Historical Sickness:

Strauss and Heidegger

Ian Loadman
Arkansas State University
Prepared for presentation at the conference of the Midwest Political Science
Association, April 2008.
Martin Heidegger is one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, but the import
of his thought for political theory is not immediately evident. Many writers have attempted to
discover a political philosophy hidden in his reflections on Being or to extrapolate one from his
involvement with the a!is. "hile these attempts have often cast light upon Heidegger#s
thought they have produced a confusing variety of conclusions about his politics. $erhaps a
more modest approach to the %uestion of Heidegger#s relevance to political philosophy would be
more fruitful. & believe that Heidegger#s thought is useful to political theorists when connected
to issues that have an independent life in political thought.
'his paper examines the relevance of Heidegger, and particularly his concept of
historicity (Geschichtlichkeit), for political thought by examining *eo Strauss+s criti%ues of him.
&t is possible to discern three distinct criti%ues of Heidegger in Strauss and all three have, to
varying degrees, been discussed in the growing secondary literature about Strauss
,
. 'hey are:
,. Historicity is nothing but a philosophically incoherent type of historicism, sub-ect to the
criticism that, either its claims cannot be applied to itself, or it posits an absolute moment in
history for which ob-ective evidence is lacking.
.. Heidegger#s history of Being charts a mistaken path through the history of philosophy and an
alternative reconstruction of that history both points to an alternate diagnosis of nihilism and
discovers in the /natural consciousness0 a starting point for philosophical reflection that
undercuts Heidegger#s concentration on Being.
1. Heidegger#s analysis of existence employs categories of thought that he has borrowed,
unexamined, from religious thought. 'hese categories distort the nature of his thought,
allowing religious longings to take root in philosophy.
'here is a clear connection between the line of thought running from the /natural consciousness0
revealed by Strauss#s excavations of classical political thought to his criticism of Heidegger for
relying on religious categories, but the two criticisms do not collapse into one another as
witnessed by the fact that a number of commentators make the second criticism while
disagreeing among themselves over Strauss#s exact position on the theologico2political problem.
"hile & will argue that it is the second criti%ue that provides the basis for the deepest
consideration of the real differences between Strauss and Heidegger, the centrality of the contest
between philosophy and revealed religion is so crucial to Strauss#s conception of philosophy that
it amply repays separate consideration. 3lthough & will conclude that Strauss#s second and third
2
criti%ues have some bite against Heidegger, they are far from conclusive and Heidegger#s
position has significant resources with which to respond to Strauss. 3 full consideration of
Strauss#s criti%ues of Heidegger casts considerable light on the importance of historicity for
political theory and on the status of history as a source of normative standards a ma-or concern
of contemporary political thought.
4ontrasting Heidegger and Strauss also opens a vista on the %uestion of what philosophy
is and can be in late modernity. Both Strauss and Heidegger are concerned to defend the dignity
of philosophy against the claims of scientific historiography and the history2based human
sciences.
.
3nd both take their point of departure from what, following iet!sche, & will call
modernity+s historical sickness. onetheless, they base their defenses of philosophy on
strikingly different grounds. Strauss appeals to a conception of fundamental problems and a
!etetic attitude toward the few typical solutions to these problems, while Heidegger finds the
historicity of Being to be the basis for overcoming historicism. &n evaluating Strauss+s criti%ues
of Heidegger, & will also -udge which conception of the human situation provides a more
ade%uate basis for the claim that philosophy is a vital and necessary form of thought. Here too &
will conclude that Heidegger+s thought has more to offer political theory than Strauss+s criti%ues
would lead one to expect.
,. Historical Sickness
Since iet!sche+s essay 56n the 7ses and 8isadvantages of History for *ife5
1
it has been
a commonplace of philosophical and social thought that modernity suffers from a historical
malady. 'he surfeit of history has become a burden impeding action. 'he source of this malady
is, according to iet!sche, 5the demand that history be a science.5
9
Scientific rationality has,
iet!sche suggests, been pursued so far that it has coiled around and bitten its own tail. Science
produces a 5white5 discourse, one without values, and one that devalues what have heretofore
served as humanity+s highest goals. iet!sche fears that without such goals humanity is doomed
to degenerate into a mediocre self2satisfied mass. 'he problem then would seem to be the need
to find a type of knowing that, rather than impeding, promotes action. Scientific historiography
needs to be replaced by a different relation to historical knowledge, one that promotes life. "e
seem to face a problem about the relation of theory and practice. iet!sche initially proposes
3
two solutions to this problem: the unhistorical and the suprahistorical. He appeals both to youth,
with its innocence born of lack of memory, and to the eternali!ing power of art and religion.
:
Subse%uent to 56n the 7ses and 8isadvantages of History for *ife,5 iet!sche reali!es
that the hope of curing historical sickness by a once and for all redemptive teaching 2 whether
the unhistorical or the suprahistorical 2 is a form of revenge against time. "hen his ;arathustra
meditates upon the eternal return, he learns that even the last man returns eternally.
<
Since even
the last man returns, ;arathustra+s teaching of the superman cannot be understood simply as
propounding a new enduring relation of knowing to doing that will banish historical sickness.
=ather the problem of historical sickness becomes more complicated> it becomes a matter of
affirming the superman even though that teaching is now understood not to offer a final
redemption.
?
'he problem then is more than simply a problem of arranging a productive relation of
knowing and doing. iet!sche reali!es that, given the demand for truth that modern man has
ac%uired, there is a deeper problem. Humanity needs goals, goals which iet!sche, thinking of
the hardening of the will into phenomena, does not hesitate to call appearances, or indeed
illusions. But this need for illusion battles against the need to be true to oneself. iet!sche
knows, having learned his Socratic lesson despite his detestation of Socrates, that if one is to be
true to oneself about one+s goals these goals must be truly given. 'he problem that the historical
malady points to is not simply the problem of how it is possible to have goals now that @od is
dead. 'his problem of combining knowing and doing is the easy problem, for we can imagine,
as iet!sche imagined, both the innocence of youth and the return to the eternal. 'he deeper
problem is to discover what makes good faith good, why it is good to be true to oneself, and why
we should not settle for bad faith, or illusion. 'his problem is not at the level of knowing and
doing, but at the level of existence and meaning.
Historical sickness is a result of the split between existence and meaning, or between
mind and world. "hat & have called iet!sche+s Socratic lesson, what iet!sche himself often
calls the will to truth, is the demand that, even if we are to take leave of philosophy, we must do
so philosophically. 'he historical malady cannot be cured simply by the construction of a new
5noble lie.5 "e need to know that we are philosophically entitled to our cure for modernity+s
historical sickness. 6nly an explanation of how existence and meaning belong together can hope
to provide such a cure. 6nly an account of the human situation, and this means an account of
4
the ontological basis of the constitution of meaning, will suffice. 3ttempted cures at the level of
knowing and doing merely repress the deeper problem.
A
"hether iet!sche himself overcomes
historical sickness is unclear. 8oes ;arathustra succeed in remaining true to both of his
mistresses: life and wisdomB Strauss and Heidegger attempt to find a definitive cure for
historical sickness.
Strauss is well known for his trenchant criticism of historicism, so the centrality of
historical sickness to his thought is hardly surprising. "hat is perhaps less obvious is the
intimate relation between the problematic of historical sickness and Strauss+s own preferred
formulation of the problem facing modernity: the %uestion of natural right or, more broadly, of
political philosophy.
C
"hen properly understood, Strauss argues, 5political5 in political
philosophy indicates not the sub-ect matter of a particular branch of philosophy but the manner
in which philosophy is treated or presented.
,D
'he problem of political philosophy so understood
is the problem of the relation between philosophy and the city, or of thought to life. 'his is the
first problem of historical sickness, the problem of knowing and doing, or theory and practice.
'here is however, as noted above, a deeper %uestion inherent in historical sickness. 'his
deeper %uestion asks about the human situation. 'his is where a thinker is re%uired to make his
or her most comprehensive and fundamental statement about the place of the human within the
whole. By contrast %uestions of science, or morality, or %uestions about the nature of the good
life, for example, are not fundamental because they leave open the further %uestion of the place
of scientific knowledge, or morality, or conceptions of the good life within the whole. 3re
human efforts to achieve knowledge, to act well, or to be happy supported by the non2human
parts of realityB 3re they harmonious with or antagonistic to the wholeB &t is here that a thinker
must face the %uestion of being and explain his or her conception of philosophy. 'his deeper
%uestion coincides with the 5philosophy5 in Strauss+s conception of political philosophy. "hat
does Strauss conceive philosophy to beB
Strauss argues for his understanding of philosophy in a negative fashion.
,,
'hat is to say,
he attempts to undermine the self2certainty of modernity rather than directly arguing for the
superiority of classical philosophy. He attempts to reopen the %uarrel between the ancients and
the moderns. 'his approach has a certain rhetorical appeal, but nothing would succeed in
reopening the %uarrel as well as a demonstration of the philosophical basis of classical thought
and a convincing defense of that basis. 'his Strauss does not undertake.
,.
Strauss advocates not
5
a simple return to classical political thought but a retrieval of that thought. Such a retrieval will
necessarily re%uire an adaptation of classical political philosophy to modernity.
'he crucial issue here is the role played by teleology or ancient cosmology in classical
political philosophy. Strauss explicitly acknowledges that classical political philosophy cannot
be revived on the basis of a conception of nature as beneficent.
,1
&n place of a conception of
nature as an ordered whole, or of the $latonic forms, or an appeal to the common sense natural
experience of the world, Strauss relies upon a conception of philosophy as 5nothing but genuine
awareness of the problems, i.e., of the fundamental and comprehensive problems,5 and a 5!etetic
(or skeptic in the original sense of the term)5 attitude toward 5the very few typical solutions.5
,9
'his basis of philosophy fits well with Strauss+s understanding that philosophy is not a set of
doctrines, but a way of life.
,:
'he iet!schean problematic of historical sickness also informs Heidegger+s reflections
on history. Heidegger+s conception of historicity transforms the twin demands faced by
iet!sche+s ;arathustra: the demands to be faithful both to life and wisdom. "isdom is no
longer taken as the will to truth, but as truth itself and an ontological conception of truth. *ife is
seen not from the perspective of the individual or culture, but as a property of Being. 'he
problem of historical sickness becomes the %uestion of the truth of Being. &n the process of this
transformation Heidegger purges iet!sche+s thought of what he perceives to be its lingering
sub-ectivist or metaphysical basis.
Heidegger+s cure for historical sickness is a homeopathic one, for it is by appealing to the
essentially historical happening of the truth of Being that he attempts to overcome the dualism
between historical existence and historical meaning. Because the sub-ect matter of philosophy is
itself historical, Heidegger conceives of philosophy as a continuously renewed %uestioning.
&t EphilosophyF is not a direct possession like everyday knowledge of things and
of ourselves. 'he GHIJK GLMoNoGLO is the PGLNJQRK SKJoTRPvK: the science
sought after, the science that can never become a fixed possession and that, as
such, would -ust have to be passed on. &t is rather the knowledge that can be
obtained only if it is each time sought anew. &t is precisely a venture...
,<
'he necessity for philosophy to remain the 5science sought after5 is in the matter for thought
itself.
'he finitude of philosophy consists not in the fact that it comes up against limits
and cannot proceed further. &t rather consists in the singleness and simplicity of
6
its central problematic, philosophy conceals a richness that again and again
demands a renewed awakening.
,?
