked to each other locally. Even more than 20 Islamic
parties are reported to have militant members (Khan, 2007). Some Islamic groups have links or
networks with other terrorist groups active in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Myanmar (Khan,
2007). HUJ I-B is the chapter of international terrorist group the HUJ I based in Pakistan, it has
links with Al Qaeda and it is a member of his International Islamic Front (IIF). The HUJ IB
supported Indian and Pakistani militants belonging to Pakistan based LeT, and Indian ARCF
(Asif Reza Commando Force) - a group allied to HuJ I. Indian militants Obaidullah and Mansur
and Amir Reza belonging to LeT and ARCF were engaged in teaching in madrassas, training and
supporting militants and opening chapters of Pakistani and Indian Islamist militant outfits Let in
Bangladesh. Obaidullah and Hannan have visited several sites in the country to establish training
camps during early 2000. Obaidullah was looking to establish camps for the LeT, one of which
was formed in 2002 at Purashanda, an area between Srimangal and Habiganj.
The New Age Xtra (17-21 August 2009) reported that the Detective Branch (DB) finds LeT
operatives hiding in the country, LeT, ARCF and HUJ I-B have ties J MB allies with newoutfit
J amaat-e-Mulimeen. In a press briefing, DMP Commissioner AKM Shahidul Haque (The Daily
Star, 8 February 2010 as cited in BIPSS, 2010) told that LeT operatives of Indiana and Pakistani
nationalities are active in Bangladesh. According to BIPSS president, the process of
radicalization in Bangladesh starts when the Islamist political parties entered into politics and
want Islam to be the state religion and extremism increased when militants intrude the political
system demonstrating terror attacks on lawyers, judges, DC offices, political leaders, diplomats,
foreigners and transnational linkages. In a workshop organized by the Bangladesh Institute of
Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), Major General Muniruzzaman (retired) and president of
BIPSS argued for a common South Asian strategies to address the problem of terrorism

(http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/more.php?news_id=120823&date=2010-12-24). In an
international meeting, Shafqat Munir told that Bangladesh`s counter-terrorism measures should
primarily focus on ensuring the security of its citizens from terrorist attacks and defeat of the
forces of terrorism that challenge the authority of the state and legitimacy of its constitution
(http://www.daily-sun.com/?view=details&type=daily_sun_news&pub_no=170&cat_id=1&
menu_id=10&news_type_id=1&news_id=35241&archiev=yes&arch_date=28-03-2011).
Obaidullaha and Mansur were engaged in militant outfits against radical Hindu organisations
such as the Shiv Sena and RSS, and worked in Bangladesh to organize a chapter of LeT in
Bangladesh. Obaidullah told interrogators about organising a local outfit of the LeT under the
leadership of Amir Reza a leader of the ARCF, a group allied to Harkat-ul-J ihad-al Islami
(HuJ I). They were among the 41 HuJ I members arrested from a training camp at Coxs Bazar on
February 19, 1996. The arrested members were sentenced to life imprisonment by the court and
after changing state power all 41 members were released on bail by the High Court. According to
the intelligence agencies, both Obaidullah and Mansur have been working as coordinators
between their operatives in Pakistan and India and were involved in most of the terrorist attacks
that were plotted in India since 2005.They disclosed the names of Amir Reza, Khurram Khaiyam
and Amzad Hossain. All these militants were in regular contact with each other over phone.
Khurram is believed to be a financer of the LeT members in Bangladesh. By scrutinizing phone
records it is found that Obaidullah and Amir had previously exchanged several calls and text
messages every day. They had extensively discussed some of the attacks, including the one on
August 21, at Hannans residence in Badda. Abdul Baki, an Afghan Mujaheed and also a HuJ I
member in West Bengal provided the explosives to Hannan for the August 21 blast (New Age
Xtra, August 21-27, 2009; The Daily Star, 2009-05-18.

According to the intelligence sources, detailed J MB explosives expert Mizan informed them
about the J MB activities, affiliates and the bomb stocks. He told that the militants are most
organised in Dhaka, Gazipur, J oypurhat, Comilla and Chittagong districts. Saidur, who once was
Ameer of Habiganj district J amaat-e-Islami, took charge of J MB after the execution of its top six
leaders including Shaekh Abdur Rahman and Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai in March 2007.
Besides him, Rahman alias Zafar, Sohel Mahfuz, Bashar, Mehedi, Mustafiz alias 'Mostafiz Sir',
Sayeem, Ejaj, Abir, Nazmul alias 'Bhagne Shahed' and Shahid alias Osman are in the top
echelons of the outlawed group. Saidur's another son AHM Shahim was J MB's IT expert, and
has been behind bars since arrest in 2005. Following up information from Mizan, the elite crime-
busters have already busted a bomb-making factory at East Monipur in Mirpur and recovered a
huge cache of explosives, detonators and grenade's outer casings.
Ex. Bangladesh Police Chief A S M Shahajahan pointed out that due to political blaming
game and using terrorist attacks and investigation for political advantages are providing
opportunities to breed militant networks. Instead of using terrorist attacks and investigations for
political advantages, a united effort is needed to address the issue of terrorism in Bangladesh.
According to Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed, professor of international relations of Dhaka University while
interviewing with the New Age mentioned that Indian and Pakistani terrorist organizations were
associated with terrorist attacks in Bangladesh since 1999; madrassas are facilitating militancy
(The New Age Extra August 17-21, 2009). He also added that Indian agencies might nurture
terrorism in Bangladesh. India has blamed for Pakistani Intelligence Service for anti-Indian
insurgency and terrorist activities.

3.5. Terrorist Financing
The content analysis of media reports showed that sources of funding for running militant
activities come from both local and external sources. All of the experts speak of both local and
foreign sources of funding, but emphasized the foreign funding sources that include international
charities, individuals and groups and even state sponsorship. They mentioned the name of
different countries, one respondent mentioned Kuwait and UK, another respondent mentioned
Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arab, and another respondent mentioned UK, Gulf Countries, and European
countries where funds are raised to support terrorist groups in Bangladesh. Among the local
sources of funding, two respondents mentioned donations in the form of sadka, kaffara, zakaat,
fitra are used by these militant groups.
From different literature, it is found that HUJ I-B primarily raises finds from madrassas in
Bangladesh. In the wake of the 17 August blasts, financial connections between J MB and some
local and international NGOs have come into the limelight (Datta, 2007). The Kuwait-based
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society has provided financial support to some of the militant
campaigns taking place in Bangladesh (Datta, 2007). The Daily Star Investigation found that
J MB gets money from local sources by collecting tolls with Kwami madrassa students and
AHAB followers. They also have Gulf donors. J MJ B used to secure funds from Saudi charities
in the name of building mosques and seminaries. HUJ I-B gets money from Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and Afghanistan through several Islamic NGOs operating in Bangladsh. Some of thee
NGOs include Adarsha Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation, and Hataddin. Shahadat al Hiqma
activities wre financed by two other militant groups - J MB and Towhidi J anata. AHAB received
funds Saudi Arabia and Kuwait through Hayatul Igaccha, and Renaissance of Islamic Legacy
respectively.

Hundi (a black market money exchange procedure) is one of the major issues of financial
crime associated with terrorist financing in Bangladesh (BIPSS, 2010). Arms smuggling is also
associated with terrorism (BIPSS, 2010). Terrorist groups use the means of money laundering for
transferring money raised in the Gulf countries in the name of charitable NGOs (BIPSS, 2010).
Various studies and reports indicate that a number of Islamic charitable NGOs local and
international is funding madrassas, mosques and orphanage or other programs supporting
militants (Datta, 2007; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Riaz, 2008; BIPSS, 2010, Munir, 2011).
According to the US DoS 2009 report, rampant corruption and the widespread use of hawala or
hundi system to transfer illegal money outside the formal banking system poses a significant
money laundering risk and contributes significantly to terrorist financing in Bangladesh. Other
financial and organized crimes such as smuggling, customs fraud and tax evasion are also
associated with hundi and annually $1 billion worth of dutiable goods are being smuggled into
India with the aid of hundi system (US DoS, 2009). According to SATP (www.satp.org),
investment and business for raising funds for terrorist activities are evident. The J MB and its
leaders invested in a large number of shrimp farms and cold storages in the south-western region
of Bangladesh. They are also alleged to be involved in activities such as money laundering
including Hundi operating from Dhaka, J essore and Chittagong which ensures a steady flow of
finances to its coffers. Funds through the Hundi (illegal money laundering mechanism) channel
are generated through operatives in places such as Dhaka, J essore and Chittagong.
It is well established that information technology facilitated the terrorist groups to mobilize
their resources resources, influence people and use for terrorist violence. Available reports and
studies show that Bangladeshi Islamist militants use latest technologies such as TV and radio
channels, websites, and CD-DVDs (Quamruzzaman, 2010). The militants use bombs using

explosives. Most of the groups have a military wing. They are trained in operations and tactics.
The simultaneous bomb blasts in 63 out of 64 districts indicate their strengths and organizational
networks in terms of use of communication technologies, explosives, training, recruitment, arms
and financing. The present government also found some private universities are linked with
militancy. It is true that some madrassa students joined Afghan jihad and get involved in militant
groups on return and used some madrassas as training camps. Aftermath of the 2005 August
nationwide bomb, local and external media and intelligence sources accused madrassas.
3.6. Factors and Causes of Islamist Militancy and Terrorism
The issue of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh is related to various factors.
According to some key informants of the study, unemployment problem, poverty and illiteracy
are the underlying factors and causes of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. While some key
informants view that madrassa education system can be associated with militancy, majority of
the experts strongly denied the linkage between madrassa education and militancy. According to
one expert interviewee in this study, bad governance leads to terrorism. Several experts
mentioned that many political leaders have link with terrorist groups. These are the internal
factors mentioned by most of the key informants. According to some respondents, anti-Islam or
anti-Muslim treatment or attack on Muslim countries by the US or other western countries as
well as the anti-Americanism or anti-Israelis motivate terrorist groups to commit terrorist acts.
However, most of the journalistic and intelligence reports and some academic studies did not
see militancy, insurgency and terrorism based on historical-empirical contexts of Bangladesh
(Quamruzzaman, 2010). According to Datta (2007), religious militancy is attached to
Islamaization, growth of madrassas, upsurge of religious parties, perceived official patronage and
Taliban/al-Qaida presence to the problem of religious militancy. Quamruzzaman (2010) did not

