PUBLIC OFFICERS

PUBLIC OFFICE AND OFFICERS

Public Office

Definition

A public office is the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
appointing power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
(Mechem)


Purpose and Nature

A public office is created to effect the end for which government has been
instituted which is the common good; not profit, honor, or private interest of any
person, family or class of persons (6 A Am !ur "d 66#)

$ature% (&) A public office is a public trust. (Art. '(, )ec. &, &*+# ,onsti)
(") (t is a responsibility and not a right. (Morfe v. Mutuc)

Elements

(&) Must be created either by (a) the ,onstitution, (b) the -egislature, or (c) a
municipality or other body through authority conferred by the -egislature;

(") Must possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of
government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public;

() .he powers conferred and the duties discharged must be defined, directly or
impliedly by the -egislature or through legislative authority;

(/) .he duties must be performed independently and without control of a
superior power other than the law;

Exception% If the duties are those of an inferior or subordinate office,
created or authorized by the Leislature and by it placed under the
eneral control of a superior office or body!

(0) Must have some permanency and continuity

Note" #his is not to be applied literally. #he $oard of %anvassers is a
public office, yet its duties are only for a limited period of time.

(cf. 1arney v. 2aw3ins)

Public &fficer v. Public Employment

4ublic employment is broader than public office. All public office is public
employment, but not all public employment is a public office.

5enerally, a position is a public office when it is created by law, with
duties cast upon the incumbent which involve the exercise of some portion of the
sovereign power, and in the performance of which the public is concerned.
4ublic employment is a position which lac3s one or more of the foregoing
elements.

Public &ffice v. Public %ontract

Public &ffice Public %ontract

,reation

(ncident of sovereignty

6riginates from will of
contracting parties

6b7ect

,arrying out of sovereign
as well as governmental
functions affecting even
persons not bound by the
contract

6bligations imposed
only upon the persons
who entered into the
contract


)ub7ect
Matter

.enure, duration,
continuity

-imited duration

)cope

8uties that are generally
continuing and permanent

8uties are very specific
to the contract

9here
duties are
defined

.he law

,ontract


No vested riht to public office

5:$:;A- ;<-:% A public office, being a mere privilege given by the state,
does not vest any rights in the holder of the office. .his
rule applies when the law is clear.

E'%EP#I&N% 9hen the law is vague, the person=s holding of the
office is protected and he should not be deprived of his
office.

(eovia v. Noel

(t is a fundamental principle that a public office cannot be regarded as the
property of the incumbent and that a public office is not a public contract.
$onetheless, Act. $o. &># should be given a prospective effect in the absence
of legislative intent to the contrary. Although there is a vested right to an office,
which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a
right to his office. (f that right is to be ta3en away by statute, the terms should be
clear.

)caoili v. (uuitan

.he )upreme ,ourt held that Agcaoili had not ceased to be a 7ustice of
the peace by operation of Act $o. &>#. .he )egovia ruling was reiterated, i.e.
Act $o. &># should be given prospective effect only, as there was no express
statement ma3ing the law applicable retroactively.


Public &ffice not property

A public office is not the property of the public officer within the provision
of the ,onstitution against deprivation of property without due process of law or
within an agreement in a treaty not to impair the property or rights of private
individuals.

Exceptions%

(&) (n ?uo warranto proceedings relating to the ?uestion
as to which of " persons is entitled to a public office

(") (n an action for recovery of compensation accruing by virtue of
the public office

%orne*o v. +abriel

8ue process is violated only if an office is considered property. 2owever,
a public office is not property within the constitutional guaranties of due process.
(t is a public trust or agency. As public officers are mere agents and not rulers of
the people, no man has a proprietary or contractual right to an office. :very
officer accepts office pursuant to law and holds office as a trust for the people
whom he represents.

)be*a v. #anada

4ublic office being personal, the death of a public officer terminates his
right to occupy the contested office and extinguishes his counterclaim for
damages. 2is widow and@or heirscannot be substituted in the counterclaim suit.


Modes of %reation of Public &ffice

(&) by the ,onstitution
(") by statute @ law
() by a tribunal or body to which the power to create the office
has been delegated


(cope and Extent of Po,er of leislature

5:$:;A- ;<-:% .he creation of a public office is primarily a
legislative function.

Exceptions" (&) where the offices are created by the
,onstitution;
(") where the -egislature delegates such power.


Deleation of po,er to create public office

-" .hat is the effect ,here an office is created pursuant to illeally deleated
po,ers/

A% .he office would have no existence.


0.(.#. v. $oard of #ax )ppeals

.he authority given to the 4resident to AreorganiBe within one year the
different executive departments, bureaus and other instrumentalities of the
5overnmentA in order to promote efficiency in the public service is limited in
scope and cannot be extended to other matters not embraced therein.
.herefore, an executive order depriving the ,ourts of Cirst (nstance of 7urisdiction
over cases involving recovery of taxes illegally collected is null and void, as
,ongress alone has the Apower to define, prescribe and apportion the 7urisdiction
of the various courts.A


Methods of &ranizin offices

(&) Single-head% one head assisted by subordinates. )wifter decision and
actions but may sometimes be hastily made.

(") Board Sy!e"# collegial body in formulating polices and implementing
programs. Mature studies and deliberations but may be slow in
responding to issues and problems.

Modification and )bolition

5:$:;A- ;<-:% .he power to create an office includes the power to modify
or abolish it. (i.e., this is generally a legislative function)

:',:4.(6$)%

(&) 9here the ,onstitution prohibits such modification @ abolition;
(") 9here the ,onstitution gives the people the power to modify or
abolish the office;

&campo v. (ecretary of 1ustice

.he legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish
it. 9hen the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also.

2andueta v. De la %osta

;<-:% 9hen a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an
office newly created by law DD which new office is incompatible with the
former DD he will be considered to have abandoned his former office.

Exception% 9hen the nonDacceptance of the new appointment would
affect public interest, and the public official is thereby constrained to
accept.

Estoppel to deny existence of office

-" .hen is a public officer estopped from denyin that he has occupied a public
office/

A% 9hen he has acted as a public officer, esp. where he has received
public monies by virtue of his office.


Public Officer
$olun!eer Ser%ice under RA &'()


Definition

A public officer is one who performs public functions @ duties of government by
virtue of direct provision of law, popular election, or appointment by competent
authority. 2is duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the
functions of the government, and are not of a merely clerical or manual nature. ((ee
(ec. 3 4567, E.&. 383)

Note" 9or the purpose of applyin the provisions of the :evised Penal
%ode, employees, aents, or subordinate officials, of any ran; or
class, ,ho perform public duties in the overnment or in any of its
branches shall be deemed as public officers.

Illustrations"

(n the case of Maniego v. 4eople, a laborer who was in
charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic
violations in a 7udgeEs sala was convicted for bribery under
;4, ">. .he court held that even temporary performance of
public functions is sufficient to constitute a person as a public
official.

(n the case of 4eople v. 4aloma, a sorter and filer of money
orders in the AuditorEs 6ffice of the 1ureau of 4osts was
convicted for infidelity in the custody of documents. .he court
pointed out that the sorting and filing of money orders in the
1ureau of 4osts is obviously a public function or duty.


.ho are not considered public officers/

)pecial policemen salaried by a private entity and patrolling only the
premises of such private entity (Manila .erminal ,o. v. ,(;);

,oncession forest guards (Martha -umber Mill v. -agradante);

,ompany cashier of a private corporation owned by the government
(.anchoco v. 5)())


May a person be compelled to accept a public office/

5:$:;A- ;<-:% $6.

:',:4.(6$)%

(&) 9hen citiBens are re?uired, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal military or civil service ()ec. /, Art. ((, &*+#
,onst.);

(") 9hen a person who, having been elected by popular election
to a public office, refuses without legal motive to be sworn in or to
discharge the duties of said office (Art. "/, ;4,; Note" the
penalty shall be either arresto mayor, or a fine not exceedin P
5,<<<.<<, or both)


No presumption of po,er

=illeas v. (ubido

$othing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises
power, not rights. .he government itself is merely an agency through which the
will of the state is expressed and enforced. (ts officers therefore are li3ewise
agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such,
there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. .here must be a
delegation of such authority, either express or implied. (n the absence of a valid
grant, they are devoid of power.


Claifica!ion of Public Office and Public Officer

%reation

(&) ,onstitutional
(") )tatutory

Public $ody (erved

(&) $ational
(") -ocal

Department of overnment to ,hich their functions pertain

(&) -egislative
(") :xecutive
() !udicial

Nature of functions

(&) ,ivil
(") Military

Exercise of 1udment or discretion

(&) FuasiD7udicial
(") Ministerial

Leality of #itle to office

(&) 8e !ure
(") 8e Cacto

%ompensation

(&) -ucrative
(") 2onorary


DE FAC*O OFFICERS

De 9acto Doctrine

-" .hat is the de facto doctrine/

)" (t is the principle which holds that a person, who, by the proper authority, is
admitted and sworn into office is deemed to be rightfully in such office until%

(a) by 7udicial declaration in a proper proceeding he is ousted therefrom; or
(b) his admission thereto is declared void.

-" .hat is the purpose for the doctrine/

)" (t is to ensure the orderly functioning of government. .he public cannot
afford to chec3 the validity of the officerEs title each time they transact with him.

De 9acto &fficer defined

-" .hen is a person a de facto officer/

A% 9here the duties of the office are exercised under any of the following
circumstances%

(&) 9ithout a 3nown appointment or election, but under such
circumstances of reputation or ac?uiescence as were calculated to
induce people, without in?uiry, to submit to or invo3e his action,
supposing him to the be the officer he assumed to be; or

(") <nder color of a 3nown and valid appointment or election, but where
the officer has failed to conform to some precedent re?uirement or
condition (e.g., ta3ing an oath or giving a bond);

() <nder color of a 3nown election or appointment, void because%

(a) the officer was not eligible;
(b) there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body;
(c) there was a defect or irregularity in its exercise;

such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being un3nown to the
public.

(/) <nder color of an election or an appointment by or pursuant to
a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is ad7udged to be such.

Note" >ere, ,hat is unconstitutional is not the act creatin the office,
but the act by ,hich the officer is appointed to an office leally
existin. 4Norton v. %ounty of (helby7

&fficer De 1ure v. &fficer De 9acto

De 1ure De 9acto

;e?uisites

(&) :xistence of a de 7ure
office;

(") must possess the legal
?ualifications for the
office in ?uestion;

() must be lawfully chosen
to such office;

(/) must have ?ualified
himself to perform the
duties of such office
according to the mode
prescribed by law.

(&) 8e 7ure office;


(") ,olor of right or general
ac?uiescence by the
public;

() Actual physical
possession of the office
in good faith




1asis of
Authority

;ight% he has the lawful
right @ title to the office

;eputation% 2as the
possession and performs the
duties under color of right,
without being technically
?ualified in all points of law
to act

2ow ousted

,annot be ousted.

6nly by a direct proceeding
(?uo ,arranto7! not
collaterally

Galidity of
official acts

Galid, sub7ect to exceptions
(e.g., they were done
beyond the scope of his
authority, etc.)

Galid as to the public until
such time as his title to the
office is ad7udged
insufficient.

;ule on
,ompensation

:ntitled to compensation as
a matter of right;

.he principle of Ano wor3, no
payA is not applicable to him.

:ntitled to receive
compensation only during
the time when no de 7ure
officer is declared;

2e is paid only for actual
services rendered by him.


&fficer De 9acto v. Intruder

De 9acto Intruder

$ature


6fficer under any of the /
circumstances discussed
under 4art (( (above).