'he similarities between Strauss and Heidegger flow from the common root of their
thought in the iet!schean problematic of historical sickness. Both Strauss and Heidegger
devote considerable attention to the thought of the @reeks, considering it necessary to reconsider
the beginning of philosophy in order to loosen the grip of the dogmatic view of the tradition.
Both are concerned with philosophy not as a set of doctrines, but as a way of life. Both seek to
restore philosophy to a place of dignity in the face of the history2based human sciences.
,A
'o see
philosophy as only one element of a Weltanschauung seems to both Strauss and Heidegger
fundamentally to misunderstand philosophy. Both believe philosophy to be the highest type of
human activity. Both react against the instrumentali!ation of reason and the sub-ectivi!ation of
all elements of life that they see around them. 3nd both seek to understand the rise of nihilism.
,C
8espite these many similarities, one is led badly astray if one considers the thought of
Strauss and Heidegger as of a piece.
.D
'here are important differences between them. Most
obviously, they locate the roots of the crisis of modernity at different points in the philosophical
history of the "est. Strauss believes that classical thought contains resources with which to
combat the crisis that began with Machiavelli, while Heidegger traces the roots of modern
nihilism back to @reek thought.
.,
'his is not, however, the fundamental difference. 3 decision
about which view of the origin of nihilism is correct can only be made by comparing the
different bases upon which Strauss and Heidegger build their conceptions of philosophy. 'he
fundamental difference between Strauss and Heidegger is found here. Strauss appeals to
fundamental problems and a !etetic %uest for wisdom, while Heidegger appeals to the historicity
of Being. "ho is correctB
.. Strauss+s Uirst 4riti%ue of Heidegger
Strauss calls Martin Heidegger 5the only great thinker in our time.5
..
Vet he also
characteri!es Heidegger+s thought as insane
.1
and maintained that there is an obvious connection
between Being and Time and Heidegger+s support of the a!is.
.9
Strauss believes that
Heidegger+s thought is a 5radical historicism5
.:
that leads to an 5un%ualified relativism.5
.<
'he
problem is to understand exactly what Strauss means by these comments, and why he thinks they
7
apply to Heidegger. 'his task is made more difficult by the lack of any sustained analysis of
Heidegger+s works by Strauss. Strauss is a theorist well2known for his detailed textual analysis
of a variety of philosophers, but when it comes to Heidegger his comments are unsupported by
textual analysis. 6nly two essays 2 5$hilosophy as =igorous Science and $olitical $hilosophy5
and 53n &ntroduction to Heideggerian Wxistentialism5
.?
2 deal explicitly with Heidegger in any
real depth. 'hese two essays will form the basis of my analysis in this section. 3lthough this
first criti%ues is, & argue, the weakest of Strauss#s three criti%ues, it is the most explicit and its
currency in the secondary literature
.A
on Strauss -ustifies treating it at length.
&n the course of this analysis & will argue that Strauss misunderstood Heidegger+s pro-ect
in Being and Time and placed that pro-ect within a dubious reconstruction of the history of
@erman post2Xantian reflection on the relation of history to philosophy. 'he misunderstanding
of Being and Time takes two forms: one relatively sophisticated, the other polemical. 'he latter
rests on the former. &n his more polemical moments Strauss is not averse to claiming that
Heidegger is simply arguing that all thought is relative to its social and cultural setting.
.C
'his
misunderstanding of Heidegger is based upon a more plausible, although & believe still mistaken,
understanding of Heidegger as continuing Husserl+s pro-ect of developing a transcendental
phenomenology.
'he general drift of Strauss+s argument is clear in both essays. Wxistentialism, whose
intellectual center is Heidegger,
1D
opposes and debunks rational philosophy.
1,
=ational
philosophy, deprived of its basis in universal reason and historical progress, can offer no real
opposition to 5poetic, emotional existentialism.5
1.
Wxistentialism argues that what is basic to
human experience is not the universal, but what is particular. 3ll knowing takes place within the
hori!on of a particular world, and thought must remain unaware of the total character of this
hori!on.
11
Wxistentialism shows that what was believed to be ob-ective is problematic, while the
sub-ective is 5profound, assertoric 2 with the understanding that there is no apodicticity.5
19
@iven the profundity of the particular, philosophy must become the 5analytics of Existenz.5
1:
5Wxistential philosophy is sub-ective truth about sub-ective truth.5
1<
Wxistentialism grows out of
the particular historical situation of the demise of the belief in progress.
1?
Strauss identifies the
social and cultural setting of existentialism as post2"orld "ar 6ne Wurope where all thought is
dominated by an unacknowledged Weltanschauung of historical and moral relativism.
1A
8
'his picture should, & think, strike even the casual reader of Heidegger as pu!!ling. &s
not Heidegger re-ecting the sub-ectivi!ation of knowledge that is typical of modernityB 8oes he
not appeal to a history of Being rather than to a theory of human understandingB 8oes not
Heidegger repeatedly re-ect the idea that he is concerned with cultural or social issues as
determinants of thoughtB How then does Strauss find him guilty of all these sinsB 3 closer
examination of the workings of Strauss+s criti%ue is clearly in order.
&n both the essays under consideration, Strauss introduces Heidegger+s pro-ect by means
of a detour through Husserl+s transcendental phenomenology.
1C
Husserl+s phenomenology
remains in the tradition of transcendental philosophy as begun by Xant.
9D
'hat is to say, it
attempts to discover the conditions under which sub-ectivity constructs the ob-ectivities of the
world, whether this world is considered the world of natural science or the everyday 5lifeworld.5
'ranscendental phenomenology attempts to discover the ultimate 5hori!on5 within which
transcendental sub-ectivity constitutes ob-ectivity. &t is concerned with the need to start
philosophi!ing from 5our common understanding of the world.5
9,
3t issue then are the
conditions for the possibility of understanding.
Strauss reads Being and Time as a continuation of Husserl+s transcendental
phenomenology that radicali!es its starting point by stressing that human beings are first and
foremost absorbed in a web of practical everyday activities in which they conduct themselves
understandingly, but without stopping to reflect on what they are doing.
9.
'hus it appears that
Heidegger, like Husserl, is concerned with the conditions of understanding. Such a reading of
Being and Time is clearly not absurd. &ndeed the book ends with the %uestion 58oes time reveal
itself as the hori!on of BeingB5
91
'his suggests that Heidegger is searching for the ultimate
hori!on within which transcendental sub-ectivity constructs the ob-ectivities of the world.
onetheless, although far from absurd, such a reading is mistaken. Heidegger is not
attempting to establish time as a Husserlian hori!on, but rather to suggest that Being is time. 3s
Hans2@eorg @adamer notes, Being and Time does not take the being that has an understanding
of Being as 5the ultimate basis from which a transcendental approach has to start... ErFather, there
is a %uite different reason why the understanding of Being is possible at all, namely that there is
a +there,+ a clearing in Being...5
99
"hat is at issue here is whether time is the ultimate hori!on
within which an anonymous transcendental sub-ectivity constitutes the world, or whether it is the
9
way that Being happens. 6n the latter view human beings participate in the clearing as
5perceivers and preservers5
9:
of the happening of Being and not as sub-ects constituting ob-ects.
6n Strauss+s Husserlian reading of Being and Time it makes sense, once one has re-ected
the idea of a pure transcendental form of the understanding, to raise the %uestion of whether
philosophy is not thereby relativi!ed to its social or cultural setting. 'his way of reading Being
and Time fails, however, to give enough weight to the centrality of the connection between
historicity and the destruction of the history of ontology that Heidegger pro-ected as $art && of
that book. 3s we will see, Heidegger insists that historicity does not relativi!e thought but rather
binds it to a 5higher lawfulness.5
Strauss is not blind to the connection between historicity and ontology,
9<
and he raises it
in a brief consideration of the turn in Heidegger+s thought. Strauss suggests three reasons for the
turn.
9?
6f these the last is the most important. Strauss asks whether it is really possible to
understand finitude without the contrasting 5light of infinity.5
9A
He suggests that a consideration
of this %uestion led Heidegger to abandon the existential analytic and to turn to what is, if not
metaphysics, then at least 5some repetition of what metaphysics intended on an entirely different
plane.5
9C
& believe that in drawing so strong a contrast between the early and late Heidegger,
Strauss misinterprets the turn. &n Strauss+s explanation, Being and Time is a form of
anthropological relativism that is completely re-ected in Heidegger+s later thought. He compares
the later Heidegger+s criticism of the existential analytic to Hegel+s criticism of Xant.
:D
&n other
words, the early pro-ect is tied up with the transcendental conditions of understanding, that is to
say a purely formal 5psychologi!ing5
:,
while the later Heidegger is bound to a metaphysics of
the absolute historical moment. &f understood in these terms, the turn does become a re-ection of
Being and Time. But this is far too extreme a view of the turn. &f instead we see the importance
of the historicity of Being already present in Being and Time the need for such an extreme
interpretation vanishes.
Strauss is surely correct, however, to raise the %uestion of whether an understanding of
finitude can be arrived at without employing the concept of the infinite. Heidegger poses this
%uestion himself at the end of his book on Xant.
:.
&t is clear that insofar as the Heideggerian
Verwindung of metaphysics is possible his own answer to this %uestion must be 5yes.5 Strauss
10
recogni!es that this is the crucial issue. 5'he only %uestion of importance, of course, is whether
Heidegger+s teaching is true or not.5
:1
Having recogni!ed that Heidegger+s pro-ect involves a rethinking of metaphysics 5on an
entirely different plane,5 Strauss proceeds to place that pro-ect in a %uestionable account of
@erman philosophical thought about history. Beginning with a characteri!ation of Hegel as
propounding the end of history as the reali!ation of the absolute moment in history, this account
moves on to present Marx and iet!sche as advocating an overcoming of all history in order to
reali!e a new, fully or more than human ideal.
:9
'he limitations of Xo-Yve+s end of history
interpretation of Hegel are well known,
::
and it is to be regretted that Strauss never critically
engaged a more accurate presentation of the Hegelian legitimation of modernity. 3s & have
suggested in my discussion of historical sickness, iet!sche cannot be understood as advocating
a simple overcoming of the human because of the modification of the teaching of the superman
by the idea of the eternal return. 3ccording to Strauss, 5Heidegger+s philosophy of history has
the same structure of Marx+ and iet!sche+s: the moment in which the final insight is arriving
opens the eschatological prospect.5
:<
But Heidegger+s concept of historicity is intended precisely
to free the future from the grasp of the present that inevitably turns that future into a vision of
itself. Strauss+s account of Heidegger here insists on reading Heidegger back into the well2
recogni!ed problems of philosophical reflection on history that Heidegger seeks to overcome.
3re there good reasons to resists this reading of HeideggerB
1. Heideggerian Historicity
&n this section & examine the place of historicity in Heidegger+s thought. &n order to bring
this large task down to a manageable si!e & concentrate on showing how historicity evades the
criticisms leveled against it by Strauss. 'his will serve not only to answer Strauss#s first
criti%ue, but also to provide the basis for consideration of the second criti%ue, for historicity is
Heidegger+s answer to the deeper %uestion of historical sickness. 3s such, it is his account of the
human situation, the place in his thought where he explains what situates human beings and how
they are able to orient themselves. Historicity informs Heidegger+s conception of philosophy, or
seinsgeschicklich thought, thought of the destiny of Being. 'his thought 5never becomes
11
groundless or beyond all %uestion.5
:?
&n other words historicity provides thought with a measure
that is neither arbitrary, nor a surrender to an external, given authority. 'he central concern of
this section will be to bring out the content of this measure for thought.