attach madrassa sector to the rise of Islamist militancy, rather he pointed out that the role of
transnational Islamic charity organizations in funding madrassas and social organizations
preaching and brainwashing distorted Islamic teachings and the presence of transnational
Islamist political organizations like HUJ I and Hizbut ut-Tahrir bringing radical Islamist
ideology in Bangladeshi politics are responsible for expanding international Islamist militant
networks in the country. He referred to a study to refute the allegation against madrassas, he
referred to the study findings that tertiary level students and their teachers in madrassa were
concerned with politics, but with the overall development of the country. Quamruzzaman (2010)
identified poverty and resource deprivation, economic dislocation and social disorganization,
political blame game and patronization, and easy access to arms and ideological apparatuses as
the major factors of militia motivation in Bangladeshis. According to him, the major causes of
radicalization include widespread poverty, huge youth population and unemployment, confused
religious identify, unregulated money flow, lack of freedom, democracy and political space, poor
governance and the failure of the state to deliver and politicization of Islam (BIPSS website,
www.bipss.org.bd).
Riaz (2008) examined the issue of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. By mid-1980s Islamists
appeared as a formidable political force. He sees the growth of Islamist militancy as the complex
web of domestic, regional and international events and dynamics. The political culture
characterized by historical patrimonialism, patron-client relationship based leadership and the
rivalry BNP and AL relationship eroded public confidence in the democracy and has assisted the
Islamists to envision an Islamist Bangladesh. He associated four factors with the rise of Islamism
as a political ideology: the crisis of hegemony of the Bangladeshi ruling class, the crisis of
legitimacy of the post-1975 military regimes, the politics of expediency of the secularist parties,

and the ineffective resistance of civil society. He found Islamist are of three categories-
mainstream (J amaat e Islami Bangladeshi, (J IB), Bangladesh Tariqat Foundation and Zaker Party
who participate in constitutional democracy); intermediate (Islami Oikyo J ote (IOJ ), Islami
Shashontantra Andolon (ISA), Hisbut-Tahrir who operate within democratic polity despite
reservations; and militant (HUJ I-B, J MJ B, J MJ B, Hizb-ut-Tawhid, Shahdat-i-Hiqma, and J aish-
e-Muhammad. Among other domestic factors, the changing socio-polirtical and cultural factors
such as economic policies, the criminalization of politics, weak governance combined with
cultural changes facilitated the Islamist to grow and allow militants to operate with impunity. He
asserted the disturbing nexus between mainstream Islamists and the militants.
Among the regional factors affecting the rise of militancy, Riaz (2008) identified
Bangladesh`s relationship with its neighbors, particularly India, operation of various militants
groups in neighboring countries, the ongoing rivalry relationship between India and Pakistan. He
also brought the potential of Bangladesh to use against India (helping the IIGs) and the vice
versa (Indian intelligence agency to assist Bangladeshi rebels). The unsolved Kashmir issue and
the use of Pakistan based militant groups to bleed in India, the arms smuggling that give access
to weapons by militants are also important here. Riaz (2008) also associated ideological and
material influence of international factors on the rise of Islamist militancy ideological support
from a transnational terrorist group called HUJ I, the financial support from the Gulf based
Islamic charities, the return of Afghan war veterans in the 1980s due to Anti-Soviet mobilization
by the USA, known and unknown foreign funds supporting militants and their activities.

CHAPTER IV: ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES
4.1. Laws, statues and conventions related to terrorism
Before 2008, Bangladesh did not have any law to address the contemporary pressing issue of
militancy and terrorism. The existing Criminal Code and politically driven laws like the Special
Powers Act of 1974, the Public Safety Act 2000, Speedy Tribunal Act and the Suppression of
Terrorist Offences Act, 1992 were used to punish terrorist offences. In 1992, Bangladeshi
National Parliament - J atiyo Sangsad (J S) enacted the Suppression of Terrorist Offences Act,
1992 for two years with provision of further extension. The definition of terrorist offence in the
1992 Act is not what the UN uses or other countries mean by terrorism in their anti-terrorism
laws (Patriot Act 2001 of USA, Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 of Canada). Many including human
rights organizations argue that without having an agreed meaning of terrorism, it is difficult to
enact laws against terrorism or an act as terrorism (Khan, 2007).
Various human rights organization including Odhikar and Ain-o-Salish Kendra (ASK) and
political parties blamed the government for not doing public consultation before enacting laws
and also raised the issue of misuse of the law against a cross section of people including
opposition activists, teachers, journalists and human rights defenders and violation of human
rights (http://www.bangladesh-web.com/view.php?hidRecord=349104; (http://www.humanrights
initiative.org/publications/chogm/chogm_2007/docs/country_reports/071004_chogm07_banglad
esh_anti_terrorism_policing_country_report2007.pdf; http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/
bangladesh/document/actandordinances/TerrorismAct94.htm; http://www.sai.uni-
heidelberg.de/bdlaw/1994-a21.htm). Despite expiry of the act, the government used it to oppress
opposition party people. The Act defines terrorism broadly by including crime like mugging,
arson, public property damage which could be dealt with the criminal code.

However, with respect to counter-terrorism, it has approved some bills/acts in 2005, such as
the Law and Order Disruption Crimes (Speedy Trial/Amendment) Act 2005, Money Laundering
and Terrorist Financing Prevention Bill 2005, Anti-terrorism Bill 2005, and Bangladesh
Telecommunications (Amendment Ordinance) 2005. The BNP-led Alliance government also
formed RAB having members form armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force), one border service
(the BGB, erstwhile BDR), and police to counter serious criminal and terrorist activities. Human
rights organizations and activists raised the issue of violation of human rights for using these
laws to punish general crimes which were supposed to be under general criminal law of the land
the criminal code, the Penal Code. Bangladesh also acceded to 11 international (the UN) anti-
terrorism conventions, of which 3 were signed in 2005 (Khan, 2007).
Two important laws -the Anti-terrorism Ordinance (ATO) and the Money Laundering
Prevention Ordinance (MLPO) were first promulgated by the military-backed Caretaker
Government in 2008. The 2008 Anti-terrorism Ordinance (ATO) and the 2009 Terrorism
Prevention Act and amended 2011 Terrorism Prevention Act are in fact anti terrorism laws to
address the issues of militancy and terrorist outfits, their links and activities. Most of these acts
were abused by different governments to revenge against political opponents. Due to serious
implications of money laundering, the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2002 came into force
on April 5, 2002 with the provisions of empowering Bangladesh Bank the central bank to
conduct investigations into money laundering cases and supervise all financial transactions,
establishing money laundering court, legal seizure of property, government`s agreement with a
foreign country and punishment for violating the law (The New Age, 29 December 2005 as cited
in BISS, 2010). The ATO 2008 provides penalty for offences like arms running, financing terror
attacks, committing murders and creating panic and endangering national sovereignty and

creation of a special tribunal to put terrorists on trial (BIPSS, 2010). It provides punishment for
being associated with proscribed groups, financing terrorism and death penalty as the maximum
punishment.
Since the present AL Government came in power in December 2008, the Terrorism
Prevention Act 2009 was passed in the very first session of the current Parliament on February
24, 2009. On J uly 11, 2011, The Cabinet also approved the draft The Anti-terrorism Act 2011
amending the Terrorism Prevention Act 2009`` to stop use of Bangladeshi land for conducting
any terrorist activities inside the country or other countries. This act keeps the provision of death
sentence as the maximum punishment to control terrorism and abuse of arms and explosives that
poses a threat to national security. The Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina`s promise with India not to
patron Indian Insurgent Groups(IIGs) for using Bangladeshi soil and arms and training support to
conduct terrorist activities in India is also reflected in this government`s counterterrorism
initiatives.
4.2. Law enforcement measures against religious militancy and terrorism
Arrest of Islamist militants has been continued as the most visible law enforcement
measure since 1998. The exact statistics of the group operatives may not be possible to estimate
as these groups change names or members change groups time to time. Our content analysis
revealed that out of 1040 arrests in 8 years (2003-2010), J MB arrestees constitute the majority
(482 militants) followed by HuT (108 militants). HT (108 militants), HUJ IB (37 militants) and
J MB (20 militants). It is found that most of the LeT arrestees were foreign nationals (Pakistan
and India). According to the content analysis, majority of the arrests (227 militants) are made in
2010, followed by the year 2007 (215 militants), 2009 (166 militants), 2006 (154 militants), 2005
(103 militants) 2003 (82 militants), 2008 (77 militants) and 2004 (2004). Table 4.1 presents the

number of arrests based on media reports for the period 2003 to 2010, which represents three
governments - BNP government (2003-2006), Care Taker Government (2007-2008) and the
present Awami League government. The content analysis show that militant groups has started
their activities from 1992 and some terrorist attacks occurred in 1999 and 2000 (Table 3.3), but
arrests of Islamist militants before 2003 were not held. AL Government in their previous tenure
(1996-2001) did not play any serious role. The content analysis indicates that since the
nationwide bomb blast in 2005, most of the arrests were held during the current Awami League
Government (2009-2010), followed the Caretaker Government (2007-2008) and the BNP-
alliance Government (2005-2006) and it can be estimated that before August 2005 terrorist
attacks, more than 100 arrests were made during the BNP regime. (2003-2005). Six (6) top
leaders of J MB were sentenced to death during the BNP coalition government.
Table: 4.1
Year wise Number of Arrests by Militant Groups/Outfits (2003 2010)
Year J MB HT HuT HUJ IB AHAB Allahr
Dal
J MJ B Other Total Others include
2003 31 28 23 82 Al Hikma, Tamir-ul
Din
2004 7 3 6 16 Amra Dhakabasi
2005 41 2 2 12 46 103 Harkat-ul Ansar
2006 134 10 5 4 1 154
2007 154 7 22 12 9 1 3 215 HAO, J adid al Qaeda
2008 30 2 10 10 20 5 77
2009 99 11 10 2 44 166 Dawat-e-Islam, Islam
o Muslim, HM
2010 46 29 66 8 37 41 227 J eM, QEF, HM,
MUMQ
Total 482 87 108 37 2 68 20 169 1040

Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) in its report Trend in Militancy in Bangladesh:
August 2007-2008 mentioned that the execution of J MB leaders has substantially reduced the

number of bomb attacks. Between 2007 and 2008, seventeen (17) militants were sentenced to
death while 86 others were sentenced to varying jail terms. According to police sources, 435
Islamist militants were arrested on charges of terrorism during 6 years from 1998, but none of
them has been convicted because of a lack of political will and a lack of coordination between
different investigating agencies (The Prothom Alo, 26 February 2005). According to Bangladesh
Enterprise Institute (BEI), 104 Islamists were arrested with highest number from HT (46 percent)
from August 17, 2005 countrywide attacks up to February 2008 (SATP Bangladesh Timeline
Year 2008, from www.satp.org). Due to unavailability of official data on arrests, based on the
content analysis of accessible reports, it is found that the number of arrests increased from 82 in
2003 to 227 in 2010 except in 2004 and 2008 (Table 4.1).
According to Bangladesh Police and RAB sources, since the nationwide 459 time bombs in
63 out of 64 districts on August 17, 2005, 356 cases have been filed against around 800 J MB
members and law enforcers have so far arrested 656 of them. Of the cases, 142 cases were filed
in connection with the August 17 blasts against 443 J MB leaders and operatives. According to
the then Home Minister Lutfozzaman Babar, 229 cases were registered in connection with the
August 17, 200, bomb blasts, 642 militants were arrested and 22 were convicted and sentenced to
death by rapid action tribunals (Raman, 2006). Out of 229 cases, 52 were against Abdur
Rahman, 48 against Bangla Bhai and 28 against Ataur Rahman Sunny. Among the 142 cases,
the courts pronounced verdicts in 78 cases giving death sentence to 24 accused, life term
imprisonment to 92 and imprisonment to 77 others on different terms. Besides, 171 of the
accused were acquitted. The senior police officials admitted that J MB still has roots, but they
have no strength to carry out ant subversive activities at this moment due to the arrests of its
members of all tiers in massive crackdowns (The Daily Star, August 17, 2011).