6ne who ta3es possession
of an office and underta3es
to act officially without any
authority, either actual or
apparent

1asis of
authority

,olor of right or title to office

$one. 2e has neither lawful
title nor color of right or title
to office.

Galidity of
AofficialA acts


Galid as to the public until
such time as his title to the
office is ad7udged insufficient


Absolutely void; they can be
impeached at any time in
any proceeding (unless and
until he continues to act for
so lon a time as to afford a
presumption of his riht to
act)

;ule on
compensation

:ntitled to receive
compensation only during
the time when no de 7ure
officer is declared;

2e is paid only for actual
services rendered by him.

$ot entitled to compensation
at all.


-" %an an intruder @ usurper ripen into a de facto officer/

A% Hes. 9ith the passage of time, a presumption may be created in the minds of
the public that the intruder has a right to act as a public officer.


-" Is ood faith a factor in the ripenin of intruder status into de facto status/

)" Hes. 269:G:;, it must be noted that the good faith must be on the part of
the public; not on the part of the intruder.




Elements of a De 9acto &fficership

(&) 8e 7ure office
(") ,olor of right or general ac?uiescence by the public;
() Actual physical possession of the office in good faith
Note" #his is not absolutely true. )n intruder @ usurper may ripen
into a de facto officer.


Examples of De 9acto &fficers

A 7udge who continued to exercise his duties after his appointment was disapproved
by the ,A according to a newspaper report, but before receiving the official
notification regarding the re7ection of his appointment (;egala v. !udge of ,C();

A lawyer instructed by the Acting 4rovincial 5overnor to file an information for
homicide, where the latter had no authority to designate him as assistant fiscal, and
where the 86! had not authoriBed him to act as such (4eople v. 4enesa);

A thirdDran3ing councilor who is designated to act as mayor by an officer other than
the proper appointing authority prescribed by law, and lac3ing the consent of the
4rovincial 1oard (,odilla v. MartineB)


Examples of those not considered as De 9acto &fficers

A 7udge who has accepted an appointment as finance secretary and yet
renders a decision after having accepted such appointment (-una v.
;odrigueB);

A 7udge whose position has already been abolished by law, and yet
promulgates a decision in a criminal case after the abolition and over the
ob7ection of the fiscal (4eople v. )o)


Leal Effect of )cts of De 9acto &fficers

)s reards the officers themselves

+ENE:)L :0LE" A party suing or defending in his own right as a
public officer must show that he is an officer de *ure. (t is
not sufficient that he be merely a de facto officer.





)s reards the public and third persons

+ENE:)L :0LE" .he acts of a de facto officer are valid as to third persons
and the public until his title to office is ad7udged
insufficient.


&fficial )cts of De 9acto &fficers not sub*ect to collateral attac;

;<-:% .he title of a de facto officer and the validity of his
acts cannot be collaterally ?uestioned in proceedings to which he is not
a party, or which were not instituted to determine the very ?uestion.

;:M:8H% Fuo warranto proceedings

9ho may file%

(&) .he person who claims to be entitled to the office;
(") .he ;epublic of the 4hilippines, represented by

(a) the )olicitorD5eneral; or
(b) a public prosecutor

Nueno v. )neles

(n this case, there were four (/) petitioners see3ing to oust six (6) 1oard
Members. .he ,ourt held that this could not be done unless all / of them were
entitled to the offices of the 6.


Liabilities of De 9acto &fficers

.he liability of a de facto officer is generally held to be the same degree of
accountability for official acts as that of a de 7ure officer.

.he de facto officer may be liable for all penalties imposed by law for any of
the following acts%

(a) usurping or unlawfully holding office;
(b) exercising the functions of public office without lawful right;
(c) not being ?ualified for the public office as re?uired by law.

.he de facto officer cannot excuse his responsibility for crimes committed in
his official capacity by asserting his de facto status.



ELI+IBILI*, AND -UALIFICA*IONS

Defini!ion

:ligibility, which is the term usually used in reference to the ,ivil )ervice -aw, refers
to the endowment @ re?uirement @ accomplishment that fits one for a public office.

Fualification generally refers to the endowment @ act which a person must do before
he can occupy a public office.


Po,er to Prescribe -ualifications

5:$:;A- ;<-:% ,ongress is empowered to prescribe the ?ualifications for
holding public office, sub7ect to the following restrictions%

,ongress cannot exceed its constitutional powers;

,ongress cannot impose conditions of eligibility inconsistent with
constitutional provisions;

.he ?ualification must be germane to the position (Areasonable relationA
rule);

,ongress cannot prescribe ?ualifications so detailed as to practically
amount to ma3ing an appointment. (-egislative appointments are
unconstitutional and therefore void for being a usurpation of executive
power.);

9here the ,onstitution establishes specific eligibility re?uirements for a
particular constitutional office, the constitutional criteria are exclusive, and
,ongress cannot add to them exceptif the ,onstitution expressly or
impliedly gives the power to set ?ualifications.


-" .hat leislative enactments are tantamount to leislative appointments/

)"
:xtensions of the terms of office of the incumbents;

.he 4eopleEs ,ourt Act, which provided that the 4resident could designate
!udges of Cirst (nstance, !udgesDatDlarge of Cirst (nstance or ,adastral
!udges to sit as substitute !ustices of the )upreme ,ourt in treason cases
without them necessarily having to possess the re?uired constitutional
?ualifications of a regular )upreme ,ourt !ustice. (Gargas v. ;illoraBa);

A proviso which limits the choices of the appointing authority to only one
eligible, e.g. the incumbent Mayor of 6longapo ,ity (Clores v. 8rilon);

A legislative enactment abolishing a particular office and providing for the
automatic transfer of the incumbent officer to a new office created
(contemplated in Manalang v. Fuitoriano);

A provision that impliedly prescribes inclusion in a list submitted by the
:xecutive ,ouncil of the 4hil. Medical Association as one of the ?ualifications
for appointment; and which confines the selection of the members of the
1oard of Medical :xaminers to the &" persons included in the list
(,uyeg3eng v. ,ruB) ;

Manalan v. -uitoriano

,ongress cannot either appoint a public officer or impose upon the 4resident the
duty to appoint any particular person to an office. .he appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the 4resident, upon which no limitations may be imposed by ,ongress,
except those resulting from%

(&) the need of securing the concurrence of the ,ommission on
Appointments; and

(") the exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe the
?ualifications to a given appointive office.

%uye;en v. %ruz

.he power of appointment vested in the 4resident by the ,onstitution connotes
necessarily a reasonable measure of freedom, latitude, or discretion in the exercise of
the power to choose appointees.

9lores v. Drilon

9here only one can ?ualify for the posts in ?uestion, the 4resident is precluded from
exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. )uch supposed power of
appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against
the very nature itself of appointment.


#ime of Possession of -ualifications

-" .hen must the ?ualifications be possessed/

A% 9here the time is specified by
the ,onstitution or law% At the time specified


9here the ,onstitution or law is silent%

.here are " views%

(&) ?ualification must be at the time of commencement of term or
induction into office;

(") ?ualification @ eligibility must exist at the time of the election or
appointment

I :ligibility is a continuing nature, and must exist throughout the holding of the
public office. 6nce the ?ualifications are lost, then the public officer forfeits the
office.

%astaneda v. Aap

Jnowledge of ineligibility of a candidate and failure to ?uestion such ineligibility
before or during the election is not a bar to ?uestioning such eligibility after such
ineligible candidate has won and been proclaimed. :stoppel will not apply in such a
case.

9rivaldo v. %&MELE%

.he citiBenship re?uirement must be met only on election day. 9hile the -ocal
5overnment ,ode re?uires one year residency immediately preceding election day and
the prescribed age on election day, no date is specified for citiBenship. .he purpose of
the citiBenship re?uirement is to ensure leaders owing allegiance to no other country.
)uch purpose is not thwarted, but instead achieved by construing the re?uirement to
apply at time of proclamation and at the start of the term.


-ualifica!ion uually .recribed

a) 4resident ()ec. ", Art. G(, ,onstitution)
Gice 4resident ()ec. , Art. G((, ,onstitution)

$aturalDborn citiBen
/> years old on day of election
resident of the 4hilippines for at least &> yrs immediately preceding election day

b) )enator ()ec. , Art. G(, ,onstitution)

$aturalDborn citiBen
0 years old on day of election
able to read and write
registered voter
resident of the 4hilippines for not less than two years immediately preceding
election day

c) ,ongressmen ()ec. 6, Art. G(, ,onstitution)

$aturalDborn citiBen
"0 years old on day of election
able to read and write
registered voter in district in which he shall be elected
resident thereof for not less than one year immediately preceding election day

d) )upreme ,ourt !ustice

$atural born citiBen
at least /> years old
&0 years or more a 7udge or engaged in law practice
of proven ,(4( (competence, integrity, probity and independence)

e) ,ivil )ervice ,ommissioners ()ec. & K&L, Art. ('1. ,onstitution)

$aturalDborn citiBen
0 years old at time of appointment
proven capacity for public administration
not a candidate for any elective position in elections immediately preceding
appointment

f) ,6M:-:, ,omm. ()ec. &K&L, Art. (',)

$aturalDborn citiBen
0 years old at time of appointment
college degree holder
not a candidate for elective position in election immediately preceding appointment
chairman and ma7ority should be members of the bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least &> years ((ee %ayetano v. Monsod)

g) ,6A ,ommissioners

$aturalDborn citiBen
0 years old at time of appointment
,4A with M&> year of auditing experience or
1ar member engaged in practice of law for at least &> years
$ot have been candidates for elective position in elections immediately preceding
appointment

%ayetano v. Monsod 4ractice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which re?uires the application of law, legal
procedure, 3nowledge, training and experience.
5enerally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any 3ind of service which re?uires the use in any
degree of legal 3nowledge or s3ill.

)?uino v. %&MELE%% ;esidency of not less than & year prior to the
elections for the position of ,ongressman. (n
election law, residence refers to domicile, i.e. the
place where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home, where he intends to return.
.o successfully effect a change of domicile, the
candidate must prove an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile. 2ere, it was held that
leasing a condominium unit in the district was not to
ac?uire a new residence or domicile but only to
?ualify as a candidate.

Marcos v. %&MELE%% 8omicile, which includes the twin elements of actual
habitual residence, and animus manendi, the
intention of remaining there permanently. (t was
held that domicile of origin is not easily lost, and
that in the absence of clear and positive proof of a
successful change of domicile, the domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue.

:eliious #est or -ualification

$o religious test shall be re?uired for the exercise of civil or political rights. (Art.
(((, )ec. 0, &*+# ,onstitution)


FOR/A*ION OF OFFICIAL RELA*ION

Modes of %ommencin &fficial :elation

(a) :lection

(b) Appointment

(c) 6thers%
(i) )uccession by operation of law;

(ii) 8irect provision of law, e.g. exDoficio officers


Election" )election or designation by a popular vote


)ppointment

Definition

-" Distinuish bet,een desination and appointment.

8esignation Appointment

8efinition

(mposition of additional
duties upon an existing
office

)election of an individual
to occupy a certain public
office by one authoriBed
by law to ma3e such
selection


:xtent of
4owers

-imited

,omprehensive

)ecurity of
tenureN

$o.

Hes.

9hen
deemed
abandonment
of prior office

Assumption of a
designated position is not
deemed abandonment of
the &
st
position

Assumption of a
"
nd
appointive position is
usually deemed
abandonment of the first
office.