My assertion that historicity provides the thread of continuity between Heidegger+s early
and late writings is a controversial one. 'he opposite view, that historicity is an active concept
only in Being and Time where it relates to human temporality in a way incompatible with the
later history of Being (Seinsgeschichte)
:A
, appears to receive support from Heidegger+s comment
that one must not interpret the destiny of Being 5in terms of what was said in Being and Time
about the historicity of man.5
:C
Heidegger+s position is, however, more nuanced than this
%uotation initially indicates, for he goes on to say that 5the only possible way to anticipate the
latter thought on the destiny of Being from the perspective of Being and Time is to think through
what was presented in Being and Time about the dismantling of the ontological doctrine of the
Being of beings.5
<D
'his refers to the destruction or destructuring (Destruktion) of the history of
ontology planned for $art && of Being and Time, but never written. $resumably the destruction
could not take place on the methodological basis provided by the existential analytic. 3 clue as
to why this was so is provided in Heidegger+s comments about the relation of the destiny of
Being to the historicity of man. 6ne should not attempt to understand the destiny of Being on
the basis of the historicity of man 5because one everywhere represents the destiny of Being only
as history, and history only as a kind of occurrence.5
<,
&f one reads Being and Time in light of Heidegger+s analysis of history in his pre2Being
and Time lecture courses one will be well armed against the representation of history as a kind of
occurrence. Heidegger+s reflections in these courses fall within the tradition of @erman
philosophical and theological reflection on history and face the problem that all such reflections
faced in the ,C.Ds: the fracturing of the unified conception of historical science as cultural
legitimation, a conception that informed the work of the @erman historical school, into the view
of history as either Wissenschaft or Weltanschauung, but not both.
<.
Historicity developed as
Heidegger+s answer to the risis des !istorismus. 3s research on Heidegger+s pre2Being and
Time works has progressed over the past 1: years, it has become clear that Heidegger believed
that both the idea of history as science and of history as a source of world views found their
ground in a mistaken understanding of what history is.
<1
Heidegger called this view the
12
ob-ective or ob-ect2historical.
<9
&n contrast to this ob-ective view of history as something that
occurs, Heidegger developed a view of history he called the actuali!ation historical.
'he actuali!ation2historical understanding of history focuses on the being2possible of
factical life. Uactical life is Heidegger+s replacement for Husserl+s transcendental &. Uactical life
is inherently historical and finds its meaning grounded in life+s 5sense of performance,5
<:
its
happening. 'he being2possible of factical life is evidenced by its restless, distressed concern for
itself. 'his view of history runs strongly counter to the idea of history as occurrence.
3s important as the early works are for evidence of the sense of history at work in Being
and Time the actual argument of that work itself must be decisive for any assessment of
historicity. Being and Time intends to ground the account of historicity in the account of
existential temporality, and therefore, in the authentic temporali!ing of 8asein. 'his attempted
grounding of historicity fails however. & believe that the tension between historicity and
temporality is one of the places where Being and Time invites a reading that goes against its own
intention. Historicity describes the belonging together of Being and human beings. 'his
understanding of historicity refuses to fit comfortably within the place provided for it by
existential temporality.
Wven if one takes historicity as 5basically -ust a more concrete development of
temporality5
<<
however, it is crucial to note the limitations of a reading of Being and Time as
transcendental philosophy. Strong evidence that Heidegger is not attempting to make
temporality into a transcendental hori!on comes in section <:, 5'emporality as the 6ntological
Meaning of 4are.5 'here it appears to many commentators that Heidegger is attempting to
establish something called original temporality as a hori!on for authentic temporality.
<?
'he
problem with this attempt is that Heidegger identifies authentic and original temporality in the
same terms. 3 transcendental hori!on cannot have the same definition as one of the particular
modes for which it is supposed to serve as a hori!on. 3s Heidegger nowhere in section <:
explicitly claims to be grounding both authentic and inauthentic temporality in original
temporality, the better view of this section is that Heidegger is pointing to the role that authentic
existence plays in a correct understanding of time and history.
<A
'he identification of original
and authentic temporality is not a mistake or ambiguity in Heidegger+s analysis> it is rather an
indication that when it is understood authentically temporality provides standards for thought
and action.
13
'he case for this claim can be elaborated by examining the relation between existential
temporality and historicity. "hen the sections on existential temporality and historicity are read
carefully it turns out that historicity must be the more fundamental concept. 'he tension
between historicity and existential temporality is, & suggest, at least one important reason why
Heidegger felt himself unable to complete Being and Time. Heidegger+s attempt to contain
historicity within the formal framework of existential temporality runs aground on the issue of
the relation among the three ecstases of time, and especially the status of the authentic present,
what Heidegger also calls the moment.
'he problem is that although Heidegger is able to account for the authentic past (5being
already in as having been5) and the authentic future (5being ahead of as coming toward5) on the
basis of the structures of authentic temporality, he cannot give an account of the authentic
present (5being alongside as making present5) on that basis.
<C
Heidegger is reduced to assuring
the reader that the authentic present 5remains included in the future and in having been.5
?D
&t is important to understand what has happened here. 'he analysis of 8asein started
with everyday life. 'his analysis, however, did not achieve access to 8asein as a totality, nor
did it discover authentic 8asein. 'he analysis had to seek a more primordial level.
?,
'his was
found in anticipatory resoluteness, and it was the access to 8asein provided by anticipatory
resoluteness that allowed the interpretation of temporality as the meaning of care to take place.
Vet, in the analysis of authentic 8asein as a totality, an essential part of 8asein+s being seems to
have disappeared. 'he present has vanished into the past and the future, and we are left with
only Heidegger+s assurance that it is still included in the other two parts.
"hat is at issue here is not simply a technical problem in the interpretation of Being and
Time. Heidegger repeatedly pointed out that 8asein is a being2possible (Seink"nnen, literally a
can2be).
?.
'his is 8asein+s authentic way of being.
?1
'he %uestion is how a being that exists
futurally, as being2possible, can be authentically present in the here and now. 'his is a %uestion
that goes to the root of modernity+s self2understanding. &f human beings are to be autonomous
they cannot take their standards from anything ob-ectively present. But if time becomes the
dimension of transcendence of what is ob-ectively present does not this generate a Hegelian bad
infiniteB 8oes not the promise of authentic existence continually recede before the constant
negating of the presentB
14
Heidegger+s answer to these %uestions is 5o,5 and this answer is possible because of his
elaboration of the moment as the authentic present.
?9
&t is with the discovery of the moment that,
as Heidegger remarked a couple of years after the publication of Being and Time, 5the
#ossibility of a completely new epoch of philosophy has begun for the first time since
anti%uity.5
?:
Heidegger elaborates the moment only in his discussion of historicity. &ndeed, the
moment+s elaboration is only possible when 8asein is 5explicitly5 aware of 5the provenance of
its possibilities upon which it pro-ects itself.5
?<
'his awareness is only available when 8asein
understands its resoluteness as the repetition of a heritage.
??
3uthentic 8asein cannot find the possibilities upon which to pro-ect itself among what is
ob-ectively present. 'his means that 8asein cannot find standards for thought or action from a
theory of human nature, or from a causal analysis of its situation. 3uthentic 8asein can only
find a measure in something that, like itself, has being2possible as a way of being. 8asein must
decide. &t cannot deduce or calculate. 6ne needs to choose oneself, one+s authentic self,
precisely because it is possible to lose oneself among what is ob-ectively present.
&f history is understood as the ob-ect2historical, 8asein does lose itself in the curiosity of
historiographical research.
?A
'he moment does not permit such an understanding of history
because it is a temporally enriched present, a present that includes both the pro-ection of the
future and a repetition of the past.
?C
'his does not mean that the future or the past is to be
organi!ed on the basis of the interests of the present. "hen the past is forced to submit to the
ob-ective interests of the present the result is historicism. "hen the future is pro-ected on the
basis of these interests the result is a messianic vision or 5eschatological prospect.5 =ather the
authentic present allows the other ecstases of time their freedom, and in doing so creates order.
AD
$ugenblicklich thought 2 thought that takes place in the authentic present 2 is the
repetition of a heritage. &t creatively reappropriates the tradition while succumbing to neither
historicism nor a messianic vision of the future. 'he %uestion that has always plagued readers of
Being and Time is: How does 8asein decide on a particular way of reappropriating the traditionB
Heidegger claims that repetition enables 8asein to 5choose its hero.5
A,
How does one find a
measure for this choiceB 'o this %uestion Being and Time returns no answer.
A.
& believe that
this reflects its status as an unfinished work, but some commentators have sei!ed upon the
absence of a measure to accuse Heidegger of either an empty decisionism, a blind fatalism or
both.
A1
&n light of these criticisms it is important to suggest where in Being and Time Heidegger
15
intended to find the resources for an answer to the %uestion of how one chooses a hero. Here the
observation that the existential analytic is grounded not in the transcendental sub-ect but in the
clearing (%ichtung) shows the way.
'he clearing is one of Heidegger+s descriptions of the belonging together of human being
and Being.
A9
&n Being and Time Heidegger notes that 8asein is its disclosedness,
A:
that is to say
8asein is the open region created by the clearing. 8asein is 5cleared5 by ecstatic temporality.
A<
&n being ahead of itself (as futural) human thought is self2transcending. 8asein is not, however,
simply another name for human being, rather it is 5a pure expression of Being.5
A?
3s a result the
clearing cannot be understood as simply the product of human thought. 'he clearing is also
formed by Being+s originary transcendence. Being+s originary transcendence is excessive> Being
is never simply or absolutely present. 'his double transcendence (self2transcendence and
originary transcendence) defines the human situation> it describes how human beings are
situated.
AA
3s such it is Heidegger+s way of overcoming the dualism between historical existence
and historical meaning. More primordial than this dualism is the duality of the double
transcendence. &t is reasonable then to expect that in choosing its hero 8asein situates itself
within the history of Being and not, as Strauss+s criti%ue suggests, by reference to social or
cultural values.
'he way in which the history of Being can provide a concrete way of situating oneself is
not spelled out in Being and Time, for this one must turn to Heidegger+s later works. 'here
Heidegger claims that historical reflection or seinsgeschicklich thought is governed by a 5higher
lawfulness>5 it is 5bound to a higher and more rigorous law than historiography.5
AC
4learly
Heidegger+s explanation of what this law is will be crucial to any assessment of his thought.
Seinsgeschicklich thought finds what is valid in the past not in the doctrines elaborated
by past thinkers, but in the grounds upon which those doctrines rest, and in the creative
establishment of those grounds. So the measure for seinsgeschicklich thought is found in the
character of the thought in the history of Being itself, and not in something external to that
thought. 'he higher lawfulness is 5the very character5 of a thinking> it is thought+s 5way of
%uestioning,5 or the 5direction from which EoneF pursues an answer5 to the %uestion.
CD
'he
higher lawfulness is not something outside of, or separate from seinsgeschicklich thought, but
the ground of that thought itself.
16
'he validity that seinsgeschicklich thought finds in the past is not simply a formal
validity. &t is not simply that the thinkers of the past established values, and therefore we can
too. 6n this view the content of the values would be a matter of indifference. Seinsgeschicklich
thought does not leave behind the thought of the past in an overcoming of that thought, but takes
it up as part of what determines the future and the present.
C,
'he measure for seinsgeschicklich
thought is not a matter of causality. 'he past does not cause the present, nor does it causally
determine the future. 'hought is not limited to tracing the chain of causes that characteri!e
historiography.
C.
'here is a matter for thought beyond causality. 5History does not withhold
itself from prediction but from calculating -udgement.5
C1
&t is for this reason that Heidegger
speaks of seinsgeschicklich thought as tolerating and sustaining the unexplainable.