It is true religious fundamentalism, extremism and radicalization were run in the cover of
religion, and the government and political parties are likely not to affect their political support.
However, it is found that the government proscribed some militant organizations and some
individuals from foreign organizations in the 1990s or before. Intelligence agencies also
suggested for banning some outfits in 2003 or before. In 2001 during the AL regime, police
arrested one civilian linked with Osama bin Laden and 80 Islamic fundamentalist leaders
including IOJ top two leaders in a crackdown on religious fundamentalists and killing of police
personnel. BNP came in power in 2001. On September 23, 2002, police arrested 7 Arab nations
working with Islamic NGO Al Hermann Islamic Institute for their involvement in arms training
to students following the intelligence reports (SATP Bangladesh Timeline Year 2002 retrieved
from www.satp.org).
Table: 4.2
No. of Convicts by Type of Sentences (2006-2010)

Type of Sentences Number of convicts Percent
Death 19 11.45
Life imprisonment 77 46.39
20 -- 48 years 37 22.29
10 --19 years 22 13.25
7 -- to 8 years 11 6.63
Total 166 100
Due to unavailability of official data on convictions and sentencing, the number of arrests,
type of sentences, the charges for which the militants were arrested and accused, and the group to
whom the convicts belong to, and the laws under which the cases are dealt with, it is difficult to
summarize the data quantitatively. Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 present the number of militants
convicted and type of sentences awarded during the period of 5 years (2006-2010) to understand
the execution of militants. During this five-year period (2006-2010), out of 166 persons
sentenced, 19 were death sentences, 77 were life imprisonment sentences and 70 persons were

imprisonment for the period between 7 years and 48 years (Table 4.2). The nature of punishment
seems to be severe as the majority of the convicts (46.39 percent) got life imprisonment followed
by 20-48 years of imprisonment (22.29 percent), 10-19 years of imprisonment (13.25 percent)
and deaths (11.45 percent) and 7-8 years (6.63 percent). In only 6 cases, fine was added and the
amount of fine ranges from 5,000 taka to 20,000 taka (Table 4.3). J MB, HT, HuT, AHAB and
HUJ IB activists are convicted for most of these cases.
From Table 4.3 it is found that most of the cases for which sentences were awarded in the
period 2006 -2010 included August 17, 2005 serial bomb blasts, killing of judges and civilians,
killing of cultural activists, 2004 grenade attack in Sylhet, cinema hall bombing in 2005, attack
on AL rally, and for carrying arms, recovery of explosives. Most of these cases were under
Explosives Act, Speedy Tribunal, and Arms Act. There was no case under money laundering or
anti-terrorism act so far. Only in 2010, one case was tried under the ATO. But many incidents
since 1999 (Table 3.1) seem to be not yet executed. While the government thinks the execution
of militants will reduce militancy, the recent prescheduled procession and posting of leaflets
containing various calls including establishment of Khilafat system (an Islamic system of
governance) through ousting the present government across the capital by a banned religious
outfit - Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) Bangladesh does not reflect the effects of anti-militancy measures
of the current government. According to press reports, around 60 activists in the capital's Paltan
area gathered to hold a rally at Muktangon at 12:30pm (The Daily Star, August 14, 2011). Police
arrested 15 activists of the outfit filed a case against the 15 arrestees under the Speedy Trial Act,
2002 for obstructing policemen in discharging their duties and assaulting them. The Committee
for Resistance and Correction Militancy (CRCM) thinks if the militants are arrested regularly,
they would loose strengths (The Daily Star, October 6, 2010). According to police and RAB

Table: 4.3
Year wise No. of Convicts and Type of Sentences (2006 2010)
Year No. of persons convicted and
type of sentence
4

Militant
groups/outfits
Charges





2006
36 ( Life imprisonment) J MB, AHAB August 17, 2005 serial bomb blast
August 27 bombing in Thakurgaon
1 (20 Years) J MB For possessing a powerful bomb
1 (17 years) J MB For processing firearms, ammunition and explosives
2 (48 years) J MB August 17, 2005 serial bomb blast
3 (12 years) J MB
10 (Death) J MB Killing of 2 judges in J halkhati
Killing of a trader in September 2004 in J amalpur






2007
1 (30 Years) J MB Possessing bomb-making materials and explosives in his
house in Rajshahi City in November 2005
1 (40 Years) Chittagon court house bomb explosion
6 (Death) J MB Convicted of killing 2 judges in J halkhati
8 (Charged) J MB, HUJ IB Serial bombing in movie theatre in Mymensingh
August 17, 2005 bomb blasts s in Dhaka
4 (Life) J MB August 17, 2005 serial bomb blast
8 (10 years) J MB August 17, 2005 serial bomb blast
4 (14 years) J MB Recovery of explosives







2008
3 (Death) J MB Killing 8 people of the cultural group Udichi and Shata
Shilpi Ghosti in Netrokona in December 2005
3 (31, 5, 10 years)
Fine 10,000 taka, 5000 taka
J MB For bombings at Udichi and Shatadal Shilpi Ghosti in
Netrokona, in December 2005
11 (life with fine 20,000 taka J MB A sedition case taking combat training to fight against the
state in J uly 2005,
4 (20 years with fine
5000taka)
HUJ I-B

for possessing arms and explosives in Magura
6 (Life) J MB Murder of a rickshaw puller during August 17, 2005
bomb blasts in Chapai Nawabganj
4 (20years) HUJI-B
6 (Charged) HUJI-B 2004 grenade attack in front of Gulshan Centre in Sulhet



2009
13 (Life) J MB August 17, 2005 serial blasts
1 (20 years) J MB Explosives
5 (20 years, fine BDT 20000) August 17, 2005Bogra
1 (15 years) J MB
5 (14 years) J MB Explosives Kishoreganj
2 (10 years) J MB August 17, 2005 serial blasts in Chittagong
1 (10 years, fine 500BDT) J MB August 17, 2005 serial blasts in Chittagong
5 (8 years) J MB August 17, 2005 serial blasts Coxs Bazar


2010
2 (Life) J MB Arms case Dinajpur
5 (Life, BDT 20,000 fine J MB August 17, 2005 bomb blasts Bogra
2 (37 years) J MB Arms and ammunition
2 (32 years) J MB August 17, 2005 bombMymensingh
14 (20 years) J MB 2 for 2003 bomb blasts in Dinajpur, 3 for explosives
possessing, 9 for arms act and xplosives act
5 (7 years) J MB 3 for August 17, 2005 bpmb in Natore, 2 for explosives
use in robbery in Dhaka
1 (charged) HUJIB August 7, 2004 AL rally blast

4
The figures are subject to fluctuation depending on the nature of sources.



sources, around 350 leaders and activists, including the organizations chief coordinator
Mohiuddin Ahmed, senior leaders Golam Moula, Kazi Morshedul Huq and Mahmudul Bari,
have been arrested since the ban imposed on the Islamist outfit and claimed that Hizb ut-Tahrir is
in no position to hold the rally and procession as announced in the posters (The Daily Star,
August 4, 2011).
4.3. Other Measures against militancy and terrorism
Denial of the presence of militant groups is a customary tradition of the government to avoid
any blame. The ruling alliance denied the presence of militant groups and al-Qaeda or Taliban
presence in the country, only after the international pressure posed by the donors in Washington,
first initiative was taken against militant groups by banning two militant outfits J BM and J MJ B
along with arrests of militants, Huji-B was overlooked (Datta, 2007). Opposition political
leaders and even the ruling part MPs pointed that political parties have militant elements (Datta,
2007).
The current government is very strict against using Bangladeshi soil by any terrorists. They
came with a mandate to war on terror. The present prime minister and AL government already
undertook various measures to uproot extremism and prevent terrorism. It banned 14 terror
outfits in 2009. The government formed a committee for combating militancy. The Committee
for Resistance and Correction Militancy comprising secretaries of the ministries of home,
education, law, religious affairs, social welfare, LGRD and cooperatives, and information, the
Inspector General of Police, chiefs of Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI),
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), Ansar and VDP, National Security Intelligence, Rapid Action
Battalion, and the director general of Prime Minister's Office. The committee under took various

initiatives that include campaign to make people aware about extremism and continual drives
against militants as well as investigation of militants` bank transaction.
It is learnt that the education ministry is taking steps to expand the on-going anti-militancy
campaign to schools and other educational institutions at the grassroots through publicizing
booklets and leaflets against the menace. The Islamic Foundation, Bangladesh took initiatives to
expedite the anti-militancy campaign through Imams of various mosques in the city and some
other districts. All imams and other religious leaders across the country were being briefed on
militancy so that they could preach their followers in mosques, especially after the J umma
(Friday) prayers, that militancy was anti-Islamic to create mass awareness about the
misinterpretation of Islam. The government had launched a socio-political campaign involving
religious leaders, teachers, students and local administration against the militancy. The Islamic
Foundation is publishing leaflets while the information ministry is working for developing short-
films to create mass awareness against militancy. Local administrationsDeputy
Commissioners, Upazila Nirbahi Officers and police and lawmakers and heads of the
educational institutions are holding meetings for effective campaign in their respective areas to
uproot extremists from the society. The members of Ansar are trained by Deputy
Commissioners (DCs) so that they can engage grassroots people at union level to fight against
the militants (The New Age, October 6, 2010).
The present government has been making efforts to work with South Asian counterparts to
fight against terrorism. In inaugurating the APGC (Asia Pacific Group) conference on financing
militancy and terrorism in Dhaka, the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said that terrorism is not
confined to a boundary and hence cannot be curbed by a country alone. She pointed out that
terrorism is causing huge threat of security in South Asia as well as global security. Outlining the

loss of lives and property, she pointed out that despite the resource constraints huge amount of
money is being spent in combating terrorism. She also Bangladesh has passed the Anti-Money-
laundering Act for the first time in South Asia (The prothom Alo, October 26, 2010). Both prime
ministers condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and underscored the need to
tackle the security issue by giving no opportunity to use either territory by militants, insurgents,
terrorists and criminals be they domestic or foreign (India-Bangladesh J oint Statement, J anuary
2010 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi).
On J anuary 28, 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in her 1
st
session of the 9
th

Parliament expressed her bold position to root out militancy by finding out militants patrons,
financiers and sources of illegal arms and ammunition. Referring the AL manifesto and her
governments election pledge to curve terrorism, she also asked authorities concerned to take
steps to form South Asian Anti-terrorism Taskfrce. On February 20 in the same year, the Home
Ministry formed a 3 member committee to investigate the J MB activities, their actors,
financiers and arms and explosives suppliers. The security agencies identified 33 militant groups
(Bangladesh Timeline Year 2009, from www.satp.org/satporgtp/bangladesh/timeline/2009.htm).
On March 16, 2009, the Government identified 12 militant outfits and banned 12 militant
organizations in April 2010.
The Government formed a 17-member high profile committee called the National Committee
on Militancy Resistance and Prevention to tackle militancy in the country and mobilize public
opinion against terrorist activities. Expressing zero tolerance against the twin problem of
militancy and terrorism, the Government announced a three-phase program to be undertaken in
short-medium and long terms. On J uly 20, 2009, the Home Ministry ordered an intelligence
agency to investigate Faruqqi Welfare Foundation a charity founded by HUJ I-B on J une 29,

2008. On April 1, 2010, the Government planned to deploy 6 million Ansar (voluntary
paramilitary force) and VDP (Village Defense Party) members to combat militancy. The CRCM
also inquired into any local bank is used by the network.