Nature of )ppointin Po,er

.he power to appoint is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of
discretion. (,oncepcion v. 4aredes)

.he power and prerogative to a vacant position in the civil service is lodged
with the appointing authority.


%onstitutional Provisions

-" .ho can the President nominate and appoint ,ith the consent of the
%ommission on )ppointments/

)"
2eads of the executive departments (Art. G((, )ec. &6,
&*+# ,onst.);

Ambassadors (ibid);

6ther public ministers and consuls (ibid);

6fficers of the armed forces from the ran3 or colonel or naval captain
(ibid);

6ther officers whose appointments are vested in him by the
,onstitution (ibid), including ,onstitutional ,ommissioners (Art. ('D1,
)ec. & (") for ,),; Art. ('D,, )ec. & (") for ,6M:-:,; Art. ('D8,
)ec. & (") for ,6A).

-" .ho can the President appoint ,ithout the need for %) approval/

)" All other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;

.hose whom he may be authoriBed by law to appoint;

Members of the )upreme ,ourt;

$ote% .o be appointed from a list of at least nominees prepared by the
!udicial and 1ar ,ouncil (Art. G(((, )ec. *, &*+# ,onst.)

!udges of lower courts;

$ote% .o be appointed from a list of at least nominees prepared by the
!udicial and 1ar ,ouncil (Art. G(((, )ec. *, &*+# ,onst.)

6mbudsman and his deputies

$ote% .o be appointed from a list of at least 6 nominees prepared by the
!udicial and 1ar ,ouncil, and from a list of nominees for every vacancy
thereafter (Art. '(, )ec. *, &*+# ,onst.)


-" Does the President have the po,er to ma;e appointments ,hen
%onress is in recess/

)" Hes. 2owever, such appointments shall be effective only until%

(&) disapproval by the ,ommission on Appointments; or

(") the next ad7ournment of the ,ongress ()ec. &6, Art. G((, &*+#
,onst.)


-" .hat is the effectivity of appointments extended by an )ctin
President/

)" )uch appointments shall remain effective unless revo3ed by
the elected 4resident within *> days from his assumption or
reassumption of office. ()ec. &/, Art. G((, &*+# ,onst.)


-ualification (tandards and :e?uirements under the %ivil (ervice La,

-ualification (tandards"

:xpress the minimum re?uirements for a class of positions in terms
of education , training and experience, civil service eligibility, physical
fitness, and other ?ualities re?uired for successful performance. ()ec.
"", 1oo3 G, :6 "*")

A statement of the minimum ?ualifications of a position
which shall include education, experience, training, civil
service eligibility, and physical characteristics and
personality traitsre?uired by the 7ob. ()ec. ", ;ule (G,
6mnibus ;ules)

9ith respect to a particular position, such ?ualification standards
shall serve as the basis for the determination by the appointing
authority of the degree of ?ualifications of an officer or employee
(ibid);

)hall be used as basis for civil service examinations for positions in
the career service, as guides in appointment and other personnel
actions, in the ad7udication of protested appointments, in determining
training needs, and as aid in the inspection and audit of the agenciesE
personnel wor3 programs (ibid);

)hall be administered in such manner as to continually provide
incentives to officers and employees towards professional growth and
foster the career system in the government service (ibid);

(t shall be the responsibility of the departments and
agencies to establish, administer and maintain the
?ualification standards on a continuing basis as an incentive
to career advancement. ()ec. #, ;ule (G, 6mnibus ;ules)

.heir establishment, administration, and maintenance shall be the
responsibility of the department @ agency, with the assistance and
approval of the ,), and in consultation with the 9age and 4osition
,lassification 6ffice (ibid);

9henever necessary, the ,), shall provide technical
assistance to departments and agencies in the development
of their ?ualification standards. ()ec. 0, ;ule (G, 6mnibus
;ules)

)hall be established for all positions in the &
st
and "
nd
levels ()ec. &,
;ule (G, 6mnibus ;ules);


Political -ualifications for an &ffice

5:$:;A- ;<-:% 4olitical ?ualifications are not re?uired for public office.

Exceptions" (&) Membership in the electoral tribunals of either
the 2ouse of ;epresentatives or )enate (Art. G(,
)ec. &#, &*+# ,onst.);

(") 4artyDlist representation;

() ,ommission on Appointments;

(/) Gacancies in the )anggunian ()ec. /0, -ocal
5overnment ,ode)

Property -ualifications

(n the cases of Ma?uera v. 1orra and Aurea v. ,6M:-:,, the )upreme ,ourt
struc3 down ;.A. //"& which re?uired candidates for national, provincial, city and
municipal offices to post a surety bond e?uivalent to the oneDyear salary or emoluments
of the position to which he is a candidate, which shall be forfeited in favor of the govt.
concerned if the candidate fails to obtain at least &>O of the votes cast.

.he )upreme ,ourt held that property ?ualifications are inconsistent with the
nature and essence of the ;epublican system ordained in our ,onstitution and the
principle of social 7ustice underlying the same. .he ,ourt reasoned out that%

A)overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and
to be voted shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual
concerned. )ocial 7ustice presupposes e?ual opportunity for all, rich and
poor ali3e, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty,
be denied the chance to be elected to public office.A


)liens not eliible to public office

#his is selfBexplanatory.

Effect of removal of ?ualifications durin the term

-" .hat happens if the ?ualification is lost ,hich the officer is holdin office/

)" .he officer must be terminated.

Effect of pardon upon the dis?ualification to hold public office

5:$:;A- ;<-:% A pardon shall not wor3 the restoration of the right to
hold public office. (Art. 6, ;evised 4enal ,ode)

Exceptions" (&) 9here such right to hold public office is expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon (Art. 6, ;4,);

(") 9hen a person is granted pardon because he did not
commit the offense imputed to him (5arcia v. ,hairman,
,6A)

Rule go%erning effec! of .ardon#

(&) A public official who has been convicted of a crime but has been
pardoned must secure a reappointment before he @ she can reassume his
@ her former position. (Monsanto v. Cactoran)

Note" )c?uittal is the only round for automatic reinstatement of a
public officer to his @ her former position.

(") 4ardon does not exempt the culprit from payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him @ her by the sentence. (Art. 6, par. ", ;4,)

() A convicted public official who has been pardoned is not entitled to
bac3pay and other emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite. (Monsanto v. Cactoran)

Discretion of appointin official

8iscretion, if not plenary, at least sufficient, should thus be granted to those
entrusted with the responsibility of administering the officers concerned, primarily
the department heads. .hey are in the most favorable position to determine who
can best fulfill the functions of the office thus vacated. <nless, therefore, the law
spea3s in the most mandatory and peremptory tone, considering all the
circumstances, there should be, as there has been, full recognition of the wide
scope of such discretionary authority. (;eyes v. Abeleda)

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to this best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the ?ualifications re?uired by law. (-apinid v.
,),)

.he only function of the ,), is to review the appointment in the light of the
re?uirements of the ,ivil )ervice -aw, and when it finds the appointee to be
?ualified and all other legal re?uirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no
choice but to attest to the appointment. (t cannot order the replacement of the


appointee simply because it considers another employee to be better ?ualified.
(-apinid v. ,),)

.o hold that the ,ivil )ervice -aw re?uires that any vacancy be filled by
promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, or certification in that order
would be tantamount to legislative appointment which is repugnant to the
,onstitution. .he re?uirement under the ,ivil )ervice -aw that the appointing
power set forth the reason for failing to appoint the officer next in ran3 applies
only in cases of promotion and not in cases where the appointing power chooses
to fill the vacancy by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification, not
necessarily in that order. (4ineda v. ,laudio)

.he ,), is not empowered to change the nature of the appointment extended
by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the re?uirements of the ,ivil )ervice -aw. 9hen the
appointee is ?ualified and all the legal re?uirements are satisfied, the ,), has
no choice but to attest to the appointment. (-uego v. ,),)

Appointment is a political ?uestion.

9here the palpable excess of authority or abuse of discretion in refusing to issue
promotional appointment would lead to manifest in7ustice, mandamus will lie to
compel the appointing authority to issue said appointments. (5esolgon v.
-acson)


Effectivity of )ppointment

-" .hen does an appointment ta;e effect/

A% (mmediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority. (;ule G, )ec. &>,
6mnibus ;ules).


.hen appointment becomes complete, final and irrevocable

5:$:;A- ;<-:% An appointment, once made, is irrevocable and not
sub7ect to reconsideration.

-ualification" .here the assent, confirmation, or approval of some other
officer or body is needed before the appointment may be
issue and be deemed complete.

Exceptions% (&) 9hen the appointment is an absolute nullity (Mitra v.
)ubido);

(") 9hen there is fraud on the part of the appointee (Mitra
v. )ubido);

() Midnight appointments

A completed appointment vests a legal right. (t cannot be ta3en away
:',:4. for cause, and with previous notice and hearing (due process).


Midniht appointments

A 4resident or Acting 4resident is prohibited from ma3ing appointments "
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term.
(Art. G((, )ec. &0, &*+# ,onst.)

Exception% .emporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will pre7udice public service or
endanger public safety.


ASSU/P*ION AND *ER/ OR *ENURE OF OFFICE

-ualifica!ion !o Office

)ppointment and -ualification to &ffice Distinuished

Appointment and ?ualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment
is the act of being designated to a public office by the appointing authority. Fualification
is the act of signifying oneEs acceptance of the appointive position. .his generally
consists of the ta3ing @ subscribing @ filing of an official oath, and in certain cases, of the
giving of an official bond, as re?uired by law. (Mechem)

$o one can be compelled to accept an appointment.

Lacson v. :omero

.he appointment to a government post involves several steps% (&) the 4resident
nominates; (b) the ,ommission on Appointments confirms the appointment; and (c)
the appointee accepts the appointment by his assumption of office. .he first " steps
are mere offers to the post but the last step rests solely with the appointee who may
or may not accept the appointment.

$orromeo v. Mariano

A 7udge may not be made a 7udge of another district without his consent.
Appointment and ?ualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment
is the sole act of the appointee. .here is no power which can compel a man to
accept the office.

Effect of 9ailure to -ualify

Cailure to ?ualify is deemed evidence of refusal of the office.

(t is a ground for removal%

(f ?ualification is a
condition precedent% Cailure to ?ualify ipso facto deemed
re7ection of the office

(f not condition precedent% Cailure is not ipso facto re7ection

!ustifiable reasons for delay in ?ualifying include sic3ness, accident, and
other fortuitous events that excuse delay.

.he 6mnibus :lection ,ode provides that the officer must ?ualify (i.e., ta3e
his oath of office and assume office) within 6 months from proclamation.
6therwise, the position will be deemed vacant.

Exception% (f the nonDassumption of office is due to a cause
beyond his control.

Fualification is significant because it designates when security of tenure
begins.

Oa!h of Office

An oath is an outward pledge whereby one formally calls upon 5od to witness to the
truth of what he says or to the fact that he sincerely intends to do what he says.

Although the law usually re?uires the ta3ing of an oath, it is not indispensable. (t is a
mere incident to the office and constitutes no part of the office itself. 2owever, the
4resident, GiceD4resident and Acting 4resident are re?uired by the ,onstitution (Art.
G((, )ec. 0) to ta3e an oath or affirmation before entering into the execution of their
office. )uch oathDta3ing is mandatory.