C9
How one finds a measure for thought can be made clearer by examining Heidegger+s
account of the first beginning of the history of Being in @reek thought. 'he %uestion that
concerns Heidegger is how the conception of truth as correctness came to be established. 3s
originally formulated by 3ristotle, this conception did not, Heidegger notes, rest upon a
foundation.
C:
=ather than appeal to 5something already present at hand,5
C<
3ristotle simply
asserts that truth is correctness. Heidegger claims that this determination of the essence of truth
comes about as a positing of the ground for that essence that is a productive seeing of the
ground.
C?
'his productive seeing is not a manufacturing of the ground, but a seeing because the
ground is what determines the essence in advance.
CA
'he truth of Being is at work in the
productive seeing that takes place as a moving onto the ground that opens up the ground. &n the
case of the determination of truth as correctness, the ground onto which thought moves is
aletheia or unconcealedness. 'his ground was not explicitly interrogated by @reek thought.
CC
'his is the unthought upon which @reek thought rests. Heidegger is clear that the failure to
%uestion unconcealedness is not a defect of @reek thought, but rather resulted from faithfulness
to the destiny meted out to that thought.
,DD
'hat destiny was to ask what beings are as such and
as a whole.
,D,
'o think of the @reek determination of the essence of truth not as a particular doctrine in
the history of philosophy, but as an episode in the history of Being is to understand the ground
upon which that thought moved. By opening this ground through the discovery of the
%uestionableness of the usual 2 an opening that takes place through the mood of wonder 2 the
@reeks began philosophy.
,D.
17
"onder is no longer the mood that governs thought. "e now stand at the end of the
@reek beginning. &n his analyses of anxiety (Being and Time, 5"hat is MetaphysicsB5) and
boredom (The &undamental 'once#ts of (eta#hysics) Heidegger attempts to awaken the need
for thought in preparation for another beginning in the history of Being. 'his preparation takes
place out of the very lack of need for a %uestioning of Being that dominates contemporary
thought. 'he 5abandonment of beings by Being,5 or in other words the oblivion of the %uestion
of Being, is itself 5an e)ent which proceeds from beings as a whole, indeed in such a way that
precisely this event is the least visible and experienceable.5
,D1
&t is this abandonment that is 5the
concealed ground of the still veiled basic disposition which compels us into another necessity of
another original %uestioning.5
,D9
Heidegger+s analysis of the absence of need created by the oblivion of Being is an
example of seinsgeschicklich thought, the thought that finds the higher lawfulness of historical
reflection. "hat seinsgeschicklich thought finds is not simply the essence of truth, the
conception of truth that governs the current epoch. Heidegger does, of course, undertake the
task of determining what this conception is. His analysis of Gestell in 5'he Zuestion
4oncerning 'echnology,5 for example, pursues this %uestion. But it is not here that the higher
lawfulness of historical reflection is found. Heidegger+s search is for the unthought in thinking,
and this in our epoch is the abandonment of the %uestion of Being, a %uestion which is no longer
even recogni!ed as such because of the unthinking nature of the epoch.
,D:
8oes this claim that we stand at the end of the first beginning of thought amount to a
claim that the present is an absolute moment in history as Strauss suggestsB "e have already
seen that historicity is an attempt neither to dominate the future, nor 5open the eschatological
prospect.5 3s Heidegger does not maintain that Being is ever something fully present, it cannot
be the case that any moment is the moment of the absolute presence of Being. Heidegger does
find that the present moment stands before a decision, a decision about 5whether we still want
and can want the truth at all.5
,D<
But this decision, which will not be made 5in the well tended
garden of our inclinations, wishes and intentions,5
,D?
can only be made because of the 5richness
that again and again demands a renewed awakening.5 &t is a decision that is re%uired because of
the absence of an absolute moment in history.
onetheless, Heidegger does seem to suggest that the present stands in a privileged
relation to the past. He asserts that while the @reeks did not explicitly interrogate the ground of
18
the determination of truth as correctness, that is aletheia or unconcealedness, the task of thinking
today is to awaken to the need to ask about that ground. 3fter all, is not what Strauss is really
attacking when he invokes the idea of an absolute moment the view that we now have
knowledge of what occurred in the past and led up to the present moment that thinkers in the
past could not have hadB $erhaps it is, but it remains important to see why this mischaracteri!es
Heidegger#s view. "hat drives Heidegger#s view is not the limitations on human thought
created by its historical position but the historicity of Being itself. Being happens. 'he
historical situation of the @reeks, at the most fundamental level of reality, was different from
that of today. 'his situation, far from representing a limitation on the thought of the @reeks,
was the source of its greatness. &s our insight superior to that of the @reeks because we are able
to see how their thought unfolded in the intervening millenniaB Heidegger#s view is that, for the
most part, current day thought fails even to perceive the %uestion that animated @reek thought as
a %uestion. &n order to rise to the level of @reek thought, a perceptive %uestioning of beings,
would, Heidegger suggests, be a ma-or accomplishment. &t would re%uire the destruction of the
history of philosophy so as to recover the living kernel of seinsgeschicklich thought that
animates that history.
Heidegger does suggest that the fate of thought in our epoch is to think what remained
unthought in the @reek beginning, to respond to the oblivion of Being by a %uestioning of
unconcealedness. But there is no suggestion in Heidegger#s account of the history of Being that
a thoughtful response to the matter for thinking meted out to one#s epoch makes one superior to
the thinkers of the past. or does he suggest that such a response will master the sources of its
own thinking. =ather it too will open a ground for thought by moving onto that ground and in
so doing will have its own unthought, and unthought that may become an issue for future
thinkers. o eschatological prospect is opened.
&t is precisely because of the way that Heidegger conceives of the history of Being that
philosophy must remain the /science sought after.0 =ather than producing a more or less
authoritative history of philosophy, reflection on Being discovers an inexhaustible fount for
thinking. Situated by both self2transcendence (8asein#s concern for its own existence which
prevents it from finding standards in things that are merely ob-ectively present alongside it) and
Being#s originary transcendence (Being#s happening that gives a matter for thought) human
beings come to thinking by finding themselves already underway. 'his duality of self2
19
transcendence and Being#s originary transcendence, or more broadly the belonging together of
Being and human being, is Heidegger#s cure for the dualism of historical existence versus
historical meaning (and ultimately that of mind and world) that creates historical sickness.
Simply asserting that more primordial that the dualism of historical sickness is the
duality of the belonging together of Being and human being hardly proves anything. 'he proof
would come in the effort to articulate and illuminate the more common experiences of life on the
basis of this picture of the human situation. 3nd it would come in efforts to find an awareness
of this situation in past thought. Heidegger found traces of such an awareness in sources as
diverse as 3ristotle#s *hysics, St. $aul#s letters and Xant#s reflections on time while maintaining
that they always succumbed to theoretical interpretation through the lens of the metaphysics of
presence which distorts the underlying experience. Xeeping in mind the centrality of the
historicity of Being to all of his work is a valuable way of thinking about Heidegger.
9. Strauss#s Second 4riti%ue: Historicity versus $olitical $hilosophy
&n the previous section & argued that Heidegger+s concept of historicity is not a theory of
understanding searching for the hori!on within which sub-ectivity constitutes the world and it
does not relativi!e thought to its social or cultural setting. or does historicity depend upon the
achievement of an absolute moment in history. & now turn to Strauss#s second criti%ue, a
criti%ue which will motivate a comparison of Heidegger and Strauss+s alternative conceptions of
philosophy. Wven more than is the case with the first criti%ue, this second line of attack is based,
not on detailed textual analysis, but rather upon scattered remarks, whose target is certainly
Heidegger. & strongly agree with Steven B. Smith#s contention that /one could almost say that
Heidegger is the unnamed presence to whom or against whom all of Strauss#s writings are
directed.0
,DA
&n this line of criticism Strauss is seen as /appropriating various Heideggerian problems
and terminology0 but for the purpose of /a far2reaching criti%ue of Heidegger#s
antimodernity.0
,DC
Heidegger opens new %uestions regarding the philosophical tradition and by
doing so opens the road to a new and fresh recovery of the ancients and in particular of classical
political philosophy.
,,D
'his return to classical thought discovers or rather rediscovers /the
primacy of political things0
,,,
and recovers the natural consciousness or common sense
20
articulation of natural phenomena.
,,.
'his natural consciousness is then favorably contrasted to
Heidegger#s fundamental ontology, which had already covered over the natural surface of life
with a particular philosophic interpretation.
,,1

Based upon the rediscovery of /the primacy of the political0 [ that is, of the fact that
human existence is /essentially moral and political0
,,9
[ Strauss finds the basis of his own
interpretation of the history of philosophy. 6rdinary experience is shot through with -udgments
of right and wrong, what is -ust and what un-ust, and it is through the examination of these
experiences that Socratic philosophy found the basis of its /second sailing.0 Strauss follows the
Socratic path and discovers the history of natural right that he outlines in +atural ,ight and
!istory. &t is this rediscovery of the fact that classical political philosophy is based on the
natural consciousness, and not any cosmological or metaphysical doctrines, that provides the
reason for thinking Strauss#s history of the nihilism as superior to Heidegger#s. /Strauss#s
emphasis on the irreducibly political character of natural right constitutes his most significant
disagreement with Heidegger.0
,,:
&n Strauss#s history nihilism is not the fate of the modern west
because of its position in the history of Being, but a result of a loss of nerve rooted in intellectual
confusion. atural right remains a position that can be defended and -ustified and as a live
alternative it -ustifies a comprehensive reevaluation of the crisis of the "est.
,,<

&t is important to understand the role that the natural attitude or the primacy of the
political plays in Strauss#s thought. Strauss does not argue that natural right is or could be a
direct solution to the current crisis of the "est, nor does he argue that nature provides a standard
for -udging all political actions or evaluating different regimes. "hat he does claim is that
classical political thought, with its natural right teaching, is the essential precondition to
rediscovering the natural attitude. 4lassical political thought displays the attitudes out of which
it arises, the beliefs and desires of the city, and it is these attitudes, supplemented by the most
elementary premises of the Bible which classical political philosophy took as its starting point.
,,?
=ather than a straightforward appeal to a natural standard for political action or evaluation, the
rediscovery of the primacy of the political for the natural consciousness is developed by Strauss
into a conception of philosophy that expresses a profound appreciation for the limits of human
thought.
,,A
'his conception of philosophy expresses the natural /manifestation of eros for
understanding.
,,C
21
Heidegger based his own response to the problem of historical sickness on historicity and
seinsgeschicklich thought. By contrast Strauss attempts to revive classical political philosophy
on the basis of a !etetic attitude toward the few typical solutions of fundamental problems. &t is
difficult to get a completely clear picture of what Strauss has in mind when he speaks of these
fundamental problems and a !etetic attitude toward them. &t is not clear what the fundamental
problems are. &n +atural ,ight and !istory Strauss gives the problem of -ustice as an example
but the broader context of that remark leaves one to wonder if the %uestion of whether /to be0
has as its fundamental meaning to be always is also such a %uestion.
,.D
3t one point Strauss
suggests that /the fundamental alternatives regarding their Ethe fundamental problemsF
solution\ are coeval with human thought,0
,.,
at another he suggests that it is always possible
that a future great thinker will develop a new alternative.
,..
Wven more vexing is the %uestion of
what exactly /awareness0 of the problems and a /!etetic0 attitude toward the solutions implies
about the type of thinking that Strauss takes philosophy to be.