CHAPTER V: CASE STUDIES ON SELECTED ISLAMIST MILITANTS
Due to inaccessibility to conducting case studies on five convicted terrorists by visiting jails,
five case studies are done on 5 terrorists based on available media and intelligence reports.
5.1. Shaikh Abdur Rahman
In order to establish Islamic rule in the country he formed J MB and became the chief of
this organization. Shaikh Abdur Rahman was born in the village Hazrabari of Melandah upazila
in J amalpur. His father Fazal Munshi was a well-known mawlana (religious leader) of the area.
Later, his family settled in Charshi Khalifanpara of Sadar Upazila. Rahman established a mosque
and a madrassa in his locality and became a Madrassa teacher. He was popularly known as
Ahsan Mawlana. Of the four brothers and five sisters, Shaikh was the eldest one. His other three
brothers, Waliur Rahman studied at the Madina University and is now a Madrasa teacher.
Obaidur Rahman is also a Madrassa teacher. Youngest brother Ataur Rahman alias Sunny, was
the student of the Kushtia Islamic University. Sunny was the military commander of J MB.In his
early life Shaikh Abdur Rahman was a fertilizer trader. His father's Fazal Munshi was a
collaborator who helped Pakistani army during the Liberation War of 1971. Fazal Munshi was
the founder of Ahle Hadith in Bangladesh (AHAB).
Rahman passed his Fazil Degree from a local Madrasa and his Kamil from the
Aramnagar Madrasa at Sarishabari in J amalpur. He then left for Saudi Arabia and studied at the
Madina Islamic University. According to the Daily Star Investigation (2005), Rahman`s father
was a leader of J ammat-e-Islami, Bangladesh (J IB) and he joined the Islamic Chatra Shangha
(present Islamic Chatra Shibir), the student front of J IB and he studied in Saudi Arabia at J IB
party expenses. After returning home Shaikh tried different jobs and did fertilizer business at
Sarishabari for some time. According to the Daily Star Investigation, his main portfolio turned to

be an interpreter and translatpr that provided many contactswith diplomatics from Middle
Eastern countries and frequently travelled to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. He also worked at
the Saudi Embassy and Kuwait Embassy in Dhaka. He worked at Saudi Embassy in Dhaka
between 1985 and 1990(The Daily Star Investigation, 2005). Rahman's father set up the Al
Madina Cadet Madrasa, the Habibunnessa Women's Madrasa (after the name of Rahman's
mother) and a mosque. Rahman reportedly fought in Afghanistan alongside Osama Bin Laden's
people.
Returning from Afghanistan where he received jihadi training, Rahman started dreaming
for an Islamic revolution in Bangladesh. He felt that arms struggle is the only means of
establishing an Islamic state. It is said that Abdur Rahman has link with Pakistan's extremist
group J aish-e-Muhammed and India's Kashmir-based group - Lashkar-e-Taiyeba. In 1998 Abdur
Rahman founded the J MB in his native district - J amalpur. But he runs J MB activities in the
North Bengal Region. His relatives in the districts of Dinajpur and Rajshahi helped him expand
J MB activities in this region. In 2003, he openly started his activities and recruited thousands of
supporters in the south and southwestern region. Following arrests of 17 activists during the first
conference of J MB commanders in J oypurhat in the early 2002, the J MB commanders went
underground and extended their activities across the country. Rahman built permanent
headquarter in Rajshahi town and formd the so called Bangla Bahini having its leader Siddik
Ullah as the key associate (The Daily Star Investigation, 2005). In a public speech, Rahman
published a manifesto of J MJ B as the public front of J MB. In an interview with the Daily Star on
May 12, 2004, Rahman mentioned that they are not part of al-Qaeda, Taliban or Islamist militant
organization, against the use of force and not interested to go to power, rather they would like to
serve people as a social organization. It is alleged that Abdur Rahman and his organization

received huge funds from two NGOs - the Saudia Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (Kuwait)
and Al Haramain Islamic Foundation. These funds were used to expand J MB's infrastructure,
train its workers and pay wages.
After the government banned J MB in 2005, Rahman simply stepped up his extremist
activities. He conceived the idea of countrywide bombings and attacks on the judiciary. J MB
carried out the nationwide near simultaneous bomb attack on August 17, 2005. Subsequently, the
suicide squad members of J MB also carried out bomb attacks in Gazipur, Chittagong,
Lakshmipur, Chandpur and Natrokona. At least 30 people were killed and hundreds injured in
the bombings that were masterminded by Shaekh Rahman. Abdur Rahman was executed on
March 29, 2007 for killing of two J halakathi judges on November 14, 2005. Since the nationwide
bomb blasts on August 17, 2005, the security forces searched for him, but he was arrested on
March 1, 2006 through a break-through counter-terrorism operation in a house in Sylhet where
he stayed and surrendered along with three of his associates to the authorities. But he was
sentenced in absentia for 40 years of imprisonment on February 9, 2006 for that judge killing
case. By the end of 2005, the authorities had arrested Rahman's son-in-law Abdul Awal Sarker
alias Ashiq alias Adil alias Arafat, and his younger brother Ataur Rahman alias Sunny alias
Sajid, both members of the Shura of the J MB. According to the Home Ministry source, out of
229 cases registered in connection with the August 17, 200, bomb blasts 52 were against Abdur
Rahman (Raman, 2006).
5.2. Mufti Abdul Hannan
Mufti Hannan is a highly educated person. He was a madrassa teacher. After his primary
education, he studied Koumi at Gouhordanga Madrasa in Gopalganj district (1975 to 1979).
Later he went to Daubond Madrasa in India. He did his MA in Islamic Studies from the Aligarh

University in India. He returned home in 1987. He went to Pakistan and studied at J amia Usof
Bin Noria Madrassa in Karachi since 1988. At that time, he joined into Afghanistan war in favor
of Afghanistan. He received a training of war for fifteen days. Upon his return at home in 1989,
he along with some other Afghan warriors established Horkatul Zihadul Islami Bangladesh to
support Afghan war.
Mufti Abdul Hannan was a regular member of HUJ IB and became operations
commander later. Mufti Hannan had contacts and worked with Indian and Pakistani militants
belonging to Pakistan based Let and Indian ARCF since 1995. Two Indian militants belonging to
Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) - Mufti Sheikh Obaidullah and Maulana Mohammad
Mansur Ali alias Habibullah were engaged in teaching in different madrassas in J essore,
Habiganj and Dhaka. They worked to strengthen militant outfits and used the territory to affect
terrorism inside the country and to organize a local chapter of LeT (New Age Xtra August 21-27,
2009, The Daily Star May 18, 2005). Hannan and Obaidullah established training camps in early
2000.
Mufti Hannan is accused for the J uly 20, 2000 assassination of former Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina. He manufactured the explosives at his shoap factory Sonar Bangla Chemical
Industries Ltd. His arrest along with other top leaders in the period 20005-2006 has weakened
the organization. He was arrested in October 2005. HUJ I-B was not banned with J MB and J MJ B
in 2005. Only after the August 17 bomb blasts, HUJ IB was banned.
5.3. Siddiqul Islam
Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai alias Azizur Rahman alias Omar Ali was an operations
commander of J MJ B. Bangla Bhai was born in Bogra District. He joined the Islamic Chatra
Shibir (ICS) when he was a college student. He led the Bangla Bahi Bahini to fight against left-

wing extremists. He and his force emerged in April. He used left-wing militancy in Rajshahi
region as a tool to justify his terrorist activities. In his camps, many dead bodies were found. He
hanged dead bodies in the tree and displayed sliced bodies. Earlier the panic was the left-wing
militants and Bangla Bhai became a panic during the BNP government. Police knew it and the
government overlooked it. The State Minister for Home Affairs ordered to arrest, he was not
arrested. The Prime Minister ordered to arrest, he was not arrested. There were some hands for
protecting him. This was explored in different media and intelligence reports. In public speech,
he spoke in the same tone of his spiritual leader Sheikh Abdur Rahman that the main aim is to
establish Islamic rule (Saptahik 2000 published in 2004-2005).
Siddikur Rahman is a Bengali professor in a college who was educated in madrassa and
general education system. He was active member of ICS in his student life. He also taught in the
Retina Coaching Centre affiliated with J IB. In course of his college teaching and coaching centre
tutoring, he recruited activists. He used to force people to go to pray, use headwear by men and
hijab by women. Siddikul Islam was known as Siddik master and Bangla Bhai. He was sent to
Afghanistan and returned with training from Taliban camp. He got Bangla Bhai title in Taliban
camp in Kandahar. On return he joined J MP as operations commander. He was arrested in
Bagerhat, but got released. Later he was again arrested in a clash with police in J oypurhat, he
was released again for unknown reasons. Later he opened J MJ B with his name as Aziur Rahman.
He made the plots of bombing in Dinajpur, cinema hall in Mymensingh. Although his group was
to fight left-wing extremists, the opposition political party leaders AL, Workers Party and
Communist Part were his targets. His attitude against secular political parties came into lime
light on May 23 when he organized a J MJ B March in Rajshahi where about 3000 people with
bamboo stick, hockey stick, and arms inside bag showed up in Rajshahi Town.

In another significant break-through in their counter-terrorism operations, the Bangladesh
authorities arrested Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai. His J MJ B carried out a spate of killings in
Rajshahi, Natore and Naogaon in early 2003 and 2004. It was reported that the J MJ B came into
existence in 1998 under the leadership of Abdur Rahman and it was renamed as the J MB in
August 2003 following the discovery by the police of a secret jihadi training camp run by it at
J oypurhat (Raman, 2006). Based on information from a 19-year old cadre of the J MB named
Amanullah Rimon who was arrested on March 5 from a house in Sylhet, Bangla Bhai was
captured wounded in the village of Rampur in the Muktagachha area of Mymensingh after an
exchange of fire with the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) next day. He was sentenced in absentia
for 40 years of imprisonment on February 9, 2006 for the killing of 2 judges case and out of 229
cases registered in connection with the August 17, 2005 bomb blasts 48 were against Bangla
Bhai (Raman, 2006).
5.4. Asadullah Al Galib
Asadullah Al Galib was a professor at Rajshahi University. He headed the Ahle Hadith
Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). He is also a leader of J MB and served it as a policy maker. He
was arrested on February 23, 2005 and a total of 10 cases were filed against with him. He was
freed on bail by the High court from Bogra J ail on August 28, 2008. He was granted bail in two
cases as the trials could not be held within the time set by the court six months ago. During the
BNP led government he got released in 6 cases and granted bail in another case. During the Care
Taker Government on J uly 16, 2008 A Gaibhanda court declared him not guilty in an explosives
case. After his arrest on February 23, 2005, Galib admitted that he spent spent huge money for
building mosques and seminaries, giving military-style training to Madrassa students and other
organizational works.