-" .ho are authorized to administer oaths/

)" (&) $otaries public;
(") !udges;
() ,ler3s of court;
(/) )ecretary of 2ouse @ )enate;
(0) )ecretary of :xec. 8epartments;
(6) 1ureau 8irectors;
(#) ;egister of 8eeds;
(+) 4rovincial governors;
(*) ,ity mayors;
(&>) Municipal mayors;
(&&) Any other officer in the service of the government of the 4hilippines
whose appointment is vested in the 4resident;
(&") Any other officer whose duties, as defined by law or regulation,
re?uire presentation to him of any statement under oath

-" .ho are oblied to administer oaths in all instances, and not *ust in matters
of official business/

)" (&) $otaries public;
(") Municipal 7udges;
() ,ler3s of court

#ime of #a;in the &ath of &ffice

A public officer must ta3e his oath of office before entering upon the discharge of
his duties.

:e?ualification

(f a public officer is reDelected or reDappointed, he must ta3e another oath and
fulfill the other condition precedents before assuming office. .he oath and other
?ualifications made prior to assumption of his previous office will not be valid for
subse?uent terms of office.


+i%ing of Bond

Persons re?uired to ive bond

-" .ho are the public officers enerally re?uired to ive a bond/

)" (&) Accountable public officers or those to whom are entrusted the collection
and custody of public money;

(") 4ublic ministerial officers whose actions may affect the rights and
interests of individuals.

.he bond is in the nature of an indemnity bond rather than a penal or forfeiture
bond.

.he bond is also an obligation binding the sureties to ma3e good the officer=s
default. (t is re?uired not for the benefit of the office holder, but for the protection
of the public interest and is designed to indemnify those suffering loss or in7ury by
reason of misconduct or neglect in office.



Effect of 9ailure to +ive $ond ,ithin the Prescribed Period

(f not condition precedent% Cailure to give bond merely constitutes a ground
for
forfeiture of the office; it is not forfeiture of the
office ipso facto.

(C condition precedent% Cailure to give bond within the prescribed period
renders the office vacant.


*er" and *enure of Office

#erm of &ffice and #enure of &ffice Distinuished

.erm of 6ffice .enure of 6ffice

De *ure De facto

Cixed and definite period of time 4eriod during which the incumbent
during which the officer may actually holds the office. (t may be
claim to hold the office as of right shorter than the term.


)lba v. Evanelista

(t is only in those cases in which the office is held at the pleasure of the
appointing power and where the power of removal is exercisable at its mere discretion
that the officer may be removed without notice or hearing.


Po,er of the Leislature to 9ix and %hane the #erm of &ffice

;<-:)%

9here the term is fixed
by the ,onstitution% ,ongress has no power to alter the term.

>o,ever, such term of office can be shortened or extended
by the vote of the people ratifying a constitutional amendment.

9here the term is not fixed% ,ongress may fix the terms of officers
other than those provided for in the ,onst.

,ongress has the power to change the tenure of officers holding offices
created by it. 2owever, if the term is lengthened and made to apply to the
incumbents, this could be tantamount to a legislative appointment which is null
and void.

.hen #erm of &ffice Dependent upon CPleasure of the PresidentC

,ongress can legally and constitutionally ma3e the tenure of certain officials
dependent upon the pleasure of the 4resident. (Alba v. :vangelista)

9here the office is held at the pleasure of the appointing power and such
appointing power can exercise the power of removal at his mere discretion, the public
officer may be removed without notice or hearing. (Alba v. :vangelista)


No =ested Interest in #erm of &ffice

4ublic office is a privilege revocable by the sovereignty at will. An incumbent
cannot validly ob7ect to the alteration of his term since he has no vested right in his
office. (5reenshow v. <.).)


#erm of &ffice Not Extended by :eason of .ar

.here is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term may be extended by
reason of war. ($ueno, et al. v. Angeles)


Doc!rine of 0oldo%er

-" .hat is the doctrine of holdBover/

)" A public officer whose term has expired or services have been terminated is allowed
to continue holding his office until his successor is appointed or chosen and had
?ualified. (Mechem)

Purpose of the >oldB&ver :ule

4ublic interest. (t is to prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when
a successor may be chosen and inducted into office.

>oldinB&ver :ules

(&) 9here the law provides for it% .he office does not become vacant upon
the expiration of the term if there is no
successor elected and ?ualified to assume
it. (ncumbent will holdDover even if beyond
the term fixed by law.

(") 9here the law is silent% <nless holdDover is expressly or impliedly
prohibited, incumbent may holdDover.

() 9here the ,onstitution limits
the term of a public officer and
does not provide for holdDover% 2oldDover is not permitted.


Co""ence"en! of *er" of Office

;<-:)%

(&) 9here the time is fixed% .he term will begin on the specified date.

(") 9here no time is fixed% .he term will generally begin on the date
of the election or the appointment.


PO1ERS AND DU*IES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Source of +o%ern"en! Au!hori!y# .he people, the sovereignty.

Sco.e of Po2er of a Public Officer

Lo %ham v. &campo

.he duties of a public office includes all those which truly are within its scope%

(&) those which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose
for which the office was created; or

(") those which, although incidental or collateral, are germane to and
serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose.


*erri!orial E3!en! of Po2er of Public Officer

5:$:;A- ;<-:% 9here a public officer is authoriBed by law to perform the duties of
his office at a particular place, action at a place not authoriBed by
law is ordinarily invalid. (Note" #his rule is applicable to all public
officers ,hose duties are essentially local in nature, e.. *udes.7

:',:4.(6$)% (&) ,onsuls;

(") 4olice officers, who may arrest persons for crimes
committed outside 4hilippine territory;

() 8octrine of hot pursuit


Dura!ion of Au!hori!y of Public Officer

.he duration of the authority of public officers is limited to that term during which he is,
by law, invested with the rights and duties of the office.

Con!ruc!ion of +ran! of Po2er

)trict construction. 9ill be construed as conferring only those powers which
are expressly imposed or necessarily implied.

Claifica!ion of Po2er

Dicre!ionary /ini!erial

Defini!ion

Acts which re?uire the exercise
of reason in determining when,
where, and how to exercise the
power

Acts which are performed in a
given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience
to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise
of his own 7udgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act
done (-amb v. 4hipps)

Can be delega!ed4

5enerally, $6.

:xception% 9hen the power to
substitute @ delegate has been
given

5enerally, H:).

:xception% 9hen the law
expressly re?uires the act to be
performed by the officer in
person and @ or prohibits such
delegation

1hen i "anda"u
.ro.er4

6nly if the duty to do something
has been delayed for an
unreasonable period of time.
(n all cases.

I .ublic officer
liable4


5enerally not liable
:xceptions% if there is fraud or
malice

-iable if duty exercised contrary
to the manner prescribed by law.


Dicre!ion5 Dicre!ionary Po2er
/ini!erial Du!y

-" .hat is discretion/

A% 8iscretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred
upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the
dictates of their own 7udgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the 7udgment or
conscience of others. (-amb v. 4hipps)

-" .hat is a ministerial act/

)" A purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
7udgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. A ministerial
act is one to which nothing is left to the discretion of the person who must
perform. (t is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or
proved to exist and imposed by law. (t is a precise act, accurately mar3ed
out, en7oined upon particular officers for a particular purpose. (-amb v.
4hipps)


Lamb v. Phipps

Auditors and comptrollers, as accounting officers, are generally regarded as
?uasiD7udicial officers. .hey perform mere ministerial duties only in cases where
the sum due is conclusively fixed by law or pursuant to law. :xcept in such
cases, the action of the accounting officers upon claims coming before them for
settlement and certification of balances found by them to be due, is not merely
ministerial but 7udicial and discretionary. Mandamus will therefore not issue.


#orres v. :ibo

.he powers of the 1oard of ,anvassers are ?uasiD7udicial and therefore
discretionary.

)prueba v. +anzon

Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a
public officer where the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise
7udgment in reference to any matter in which he is re?uired to act.

.he privilege of operating a mar3et stall under license is not absolute but
revocable under an implied lease contract sub7ect to the general welfare clause.

Mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of contractual obligations.


Miuel v. 2ulueta

4ublic officers may properly be compelled by mandamus to remove or rectify
an unlawful act if to do so is within their official competence.


-" .hen ,ill the ,rit of mandamus issue/

)"
.o correct a gross abuse of discretion, a palpable excess of authority
resulting in manifest in7ustice (5esolgon v. -acson);

9here the ?uestion of constitutionality is raised by the petitioner (,u
<n7ieng v. 4atstone);


-" .hen ,ill the ,rit of mandamus never issue/

)" (&) .o control discretion;

(") 9hen another ade?uate remedy exists;

() .o enforce the performance of contractual obligations, as in the
issuance of a license @ permit (Aprueba v. 5anBon);


-" In filin a mandamus suit, ,hen does a taxpayer not have to sho, that he
has any leal or special interest in the results of such suit/

)" 9hen the ?uestion is one of public right and the ob7ect of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, such as the observance of the
law. (Miguel v. Pulueta)


*i"e of E3ecu!ion of Po2er

9here not indicated% 9ithin a reasonable time

9here indicated% Merely directory

Exceptions"

(&) 9hen there is something in the statute which shows a different
intent (Araphoe ,ity v. <nion 4ac);

(") 9here a disregard of the provisions of the statute would
in7uriously affect a public interest or public right;

() 9hen the provision is accompanied by negative words
importing that the acts shall not be done in any other manner
or time than that designated.


Ra!ifica!ion of Unau!hori6ed Ac!

(f act was absolutely void
at the time it was done% ,annot be ratified

(f merely voidable% ,an be ratified and rendered valid


9here superior officers have authority to ratify the acts of their inferiors, they are
restricted to the ratification of acts and contracts which they themselves are
empowered to ma3e.

(t is not enough that the public officer acted beyond his powers in order that he may
be held liable for damages. (f the act committed is reasonably related to his
duties and the officer was in good faith, he will not be held liable.


+o%ern"en! no! e!o..ed by !he unau!hori6ed or Illegal ac! of officer


As between an individual and his government, the individual cannot plead the void
act of an official to shield him from the demand of the government that he (the
individual) fulfill an obligation which he has contracted with the government, after the
benefits accruing to him as a result of that obligation have been received. .he
government can neither be estopped nor pre7udiced by the illegal acts of its
servants. (5overnment v. 5alarosa)

>ilado v. %ollector

A tax circular issued on a wrong construction of the law cannot give rise to a
vested right that can be invo3ed by a taxpayer.


Accoun!abili!y and Re.onibili!y of Public Officer and E".loyee

Nor" of Perfor"ance of Du!ie

-" .hat are the standards of personal conduct provided for in (ec. 6, :) DE5F/

A% (&) ,ommitment to public interest;
(") 4rofessionalism;
() !ustness and sincerity;
(/) 4olitical neutrality;
(0) ;esponsiveness to the public;
(6) $ationalism and patriotism;
(#) ,ommitment to democracy;
(+) )imple living


RI+0*S AND PRI$ILE+ES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Righ! !o Office

.he right to office is the right to exercise the powers of the office to the exclusion of
others.


Righ! !o Salary or Co".ena!ion

5:$:;A- ;<-:)%

A public officer is not entitled to compensation for services rendered under
an unconstitutional statute or provision thereof.

Exception% (f some other statute provides otherwise.

(f no compensation is fixed by law, the public officer is assumed to have
accepted the office to serve gratuitously.

After services have been rendered by a public officer, the compensation thus
earned cannot be ta3en away by a subse?uent law. 2owever, he cannot
recover salary for a period during which he performed no services.

6ne without legal title to office either by lawful appointment or election and
?ualification is not entitled to recover salary or compensation attached to the
office.

6ne who intrudes into or usurps a public office has no right to the salary or
emoluments attached to the office.