&t is worth reiterating that Strauss does not undertake a simple return to classical political
thought but rather a retrieval of that thought. 'his retrieval does not rest upon a contemplative
attitude toward an eternal cosmological order. 'he attitude of the thinker toward the few typical
solutions to the fundamental problems is said by Strauss to be /neither dogmatic, nor skeptic,
and still less ]decisionistic#.0
,.1
=ather it is !etetic by which Strauss means an awareness of the
problems as problems that remain problems despite one#s best efforts to solve them.
onetheless, Strauss argues, one cannot /think about the problems without becoming inclined
toward a solution.0
,.9
Strauss+s conception of philosophy has the virtue of preserving the otherness of Being to
thought. 'here will be no dialectical mediation of the solutions to the fundamental problems
into a totality. But Strauss+s aversion to direct engagement with ontological %uestions leaves one
unsatisfied with the account of the relation between !etetic thought and the problems. 'he
problems are 5fundamental and comprehensive5
,.:
while their contemplators are finite and
temporal. 8oes this not raise the dualism problemB 3re not the problems separated from the
awareness of them in such a way that their supposed interaction becomes somewhat mysteriousB
6ne might suggest that interpretation is itself the way in which the temporal partakes of the
eternal, but this raises the %uestion of the nature of this participation.
22
Strauss+s conception of philosophy as !etetic awareness of the fundamental problems runs
the risk of taking on the character of a fake sort of %uestioning. Strauss himself is aware of this
danger> indeed the reason that one must become 5inclined toward a solution5 is to avoid the
danger that philosophy will 5degenerate into playing with the problems.5
,.<
onetheless since
one must also, Strauss believes, remain aware that 5the evidence of all solutions is necessarily
smaller than the evidence of the problems5
,.?
it is difficult to see what this inclining toward a
solution can really amount to. "hat is at issue here is not the degree of 5sub-ective certainty5
,.A
one feels about a particular solution, nor is it a matter of being for or against progress in the
understanding of the fundamental problems. 'he %uestion is how philosophy can be the sort of
ever renewed %uestioning that both Strauss and Heidegger believe it to be.
Wven given his awareness of the danger of philosophy becoming a mere playing with
problems, however, Strauss is unable to provide a satisfactory answer to this %uestion. 'he
fundamental problems remain on the far side of a dualism from the human beings who, for
reasons unrelated to any ultimate solution to these problems, incline toward different typical
answers. 3ny explanation of why different people incline toward different answers is restricted
to the human side of the dualism cut off from the problems and the %uestion of Being. 3s
awareness of the fundamental problems, philosophy can never be more than an empty
edification, perhaps morally uplifting but groundless. *ife and wisdom remain unreconciled and
modernity#s historical sickness remains uncured.
'his conclusion certainly does not re%uire one to re-ect all of Strauss#s varied
contributions to political thought. onetheless, Strauss+s challenge to modernity+s self2
understanding depends upon his argument that the abandonment of nature as a normative
standard leads inevitably to a relativistic or decisionistic 5radical historicism.5 &nsofar as his
criti%ue of Heidegger fails, his own argument for the need to retrieve classical political
philosophy is undermined. 3nd insofar as it remains unclear how Strauss#s account of
philosophy as !etetic awareness of the fundamental problems answers the dualism problem of
historical sickness one is forced to wonder how that retrieval can succeed.
:. Strauss#s 'hird 4riti%ue: 'he 'heologico2$olitical $roblem
23
'he final criti%ue of Heidegger & examine re%uires even more extrapolation from
Strauss#s texts than did the second. &t touches on what most interpreters of Strauss agree is the
deepest root of his thought, the theologico2political problem. Something close to a consensus
among commentators on Strauss is beginning to form around the idea that the theologico2
political problem is the true vital center of his thought.
,.C
$aradoxically however, what Strauss
believed about the exact relation of philosophy to revealed religion remains a matter of debate.
&n the third criti%ue, Heidegger is called to account for relying on religious categories of thought
to dominate his existential analytic and for allowing religious hopes and longings to take root in
philosophy. &t is further suggested that these hopes and longings found expression in
Heidegger#s political involvement. & intend to discuss these criticisms relatively briefly and to
devote most of my attention to the theologico2political problem, for the criticism of Heidegger is
that he errs precisely because of his inade%uate attention to the confrontation of philosophy with
revealed religion. &n other words he fails to understand the theologico2political problem.
'he immediate criticism of Heidegger in this instance is that he relies on 4hristian
categories of experience such as conscience and guilt without sub-ecting them to analytic
scrutiny and this leads to unanaly!ed religious hopes taking root within his philosophy.
,1D
&t is
particularly difficult to address this criticism at the level of textual analysis, both because so
little textual analysis is actually given to support it and because, as & argue below, the claim gets
its best support when seen in the context of Strauss#s analysis of the theologico2political
problem. 'here is no doubt that 4hristian thinkers such as 3ugustine, *uther and Xierkegaard
were of critical importance to Heidegger as he was preparing Being and Time, but it is also
indisputable that many of Heidegger#s analyses take their starting point from non24hristian
sources: from Sophocles, Heraclitus and Holderlin. 'here are certainly similarities between
some of Heidegger#s concepts and those of 4hristian thought> far more important than the
examples such as guilt, fate, decision or conscience usually cited by Straussians, is the parallel
between Heidegger#s ontological difference and the difference between creator and creature in
4hristian theology. one of these similarities go very far however in undermining Heidegger#s
analysis unless one adds the assumption that 4hristian theology has so completely
misunderstood basic elements of human existence that any resemblance to theology renders
philosophy faulty. 'his assumption is extremely unlikely to be true.
,1,
24
Strauss#s third criti%ue only gains plausibility if revealed religion is fundamentally and
systematically misunderstood by any analysis other than Strauss#s own theologico2political
understanding. &n Strauss#s analysis theology is first and foremost political theology and while
theology and philosophy are rivals for the status of guide to the best life, they are also
dialectically entwined. 'he Bible was, for Strauss, alongside $lato the source for his
understanding of the pre2philosophic consciousness. =eligion is also seen as necessary for sound
political order. Uinally, and most importantly it is not clear whether Strauss thought that
philosophy could ever refute the claims of revealed religion.
,1.
=ather, through keeping alive
the tension between the two, Strauss believed that revealed religion helped philosophy remember
its awareness of limitations. 'he inability of philosophy to refute the claims of revealed religion
is seen, by most commentators, as a conse%uence of Strauss#s !etetic conception of philosophy.
'he tension between philosophy and revealed religion and their mutual inability to refute one
another prevents philosophy from becoming a science with results that could be simply passed
on. 3s Strauss writes:
Men are constantly attracted and deluded by two opposite charms: the charm of
competence which is engendered by mathematics and everything akin to mathematics,
and the charm of humble awe, which is engendered by dedication on the human soul and
its experiences. $hilosophy is characteri!ed by the gentle, if firm, refusal to succumb to
either charm. &t is the highest form of the mating of courage and moderation. &n spite of
its highness or nobility, it could appear as Sisyphean or ugly, when one contrasts its
achievement with its goal. Vet it is necessarily accompanied, sustained, and elevated by
eros. &t is graced by nature#s grace.
,11
3 slightly different analysis of the theologico2political problem is given by Heinrich
Meier in %eo Strauss and the Theologico-*olitical *roblem.. 'he significant difference in
Meier#s account is that he does not believe that Strauss saw revealed religion as a serious
intellectual challenge to philosophy, believing rather that Strauss exoterically exaggerated the
case for revealed religion in order to revitali!e the theologico2political problem itself, while
remaining fully committed, esoterically, to philosophy.
,19
*ike other commentators, Meier stresses that, in Strauss#s understanding of it, philosophy
finds its true nature and path in the confrontation with the city and with poetry over the best way
of life. 'his orientation of philosophy carries over into philosophy#s confrontation with
religion, that is the conflict between philosophy and revealed religion is a conflict over the best
way of life> a conflict between political philosophy and political theology. Meier underlines this
25
point through an interpretation of an unpublished lecture by Strauss where he develops what is in
effect a speculative account of the origin of monotheistic revealed religion.
,1:
&n addition, he
notes, as do other commentators, that Strauss pays particular attention to a line of interpretation
running through 3lfarabi, 3verroes, 3vicenna and Maimonides which stresses the political side
of theology and the theological side of political philosophy.
,1<
'he difference between Meier and other interpreters of Strauss is somewhat narrowed by
Meier#s acknowledgement that is it the very success of the modern political theological
enterprise that has relegated both philosophy and religion to the status or independent realms of
culture without public claim to affect the political or spiritual life of society. 'he theological
political enterprise is the alliance between philosophy and politics against religion that followed
a apoleonic strategy of bypassing rather than refuting the strong points of religion.
,1?
&nstead
of addressing the claims of religion to guide the search for the best political order, the
theological political enterprise created a new world in which religion was essentially a private
matter. 'he unintended conse%uence of the success of modern philosophy#s apoleonic strategy
is that philosophy too is relegated to the private sphere and political irrelevance.
*ike his fellow commentators on Strauss, Meier notes that without the challenge posed to
philosophy by revealed religion#s claim to be both the guide to truth and the source of the
commands that order the good political community, philosophy is in danger of misunderstanding
itself. /Uor Strauss, a criti%ue of modernity (of culture) must take place via a (new) theological2
political treatise.0
,1A
$erhaps this is itself a productive tension between philosophy and religion,
though Meier#s claim that Strauss plays up the strengths of religion only exoterically seems to
undermine the possibility of religion being one of the fundamental alternatives that support the
idea of philosophy as !etetic.
&n Strauss#s analysis it is precisely the apoleonic strategy of evasion that allows
religious longings to take root in philosophy and this is the key to his third criti%ue of
Heidegger, so everything rests on this analysis. &n the remainder of this section, & want to raise a
few %uestions about Strauss#s analysis of the theological, political enterprise. & want to
emphasi!e that this discussion does not even begin to settle the %uestion of how much weight to
grant to Strauss#s theologico2political problem: it does however indicate a number of not
insignificant problems that a full defense of Strauss#s views would have to overcome.
26
Uirst, Strauss#s analysis of religion as political theology notoriously takes as its
predecessors &slamic and ^ewish thinkers, thinkers immersed in religious traditions where
revealed religion takes the form of law. &t is a commonplace that 4hristian thought is more akin
to philosophy than law and this immediately raises the %uestion of whether Strauss#s analysis of
the centrality of political theology to the crisis of the modern "est is correct: what is the place
of political rule in the 4hristian understanding of community. 'he following brief account does
no more than highlight some of the difficulties of understanding the relation of political rule and
religious authority as Strauss does on the basis of a sort of political theology.
'he paradigmatic account of the relation of relation between political rule and the
4hristian community is formulated by $ope @elasius & and based upon St. $aul#s formulation of
that community as the cor#us mysticum, the mystical body of 4hrist and the collective social
organi!ation of that community. &n $aul#s original formulation, carried over by @elasius, the
members of the community are differentiated by the charismata (the gifts of grace), but political
power or temporal rule is specifically identified as not charismatic and the ruler is excluded from
the community, the ruler is exousia. 'he @elasian formulation is designed to distinguish the
place of political rule in the broader 4hristian community from the =oman tradition of the
$ontifex Maximus, the Hellenistic concept of sacred kingship and the By!antine practice of
4aeseropapism, prime examples of political theology.