Galib and J MB chief Rahman has close relationship. They have similar opinions about
the Islamic revolution. Galib joined hands of Rahman in starting J MB activities with
international support. Indian AHAB leader Abdul Matin Salafi who was expelled from
Bangladesh in 1988 worked with them. In the mid 90s, Galib established AHAB and recruited
nationwide secretly to work for Rahman (Kumar, 2006). Galib recommend Rahman to study at
Madian University in Saudi Arabia and work at the Saudi Arabia and Kuwait embassies in
Dhaka. Galib was with J amayate Ahle Hadith founded in 1945 but he left in the late 70s due to
his debatable actions. He established Ahle Hadith J uba Sangha (AHJ S) and recruited members
afterwards (Kumar, 2006). Galib and Rahman used to meet in Chittagon in 1998 to discuss about
their plans for revolution and they worked among Muslim Rohingas and Arakan militants. It is
reported that Galib masterminded the militant actions in the country (Kumar, 2006). AHAM
used J MB as operational wing and HUJ I as training unit. In the Rajshahi AHAB Conference in
the late 90s, his links with al-Qaeda militants from Middle East, South Asia was revealed. West
Bengal and Punjab Ahle Hadith leaders, Nepalese Ahle Hadith Leader participated in the
conference.
5.5. Zahidul Islam Sumon alias Boma Mizan
Mizan joined J MB as a full-timer in 2001 and had close relations with executed militant
kingpins Shaekh Abdur Rahman (HUJ IB leader) and Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai (J MB
leader). He is known as boma (bomb) Mizan for being an explosives expert. According to the
intelligence unit of the elite crime busters, Mizan had long been working as explosives expert for
J MB and he had been training the militants how to make bombs and improvised grenades. Mizan
had visited a number of countries including Afghanistan. He however did not reply to query how

they manage funds to run their organization. He was arrested in 2003 at J hikargachha of J essore,
but released on bail after three months. Since then he had been on the run.
Mizan was born in Shekher Bhita of J amalpur district. He is a former student of the
Tejgaon Polytechnic Institute. He was sentenced to 20 years rigorous imprisonment in his
absence in 2008 along with the Chittagong division J MB chief, J aved Iqbal, and two others on
charge of carrying out a bomb attack on a judge in Chittagong in 2005.
Detained Mizan told that J MB high command paid him told Tk 30,000 a month to cover
personal and organizational expenses. He also disclosed about the J MB plan for terrorist attacks
and about some bombs ready for use. Mizan used to often meet Saidur's son Bashar, a key figure
in J MB, at Gulistan and asked to make bombs. He said his deputy Shishir or the outfit's military
wing commander Sohel Mahfuz alias 'Hatkata Mahfuz' might fill in for him. Bashar and Sohel
Mahfuz would hand him the money.
Mizan sometimes used his wife for terrorizing activities, for an example he gave his wife
Sharmin some coded instructions, and immediately afterwards a bomb went off inside the room
when RAB raid his house. The blast has blown off Sharmins right wrist and wounded her two
childrentwo-year-old son and a few months old girl. The boy sustained head injuries, while the
baby girls dress bore bloodstains. According to RAB sources, the J MB explosives expert Mizan
was involved in the countrywide bomb blasts. He informed the interrogation team that J MB has
close links with RSO an Arakan State of Myanmar based insurgent group, from which he along
with other J MB operatives received training near Myanmar border in 2002. He also disclosed
that in exchange for the firearms training, the J MB trained RSO to manufacture improvised
explosive devices. He also revealed one new outfit J amaat-e-Muslimeen that is linked to J MB.

Mizan used fake identity for renting his house. According to the owner, Nishat
Mohammad, said he rented out the second floor of his four-story building to Mizan in the name
of Imrul Kayes, working as a contractor and hailing from J essore.

CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS OF KEY INFOMANT INTERVIEWS

Eight experts agreed to participate in the study. They represent different organizations
including police practitioners, human rights activists, security researchers, anti-corruption
researchers, terrorism researchers, and university professors. The findings of the Key Informant
Interviews (KIIs) are presented thematically.
6.1. Public Perception
Public do not support any kind of terrorism and terrorist activities not only in Bangladesh
even in the world. Public perceived election related political violence and terrorism in different
ways. Most of the respondents pointed out that some people support aims, goals of the religion
based political groups but not support the act such as destruction of property, assault and murder
--- or conspiracies and coercive threats to achieve the goals through terrorism. Ideologies of
religious groups are ok, but their methodology is wrong which leads to commit terrorist
activities. Our neighbor countries have many terrorist groups, so we cant deny terrorism in our
country. One of our respondents pointed out that Islam is against the terrorist activities. But all
the terrorist groups for example, J MB, Harkatul J ihad, are misinterpreting this concept and in the
name of J ihad they killed many innocent people. One respondent claimed that extremists
support terrorist activities. Another respondent told that most of the political parties use
militancy for political advantage, such as blaming each other facilitating militants.
While asked about the claim that Bangladesh became a heaven for international Islamic
terrorists most of our respondents said that it is completely incorrect. Presently, there is no such
symptom. It is simply propaganda.

6.2. Rise of Islamist Militancy
The vast majority of the respondents argued that the weak political system and absence of
good governance is the key to the rise of Muslim militancy in Bangladesh. In many cases our
politicians patronize the terrorist groups for their political interest. Citing the reference
respondents pointed out that during the BNP-J amat regime the top BNP leaders including the
then Prime- Minister publicly denied the existence of Muslim militancy in Bangladesh. For
example, J MJ B chief Siddiqul Islam Bangla Bhai had escaped from police dragnets and
subsequently waged a reign of terror with backing from ruling party lawmakers. Police arrested
Bangla Bhai several times but he was released. Press report revealed that forty-one Huji
operatives were convicted in May 1998 for keeping arms and explosives but the High Court
granted them bail after BNP led coalitaion came to power. In sum, there are many examples
where police released the militants without investigating charges brought aginst them. An
investigation by the Daily Star found that most of the J MB and J MJ B leaders were in the past
members of the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the student front of ruling coalition partner J amaat-
e-Islami Bangladesh (J IB). Unfortunately, the previous BNP government did not take any
concrete actions against these terrorist organizations. In other words, to some extent terrorists
received political support from their allies. As a result, they managed to secure international
funding to organize the groups.
KIIs suggest that the main contributing factors for the terrorist activities in Bangladesh
include poor knowledge about religious matter such as rules and regulations, laws relating to
Islam, poverty, unemployment etc. Most importantly, some people especially the activists of the
religion-based political parties mislead the illiterate people in the name of religion. In public do
not support any kind of terrorism and terrorist activities not only in Bangladesh even in the

world. Though some people support religious groups and their objectives but they do not support
terrorism as a means of achieving the goals. It is important to mention that the primary goal of
most of the political parties is to establish the Sharia Law. Respondents argued that the
ideologies of religious groups are okay, but their course of action in achieving the goals is not
acceptable. In fact, it is against the spirit of Islam because any sensible person can not support
the act of violence and terrorism in the name of Islam. For example, the concept of Zihad is
heavily misinterpreted by the terrorist organizations like J MB to recruit young and innocent
people.
While asked about the patrons of terrorist groups data revealed that different religious
groups especially J amat-e-Islami Bangladesh and Islami Oikko ote (IOJ ) are the main patrons of
the terrorist groups. Besides, some international Muslim NGOs are providing financial support
to many religious educational institutions in our country.
6.3. Organization of Terrorist Groups
Terrorist groups firstly chose and target aggrieved party people and recruit them as
member of their groups/ outfits by providing various job opportunities. They also target mentally
weak people and motivate them to work for the organization. Some terrorist groups have also
international linkage for obtaining financial assistance. In recent years, the activities of these
terrorist groups have decreased because a large number of terrors are in jails who are serving
sentences. The majority of the respondents believe that only the arrests and conviction of some
members of the terrorist groups would not reduce the risk of future terrorist activities in the
country. This is because it is very difficult to eliminate the member of the terrorist groups from
the grass root level. Terrorism arises from sense of deprivation. It is true that for counter
terrorism, good political system and good governance is essential.

The majority of the respondents do not link between the expansion of madrassa and the
rise of militancy. But some argue that the present system of madrassa education is largely
responsible for the growth of terrorist organizations in this country. This is because the
unfocused educational policy makes them frustrated after completing madrassa education. Most
of the madrassa students are motivated to obey the instruction of their leader and fight for the
cause of establishing Islam. The common belief is that the establishment of religious institutions
for example, madrassa and expansion of religious education in recent years promote religious
militancy in Bangladesh. But one respondent claimed that this may not be the case always. He
pointed out that several years ago, some madrassas used to provide financial support to the
terrorist groups. But now, the madrassa are properly monitored and their courses and curriculum
are being modernized over the years. On the other hand, the Western propaganda against Islam
especially identifying Muslims as terrorist rather motivated them to get involved in terrorist
activities around the world. For example, the propaganda that Bangladesh is a haven for
international Islamic terrorists.
What it appears that most of the political parties including the top two are using religion
as a weapon to win the election. In fact, this is an election strategy for the political parties. For
example, prior to the last election the AL lead grand alliance made different election pledge such
as after assuming state power they will eliminate the Islamic militancy from Bangladesh. Also,
they pledged that they would not enact any anti-Islamic law.
Bad governance leads terrorism in any country and Bangladesh is not different. In our
country many political leaders are doing so many illegal activities and they have link with
terrorist groups to stay in power. If the objectives of political leaders and terrorist groups are

same, then terrorist activities must be continued. Some foreign countries NGOs are providing
money and support to do these illegal activities in Bangladesh.
6.4. Terror Financing
It is learnt that the militant groups received funds from foreign countries, Bangladeshi
citizens living abroad, foreign cultural group, charity group formed by Bangladeshi citizens. Not
only that some of the Muslim countries (like Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arab) plays an active role
as donor, NGOs and Bangladeshi and foreign citizens in the UK and USA raise funds for
terrorists in Bangladesh. Some international Islamic NGOs also provided funds. Respondents
pointed out those not only foreign countries militant groups have been managing funds locally.
According to some respondents, most of the funds are generated locally from sources like
membership fee, Islamic waz, sadka, and jakat. One respondent argues that resource mobilization
mechanism is very complex.
While asked about the measures to stop terror financing respondents argued that only
sealing the bank account of terrorist groups is not enough in controlling terrorist activities. It may
be an immediate solution to control terrorism. According to press report the militant groups have
been using Zakat funds for conducting their terrorist activities. In this respect some
respondents emphasized the importance of monitoring the activities of international Muslim
NGOs working in Bangladesh because there are widespread allegations that these NGOs
provided financial assistance to different terrorist groups. Therefore, government should block
the opportunities for securing funds from local and international sources.
6.5. Preventing Religious Militancy
Most of the respondents believe that the weak political system and absence of good
governance may be an immediate cause of terrorism in Bangladesh. However, it is not the root