%ompensation not an element of public office

,ompensation is not indispensable to public office. (t is not part of the office but
merely incident thereto. (t is sometimes expressly provided that certain officers shall
receive no compensation, and a law creating an office without any provision for
compensation may carry with it the implication that the services are to be rendered
gratuitously.

(alary, .aes, and Per Diems Defined and Distinuished


)alary% timeDbound
9ages% serviceDbound
4er 8iem% allowance for days actually spent for special duties

(alary of Public &fficer Not (ub*ect to )ttachment

.he salary of a public officer or employee may not, by garnishment,
attachment, or order of execution, be seiBed before being paid by him, and
appropriated for the payment of his debts.

Money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of
garnishment because the sovereign )tate cannot be sued in its own courts
except by express authoriBation by statute. <ntil paid over by the agent of
the government to the person entitled to receive it, public funds cannot in any
legal sense be part of his effects sub7ect to attachment by legal process.
(8irector of ,ommerce and (ndustry v. ,oncepcion)

9uture or 0nearned (alaries %annot be )ssined

.he salary or emoluments in public office are not considered the proper sub7ect
of barter and sale. ("" ;.,.-. 0/&)

)reements )ffectin %ompensation >eld =oid

An agreement by a public officer respecting his compensation may rightfully be
considered invalid as against public policy where it tends to pervert such compensation
to a purpose other than that for which it was intended, and to interfere with the officerEs
free and unbiased 7udgment in relation to the duties of his office. (.his is usually with
reference to unperformed services and the salary or fees attached thereto.)

:iht to :ecover (alary" De 1ure &fficer and De 9acto &fficer

Monroy v. %) and del :osario

9here a mayor filed a certificate of candidacy for congressman then
withdrew such certificate and reassumed the position of mayor, thus preventing
the viceDmayor from discharging the duties of the position of mayor, the mayor
should reimburse to the viceDmayor, as the right rightful occupant of the position
of mayor, the salaried which he had received.


:odriuez v. #an

9here a duly proclaimed elective official who assumes office is
subse?uently ousted in an election protest, the prevailing party can no longer
recover the salary paid to the ousted officer. .he ousted officer, who acted as de
facto officer during his incumbency, is entitled to the compensation, emoluments
and allowances which are provided for the position.

Exception" (f there was fraud on the part of the de facto officer which
would vitiate his election.

-" .hen can the de *ure officer recover from"

4a7 the overnment/

9hen the government continues to pay the de facto officer even after the
notice of ad7udication of the protest in favor of the de 7ure officer.

4b7 ) de facto officer/

9hen notice of ad7udication of the title to the de 7ure officer has been
given, and the de facto officer still continues to exercise duties and receive
salaries and emoluments.

4c7 )n intruder @ usurper/

At all instances.


)dditional or Double %ompensation Prohibited

-" Differentiate additional compensation from double compensation.

)dditional Double

.here is only & position, but .here are " positions, and with
additional functions and the public officer is getting
additional compensation. emoluments for both
positions.


-" Differentiate the 3 ;inds of allo,ances.

%ommutable :eimbursable

5iven by virtue of the position .he public officer must present
whether or not he incurred a receipt or certification under
expenses for which the allowance oath that such amount was spent
is given. ;eceived as a matter in order that the public officer
of right. may recover the money spent.

.here is a conclusive presumption
that it was spent.




:0LE("

4ensions @ gratuities are not considered as additional, double, or indirect
compensation. ()ec. +, Art. ('D1, &*+# ,onstitution)

1y its very nature, a bonus parta3es of an additional remuneration or
compensation. (4eralta v. Auditor 5eneral)

An allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of office is
not an increase of salary, a per?uisite, nor an emolument of office. (4eralta
v. AuditorD5eneral)


%an Public &fficer :ecover (alary for Period of (uspension/

;<-:)%

(f preventively suspended% $6, he cannot recover salary.

1<.% (f he is subse?uently exonerated, he can recover
salary for the period of his preventive suspension.

(f he was given penalty of
removal from office, but was H:), he can recover because
completely exonerated upon he was completely exonerated.
appeal%

(f he was given penalty of
removal from office, but his $6, because he was still found
penalty was commuted from guilty although the penalty was
removal to mere suspension, reduced.
or demotion%

(f the suspension @ removal
from office is un7ustified% H:).


-" In summary, ,hen can payment of salaries correspondin to the period
,hen an employee ,as suspended be allo,ed/

A% (&) 9hen he is found innocent of the charges which
caused his suspension;

(") 9hen the suspension is un7ustified (Abellera v. ,ity of
1aguio)



AD/INIS*RA*I$E DISCIPLINE

O%er Preiden!ial A..oin!ee

&lonan v. %(%

Administrative charges were filed against the 4<4 4resident and other officers for
violations of ;A >&* with the ,),. 6lonan et.al. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
contending principally that the ,), has no 7urisdiction to try and decide the case against her,
she being a presidential appointee. .he ,A upheld 6lonan=s contention. .here is nothing in the
provisions of the ,onstitution or the Administrative ,ode of &*+# which gives the ,), the
power to discipline presidential appointees li3e petitioner herein. )ec. /#(&), 1oo3 G of :6 "*"
which provides that Qa complaint may be filed directly with the ,), by a private citiBen against a
government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the caseR must be read
together with )ec. /+ which is entitled Q4rocedure in Administrative ,ases Against $onD
4residential Appointees.R .he very sub7ect of )ec. /+ implicitly limits the scope of the ,),=s
7urisdiction in administrative cases to nonDpresidential appointees and ma3es patent the
conclusion that the disciplinary authority over presidential appointees lies elsewhere S the
4resident as appointing power himself.

Po,er to )ppoint Implies the Po,er to :emove! Exceptions

a) !ustices of the )upreme ,ourt (by impeachment)
b) Members of ,onstitutional ,ommissions (by impeachment)
c) 6mbudsman (by impeachment)
d) !udges of inferior courts (disciplinary or removal power vested
in the )upreme ,ourt)

$onifacio (ans Maceda v. =as?uez

A 7udge who falsifies his ,ertificate of )ervice is administratively liable to the ), for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under )ec. &, ;ule &/> of the ;ules of ,ourt and criminally
liable to the )tate under the ;evised 4enal ,ode for his felonious act. 9here a criminal
complaint against a 7udge or other employee arises from their administrative duties, the
6mbudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the ), for
determination whether said 7udge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties. .hus, the 6mbudsman should first refer the matter to the ), for
determination of whether the certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as
the ), had the necessary records to ma3e such a determination. Art. G(((, )ec. 6 of the
,onstitution exclusively vests in the ), administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel.

Dolalas v. &mbudsmanBMindanao

,iting the Maceda case, the ), power of administrative supervision over 7udges and
court personnel is exclusive. (nvestigation by the 6mbudsman violates the specific constitutional
mandate of the ), and undermines the independence of the 7udiciary.


O%er Non-Preiden!ial A..oin!ee

+rounds

)ec. /6(a), 1oo3 G of :6 "*" provides that Q$o officer or employee in the
,ivil )ervice shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and
after due process.R .he grounds constituting 7ust cause are enumerated in )ec. /6(b).

1urisdiction

6riginal complaints may be filed% (a) directly with the ,), or (b) with the )ecretaries
and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities for officers
and employees under their 7urisdiction.

8ecisions of )ecretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days= salary.

(n case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
,ommission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
,ommission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is
removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the )ecretary
concerned.

8ecisions imposing the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days= salary, demotion in ran3 or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office shall be appealable to the ,),.

Procedure in )dministrative %ases )ainst NonBPresidential )ppointees

Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or
employee by the )ecretary or head of office of e?uivalent ran3, or head of local government, or
chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn written complaint of any other person.

9or complaints filed by any other person

,omplainant shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his
witnesses together with his documentary evidence.

(f based on such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining
authority shall dismiss the case. 6therwise, he shall notify the respondent in writing of the
charges against the latter.

;espondent shall be allowed not less than seventyDtwo hours after receipt of the
complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath, together with supporting sworn
statements and documents. 2e shall also indicate whether or not he elects a formal
investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory.

(f the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.

Although a respondent does not re?uest a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless
be conducted when from the allegations of the complaint and the answer of the respondent,
including the supporting documents, the merits of the case cannot be decided 7udiciously
without conducting such an investigation.

.he decision shall be rendered by the disciplining authority within thirty days from the
termination of the investigation or submission of the report of the investigator, which report
shall be submitted within fifteen days from the conclusion of the investigation.

:ither party may avail himself of the services of counsel and may re?uire the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through
the compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.


)ppeals and Petition for :econsideration

Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration
is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days.

A petition for reconsideration shall be based only on any of the following grounds%

(a) new evidence has been discovered which materially affects the decision rendered;
(b) the decision is not supported by the evidence on record; or
(c) error of law or irregularities have been committee which are pre7udicial to the
interests of the respondent.

6nly one petition for reconsideration shall be allowed.

Mendez v. %ivil (ervice %ommission

.he remedy of appeal in civil service cases may be availed of only in a case
where respondent is found guilty of the charges against him. 1ut when the respondent is
exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal. 48 +>#
shows that it does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges. Q4arty adversely affected by the decisionR in
)ection * of the ,ivil )ervice -aw refers to the government employee against whom
case was filed.

(ummary Proceedins

$o formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be
immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present%

(&) 9hen the charge is serious and the evidence if guilt is strong;
(") 9hen the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and
there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty or the present charge;
and

() 9hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable.

Preventive (uspension

.he proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or
employee involves%

(a) dishonesty; or
(b) oppression or grave misconduct; or
(c) neglect in the performance of duty; or
(d) if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which
would warrant his removal from the service.

Maximum period for preventive suspension is ninety (*>) days for national officials.
<nder the -ocal 5overnment ,ode, local appointive and elective officials may be
preventively suspended for only sixty (6>) days. (f the case is filed in the 6mbudsman, the
latter may impose a preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months.

9hen the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (*>)
days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service.

Penalty

(n meting out punishment, the same penalties shall be imposed for similar offenses
and only one penalty shall be imposed in each case.

.he disciplining authority may impose the penalty of removal from the service,
demotion in ran3, suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in an amount not
exceeding six months= salary, or reprimand. ()ec. /6(d), 1oo3 G, :6 "*")

(f the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty
imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the test may
be considered as aggravating circumstances. ()ec. &# of the (mplementing ,ivil )ervice
;ules and ;egulations)

A reprimand whether given by the ,ivil )ervice ,ommission or the head of
department or agency shall be considered a penalty. 2owever, a warning or an admonition
shall not be considered a penalty. ()ec. &0 of the (mplementing ,ivil )ervice ;ules and
;egulations)

#obias v. =eloso

;eprimand is a penalty. (n this case, police chief is not entitled to bac3 wages as
)ec. &6 of the 4olice Act of &*66 expressly provides that a suspended member of the
police force shall be entitled to his salary for the period of his suspension upon
exoneration. A reprimand is not e?uivalent to an exoneration. (t is more severe than an
admonition, which is considered a mild rebu3e. A reprimand is administered to a person
in fault by his superior officer or a body to which he belongs. (t is an administrative
penalty, although it may be slight form of punishment.

NO*E% A warning is an act or fact of putting one on his
guard; an admonition is a
gentle or friendly reproof or a mild rebu3e; while a reprimand is a formal
and public censure or a severe reproof.

:emoval of )dministrative Penalties or Disabilities

(n meritorious cases and upon recommendation of the ,),, the 4resident may
commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities imposed upon officers or
employees in disciplinary cases, sub7ect to such terms and conditions as he may impose in
the interest of the service.