'he @elasian tradition is transformed with the translatio im#eri whereby the mantle of
=ome is passed on the Urankish kingdom of 4harlemagne at which time political rule is
recogni!ed as charismatic. But even after this change, the philosophy of political rule never
reverts to the patterns of political theology that @elasius sought to distinguish it from. 'he
medieval concept of the sacrum im#erium, while acknowledging that the Wmperor rules by the
grace of @od, maintains a strict differentiation between temporal and spiritual. 'he $ope and
the Wmperor rule -ointly without ever collapsing the difference between political and theological
authority.
,1C
"hile the concept of the sacrum im#erium suffers a variety of practical vicissitudes,
including the tendency of medieval kings to increase their independence from the $apacy by
modeling themselves as theocratic monarchs and the tendency of the 4hurch itself, through its
extensive holdings toward practical power [ a sort of $apalcaeserism [ the idea of a balance
between temporal and spiritual authority is never completely lost and constantly reasserts itself
27
throughout the Middle 3ges. &t is only with the fracturing of the universality of 4hristianity
with the =eformation that it is lost, as the idea of secular authority develops and replaces the
idea of temporal rule.
&t is at this point in early modernity, that Strauss suggests there is an alliance between
politics and philosophy to relegate religion to the private realm, yet the immediate result of the
collapse of the sacrum im#erium was the rise of the national churches. 'oynbee and _oegelin,
for example, both analy!e the collapse of the characteristically "estern idea of the sacrum
im#erium, in early modern Wurope as a loss of civili!ational substance and a reversion to an
earlier and lower pattern of church and state relations. =ather than an alliance between
philosophy and politics, the historical pattern can, perhaps with more -ustification, be interpreted
as an alliance between church and state, a /reemerging of the 4hurch into an undifferentiated
/totalitarian0 social order of the primitive kind.0
,9D
'his reemergence of something more closely
resembling Hellenic sacred kingship than the medieval "estern ideal of the sacrum im#erium is
in turn shattered by the proliferation of sects as non2conformists undermine the national
churches. 'here seems less of a role for the alliance between philosophy and political society in
this analysis than Strauss re%uires for his theologico2political account.
Second, Strauss maintains that the tension between 4hristianity and philosophy,
particularly ancient @reek philosophy, characteri!es the "est. Much turns here on what exactly
is understood by /the "est.0 &t is worth noting that most historians and many political
philosophers concerned with the idea of civili!ations take the fourth and fifth century migrations
of the @ermanic tribes into what was then the =oman empire as the founding event of the "est
and identify the conversion of these tribes to 4hristianity as a critical moment in the
differentiation of the "est from predecessor civili!ations.
,9,
6n this view, the "est is 4hristian
to its core and the revivals of @reek thought remain intrusions from an affiliated, but
fundamentally separate civili!ation. 6n this view, rather than being the vital nerve of the "est,
the tension between religion and philosophy may well be the point at which the destruction of
the spiritual substance of the "est begins.
Uinally, it is difficult to know what weight to attach to Strauss#s unpublished speculative
account of the emergence of monotheistic revealed religion which Meier has published and
analy!ed with such insight. "hat are we to make of the fact that Strauss chose not to pursue and
28
publish these reflectionsB "hile his account compares favorably with many other speculative
accounts of religion, Ureud#s one dimensional account in The &uture of an /llusion springs
immediately to mind, there are other contenders with insights of their own, such as 8urkheim#s
Elementary &orms of ,eligious %ife. &f the theologico2political problem is to bear the weight that
it Strauss#s account of modernity seems to re%uire of it, much more needs to be said than Strauss
ever ventured.
'his discussion of the theologico2political problem has done little to advance the
comparison of alternate visions of philosophy outlined at the end of section four of this paper.
&nsofar as Strauss#s account of the nature of philosophy as !etetic is supposed to be supported by
his analysis of the theologico2political problem, there are fundamental %uestions about both the
theoretical and practical relations between religion and politics in the "est that remain
unaddressed.
<. 4onclusion
& have argued that Strauss#s criti%ues of Heidegger fail to show that historicity is an
incoherent idea and that Strauss#s alternative history and conception of philosophy, while casting
a critical light on elements of Heidegger#s thought are not without their own problems. 'his is
not, however, to claim that historicity can be immediately applied in political theory. 'he
%uestion of whether seinsgeschicklich thought can really be practical is a staple of criticisms of
Heidegger.
,9.
'he complaint is that there is no obvious way to connect Heidegger+s history of
Being with what we ordinarily understand as political or social history. Heidegger is arguing
that there is a type of thought, different from the causal analysis of history that is essential to
authentic existence. 3nd he believes that because this is so our understanding of action and of
ethics will re%uire a rethinking. But Heidegger does not undertake these tasks, providing at most
hints about the direction in which such an undertaking would proceed. 'his raises the %uestion
of the relevance of his work to political theory.
Uor this reason & have approached Heidegger#s thought by way of the criti%ue of
historicism and the %uestion of how, by being a constantly renewed venture, philosophy can
29
offer a cure to modernity#s historical sickness. Strauss#s concern with both issues attests to their
relevance to political philosophy. &t is worthwhile asking whether Strauss#s criti%ue of radical
historicism succeeds, and political theory ought to be interested in the nature of philosophical
thought. Uinally, the comparison of Strauss and Heidegger is interesting on its own merits.
"hile a consideration of Strauss#s explicit criti%ue of Heidegger may be far from exhausting the
possibilities of such a comparison, it is the place to start.
30
1
. Steven B. Smith, ,eading %eo Strauss0 *olitics1 *hiloso#hy1 2udaism (4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, .DD<)>
Heinrich Meier, *eo Strauss and the 'heologico2$olitical $roblem, trans. Marcus Brainard (4ambridge: 4ambridge
7niversity $ress, .DD<)> 4atherine ;uckert and Michael ;uckert, 'he 'ruth about *eo Strauss: $olitical $hilosophy `
3merican 8emocracy (4hicago, 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, .DD<)> 'homas *. $angle, %eo Strauss0 $n /ntroduction to
his Thought and /ntellectual %egacy (Baltimore: ^ohns Hopkins 7niversity $ress, .DD<)> Wugene =. Sheppard, %eo
Strauss and the *olitics of Exile0 The (aking of a *olitical *hiloso#her ("altham, Massachusetts: Brandeis 7niversity
$ress, .DD<) and 8aniel 'anguay, %eo Strauss0 $n /ntellectual Biogra#hy(ew Haven: Vale 7niversity $ress, .DD?)
trans. 4hristopher adon.
2
. Since Heidegger comes to speak of the end of philosophy it may seem mistaken to say that he is concerned to restore
the dignity of something called philosophy. &n most of his works, however, Heidegger is happy to use the term, although
it always means something different from philosophy as traditionally practised. 'hroughout this paper philosophy for
Heidegger will carry the sense of augenblicklich or seinsgeschicklich thought, a type of thinking that concerns Heidegger
throughout his lifelong pursuit of the %uestion of Being.
3
. Uriedrich iet!sche, 56n the 7ses and 8isadvantages of History for *ife,5 in 3ntimely (editations, trans. =. ^.
Hollingdale (4ambridge: 4ambridge 7niversity $ress, ,CA1), pp. :C2,.1.
4
. /bid., p. ??. &talics in the original.
5
. /bid., pp. ,.D2,.
6
. Uriedrich iet!sche, Thus S#oke 4arathustra, trans. =. ^. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: $enguin Books, ,C<,), pp.
.1.2.1A, 5'he 4onvalescent.5
7
. See =obert $ippin+s excellent article 5&rony and 3ffirmation in iet!sche+s Thus S#oke 4arathustra,5 in Michael 3llen
@illespie and 'racy B. Strong eds. +ietzsche5s +ew Seas (4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,CAA), pp. 9:2?,.
8
. Uor a discussion of the dual problems of knowingadoing and existenceameaning in iet!sche that relates them to
@adamer and Heidegger see @ianni _attimo+s essay 5Hermeneutical =easona 8ialectical =eason,5 in The $d)enture of
Difference0 *hiloso#hy after +ietzsche and !eidegger, trans. 4yprian Blamires (4ambridge: $olity $ress, ,CC1), pp. C21C.
9
. 6n the influence of iet!sche on Strauss see *awrence *ampert, %eo Strauss and +ietzsche (4hicago: 7niversity of
4hicago $ress, ,CC<), esp. pp. :2.9. Strauss has been accused of being a secret iet!schean by Shadia 8rury, The
*olitical /deas of %eo Strauss (*ondon: St. Martin+s $ress, ,CAA) and $eter *evine, +ietzsche and the (odern 'risis of
the !umanities (3lbany: State 7niversity of ew Vork $ress, ,CC:), pp. ,:.2C, but neither successfully makes the case
that Strauss+s attempted revival of classical political thought is purely exoteric.
10
. *eo Strauss, What is *olitical *hiloso#hy6 (4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,C:C), pp. C129.
11
. _ictor @ourevitch, 5$hilosophy and $olitics &&,5 ,e)iew of (eta#hysics .. (,C<A): .A,21.:, pp. 1.92:.
12
. @ourevitch puts the point nicely. 3fter citing Strauss+s comment in 7n Tyranny that both he and Xo-Yve 5a##ear to
turn our attention away from Being and toward tyranny5 (p. .,., emphasis added) @ourevitch notes that Strauss both
5alerts us to the importance of the problem of Being and warns us not to expect an ade%uate discussion of it.5
5$hilosophy and $olitics &&,5 p. .A,.
13
. *eo Strauss, +atural ,ight and !istory (4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,C:D), pp. ?2A.
14
. *eo Strauss, 7n Tyranny, =evised and Wxpanded Wdition, ed. _ictor @ourevitch and Michael S. =oth (ew Vork: 'he
Uree $ress, ,CC,), p. ,C<. 3lso see *eo Strauss, The ,ebirth of 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism (4hicago: 7niversity of
4hicago $ress, ,CAC), pp. .C21D> +atural ,ight and !istory, p. 1.> "hat is *olitical *hiloso#hy6, pp. .9, C129> and
Studies in *latonic *olitical *hiloso#hy (4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,CA1), pp. 1<2?.
'he %uestion of how Strauss proposes to support the revival of classical political philosophy is admittedly a
controversial one. 'here are appeals to the idea of an ordered whole of which the human soul is both a part and a
reflection, as well as an appeal to the natural consciousness of such an order, throughout Strauss+s works. But Strauss
does not attempt to defend these assumptions of order in such a way as to suggest that they form the foundation for his
retrieval of natural right. or, & believe, could they form such a foundation. See the discussions in _ictor @ourevitch,
5$hilosophy and $olitics &&5> =obert $ippin, 5'he Modern "orld of *eo Strauss,5 *olitical Theory .D (,CC.): 99A2?.>
Stanley =osen, !ermeneutics as *olitics (6xford: 6xford 7niversity $ress, ,CA?), pp. ,D?2,9D> and =ichard Xennington,
5Strauss+s +atural ,ight and !istory,5 ,e)iew of (eta#hysics 1: (,CA,): :?2A<.
15
. Strauss, What is *olitical *hiloso#hy6, p. C,.
16
. Martin Heidegger, The (eta#hysical &oundations of %ogic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: &ndiana 7niversity
$ress, ,CA9), p. ,,.
17
. /bid., pp. ,::2<.
18
. ^brgen @ebhardt, 5*eo Strauss: 'he Zuest for 'ruth in 'imes of $erplexity,5 in $eter @raf Xielmansegg, Horst
Mewes, and Wlisabeth @laser2Schmidt eds., !annah $rendt and %eo Strauss0 German Emigr8s and $merican *olitical
Thought $fter World War // (4ambridge: 4ambridge 7niversity $ress, ,CC:), p. AC.