cause. Terrorism arises from sense of deprivation. It is true that for counter terrorism, good
political system and good governance is essential. The present madrassa education should be
vision oriented and scientific so that after completing the education graduates can actively
participate in the job market. At the same time government should take some awareness building
program against terrorism. Terrorism as a subject matter should be included in the curriculum at
the secondary and higher secondary level.
Interviews suggest that just banning terrorist groups is not enough in controlling terrorist
activities in Bangladesh. It can be an immediate solution but after banning the organizations,
they run their activities in the banner of another name or joined another groups. According to one
respondent, militant network, sources of funds, arms and explosives supply mechanism and
implementation of law must be checked. According to another respondent, execution of militants
is essential and for long terms impacts, the governments must punish the criminals for cases like
the BDR mutiny, war criminals, Bangabandhu killing, and justice must be ensured regardless of
political considerations for university campus violence. One respondent argues for ending of the
culture of immunity. If terrorist see criminals can pass the justice system, militants will be
encouraged to continue their activities.
Though terrorism is an international problem, our respondents think that terrorism in
Bangladesh is homegrown and is related to domestic politics. On the other hand, the problem of
terrorism in the USA or UK is international in nature and the causes are different. In preventing
terrorism the government should undertake both short-term and long-term plan. Besides legal
action, such as arrest and prosecution of terrorists should be effective. At the same time,
education, awareness, motivational campaign should be undertaken to combat the root of

terrorism. This is because awareness and motivational programs can play a vital role in
preventing religious militancy in Bangladesh.
Everybody should work together to prevent terrorist activities from Bangladesh. In this
case, government and non-government organization can work jointly and state security sector
has to take the primary responsibility in curbing terrorism. Therefore, we need good intention
and effective program. Finally, the political parties have to come forward and work with the
government for preventing terrorist activities in Bangladesh. Most of our respondents suggest to
reform madrassa curriculum, especially Ahle Hadith and Qaomi madrassa, remove the legal
loopholes, remove corruption of NGO Affairs Bureau officials and build its capacity as an
independent agency, undertaking of development projects in northern and southern poverty-
driven districts, and creation of job opportunities for unemployed youth and madrassa graduates.
In 2009, our Prime Minister proposed the setting up of South Asian Task Force (SATF)
for combating terrorism in this region. Respondents were asked whether they think it would
have any impact in controlling terrorist activities. South Asian Task Force for combating
terrorism is still on conceptual level. Till now, there is no follow up action in this regard. They
argued that it is too difficult to control the border of our country. So, it (South Asian Task Force)
may be done. But the organization should be transparent and competent enough to fight terrorism
across the region. Otherwise, the establishment of such Task Force would not serve the purpose.
While most of the respondents think it is a good idea, but doubt of its implementation unless
SAARC is involved seriously. One respondent suggests to add other regional actors in the
process, such as China, J apan and some other countries.
Regarding the challenges, our law enforcement agencies facing today, most respondents
brought some important issues like the inadequacy of skills, technology and resources, political

interference, corruption, lack of plans, laws and data, and lack of coordination among different
state organs.
Most respondents do not think sealing the bank account can control terrorist financing, it
is a good short-term measure, but for long term impacts, channels like informal hundi system,
use of banking channel of patrons or mentors (politicians, business people, NGO, charities) must
be checked.
6.6. Impact of Terrorism
There are many bad impacts of terrorist and militant activities in national socio-economic
and political development. In a sentence we can say these activities destroy all advantages and
security system of a country. Among various implications of terrorism, respondents include
civilian casualties and property damage, creation of panic among the public, fear of women for
participating in politics, decline of national and foreign investment, crisis of international image,
and halting of democratic institutions building, continuity of political conflicts between major
parties, law and order deterioration, human rights violation by law enforcement agencies, and so
on. One respondent mentioned about madrassa education system where about one million
students get educated.


CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
7.1. Discussion
Bangladesh, which is the 7
th
most populous and 3
rd
largest Muslim country, has a global
image for being a moderate secular Muslim country. Bangladesh is mostly a homogenous
country with communal harmony having minority groups of other religions and indigenous tribal
communities rooted in linguistic nationalism. Bangladeshi people are very God loving, peaceful
and very sensitive to religion. The majority of its people are poor, illiterate and ignorant.
Although it has become recently reputed as a lawless, corrupt and violent country, its crime rates
are still lower compared with South Asian or western countries. Both militancy and terrorism
have become complex issues for Bangladesh today. The rise of Islamic militancy and terrorism
has become globally known in the 2000s, particularly after the publication of some international
media reports in 2002 and the August 17, 2005 nationwide serial bomb blasts in 63 out of 64
districts. Most of these Islamist militant groups sought to establish Islamic state. While the rise
of HUJ I can be traced back to 1992, but terrorist attacks since 1999 by J MB, J MB and HUJ I
have raised concerns among the national governments, intelligence agencies, security forces, and
foreign governments and international media regarding the rise of religious militancy and
international terrorism in Bangladesh.
Despite the claims of the government and security agencies that Islamist militancy is under
control and anti-terrorism measures particularly the banning of militant outfits, surveillance of
terrorist financing, arrest and execution of militants have reduced militancy and terrorism, the
study findings indicate that there are various issues and concerns over the problem of Islamist
militancy and if appropriate strategy is not undertaken, the menace of militancy and terrorism
may rise again.

The first issue is that there is no exact number of terrorist groups and militants and no
reliable and accurate data about who joins militancy, what are the backgrounds of militants, what
are the reasons for joining militancy, who supports militancy, where operating, operational
headquarters, sources of money, geographic variations and so on. As the content analysis of
secondary sources and the key informants indicate that it is not easy to estimate the exact number
of militant outfits and the number of militants. But it is found that the number of terrorist groups
can be more than 100 and the number of militants can be several hundred thousand. Some
militant groups are operating as home-grown groups, some are operating as Bangladeshi chapters
of international terrorist outfits, and others are operating as charity, foundation, NGOs, voluntary
organization, student or youth groups. Islamist militant groups are operating in different names
and reorganized in different groups. When J MB is banned, J MJ B emerged. AHAB, J MB and
HUJ I-B are interlinked; there are overlaps in leadership, operational and training activities,
ideologies and financing among different militant groups. They also have international links and
networks in different countries including Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Afghanistan. Many
militants are also linked to religion-based political parties. Many militants formed political
parties and many militants run NGOs. New outfits came in the intelligence reports and arrest
data. The arrest and execution data show that major groups are banned and militants of major
groups are executed. But compared with the number of militants, groups and terrorist attacks
since 1999, very few militants are arrested and executed. There are many militants hiding and
many are reorganizing. Recent intelligence and media reports alarmed that banned militant
outfits like Hizbut Tahrir dared to gather in the capital for a prescheduled well-advertised rally
and demonstration against anti-government and anti-Islamic forces.

According to key informant interviews, one of the reasons of difficulty to estimate the exact
number of terrorist groups in Bangladesh is the definition of terrorism. For example, a report
published in the Daily Star revealed that there are 30 terrorist groups in Bangladesh but the
report mentioned the name of only few. Respondents of our Key Informant Interviews argued
that there must be an agreement regarding the definition of terrorism. That is, what types of
activities terrorist act should treat. Besides one can raise the question whether they are really
terrorist group or not. We must remember that there is a difference between political violence
and terrorism. Not every form of violent, destructive or antisocial behavior is terrorism.
Sometimes people perceive political violence as an act of terrorism. We merged these two
concepts, which are very unproductive and meaningless. However, suicide bombing in a public
place or government establishment to precipitate a change in government policy is an act of
terrorism. In our country, there are some terrorist groups who are active and in this case series
bomb blast in 64 districts can be an example. Aims, goals of terrorist groups are not like terrorist,
we can mention they have potential to do those kinds of activities.
Since 1999, terrorist attacks targeted legal and judicial establishments including lawyers,
judges, and courts. Bengali cultural events (Bengali new Year celebration), cultural activists
(Udichi cultural group), entertainment establishments (movie theatre, cinema hall), religious
minorities, secular intellectuals, cultural sculptors, journalists and politicians belonging to
secular parties and leftist activists are also attacked by Islamist extremist during the last two
decades. Our intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies could not identify the
perpetrators of different attacks. In 2004, Bangladesh Awami League policy makers and leaders
including Awami League leader Shaikh Hasina (August 2004) were targeted. The nationwide
bomb blasts in 2005, attack on British High commissioner, lawyers, courts, journalists, cinema

halls, cultural activists and leftist progressive scholars. Interpol, FBI and Scotland Yard helped
our investigators to investigate several cases but no report has been published. Most of the key
informants also mentioned that they are not skilled and equipped to investigate terrorism.
The lack of political will to take bold steps against extremism and militancy is another issue.
The culture of customary denial of the presence of militancy, terrorist groups and the negligence
of governments led by both BNP and AL is evident. Politicians and state has patronized or
supported militants and extremists in different times. The study also found that intelligence
agencies of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have patronized and facilitated different militant
groups in different regimes. This is beyond the expectation that politicians use these agencies to
support insurgent groups to conduct terrorist activities against each other. Politicians take
advantage for their own interests. The government and its administration facilitated the rise of
militancy before 2005. The government did not take any step despite various terrorist incidents
including the grenade attack of August 2004, attack on AL leaders, British High commissioner to
Bangladesh, bombing in cinema halls, Udichi cultural events and the nationwide bomb blasts in
2005. While our governments have customarily been denying the existence or incidence of
terrorism, the issue of militancy and terrorism has been acknowledged in 2005 when the donors
met in Washington and when the BNP government was forced to take some steps against terror
outfits under international pressure from the EU.
The Far Eastern review article by Bertil Linter in April 2002 says hundreds of Taliban and Al
Qaeda fighters travelled to Bangladesh from Pakistan by ship. The Time Magazine article by
Alex Perry says that the southern Bangladesh have become a haven for hundreds of jihadists.
Bangladeshi media by that time already published the news about the activities of extremists and
militants of Bangla Bhai and J MJ B. Some leaders were arrested, but Bangla Bhai and Moulana