O%er Elec!i%e Official

Impeachment

A verified complaint may be filed by any member of the 2ouse of ;epresentatives or
by any citiBen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member thereof.

,omplaint shall be included in the 6rder of 1usiness within ten sessions days and
referred to the proper ,ommittee within three sessions days thereafter.

.he ,ommittee, after hearing, and by a ma7ority vote of all its members, shall submit
its report to the 2ouse within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolutions. .he resolution shall be calendared for consideration of the
2ouse within ten session days from receipt thereof.

A vote of at least oneDthird of all the members of the 2ouse shall be necessary either
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of (mpeachment of the ,ommittee, or
override its contrary resolution.

(n case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least oneD
third of all the members of the 2ouse, the same shall constitute the Articles of
(mpeachment, and trial by the )enate shall forthwith proceed.

.he )enate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
9hen sitting for that purpose, the )enators shall be on oath or affirmation. 9hen the
4resident of the 4hilippines is on trial, the ,hief !ustice of the )upreme ,ourt shall preside,
but shall not vote. $o person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twoDthirds of all
the members of the )enate.

!udgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and dis?ualification to hold office under the ;epublic of the 4hilippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and sub7ect to prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law.

$o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.


Local Elec!i%e Official 7Sec8 &9-&:; Local +o%ern"en! Code<

+rounds for Disciplinary )ctions

(&) 8isloyalty to the ;epublic of the 4hilippines

(") ,ulpable violation of the ,onstitution

() 8ishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or
dereliction of duty

(/) ,ommission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by
at least prision mayor

(0) Abuse of authority

(6) <nauthoriBed absence for fifteen (&0) consecutive days, except in the case of
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay

(#) Application for, or ac?uisition of, foreign citiBenship or residence or the status of
an immigrant of another country

(+) )uch other grounds as may be provided in this ,ode and other laws.

Procedure

457 =erified %omplaint

A verified complaint may be filed against any erring local elective official and submitted to the
following disciplinary authorities%

6ffice of the 4resident D elective official of a province, a highly urbaniBed
city, an independent component city or component
city;

)angguniang panlalawigan D elective official of a municipality

)angguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan D elective barangay official

437 )ns,er

9ithin seven (#) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the 6ffice of the 4resident or
the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall re?uire the respondent to submit his
verified answer within fifteen (&0) days from receipt thereof

4F7 Investiation

.he investigation of the case shall be commenced within ten (&>) days after receipt of
such answer of the respondent.

2owever, no investigation shall be held within ninety (*>) days immediately
prior to any local election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said
period.

Preventive (uspension

4reventive suspension may be imposed%

a) 1y the 4resident% if the respondent is an elective official of a
province,
a highly urbaniBed or an independent component
city;

b) 1y the governor% if the respondent is an elective official of a
component city or municipality; or

c) 1y the mayor% if the respondent is an elective official of the
barangay.

4reventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are 7oined, when
the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability
that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

2owever, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend
beyond sixty (6>) days.

Curthermore, in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an
elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (*>) days within
a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and 3nown at the time of the first
suspension.

<pon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall be
deemed reinstated in office without pre7udice to the continuation of the proceedings against
him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (&">) days from the time he was
formally notified of the case against him.

Note% .he respondent official preventively suspended from office shall
receive no salary or compensation during such suspension; but upon subse?uent
exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or compensation including
such emoluments accruing during such suspension.

Note% $o preventive suspension shall be imposed within
ninety (*>) days immediately prior to any local election. (f preventive suspension has
been imposed prior to the *>Dday period immediately preceding local election, it shall be
deemed automatically lifted upon the start of the aforesaid period.

:ihts of :espondent

.he respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself in
person or by counsel, to confront and crossDexamine the witnesses against him, and to re?uire
the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary process of subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum.

9orm and Notice of Decision

.he investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (*>) days from the start
thereof.

9ithin thirty (>) days after the end of the investigation, the 6ffice of the 4resident or
the sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the reasons for such decision.

.he penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a
period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to
the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the ?ualifications
re?uired for the office.

.he penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall
be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position.

)dministrative )ppeals

8ecisions in administrative cases may, within thirty () days from receipt thereof, be
appealed to the following%

a) .he sanggunian panlalawigan% in the case of decisions of%

(&) sangguniang panlungsod of component cities; and

(") sangguniang bayan;



b) .he 6ffice of the 4resident% in the case of decisions of%

(&) the sangguniang panlalawigan;
(") the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbaniBed cities;
() the sangguniang panglungsod of independent component
cities.

8ecisions of the 6ffice of the 4resident shall final and executory.

Execution Pendin )ppeal

An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. .he
respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the
pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. (n the event the appeal results in an
exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the
appeal.


*ER/INA*ION OF OFFICIAL RELA*IONS

/ode of *er"ina!ion

&) :xpiration of .erm or .enure of 6ffice

a) :nd of a fixed term
b) :nd of 4leasure where one holds office at pleasure of appointing
authority
c) -oss of confidence in primarily confidential employment

") ;eaching the age limit; ;etirement
) 1ona fide abolition of office
/) Abandonment of office
0) Acceptance of an incompatible office
6) ;esignation
#) ;esignation
+) ;emoval for cause
*) .emporary appointments= termination
&>) ;ecall
&&) (mpeachment
&") 4rescription of right to office
&) 8eath
&/) ,onviction of crime where dis?ualification is an accessory penalty
&0) Ciling of certificate of candidacy
&6) 4erformance of act or accomplishment of purpose for which the office was created



E3.ira!ion of *er" or *enure of Office

End of 9ixed #erm

<pon the expiration of the officer=s term, unless he is authoriBed by law to
hold over, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must be ipso
facto terminated.

End of pleasure ,here one holds office at the pleasure of the appointin authority

)lba v. Evanelista

4resident can validly terminate tenure of Gice Mayor of ;oxas ,ity as the office was
created at the pleasure of the 4resident. 9hat is involved here is not the ?uestion of
removal, or whether legal cause should precede or not that of removal. 9hat is involved
here is the creation of an office and the tenure of such office, which has been made
expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the 4resident.

9ernandez v Ledesma

.he ,harter of 1asilan ,ity provides that the 4resident shall appoint and may remove
at his discretion any of the city=s officers, including its ,hief of 4olice, with the exception
of the municipal 7udge, who may be removed only according to law. .he legislative intent
is to ma3e continuance in office dependent upon the pleasure of the 4resident.
,ongress has the power to vest such power of appointment. Curther, QA public office is
the right for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power.R Alba v. :vangelista states that the replacement is not removal, but an expiration
of tenure, which is an ordinary mode of terminating official relations. 9hat is involved is
not removal, or whether legal cause should precede such removal, but the creation of an
office and the tenure of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the
pleasure of the 4resident.

Loss of %onfidence in Primarily %onfidential Employment

>ernandez v. =illeas

:ven officers and employees of the civil service occupying primarily confidential
positions are sub7ect to the constitutional safeguard against removal or suspension
except for cause.

6fficial and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so
long as confidence in them endures. .he termination of their official relation can be
7ustified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case, their cessation from
office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office.



Inles v. Mutuc

.he statement that an officer holding a position which is primarily confidential in
nature is Qsub7ect to removal at the pleasure of the appointing powerR is inaccurate.
)uch statement (a mere obiterin the case of 8e los )antos v. Mallare), if detached from
the context of the decision in said case, would be inconsistent with the constitutional
command to the effect that Qno officer or employee in the ,ivil )ervice shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law,R and it is conceded that one holding
in the government a primarily confidential positions is Qin the ,ivil )ervice.R

.his should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily
confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. (t should
be noted however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not
QremovedR or QdismissedR from office D his QtermR merely QexpiresR in much the same way
as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he
had been appointed or elected is not and cannot be deemed QremovedR or QdismissedR
therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. .he main difference between the former D
the primarily confidential officer D and the latter is that the latter=s term is fixed or definite,
whereas that of the former is not preDfixed but indefinite, at the time of his appointment
or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its
decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. 9hen this event ta3es place,
the latter is not QremovedR or QdismissedR from officer D his term has merely expired.

+ray v. De =era

4resident appointed 5ray as 1oard secretary of the 4eople=s

2omesite and 2ousing ,orporation but was later terminated through a board resolution
due to loss of confidence. ), reversed ruling that 5ray=s appointment was a permanent
one. Although the 4resident, :6 **, declared the position of secretary to the board of a
government corporation Qprimarily confidential in nature,R it does not follow that a board
secretary whose appointment was permanent may be removed from office without a
formal charge specifying the ground for removal and without giving him an opportunity to
be head. )uch removal was illegal since there was no lawful cause for removal.

1y declaring that the position is primarily confidential in nature, the 4resident
intended that the position be filled by an appointee of un?uestioned honesty and
integrity. .he act of 5ray in reporting the board=s act of mismanagement and misconduct
was in consonance with the honesty and integrity re?uired for the position.

%ariGo v. )%%9)

), reversed termination of lawyers who were appointed as permanent employees of
A,,CA. .hat petitioners= positions are primarily confidential is immaterial. .he
,onstitution merely excepts primarily confidential positions from the coverage of Qthe
rule re?uiring appointments in the civil service to be made on the basis of merit and
fitness as determined from the competitive exams,R but does not exempt such positions
from the operation of the principle that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law, which recogniBes no
exception.


Reaching !he Age Li"i!5 Re!ire"en!

%onditions for entitlement to retirement benefits 4:.). No. H3857

a) he has rendered at least fifteen (&0) years of service;
b) he is at least sixty (6>) years of age at the time of retirement; and
c) he is not receiving a monthly pension benefit from permanent total disability.

%ompulsory :etirement

<nless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for
an employee at least sixtyDfive (60) years of age with at least fifteen (&0) years of service;
4rovided that if he has less than fifteen (&0) years of service, he may be allowed to continue in
the service in accordance with existing civil service rules and regulations.

:etirement benefits

(&) the lump sum payment defined in ;A $o. +"*& payable at the time of retirement plus an
oldDage pension benefit e?ual to the basis monthly pension payable monthly for life,
starting upon expiration of the giveDyear (0) guaranteed period covered by the lump sum;
or

(") cash payment e?uivalent to eighteen (&+) months of his basic monthly pension plus
monthly pension for life payable immediately with no fiveDyear (0) guarantee.

$eronilla v +(I(

.he compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon reaching the
age of 60 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the
government service and, at the same time, give to the retiring public servants the
opportunity to en7oy during the remainder of their lives the recompenses for their long
service and devotion to the government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed
from the rigors, discipline and the exacting demands that the nature of their wor3 and
their relations with their superiors as well as the public would impose on them.

0P $oard of :eents v. )uditor +eneral

A 16; resolution extended the services of a <4 professor for another year. (n the
same year, he reached the age of 60. .he Auditor 5eneral ?uestioned the legality of the
resolution arguing that the services rendered after the compulsory retirement age were
illegal and that he was not entitled to compensation. ), upheld Auditor 5eneral ruling
that as government employees, <4 professors are compulsorily covered by the
;etirement -aw which creates a uniform retirement system for all members of the 5)().

:abor v. %(%

At the age of 00, ;abor was hired as a government employee at the 8avao ,ity
Mayor=s 6ffice in &*#+. (n &**&, he was advised to apply for retirement. 2e was already
6+ years old with & years of service. 2e re?uested that his services be extended in
order that he may complete the &0Dyear service re?uirement. .his was denied and
;abor claimed that the doctrine enunciated in ,ena v. ,), should be applied in his
case.