19
. 3s this paragraph suggests there are many areas of Heidegger#s and Strauss#s thought that could be profitably
compared. &n concentrating on Strauss#s criti%ue of historicity and the %uestion of how philosophy can be the continually
renewed venture that both Strauss and Heidegger take it to be, & do not wish to suggest that this is the only basis on which
one might prefer the thought of Strauss to that of Heidegger. Uor a comparison of Strauss and Heidegger on $lato see
4atherine ;uckert, *ostmodern *latos (4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,CC<).
20
. 3 recent example of this identification of Strauss and Heidegger is *uc Uerry, *olitical *hiloso#hy 90 ,ights - The
+ew :uarrel Between the $ncients and the (oderns, trans. Uranklin $hilip (4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,CCD),
pp. 129, ,A2.,.
21
. 'wo recent examples of this approach to the relationship between Heidegger and Strauss, both of which take Strauss+s
side of the argument, are Steven B. Smith, 5Destruktion or =ecovery: *eo Strauss+s 4riti%ue of Heidegger,5 ,e)iew of
(eta#hysics :, (,CC?): 19:2??, and Horst Mewes, 5*eo Strauss and Martin Heidegger: @reek 3nti%uity and the Meaning
of Modernity,5 in Xielmansegg, !annah $rendt and %eo Strauss, pp. ,D:2,.D.
22
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, (4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,CAC)> also see What is *olitical
*hiloso#hy6, p. .9<.
23
. Strauss, What is *olitical *hiloso#hy6, p. .9,.
24
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, p. 1D> What is *olitical *hiloso#hy6, p. .?.
25
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, pp. 1D2,> *latonic *olitical *hiloso#hy, p. 1D.
26
. Strauss, +atural ,ight and !istory, p. ..
27
. 'he former was originally published in /nter#retation in ,C?,. 'he latter is an unpublished piece put together from a
student transcript of a recording of a talk and supplemented by other unpublished notes. See 'homas $angle+s comments
on this piece in his &ntroduction to 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, p. xxix. &n +atural ,ight and !istory, pp. ..21:,
Strauss criti%ues a position he calls radical or existential historicism, a position whose central thesis is /prepared by
iet!sche.0 (p..<) &t is likely that Heidegger is the intended target of these remarks. 'he structure of Strauss#s argument
here is similar to that of the two essays considered in the body of this paper. Historicism is a thesis about the historically
imposed limitations on human 7nderstanding which leads to relativism unless supplemented by the insight gained in an
absolute moment. Similarly in his exchange with @adamer over the latter#s book Truth and (ethod Strauss argues that
historicism is an incoherent relativism unless it invokes an absolute moment. *eo Strauss and Hans2@eorg @adamer,
/4orrespondence 4oncerning Wahrheit und (ethode: *eo Strauss and Hans2@eorg @adamer,0 /nde#endent 2ournal of
*hiloso#hy . (,C?A)::2,.. 3lso see 4arl $age, /Historicist Uinitude and $hilosophical Hermeneutics,0 The *hiloso#hy of
!ans-Georg Gadamer, ed. *ewis Wdwin Hahn (4hicago: 6pen 4ourt, ,CC?), pp. 1<C21A9 and Hans2@eorg @adamer,
/=eply to 4arl $age,0 in the same volume, pp. 1A:21A?.
28
. Uor example, ;uckert and ;uckert, The Truth about %eo Strauss1 p. C9, ,D,and Meier, %eo Strauss and the Theologico-
*olitical *roblem1 p. ::.
29
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, pp. 1:21<, 1C, 9.> *latonic *olitical *hiloso#hy, p. 11.
30
. Strauss, *latonic *olitical *hiloso#hy, p. 1D.
31
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, p. 1..
32
. /bid., p. 19.
33
. /bid., p. 1<.
34
. /bid., p. 1A.
35
. /bid., p. 1?.
36
. /bid.
37
. /bid., pp. 1.2:.
38
. Strauss, +atural ,ight and !istory, pp. C21:.
39
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, pp. .A2C> *latonic *olitical *hiloso#hy, p. 1,.
40
. 8avid 4arr, *henomenology and the *roblem of !istory (Wvanston: orthwestern 7niversity $ress, ,C?9), pp. .?211.
&t is a point of contention in the literature on Husserl whether Xant or 8escartes is the great original whom Husserl
follows, but this debate concerns not the constitution of ob-ectivity by a transcendental sub-ect, but the %uestion of
whether that sub-ectivity is primarily active or passive. 'his point is not crucial to my discussion of Strauss.
41
. Strauss, *latonic *olitical *hiloso#hy, p. 1,.
42
. /bid.
43
. Martin Heidegger, Sein und 4eit, 'welfth Wdition ('bbingen: Max iemeyer _erlag, ,C?.), p. 91?. Both translations
of Sein und 4eit 2 Being and Time, trans. ^ohn Mac%uarrie and Wdward =obinson (ew Vork: Harper ` =ow, ,C<.) and
Being and Time, trans. ^oan Stambaugh (3lbany: State 7niversity of ew Vork $ress, ,CC<) 2 contain the page numbers
of the @erman edition so & have cited only these. Uor the most part & have followed Stambaugh+s translation.
44
. Hans2@eorg @adamer, Truth and (ethod, Second =evised Wdition, trans. ^oel "einsheimer and 8onald @. Marshall
(ew Vork: 4rossroads $ublishing, ,CC.), p. .:?. @adamer+s discussion of the relation of Heidegger+s hermeneutical
phenomenology to Husserl+s transcendental phenomenology (pp. .:92A) is enlightening.
45
. Martin Heidegger, Basic :uestions of *hiloso#hy0 ;Selected; *roblems of ;%ogic;, trans. =ichard =o-cewic! and
3ndrc Schuwer (Bloomington: &ndiana 7niversity $ress, ,CC9), p. ,.D.
46
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, pp. 1?, 1A2C> *latonic *olitical *hiloso#hy, p. 1..
47
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, p. 1A.
48
. /bid.
49
. /bid.
50
. /bid., p. 1C.
51
. See Hegel+s remarks on 54ritical $hilosophy5 in paragraphs 9D2<D of @. ". U. Hegel, The Encyclo#edia %ogic, trans.
'. U. @aerts, ". 3. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (&ndianapolis: Hackett $ublishing, ,CC,), pp. AD2,DA.
52
. Martin Heidegger, ant and the *roblem of (eta#hysics, Uifth Wdition, trans. =ichard 'aft (Bloomington: &ndiana
7niversity $ress, ,CC?), p. ,?..
53
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, p. .C.
54
. /bid., p. 9D> *latonic *olitical *hiloso#hy, pp. 1.21.
55
. 6n Xo-Yve see $atrick =iley, 53n &ntroduction to the =eading of 3lexandre Xo-Yve,5 *olitical Theory C (,CA,): :29A>
_incent 8escombes, (odern &rench *hiloso#hy, trans. *. Scott2Uox and ^. M. Harding (4ambridge: 4ambridge
7niversity $ress, ,CAD)> and Michael S. =oth nowing and !istory0 $##ro#riations of !egel in Twentieth-'entury
&rance (&thaca: 4ornell 7niversity $ress, ,CAA). 3 valuable corrective to Xo-Yve+s reading of Hegel+s historicism is
Urederick 4. Beiser, 5Hegel+s Historicism,5 in Urederick 4. Beiser ed., The 'ambridge 'om#anion to !egel (4ambridge:
4ambridge 7niversity $ress, ,CC1), pp. .?D21DD.
56
. Strauss, *latonic *olitical *hiloso#hy, p. 11.
57
. Martin Heidegger, 5'he 3ge of the "orld $icture,5 in The :uestion 'oncerning Technology and 7ther Essays, trans.
"illiam *ovitt (ew Vork: Harper ` =ow, ,C??), p. ,1?.
58
. 6tto $dggeler, 5+Historicity+ in Heidegger+s *ater "ork,5 Southwestern 2ournal of *hiloso#hy 9 (,C?1): :12?1. 3lso
see Xarl *dwith, 58asein =esolute 7nto &tself, and Being "hich @ives &tself,5 in (artin !eidegger and Euro#ean
+ihilism, ed. =ichard "olin, trans. @ary Steiner (ew Vork: 4olumbia 7niversity $ress, ,CC:), pp. 112<A. =ecently the
view that Being and Time is an anthropological misstep on the way to the antihumanist later works has been developed in
Urance. ^ac%ues 8errida, 7f S#irit0 !eidegger and the :uestion, trans. @eoffrey Bennington and =achel Bowlby
(4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,CAC) and $hilippe *acoue2*abarthe, !eidegger1 $rt and *olitics, trans. 4hris
'urner (6xford: Basil Blackwell, ,CCD) argue that Heidegger+s early work was still in the grip of a humanism that misled
him into supporting the a!is in ,C1129. 'hey suggest that the later Heidegger overcomes this element of his early
thought. Uor a criti%ue of this view as a mere tactical reaction to the Heidegger controversy see 'om =ockmore,
!eidegger and &rench *hiloso#hy0 !umanism1 $ntihumanism and Being (*ondon: =outledge, ,CC:), pp. ,:C2<..
59
. Martin Heidegger, 7n Time and Being, trans. ^oan Stambaugh (ew Vork: Harper ` =ow, ,C?.), p. C.
60
. /bid.
61
. /bid.
62
. 6n @erman historical thought see @eorg &ggers, The German 'once#tion of !istory0 The +ational Tradition of
!istorical Thought from !erder to the *resent, rev. ed. (Middletown: "esleyan 7niversity $ress, ,CA1). 3lso of interest
is the same author+s 5Historicism: 'he History and Meaning of the 'erm,5 2ournal of the !istory of /deas :< (^anuary,
,CC:): ,.C2,:., and Urit! X. =inger, The Decline of the German (andarins0 The German $cademic 'ommunity1
9<=>-9=?? (4ambridge: Harvard 7niversity $ress, ,C<C). @ood accounts of Heidegger+s position in, and reaction to, the
@erman tradition of philosophical thought about history are found in ^effrey 3ndrew Barash, (artin !eidegger and the
*roblem of !istorical (eaning (8ordrecht: Martinus i-hoff, ,CAA), and 4harles =. Bambach, !eidegger1 Dilthey1 and
the 'risis of !istoricism (&thaca: 4ornell 7niversity $ress, ,CC:).
63
. 'heodore Xisiel, The Genesis of !eidegger5s Being and Time (Berkeley: 7niversity of 4alifornia $ress, ,CC1) contains
a thorough account of Heidegger+s early lecture courses. &n addition to Xisiel and the Bambach and Barash works already
cited, 6tto $dggeler, (artin !eidegger5s *ath of Thinking, trans. 8aniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (3tlantic
Highlands, Humanities $ress, ,CA?) and Hans =uin, Enigmatic 7rigins0 Tracing the Theme of !istoricity Through
!eidegger5s Works (Xarlshamn: 3lm%uist ` "iksell, ,CC9) contain useful discussions of the pre2Being and Time works.
64
. Xisiel, The Genesis of !eidegger5s Being and Time, p. ,9:. 'he contrast between ob-ect2historical and actuali!ation2
historical is first made by Heidegger in his comments on Xarl ^asper+s *sychology of World)iews. 'hese comments were
distributed by Heidegger in ,C.,. 3lso see Martin Heidegger, The 'once#t of Time, trans. "illiam Mceill (6xford:
Blackwell, ,CC.), p. ,C.
65
. $dggeler, (artin !eidegger5s *ath of Thinking, p. ,?.