Abdur Rahman a former activist of J IB were not caught. No action against HUJ IB was taken
either. Politicians are not serious to address the problem; they mostly do showdown by doing
some token programs just to satisfy foreign powers or following external pressure or
international concerns. If our governments or politicians were serious, the situation would not be
that worst.
Islamist forces often misinterpret about religion to convince the ignorant and religiously
sensitive people to support religion based political parties and groups. BNP, J P and J IB often use
the general public sentiment in bringing Islamist elements in politics. After 2001 election,
another party Islamic Oikya J ote (IOJ ) joined the BNP led alliance government. This coalition
government coincided with the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001 and the
disruption of their operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Research indicates that both of these
parties are not just fundamentalist organizations, they have links with terrorist activities in
Bangladesh. Many of the leaders are accused of membership in HUJ IB, J MB and J MJ B were
associated with J IB and its student wing ICS.
Another issue is about madrassa education system. The study found the linkage between
madrassa education and the rise of militancy is not true for Bangladesh. We have madrassa for
many years, but militancy and terrorism are of recent phenomena. However, the study found
madrassa students particularly from kaomi and Ahle Hadith madrassa are associated with
militant activities. The study found that some madrassas are used for employing and sheltering
foreign militants linked with Pakistan or India based militants. Some madrassas funded by
militant groups or Islamic NGOs were used by militants for training and operational activities.
Intelligence reports indicate that many foreign militants despite rejection have resided in
Bangladesh and continued to plot for attacks both in Bangladesh and in India. According to some

key informants, about a million students get education from madrassa. The absence of
monitoring of madrassa education and the traditional curriculum of kaomi madrassa are likely to
join militant groups and the graduates with no scientific education remain unemployed and are
risky to join militancy. The teachers and funding sources of those educational institutions also
facilitate militancy.
Regional political and economic factors also are important issues regarding Islamist
militancy in Bangladesh. International links of homegrown terrorist and militant outfits with
militant groups in Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Al Qaeda network is established in the
literature. However, some scholars and key informants did not consider Bangladesh as a hotbed
for international terrorism like Pakistan or Afghanistan or the USA. Due to its strategic
geographic location and the reciprocal relationships of home grown Islamist militant groups with
regional non-Islamist insurgent groups or terrorist groups (India, Pakistan, Nepal, and
Myanmar), the context of Bangladeshi militancy became critical. Borders are not secure in terms
of immigration, arms and drug trafficking and money laundering. Both Islamist and non-Islamist
terrorist can cross the border, give shelter, provide training, supply arms and engage in money
laundering. The study found that HUJ IB and J MB are getting arms trainings from the RSO, IIGs
(ULFA, NITF), and Nepalese Maoist groups. The Rohinga refugee problem of Myanmar and
their miserable living conditions in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and Cox`s Bazar Districts, the
anti-India militants (United Liberation Front of Assam, National Liberation Front of Tripura
(NLFT), Maoist problem in Nepal, Tamil problem in Sri Lanka provide avenues for their inter-
group linkages and support. According to media reports, the number of Rohinga Muslim
refugees and their spread in Bangladesh are unknown; many of the poor and unemployed
Rohinga youths are recruited by militant groups. Because of their economic circumstances,

young people get motivated to join these groups and they will continue when they see their
income and other facilities from the outfits. Arms and drug trafficking can serve two purposes,
moneymaking and the use of arms for their use. Newspaper reports showed that various training
camps of anti-India militants are operating in Bangladesh and many Islamist terrorist are passing
borders and build networks to expand their activities and terrorist operations.
The money laundering and terrorist financing is another significant issue. There was no anti-
money laundering law before 2005 in South Asia. Bangladesh for the first time introduced. It
also empowered Bangladesh Bank (BB) to oversee banking transactions and detect terrorist
financing. The study found that there are loopholes in the anti-money laundering act and anti-
terrorism act and the capacity of Bangladesh Bank and the NGO Affairs Bureau are not yet
adequate to monitor terrorist financing. The BB needs skilled people and logistics. NGO Affairs
Bureau is weak in terms of its manpower, funding and corruption. The Government initiated to
monitor money exchange agencies to check hundi, but due to he the absence of remittance
transfer policy, hundi is likely to continue. Many militants abused immigration act, used false
passports and identity cards to travel between Bangladesh and other South Asian countries and
Middle Eastern countries. A number of Islamic charities and chapters of international Islamic
NGOs operating in Bangladesh helped them to channel money, raise funds and engage in
militancy activities. The study also revealed that many foreigners worked in these NGOs and
engaged in militant activities. Various infrastructures like madrassa, orphanage and mosques
were established with foreign funds and these facilities were used for training camps and
supporting operations of these outfits.

7.2. Conclusions
Terrorism is the cruelest of crimes, which is designed to threaten the personal safety of its
target. Terrorism, which was a domestic phenomenon, is now considered as a threat to global
peace and security. In Bangladesh, terrorism is not just an issue of Islamist militancy and it is not
only associated with Islamist terrorist groups only. Islamic extremism, threat of fundamentalist
elements and the sharp increase in the number of terrorist attacks in recent years deteriorated the
the international image of Bangladesh as a moderate secular Muslim country. Some scholars
argue that a number of international media, intelligence reports and studies portrayed Bangladesh
as a new hub for Islamist militancy devoid of any socio-political and historical contexts.
Fortunately Bangladesh has not witnessed any lethal terrorist like Pakistan or India. Bangladesh
has not been portrayed by the international community, media or security institutes as a risky
country. It is not in the extreme risk category of 20 countries as per the latest Terrorism Risk
Index (TRI) of 2011 released by the respected British risk analysis and mapping firm Maplecroft
(http://maplecroft.com/about /news/terrorism_index_ 2011.html). Maplecrofts TRI rated
Neighbor South Asian countries Pakistan, Afghanistan and India rated 1
st
, 3
rd
and 18
th

respectively. The International Crisis Group reported about the threat from J MB (International
Crisis Group, 2010). Indian scholars, media and government reports are found much concerned
about Islamist militant networks with Pakistan and India, links with IIGs and these are very
expected in the midst of the bilateral counter-terrorism initiatives since AL came to power.
Based on the findings, the study recommended for a comprehensive anti-militancy and
counter-terrorism strategy balancing enforcement, intervention and prevention. The existing
approaches seem to be law enforcement-centric. Catching and execution of militants is effective
but cannot be sustainable solution. Banning militant outfits, catching militants, sealing bank

account, and anti-money laundering can be some short-term solutions, but these may not prevent
religious militancy. This is evident from the recent media and intelligence reports that despite
various enforcement measures, militant outfits are reorganized and operating activities.
According to newspaper reports from 2010 and 2011, security forces have been arresting
militants of banned outfits like Hizb-ut Tahrir, Allahar Dal, for their involvement in militant
activities including recruitment, dawati activities ( invitation ) and distributing jihadi books,
CDs, leaflets. This fact indicates that what the Committee for Resistance and Correction
Militancy and the law enforcement agencies think that militancy is under control and arresting
the militants would curb terrorism is not true.
The government has undertaken various initiatives, but effective short, medium and long
term well-coordinated plans are needed. The study made the following recommendations to root
out the problem of militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh.
7.2.1. Enforcement
Implementation of existing laws and execution of militants must be ensured. The study found
that most of the cases were tried under the explosives and substance act or arms act. No case
before 2010 was found executed under the anti-terrorism acts. Adequate laws need to be in place
by identifying the legal loopholes among the existing acts such as anti-terrorism laws and anti-
money laundering act. The definition of terrorism must be decided by all political parties and
adequate public consultation must precede the formulation of anti-terrorism laws. According to
some human rights organizations (Odhikar and ASK) and key informants of this study, the
definition of terrorism is broad and may be abused to take political advantage to oppress
opposition parties. Law enforcement must be kept free from political pressure, political
patronage and corruption. RAB demonstrated some success in catching dangerous criminals, but

they are criticized for extra-judicial killings and human rights violation. Violation of human
rights by law enforcement must end. Politicians must not facilitate the culture of immunity
among the law enforcers. Regardless of political identity, ethnic identity or socio-economic
status, criminals must be punished fairly. This will discourage militants to join terrorist activities.
Capacity building of security forces including the RAB and the police in investigating
terrorist incidents, explosives and arms must be undertaken. They also need to have training in
human rights, terrorism-related crimes, money laundering and social research and data analysis.
Intelligence training needs to include how to uncover the militancy network, to track operations,
sources of funds, the financiers, patrons and actors and the motives for joining militancy.
Sophisticated technology and logistics must be provided to the law enforcers and investigators.
Surveillance of Islamic NGO operations, foreign funding, money exchange agencies,
banking and hundi channels must be strictly continued. NGO Affairs Bureau must have adequate
manpower and financial capacity and accountability mechanisms of its staff to monitor NGO
operations and the use of foreign funds in fairly and transparent ways. The government has
increased some staffs and regulations of foreign funds in recent years. But according to TIB,
experts and many NGO executives, the NGOAB is still lacking capacity and many officials are
corrupt institution. These issues around NGOAB may facilitate the flow of foreign funds to
terrorist outfits. The Government should establish NGOAB as an independent self-sustaining
agency. Fees can be imposed from its affiliated NGOs that fund can make NGAB self-
sustainable.
Bangladesh Bank is empowered under the anti-money laundering act, but its staffs must
be provided skill training to conduct financial crime including money-laundering cases,
investigate transactions, and execute under money laundering courts. The government should

undertake measures to address arms smuggling, customs fraud and tax evasion, drug trafficking,
passport fraud, national identification forgery, foreign workers background check and legal
permit for working in madrassas , business investments and illegal business run by militants for
generating funds for terror activities. Appropriate legal and institutional measures to ensure
accountability of financial institutions and NGO regulatory bodies, implementation of
immigration acts, money-laundering acts, arms act, explosives act, and other criminal acts
including anti-terrorism. Monitoring of madrassas and vigilance on hundi and foreign funded
NGOs need to be in place.
The government already took initiatives to stop cross-border terrorism. Security forces must
ensure border security. The government must be vigilant so that Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs)
in the North East India, J ammu-Kashmir based Islamist militant groups and other foreign
militants do not use our soil for training, operations or hiding. The Government also needs to
check two Islamist militant groups and two other domestic insurgent groups who are non-
religious (ethnic groups in the CHT, leftwing extremism) do not exchange and cooperate with
Myanmar based refugee militant groups like RSO, Nepalese Maoist groups.
7.2.2. Intervention
The government should undertake programs to intervene with madrassa students, Rohinga
refugees and others who are already exposed to militancy. The study found that many Rohinga
refugees are involved in arms smuggling and drug trafficking in Coxs Bazar, Chittagong and
CHTs. Many madrassa students are brainwashed by militants. Many rural and char (riverine
island) residents are motivated to support and join militant activities. Counseling, awareness
raising , life skills training and income generating activities for these segments of affected
population can change their paths to become militants. Social development programs and proven

crime prevention programs based on the local context, culture and socio-economic characteristics
have demonstrated successful interventions to reduce crime rates improve the quality of life for
the youth at risk and address the risk factors that cause crime.
7.2.3. Prevention
Anti-madrassa policy will result negatively in Bangladesh as tshousands of students are
getting education from madrassas. The study found that madrassa is not responsible for the rise
of militancy, but existing curriculum of madrassa may not produce graduates attractive for the
job market. Curriculum needs to be modernized with special focus on kaomi and ahle hadith
madrassa. Well-integrated education policy along with competitive examination is needed. The
present government has undertaken some initiatives, but needs to implement policy based on
research and needs analysis.
The government needs to include lessons about anti-terrorism in the pre-university school
curriculum. The government already undertook initiatives to raise awareness in schools,
mosques and community through educational institutions, Islamic foundations and Ansar and
VDP respectively to root out militancy. For implementation of these initiatives, Deputy
Commissioner, civil society organizations and community leaders need to work together.
The study found that most of the southern and northern poverty-driven districts are the hot
spots for militant activities. While many outfits are originated in Dhaka or surrounding districts,
militant networks and activities are spread in these northern districts. Poverty, unemployment,
monga ( food crisis ) and illiteracy are some reasons for which people may join militancy for
easy livelihood and going to haven. The government needs to undertake development projects in
these areas and create employment opportunities. The government needs to undertake social