), ruled that the ,ena doctrine is not applicable. ,), Memo ,ircular $o. "#, s. of
&**> cited in the decision in ,ena v. ,),, provides that Qany re?uest for the extension
of service of compulsory retirees to complete the &0Dyear service re?uirement for
retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are
regular 5)() members, and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (&) year.R
,ena further stated that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one
vested in the head of the agency concerned. .o reiterate, the head of the government
agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of
service of an employee who has reached 60 years old without completing &0 years of
government service; this discretion to be exercised conformably with ,), Memo
,ircular $o. "#, s. of &**>.


Bona Fide Aboli!ion of Office

As a general rule, absent some ,onstitutional prohibition, ,ongress may abolish any
office it creates without infringing upon the rights of the officer or employee affected.

.o consider an office abolished, there must have been an intention to do away with it
wholly and permanently.

.ermination by virtue of the abolition of the office is to be distinguished from removal.
.here can be no tenure to a nonDexistent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. (n case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. (t is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the ?uestion of any
impairment of security of tenure when there is an abolition of office does not arise. .he right
itself disappeared with the abolished office as an accessory following the principal.

$usacay v. $uenaventura

1usacay was laid off as toll collector when the bridge was destroyed. 2owever, the
bridge was later reconstructed and opened to the public with a new collector being
appointed. 1usacay was ordered reinstated by the ),. .o consider an office abolished,
there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and permanently. (n the
case at bar, there was never any thought of not rebuilding the bridge. .he collapse of the
bridge did not wor3 to destroy but only to suspend the position of toll collector thereon,
and upon its reconstruction and reDopening, the collector=s right to the position was
similarly and automatically restored.

Manalan v. -uitoriano

.he $ational :mployment )ervice was established by ;.A. $o. #6& in lieu of the
4lacement 1ureau. Fuitoriano was appointed as $:) ,ommissioner in spite of the
recommendation of the -abor secretary to appoint Manalang who was the incumbent
8irector of the 4lacement 1ureau. ), held that appoint of Fuitoriano was valid. A
removal implies that the office still exists. ;.A. $o. #6&, creating $:), expressly
abolished the 4lacement 1ureau and, by implication, the office of the 8irector of the
4lacement 1ureau. 2ad ,ongress intended the $:) to be a mere enlargement of the
4lacement 1ureau, it would have directed the retention, not the transfer, of ?ualified
personnel to the $:). Manalang has never been $:) ,ommissioner and thus could not
have been removed therefrom.

)bolition Must $e in +ood 9aith

As well settled to the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal
or separation of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith, not for personal or political reasons, and not implemented in violation of law.

$riones v. &smeGa

1riones and ;osagaran were employees in the 6ffice of the ,ity Mayor since &*#
and &*/>, respectively, (n &*06, the ,ity created 0 new positions and abolished ", of
which the positions of 1riones and ;osagaran were included. ,onse?uently, the two
were terminated. ), held that the termination was not valid. 9hile abolition does not
imply removal of the incumbent, this rule is true only where the abolition is made in good
faith. (n other words, the right to abolish cannot be used to discharge employees in
violation of the ,ivil )ervice law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons.

9acundo v. Pabalan

.here is no law which expressly authoriBes a municipal council to abolish the
positions it has created. 2owever, the rule is wellDsettled that the power to create an
office includes the power to abolish it, unless there are constitutional or statutory rules
providing otherwise. 1ut the office must be abolished in good faith.

%ruz v. Primicias

As well settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith. 9here the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal
reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
employees, it is null and void. (n the case at bar, while "" positions were abolished, "+
new positions with higher salaries were simultaneously created. $o charge of
inefficiency is lodged against petitioners. (n truth and in fact, what respondents sought to
achieve was to supplant civil service eligibles with men of their choice, whose tenure
would be totally dependent upon their pleasure and discretion.

Reorgani6a!ion

;eorganiBation occurs where there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them to promote greater efficiency, to remove redundancy of functions, or to effect
economy and ma3e it more responsive to the needs of their public clientele. (t may result in the
loss of one=s position through removal or abolition of office. ;eorganiBation of the government
may be re?uired by law independently of specific constitutional authoriBation. 1ut in order to be
valid, it must also be done in good faith.

$oard of Directors of P%(& v. )landy

Alandy was the incumbent Assistant 5eneral Manager of the 4,)6. (n &*0/,
;esolution $o. &/ was passed to reorganiBe the 4,)6. .he position of Assistant
5eneral Manager was converted to 5eneral Cield )upervisor to which Alandy was
appointed. 2owever, in &*00, the position of Assistant 5eneral Manager was again
created through ;esolution $o. /"" and a different person was appointed to the
position. ), invalidated the new appointment and reinstated Alandy to his position as
4,)6 Assistant 5eneral Manager. 9hat occurred here is that the position of Assistant
5eneral Manager was not abolished but was merely converted to another position. As
such, the conversion merely caused the giving of additional functions to Alandy, who still
held the position of Assistant 5eneral Manager.

Dario v. Mison

(n pursuance of its reorganiBation policy, 4res. A?uino issued :6 &"# in &*+# which
provided for the reorganiBation of the 1ureau of ,ustoms. 4ursuant to :6 &"#,
,ommissioner Mison terminated a total of &> employees. <pon appeal, the ,),
ordered the reinstatement of "+ employees which was upheld by the ),. .he dismissal
are not valid. .here is no dispute that pursuant to the Creedom ,onstitution and the
various executive orders issued by 4res. A?uino, the different departments of
government were authoriBed to carry on reorganiBation programs. 1ut the nature and
extent of the power to reorganiBe were circumscribed by the source of the power itself.
.he ;eorganiBation process is made up of two stages. .he first stage, which was
effected pursuant to 4roclamation , allowed removals Qnot for cause,R and it ended on
>" Cebruary &*+#. 6n the other hand, the second stage is a continuing one from >"
Cebruary &*+# pursuant to the &*+# ,onstitution. .he &*+# ,onstitution re?uires that
removal Qnot for causeR must be a result of reorganiBation. )uch removals must also
pass the test of good faith, a test obviously not re?uired under the first stage which was
envisioned as a purgation.

A reorganiBation is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
ma3e the bureaucracy more efficient. 5ood faith, as a component of reorganiBation
under a constitutional regime, is 7udged from the facts of each case. (n the case at bar,
there was lac3 of good faith. Mison=s argument that the reorganiBation is progressive
would be valid only if it was pursuant to 4roclamation . 2owever, in spite of her
immense revolutionary power, 4res. A?uino still promulgated :6 &# which established

safeguards against the propensity that accompany reorganiBations and established the
rule that dismissals should be based on findings of inefficiency, graft and unfitness to
render public service. Assuming then that the reorganiBation in the first stage was
progressive and still valid, such dismissals as ordered by Mison would still have to
comply with the terms set down in :6 &#.

:ubenecia v. %(%

), upheld power of the ,), to transfer 7urisdiction over administrative appeals from
the Merit )ystems 4rotection 1oard to the ,), en banc itself. .he &*+# Administrative
,ode made clear that the M4)1 was intended to be an office of the ,), li3e any other
of the other & offices in the ,),. (n other words, the M4)1 was a part of the internal
structure and organiBation of the ,),. (t was not an autonomous entity created by law
and merely attached for administrative purposes to the ,),. .hus, it was a proper
sub7ect of organiBational change which the ,), is authoriBed to underta3e under the
present ,ivil )ervice law. .he resolution merely reDallocated to the ,), itself the
functions of the M4)1 relating to the determination of administrative disciplinary cases
to Qstreamline the operation of the ,),.R (t did not purport to abolish the M4)1 nor to
effect the termination of the relationship of public employment between ,), and any of
its officers or employees.


Abandon"en! of Office

A public office may become vacant ipso facto by abandonment and nonDuser. 9hen
an office is once abandoned, the former incumbent cannot legally repossess it even by
forcible reDoccupancy.

Abandonment must be total and absolute, and must be under such circumstances as
clearly to indicate an absolute relin?uishment thereof. Moreover, the officer should manifest
a clear intention to abandon the office and its duties. Abandonment by reason of acceptance
of another office, in order to be effective and binding, must spring from and be accompanied
by deliberation and freedom of choice, either to 3eep the old office or renounce it for
another. .emporary absence is not sufficient.

(ummers v. &zaeta

)ummers, a cadastral 7udge, assumed office as ,C( 7udge due to an ad interim
appointment. 2owever, the ad interim appointment was disapproved and )ummers now
see3s to be reappointed as cadastral 7udge. ), held that )ummers= voluntary
acceptance of the position of ,C( 7udge amounted to a waiver of his right to hold the
position of cadastral 7udge during the term fixed and guaranteed by the ,onstitution. 2e
accepted and ?ualified for the position of 7udgeDatDlarge by ta3ing the oath of office of
7udgeDatDlarge, and not merely of an QactingR 7udgeDatDlarge. .he situation is one wherein
he cannot legally hold two offices of similar category at the same time.

2andueta v. Dela %osta

9hen a public official accepts an appointment to an office newly created or
reorganiBed by law which new office is incompatible with his former office, ?ualifies for
the position, ta3es the necessary oath, and executes acts inherent in the newly created
office, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of
his former appointment and he cannot ?uestion the constitutionality of the law by virtue
of which he was appointed.

9loresca v. -uetulio

Cloresca=s refusal to assume his preDwar post as !ustice of the 4eace and his
subse?uent acceptance of other employments without any pretense on his part that he
simultaneously continued to perform the functions of the !ustice of the 4eace, clearly
show deliberate abandonment of the latter office.

&rtiz v. De +uzman

6rtiB allowed three years to elapse since he was ousted from office without having
ta3en any steps to reclaim his former office. ), held that he cannot as3 for
reinstatement. A public employee who voluntarily abandons his office for a long time is
estopped from as3ing for reinstatement. (n order to constitute an abandonment of office,
it must be total, and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an absolute
relin?uishment. .emporary absence is not sufficient where no statute fixes the period
beyond which the absence must continue. (n all cases, the officer should manifest a
clear intention to abandon the office and its duties. Het, this intention may be inferred
from his conduct. (f his acts and statements are such as to clearly indicate absolute
relin?uishment, a vacancy will be thereby created and no 7udicial determination is
necessary. 9hen once abandoned, the former incumbent cannot legally repossess the
office.

Madrid v. )uditor +eneral

6ne claiming the right to a position in the civil service must institute the proper
proceeding within one year from the date of separation, otherwise he is deemed to have
abandoned his office or even ac?uiesced or consented to his removal, and thus is not
entitled to see3 reinstatement. .he rationale is to inform the 5overnment of the rightful
holder of the office and to prevent payment of salary to both claimants.

Maana v. )uditor +eneral

2aving accepted the benefits accruing from the abolition of his office, he is estopped
from ?uestioning its validity or deemed to have waived the right to contest the same.

=illeas v. (ubido

Gillegas did not abandon his office as mayor of the ,ity of Manila when he assumed
the position of 8irector of $A9A)A because he had been merely designated in an
acting capacity and was not appointed to the said position.

#an v. +imenez

.he fact that, during the time his appeal was pending and was thus deprived of his
office and salary, an employee sought employment in another branch of the government
does not constitute abandonment of his former position.


Acce.!ance of an Inco".a!ible Office

2e who, while occupying one office, accepts another office incompatible with the
first, ipso facto absolutely vacates the first office. .hat the second office is inferior to the first
does not affect the rule. And even though the title to the second office fails as where election
is void, the rule is still the same, nor can the officer then regain the possession of his former
office to which another has been appointed or elected.