66
. Heidegger, Sein und 4eit, p. 1A..
67
. "illiam 8. Blattner, 5Wxistential 'emporality in Being and Time,5 in !eidegger0 $ 'ritical ,eader, eds. Hubert
8reyfus and Harrison Hall (6xford: Basil Blackwell, ,CC.), pp. CC2,.C and =uin, Enigmatic 7rigins both argue that
Heidegger is attempting to establish original temporality as a transcendental hori!on. 'hey differ on whether this effort is
successful or not, and draw %uite different conclusions from their analyses.
68
. 6n this point see 8aniel 8ahlstrom+s important article 5Heidegger+s 4oncept of 'emporality: =eflections on a =ecent
4riticism,5 ,e)iew of (eta#hysics 9C (,CC:): C:2,,:.
69
. Heidegger, Sein und 4eit, pp. 1.?2A.
70
. /bid., p. 1.A. &talics in the original.
71
. /bid., p. .11.
72
. /bid., p. .<..
73
. /bid., p. 1,,.
74
. /bid., pp. 199, 19?, 1?,, 1A<, 1C,, 9,D, 9.:, 9.?.
75
. Martin Heidegger, The &undamental 'once#ts of (eta#hysics0 World1 &initude1 Solitude, trans. "illiam Mceill and
icholas "alker (Bloomington: &ndiana 7niversity $ress, ,CC:), p. ,:D. &talics in the original.
76
. Heidegger, Sein und 4eit, p. 1A:.
77
. /bid., p. 1A:. 7p to the discussion of repetition of a heritage in section ?9 Heidegger+s discussion of historicity has
moved entirely within the terms established by anticipatory resoluteness. 3s anticipation (or being2toward2death)
corresponds to the future and resoluteness (or being2guilty) corresponds to the past, this is e%uivalent to saying that the
discussion has moved within the terms established in the analysis of existential temporality. 6nly with repetition does the
5included5 dimension of time, the authentic present, come into its own. 'his supports the argument that historicity and
not existential temporality is the more fundamental concept.
78
. /bid., pp. 1C.29> also Heidegger, Basic :uestions of *hiloso#hy, pp. 1.2:, 9:2:,.
79
. 6n the idea of a temporally enriched or filled present see =obert ^. 8ostal, 5'ime and $henomenology in Husserl and
Heidegger,5 in 4harles @uignon ed., The 'ambridge 'om#anion to !eidegger (4ambridge: 4ambridge 7niversity $ress,
,CC1), pp. ,9,2,<C.
80
. 3 good discussion relating the ecstases of time to order and -ustice is found in Ured 8allmayr, The 7ther !eidegger
(&thaca: 4ornell 7niversity $ress, ,CC1), pp. ,,C2.:.
81
. Heidegger, Sein und 4eit, p. 1A:.
82
. 'his is a conclusion advanced by both 8avid 4ou!ens Hoy, 5History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and
Time,5 in Michael Murray ed., !eidegger and (odern *hiloso#hy (ew Haven: Vale 7niversity $ress, ,C?A), pp. 1.C2:1,
and Xarsten Harries, 5Heidegger as a $olitical 'hinker,5 in the same volume, pp. 1D92.A.
83
. =ichard "olin in The *olitics of Being (ew Vork: 4olumbia 7niversity $ress, ,CCD), p. <., finds that Being and
Time contains a voluntaristic decisionism, and harbours 5certain fatalistic tendencies.5 &talics in the original. *acoue2
*abarthe, !eidegger1 $rt and *olitics, p. 91 finds historicity to be 5rigorously Xantian5 and a 5structural matrix5 and as
such neutral between possible choices. 4harles @uignon, 5History and 4ommitment in the Warly Heidegger,5 in 8reyfus
and Hall eds., !eidegger0 $ 'ritical ,eader, pp. ,1D29.> and 4hristopher Uynsk, !eidegger0 Thought and !istoricity
(&thaca: 4ornell 7niversity $ress, ,CC1), p. 9?, argue that the choice of oneself amounts to nothing more than affirming
one+s thrownness.
84
. &n What is 'alled Thinking6, trans. ^. @lenn @ray (ew Vork: Harper ` =ow, ,C<A), p. ?C, Heidegger describes this
belonging together as follows. 5"e ask what the relation is between man+s nature and the Being of beings. But as soon
as & thoughtfully say +man+s nature,+ & have already said relatedness to Being. *ikewise, as soon as & say thoughtfully:
Being of beings, the relatedness to man+s nature has been named. Wach of the two members of the relation between man+s
nature and Being already implies the relation itself. 'o speak to the heart of the matter: there is no such thing here as
members of the relation, nor the relation as such.5 &n 5'he $rinciple of &dentity,5 in /dentity and Difference, trans. ^oan
Stambaugh (ew Vork: Harper ` =ow, ,C<C), pp. .?, 9:, Heidegger remarks that 5thinking and Being belong to the
Same5 and the same 5is not merely the identical.5
85
. Heidegger, Sein und 4eit, p. ,11.
86
. /bid., pp. 1:D2,.
87
. Martin Heidegger, !istory of the 'once#t of Time0 *rolegomena, trans. 'heodore Xisiel (Bloomington: &ndiana
7niversity $ress, ,CA:), p. .1<.
88
. 6n the double transcendence see the discussion of the two meanings of #hysis in Martin Heidegger, $n /ntroduction to
(eta#hysics, trans. =alph Manheim (ew Haven: Vale 7niversity $ress, ,C:C), p. ,A.. Uor a fascinating discussion of
what it means for human beings to be in the middle, the between of the double transcendence, see "illiam 8esmond,
Being and the Between (3lbany: State 7niversity of ew Vork $ress, ,CC:). 3lthough 8esmond is explicitly hostile to
Heidegger+s Seinsgeschichte, & believe that his sense of the between is, if not shaped by, at least compatible with, the
Heidegger of Being and Time.
89
. Heidegger, Basic :uestions of *hiloso#hy, p. 9<.
90
. /bid., p. ,,..
91
. 6n the difference between Verwindung and @berwindung, or the way that Heidegger believes that seinsgeschicklich
thought takes up the past without overcoming it, see @ianni _attimo, the End of (odernity0 +ihilism and !ermeneutics
in *ostmodern 'ulture, trans. ^on =. Snyder (Baltimore: ^ohns Hopkins 7niversity $ress, ,CAA), pp. ,?,2<.
92
. Martin Heidegger, The *rinci#le of ,eason, trans. =eginald *illy (Bloomington: &ndiana 7niversity $ress, ,CC,), p.
C,.
93
. Heidegger, Basic :uestions of *hiloso#hy, p. AD.
94
. /bid., pp. ,9A2C.
95
. /bid., p. <9.
96
. /bid.
97
. /bid., p. ?9.
98
. $roductive seeing is a 5seeing which in the very act of seeing compels what is seen before it.5 /bid., p. ?<.
99
. /bid., p. C?.
100
. /bid., p. ,D?.
101
. /bid., p. ,,..
102
. /bid., pp. ,992?.
103
. /bid., p. ,<D. &talics in the original.
104
. /bid.
105
. "erner Marx, /s There a (easure on Earth6, trans. 'homas ^. enon and =eginald *illy (4hicago: 7niversity of
4hicago $ress, ,CA?), pp. 1C29., ,.C29<.
106
. Heidegger, Basic :uestions of *hiloso#hy, p. C<.
107
. /bid., p. ,DA.
108
. Smith, ,eading %eo Strauss1 pp. ,DA2C.
109
. /bid.1 p. ,,D.
110
. /bid.1 pp. ,,:2<.
111
. /bid.1 p. ,,,.
112
. /bid.1 p. ,,<.
113
. /bid.1 pp. ,,<2?.
114
. ;uckert and ;uckert, The Truth about %eo Strauss1 p. C?.
115
. Smith, ,eading %eo Strauss1 p. ,.,.
116
. $angle, %eo Strauss1 pp..<21..
117
. Smith, ,eading %eo Strauss1 p. ,.D. "hile not crucial to the analysis here, these claims about the natural attitude
remain problematic. Uor example, the parable of the poor man#s lamb that athan relates to 8avid in && Samuel that
Strauss uses as one of the epigrams of +atural ,ight and !istory is thought to be a late interpolation in the 8avid and
Bathsheba story dating from the prophetic period. 'he parable introduces a moral that it simply had not occurred to the
original chroniclers of the political history of 8avid to draw. Uor an interesting discussion of this passage see Wric
_oegelin, 7rder and !istory1 Volume /0 /srael and ,e)elation ( Baton =ouge: *ouisiana State 7niversity $ress, ,C:<),
pp. .:C2<?.
118
. Smith, ,eading %eo Strauss1 p. ,...
119
. ;uckert and ;uckert, The Truth about %eo Strauss1 pp. ,:129.
120
. Strauss, +atural ,ight and !istory, pp. 1D21..
121
. /bid., p. 1..
122
. Strauss, 'lassical *olitical ,ationalism, p. 1D.
123
. Strauss, 7n Tyranny, p. ,C<.
124
. /bid.
125
. /bid.
126
. /bid.
127
. /bid.
128
. /bid.
129
. Smith, ,eading %eo Strauss1 pp. ,D2,:> ;uckert and ;uckert, The Truth about %eo Strauss1 pp. 1<29<> $angle, \ and
particularly Meier, %eo Strauss and the Theologico-*olitical *roblem.
130
.See Meier, %eo Strauss and the Theologico-*olitical *roblem1 p. 9?> ;uckert and ;uckert, The Truth about %eo
Strauss1 pp. C:2<.
131
. 3n clear and insightful account of the relation between Heidegger#s thought and 4hristian theology is ^ohn
Mac%uarrie, !eidegger and 'hristianity (ew Vork: 4ontinuum, ,CCC).
132
. Smith, ,eading %eo Strauss1 pp. .<21D.
133
. Strauss, What is *olitical *hiloso#hy1 p. 9D.
134
. Meier, %eo Strauss and the Theologico-*olitical *roblem1 pp. ..2.A.
135
. /bid.1 pp. ,9,2,AD. 'he Strauss lecture is entitled /=eason and =evelation0 and dates from ,C9A.
136
. ;uckert and ;uckert, The Truth about %eo Strauss1 pp. 1<29<> Meier, %eo Strauss and the Theologico-*olitical
*roblem1 ,.2,1.
137
. Meier, %eo Strauss and the Theologico-*olitical *roblem1 pp. C2,D.
138
. /bid.1 p. ,D.
139
. My account of the sacrum im#erium is taken from Wric _oegelin, !istory of *olitical /deas1 Volume //0 The (iddle
$ges to $Auinas (4olumbia: 7niversity of Missouri $ress, ,CC?), pp. :.2<: and Michael 6akeshott, %ectures in the
!istory of *olitical Thought (4harlottesville: &mprint 3cademic, .DD<) pp. .<<2C..
140
. 3rnold 'oynbee, $ Study of !istory1 Volume B (*ondon: 6xford 7niversity $ress, ,C:9), p. ?.D.
141
. _oegelin, !istory of *olitical /deas, pp. 9,2<:.
142
. Barash, (artin !eidegger and the *roblem of !istorical (eaning, pp. .9< ff., $ippin, (odernism as a *hiloso#hical
*roblem, pp. ,992,9?> 8avid Xolb, The 'ritiAue of *ure (odernity (4hicago 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,CA<), p. ,.<:
and Michael 3llen @illespie, !egel1 !eidegger1 and the Ground of !istory (4hicago: 7niversity of 4hicago $ress, ,CA9),
p. ,?,21.