policy to provide training and job opportunities for the Rohinga refugees. The study found that
Rohinga refugees are recruited by the militant outfits.
7.2.4. Other Recommendations
Given the regional issue of terrorism and militancy affecting the region for a long time,
Bangladesh alone cannot solve the terrorism and militancy problem. The Tamil problem in Sri
Lanka, the Kashmir issue in India and Pakistan, the liberation movement in the North-East India,
the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) issue in Bangladesh and the Maoist problem in Nepal have
long been discussed in politics and policy agenda. Islamist extremism and terrorism have been
added to this context in the region over the last two decades. The PMs South Asian Anti-
Terrorism Taskforce is a good idea but depends on the SAARC actors specially the two big
brothers India and Pakistan. It is a good success that Bangladesh and India could reach
consensus to stop cross border terrorism between India and Bangladesh. But the success of joint
initiative will depend on the fair deal between the two neighbor countries. Both government
should be transparent in making agreements and must be politically supported by its citizens.
Given the rivalry political relationships between political parties and between countries, regional
taskforce on equal partnership can make a difference.
There is a dire need for reliable and accurate data about militancy and terrorism. Law
enforcement must have available data about the background of militants, operational
headquarters of militants, sources of funding, regional variations of militant networks, bomb and
explosive makers, and socio-economic data about developmentally deprived areas. Future
empirical research can examine the different aspects of actors, patrons, financiers, and arms and
explosives suppliers and areas of operations. Future research can also look at the money
laundering and terrorist financing, regional variations, patrons, networks and strengths of militant

outfits. Research should also investigate the loopholes of anti-terrorism laws and the impacts of
anti-terrorism measures from time to time.
Political violence and confrontation political culture facilitate militancy in any country. We
have passed 4 decades and over 20 years the country was ruled by military or army-backed
governments. Since 1991 elected governments are running the country, but in 2007 we went
back to military backed caretaker government which was not expected at all. This is happened
just for intolerant and violent political culture of Bangladesh. The two rivalry political parties
BNP and AL involved political blaming without respecting properly the democratic values and
mechanisms have jeopardized the quality of life for the citizens. Politicians should be tolerant
and not let the political environment conducive for the rise of extremism and militancy.
Confrontational political culture and alarming rise of Islamist extremists also paved the way for
proliferation of small and illegal arms threatening the human security. Good governance, rule of
law and democracy must be prevailing.
Bangladesh got independence in 1971; religion was not the determining factor for our
struggle for independence from Pakistan. We got a state with constitutional principles of
secularism, democracy, socialism and economic emancipation. J amat e-Islami Bangladesh (J IB)
collaborated with the Pakistan Army and was involved in war crimes which are yet to be
investigated. Fortunately the present government initiated the war crime tribunals after 40 years
of independence. But many doubt whether fair justice will be ensured in this regard. Many
leaders who are now considered war criminals left the country for Pakistan. Since independence
our governments have been reluctant to try war criminals. The Father of the Nation issued
general forgiveness to them. Following his assassination in a military coup in 1975, both military
backed and elected governments (BNP and J P) facilitated Islamist forces to engage in politics,

become partners in coalition governments and used to counter the Bangladesh Awami League
(AL) until 1996. Even AL also compromised and made Islamist parties as ally in the vote
politics. This political culture provided avenues for the rise of Islamist forces to implement their
agenda in the name of Islam. Politicians should agree to not let religion-based political parties
facilitate militancy. They also need to support the implementation of executing all political
killings to establish the rule of law and to end the culture of immunity.

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Appendices
Appendix 1. Research Instruments

Key Informant Interview (KII) Guide
(The followings are some focus questions, but the KIIs are expected to explore the underlying
causes of terrorism and militancy, factors influencing involvement with terrorist and militant
groups, international linkages, trends, history and policy recommendations. The KIIS may
include 5 to 10 persons including academic experts, law enforcement and defense personnel,
politicians and civil society leaders)

Key Informant Interview

Interview Number:
Date / Time / Venue:
Interviewer/s:
Others Present:


Key Informant:

Name:
Position:
Organization / Department, Ministry etc.:
Telephone / Fax / Mobile:
E-mail:
Openness:
Credibility/ Reliability:

Other Comments:



B. Follow-up Questions

C. Follow-up Correspondence

1. Perceptions of Terrorist Groups

1.1. How many terrorist groups are active in Bangladesh?
1.2. How do you think the terrorist group is perceived by the public? Has this changed since the
elections, and if so, how and why?
1.3. Would you please tell us about the actors, patrons, motivators and supporters of such
activities?

1.4. How these groups are organized initially? Has this changed in recent years?
1.5. What are the underlying factors that motivated them to involve in terrorist activities?
1.6. Ideology and terrorism Is there any relationship?
1.7.Do you think that the expansion of Madrassas and religious education promote religious
militancy in Bangladesh?
1.8. Many argue that Bangladesh became a heaven for international Islamic terrorists? What do
you think?
19. Many argue that the weak political system and absence of good governance is the key to the
rise of militancy in Bangladesh. What do you think?
2. Terror Financing
2.1. Do you think that funds for terrorist activities are drawn from foreign countries? If there are
any local sources?
2.2. Do you think that sealing the bank account of terrorist groups is enough in controlling
terrorist activities?
2.3. What measures would you suggest to block the opportunities for securing funds?
3. Fighting Religious Militancy
3.1. Do you think that banning terrorist groups is enough in controlling terrorist activities?
3.2. What are the key security actors doing to address the problem of militancy? Do you think
that the state security sector is doing well, and where is there room for improvement?
3.3. What legal and institutional measures would you suggest in combating militancy and
terrorist activities in the country?
3.4. In 2009, our Prime Minister proposed the setting up of South Asian Task Force for
combating terrorism in this region. Do you think that it would have any impact in controlling
terrorist activities?
3.5.What challenges do law enforcing agencies face when trying to combat terrorism?
3.6. What are the implications of terrorist and militant activities in national socio-economic and
political development?

Secondary Analysis (Content Analysis)

The secondary analysis will involve literature review of available relevant police reports, studies,
websites and Content Analysis of one major English (Daily Star) and one Bangla newspaper
(Daily Ittefaq). Using a checklist the information regarding the types, numbers, ideologies,
activities, strategies, funding sources and location of militant and terrorist activities will be
collected.

A. Origin, growth and development of outlawed, militancy and terrorist groups and outfits
B. Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the militants/terrorists, their reason of
joining terrorist groups, types of activities, tools, techniques, strategies and targets of
attacks
C. Initiators, mentors and patrons of such groups and their linkages with local, national and
international outfits, political parties or religious groups
D. Factors (economic, social, ideological, international, religious, political) associated with
militant and terrorist activities
E. Underlying issues and causes of bombings and other terrorist incidents and their linkages
with actors, patrons and ideologies

F. Implications of terrorist and militant activities in national socio-economic and political
development

Case Study (Checklist of Items)

Five case studies of the reported/convicted militant activists/leaders will be conducted. These in-
depth interviews will help us to understand how they join and become militant and terrorist and
their life story as a terrorist)

A. Socio-Demographic characteristics of militants, terrorists and patrons
Name (Real): Other names (or titles)
Age
Sex
Marital status
Religion
Education
Schooling (Name, Type (school, madrasha, others), Duration, Trainings, Skills)
Religiosity (Frequency of prayer -times/day, visit to mosque, visit to religious gathering, :
Home District
Parents occupation
Education
Income:
Siblings:
Political affiliation

B. Factors influencing militancy and terrorist activities

Date of joining militancy/terrorist activities

How did you involve in terrorist group
Any party, organization, club, or group affiliation (political, social, religious, terrorist,
friends, sports etc)
Patrons/mentors/supporters/leaders (anonymously due to sensitivity of the topic)
Type of activities (killing, bombing, threats, extortion etc)
Location of activities (specific area, Upazila, district, by type and duration with dates)
Who designed and who implemented the plot (type, target, reasons etc)
Ideological orientation/doctrines
Do you have confidence in our legal system

C. Training and Funding

Training received (in months)
Who provided and what types of training received
Sources of funding (local individuals, party or group, NGOs, international groups,
persons, others)

Mode of funding (kind, cash, other specify)


D. Punishment
Reason for imprisonment (as key actor or associate)
Date accused/ reported/arrested
Number of prior arrest
Number of prior conviction
Type of sentence received
Date of conviction
Length of imprisonment for the present offense
Total time served in prison for prior conviction

E. Implications of militancy and terrorism

Economic factors of joining militancy/terrorist activities (poverty, training,
Social factors (family, friends, relatives, peers, political/religious/other groups)
Organized/transnational criminal factors-drugs, arms, trafficking
Association with patrons (nature of relationship, known, anonymous, type etc)
Association with fellow terrorists/militants (reason, proximity, other factors)
Association with groups (underlying causes, issues etc)
Association with funders (personal gains, group interests)
Political factors (political party affiliations, political mission/agenda/ideology)
Rationality of doing militancy/terrorism (views/perceptions/attitudes)

Appendix 2. Analysis Coding Framework

Content Analysis
Name of the News paper: Month:
Data Collector: Year:
No. Date Description
of the
Incident
Location No. of
Victim
No. of
offender
Status
(Dead/Live/Arrest)
Causes
of
Incident
Consequence
of Incident
Page
and
Colum
Victim offender P Q









Reporting Item: Summary of Findings from Key Informant Interviews

Sl. Item/Interview Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Name of the Key Informants
and Position

Date interviewed

1.1 Number of terrorist groups
1.2 Public perceptions about
terrorist groups

1.3 Actors, patrons, motivators
and supporters of terrorist
activities

1.4 Origin and growth of terrorist
groups

1.5 Underlying factors that
motivated terrorists

1.6 Relationship between
ideology and terrorism

1.7 Linkage with madrassa
education

1.8 Bangladesh as heaven for
international terrorists

1.9 Rise of militancy due to weak
political system and
governance


2.1 Funds fromforeign sources
2.2 Sealing the bank account can
control terrorist activities

2.3 Measures to block the
opportunities for securing
funds


3.1 Banning terrorist groups can
control terrorist activities

3.2 Role of state security actors in
addressing the militancy
problem

3.3 Legal and institutional
measures in combating


militancy and terrorist
activities
3.4 Impact of South Asian task
force in controlling terrorist
activities

3.5 Challenges that law enforcing
agencies are facing in
combating terrorism

3.6 Implications of terrorist and
militancy in national
development



Appendix 3
Year wise Number of Arrests (2003 2010)

2006 154 J MB (134), J MJ B (4), HT (10), HUJ I,
2007 215 J MB (154), Hizbut Tahrir HuT (22), HUJ IB (12), Allahr Dal (9), Hijbe Abu
Omar (HAO) (7), HT (7), J adid al Qaeda (3), J MJ B (1),
2008 77 J MB (30), Allahr Dal (20), HUJ IB (10), Hizbut Tahrir (10), HT (2), others (5)
2009 166 J MB (99), HT (11), Hizbut Tahrir HuT (10), Let (9), Dawat-e-Islam (7),
HUJ I-B (3), Islam o Muslim (3), Allahr Dal (2), others (23), Hizb-ul
Mujahideen-HM (1)
2010 227 HuT (66), J MB (46), Allahr Dal (37), HT (29), LeT (11), J eM (10), HUJ I-B
(8), QEF (7), HM (7), MUMMQ (6)
Total 1,040