(f the law or ,onstitution as an expression of public policy forbids the acceptance by a
public officer of any other office other than that which he holds, it is not a case of
incompatibility but of legal prohibition.

(ncompatibility of offices exists where%

(a) .here is conflict in such duties and functions so that the performance of the
duties of one interferes with the performance of the duties of another, as to
render it improper for considerations of public policy for one person to retain
both.

(b) 6ne is subordinate to the other and is sub7ect in some degree to its
supervisory powers for in such situation where both are held by the same person,
the design that one acts as a chec3 on the other would be frustrated.

(c) .he ,onstitution or the law itself, for reasons of public policy, declares the
incompatibility even though there is no inconsistency in the nature and functions
of the offices.


Exceptions to the :ule on >oldin of Incompatible &ffices

(a) 9here the officer cannot vacate the first office by his own act, upon the principle
that he will not be permitted to thus do indirectly what he could not do directly, as
where the law re?uires the approval of the provincial board before a municipal
official can resign.

(b) Cirst office is held under a different government from that which conferred
the second.

(c) 6fficer is expressly authoriBed by law to accept another office.

(d) )econd office is temporary.


Reigna!ion

A resignation of a public officer need not be in any particular form, unless some form
is prescribed by statute. 6rdinarily, it may either be in writing or by parol. .he conduct of an
employee may properly be regarded as constituting a resignation from the position held by
him. 2owever, to constitute a complete and operative resignation of public office, there must
be an intention to relin?uish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relin?uishment.

.he right of a public officer to resign is well recogniBed, even where it is provided than
an officer may hold over until election and ?ualification of a successor. .he right is
sometimes recogniBed or secured by constitution or statute.

.he views in the various 7urisdictions are conflicting in regard to what constitutes
acceptance of a resignation and whether an acceptance is re?uired. According to some
authorities, no acceptance is necessary to render a resignation effective, especially when
the resignation is unconditional and purports to ta3e effect immediately. (ndeed, it may be
provided by statute that the resignation of a public officer is to ta3e effect at the time of filing
it.

2owever, many other cases ta3e the view that to be effective, the resignation must be
accepted by competent authority. 9ithout acceptance, the resignation is nothing and the
officer remains in office. (6 Am !ur "d., sec. &6)

Prof. $arlonay% .wo (") elements are necessary to constitute an effective
acceptance%

(&) intention to relin?uish office coupled with actual relin?uishment; and
(") acceptance of resignation.

+onzales v. >ernandez

5onBales filed a letter of resignation the pertinent portion of which reads% Q x x x
sub7ect to the result of my appeal with the ,ivil )ervice 1oard of Appeals, and to the
provisions of the ;esolution of the ,abinet on !uly &#, &**.R ), held that 5onBales,
although his conditional resignation was unconditionally accepted, cannot be considered
as having resigned from office. .here was no resignation to spea3 of. .o constitute a
complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear
intention to relin?uish or surrender his position. (n the case at bar, there was no such
intention as 5onBales= resignation was sub7ect to the result of his appeal.

&rtiz v. %&MELE%

4etitioner=s separation from the government as a result of the reorganiBation
ordained by former 4res. A?uino may not be considered a resignation within the law=s
contemplation. ;esignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by
which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. .o constitute a
complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear
intention to relin?uish his position accompanied by the act of relin?uishment and its
acceptance by competent and lawful authority. 1ased on the facts, petitioner=s
resignation lac3s the element of clear intention to surrender his position. 9e cannot
presume such intention from the letter he sent placing himself at the disposal of the
4resident. 2e did not categorically state that he was unconditionally giving up his
position. (t should be good to note that said letter was actually a response to
4roclamation $o. & of 4res. A?uino calling all appointive public officials to offer their
Qcourtesy resignation.R

A Qcourtesy resignationR cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in a legal sense.
(t 7ust manifests the submission of a person to the will of the political authority.

Prof. $arlonay% ,ourtesy resignation is not allowed in (&) career positions and (") nonD
career positions with security of tenure (i.e. local elective officials).


Re"o%al for Caue

$o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law ()ec. "(), Art. (', &*+# ,onstitution).


+round for Re"o%al fro" Office

Cor 4residential appointees, 4rof. 1arlongay states that there is no specific law
providing for the grounds for their removal. 8etermination of grounds is 7ust a matter of
practice and by analogy, the grounds used for nonDpresidential appointees are made
applicable.

Cor civil service officials and employees, see )ec. /6, 1oo3 G, :.6. $o. "*" which
provides for at least > grounds for disciplinary action.

Cor local elective officials, )ec. 6> of the -ocal 5overnment ,ode provides for the
grounds where an elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from
office.


/iconduc! need no! be =in office> in cae of a..oin!i%e officer8
/iconduc! "u! be =in office> in cae of elec!i%e officer8




Nera v. +arcia

<nder the ;evised Administrative ,ode, the rule in preventive suspension provides
that a 1ureau ,hief may suspend, with the approval of the head of the department, any
subordinate officer or employee if he is charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty. .he same words are expressed in the
civil service law. Crom these provisions, suspension was proper even if the dishonest act
was not in the performance of his duty since under the ;evised Administrative ,ode and
the ,ivil )ervice -aw, dishonesty was not ?ualified by the phrase Qin the performance of
duty.R

&chate v. #y Delin

.he ), held that the facts alleged in the administrative charge, as substantiated by
the affidavits of the complainants, do not 7ustify the administrative proceedings instituted
against the petitioner and his suspension by the governor. .he alleged libel imputed to
the mayor was not such misconduct even if the term Qmisconduct in officeR be ta3en in its
broadest sense. .he radio broadcast in which the ob7ectionable utterances were made
had nothing to do with his official functions and duties as a mayor.


/iconduc! co""i!!ed during a .rior !er"; no! a ground for di"ial

Pascual v. Provincial $oard

.he ), held that the weight of authority follows the rule which denies the right to
remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term. 6ffenses committed
or acts done during a previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal
and this is especially true where the ,onstitution provides that the penalty in
proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office and
dis?ualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected and
appointed. .he underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms and that
reDelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer=s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore.

)uinaldo v. (antos

), held that A?uinaldo should not be removed from office. 2is reDelection to the
position of 5overnor of ,agayan has rendered the administrative case pending before it
moot and academic.

6ffenses committed or acts done, during a previous term are generally not held to
furnish cause for removal. .he ,ourt should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. .o do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. 9hen the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with 3nowledge of his life and character, and that they


disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if guilty of any. (t is not for the court, by
reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overruled the will of the people.

.he rule then is that a public officer cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of
the officer=s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefore. .his rule, however, is not applicable to criminal cases pending against the
petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.


*ranfer fro" One Poi!ion !o Ano!her /ay or /ay No! Con!i!u!e
$iola!ion of Securi!y of *enure

A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of e?uivalent ran3,
level, or salary without brea3 in service involving the issuance of an appointment.

(t shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in
which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefore. (f the
employee believes that there is no 7ustification for the transfer, he may appeal to the ),.

.he transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one
organiBational unit to another in the same department or agency; 4rovided, however that
any movement from the nonDcareer service to the career service shall not be considered a
transfer.

Lacson v. :omero

-acson was appointed provincial fiscal of $egros 6riental by the 4resident. 2owever,
three years after, another person was appointed to the same position while -acson was
nominated to the position of provincial fiscal of .arlac. -acson never accepted the
appointment and did not assume the duties of said office. .he ), held that -acson has
the right to occupy the office of provincial fiscal of $egros 6riental as he neither
accepted nor assumed the office of provincial fiscal of .arlac and no one can compel his
to do so.

.he intended transfer of -acson to .arlac, if carried out without the approval of
-acson, would be e?uivalent to a removal from his office in $egros 6riental. .he reason
is that a fiscal is appointed for each province and -acson could not legally hold and
occupy the two posts of fiscal of .arlac and $egros 6riental simultaneously. .herefore,
to be a fiscal of .arlac must mean his removal from office in $egros.

)ince the transfer in the case at bar is considered a removal, such should be for
cause in order for the other person to legally occupy the office in $egros. .here was no
cause for -acson=s removal. 2e therefore remains as fiscal of $egro.






*er"ina!ion of *e".orary A..oin!"en!

-uiti?uit v. =illacorta

.he appointment being temporary in character, the same can be terminated at
pleasure by the appointing power.

9errer v. de Leon

6ne holding an office in a temporary capacity may be ousted at anytime with or
without cause.

.hat determines character of appointment

>o*illa v. Marino

.he controlling factor in determining the character of the appointment is the
appointment itself. :ven if a position is permanent, if the appointment is made
temporary, the appointment is determinative. 9hat is determinative is not the nature of
the office (permanent or temporary), but the nature of the appointment.


6ne appointed to a position of another who was illegally suspended or dismissed,
holds it in temporary capacity and must yield to the latter. .he reason for this is that there
was no valid termination.


Recall

.he ,ongress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentraliBation with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum T()ec. , Art.
', &*+# ,onstitution)

4rocedure for recall is provided in )ections 6*D#0 of the -ocal 5overnment ,ode.

+arcia v. %&MELE%

), upheld initiation of recall through the 4reparatory ;ecall Assembly. ;ecall is a
mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office.
.he people=s prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident to their sovereign
power, and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all
government operations. .here are two reasons why a 4reparatory ;ecall Assembly is
allowed% (&) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall through direct action of the people;
(") to cut down on expenses. Moreover, the ,onstitution does not provide for any
particularly mode of initiating recall elections. (nitiation by the 4reparatory ;ecall
Assembly may be considered as initiation of recall by the people, although done
indirectly through representatives. (n any event, the composition of the 4reparatory
;ecall Assembly is politically neutral, so loss of confidence cannot be said to be inspired
by difference in political party affiliation.

Precri.!ion of Righ! !o Office

0nabia v. %ity Mayor

$o reinstatement is possible in the case at bar. :ven if the removal was void for lac3
of cause, <nabia filed his petition for reinstatement with the ,C( after a delay of one year
and fifteen days. Any person claiming a right to a position in the civil service is re?uired
to file his petition for reinstatement within one year, otherwise he is deemed to have
abandoned his office. ;eason is public policy and convenience, stability in the public
service.

Prof. $arlonay% .he oneDyear period is the prescriptive period to claim public office
(whether through ?uo warranto or otherwise). .he oneDyear period presupposes 7udicial
action, not administrative action.


Filing of Cer!ifica!e of Candidacy

)ec. 66 of the 6mnibus :lection ,ode states that any person
holding appointive public offices or positions, including active AC4 members, is
considered ipso facto resigned from office by the mere filing of certificate of candidacy.

6nly the moment and act of filing are considered. 6nce the certificate is filed, the seat
is forever forfeited and nothing, save a new election or appointment, can restore the ousted
official.

$ote% .he following provisions have been repealed by )ec. &/ of ;.A. *>>6 (Cair :lection
Act of ">>&)%

)ec. 6# of 1.4. ++& which states that any elective official, whether national or
local, running for any office 6.2:; than one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for 4resident and Gice 4resident, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from office by the mere filing of a certificate of candidacy.

.he first proviso of )ec. && of ;.A. +/6 which states that AAny elective
official, running for any officer other than one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for 4resident and GiceD4resident, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned upon the start of the campaign period.A


Perfor"ance of Ac! or Acco".lih"en! of Pur.oe for 2hich !he Office 2a Crea!ed

4erformance of act or accomplishment of purpose renders office functus
officio.